

American Political Science Association

American Political Science Review

Volume 97 | Number 1 | February 2003

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

ARTICLES

- Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville's Township 7
Robert T. Gannett, Jr.
- James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty 17
Vincent Phillip Muñoz
- Unreconstructed Democracy: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Case for Reparations 30
Lawrie Balfour
- Black Opinion on the Legitimacy of Racial Redistricting and
Minority-Majority Districts 41
Katherine Tate
- No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder since 1955 51
Barbara Harff
- Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War 71
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin
- Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy 91
E. Spencer Wellhofer
- The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia 101
Debra Javeline
- The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States 121
Branislav L. Slantchev
- Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles 131
Lars-Erik Cederman
- Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions 151
Bryan D. Jones, Tracy Sulkin, and Heather A. Larsen
- Coping with Uncertainty: Analyzing Risk Propensities of
SEC Budgetary Decisions, 1949–97 171
George A. Krause

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Subscription, Publishing, and Advertising Office Address: Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211; and (outside the United States, Canada, and Mexico) Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU, England.

Subscription Information: *American Political Science Review* (ISSN 0003-0554) is published quarterly in February, May, August, and November by Cambridge University Press for the American Political Science Association. Annual institutional electronic-only subscription rate (2003) is US\$392 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK £253 elsewhere. Annual institutional print-and-electronic subscription rate (2003) is US\$435 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK £280 elsewhere. Periodicals postage rate is pending at New York, NY and additional mailing offices. Institutional subscription orders and address changes should be sent to: *American Political Science Review*, Cambridge University Press, 110 Midland Avenue, Port Chester, NY 10573; USA.

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
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COR - 405477-10-RP3 865 (10)

American Political Science Review

Volume 97, Number 1, February 2003

Table of Contents



NOTES FROM THE EDITOR	
ARTICLES	
Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville's Township Robert T. Gannett, Jr.	1-16
James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty Vincent Phillip Muñoz	17-32
Unreconstructed Democracy: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Case for Reparations Lawrie Balfour	33-44
Black Opinion on the Legitimacy of Racial Redistricting and Minority-Majority Districts Katherine Tate	45-56
No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955 Barbara Harff	57-73
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin	75-90
Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy E. Spencer Wellhofer	91-106
The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia Debra Javeline	107-121
The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States Branislav L. Slantchev	123-133
Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles Lars-Erik Cederman	135-150
Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions Bryan D. Jones, Tracy Sulkin, and Heather A. Larsen	151-169
Coping with Uncertainty: Analyzing Risk Propensities of SEC Budgetary Decisions, 1949-97 George A. Krause	171-188

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Notes from the Editor

Welcome to the first-ever February issue of the *APSR*, which, by no coincidence, is also our first book reviewless issue. As indicated in prior "Notes from the Editor," beginning with the first issue of Volume 97, the *APSR*'s cover dates now become February, May, August, and November, rather than the familiar March, June, September, and December. This change has been made to accommodate the APSA's new *Perspectives on Politics*, which will be published on a quarterly basis, with its inaugural issue appearing a month from now, in March 2003. Formerly bundled with the *APSR*, *PS* will now appear in your mailbox in January, April, July, and October; by now you should already have received the January 2003 issue. These changes have been necessitated by the complexities of publishing and distributing three quarterly journals rather than two.

The launch of *Perspectives on Politics* is also the reason why book reviews, a staple attraction of the *APSR* in decades past, do not appear in these pages. The book review operation is alive and well, but has emigrated to the new journal, in whose March 2003 issue it will reappear. The new challenge for the *APSR* is to claim, or to reclaim, the attention of those who in the past have opened up the *APSR*, if at all, to keep abreast of new books in their areas of interest. If that description fits you, then I invite you to take a few minutes to browse recent issues of the *APSR*, including this one. If you do, I am confident that you will find something (or, I strongly suspect, several things) well worth reading—and I hope that the exercise will prove habit-forming.

IN THIS ISSUE

In another departure from long-standing practice, the address of the immediate past President of the American Political Science Association does not appear as the lead article in this, the *APSR*'s first issue of the year. The reason is that the interested parties—Robert Putnam, the president who delivered the address, Jennifer Hochschild, the editor of *Perspectives on Politics*, and I—agreed that presidential addresses fall more within the purview of *Perspectives on Politics* than of the *APSR*. Accordingly, President Putnam's address is to appear in the June 2003 *Perspectives on Politics* rather than here, and in future years the addresses of Presidents Skocpol, Rudolph, and their successors will continue to be printed in *Perspectives on Politics*.

Putnam may be gone from this issue, but he is not forgotten. In our first article, Robert T. Gannett, Jr. addresses the distinctly Putnamian theme of civic engagement. In "Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville's Township," Gannett notes that many scholars, and most prominently Putnam, have drawn on Tocqueville to guide their interpretations of what they consider the distressingly low levels of political participation in the United States today. However, Gannett disputes a reading of Tocqueville as trumpeting the importance of a dense social network that breeds interpersonal

trust, energizing the populace and thereby breeding healthy democracy. That reading, Gannett argues, is not so much incorrect as it is incomplete, for it neglects the distinctly *political* origins of civic vitality. (Hence this issue's cover graphic: a township hall. As readers will soon see, though, that idyllic image is distinctly out of keeping with the sanguinary subject matter of several other articles in this issue, which deserve an "R" rating for violence.) Gannett's analysis not only clarifies the meaning of Tocqueville's work, but also serves as a superb example of how deep familiarity with political theory can enrich our understanding of important contemporary political processes.

An intriguing pairing with Gannett's reconsideration of Tocqueville is Vincent Phillip Muñoz's reconsideration of the thought of another icon, James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution." Proponents of sharply contrasting positions routinely cite Madison on a wide variety of issues, a tendency nowhere more evident than in disputes about the proper relationship between church and state. In "James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty," Muñoz contends that those who have tried to use Madison's teachings as a guide to the proper constitutional interpretation of church-state relations have consistently misunderstood Madison's position. According to Muñoz, Madison's guiding principle was that the Constitution is "religion-blind," and the implications of that principle for what constitutes an "establishment of religion" or the "free exercise thereof" turn out to differ dramatically from what Madison's interpreters of various schools of thought have urged. This is a genuinely interesting analysis that specialists and general readers alike will profit from reading, and one that could inform policy debates for decades to come.

Yet another influential figure whose analyses of key aspects of American politics and society have long outlived him was W.E.B. Du Bois, whose writings concentrated on "the problem of the color-line." In "Unreconstructed Democracy: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Case for Reparations," Lawrie Balfour addresses a question that "has gone largely unasked in American public life": "What does the United States owe the former slaves and their descendants?" While conceding that Du Bois himself would not necessarily endorse a campaign for reparations, Balfour nonetheless finds in Du Bois's analyses several bases for favoring reparations, or, at the very least, for giving the case for reparations a more serious hearing than it has heretofore received.

The likelihood of reparations may seem remote (indeed, Du Bois dismissed reparations as a pipedream), but other policies intended to ameliorate the long-term consequences of slavery and racial injustice are quite real. Race-conscious legislative redistricting and minority-majority districts have been a source of controversy in this country for two decades now, and no cessation of the controversy is yet in sight. In "Black Opinion on the Legitimacy of Racial Redistricting and Minority-Majority Districts," Katherine Tate uses this

controversy as a means, not only of understanding African Americans' opinions on this important policy issue, but more broadly of clarifying how citizens try to counterbalance competing principles and goals—in this case, a belief in “color-blind” policies, on the one hand, and a desire for greater minority representation, on the other.

The emphasis on conflict—among competing values and/or different groups—that runs through the first four articles in this issue of the *Review* plays out even more starkly in the next six articles. In “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” Barbara Harff identifies 35 cases of genocide or political mass murder (“politicide”), analyzes the conditions that gave rise to them, and, importantly, points to specific nations where these conditions are present today. Harff's research warrants serious attention from scholars interested in understanding why geno-/politicide occurs as well as from anyone who is concerned with preventing it.

Estimating the risk of another form of mass political violence, civil war, is the focus of James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin's “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” After identifying 127 civil wars during the post-World War II era, Fearon and Laitin observe that what puts countries at risk of civil violence is not ethnic or religious diversity, but rather a host of other conditions that give rise to insurgency (defined as a military conflict technology characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas). The conditions that favor insurgency, Fearon and Laitin establish, are “largely independent of cultural differences between groups and even group grievances.” This conclusion bears directly on the validity of widely held interpretations of the sources of political instability and violence, and—like the conclusions reached in several other articles in this issue—has major policy implications as well.

A different form of political transition comes under scrutiny in E. Spencer Wellhofer's “Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy.” Here the underlying question is how a political system can rapidly change from democracy to fascism—a question that has been extensively studied in the context of Weimar Germany. Analyzing Fascist voting patterns in Italy, 1919–1921, Wellhofer turns up evidence that directly contradicts a class-based interpretation and offers only mixed support for a “civil society”-based interpretation, but seems consistent with a rational choice-based interpretation. That is, Fascist electoral successes in Italy appear to have been most marked among those who stood to gain the most materially from the Fascist program—a pattern that Wellhofer chillingly characterizes as the “rational” appeal of fascism.

Similar questions motivate Debra Javeline's analysis of mass grievances and the potential for political protest in transitional Russia. The point of departure for “The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia” is the observation that when people are victims of severe hardship and injustice, their typical response is to suffer in silence. Only occasionally do

they protest, and when they do, political scientists seem unable to explain why they are acting in this unusual way. Javeline constructs an account that centers on the role of blame, the disarmingly simple idea being that discontent is unlikely to lead to protest unless specific wrong-doers can be identified against whom to protest. This idea performs nicely, Javeline finds, in the case of mass responses to the wage arrears crisis in Russia, and it holds out considerable promise, she argues, for broadening our understanding of various forms of collective action in Russia and elsewhere.

In Branislav L. Slantchev's “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” the spotlight stays on conflict but the scene shifts to the international arena. Slantchev's guiding question is why, given the enormous costs of a war, the combatants delay in reaching a settlement that would end it. The key distinction in his analysis is between a nation's ability to bear the costs of war and its ability to impose them, and the most intriguing result—reached via a sophisticated formal modeling exercise and enlivened by confrontation with several specific historical cases—is that each side will keep fighting as long as it maintains its ability to impose costs on the other side, i.e., as long as it has the “power to hurt” its enemy. As viewed from this perspective, the answer to the question of why nations continue to wreak damage on one another appears to be “Because they can.”

Of course, some wars inflict more casualties than others. Mercifully, while relatively minor skirmishes flare up regularly, particularly brutal wars with many casualties occur infrequently. This tendency has been well known to students of international conflict for more than a half a century, and is so consistently borne out in practice that it seems to be one of the rare instances in political science of the operation of something approaching an empirical law. However, as Lars-Erik Cederman points out in “Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles,” it is an “acute embarrassment” that scholars have generally ignored this lawlike behavior rather than trying to account for it. That is precisely the task that Cederman sets for himself. Employing an agent-based approach, and importing state-of-the-art theoretical advances from physics, Cederman provides an original and compelling theoretical explanation for the “power-law” distribution of war severity.

A certain resemblance in spirit and in substance to Cederman's analysis of wars is evident in Bryan D. Jones, Tracy Sulkin, and Heather A. Larsen's “Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions.” Here the phenomenon to be accounted for is the tendency of political institutions to produce long periods of policy stasis interrupted by sudden sharp breaks. Incrementalism may be the norm, but the real engine of dynamism comes as a “punctuation” that overcomes the normal “friction” or “stickiness” of political institutions. Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen integrate this interpretation theoretically and distill from it some straightforward statistical implications. They go on to demonstrate that these implications are indeed borne out in a wide array of political phenomena in the U.S., including election

results, media coverage patterns, legislative enactments, and budget outlays. Here, then, is a theoretical approach at once broad enough to encompass political phenomena that are typically treated in isolation from one another; concrete enough to yield specific, testable propositions; and powerful enough to produce accurate predictions.

The perils of producing accurate predictions motivate the final article in this issue. In "Coping with Uncertainty: Analyzing Risk Propensities of SEC Budgetary Decisions, 1949–97," George Krause notes that uncertainty permeates decision-making in all sectors of government. Focusing on one particular agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, Krause tests a model of budget requests, the key insight of which is that these requests provide agencies with a means of hedging against an uncertain future. Faced with uncertainty in its political environment and a consequent inability to anticipate the consequences of alternative courses of action, an agency should proceed cautiously, in a risk-averse manner. Krause's case study of the SEC yields evidence consistent with this interpretation, thus providing initial empirical support for a line of interpretation that should be expected to find broader applicability in research undertaken in a wide variety of decision-making contexts.

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The *APSR* strives to publish scholarly research of exceptional merit, focusing on important issues and demonstrating the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. Because the *APSR* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, authors must demonstrate how their analysis illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science. For the same reason, authors must strive for a presentation that will be understandable to as many scholars as possible, consistent with the nature of their material.

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Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville's Township

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Despite elevating Alexis de Tocqueville to iconic status in our national debate on civic engagement, we have frequently neglected the range and depth of his associational thought. In this essay, I trace the early manifestations and evolution from 1828 to 1840 of his understanding of the commune or township, a featured source of public participation and cohesion within his larger associational lexicon. I show how his reflections on local liberties, in general, and the New England township, in particular, inspired and helped to shape both volumes of his *Democracy in America*. I emphasize the degree to which Tocqueville saw the participatory vector originating in the township's political life as galvanizing an ardent civic spirit leading to cultural, intellectual, and economic achievements. I conclude by seeking to connect lessons gleaned from Tocqueville's township to contemporary strategies to strengthen citizen participation.

“Tocqueville was right,” Robert Putnam (1993, 182) proclaimed as he concluded his immense Italian studies by asserting that it was northern Italy's dense network of voluntary associations and its accumulated reservoir of social capital that deserved principal credit for producing effective democratic government there. Trumpeting his attention to the primacy of these “sociocultural factors” (11), Putnam seamlessly wove Tocqueville into the early conceptual frame of his own larger project, which has expanded during the past decade to encompass a series of works calling for a reappraisal of the very texture of day-to-day American civic life. “Making democracy work,” Putnam's now famous argument goes, requires the engagement (or reengagement in America's case) of citizens to the tasks of building (or rebuilding) thriving networks of social interaction and trust. By adverting Tocqueville's powerful imprimatur, Putnam has sought to enhance his theoretical argument and bolster his own “social capitalist” agenda.

Putnam's reading of Tocqueville is misleading. Of course Tocqueville makes a classic argument about the value of voluntary networks or associations in the early American republic—his comments on these matters are excerpted in anthologies of American political thought and cited with unabashed veneration by political and civic leaders alike, with President Bush only the latest in such a line of admirers (Bumiller 2002). But despite locating several of these evident features of Tocqueville's fertile and fervent associational topography, Putnam ignores or fails to grasp the larger forest within which Tocqueville's analysis is situated.

Tocqueville's analysis of American civic life, as we will see in this paper, is noteworthy for its consistently

political dimension, evident in his unswerving attention to a participatory vector that originated in the political life of the American township and then disseminated its own bracing vitality to civil society as a whole. Nor was Tocqueville's analysis of this dynamic exclusive to America. In 1836, after the publication of volume 1 of *Democracy in America*, he wrote his own analysis of the roots of civic engagement in northern Italy: Reading Machiavelli's *History of Florence*, Tocqueville (1989, 546) concluded that liberty as exhibited in “political passions” and revolutions, however turbulent it might have been, was a principal catalyst (“agent puissant”) for the Florentine republic's “extraordinary expansion” of the human spirit, its power and commercial riches, and its perfecting of the arts, sciences, and letters from 1245 to 1492. Twenty years later, in *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, Tocqueville ([1856] 2001, 243) analyzed the evisceration of French civil society that preceded and precipitated the French Revolution, memorably concluding that “when the Revolution broke out, one would have searched in vain in the greatest part of France for ten men who had the habit of acting in concert in a regular manner.” Based upon his ruminations during four and one-half years about the Revolution's causes, he finally fingered in his book the French monarchy as the principal culprit for French civic isolation, owing to its centuries-old tendency to suffocate local community life by absorbing local political responsibilities.

Tocqueville's associational topography is both more extensive and more nuanced than commentators have tended to recognize.¹ In *Democracy in America*,

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For their early encouragement and advice, I thank Clark Gilpin and David Tracy, leaders of the Brauer Seminar at the University of Chicago Divinity School where I presented an initial version of this essay in spring 1994. I am grateful to the late François Furet, who also commented upon that early paper, and Ralph Lerner, who read and notated each of its successive formulations, for their generous and sage oversight of my ensuing Tocquevillian studies. I also thank three anonymous reviewers and the editor of this journal for their comments and constructive criticisms.

¹ Besides Putnam, I have in mind analysts such as Skocpol, who sees Tocqueville as epitomizing “a zero-sum way of thinking that pits ‘state’ against ‘society’” (1997, 459) and who criticizes his consistent associational “romanticism” (1996, 23–24), and Mark E. Warren (2001, 32), who argues that Tocqueville's frame consists of a “relatively simple bipolar model of state–civil society relations.” Several commentators have provided thoughtful discussions seeking to clarify Tocqueville's subtle associational framework, among them Wudel (1993), Galston (2000), Fleischacker (1998, 308–10), Rosenblum (1998, 43–44), Whittington (1998, 21–32), and Encarnación (2001). Of these, Galston, Whittington, and Encarnación draw explicit attention to the common failure of contemporary civil society enthusiasts to grasp Tocqueville's political emphases. Fried (2002) cites additional areas in which she believes that Putnam neglects important aspects of Tocqueville's analysis and methodology.

Tocqueville carefully distinguished four principal forms of association: permanent, voluntary political, voluntary civic, and small private. He began by emphasizing America's "permanent associations created by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties"; he then separated these from more ephemeral, voluntary associations "that owe their birth and development only to individual will" (Tocqueville [1835 & 1840] 2000, 180; hereafter *DA*).² He proceeded to split his voluntary associations along a political/civic axis, with the former principally treated in volume 1 and the latter in volume 2. Leaders and members of such voluntary political and civic associations were driven by the very logic of potent democratic equality to cast their associational nets widely. In their desire to achieve lofty objectives with their organizations, they knew they had to garner broad membership on an often vast geographic scale. Their efforts thus differed in nature and scope from those of members of Tocqueville's fourth associational group—the host of small private associations that formed in democracies to allow residents "to taste the enjoyments of private life" (577). Tocqueville deferred treatment of such groups to volume 2, part 3, when he discussed less conscious, less voluntary, more natural "mores properly so-called." I do not include religious sects in Tocqueville's associational lexicon, since he did not refer to them as associations per se in either volume 1 or volume 2. Religion for Tocqueville underpinned democratic life in a host of largely indirect ways (Zuckert 1981); it did so by responding to human spiritual aspirations in a manner that restrained (volume 1) and elevated (volume 2) democratic men and women at precisely the points of democracy's greatest needs (Mitchell 1995, 5–11; Tinder 1999). By steering clear of democratic politics, religion made democratic politics possible. All four types of association also operated in spheres separate from that of the state and national governments that protected the homeland. Although these governments ensured the nation's political "*great liberty*" (Tocqueville 1977, 1:407–8), by themselves they were incapable of maintaining and renewing "the circulation of sentiments and ideas in a great people," owing to their ingrained tendency to dictate their wishes to the populace (*DA*, 491–92).³

To begin to grasp the multiple dimensions of Tocqueville's associational quadrant, I concentrate in this paper on one neglected aspect of it—the township. By tracing the trajectory of his township inves-

tigations through pre-American (1828–31), American (1831–32), and post-American (1832–40) phases, and by examining his expression of his findings in both volumes of *Democracy in America*, I hope to broaden our appreciation of the range and depth of his associational thought. To sharpen our understanding of the importance he ascribed to the political origins of American civic dynamism, I examine Habermas' and Arendt's own thoughtful responses to his arguments. Finally, I situate our Tocquevillian analysis within the context of contemporary debates about our nation's civic shortcomings. Remedial proposals have foundered, I believe, on the shoals of conceptual ambiguity, leading even a prestigious panel such as Putnam's Saguaro Seminar (2001, 79) to conclude its recent report by conflating town meeting attendance and running for public office with cookie baking and neighborhood barbecues, thus unintentionally trivializing the national "civic crisis" (6) to which it has sought to draw our attention. In my opinion, we simply cannot equate family picnics (Putnam 2000, 414) with various types of political engagement if we hope to make our democracy work. But at the very least, if we insist upon doing so, we should remove Alexis de Tocqueville as an expert witness or national cheerleader for this saccharine project.

TOCQUEVILLE'S INTRODUCTION TO THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNE IN GUIZOT'S LECTURES

Prior to setting foot in America, Tocqueville recognized the importance of the township, or commune, as an indispensable, if often turbulent and unstable, incubator for local liberties. For decades, our understanding of the importance of this conceptual underpinning for his associational thought has been obscured, however, by a gap in Tocquevillian scholarship that has only recently begun to be filled: the recognition of François Guizot as "one of the essential interlocutors of Tocqueville, and perhaps the principal among them" (Furet 1984, 230). To grasp the significance for Tocqueville of his discovery in America of the New England township, we must begin by examining his response to Guizot's portrayal of the medieval commune in his 1828–30 lectures at the Sorbonne. And to grasp the novelty of our own emerging understanding of the importance of that response, we must briefly recap 150 years of Tocquevillian scholarship.

Until the mid-1980s, Tocqueville studies proceeded in relative ignorance of Guizot's influence on Tocqueville's thought. The reason is not hard to discern: Tocqueville himself had no desire to trumpet his debt to his most prominent political rival, and Gustave de Beaumont, in his own hagiographic role as posthumous editor of Tocqueville's works, neglected even to mention Guizot in either his 1861 "Notice" or his 1864 "Preface," let alone incorporate in his nine-volume *Oeuvres complètes* any portion of the extensive lecture notes that Tocqueville had transcribed as a rapt student at Guizot's Sorbonne lectures in 1829–30. The result of Tocqueville and Beaumont's systematic discretion

² For passages cited from *Democracy in America*, I have used the translations of Mansfield and Winthrop (Tocqueville [1835 & 1840] 2000), with occasional changes where I saw fit. For several of Tocqueville's (1985a) letters, I have used Toupin's and Boesche's translations, again with occasional changes. Other translations of Tocqueville's writings and correspondence are my own.

³ I collapse Tocqueville's "state" and "national" governments within a single sphere based upon his comments in I:1:5 and elsewhere that portrayed state governments as components of that "national power [that] is more concentrated [in the United States] than it was in any of the old monarchies of Europe" (*DA*, 84). These multiple "republics of the New World," he added, using the plural to refer to both state and national governments, carried governmental centralization to a degree that rivaled that of the French National Convention of 1792–95 (85).

was to obscure the influence of Guizot for many decades: Thus, we look in vain for more than a passing reference to Guizot in the writings of generations of Tocqueville scholars (e.g., Drescher [1964a, 1964b], Marcel [1910], Mayer [(1939) 1960], and Schleifer [1980]). Each probed Tocqueville's historical and sociological method, often with great care and insight, but with scant reference to Professor Guizot's influence on his most precocious student's reflections on civil and political society.⁴

It was the French Revolutionary historian, François Furet, who took the two essential steps that marked the decisive turn toward Guizot in Tocquevillian scholarship in a 1984 article, provocatively entitled "Birth of a Paradigm: Tocqueville and the Voyage in America (1825–1831)."⁵ First, he highlighted the importance of Tocqueville's astonishing claim to Kergorlay in January 1835, just after he had published the *Democracy*, volume 1, that "it has already been almost ten years" since he had first contemplated modernity's inevitable move to equality of conditions, adding that "I was only in America to clarify this point for myself" (Furet 1984, 227–28). Based on this claim, Furet pushed the search for the roots of Tocqueville's historical insights back in time to 1825 in France . . . a period for the understanding of which Guizot's lectures and writings suddenly assumed immense significance. Second, he sought to pinpoint Guizot's influence more precisely (229–31) by analyzing it within an October 5, 1828, letter to Beaumont in which Tocqueville provided his fellow Versailles magistrate with a synopsis of English history spanning 1,000 years. In keeping with his earlier recognition of the abiding ambivalence of the relationship of student and professor, Furet took great care to distinguish the important differences in Tocqueville's and Guizot's respective analyses of English history, in general, and of the precipitating causes of the English Revolution of 1688, in particular (230–32).

⁴ There are several important exceptions to this general neglect of Guizot. In 1938, Pierson ([1938] 1996, 23n) provided a tantalizing reference to a file of "Toc. notes" in the author's archives that he indicated had been transcribed at Guizot's lectures between April 11, 1829, and May 29, 1830; he then attributed Tocqueville's theory of democracy's irresistible march to the influence of Guizot's "progressive" history (23, 33). Building from Pierson's brief reference, Gargan (1955, 4–7, 1965, 26–34) subsequently hypothesized a number of possible areas of Guizot's influence on Tocqueville's historical studies, as did Diez del Corral (1960, 58–59) in his assessment of Tocqueville's relation to the *Doctrinaires*. In an essay that first appeared in 1971, Furet ([1978] 1981, 135–39), citing a 1969 paper by Stanley Mellon, characterized the Guizot–Tocqueville relationship as "a continuous intellectual and political exchange marked by a mixture of complicity and hostility"; he then analyzed the significant distinctions between their respective analyses of French history. In 1979, studying the *Doctrinaires* as architects of a distinct French liberal tradition, Siedentop (1979, 162–68) sought to trace the direct lineage between their political, sociological, and historical thought in France in the 1820s and Tocqueville's 1835 *Democracy*. In his 1984 biography, Jardin took advantage of his own access to Tocqueville's archives and excerpted a single note from Tocqueville's extensive files of notes to demonstrate the methodological parallels between professor and student (Jardin [1984] 1988, 82).

⁵ Furet repeated and expanded his argument in the 1985–86 edition of *The Tocqueville Review* (117–29).

It was not until the publication in 1989 of Tocqueville's (1989, 439–534) complete lecture notes, containing his personal observations on Guizot's lectures carefully delineated by the editor, as well as the 1997 republication in the English-speaking world of Hazlitt's translation of Guizot's 1828 lectures on *The History of Civilization in Europe*, that the link with Guizot was finally made explicit, ushering in the surge of "Tocqueville–Guizot" commentary and studies since that time (e.g., Craiutu 1998, 1999; Hancock 2001; Mélonio [1993] 1998, 8, 34, 118–20; Siedentop 1994, 20–40, 42–43, 1997, xxx–xxxiii; and Welch 2001, 24–31). Should a further translation of Guizot's 1829–30 lectures on *The History of Civilization in France* appear, we can expect that it will provide new impetus to our recognition of the Guizot/Tocqueville parallels . . . and distinctions. If the 1960s featured a wave of important Montesquieu–Tocqueville studies (e.g., Arcn 1965 and Richter 1969, 1970), the 2000s seem destined to solidify the complementary Guizot–Tocqueville intellectual lineage.

For the purposes of our discussion of the intellectual antecedents of Tocqueville's associational probes, we can thus now state with confidence that the future American voyager had closely examined the commune's evanescent role in European and French civilization when he attended or read Guizot's three cycles of Sorbonne lectures, delivered from April 9, 1828, to May 29, 1830. In his initial series of 1828 lectures, Guizot heralded the dramatic appearance in Europe of the medieval commune—home to the Third Estate, his principal protagonists in the rise of Western civilization. Winning its charter by fiery rebellion against oppressive feudal lords, Guizot's ([1828] 1997, 121) commune exercised a measure of local self-government:

Let us enter into the borough [*commune*] itself . . . we are in a kind of fortified place defended by armed burghers [*bourgeois*]: these burghers tax themselves, elect their magistrates, judge and punish, and assemble for the purpose of deliberating upon their affairs. All come to these assemblies; they make war on their own account against their lord; and they have a militia. In a word, they govern themselves; they are sovereigns.

But local liberty in such communes was turbulent, Guizot ([1828] 1997, 135) proceeded to say, with the principal check on the power of local magistrates often consisting of popular riots by the larger body of inhabitants, who possessed a "blind, unbridled, and ferocious spirit of democracy." Guizot documented both the rise and the eventual fall of such chaotic communes during the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, showing how at the end of this period they succumbed to a sweeping process of royal centralization that united the nation and made possible the eventual rise of representative institutions. And what was Guizot's verdict on this historical process in which the traditional liberties of Europe, in general, and England, in particular, perished? "It must be understood," he emphasized, "that this revolution was not only inevitable, but beneficial [*utile*] also" (188).

Three months after the conclusion of Guizot's first cycle of lectures, Tocqueville (1988, 21–41) certainly appears to have woven his professor's theatrical account into his own earliest written reflections on English history. In his October 5, 1828, letter to Beaumont, he highlighted the appearance of "*the third estate* or *the communes*" in France and England in the eleventh century, with such communes composed "of all the industrious men of independent spirit on whom feudal or royal tyranny trampled on all sides" (27). Like Guizot, Tocqueville applauded the manner in which these thriving municipal centers exercised their local liberties in the manner of "a true republic"—electing magistrates, administering finances, raising a militia—while adding his own judgment that their success resulted from "a reasonable equality [that] is the only state natural to man" (28). Accurately reflecting the nuances of Guizot's account, Tocqueville characterized the local life of Europe's pioneering communes as a "bizarre blend of oppression and liberty" (27).

But where Guizot had portrayed the loss of communal liberties as a boon to centralization, Tocqueville decried the craven submission to the monarchy by members of the House of Commons who "had lost all of that republican energy that had marked their fathers" during a new era of absolutism when "the standard of one [ruler] everywhere succeeded the oligarchic liberty that had been enjoyed for two centuries" (38). He castigated the Tudor kings individually and collectively, while also decrying to Beaumont the English people's surrender of their precious constitutional liberties. "I don't know who can see in this time a step towards the Revolution of 1688," he stated with evident reference to Guizot (39).⁶ He argued instead that the Revolution was made possible by the ability of the Commons to take advantage of surviving forms of constitutional government: "When the nation finally awoke, it found all of the instruments of its regeneration near at hand" (39).

Tocqueville's dismay with Guizot's tendency to "sell off communal liberties at a bargain price" (Pouthas 1923, 331) can be detected as well in his lecture notes of 1830. It was in the third and final cycle of his lectures that Guizot brought his portrayal of civilization's history in France to a climax. In a concluding four-lecture unit on the French medieval commune based upon further study of 236 royal acts of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, he differentiated his earlier 1828 portrayal of a generic commune into three distinct classes (Guizot [1829–30] 1868, 11–12). Tocqueville's (1989, 516–34) notes on these communal lectures display several signs of his discomfort with Guizot's portrayal, as he isolated and then judged for himself Guizot's two most distinctive strains of the bourgeois historical tradition. He urged particular attention to the first strain of the "true communes"—the independent, turbulent, fiercely proud and self-reliant "democratic" communes

(520, 523, 526–27) that won their charters by insurrection but then surrendered them owing to fatigue caused by liberty's precarious status. Conversely, he disdained Guizot's second, triumphant bourgeois strain forged in communes granted by royal concession and exemplified by the orderly, docile, "excessively timid" group of bourgeois legists (521, 533–34) who assisted the king in expanding and codifying his central powers in exchange for personal equality and order, or what Tocqueville pejoratively dubbed "equality under a master" (516) or "the calm of servitude" (531). At the end of this third cycle, Guizot concluded his communal sequence and larger Sorbonne courses by repeating his own positive verdict on the demise of French communal liberties (534).

In these ways Tocqueville demonstrated his early recognition of the commune's importance as both an incubator for local liberties and a potential antibody to France's ubiquitous, stifling, centralized administrative regime. Fifteen and one-half months later, in fall 1831, Tocqueville would discover in America the thriving New England commune . . . and instantly recognize it as a *prima facie* rebuttal of Guizot's assumption that national liberty could only rest on a centralized foundation made possible by the sacrifice of local liberty.

TOCQUEVILLE'S DISCOVERY OF THE NEW ENGLAND TOWNSHIP

Tocqueville departed for America on April 2, 1831, 12 days after the passage by the July Monarchy's newly minted Chamber of Deputies of the nation's most significant decentralizing legislation in 40 years. For the first time since 1792, the laws of March 21, 1831, gave to France's 40,000 communes the right to elect their own municipal councils. Moreover, while the king could still appoint local mayors and their deputies, he now had to choose them from among the duly elected councillors. Changes in voter eligibility increased participation in each commune to 10%–14% of all males—qualified by the level of "cens" they paid or their superior "capacity" as demonstrated by a prestigious vocation or membership in a learned society—totaling more than 1 million municipal voters throughout France, five times the narrow electorate for the national legislature. Political participation, debate, and accountability were thus "reintroduced . . . into the villages where [politics] had been virtually extinct since 1800, if not 1792" (Furet 1988, 333–34).

I take this to be the context for Tocqueville's (1985a, 56) June 29, 1831, lament shortly after his arrival in America to his cousin, Louis de Kergorlay, in which he regretted that the Bourbon kings themselves did not create such local political institutions during the 1814–30 Restoration:

In my opinion, the communal and departmental system should have attracted all of [the Bourbons'] attention from the outset. Instead of living day to day with Napoleon's communal institutions, they should have hastened to modify them, to initiate the inhabitants little by little into their own affairs, to interest them in such activities over time,

⁶ Furet (1984, 230, 1985–86, 121) similarly identifies Guizot as Tocqueville's probable target, drawing upon this comment as one piece of evidence for his assertion of the sharp "disagreement" in the views of Tocqueville and Guizot.

to create local interests and above all to found, if possible, *those habits and those legal ideas* that are, in my opinion, the only possible counterweight to democracy.⁷

In Tocqueville's view, local government could have provided an elite group of residents in each French community—"the most enlightened and most moral classes of the society" (56)—with an opportunity to gain by local experience the savvy, discipline, and respect for laws needed to bring "order and stability" to the chaotic process instituted by unfolding democratic equality.

Perhaps it was fitting that Boston's enlightened Brahmins were the first to apprise Tocqueville of the existence and significance of the New England township, since they were the very group whose elite counterparts in France stood to benefit most by the new communal electoral procedures. When Tocqueville first arrived in Boston on September 9, 1831, he appears to have had no notion of the important historical role played by the township in New England governance. Indeed, he was obsessed by two quite different paradigms that had monopolized his earlier thinking and tended to reflect American and French discontinuity: that of the need for Canada's French peasants to rebel against their English overlords (Pierson [1938] 1996, 339) and that of the evident "ease," as he told Kergorlay, "with which [the American people] does without government" (Tocqueville 1985a, 57). Such observations possessed no useful lessons for France, however, a point both Tocqueville and Beaumont emphasized repeatedly in their letters home (see, for example, Pierson [1938] 1996, 370–72). But Tocqueville's discovery in Boston of the New England township contained the seeds of such edification, causing him to launch on September 20 "a very sober investigation," in Pierson's words, "of [the theory and practice of local self-government] that had not hitherto engaged his attention" (380). The fortuitous fusion of Tocqueville's political beliefs with his field research findings thus made New England "the intellectual pivot of [his] voyage" (Mélonio 1986, 16), constituting the spark that would ignite his book.

In Boston, between September 20 and September 29, Tocqueville (1971, 38–39, 46–48) learned from Josiah Quincy, Jr., and Jared Sparks, present and future presidents of Harvard, of the Massachusetts township's indigenous "*communal spirit*" and of its subsequent exportation westward, thanks to New England's pio-

neers; he commenced his study of the American jury (41–42, 229–30, 310–16); he began to read the *Town Officer or laws of Massachusetts Relative to the Duties of Municipal Officers* . . . , given to him by President Quincy; and he encountered repeated eloquent statements of the benefits to American life afforded by the townships, such as that by State Senator Francis Calley Gray, closely paralleling his own comments to Kergorlay three months earlier:

I regard it as even more difficult to establish municipal institutions among a people than great political assemblies. When I say municipal institutions, I wish to speak not of the forms but of the very spirit that gives them life. The habit of treating all matters by discussion, and of directing them all, even the smallest, by means of majorities, this habit is acquired with greater difficulty than all the rest. But it alone makes governments that are truly free. (45)

By September 30, Tocqueville was able to note in his journal the useful comparison that now resonated in his thinking between America, where "free habits have created free political institutions," and France, where "it's for free political institutions to create the habits" (Pierson [1938] 1996, 414, with journal entry misdated as September 13; Tocqueville 1991, 167). "There is the goal at which we must aim," he could now declare.

Preparing to leave Boston, Tocqueville inaugurated a new course of investigation: he submitted lists of written questions to American friends seeking corroboration for his new insights. On October 1, he and Beaumont left Sparks a lengthy list of specific questions about the township (Tocqueville 1986, 29–33). Two months later, on December 2, writing from Cincinnati on a day when he queried Western informants about the New England township's influence there (Tocqueville 1971, 84–86), Tocqueville (1986, 36) politely pressed Sparks for answers:

The further I travel from Massachusetts, Sir, the more acutely I experience the regret of not having made a longer visit. Nowhere, in the portions of the Union through which I have already traveled since my departure from Boston, have I found communal institutions that appear to me to approach those that operate with such vigor in New England. . . . It thus would have been of immense importance for me to study on the spot the principles, forms, and methods of action of this local government of which, for such a long time in France, we have felt the need and sought the model.

In the midst of his request for these answers, he peppered Sparks with a series of additional questions refined by two months of reflections and his reading of the *Town Officer*. His two sets of questions jointly probed five key issues about the township.

1. Its legal powers, including definition of its permissible functions, its executive powers, its ability to carry out its affairs without external interference from the State, and its status as a "corporation."
2. The relationship with other townships, either mandated or voluntary, in counties or in districts, relating to such objects as petitioning the legislature or constructing roads.

⁷ We here encounter an early version of the difficulties posed by Tocqueville's shifting definitions of "democracy" that have bedeviled Tocquevillian scholars. In an indispensable article in this regard, Rosanvallon (1995, 148–51) describes how Tocqueville's vacillation in his varied meanings of the word—"never settled in his work"—separated him from the Doctrinaires, who clearly moved during the Restoration from "the political to the social" definition of democracy, by which, Rosanvallon says, they meant to indicate "modern egalitarian society." In the context of his analysis for Kergorlay of the move in their times "toward a [social] democracy without limits," Tocqueville here argued that communal political practices could create the requisite habits and legal ideas to retard the extraordinary haste with which that process was progressing. He sought to stabilize "democracy," not to resist it, as he clearly stated in his preceding sentences when he advised Kergorlay that they must accept its inevitable arrival, even though it surely would cause the eventual demise of their own estates, riches, and families.

3. Its actuality. Was it only a model on paper or did its officers and laws in fact perform the assigned tasks?
4. The role of faction within it. Did political passions and inequalities in education, income, and political leadership skills thwart the fair and impartial functioning of the town assemblies and lead to oppression, intrigue, and turbulence?
5. The entanglement of church and state within it. Was there a religious influence in the selection of teachers and curriculum at the local schools? Were there electoral and tax requirements linking the town and its churches, as well as religious requirements for its inhabitants? Did this not establish "up to a certain point a *State religion* and entangle politics and religion in a *mélange* that Americans had seemed to make a point to avoid?" (37).

Sparks's answers, contained in his letter of February 2, 1832, and accompanying short treatise, "Observations by Jared Sparks on the Government of Towns in Massachusetts" (Adams 1898, 15–38), were received by Tocqueville just before he sailed for home from New York City on February 20. They provided satisfactory assurances on all points but one. The township was authentic: It did in practice what was said it would do on paper. It was able to transact business in public, without recourse to secret deliberation on sensitive points. It could moderate unruly passions. It could control faction. It could keep the educated citizen from becoming a source of unrest. And it could keep the poor from using their majority status to exploit the rich or deny them a voice in key decisions. But Sparks's single warning flag—in the area of the historic entanglement of church and state in New England (25)—confirmed the premonitions of the very mingling that Tocqueville had foreseen in his letter of December 2.

On October 7 and 10, Tocqueville also sent queries from Connecticut to Ernest de Chabrol, Ernest de Blosseville, and his father in France for information on the French Ministry of Interior, its administrative courts, and its internal functionings at all levels (Pierson [1938] 1996, 403–5). The thoughtful and detailed descriptions of the phenomenon of French "centralization" that his three informants provided in response should best be viewed, however, as documents that served to confirm, rather than edify, Tocqueville's thoughts in these matters. For despite his professed naiveté in his letters soliciting the three reports, he already possessed the powerful intuitions and ample knowledge evident in his detailed communal questions previously submitted to Sparks. His father's "Overview of French Administration" (Hervé de Tocqueville 1831) is particularly remarkable as a concise, unapologetic synopsis of France's system of administrative centralization, written by a one-time prefect and subsequent member in 1828–29 of the Martignac ministry's commission that had sought, unsuccessfully, to fashion a compromise among Martignac's highly restrictive electoral proposals, the Left's demands for more extensive suffrage, and the Right's resistance to elections of any kind (Mélonio [1993] 1998, 10; Monnet 1885, 363–70).

Following his son's suggested framework, Hervé divided his memoir into two distinct parts. In the first, he described the three levels of France's administrative structure in 1831—the department, the *arrondissement*, and the *commune*. For each component part, he graphically detailed the king's direct, personal mechanisms that gave him effective control over every aspect of local political life. The brilliantly conceived French monarchic administrative system extended checks, not balances, throughout France, with the checks designed to ensure that no action by any council at any of the three administrative levels could evade the king's control: "No deliberation of any municipal Council is valid unless it is approved by the prefect on the advice of the under-prefect" (Hervé de Tocqueville 1831, 35) captured the gist of his common refrain. The crown thus fixed the meeting times of all local councils and their meeting agendas; it restricted discussion to preapproved topics and curtailed all public proclamations and correspondence with other councils; it insisted that all council decisions be submitted to layers of royal scrutiny and control; and it retained the ultimate sanction of dissolving any council at any level at any time whose "deliberations might become a cause of perturbation for the State, department, *arrondissement*, or *commune*" (25). We can only fully appreciate the extraordinary reach of the tentacles of such a system—and the extent of the tutelage it instituted throughout France—when we recall that the king and his agents utilized these broad powers to supervise Councils whose every member they themselves had appointed! Hervé made no apologies, however, when he clarified the rationale for these multiple layers of oversight, saying that "without it, the intimate union of all of the parts of the State would not hesitate to be replaced [several words crossed out] by small republics" (25). In his second section, he clearly encapsulated as well the risks he saw in the changes wrought by the March 21st legislation:

We are still ignorant as to what will be the consequences of the notable changes instituted since 1830. With the principle of election introduced into the formation of all of the councils, will it not inspire among the provincial bodies pretensions of independence difficult to curb. . . ? (38)

On January 24, 1832, in his final letter to Hervé from America, Tocqueville thanked his father for his report and shared a number of his writing strategies that he had been pondering during the preceding six weeks. His emerging view of his book called for him "to present only subjects that bore more or less direct connections to our social and political state [in France]" (Tocqueville 1998, 166). He proceeded to assert that he must write what he believed but added that "the entire truth is not wise to say," creating difficult choices "that I have constantly in mind." How far should he push his criticism of administrative centralization and his support for independent local political life? we can imagine as two such choices, knowing the status of each as an explosive political issue in France and knowing his own aspirations for a future political career. The answer, it will turn out, was very far, regardless of whose

political beliefs, including those of his own father, he might offend in the process.

TOCQUEVILLE'S "MIRACULOUS" TOWNSHIP IN THE 1835 *DEMOCRACY*

Tocqueville unveiled his discovery of the robust American strain of the transplanted European commune in a four-chapter unit in *Democracy in America*, volume 1, part 1, chapters 2–5, in which he traced its roots to Tudor England and made it the focal point of his work's principal political argument. Township government, he began, had insinuated the dogma of the sovereignty of the people "into the very heart of the Tudor monarchy" (DA, 29). Exported to the New World, old England's resilient local liberty then became the basis for New England's "singular" and "original" foundation (32), a rebirth that he highlighted with imagery of procreation and light mirroring his own creative efforts (28, 29, 32). Hazy mists concealed the truth of the origins of European civilization—the subject of Guizot's history; American civilization, in contrast, brought truth to light as it allowed observers "to specify the influence exerted by the point of departure on the future of states" (28). Properly differentiated and interpreted by one such intent observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, New England's rays of local governance might even serve to reilluminate their depleted European source.

Drawn to America's shores in the early 1600s, Tocqueville's "civilized men" (27) were ardent, feisty, well-educated, and devout bourgeois Englishmen. Possessing a spirited love for freedom, they shamed their obsequious confreres of continental Europe, who, deprived of political life, were oblivious to "notions of true freedom" (42). Indeed it had been just those timid, conciliatory, legally attuned, and soon-to-be-religiously-deprived bourgeois Frenchmen who had sacrificed their local liberties to curry favor with and solidify the power of newly ascendant monarchs, making them heroes in Guizot's ([1828] 1997, 135, [1829–30] 1868, 86–87) lectures. Tocqueville's Anglo-Americans bore hearty witness to the fact that civilization's progress need not spawn partisans of absolute government. Thanks to communal government, they established local liberty in the American township, preserved it there "in secret" for almost 200 years (DA, 54), and then artfully deployed it at the time of the American Revolution to provide the nation as a whole with its own foundation in freedom ("the dogma of the sovereignty of the people came out from the township and took hold of the government"). Civilization, they demonstrated, could indeed lead to "the bourgeois and democratic freedom of which the history of the world had still not offered a complete model" (30).⁸

⁸ The very imagery employed by Tocqueville—such as his portrayal here of the concealed gestation of American liberty—mirrors and trumps Guizot's ([1828] 1997, 183) own portrayal of the "silent and concealed work of centralization" in Europe during this same period. See Gannett 2003 for my argument that Tocqueville's rebuttal of Guizot in *Democracy in America* is an early example of his lifelong use of "riposte," a strategy through which he contested the theses of

Placing his early New Englanders on a participatory pedestal, Tocqueville ascribed to them six defining acts of local liberty: they directly participated in enacting their own laws, they freely voted their taxes, they appointed a broad number of officials accountable to them, they made peace and war, they possessed individual freedom in their personal affairs, and they enjoyed the right to trial by jury. At the same time that they enjoyed rights, they also possessed "a more elevated and more complete idea of the duties of society toward its members" (41), leading them to provide for the poor, maintain their roads, keep sound order, and furnish universal public education. The English king's law might have ruled the colony as a whole, but "a republic [was] already very much alive in the township" (43).

In his desire to accentuate the contrast viewed "with profound astonishment" (42) by himself and other observers between American and French carriers of civilization, Tocqueville highlighted the manner in which the Puritans "marvelously combine[d] . . . the *spirit of religion* and the *spirit of freedom*" (43). In the political realm, the commune seethed with tension and struggle, often unleashed by men who sought to exploit the inherent malleability of its man-made principles, laws, and institutions. Such contention bred "independence, contempt for experience, and jealousy of every authority" (43). Tocqueville did not fear these qualities and the turmoil they produced—he welcomed them, despite their accompanying risks, since they fostered each man's natural creativity, intelligence, and capacity for bold action. But unlicensed and unregulated freedom, on its own, might end in chaos and anarchy unless a force of equivalent power could check it. For Tocqueville, religion provided this essential communal counterweight, since it established a realm in which "everything is classified, coordinated, foreseen, decided in advance" (43). Freedom and religion thus complemented each other, producing initiative and self-control, tempestuous challenge to authority and obedient respect for it, supreme energy and supreme order. Their delicate balance made communal liberty possible.

Tocqueville's glowing account of this early "Massachusetts miracle"⁹ is overblown. Sparks, as we have seen, was the first to confirm the unseemly mix of religion and politics in Massachusetts:

Their social and political organization partook of their ecclesiastical spirit, and the affairs of state and religion became mingled in a manner not very consistent with republican freedom or a wise administration of government. (Adams 1898, 25)

varied interlocutors, acknowledged and unacknowledged within his texts.

⁹ Many "miracles" have been attributed to Massachusetts, but Tocqueville was perhaps the first to consider coining such a term for New England's founders. In his manuscript for *Democracy in America*, I:1:2, he first described the spirits of religion and liberty as "miraculously placed and incorporated one in the other in America" (Tocqueville 1833–40, Box 1), only subsequently to redefine this miraculous union as one achieved "marvelously."

Tocqueville's subsequent readings of Marshall (1804, 108), Hutchinson ([1764] 1936, 24–25), and Pitkin (1828, 42) attested to the tension that often led the Puritans to reserve political life as the exclusive domain of church members.

Choosing to focus his discussion on religion's positive role in circumscribing individual freedom, Tocqueville pushed aside the inconveniences posed by this evidence of New England's blurred institutional boundaries, as he artfully made his persuasive case for religion and liberty's seamless merger in the early township. He quickly sought to establish his own impartiality by chastising certain of the Puritans' moral laws as "bizarre or tyrannical" (DA, 39). He then used more liberal political compacts—such as those of Hartford, Wethersfield, and Windsor in Connecticut and of Rhode Island—from which to generalize that all political life in the whole of New England was "completely democratic and republican" during this period (40), suppressing the potent contrary evidence from the Massachusetts of Sparks, Marshall, Hutchinson, and Pitkin. He highlighted the universal consent required in New England's founding compacts (35n) while failing to mention that in the case of New Haven, for instance, the compact itself restricted participation to church members (*The Code of 1650* [1821] 1999, 117–18; Pitkin 1828, 46). He drew heavily for support for his arguments upon the histories of Puritan apologists such as Cotton Mather, whose *Magnalia Christi Americana* of 1702 was itself a work of persuasion designed to exonerate Puritan elders, including his own father and grandfather, of charges of intolerance that threatened the renewal of Massachusetts's charter after the passage of the Toleration Act in England in 1689. Tocqueville featured Mather as his preferred New England historian (DA, 686–88) since they pursued parallel objectives in their respective projects: to demonstrate how religious zeal abetted political freedom in the early New England township.¹⁰

Having separated his discussion of the commune's liberal "body of political laws" (39) into a single compartment untainted by religious zeal, Tocqueville reintroduced at the end of his section the positive influence of the churches in instituting universal public education. The Puritans' commitment to universal education was crucial to resisting Satan's wiles (41); in Tocqueville's account, it provided the philosophical basis for the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, wherein "each individual is therefore supposed to be as enlightened, as virtuous, as strong as any other of those

like him" (61). Such belief in every man's abilities and virtue led to two practical results: the right of every inhabitant to vote and the duty of every inhabitant to accept township office when called upon (61). Despite considerable personal ambivalence in this matter of universal participation (Tocqueville 1990a, 46n), Tocqueville highlighted its status as a fundamental New England principle.

Tocqueville's early New England township displayed further "miraculous" powers, beyond the mutual support of politics and religion and the universal participation of its citizens. It owed its existence to an unprecedented combination of nature and history, making it a unique hybrid in political thought, with even communal freedom possessing a natural basis (DA, 57).¹¹ It both avoided and embraced representative institutions, conducting public affairs "in the public square and within the general assembly of citizens," as in Athens (40), but also quickly forming representative institutions such as the General Court of Connecticut, which promulgated *The Code of 1650* ([1821] 1999) and imposed its terms upon the citizenry. And it managed both to support and to forestall the Revolution (DA, 54, 65), artfully shifting its role in line with the exigencies of the times.

Tocqueville's opening unit on the commune built steadily during I:1:5 to its climactic section—"On the Political Effects of Administrative Decentralization in the United States"—which culminated with his rejection of the standard French endorsement of administrative centralization as a praiseworthy "conquest" of the Revolution (92, 692). Having traced Tocqueville's dismay at the tendency of Europe's centralized monarchies to stifle local independence and initiative—in both Tudor England and Bourbon France—we are not surprised that he approached the topic with heightened animation. Indeed, in a letter of June 15, 1834, containing advice on Tocqueville's manuscript, his brother Édouard criticized Alexis' injection of his personal sentiments into this section of his text:

... You appear too much on the scene, you descend into the lists armed with your personal opinion; you apply your principles to France, you engage in politics. ... You judge when you must allow the reader to judge. (Schleifer 1983, 32; Tocqueville 1990a, 69n).

Tocqueville began this climactic section by famously distinguishing between governmental centralization and administrative centralization (DA, 82–83): The former was positive and indeed indispensable in matters

¹⁰ I thank one of the *Review's* anonymous reviewers for his/her eloquent effort to clarify the reasons for Tocqueville's misreading of the early Puritans: "[Tocqueville] was blind to the fact that the political forms they developed were rooted in Calvin's notion of covenant, and in no way confirmed Pascal's notion of different modalities of experience, the latter of which provided Tocqueville with a basis for the claim that religion and politics are two distinct domains of experience." I am not finally persuaded that this explains Tocqueville's misreading, however, since he appears to choose to ignore the contrary evidence provided by Sparks's explicit warning in his short treatise and the various strident denunciations of the illiberal aspects of Puritan political life offered by several of his historical sources, especially Marshall (1804, 108).

¹¹ In their introduction to Tocqueville 2000, Mansfield and Winthrop (2000, xxvi) argue that Tocqueville is best seen as a writer who privileged history over human nature in his new political science, eschewing both classical and earlier modern liberal arguments that granted broad sway to enduring natural attributes. Such a view takes insufficient account, I believe, of the frequency with which Tocqueville did make recourse to nature, as in his views of man's natural right of association, his "invincible inclination" to religion (DA, 284), his instinctive tastes for both liberty and equality, and his natural sociability. Tocqueville conceived of the township as "the sole association that is so much in nature that everywhere men are gathered, [it] forms by itself" (57); in his discussion of communal freedom, he emphasized its spontaneous eruption (*elle naît en quelque sorte d'elle-même*), unaided, at least in its initial stages, by human effort or planning (57).

affecting the general interest such as national security, foreign diplomacy, and a unified justice system, while the latter was negative and readily dispensable in affairs best addressed by local districts. Perhaps because of his brother's cautionary comments, he presented a well-balanced argument. America, he believed, had "overstepped the limits of sound reason" by granting too much independence to its feisty, local, independent municipalities (85); he proceeded to argue that a special brand of government official should be posted in each American county to bring judicial action against townships that exceeded their rightful powers (85n). He then cataloged the township's administrative success stories, all attributable to the increased energy and patriotism felt by residents connected to the public interest: more numerous and efficient schools, more responsive churches, better-maintained highways, better vigilance and help to police on crime, universal assistance in the suppression of smuggling, and prompter fire response (87, 91, 691). Tocqueville did not view private initiative as the magical answer to these local problems; rather, he emphasized public-private partnerships, situated at the township level, where local neighbors could provide the wisdom and vigilance both to aid and to restrain the local administration (90). He did not seek an end to governmental centralization, only to excessive governmental administration. By concentrating administration at the local level, America increased "the force that the state administers" 100-fold (87), more than compensating for its less tidy and less skillful operations.

Concluding his 1835 *Democracy*, Tocqueville argued that America's republican institutions possessed a good chance for a long future, since they melded republican characteristics at both the local and the national levels (DA, 381). "The country par excellence of provincial and township government" (380), America benefited from the infusion of its traditional habits of local governance into the ideas, opinions, mores, and laws of the nation as a whole. Tocqueville's circle of republican liberties—in which local vitality led to national order, making possible more local vitality—produced his final township miracle, one that again defied conventional political wisdom. Vast territorial size, he claimed, contributed to democracy's success in America in two mutually supportive ways—it thwarted the ready imposition of a central administration, and it fostered among the people a desire to pursue their own provincial and township freedoms.¹²

TOCQUEVILLE'S INVESTIGATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNE

The acclaim that greeted Tocqueville after the publication in January 1835 of *Democracy in America*, volume 1, fed the dual flames of his literary and political ambitions—ever fused in his mind as complementary means to fulfill his societal duty. "I have always

placed action above all else," he would tell Kergorlay in 1837, adding, however, that when the path to "action" was blocked, he could usefully pursue "thought," since immaterial ideas had demonstrated repeatedly for 300 years their own ability to move the world (Tocqueville 1977, 1:479). Tocqueville's "action" agenda consisted of his flirtation in November 1836 with a run for provincial council as a candidate from the canton of Beaumont-Hague, his unsuccessful campaign in 1837 for national deputy from the arrondissement of Valognes, and his successful candidacy in 1839 for that same position. His program of "thought" gave precedence to his "monomania" (Tocqueville 1954, 309) with the second volume of *Democracy in America*, but led first to his publication in 1835–36 of two journal articles, both of which testified to his continuing communal reflections.

In his *Memoir on Pauperism*, written between January and April 1835 (Tocqueville 1989, 117n) and published in Cherbourg a short distance from his ancestral chateau, possibly to burnish his local credentials as an expert on social problems (Drescher 1968, In), Tocqueville denounced the English welfare system. He traced the system's origins to a tyrannical act by a Tudor monarch—namely, Henry VIII's abrupt seizure of the same convents that had long served as the centers of the nation's private relief system. Elizabeth I instituted the great Poor Law of 1601 to address the needs of the nation's unattended poor. Her system reflected the Tudors' centralizing spirit, as she required every English commune to appoint commissioners who would assign and collect an arbitrary communal tax to pay for the needs of each parish's poor (Tocqueville 1997, 52). Tocqueville hated both the Tudors' cavalier overturning of a national institution and their penchant to impose a governmental solution upon a problem best addressed by private initiative. He proceeded to highlight two unintended consequences of these Tudor policies that further poisoned English communal life: the effective imprisonment of the poor within their local parishes and the breakdown of trust caused by the spying of local residents on their neighbors to lessen their own welfare burden (62–63).¹³

In his 1836 essay for John Stuart Mill's *London and Westminster Review*, "Political and Social Condition of France," Tocqueville urged the English to protect their communal institutions and to modify their landowning patterns so as to forestall both excessive centralization

¹² For further assessments of Tocqueville's township in *Democracy in America*, see Wolin 2001, 211–21, and Lamberti 1992, 916–19.

¹³ Only after completing his article does Tocqueville appear to have studied the new Poor Law Amendment Act in detail (for this dating, see Drescher 1964a, 80n); in his notes (Tocqueville 1988, 205–9), he wrote approvingly of the manner in which the new English system combined three elements—executive appointments, elections of local officials, and judicial appeal—to produce "an active but not a tyrannical" centralized administrative system (206). Drescher (1964a, 81) sees this new respect for the Poor Law Act as the "trigger [for] a second revolution in Tocqueville's thought"; I disagree, seeing it as a continuation of the same sophisticated assessment of local government that he had applied to the New England township. Tocqueville (1988, 206) indeed articulates this link between his studies in his notes: "Let us stop a moment to look at this organization which is characteristic of the English race, and which can be seen again in almost all of the institutions created by it in the New World."

and revolution, never uncoupled in his thought. Traditionally, in England and France, local liberty had best been preserved by aristocratic institutions:

It may perhaps be laid down as a general truth, that there is nothing more favorable to the establishment and durability of a system of municipal and provincial institutions independent of the general government than a territorial aristocracy. (Tocqueville [1836] 1862, 233)

But such aristocracy had no place in modern times, leading Tocqueville to dismiss it as a viable safeguard for liberty. In its stead, he offered a democratic lineage and philosophical basis for a French "democratic liberty" that could also forcefully challenge, rather than timidly abet, the central government. He placed the origins of such liberty in the same French commune portrayed by Guizot in his lectures: "Never did the spirit of democratic liberty show itself with more energy, and I would almost say more savagely, than in the French *communes* of the Middle Ages" (244). Building upon, but now correcting portions of, Guizot's own history, he proceeded to chronicle the brief heyday in France of such bourgeois "democratic liberty" and its subsequent extinction in the fifteenth century (248), its preservation by alternative aristocratic carriers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and its reemergence and transformation during the eighteenth century into "the modern, the democratic, and, I venture to say, the only just notion of liberty" (247). Such democratic liberty owed its "just" character to its adaptation to the emerging equality of conditions, described in detail in the essay's opening analysis of French civil society and harking back to Tocqueville's (1988, 27, 28) acknowledgment in his 1828 letter to Beaumont of the same "natural," "rational" equality in the early English commune. Propelled by men's hunger for equality, this new variant of an old passion reemerged in the eighteenth century as a potent viral antibody to France's potent central government, forcing even kings to acknowledge its power (Tocqueville [1836] 1862, 248). Since the French monarchy "had destroyed even the semblance of a local government" in the towns and provinces (243), liberty lacked the intermediate institutions to sustain and nurture it, accounting for its intermittent, capricious, and often contradictory character (249). By emphasizing "the great utility of popular institutions" for sustaining liberty over time (250), Tocqueville encouraged his English audience to recognize and capitalize upon their own local assets.

From 1835 to 1837, Tocqueville expanded his studies of the commune through conversations, readings, firsthand observations, and probes by friends undertaken at his behest. On June 8 and 14, 1835, during his travels in England, he conducted interviews with the London lawyer Sutton Sharpe on the workings of the English commune, or parish, asking many of the same communal questions he had explored so fruitfully with Jared Sparks in America, with particular emphasis on the parish's participatory mechanisms and judicial constraints that provided checks on its activities in the absence of direct central administration (Tocqueville 1988, 233–38, 1991, 480–89). In early 1836, Tocqueville

requested and received an in-depth study from Reeve that highlighted the popular administration of London parishes as so many "small democracies" (Schleifer 1983, 33–36); he responded on April 17, with reference back to his own trip to England of the previous summer, that Reeve's report provided "the entire confirmation of my ideas in this matter" (Tocqueville 1954, 29).¹⁴ On July 27, 1836, during a visit to Switzerland, he explained to Corcelle that Switzerland's diminished civic life resulted from the urban bourgeoisie's imposition of "a small bourgeois centralization . . . equivalent to our royal centralization" that stifled communal liberty and erased local accountability (Tocqueville 1985a, 108); he subsequently studied the checkered history of the independent Swiss canton and its unsettled status within a federal form of government (Tocqueville 1991, 615–32). On August 1, during the same Swiss sojourn, he read Machiavelli's 1507 report of his posting to Germany, noting the many "benefits of communal liberty" that Machiavelli had found among the German "free towns" (Tocqueville 1989, 541–43). Writing to Kergorlay four days later, he expressed in passionate terms his response to the same communal investigation of northern Italy based on his reading of Machiavelli's *History of Florence* (Tocqueville 1989, 543–50) upon which we have already commented. In the medieval Florentine republic, he told Kergorlay, he found the immense political vitality and consequent explosive economic growth that he would have expected in a local republic, unchecked, however, by religion owing to superstition in the lower classes and skepticism in the upper—"in a word the evils of barbarism and high civilization united together" (Tocqueville 1977, 1:390). The resulting vice, violence, and scorn for the laws, combined with the extraordinary political corruption of the Medicis, rendered moderate, balanced liberty untenable in Florence. Writing to Beaumont on September 22, 1836, Tocqueville (1967, 166–67) reported that a "revolution" was visibly taking place in his cousin, Le Peletier d'Aunay, and might reasonably take place in many others as well: The more d'Aunay "savor[ed] provincial liberty and the consideration that it [gave] to all those who [were] its representatives," the more his love of centralization was being transformed into "a reasoned taste for the independence of localities." Two weeks later, testing the political waters for his own candidacy in Normandy, he reported to Corcelle a whiff of resurgent communal vitality in that province, thanks to the renewed experience of local elections mandated by the 1831 communal election laws and the subsequent departmental reforms of 1833: "It is not the

¹⁴ The essential work on Tocqueville's English probes remains Drescher's *Tocqueville and England*, although one should supplement it with the introduction and detailed notes to Tocqueville's (1991, 1398–1472) texts provided by Lise Queffélec. Queffélec's introduction and notes are also the indispensable guide for Tocqueville's subsequent Swiss investigations (1473–84). Both Drescher and Queffélec recognize the importance of Tocqueville's interest in communal affairs, with Drescher (1964a, 30) stating that after returning from America, Tocqueville "thenceforth would seek for the key to the political attitudes of every country in local government and public administration."

elected, it's especially the *candidates* that impart this movement to the machine," he declared (Tocqueville 1983, 74).

Tocqueville most clearly explained the purpose and relevance of these continuing communal probes in his remarkable letter to Kergorlay of October 10, 1836. Offering practical advice for a philosophical and political voyage that Kergorlay was making in Germany, he concisely summarized the methodological tools he himself had used so effectively in his own field investigations (Tocqueville 1977, 1:408–9). Chiefly, he sought Kergorlay's help in gaining precise intelligence on a topic of the greatest personal importance: "the Prussian *provincial* and *communal* system, as well as . . . the limits of centralization" (408). Provincial and communal liberties flourished in Prussia, he believed, because the nation's authoritarian rulers liberally granted their subjects "all the secondary liberties that can be compatible with absolute monarchy," while denying them "political *great liberty*" (407–8). The absolute Prussian government thought it was mollifying its people through such a strategy; Tocqueville however, thought it was unknowingly issuing its own death warrant, since the people were gaining local political expertise and skills that eventually would lead them to obtain national liberty, peacefully (*sans secousse*) and in due course. Most importantly in our consideration of Tocqueville's communal thought, he believed that the Prussian experience might allow him to "attack with advantage French centralization" since France's own "antiliberal" rulers could be convinced to make local reforms only if they were presented with arguments based upon an absolutist (i.e., Prussian) rather than a republican or semirepublican (i.e., American) model (408). In Tocqueville's long view, secondary local liberties granted unwittingly by the French government would sharpen the people's political skills, build their political understanding, and eventually inspire them to procure the moderate, balanced constitutional government that alone could assure "*great liberty*."

On two occasions in the following year, Tocqueville injected his strategic vision into the political arena, although he chose in both cases to confront with a hammer the central government's suffocating administrative power, rather than to attempt to coopt it with a velvet glove. On June 23 and August 27, 1837, he published letters on Algeria in which he predicted that anarchy would result unless France halted its forcible attempts to impose a tabula rasa in that country "with no regard for law and rights" (Tocqueville 2001, 15), followed by its efforts to institute a rationalized French central bureaucracy in the vacuum thus created. Later that fall, announcing on October 14 his candidacy for national deputy to the small college of privileged electors of Valognes, he stated his principal rationale for seeking office, adding that it predated and was reinforced by his American travels: to advance liberty so as to counter the government's "absolute power [that] will never create anything in France except an eternal succession of servitude and anarchy" (Tocqueville 1985b, 42). The spirit of liberty must be extended—slowly, gradually, with infinite caution—and "fortified]

daily by frequent and peaceful exercise" (43). In arguing for a potentially tempestuous local liberty to a people craving order from a government all too happy to grant it, Tocqueville showed his courage, if not his electoral viability.

TOCQUEVILLE'S EXPANDED VIEW OF DESPOTISM AND ITS NECESSARY ANTIDOTES IN THE 1840 DEMOCRACY

During the period of these continuing investigations, reflections, and political activities, Tocqueville was simultaneously engaged in the writing of *Democracy in America*, volume 2. By the time of his trip to Switzerland in the summer of 1836, for example, he had planned to complete his first draft of part 1 on equality's influence on America's intellectual ideas (Tocqueville 1967, 160). In November 1836, six weeks after his letter of inquiry to Kergorlay in Germany, he announced to Reeve that he had been working on his book "day and night" for almost a year and that he was planning a "great voyage" of his own to Germany within a year (Tocqueville 1954, 35–36), presumably to probe for himself, after his book's completion, the interplay of national and local liberties that he had described to Kergorlay and already woven into his book's initial drafts, at times even with reference to Germany (see Tocqueville 1990b, 49n). Given the persistence of Tocqueville's communal interests, we are not surprised that they were never far from the surface of his book, forming one key component of "the political side of the work that I must never allow entirely to slip from view" (92n). In two cases, Tocqueville addressed the commune directly, explicitly in the short chapter that treated the role of "free institutions" in combating individualism (DA, II:2:4), and implicitly in his long-planned grand finale—part 4—in which he explored the ramifications for political society of equality's influence in the civil sphere on men's ideas (part 1), sentiments (part 2), and mores (part 3).

Tocqueville's treatment of the commune in II:2:4 consists of two parallel essays written in two stages. He drafted the first in fall 1836, when he was most actively engaged in his communal investigations, and wrote the second in 1838, when he revised his text and chose to personify his expanded vision of democratic despotism in a cunning figure who shrewdly "chang[ed] the natural sense of words" (DA, 485) by redefining citizenship as a condition of isolation from one's fellows and obedience to one's ruler. For his definitive text, he simply placed the two essays in succession, one (1836) after the other (1838).

While the subject of a shift in Tocqueville's perspective during his writing of Volume Two has elicited a lively scholarly exchange, dubbed the "two *Democracies*" debate,¹⁵ I am more interested here in what I

¹⁵ Drescher (1964b, 202) has been the most forceful proponent of the thesis that a break took place between the two volumes of *Democracy in America* due to "an intrusion of new social facts which led to new perspectives." Lamberti popularized the notion with his book title in 1989, although he chose to emphasize a different point of rupture,

believe are the close connections binding his 1836 chapter draft both to America and to his European communal investigations. In that early draft, Tocqueville focused on America and its success in combating democracy's isolating tendencies by building sentiments of cross-cultural, cross-class communal collaboration. The Americans, he began, constructed "a political life in each of the limbs [of the body of the nation]" and thereby "multiplied infinitely for its citizens the opportunities to act in concert," thus binding society by making all individuals "feel at each instant that they depend upon one another" (Tocqueville 1836–39, 5).¹⁶ American "municipal liberty," operating with a multiplier effect upon citizens already placed in "a permanent manner" in proximity to each other, allowed them to discover "the tight tie [that] unites private interest to the general interest" (5[b]). It thus accomplished what "political great liberty" could never accomplish, since the latter only brought together a nation's "principal citizens," and in very brief encounters at that (5). The local "elective system" made class barriers disappear, since the wealthiest citizens, recognizing that they depended for political support upon the poorest, learned to hide "almost all of the passions that divide men . . . carefully at the bottom of [their] hearts," especially pride, scorn, and egoism (7). It broke down cultural barriers, too, as the most "enlightened" members of each canton applied themselves daily to discover "new secrets to create public riches," with the goal that they could then "deliver them to their fellow-citizens in order to merit their [political] favor" (7). "It's not the elected magistrate that makes Democracies prosper," he concluded in a comment that mirrored his October 7, 1836, assertion to Corcelle (Tocqueville 1983, 74), "but they prosper because the magistrate is elected" (7[b]). With these arguments, Tocqueville grafted current and past European communal lessons, confirmed by his readings and travels in summer and fall 1836, to his

American focal point to document the political roots of American democracy.

In his culminating part 4 of *Democracy in America*, volume 2, written in 1838, Tocqueville expanded his critique of the Faustian trade-off demanded by democratic despots of their all-too-compliant citizens, a trade-off reminiscent of Guizot's own sell-off of local liberties in his lectures a decade earlier: They countenanced private bourgeois activity and comfort in return for the voluntary relinquishment of public responsibilities, all in the name of building the central state. Writing to Beaumont on July 8, 1838, when he was in the heart of this writing, he indicated that he had managed to achieve a vantage point "very much higher" than that from which he had treated the topic of administrative centralization in volume 1. There he had seen administrative centralization as a subsuming by the central government of local political life, consisting "especially of replacing the secondary powers by the central power." With his new vision, he told Beaumont, he could now elevate that analysis by presenting a far more frightening portrait of the death of the citizen, caused by

the state successively seizing everything, injecting itself on all sides in the place of the individual or putting the individual in tutelage, governing, regimenting, *rendering uniform* all things and all persons. (Tocqueville 1967, 311).

As Tocqueville extended his view of the manifold ways in which a despotic state could insinuate its despotic tentacles within civil society, he also broadened his portrayal of the antidotes needed to combat such a state, with his expanded list of remedies to his expanded democratic threat appearing in his next-to-last chapter, II:4:7. There he highlighted "secondary bodies formed temporarily of plain citizens," a "provincial assembly," and the need for "elective officials" (DA, 667), and he broadened his civil remedies to include powerful associations—"very opulent, very influential, very strong beings—in a word, aristocratic persons" (668)—now marshaled to resist the new despot's insidious appropriation of men's minds and souls. Tocqueville's final word on liberty emphasized its resistant, watchful, and, yes, combative qualities, all needed to counter that despot (673). With his new tableau, Tocqueville (1990b, 265n, 270n) hoped to "jolt" (*frapper*) the senses of his fellow citizens in the July Monarchy. As we have seen repeatedly in our study, Tocqueville thus promoted liberty's invigorating tumult over general indifference and apathy, be it induced by tyrannical Tudors, French monarchic tutors, absolute Napoleons, or limited and visionless middle-class July Monarchists.

HABERMAS' AND ARENDT'S RESPONSES TO TOCQUEVILLE'S POLITICAL VECTOR

Jürgen Habermas was the first of the new wave of civil society theorists to engage these reflections of Tocqueville. He did so both implicitly, without reference to Tocqueville, in his historical account of the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in mideighteenth-century France, and explicitly, in his

placing it between part 3 and part 4 of volume 2. Schleifer (1992, 197–99) offers a rebuttal to Drescher's claims by signaling particular passages in Tocqueville's drafts and text of volume 1 that presage parallel arguments in volume 2, most importantly with respect to administrative centralization and its connections to egalitarian social conditions and to despotism. For my own view that Tocqueville's vision and rhetorical strategy did shift in volume 2, but in ways and for reasons that have not fully been recognized, and for my use of these dual essays to help elucidate that shift, see Gannett 2003.

¹⁶ This and the ensuing excerpts from the earliest draft of Tocqueville's chapter can be found in his "Manuscript Notes and Drafts" or "Rubbish" of 1836–39, lodged at Yale's Beinecke Library, beginning on the unnumbered fifth page of his folder for II:2:4, where it is headed by three proposed titles: "Of Several Particular Methods Used by the Americans to Combat Isolation and Egoism," "How the Americans Combat the Tendency that Causes Men to Isolate Themselves through Municipal Institutions and the Spirit of Association," and "Of the Doctrine of Utility that Democratic Liberty Causes to be Understood." It continues for five pages, with the relevant sections traceable in Nolla's text (Tocqueville 1990b), beginning on page 101 with "*Les Américains ont combattu par la liberté. . .*" and concluding on page 102 with the final phrase, "*. . . on prend enfin l'habitude et le goût de les servir.*" This early draft did not include the two paragraphs indicated by Nolla, on page 102, note m, as being omitted even from Tocqueville's "original working manuscript." I use [b] to refer to the back side of one of Tocqueville's pages of notes.

praise for Tocqueville's role in 1848 in crafting a "liberalist apologetic" that redefined that bourgeois sphere to make it a more "realistic" arena of contention that could both enlarge and diversify public participation (Habermas [1962] 1991, 67–71, 129–40, with quotes on 130–31). In his applause for Tocqueville as a contemporary counterpoint to the young Marx, Habermas showed how both thinkers divined the essential weakness of the emerging bourgeois model of the public sphere (its propensity to suppress conflict and rationalize bourgeois political domination, in keeping with Guizot's historical philosophy and political leadership during the July Monarchy) and how they similarly recognized and sought to challenge the power of Napoleon III's suffocating state apparatus. But Tocqueville did not seek to smash that bureaucratic-military machinery, as did Marx; rather, he championed in opposition to it the creation of those "associations of plain citizens," formulated as we saw in his penultimate chapter of the *Democracy*, volume 2, that "can compose very rich, influential, and powerful bodies, in other words, aristocratic bodies" (Habermas [1962] 1991, 137). Through his writings and 1848 speeches to the National Assembly, Tocqueville triggered a reappraisal of the bourgeois conception of an elite, restricted public sphere; by doing so, he helped to save it, in Habermas' view, from its conceptual thinness and susceptibility to despotic manipulation.

In *On Revolution*, published a year later, Hannah Arendt similarly engaged Tocqueville as a major dialogical presence. "Following Tocqueville's insights" that portrayed equality as a "[frequent] danger to freedom," Arendt ([1963] 1990, 30) sought to provide more precise referents for this generic danger: She thus criticized the modern revolutionaries' concurrent drives to meet "the urgent [social] needs of the people" (60), to satisfy private welfare through the "pursuit of happiness" (115–40), and to safeguard civil liberties at the expense of the establishment of a foundation of freedom, "that is, the foundation of a body politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear" (125). Sidetracked by their pursuit of such objectives, they neglected the original source of their revolutionary inspiration, namely, the insistence upon each individual's right to participate in public affairs.

Arendt's public space is a *political* realm of freedom. Framing her discussion with references to Tocqueville's own treatment of the New England township (166, 176 [n. 64]), she placed the township at the center of this space, both historically and conceptually. There, it embodied "an entirely new concept of power and authority" (166), providing a "working reality" for freedom by which she meant a recognized means for the legitimate election of delegates to a Constitutional Convention and a reservoir of practical experience in generating bonds of trust through mutual promises that would aid those delegates in framing their state and national constitutions. The towns of New England alone numbered 550 in 1776, she stated, thus demonstrating the "extraordinary degree of political articulation of the country" as a whole (306 [n. 46]); their proliferation ensured the widespread suffusion of that "elementary

grammar of political action and its more complicated syntax... of human power" (173), which for Arendt consisted of mutual pledges and promises. As Tocqueville (*DA*, 42) cited Winthrop on freedom, Arendt ([1963] 1990, 309 [n. 58]) cited Winthrop on freedom. As Tocqueville (*DA*, 40) cited Connecticut's earliest constitution, Arendt ([1963] 1990, 176 [n. 63]) made glowing reference to the same document. And as Tocqueville (*DA*, 43) emphasized the "marvelous" combination of religion and freedom in the early township, Arendt ([1963] 1990, 172, 308–9) also highlighted the influence of Puritan covenant theology upon early New England political thought and structures, although she took pains to distance her argument from that aspect of those covenants that could lead to inequality and exclusion.

But Arendt's conception of the New England township's role in promoting freedom ultimately diverged in important respects from Tocqueville's view. Her principal emphasis was on the political act of foundation through which men mutually pledged and bound themselves together "for the purpose of action" (175). Tocqueville's township was less a point of embarkation based on a defining initial contract than a "primary school" (*DA*, 57) where citizens learned the skills and gained the habits of discussion and decision-making essential to freedom. For Arendt ([1963] 1990, 279) her public act of binding was enacted by "those few from all walks of life" who cared more for public participation than for private happiness. Tocqueville saw his township as a catalyst for majority participation, both politically in its assemblies and socially and economically through the ripple effects it created throughout society as a whole, as he stated in *Democracy in America*, volume 1:

This agitation, constantly reborn, that the government of democracy has introduced into the political world, passes afterwards into civil society... it spreads a restive energy throughout the whole social body, a superabundant force, an energy that never exists without it, and which, however little circumstances may be favorable, can bring forth marvels. (*DA*, 233–34)

Arendt ([1963] 1990, 182) defined "association" in a precise and carefully limited fashion: "the gathering-together of people for a specified political purpose"; she relegated other forms of association to a social sphere that she argued must be rigorously segregated from the political one (Cohen and Arato 1992, 190–92). Political associations—both permanent and voluntary—comprised, of course, two essential sectors in Tocqueville's associational frame, but he believed that they both encouraged and were supported by voluntary civic groups and the informal socializing facilitated by the bevy of small private groups in democratic society. Finally, Arendt ([1963] 1990, 261) placed her hopes for the reclamation of the "lost treasure" of the revolutionary tradition—its legacy of political participation—in revolutionary councils that constituted "the only entirely new and entirely spontaneous institution in revolutionary history." Tocqueville, on the other hand, saw township government itself as a continuing viable

incubator for "local liberties," one that he sought to retransport from America to Europe—in spirit, if not in every practical detail—as the principal catalyst for local participation and accountability in a properly balanced system of French local and national government.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

I have directed attention in this paper to what I see as the neglected first sector of Tocqueville's participatory quadrant, that of the township or commune that he found flourishing in America, where "the law has established in each province, in each city, and so to speak in each village, small associations having local administration as an object" (DA, 494). Such "township freedom," Tocqueville claimed, "is in a way born of itself" as citizens pursued their natural right of administering their own local affairs (57). Tocqueville did not romanticize his township as a panacea to problems of civic participation; indeed, he recognized that its particular brand of local liberty could, at times, be repressive and "full of prejudices" (Tocqueville 1990b, 248n), with "the trials of freedom" it experienced eliciting the disdain of the more sophisticated, more "enlightened" larger society (DA, 57). He did not advocate a potent local system of townships as a substitute for a strong central government; indeed, he supported a healthy measure of such governmental centralization, telling Eugène Stoffels in October 1836: "What I want is a central government energetic in its own sphere of action" (Tocqueville 1985a, 113). Nor, *pace* Arendt, did he expect that the township would operate in splendid isolation from the other sectors of his associational frame: Indeed, each sector had a complementary role to play in his larger associational vision as it intersected with religion, state and national governments, and the other associational groups. With his finely tuned political sense, honed by his practice of politics in an era of unstable regimes and vacillating communal powers, as well as with his aristocratic confidence "that the real can still be distinguished from the fake" (Cantor 2000, 118n), Tocqueville carefully weighed during his lifetime the shifting factors that could solidify national "great liberty" with the aid of secondary local liberties. Working within a nation that was fundamentally suspicious of and hostile to associations of any kind, he deployed practical sophistication and shrewd flexibility in his quest to forge a multifaceted political life for his era's new democracies.

Tocqueville (1990b, 106–7) provided a telling example of his flexibility in a small chapter for the 1840 *Democracy* that he drafted but did not finally use in the book: "On the Manner in Which the American Governments Act Toward Associations." In it, he distinguished the American governments' approach to civil associa-

tions from that of their single central counterpart in England. Lacking powerful aristocratic associations, American governments often recognized the need to extend their own role and "loan[ed] to certain associations the support of the State or even instruct[ed] the State to take their places." Central governments need not automatically usurp associational incentive or authority, Tocqueville thus argued, provided that they remain mindful of their proper role of giving short-term "help," not commanding long-term "obedience." "The greatest art of government in democratic countries," he asserted, in what I take to embody both his life's credo and his supreme challenge to all democrats, "consists of carefully disentangling circumstances and acting according to what they require" (107).

In highly diverse settings in America today, citizens have effectively responded to Tocqueville's challenge and forged contemporary prototypes of township-style government, based on their recognition of the need to act "according to what [circumstances] require." Their projects range from inner-city "community organizing" (e.g., Eig 2001, Osborn 2002, and Warren, Mark R. 2001) to rural and mountain "collaborative stakeholder" models for managing forests, wetlands, rivers, lakes, wildlife, and other natural assets (Sagoff 1999, 171, 163) to suburban initiatives for targeted tax referendums to protect wet and farmlands so as to resist urban sprawl. Within the New England township itself, one shrewd observer has suggested ways for it to experiment with new, technologically innovative mechanisms that might increase the relative participatory weight of ordinary, moderate, uninformed citizens, while decreasing that of those "informed minorities," "committed activists," and "quarrelsome blowhards" who have often obstructed town business (Fiorina 1999, 412–17). Such civic fine-tuning within the township and imaginative recreation of its principles outside it are examples, I believe, of Tocqueville's "greatest art" and of the ingenuity and vitality at the communal level that are indispensable to spurring renewed citizen participation.

Tocqueville's model township can be writ large in many settings. His township insists upon local engagement, respecting the ability of each and every citizen from a clearly defined geographic area to participate directly in decisions affecting his or her life. It enjoys a unique source of citizen motivation: Not owing to simple altruism, or to pure self-interest, individuals participate for reasons of dignity and self-respect, choosing to exercise their natural right of administering their own affairs. The township respects the sober and sensible mandate of the majority. It authorizes taxes to be raised to support locally endorsed projects. It appoints a broad number of officials to enact its wishes, expecting all of its members to be prepared to serve in such capacities. It recognizes each citizen's ability to be independent and self-asserting: As such, it views local liberty as invigorating and stimulating, even tempestuous, at times. Finally, as a "permanent" association, the township recognizes its unique standing as an institutional embodiment of a *process* of self-government: Thus, it envisions different levels of commitment and responsibility from its members, and evaluates its collective

¹⁷ For a more broadly based discussion of Arendt's probable reliance on Tocqueville for aspects of her political and social theory, as well as for a thoughtful assessment of Tocqueville's own associational frame, see Pitkin 1998, 115–27. Reinhardt (1997, 145) characterizes Arendt's project as a "quest for political purity," stating that "the politics she theorizes is as narrow and limited as it is mobile and plural."

accomplishments in different ways, than do voluntary political, voluntary civic, or small private associations.

"When I say municipal institutions," Massachusetts Senator Gray had counseled Tocqueville during his Boston sojourn in 1831, "I wish to speak not of the forms but of the very spirit that gives them life" (Tocqueville 1971, 45). "But [that spirit, exemplified in the habit of dealing with all matters by discussion leading to majority decisions]," he concluded in a message that the young Frenchman took to heart and proceeded to make reverberate among aspiring democrats worldwide, "alone makes governments that are truly free."

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James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty

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Although James Madison has been invoked by justices and judicial scholars for over 100 years, Madison's principle of religious liberty has never been fully grasped or adopted by the Supreme Court. Judges and scholars have failed to understand Madison's radical but simple teaching that religion is not part of the social compact and, therefore, that the state may not take religion within its cognizance. In this article I set forth Madison's principle of "noncognizance" in light of the social compact theory he articulates in the "Memorial and Remonstrance." I then attempt to show how it consistently explains Madison's political actions and writings on religious liberty. I conclude by explaining how a "Madisonian" approach, properly understood, would adjudicate the First Amendment's religion clauses.

No man is more responsible for the U.S. Constitution than James Madison. Leading delegate at the Philadelphia Convention, advocate and expositor as Publius, author and sponsor of the Bill of Rights, Madison rightfully earned his title "Father of the Constitution." Madison also played the leading role in Virginia's battle for religious freedom, which was won, in no small part, because of his "Memorial and Remonstrance." It should come as no surprise, then, that, along with Thomas Jefferson, he has been considered an authoritative guide to the meaning of the First Amendment's religion clauses. Yet Madison's understanding of the proper relationship between church and state continues to be debated vigorously. For Establishment Clause jurisprudence, "strict-separationist" judges and scholars claim that Madison sought to erect a wall separating state from church, thereby prohibiting all governmental support for religion. "Nonpreferentialists" challenge this interpretation, contending that Madison meant only to prevent the state from favoring one religious sect over others. The state may support religion, they claim, so long as it supports all religions equally. In recent Free Exercise cases, Madison has been invoked as defending the right to religious exemptions from facially neutral but burdensome laws. Justice Scalia, the Court's most articulate defender of "originalism," has authored the Court's rejection of this position, but his Court opinions have failed to respond to his opponents' Madisonian arguments. Thus, although Madison's authority for First Amendment religion jurisprudence has been nearly universally accepted, what he says on these matters remains sharply contested. Did Madison think any and all state aid to religion violates constitutional principles? If so, did he also intend to protect the free exercise of religion by granting religious citizens exemptions from oppressive laws?

This article attempts to answer these questions by articulating Madison's principle of religious liberty. It begins by reviewing the leading interpretations and constitutional applications of Madison's thought on re-

ligious liberty, all of which, I suggest, have failed to grasp Madison's position. I then offer my alternative interpretation, focusing on the social compact framework of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance." I argue that Madison champions a "religion-blind" constitution, a constitution that prohibits the state from taking cognizance of religion. The state, in Madison's view, may not classify citizens on the basis of religious beliefs or religious affiliation, which means that the state may neither privilege nor penalize religious institutions, religious citizens, or religiously motivated conduct as such. I defend my interpretation by showing how the principle of a "religion-blind" constitution explains Madison's political actions, statements, and writings made as a state legislator, congressman, president, and elder statesman. I conclude by explaining the implications that a correct understanding of Madison's principle of religious liberty has for First Amendment religion jurisprudence.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MADISON

About 100 federal and state court decisions have highlighted Madison's role in crafting the religion clauses of the First Amendment (Drakeman 2000, 219). In judicial decisions and scholarship on the Establishment Clause, Madison has been identified both as a "strict separationist" who stands against any and all public support of religion and as a "nonpreferentialist" who proscribes only aid that favors some religions over others. For the Free Exercise Clause, Madison has been invoked as a defender of the right to religious exemptions from laws that burden religious exercise. All three of these interpretations, I argue, are incorrect.

Madison and the Establishment Clause

The "strict-separationist" interpretation of Madison began in the Supreme Court's landmark incorporation decision *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947). *Everson* was decided five to four, but all nine justices agreed that the meaning of the Establishment Clause was to be found in Jefferson's and Madison's writings establishing religious freedom in Virginia, and that these writings indicated that the founders intended "to erect a wall of separation between church and state"

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The author would like to thank Mark Blitz, Charles R. Kesler, Nicholas May, Ralph A. Rossum, and Michael Uhlmann for their comments on drafts of this article.

(p. 16).¹ Justice Wiley Rutledge, writing in dissent, paid particular attention to Madison. His historical research led him to conclude that "Madison opposed every form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority" (p. 39) and, therefore, that the Establishment Clause "forbids any appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises" (p. 41).

This "strict-separationist" interpretation of Madison received authoritative confirmation four years later by Irving Brant, the distinguished biographer of the fourth president. According to Brant (1951, 3), freedom of religion was for Madison "the fundamental item upon which all other forms of civil liberty depended," and the fundamental requirement for religious freedom "was the total separation between government and religion." Brant canvassed all of Madison's major writings on religious liberty, but he employed most forcefully the then newly rediscovered "Essays on Monopolies."² In that essay, Madison calls the appointment of taxpayer-funded legislative chaplains by the First Congress a "palpable violation" of constitutional principles. Religious proclamations by the president are "shoots from the same root." Madison goes so far as to identify a prohibition on taxpayer-funded chaplains for navy crewmen insulated at sea as "the consequence of a right principle" (Brant 1951, 21–24; Fleet 1946, 558–62). Brant (1951, 11) took the date and the dispassionate, retrospective tone of the "Essay on Monopolies" as conclusive proof that Madison "regarded any compulsory contribution to religion, through taxes, as a violation of the individual taxpayer's religious liberty."

As the Supreme Court continued to hear Establishment Clause cases in the 1950s and 1960s, the prolific and influential Leo Pfeffer (1958) augmented Brant's interpretation with a "strict-separationist" reading of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance."³ Pfeffer focused on the "Memorial's" political context, pointing out that Madison wrote it with a specific legislative intention, to defeat Patrick Henry's pending "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion." Henry's measure, according to Pfeffer,

represents the closest approximation in American history to absolutely non-preferential government aid to religion. It is difficult to conceive of any measure which adheres

more closely to the requirements of non-discrimination and equality among sects. (p. 66)

Pfeffer thus concluded that Madison could not be understood as opposing only preferential aid to religion. His opposition to Henry's nonpreferential measure demonstrated that he opposed every form of aid to religion.

Attention to Madison waned in the 1970s as the Supreme Court eschewed the philosophy of "original intent." In 1984, however, then Associate Justice William Rehnquist's "originalist" dissent in the public school-moment-of-silence case *Wallace v. Jaffree* (1985) marked a resurgence of interest in Madison. Building on the scholarship of Robert Cord (1982), Justice Rehnquist denied that the founders in general or Madison in particular intended to erect a wall separating church and state or to require state neutrality between religion and irreligion. The founders, Justice Rehnquist claimed, intended to prohibit only sectarian government support to religion. The Establishment Clause, accordingly, should be read only to prohibit preferential aid to some religions over others.

To make his case, Justice Rehnquist turned to the drafting of the Establishment Clause in the First Federal Congress. There he found, contrary to the Court's *Everson* ruling, that Madison was not trying to introduce Jefferson's "Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty." Madison, rather, was "an advocate for sensible legislative compromise" (*Wallace* 1985, 97). Justice Rehnquist zeroed in on Madison's original draft amendment, "nor shall any national religion be established," and on his subsequent explanation on the House floor that it meant "that congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law" (p. 98). These statements indicated to Justice Rehnquist that Madison

saw the [First] Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He [Madison] did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion. (p. 98)⁴

Everson and the "strict-separationist" jurisprudence built on it, Justice Rehnquist concluded, were constructed on a "mistaken understanding of constitutional history" (p. 92). "Nonpreferentialism," not a "wall of separation," best reflects Madison's and the founding fathers' original intentions.⁵

¹ The Justices disagreed only on where the wall stood in the case at hand. The majority ruled that the New Jersey program in question, which reimbursed the transportation costs incurred by parents sending their children to Catholic schools, did not breach the wall.

² Madison's "Essay on Monopolies" had been published in *Harper's Magazine* in 1914 but was lost and forgotten until rediscovered and republished by Elizabeth Fleet (1946). The exact date of its composition is unknown but it is thought that Madison drafted it between 1817 and 1832.

³ According to Gregg Ivers (1995, 222) it is "impossible to overestimate the impact that Leo Pfeffer, as an individual and as a public interest lawyer, had on the constitutional development of church-state law during the latter half of this [twentieth] century. . . . [F]or no lawyer has exercised such complete intellectual dominance over a chosen area of law for so extensive a period. . . ." Cushing Strout (1988, 225) reports that of some 50 adversarial cases between 1951 and 1971 involving the Establishment Clause, Pfeffer was active in 20 of them at the trial stage and in 14 at the appellate stage.

⁴ In his dissent in the released-time for religious instruction case *McCollum v. Board of Education* (1948, 244), Justice Stanley Reed also cited Madison's explanatory statement on the House floor as evidence that the Establishment Clause aimed only to proscribe an official state church.

⁵ Both Cord and Rehnquist also introduce as evidence numerous instances in which the founding fathers endorsed and supported religion, including the reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance by the First Congress, which proclaimed, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, school and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"; calls for national days of prayer and thanksgiving by Presidents Washington, Adams, and Madison; and Jefferson's authorization of direct payments by the federal government to a Catholic

Justice Rehnquist's reinterpretation brought forth a wave of "strict-separationist" scholarship, the influence of which now can be seen most pronouncedly in Justice David Souter's opinions.⁶ In two nonmajority opinions in the 1990s, Justice Souter established himself as the leading "originalist," "strict separationist" on the Court. In *Lee v. Weisman* (1992), the prayer-at-public-school-graduation case, Justice Souter poured over the same historical materials that Justice Rehnquist did in his *Wallace* dissent. Like Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter focused on Madison's original draft amendment. But Justice Souter pointed out that Madison's initial draft was not adopted. A comparison of rejected drafts of the Establishment Clause with the actual adopted text, he argued, reveals that the farmers considered but ultimately rejected prohibiting only nonpreferential aid to religion (*Lee* 1992, 615).⁷ When the Court ruled three years later that a University of Virginia Christian student newspaper could receive student activity funds, in *Rosenberger v. University of Virginia* (1995), Justice Souter further developed his position with a "strict-separationist" reading of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance." His dissenting opinion in that case emphasized article 3 of the "Memorial," where Madison states, "Who does not see that . . . the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?" (*Rosenberger* 1995, 868). This statement, in addition to the fact that the "Memorial" was written against a general assessment, demonstrated to Justice Souter that Madison objected to any government subsidization of religion.

Justice Souter wrote his *Rosenberger* dissent in response to Justice Clarence Thomas's "nonpreferentialist" concurring opinion in the same case. Justice Thomas picked up Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that the entire edifice of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been built on a mistaken understanding of history. In addition to focusing on the records of the First Federal Congress, Justice Thomas also returned to the "Memorial and Remonstrance," specifically article 4, which argues that Henry's proposed assessment "violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law." According to Justice Thomas, Madison opposed Henry's assessment bill "not because it allowed religious groups to participate in generally available benefits, but because the bill singled out religious entities for special benefits" (*Rosenberger* 1995, 854–55). A proper interpretation of the "Memorial," and thus

the Establishment Clause, prohibits government only from favoring some religious faiths over others.

Although Justice Thomas employed the "Memorial" to defend "nonpreferentialism," his opinion betrays a leery suspicion of Madison. Justice Thomas concedes that others have interpreted the "Memorial" differently than he does (*Rosenberger* 1995, 854–55; citing Laycock 1986), and perhaps because the "strict-separationist" interpretation of Madison looks so strong, he suggests that "the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the First Amendment" (p. 856). Is Madison, then, a "strict separationist?" Did he think that any and all aid to religion violates constitutional principles? If so, why did he not say so clearly in either his initial proposed constitutional amendment or his later clarifying remarks made during the Constitutional Convention? And if Madison did intend strictly to separate religion and politics through the Establishment Clause, did he also, as some claim, intend vigorously to protect religion from politics with the Free Exercise Clause?

Madison and the Free Exercise Clause

Until the 1990s, Madison was not invoked for Free Exercise jurisprudence nearly to the extent that he was for Establishment Clause cases. This was partially because when the Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of free exercise in the Mormon polygamy case *Reynolds v. United States* (1879), it turned to Jefferson.⁸ When the Court later incorporated the Free Exercise Clause in *Cantwell v. Connecticut* (1940), and then expanded its reach to grant religious exemptions from generally applicable regulations and laws in the 1960s and 1970s,⁹ it did so again without invoking Madison. The Court overlooked Madison one more time in its controversial 1990 *Smith* decision,¹⁰ which denied a constitutional right to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. A conservative reaction to this decision, however, has led to a vigorous application of Madison's thought to the free exercise controversies.

The leading scholar to apply Madison to the Free Exercise Clause is Michael McConnell. In a widely cited *Harvard Law Review* article, McConnell (1990) meticulously defends the case for religious exemptions from laws that burden religious exercise. At the center of his arguments stands Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance." In article 1 of the "Memorial," Madison derives the right of religious liberty from "the duty of

priest ministering to Native Americans. The deficiency in Cord's "nonpreferentialist" interpretation of Madison is that he cannot square it with Madison's seemingly "strict-separationist" "Detached Memoranda." As such, Cord (1982, 35–36, 1987, 79–85) is forced to say that Madison was inconsistent or that he changed his mind as "an old man" in his "declining years," both highly dubious propositions.

⁶ The scholarship cited by Justice Souter includes Leonard Levy 1986 and Douglas Laycock 1986.

⁷ Souter also trumpeted Madison's "Detached Memoranda," employing the same evidence and reaching the same conclusion that Irving Brant did nearly 50 years prior (*Lee* 1992, 622–26).

⁸ The Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause protects beliefs, not actions, and therefore that Reynolds was not exempt from federal laws banning polygamy.

⁹ See, in particular, *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963), ruling that Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was entitled to unemployment compensation despite being fired with cause (refusing to work assigned hours on Saturday), and *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972), ruling Amish parents exempt from state laws requiring parents to send their children to school past the eighth grade.

¹⁰ *Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith* (1990) ruled that Smith's and other Native American Church members' sacramental use of peyote was not constitutionally protected.

every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him." "This duty," Madison continues, "is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society." McConnell (1990, 1453) reasons,

If the scope of religious liberty is defined by religious duty (man must render to God "such . . . homage as he believes acceptable to him"), and if the claims of civil society are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would seem to follow that the dictates of religious faith must take precedence over the laws of the state, even if they are secular and generally applicable. This is the central point on which Madison differs from Locke, Jefferson, and other Enlightenment advocates of religious freedom.

If religious duties conflict with civic regulations, civic regulations must give way. Although McConnell admits that the "Memorial" does not call for judicial exemptions explicitly, he claims that it "suggests an approach toward religious liberty consonant with them" (p. 1453; see also McConnell 2000).

To support this reading of the "Memorial," McConnell also introduces into evidence Madison's proposed revisions of the "free exercise provision" of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. He reports that, as drafted by George Mason, Article XVI proposed

that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless under color of religion any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety of society. (McConnell 1990, 1462)

Madison, McConnell claims, objected on two grounds. First, Madison criticized the use of the word "toleration," because religious liberty is a right derived from duties more sovereign than civic obligations. He moved, accordingly, to strike Mason's language of toleration and substitute instead, "All men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience." Second, Mason and Madison clearly anticipated exemptions from generally applicable laws, which is why they included balancing test standards at the ends of their drafts. Mason would have extended exemptions only to religious actions that did not disturb the "peace, happiness, or safety of society," a standard, McConnell suggests, "that would encompass virtually all legitimate forms of legislation" (p. 1463). Madison, according to McConnell, aimed to create a test much more favorable to religious citizens. He proposed to narrow the compelling state interest in denying religious exemptions only to cases manifestly endangering "the preservation of equal liberty and the existences of the state." This standard, McConnell concludes, "only the most critical acts of government can satisfy" (pp. 1462–63).¹¹

McConnell's arguments have found a voice on the Supreme Court in Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. In her

dissenting opinion in *City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores* (1997, 549), Justice O'Connor calls for a reversal of *Smith* and a restoration of the *Sherbert* balancing test because "the historical evidence casts doubt on the Court's current [nonexemption granting] interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause." For her historical evidence, she relies heavily on McConnell's Madison.

McConnell's and O'Connor's arguments have been criticized sharply both on and off the bench by those who deny that the First Amendment secures a right to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. These critics have failed, however, to address adequately the McConnell/O'Connor interpretation of Madison. Philip Hamburger (1992), the most thorough and persuasive critic of religious exemptions on historical grounds, has countered McConnell's historical research point by point. When it comes to McConnell's reading of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," however, Hamburger is noticeably silent (see especially pp. 926–29, which discuss McConnell's use of Madison). The same omission also can be attributed to Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court's leading critic of exemptions. In both his *Smith* majority opinion, in which he originally overturned the Court's exemption-granting balancing test, and then his defense of *Smith* in response to O'Connor in *City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores*, Justice Scalia fails to address McConnell's and O'Connor's strongest argument: that James Madison, architect of the First Amendment, grounds the right to religious liberty on the premise that religious obligations are precedent in time and obligation to civil obligations. Those who defend a constitutional right to religious exemptions from burdensome laws seem to have Madison on their side.

As is true of the "strict-separationist" and "nonpreferentialist" interpretations of Madison, so too is the "proexemption" interpretation incorrect. Madison is misinterpreted for both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise jurisprudence because scholars and judges have failed to see the social compact framework of the "Memorial and Remonstrance." Prior interpreters thus fail to see Madison's clearly stated doctrine about the meaning of religious liberty in a constitutional republic limited by and dedicated to the protection of natural rights—namely, that the state must remain noncognizant of religion.

MADISON'S PRINCIPLE OF "NONCOGNIZANCE"

The Historical and Political Context of the "Memorial"

Madison's most mature and most philosophical defense of religious liberty is his "Memorial and

¹¹ McConnell's history on this point suffers from his reliance on Sanford Cobb's (1902, 491–92) incomplete account of Madison's proposed revisions to Mason's text. What McConnell presents as Mason's original proposal is actually a slightly amended committee version of Mason's initial draft. Madison then offered two different sets of revisions on two different dates. What McConnell reports as Madison's proposed revisions is actually the second set of revisions

he offered—Madison's initial revisions were rejected. McConnell appears to be unaware of Madison's first proposed revisions and thus fails to consider them. Unfortunately for McConnell, it is these revisions that reveal most clearly Madison's intentions (see discussion below, under The "Memorial's" Argument). For a complete account of the drafting of Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, see Dreisbach 2000, 9–18.

Remonstrance." He drafted the "Memorial and Remonstrance" in the spring of 1785, in the midst of a fierce debate over Patrick Henry's proposed bill "Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion."

Before discussing the "Memorial's" argument, it is important to note what exactly Madison was arguing against. According to Leo Pfeffer (1958, 66), as noted above, Henry's proposed assessment bill

represents the closest approximation in American history to absolutely non-preferential government aid to religion. It is difficult to conceive of any measure which adheres more closely to the requirements of non-discrimination and equality among sects.

Pfeffer is simply wrong. Though more accommodat- ing than the prerevolutionary establishment or the proposed establishment of 1779, it is incorrect to claim that Henry's bill was nondiscriminatory or es- tablished equality among all religious sects. The title alone, "A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," belies Pfeffer's interpretation. Only ministers of recognized Christian sects were elig- ible for state funding. In December 1784, an amendment was passed to drop the word "Christian," in order to open up the assessment to any religious society, but Benjamin Harrison, the former governor, managed to have the change reversed (Buckley 1977, 108). Instead, in the final text appeared a statement of the bill's liber- ality, which more clearly reveals its limits:

[I]t is judged that such a provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abol- ishing all distinctions of preeminence amongst the different societies or communities of Christians.¹²

Henry's bill may have erased distinctions among Protestants, but it was not nonsectarian.

What it was a property tax. Under the bill's provi- sions, each property owner was to specify the Christian denomination to which he wished his tax directed. The sheriffs of the several counties would then distribute the taxes accordingly, minus 5% for administration. If a taxpayer failed or refused to specify a Christian society, his tax would go to the public treasury "to be disposed of under the direction of the General Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning . . . and to no other use or purpose whatsoever." Similarly, the taxes received by the various denominations were to be "appropriated to a provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel, or the providing of places of divine wor- ship, and to none other use whatsoever." An exception to this rule was made for Quakers and Mennonites, who were allowed to place their distribution in their general funds because they lacked the requisite clergy.

The restrictions on how funds were to be distributed, with the noted exceptions, were due to the bill's stated educational purpose. The bill began,

WHEREAS the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society, which cannot be effected without a competent provision for learned teach- ers

This educational facade was not present in the bill's original version, which was designed to support Christian ministers, churches, and worship. A drafting committee added it, probably to increase the bill's ap- peal (Buckley 1977, 105; cf. Braun 1997, 210). Even with these changes, however, all knew that the purpose of the bill was to keep the Christian ministry, particularly Episcopalian clergy, active and solvent (Buckley 1977, 109). And even with the educational preamble, minis- ters who received appropriations were not required to use them for educational purposes. In its effect, the bill granted a direct subsidy to Christian clergymen.

Madison revealed his perception of the measure and what he thought was at stake in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on 9 January 1785. "Should the bill ever pass into law in its present form," he wrote, "it may and will be easily eluded." Madison probably had in mind the as- sessment's provision that allowed citizens not to name their denomination and thereby steer their taxes to a state general education fund. "It is chiefly obnoxious," he continued, "on account of its dishonorable principle and dangerous tendency" (Madison 1884, 1:131). For Madison, defeating Henry's assessment was primarily a matter of principle. This understanding is reflected in the nature of the "Memorial's" argument. It addresses specifics of Henry's bill and its immediate political consequences, but its true force is its theoretical ar- gumentation. While not ignoring immediate politics— indeed, while intending directly to influence them—the "Memorial" offers a philosophical understanding of the proper relationship between church and state.

The "Memorial's" Argument

The "Memorial and Remonstrance" consists of 15 arti- cles. Each article is written as if to stand alone, but there is an obvious sequence. Articles 1 through 4 argue from principle articles 5 through 14 offer pragmatic reasons for defeating Henry's proposed assessment. Article 15 returns to the principle articulated in article 1. Madison sets forth his doctrine of religious liberty in the first article. Although almost all commentators focus on it, its exact meaning has been missed.

The structure of article 1's argument follows Locke's social compact theory. In the *Second Treatise* ([1689a] 1960), Locke teaches that men are originally born into the state of nature, a condition in which every man possesses the rights to life, liberty, and property and the right to execute the law of nature. But because of the tendency of each man to execute the law of na- ture to his own advantage, no effective common law exists among men. The state of nature tends to break down into a state of war. To escape this situation of war and poverty that ill secures man's rights to life, lib- erty, and property, men enter into a social compact with one another. They consent equally to give up their full

¹² The text of Henry's assessment bill can be found in Buckley 1977, 188–89.

natural right to execute the law of nature in exchange for governance under the rule of law as expressed by the majority. Rights such as property, which in the state of nature are left to each individual to secure for himself, are protected by common civil law executed by a government whose ultimate authority derives from the unanimous consent of the governed.

Following Locke, the "Memorial" begins with a statement of natural rights: Men have a natural right to exercise religion according to conviction and conscience. Madison derives this right from the "fundamental and undeniable truth" that had been set forth previously in Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights:

Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence. (article 1)

The "Memorial" presupposes this truth as its fundamental starting point. It does not attempt to demonstrate how or why religion can be directly only by reason and conviction; it takes this as given.¹³

Because the exercise of religion must follow one's own conscience and conviction, it is a particular kind of natural right, an inalienable natural right. Madison gives two reasons why. The first is

because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men. . . . (article 1)

Since religion is a matter of conviction and conscience, the essence of religion is opinions—namely, opinions about the duties man owes to the Creator and how those duties ought to be discharged. And opinions, Madison says, depend only on the evidence contemplated by the mind. He follows here the argument of Locke's ([1689b] 1983) *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Every man, Locke claims, comes to his opinions and beliefs individually by virtue of the evidence he sees and finds persuasive. Since opinions and beliefs can be shaped by evidence alone, no man can impose his opinions on any other man: all that can be proffered is persuasive evidence and argument. Similarly, no man can simply accept the opinions of another, even if he wishes to, if he is not truly persuaded (Locke [1689b] 1983, 27). Opinions, then, are very different from other types of property such as land and money. Whereas a man can freely give away his money or have it stolen from him, no man can cede or lose his opinions unless he loses his mind. The right to one's opinions, accordingly, is different from one's right to other forms of property.

¹³ Gary Rosen (1999, 23) identifies this starting point as "the obvious Protestant subtext" of the "Memorial and Remonstrance." Rosen then draws out the following theological implications: "Religious truth becomes a particular sort of experience rather than a doctrine. In this view, sincerity takes the place of right-thinking and -acting." Rosen is correct that the starting point of Madison's argument is compatible with certain strains of Protestantism, but this does not make Madison's argument necessarily Protestant or even theological. Madison leaves it unclear whether the "Memorial's" argument is theological, strictly rational, or both.

Whereas men transform their natural right to one's possessions into a civil right to property upon entering into the social compact, men do not similarly transform the right to their opinions. Opinions by their nature cannot be alienated, and therefore religion, which is essentially opinion, is an inalienable natural right.¹⁴

The second reason Madison gives for the inalienable character of man's natural religious right is that

what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. (article 1)

Here, again, Madison relies on a distinction made by Locke in *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Civil society, Locke maintains, arises in order to overcome war and poverty. At the most basic level, the social compact aims at the protection of life and to secure the conditions that allow for material comfort (Locke [1689b] 1983, 26). Religion, in contrast, is concerned with the good of the soul, which means, ultimately, either eternal salvation or damnation (Locke [1689b] 1983, 28). Madison assumes Locke's separation of religion from civic obligations and, from this, concludes that religious duties take precedence over the claims of civil society. Religious duties are precedent in time because a man's relationship with God exists prior to his citizenship. More importantly, religious duties are precedent in degree of authority because man's eternal soul is of higher status than his temporal body. Just as no rational man would ever sacrifice his eternal soul for the temporary good of his body, a man could never rationally forsake his duties to God in order to fulfill his duties as a citizen. Duties of citizenship—that is, the obligations one agrees to upon entering the social compact—cannot trespass upon duties to God. It would be irrational and contrary to the gravity and nature of man's religious obligations for men to agree to a social compact that includes religious obligations or precepts. Religion, thus, is an inalienable natural right.

Having established the inalienable nature of man's natural religious right, Madison's argument reaches its pinnacle:

We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society,

¹⁴ Madison also makes the distinction between alienable (e.g., money) and inalienable (e.g., opinions) types of property in his essay on property, which appeared in the *National Gazette* in 1792:

In its larger and juster meaning, it [property] embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right, and which leaves to every one else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandise, or money, is called his property. In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them. . . . In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights. . . . Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on the positive law, the exercise of that being a natural and unalienable right. (1981, 186–87; Madison's emphasis)

and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. (article 1)

The inalienable character of man's natural right to religion has a precise meaning and implication.¹⁵ Because man's religious right is inalienable, it does not become part of the social compact. Literally, it is not alienated; men retain what they possessed in the state of nature. The status of man's religious right, then, is different from property rights such as land and money within the social compact. Whereas the right to land or money is limited equally within civil society (and thereby better secured), religion, Madison says, "is wholly exempt from its [civil society's] cognizance."

Used in a legal sense, the word "cognizance," then as now, means "the action of taking judicial or authoritative notice," or "jurisdiction." More generally, it means "knowledge," "perception," or "the state of being aware of" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "cognizance"; see also the entries under "cognition" and "cognizance" in Johnson 1755 and Ash 1775). A state noncognizant of religion lacks jurisdiction over religion. It may not take authoritative notice of or perceive religion or the religious affiliation of its citizens. A government noncognizant of religion, in other words, must be blind to religion. It cannot use religion or religious preference as a basis for classifying citizens. This is the doctrinal teaching of the "Memorial and Remonstrance." The state, which is a product of the social compact between men originally born in the state of nature, must remain noncognizant of religion because religion is not a part of the social compact. Religion cannot be part of the social compact because of the inalienable character of man's right to direct his religion according to conviction and conscience.¹⁶

Insofar as Henry's bill is cognizant of religion, then, it usurps power. It violates the fundamental principles of the social compact. This is why Madison uses the language of tyranny and slavery in article 2 of the

"Memorial." The preservation of free government, he says, requires, first, the separation of powers, but also, and more importantly, that no branch of government "overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of people." This great barrier is the social compact through which the people grant legitimate authority to those who govern. Rulers guilty of an encroachment on the social compact "exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants." It may seem hyperbolic and demagogic to characterize the Virginia House of Delegates as tyrannical if they pass a bill favored by a majority of the voting citizens, but Madison's point is that every encroachment of the social compact, even a popular one, usurps power. It is to rule without legitimate consent, which is tyranny. "The People who submit to it," Madison continues, "are governed by laws made neither by themselves, nor by an authority derived from them. . . ." (article 2). No free people can approve legislation that classifies citizens and grants them benefits on account of their religious affiliation, because religion lies outside the jurisdiction of any social compact that respects and secures natural rights.

In the "Memorial's" fourth article, Madison derives the implications of "noncognizance" with regard to equality. "If all men are by nature equally free and independent," Madison reasons,

all men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all they are to be considered as retaining an *equal* title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience. . . . As the [Henry's] Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions. (article 4; Madison's emphasis)

Madison does not identify whom the law burdens but presumably he means non-Christians. Like everyone else, they had to pay the tax, but their religions alone were not eligible for funding under the bill. The "extraordinary" privilege Madison rails against is that Quakers and Mennonites (or "Menonists," as both the bill and Madison called them) would receive their appropriations with no restrictions attached. On its face, this exception does not seem like a distinct privilege but rather a realistic accommodation for denominations that lacked ministers of the gospel—in order to use the funds appropriated to them for Christian education, Quakers and Mennonites would have to fall under a different set of rules. A corollary to the doctrine of "noncognizance," however, is equality. Members of different religions may not be treated differently on account of their religion, because any legal exemption or exception based on religious affiliation by definition takes religion into the state's cognizance. To grant exemptions or exceptions on the basis of religious affiliation requires the recognition of religion. All exemptions and exceptions, therefore, no matter how miniscule or convenient, violate the principle of

¹⁵ For a discussion of the founders' understanding of the difference and relationship between natural rights and civil rights, see Hamburger 1993.

¹⁶ Although the "Memorial and Remonstrance" adopts Locke's basic social contract framework, Madison's derivation of the principle of "noncognizance" represents a significant break from Locke. In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke does not speak of religion as an "inalienable" right, nor does he claim that the state must remain noncognizant of religion. He explicitly says that civil magistrates are not obliged to tolerate "opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society" (Locke [1689b] 1983, 49). In this context, Locke famously teaches that civil magistrates need not tolerate atheists or "that church [whose members] . . . *ipso facto* deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince" (p. 50), i.e., Catholics. Locke clearly allows the state to be cognizant of a citizen's religious belief or lack thereof. Madison breaks from Locke on this point; his principle of "noncognizance" is uniquely his own. In this context, one should also note that other leading American founders adopted an approach more Lockean than Madisonian. George Washington, for example, did not share Madison's conclusion that the state must remain noncognizant of religion. For a discussion of Washington's differences from Madison on matters of church and state, see Muñoz 2003.

religious liberty.¹⁷ The principle of equality follows from the principle of "necognizance."¹⁸

Articles 5 through 14 of the "Memorial" offer pragmatic arguments. The assessment should be rejected, Madison contends, because it implies either that the civil magistrate is a competent judge of religious truth or that he may employ religion as an engine of civil policy (article 5), is not needed for the support of the Christian religion (article 6), will corrupt the purity and efficacy of religion (article 7), is unnecessary for the support of civil government (article 8), is a signal of persecution and thus will discourage immigration (article 9) and encourage emigration (article 10), will

¹⁷ I disagree with Steven D. Smith's criticism of the "Memorial" regarding its treatment of Quakers and Mennonites. Smith (2000, 66–68) writes, "The fudginess in Madison's treatment of Quakers and Mennonites points to a larger problem that afflicted Madison's 'Memorial and Remonstrance' at all levels"; namely, that Madison begged the question of the meaning of religious liberty by appealing to "equality." Smith fails to recognize that Madison's use of "equality" in article 4 derives from his social compact argument in article 1. Smith thus does not see the solid grounds from which Madison derives his principle.

¹⁸ Although I agree with most of Weber's (1982) interpretation, I disagree with his contention that equality is the fundamental teaching of the "Memorial and Remonstrance." The "Memorial's" argument from equality, Weber correctly points out, clearly reveals Madison's understanding that a proper church–state relationship requires the state to treat all religions and religious citizens equally to one another and equally to nonreligious citizens. Equality does not exhaust the principle of "necognizance," however. The demand for equal treatment could be met while still using religion as a basis for classification (the 1790 census, discussed below, is an example of such a case). To say the same thing differently, equality relates only to the application of a law to different classes of citizens; it says nothing about the authority of the state to make those classifications in the first place. In the assessment case, equality demands that all citizens be treated equally regardless of religion. But equality alone does not consider whether the state has the authority to pass an assessment for religion. The "Memorial's" fundamental teaching, with which it both begins and ends, is jurisdiction—namely, that states lack jurisdiction to enact a law that takes cognizance of religion. This is why Madison concludes in article 15 by calling Henry's bill a dangerous "usurpation" by the legislature, violating "the trust committed to them." While the assessment does violate the equality "which ought to be the basis of every law," its most egregious offense is its "dangerous abuse of power," which will allow the legislature to act tyrannically, thus enslaving the people.

The shortcoming in Weber's interpretation is that he overemphasizes article 4 of the "Memorial" at the expense of recognizing Madison's social compact argument in article 1. This leads him to misinterpret article 15 of the "Memorial," which begins "Because, finally, 'the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other rights." Weber takes this statement to mean that individuals' religious rights are protected just like other natural rights. For Madison, Weber contends, "religion is an inalienable right on a par with other natural rights such as life and property" (p. 185). Madison's point in article 15 is actually that religious rights, like other rights, are secure only if the legislature respects the terms of the social compact. Both inalienable natural rights (religion) and natural rights limited and protected as equal civil rights (property) are secured by the maintenance of the social compact. Madison's point is not that they have the same status under that compact, but that they are both protected by respecting the limits of the compact. Nonetheless, I agree with Weber's conclusion that "Madison's principle [of religious liberty] was that religious individuals had the same rights and privileges—and no other—as any other individuals and associations" (p. 185). It is precisely because religion is an inalienable natural right, different from other natural rights, that this conclusion is true.

encourage rivalry between sects to control the government (article 11), is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity (article 12), and is obnoxious to a great proportion of the citizens, who will not follow the law, thus enervating the authority of the law in general (article 13), and because a matter of such importance should not be imposed without the clearest evidence of a support of the majority, which is not secured (article 14).¹⁹ Article 15, as mentioned, concludes the "Memorial" by returning to its social compact foundations. The principal and principled argument of the "Memorial," to repeat, is that the exercise of religion is an inalienable natural right and therefore that religion is not part of the social compact. The state, accordingly, must remain necognizant of religion, which means that it can neither privilege nor punish citizens on account of religion or religious affiliation.

The "Memorial and Remonstrance" offers Madison's most comprehensive philosophical statement on the fundamental political principles excluding religion as such from civil jurisdiction. It stands as the pinnacle of his theoretical reflections on the subject of church and state. We must not overlook, though, that Madison was a man of political practice as well as political philosophy. He labored for the cause of religious liberty throughout his entire political career, from his first year in the Virginia House of Delegates to his final station as the nation's foremost retired statesman. These efforts offer ample material to test any hypothesized interpretation of Madison's principle of religious liberty. A careful consideration of these events demonstrates that the principle of "necognizance" consistently explains Madison's actions. Madison maintained an unwavering commitment to the maxim that the state may neither privilege nor penalize citizens on account of their religion.

MADISON'S POLITICAL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Madison's Revision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights

Madison's first political contribution to the cause of religious liberty took the form of a proposed amendment to the religion article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. In the late spring of 1776, Virginia's Revolutionary Convention moved to adopt a declaration of rights. George Mason's slightly revised initial draft stated,

That religion or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be governed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpublished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under colour of religion, any many disturb the peace the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the

¹⁹ For a helpful restatement of the bare bones on the "Memorial's" argument, see Braun 1997, 245.

mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity, towards each other. (Madison 1962–91, 1:173)

Dissatisfied with Mason's text, Madison initially proposed the following revision:

That Religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accord[ing] to the dictates of Conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities unless under &c. (Madison 1962–91, 1:174)

Most commentators highlight Madison's replacement of Mason's language of toleration with the language of rights (see, e.g., Buckley 1977, 18; Dreisbach 2000, 14; and Hunt 1902, 1:166).²⁰ More important, however, is Madison's clarification of what the right of free exercise means. Men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of religion according to conscience; therefore, Madison explains, no man or class of men is to be invested with particular privileges or subject to particular penalties on account of religion. The full and free exercise of religion and freedom of conscience means no privileges or penalties on account of religion (cf. Soifer 2000).²¹ Madison says here exactly the same thing he would declare a decade later in the "Memorial and Remonstrance." Religious citizens are to be treated the same as all other citizens, with no distinctions made on the basis of religious affiliation. Civil government is to be blind to religion as such.

The Virginia convention quickly rejected Madison's proposed amendment because his language seemed incompatible with the existing Anglican establishment (Buckley 1977, 19). If no class of men was eligible for peculiar emoluments on account of their religion, then Anglican clergy could not be employed by the state. Instead, Virginia adopted an amendment that declared that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience. . . ."²² The exact parameters of "free exercise of religion" were left unstated, and debate over the Anglican establishment was left for another day. Madison, however,

had already arrived at his understanding of the principle of religious liberty. A decade later, when political circumstances had changed, he would bring Virginia's law of religious freedom more in accordance with his understanding of the right to religious freedom.

Madison and the Drafting of the Bill of Rights

By 1789 Madison had left the Virginia House of Delegates to represent Virginia in the U.S. House of Representatives. One of his first legislative aims was to secure the adoption of a bill of rights. The drafting of the First Amendment, however, offers little guidance in understanding Madison's principle of religious liberty. Along with nearly every member of the Constitutional Convention, Madison did not think a bill of rights essential to the protection of liberty.²³ Republican liberty required a carefully designed system of representation, the separation of powers, and the cultivation of republican character in an extended, diverse, commercial republic—elements that were provided by the unamended Constitution. Bills of rights were no more than parchment barriers and, therefore, not to be relied on.²⁴

Madison's view of the necessity of adopting a bill of rights would change, but not his appreciation of its utility for protecting liberty. Robert Goldwin (1997, especially chaps. 4, 5) has demonstrated persuasively that Madison's leadership in securing amendments to the Constitution was primarily defensive. Madison's intention was to keep the promise made to those states that had ratified the Constitution expecting amendments. At the same time, he sought to silence the Constitution's critics and to prevent a second meddlesome and damaging constitutional convention.²⁵ Last in his priorities was to procure amendments that might do some good in further protecting the essential liberties of the people.²⁶ For Madison, the adoption of the Bill of Rights was more pragmatic than principled. This is why later in his life he identified the battle for disestablishment in Virginia and the Virginia Statute, and not the debates in First Congress and the First Amendment, as "where religious liberty is placed on its true foundation and is defined in its full latitude" (Fleet 1946, 554). It is naïve and mistaken to turn to the drafting of the First Amendment to find Madison's deepest reflections on religious liberty.

Compounding this difficulty is also the fact that the final text of the First Amendment was the product of

²⁰ For a discussion of the difference between religious "toleration" and religious "liberty," see Palm 1997.

²¹ Michael McConnell (1990) fails to address the meaning of Madison's proposed language "therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities." Because of his use of Sanford Cobb's incomplete historical account of Madison's proposed revisions (see footnote 11), McConnell appears to be unaware that Madison offered such language.

²² The following was adopted as Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights:

That religion, or the duty to which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.

²³ The Constitutional Convention spent almost no time considering whether to include a bill of rights in the Constitution. When adopting a bill of rights was proposed on September 12, no state delegation voted in favor of the motion (Farrand 1966, 2:583). See also James Wilson's recollection during the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of the Constitutional Convention's near-unanimous opinion of the lack of necessity of a bill of rights (Farrand 1966, 3:143–44).

²⁴ For Publius' (Hamilton) classic Federalist statement against a bill of rights. See *Federalist* 84 (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay [1788] 1961).

²⁵ For Madison's (1884, 1:386) view of the possible danger of a second constitutional convention, see his letter to Edmund Randolph, 10 April 1788.

²⁶ See Madison's (1884, 1:446–48) letter to George Eve, 2 January 1789.

debate and compromise within and among legislative committees. The religion clauses, in particular, went through several changes offered by numerous congressmen. Although Madison certainly had his influence, he was not the sole author and, hence, not simply responsible for the adopted text.²⁷

What we know for certain is that Madison drafted the initial text proposed and that he made a few comments on subsequent proposals on the House floor. His initial proposal consisted of two amendments. For the national government he suggested,

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner or in any pretext, infringed. (1962–91, 12:201)

He also proposed an amendment to apply against the states,

No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience. (1962–91, 12:201)

If we are searching for what Madison hoped to secure, it is reasonable to assume that he expressed it in his initial drafts (Weber 1982, 174).

The one clear principle that emerges is that Madison sought to prevent the federal government from penalizing citizens because of their religious affiliation. This can be seen in his proposal that “the civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religion or worship.” Madison also sought to prohibit a certain class of privileges toward religion—“nor shall any national religion be established”—and prevent infringements of the liberty of conscience by both the national and the state governments. What he meant by “an establishment of religion” and “the equal rights of conscience” is clarified by a statement he made on the House floor on 15 August 1789. At the time, the text under consideration was, “No religion shall be established by Law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed,” which was close to his initial proposal minus the first clause:

MR. MADISON said he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience; whether the words were necessary or not he did not mean to say, but that had been required by some of the state conventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave power to congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience or establish a national religion. To prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of language would admit. (*Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789–1834, 1789, 1:758*)

Madison thought that the proposed text made clear that Congress lacked authority to legislate a traditional

establishment akin to the Anglican Church's privileged position in England. What is most revealing in his comment, however, is the indifference it reveals toward the precise language used. The real purpose of the amendment and the Bill of Rights as a whole, Madison says, is to satisfy those who ratified the Constitution with reservations. He is recorded here as saying that it is not necessary to say whether such an amendment is necessary, but all familiar with his politics knew that one year earlier he had vehemently argued that such an amendment was absolutely unnecessary. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention on 12 June 1788, Madison had argued that “there is not a shadow of a right in the general government to intermeddle with religion” and that the national government's “least interference with it [religion] would be a most flagrant usurpation” (Elliot 1836, 3:330). Because the national legislature's powers were enumerated, what was not granted was denied. With or without an amendment, Congress lacked all authority over religion, and thus, the exact language used to restrict Congress's power over religion did not matter. Any language aimed at restricting Congress would be redundant.

The only amendment imposing a new, substantive restriction on governmental power was Madison's proposal to prohibit state governments from violating the equal rights of conscience. This is why Madison called it “the most valuable amendment on the whole list” (*Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789–1834, 1789, 1:784*). Unfortunately, during Congress's deliberations, Madison was never recorded clearly defining what he meant by the “equal rights of conscience.” His August 15 statement directed at the national amendment that prohibited Congress from infringing the “equal rights of conscience” would have prohibited states, in his recorded words, from “compel[ling] men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.” This provides some insight into one type of state legislation that Madison intended to prohibit, but whether this is all that the “equal rights of conscience” covers is unclear. Also unclear is how Madison would have legally defined “compulsion” and “the worship of God.”

Given Madison's expressly stated political intention in securing a bill of rights and the paucity and unreliability of the congressional record, the drafting of the First Amendment is a relatively poor source of information for Madison's doctrine of religious liberty. From what can be determined, Madison's proposals in the First Congress approach the principle of “noncognizance.” Madison's proposed clause preventing the national government from abridging the civil rights of citizens on account of their religion is the same as the no-penalty provision. His prohibition against the establishment of any national religion and his restrictions on infringements of the equal rights of conscience approach the no-privilege provision.²⁸ Thus regarding

²⁷ For a discussion of the degree to which Madison is responsible for the final text of the First Amendment's religion clauses, see Drakeman 1983.

²⁸ No privileges on account of religion may be what Madison meant by “the equal rights of conscience,” but he does not say so as explicitly as he did in the drafting of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Madison may have limited what he was willing to state on the House

Madison's actions in the drafting of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, we can say that they are consistent with the doctrine of "noncognizance," though they do not reaffirm it in its full latitude.

Madison on Government Classifications Based on Religious Affiliation

When Madison first had the opportunity to interpret the First Amendment a few months later, however, he returned to his strict "noncognizance" doctrine. In early 1790, following Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, the House of Representatives made preparations to conduct the first national census. Madison suggested that in addition to obtaining an enumeration of the population, the census include questions that might provide information useful to Congress, such as the relative proportions of citizens engaged in agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce (*Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789–1834*, 1790, 1:1115). There was a limit, however, to what questions Congress could ask. The census, he said, should ascertain information "only so far as to be extremely useful, when we come to pass laws, affecting any particular description of people." It could not ask, therefore, whether a citizen was a religious minister:

As to those who are employed in teaching and inculcating the duties of religion, there may be some indelicacy in singling them out, as the General Government is proscribed from interfering, in any manner whatever, in matters respecting religion; and it may be thought to do this, in ascertaining who, and who are not ministers of the Gospel. (*Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789–1834*, 1790, 1:1146)

Madison's comments suggest two problems with asking citizens if they are religious ministers. First, knowing the relative number of ministers would in no way be useful to Congress. Ministers as such could never properly be the subject of legislation because the Constitution proscribes the federal government from intermeddling with religion. Second, the very act of ascertaining who is and who is not a minister itself violates constitutional principles. To identify ministers as ministers is to classify citizens on account of their religion. Even

in something as innocuous as a census, Madison stood firm on the principle of "noncognizance."²⁹

Madison had taken exactly the same position on a different issue two years earlier. In 1788 he had received a letter from John Brown, a leading politician from Kentucky, asking his opinions about Thomas Jefferson's draft of a constitution. Jefferson had published his proposed constitution for Virginia as an appendix to *Notes on the State of Virginia*, and it was being read with attention because Kentucky was drafting its own constitution in preparation for statehood. Jefferson's constitution included a provision excluding "ministers of the gospel" from the legislative assembly, a practice that was common at the time, especially in the South.³⁰ In his response to Brown, Madison singled out this exclusion for particular disparagement:

EXCLUSIONS. Does not the exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel as such violate a fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right? does it [not] violate another article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power? does it not violate justice by at once taking away a right and prohibiting compensation for it? does it not in fine violate impartiality by shutting the door against the Ministers of Religion and leaving it open for those of every other. (1900–10, 5:288)³¹

To single out ministers for exclusion from political office penalizes them on account of religion. It is to act on the basis of religion, which is what the principle of religious liberty forbids. Here, again, Madison requires the law to be blind to the religious affiliation of citizens.

Madison on Government Support to Religion as Such

As president, Madison employed the principle of "noncognizance" to veto two congressional statutes. In February 1811, Congress passed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church of Alexandria, D.C. In addition to recognizing the church as a corporate

floor on account of his experience in Virginia. Just as Virginia had a state establishment in 1776, six of the 13 states had official religious establishments in 1789. To deny explicitly the states' authority to privilege religion as such surely would have been rejected out of hand, just as it was in Virginia in 1776. One of the primary reasons Madison doubted the efficacy of adopting a bill of rights, in fact, was that any public attempt to define the rights of the people would fail to do so in the requisite latitude. "I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular," he wrote to Jefferson in 1788, "if submitted to public definition, would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed [federal] power" (Madison 1884, 1:424). Madison may have hoped to secure whatever vague language he could and then to define it later when the opportunity presented itself. Regardless, Madison would have at least denied explicitly some forms of privilege to religion, which may or may not have included all privileges to religion as such.

²⁹ Irving Brant (1951, 17–18) interprets Madison's remarks on the census to support his larger contention that Madison sought to prohibit all federal aid to religion. While it is true that Madison would prohibit aid to religion as such, Brant fails to recognize that this conclusion is derivative from Madison's principle of "noncognizance." The principle of "noncognizance" also forbids singling out religion for denial of aid. Madison would prevent the government from knowing the religious affiliation of its citizens, which means that government may not single out religion for either privilege or penalty. Because of privacy concerns (see Mr. Livermore's objections in *Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789–1834*, 1790, 1:1145), the 1790 census asked only the names and number of persons in every household.

³⁰ About half the states belonging to the Union in the first half-century after independence, including Virginia, had constitutional provisions excluding clergymen and ministers of the gospel from serving in their state legislatures (Stokes 1950, 1:622–28).

³¹ Madison's reference "to another article of the plan" refers to text just three paragraphs below the provision excluding clergymen from public office, which stated, "The general assembly shall not have power to infringe this constitution, to abridge the civil rights of any person on account of his religious belief, to restrain him from professing and supporting that belief. . . ." The relevant passages of Jefferson's draft of a constitution can be found in Jefferson 1904, 2:286–87.

body, the bill specified rules for electing and removing the church's ministers. This, Madison said, would make the church a religious establishment by law. It would subject sundry rules and proceedings pertaining purely to the church's internal organization to enforcement by the state. A government blind to religion cannot make or enforce laws for the internal governance of a church. Madison (1984-, 3:176) also objected to Section 8 of the bill, which stated, "That it shall and may be lawful for the said vestry to make such provisions for the support of the poor of the said church as shall by them be thought proper. . . ." This provision, Madison (1984-, 3:176) claimed, "would be a precedent for giving to religious Societies as such, a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty."³² The most important words of Madison's sentence are "as such." His objection is not that the bill would allow a religious society to participate in the carrying out of public duties, but that a specific legal sanction to help the poor in a bill of incorporation would suggest that the church had legal sanction to help the poor because it was a church. Madison objects to giving religious societies as such a legal agency in carrying into effect public duties, which means giving religious groups a special privilege because they are religious. It is the singling-out of religion, the treating of religious groups as religious groups as such, that violates the Constitution.³³

For the same reason, Madison vetoed a second bill concerning religion one week later. Congress passed a bill resolving the land claims of five individuals in the Mississippi territory.³⁴ The sixth section of the bill granted five acres to the Baptist church, which had erected a meeting house on the land. Madison (1984-, 3:193) vetoed the bill on the straightforward grounds that

reserving a certain parcel of land of the United States for the use of said Baptist Church, comprizes [*sic*] a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the use and support of Religious Societies. . . .³⁵

³² Congress first passed the bill on 8 February 1811. Following Madison's veto, the House of Representatives debated the constitutionality of the bill and the means of reconsidering it before voting against its passage on 23 February 1811. See *Annals of Congress*, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, 129, 453, 828, 983–85, 995–98.

³³ James Hutson (2001, 16–17) claims that the veto represents Madison's effort undertaken later in life to limit the political influence of ecclesiastical institutions, i.e., that Madison targeted religious institutions for unfavorable treatment. In his "Detached Memoranda," Madison does warn that "there is an evil which ought be guarded agst [*sic*] in the indefinite accumulation of property from the capacity of holding in perpetuity by ecclesiastical corporations." But Madison also says that "the power of *all corporations*, ought to be limited in this respect" (Fleet 1946, 556; emphasis added). Madison's concern about the accumulation and concentration of property was not exclusively about the property of religious institutions as Hutson seems to suggest.

³⁴ "An Act for the relief of Richard Tervin, William Coleman, Edwin Lewis, Samuel Mims, Joseph Wilson, and the Baptist church at Salem meeting house, in the Mississippi Territory," passed by Congress on 20 February 1811 (*American State Papers*: 10, *Miscellaneous* 2:154).

³⁵ On 2 March 1811, both houses of Congress reconsidered the bill. The House failed to override Madison's veto, then passed the bill after removing Section 6. The Senate concurred on 3 March 1811. See *Annals of Congress*, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, 125, 127, 150–

Both vetoes reflected Madison's (1984-, 1:17) understanding that the rights of conscience and the functions of religion are, as he stated in his first inaugural address, "wisely exempted from civil jurisdiction."

It would seem that Madison violated his principle of "noncognizance" in 1812 when he issued the first of his four presidential proclamations declaring national days of prayer and thanksgiving. The practice of issuing religious proclamations had been started by George Washington and continued by John Adams. Jefferson refused to issue them and Madison sought to follow Jefferson's example. During the War of 1812, however, Congress requested that President Madison revive the tradition. In his "Detached Memoranda," (Fleet 1946, 562) Madison says that he issued the proclamations because he thought "it was not proper to refuse a compliance [to Congress] all together."³⁶ Removed from the exigencies of war and politics, however, Madison forthrightly revealed that his true position was that religious proclamations by the president violated the Constitution.

This revelation has been interpreted as conclusive proof that Madison stood for the "strict-separationist" wall between church and state (Brant 1951, 23). Madison's own explanation is more nuanced, however. First, Madison explicitly permits public leaders to make religious proclamations as private individuals, a point that is often overlooked:

In their individual capacities, as distinct from their official station, they [government officials] might unite in recommendations of any sort whatever, in the same manner as any other individuals might do. But then their recommendations ought to express the true character from which they emanate. (Fleet 1946, 560)³⁷

What violates the Constitution are religious proclamations made by a government official acting in his official capacity. Even though proclamations alone are only advisory, "they imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust delegated to political rulers" (Fleet 1946, 560). For the president acting in his official capacity to advise citizens to pray and give thanksgiving to God suggests that prayer is a legitimate subject for government legislation. But prayer, like every other aspect of

51, 329, 508, 900, 1098, 1103, 1105, 1106. See also Madison's (1884, 2:511–12) letter, dated 3 June 1811, to the Baptist Churches on Neal's Creek and on Black Creek, North Carolina, discussing his veto.

³⁶ Madison's four proclamations requesting days of prayer and thanksgiving can be found in Richardson 1896, 1:513, 532–33, 558, 560–61. A perusal of the text of the proclamations reveals Madison's ambivalence in issuing them. Each one begins with a statement that Congress has requested that such a proclamation be issued. Madison's first proclamation, which is typical of all four, begins, "Whereas the Congress of the United States, by a joint resolution of the two Houses, have signified a request that a day may be recommended to be observed by the people. . . ." Madison never takes personal responsibility for initiating the proclamations. He is extremely careful, moreover, to emphasize their advisory character. He "recommends" "to all those who shall be piously disposed to" pray to do so. Madison is also extremely careful to use nonsectarian language. He recommends that citizens render homage to the "Sovereign of the Universe" and "the Benefactor of Mankind" and celebrate "the goodness of the Great Disposer of Events."

³⁷ Locke ([1689b] 1983, 27) makes this same point in *A Letter Concerning Toleration*.

religious worship, is not a part of the social compact. To issue an official religious proclamation implies that the state has authority over religion, which indicates a lack of understanding of the legitimate authority of the state and nature of man's inalienable religious right.

In his "Detached Memoranda," Madison also writes that congressional and military chaplains violate the First Amendment for the same reason. The purpose of chaplains is to facilitate religious worship, and although "it [may] be proper that public functionaries, as well as their Constituents shd [sic] discharge their religious duties," such is not a proper object for the law (Fleet 1946, 560). It would have been much better proof of their pious feelings, Madison (1900–1910, 9:100) later wrote to Edward Livingston, if individual congressmen would have maintained a chaplain with contributions from their own pockets. The same would go for the military.

Madison's discussion of legislative chaplains nicely summarizes his doctrine of "necognizance" and how, in his judgment, that principle leads to better, safer politics. The selection of a legislative chaplain necessarily requires favoring one religion over others unless a chaplain of every denomination is employed. With such a selection before them, legislators are encouraged to think of themselves along sectarian lines. One sect's benefit is necessarily another sect's loss. "Necognizance" moderates sectarian politics by preventing the government from either privileging or punishing religion as such. Sectarian political aspirations are limited because religious affiliation is not allowed as grounds for government action. Legislators and citizens are thus encouraged to see themselves not as sectarian partisans, but as fellow citizens who mutually respect one another's rights. The multiplicity of sects further encourages this by giving every religion an interest in mutual toleration and respect. The intractable problem of religious oppression that follows from religious diversity is thus submerged within a republic dedicated to respecting individuals' natural rights.

The ground for the principle of "necognizance" is man's inalienable natural right to religious freedom. Because religion is not part of the social contract, government must remain blind to religion as such. It can neither privilege religion nor punish citizens on account of their religion. Madison held fast to this position throughout his entire political life, from his first year in the Virginia legislature, when he proposed amendments to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, to his last reflections as the "Father of the Constitution" in his "Detached Memoranda."

MADISON AND CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION JURISPRUDENCE

It is relatively easy to apply Madison's principle of religious liberty to contemporary constitutional controversies.³⁸ A Madisonian approach to the First Amendment would utilize the straightforward rule that

the state must remain necognizant of religion. No state actor or government policy could classify, punish, distribute, or withhold benefits from individual citizens or organizations on account of religion or religious affiliation. To borrow from contemporary civil rights discourse, the Constitution must be "religion blind."³⁹

The Establishment Clause

A Madisonian interpretation of the Establishment Clause would prevent the state from singling out religious citizens or religious organizations for any reason. Government policies that require cognizance of religion or religious affiliation in order to benefit religion, then, violate the First Amendment. The Nebraska taxpayer-funded legislative chaplaincy upheld by the Supreme Court in *Marsh v. Chambers* (1983) exemplifies such a violation. Nebraska became necognizant of religion in two ways: It hired an employee on the basis of religious affiliation—a prerequisite for the chaplain position, no doubt, was that one be a religious minister—and it employed an individual specifically to conduct a religious exercise, to open the state legislative session with a prayer. A second example of an impermissible state recognition of religion is the New York tax exemption upheld in *Walz v. Tax Commissioners of New York City* (1970). New York exempted from taxation real property "owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes" and used "exclusively for carrying out" such purposes. New York became impermissibly necognizant of religion from a Madisonian perspective when it made religion a criterion for a government classification (nontaxpayer status). For the same reason, a Madisonian approach also would have struck down the tax exemption ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in *Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock* (1989). The Texas statute in question exempted from sales and use taxes "[p]eriodicals . . . published or distributed by a religious faith . . . consist[ing] wholly or writings promulgating the teachings of the faith and books . . . consist[ing] wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith." Government must remain blind to religion, which means that it cannot benefit individuals or organizations on account of their religious character.

Walz offers a clear example of how "necognizance" differs from "nonpreferentialism." Chief Justice Warren Burger's majority opinion upheld the New York exemption on the grounds that tax exemptions for religious organizations are "deeply embedded in

the framers and drafters of the First Amendment. Madison did not explicitly propose the principle of "necognizance" in the First Federal Congress and his proposed amendment protecting the equal rights of conscience against state encroachments was not adopted. This article attempts only to offer a "Madisonian" approach to First Amendment religion jurisprudence, not a more general interpretation of the "original understanding" of the First Amendment's religion clauses.

³⁹ Philip B. Kurland (1961) advocated for the Court to adopt a test similar to Madison's position. Kurland did not, however, trace his position back to Madison, suggesting instead that a proper construction of the religion clauses "cannot now be confined to the application they might have received in 1789" (p. 5).

³⁸ It is important to note that one should not assume that Madison's principle of "necognizance" represents the "original intentions" of

the fabric of our national life" and that such policies reflect "benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise generally" without favoring one religion over others (Walz 1970, 676–77). His opinion invoked what has become standard "nonpreferentialist" reasoning: Government policies that aid religion meet constitutional muster if they support all religions equally. "Noncognizance" respects equality, but it does not make equality among religions the grounds for constitutional sanction. Under the principle of "noncognizance," what matters is whether the government makes religion a criterion for governmental classification. As a result, all religions stand in formal equality with one another before the law. But this is not all. Madison's principle also requires that religious individuals and organizations stand in formal equality with nonreligious citizens and organizations, a demand that "nonpreferentialism" does not make. In order for a tax exemption to pass Madisonian constitutional muster, it must base eligibility on a nonreligious classification, e.g., charitable nonprofit organizations. Religious organizations as well as nonreligious organizations then may apply for the exemption without needing to make reference to the religious or nonreligious character of their organization. An example of a permissible "religion-blind" tax exemption came before the Court in *Mueller v. Allen* (1983). The state of Minnesota allowed a state income tax deduction for tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses incurred for sending a child to any elementary or secondary school. Since the tax deduction did not inquire into the religious character of the child's school, the state remained noncognizant of religion.

The principle of "noncognizance" also forbids the state from using religious affiliation to exclude individuals or organizations from generally available benefits. If, for example, New York extended tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations but excluded religious organizations as such from qualifying for them, this would violate the First Amendment. In *Rosenberger v. University of Virginia* (1995), the Court evaluated a University of Virginia policy that explicitly excluded groups that sponsored religious activities from receiving student activity funds. Following its own rules, the university denied funding to a student group that published a multicultural Christian newspaper, despite its general policy of funding student-sponsored newspapers. A majority of the Supreme Court struck down the university regulation on the grounds that it violated the free speech rights of students. A Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment would have reached the same result on the grounds that to deny a student newspaper generally available newspaper funds because their paper contains religious content subjects religious students to a particular disability. The university became unconstitutional cognizant of religion by singling out religious activities for exclusion from generally available funds. The state must remain blind to religion, which means that if a public university chooses to fund student-sponsored newspapers, it cannot exclude religious newspapers because they are religious.

Rosenberger reflects the distance between a Madisonian approach to the Establishment Clause and "strict separationism." As discussed above, in *Rosenberger* Justice Souter (with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer agreed) offered a "strict-separationist" dissent that argued that to allow direct funding to core religious activities by an arm of the state violates the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter's "strict-separationism" demands that no government benefit directly support religion or religiously motivated activities. If pushed to its logical conclusion, it requires state actors to identify and to monitor religious recipients of benefits to ensure that they do not use them in a manner that directly supports religion. To ensure compliance with prior "strict-separationist" rulings, the University of Virginia adopted the safest course of action—singling out religious groups in order to deny funding them so as to avoid a possible Establishment Clause violation. Madisonian "noncognizance" requires a different course of action and a different line of inquiry. It asks whether the policy in question takes religion into account for either privilege or penalty. If religion or religious affiliation is not made the basis for qualification or exclusion, the policy stands. "Noncognizance" does not require state actors or judges to ask about or to monitor the use of governmental benefits by religious recipients. Quite the opposite, it prevents the state from taking religion or religious affiliation into its view.

The simplicity of the principle of "noncognizance" offers perhaps its most important advantage in the vexing realm of religion in public schools and public money supporting private religious schools. Madison would have viewed prayer in public schools in the same way that he viewed government-funded military chaplains and religious proclamations made by the president. Religion is not part of the social compact, and therefore, the state has no authority over religious exercises as such. States and state actors acting in their official capacity lack authority to command or direct religious activities. A Madisonian interpretation of the Establishment Clause, then, would have supported the Court when it ruled that public school officials cannot compose and direct prayer (*Engel v. Vitale* 1962) or mandate daily Bible readings at the beginning of the school day (*Abington v. Schempp* 1963). By the same principle, however, voluntary prayer and Bible readings by students—or even school officials when not acting in their official capacity—on public school grounds or at public school events are constitutional. A public school may not require such activities, but it also may not single out religious activities to prohibit them.

Regarding the constitutionality of public money going to private religious schools, the Madisonian approach would adjudicate the issue like any other policy of governmental funding. The government may not use religious affiliation as a classification or criterion for either privilege or penalty. The government may not fund schools because they are religious, but it also may not fund schools only because they have a religious affiliation. If the government chooses to adopt a general policy to fund educational programs in public and private schools, it may not adopt standards that take

religion into account. Religiously affiliated schools cannot be disqualified automatically from federal or state funds that provide, for example, sign-language interpreters for deaf students (upheld in *Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District* 1993), school teachers for remedial education for disadvantaged children (initially ruled unconstitutional in *Aguilar v. Felton* 1985 but then ruled constitutional in *Agostini v. Felton* 1997), or library services and computer hardware for secular education (upheld in *Mitchell v. Helms* 2000). The First Amendment prohibits religion or religious affiliation from entering the government's consideration. A Madisonian interpretation of the Establishment Clause would allow a general program of school vouchers, including vouchers to private religious schools, so long as religious schools are in no way singled out for special privileges or particular penalties. Similarly, "charitable choice" legislation, which extends government funding to faith-based organizations, would pass a Madisonian test as long as funding decisions do not require cognizance of religious affiliation.

The Free Exercise Clause

The same standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence would also apply to Free Exercise cases: Government must remain blind to religion and, hence, may not privilege or penalize religion as such. The dominant free exercise issue over the last decade has been whether the Free Exercise Clause grants to religious individuals and organizations exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that have the indirect effect of burdening religious exercise. As discussed above, Michael McConnell and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor invoke Madison as the founding father who champions religious exemptions. A proper understanding of Madison's principle of "noncognizance," however, leads to the conclusion that Madison would find religious exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws to violate the principle of religious liberty. To classify citizens or organizations as "exemption eligible" on account of religion requires the government to take cognizance of religion. It grants religion as such special treatment, which violates the principle of a "religion-blind" constitution. Madison would have agreed with most of the Court's early Free Exercise jurisprudence, which denied to religion and religious groups exemptions from generally applicable laws (e.g., *Reynolds v. United States* 1879; denying a practicing Mormon an exemption from federal laws banning bigamy and polygamy). He would have objected to the modern Court's introduction of a compelling state interest test in *Sherbert v. Vener* (1963; granting a religious exemption to a Seventh-Day Adventist from unemployment insurance regulations requiring Saturday work) and its subsequent implementation in *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972; granting Amish parents exemptions for state laws requiring school attendance past the eighth grade). He would have cited with approval the Court's return to its pre-*Sherbert* position in *Employment Division v. Smith* (1990; ruling that the Free Exercise Clause does

not grant religious individuals and organizations a constitutional right to exemptions from generally applicable laws that do not target religion but have the effect of burdening religious exercise). A Madisonian interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would prohibit the government from making laws that single out a religion or religion generally for unfavorable treatment. It would also deny the government the authority to make laws or exemptions singling out a religion or religion generally for favorable treatment under the law.

Although James Madison has been invoked by justices and judicial scholars for over 100 years, Madison's principle of religious liberty has never been fully recognized or adopted by the Supreme Court. Judges and scholars have failed to understand Madison's radical but simple teaching: Religion is not part of the social compact, and therefore, the state may not take religion within its cognizance. A Madisonian interpretation of the Establishment Clause would prevent the state from supporting religion as an end in itself, but it also would prevent the state from excluding religious individuals and organizations from generally available benefits supporting a secular purpose. A Madisonian interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would prevent the state from prohibiting religious exercises directly, but it would not extend to religious individuals and organizations special exemptions from generally applicable laws that indirectly burden religious exercise.

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Unreconstructed Democracy: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Case for Reparations

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W. E. B. Du Bois's observations about the links between Americans' unwillingness to acknowledge the legacies of slavery and the shortcomings of formal equality in the post-Reconstruction era anticipate the obstacles to racial justice in the "post-civil rights" era. His study of the "splendid failure" of Reconstruction indicates how a kind of willful national amnesia prevented black citizens from enjoying in fact the freedom and equality they were guaranteed by law. Arguing that the story of racial injustice is still importantly a story about memory's suppression, I use Du Bois's writings to explore the case for reparations as one element of a larger effort to expose the presence of the slave past and to undermine the continuing effects of slavery and Jim Crow.

Memory—of what has been, of acts of commission or omission, of a responsibility abdicated—affects the future conduct of power in any form. Failure to adopt some imaginative recognition of such a principle merely results in the enthrone of a political culture that appears to know no boundaries—the culture of impunity.

Wole Soyinka (1999)

Whereas the persistence of racial injustice poses a challenge for the present and future of American democracy, understanding and responding to such injustice requires a new orientation toward the past. It is in this regard that W. E. B. Du Bois's analysis of "the problem of the color-line" remains a powerful resource for reflection on contemporary politics in the United States. Through the study of Reconstruction and its aftermath, Du Bois provides a window onto the ways in which the American democratic project has been hobbled by the denial of the significance of slavery and the decades of Jim Crow segregation that followed from it. He also shows how this unwillingness to confront the past is connected to the failures of formal equality as an antidote to the poison of racial injustice. In so doing, he sheds light on the dilemmas of the "post-civil rights" era.¹

I aim to suggest how Du Bois's analysis of Reconstruction and the disappointments that followed illumi-

nates the disappointments that succeeded the triumphs of the civil rights era or "second Reconstruction." Focusing on his reflections on the "splendid failure" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 708) of Reconstruction in *The Souls of Black Folk* and *Black Reconstruction in America*, I explore Du Bois's account of the measures that would have been necessary to bridge the gap between formal guarantees of equal citizenship and substantive racial equality. Sustaining that gap, Du Bois attests, is an unwillingness to confront the unasked question of what the United States owed to the women and men who had been enslaved. My analysis focuses on three dimensions of this reticence: the absence of serious discussion about the kinds of economic policies that would have ensured the former slaves their freedom; the reluctance to acknowledge what Du Bois calls the "gifts" of African Americans, their contributions to the making of the United States; and the fundamental failure to come to terms with the denial of black humanity "at the heart of slavery" (Davis 1996). Contending that these issues continue to lurk behind debates about racial justice, I consider the case for reparations as a concrete "resistance to forgetting" (Minow 1998, 5), one element of a larger effort to acknowledge the afterlife of past racial injustices and to eliminate racial disparities in the distribution of power and powerlessness.

Writing in "the shadow of a deep disappointment," Du Bois ([1903] 1997, 40) apprehends the paradox of formal equality: The guarantees of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, though incalculably precious, engendered a kind of public forgetfulness about slavery and fed the Southern fury against the former slaves. "The War Amendments," he observes at the turn of the twentieth century, "made the Negro problems of to-day" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 45). While he would not relinquish those amendments, Du Bois ([1903] 1997, 125) perceives that the constitutional promise of rights that apply regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude" assured liberal-minded citizens that enough had been done, perpetuating the "carelessness" that characterized the national attitude toward the former slaves. Much the same can be said for the post-civil rights predicament. Black Americans fought hard for the formal guarantees embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting

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Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC, the 2001 meeting of the Collegium for African American Research in Sardinia, Italy, and the 2002 Riker Seminar and Frederick Douglass Institute Seminar at the University of Rochester. I am grateful for the comments of all of the participants at those sessions, as well as for careful readings by Joshua Dienstag, Roxanne Euben, Frederick Harris, George Klosko, James Johnson, Joel Olson, George Shulman, Valeria Sinclair-Chapman, Jeffrey Tucker, and Stephen White.

¹ Although I focus on "the color-line" between white and black Americans and insist on the centrality of slavery to the history of American democracy, I do not mean to imply that the black-white line is the *only* salient racial distinction in the United States or that African Americans are the only group of citizens who experience disadvantages on account of race.

Rights Act of 1965, and, like other vulnerable populations, they do not have the luxury of dispensing entirely with the language of formal equality in which those guarantees are framed.² At the same time, the promise enshrined in those laws has come to be interpreted in ways that allow white Americans to disown the past and its implications for the present, thereby compounding the disadvantages faced by the very people the laws were passed to protect. For example, Derrick Bell writes that the courts have collapsed the distinction between race-based remedies for decades of racial injustice and the segregationist policies of the Jim Crow period. The result of such interpretation is that, "for equal protection purposes, whites become the protected 'discrete and insular' minority" (Bell 1993, 80). Thus it becomes all the more difficult to summon the collective will to respond when activists and scholars identify disturbing trends in residential and educational segregation and the disadvantages they engender or when the wealth gap that white and black Americans have inherited from previous generations is exposed.³

One might acknowledge the paradox and still contend that it is reckless to respond by insisting on a relation between the shortcomings of Reconstruction in the nineteenth century and the unfinished business of the civil rights revolution in the twentieth. There are, to be sure, substantial differences between the two periods and reasons to be wary about easy comparisons between them. Known as the "nadir" of African American history, the years that followed Reconstruction witnessed the development of new forms of political, social, and economic oppression. Together with the organized terror of such groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the widespread practice of lynching, these forms of oppression instituted the regime of neoslavery that prevailed in the South until the Civil Rights Movement challenged it in the midtwentieth century. Moreover, the legitimacy of such developments was bolstered by historical accounts of Reconstruction, which painted the postwar experiment in black political participation as a disaster and blamed it for widespread corruption and fiscal mismanagement (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 711–29; Foner 1988, xix–xxvii). The Civil Rights Movement, in contrast, is viewed as a highpoint in U.S. history, and the visibility of powerful African Americans, the paeans to racial equality offered up by political leaders, and Americans' enthusiasm for Martin Luther King, Jr., Day celebrations indicate how much has changed.

Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the two reconstructions and their aftermaths, deep similarities remain. Although I can provide only a compressed discussion here, let me call particular attention to the ways in which both reconstructions were marked

by an absence of serious discussion about the sorts of economic changes required to counteract generations of exploitation and discrimination, a blindness toward the crucial role of African Americans in securing their own freedom and that of their fellow citizens, and a willingness to privilege the needs and feelings of whites over the implementation of black citizens' constitutionally guaranteed rights.⁴ In both cases, moreover, the passage of civil rights legislation was followed by a backlash—often couched in the rhetoric of self-help—against attempts to give concrete substance to legal promises. Tellingly, recent studies show that although white Americans are supportive of the principles of racial justice in a way that they were not during the Jim Crow era, they are resistant to policies that might realize those principles (Bobo and Smith 1998; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Thus one might reasonably conclude that the "carelessness" Du Bois discerns at the turn of the twentieth century remains in effect a century later.

I do not offer Du Bois's account of Reconstruction merely as a caution that history not be repeated, however. To do so is to neglect the larger contribution to the practice of democratic theory embodied in Du Bois's use of history. By drawing attention to the experiences and accomplishments of the invisible actors at the center of the conflict over slavery and Reconstruction, Du Bois imagines what a genuinely democratic society might look like. A "self-conscious creator of black counter-memory" (Blight 1994, 46), Du Bois concentrates on those Americans who have been excluded from the benefits of American democracy and from its history. In doing so, his work resonates with Judith Shklar's (1991, 15) suggestion that "one way to undertake a historically rich inquiry into American citizenship is . . . to investigate what citizenship has meant to those women and men who have been denied all or some of its attributes, and who ardently wanted to be full citizens." Consideration of one example from Du Bois's ([1903] 1997, 123) work indicates his contribution to democratic theory by calling attention to the limitations of legal guarantees of freedom from the vantage point of the ex-slave:

Free! The most piteous thing amid all the black ruin of war-time, amid the broken fortunes of the masters, the blighted hopes of mothers and maidens, and the fall of an empire,—the most piteous thing amid all this was the black freedman who threw down his hoe because the world called him free. What did such a mockery of freedom mean? Not a cent of money, not an inch of land, not a mouthful of victuals,—not even ownership of the rags on his back. Free!

² For an extended treatment of this paradox of formal equality, see Williams 1991.

³ The literature on these subjects is too extensive to be adequately surveyed here. Instead I simply mention three noteworthy treatments: Massey and Denton (1993) on residential segregation; Orfield, Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation (1996) on education; and Oliver and Shapiro (1997) on wealth.

⁴ On this last point, the fate of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) provides a forceful example. After unanimously outlawing segregation in public schools, the Supreme Court issued a second decision concerning implementation, *Brown II* (1955), in which it ordered that desegregation proceed "with all deliberate speed," thereby subordinating the constitutional rights of black schoolchildren to other considerations. In her essay on "whiteness as property," Cheryl Harris (1993, 1755) notes that this decision "articulated a new and heretofore unknown approach to rectifying violations of constitutional rights—an approach that invited defiance and delay." For a more thorough list of the parallels between the two post-reconstruction periods, see Klinkner and Smith 1999.

As the passage suggests, Du Bois's preoccupation with the condition of African Americans does not indicate a narrowness of perspective. His attention to "the broken fortunes of the masters" and "the blighted hopes of mothers and maidens" reveals an appreciation for the wider suffering wrought by the Civil War. In a similar vein, he advises, in a 1915 editorial in *The Crisis*, that the "fiction of failure" that represents Reconstruction (and the participation of African Americans in their own government) as the low point in American democracy also provides a basis for discrediting suggestions about extending the vote to women and immigrants (Du Bois 1915, 132). Both examples support Du Bois's insistence that much can be learned about the prospects for *all* citizens by studying the lives of a society's most vulnerable members and his insight into the *general* benefits that follow from policies that aim to improve the circumstances of particular groups.

Offering a counter to triumphalist narratives about American democracy, Du Bois's writings speak directly and critically to contemporary debates in American political science and public life. He anticipates, for example, much of the discussion occasioned by Rogers Smith's (1997) critique of the notion that the United States has been defined by a single, liberal political vision; and he offers sober reflections on the implications for American political culture of the continuing power of the "Lost Cause" tradition in which the legacy of the Confederacy is disconnected from slavery.⁵ His exploration of the concepts of equality and freedom simultaneously demonstrates how ardently he cherishes these ideals and exposes their consanguinity with the specifically American horrors of racial slavery and Jim Crow segregation. It reveals, furthermore, Du Bois's capacity to marry the material with the symbolic and psychological in a way that demands that his readers see the meaning of political principles from multiple perspectives. In his reflection on the valence of freedom during Reconstruction, for instance, Du Bois observes that "to the Negro 'Freedom' was God; to the poor white 'Freedom' was nothing—he had more than he had use for; to the planter 'Freedom' for the poor was laziness and for the rich, control of the poor worker; for the Northern business man 'Freedom' was the opportunity to get rich."⁶ Because the language of American democracy has been rendered "in different and unknown tongues" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 347), Du Bois's effort to bring to public attention the aspirations and experiences of citizens who have been systematically unheard from is itself a democratic act. It exemplifies

the kind of historical consciousness necessary to come to terms with the demands of democracy in the post-civil rights era.

RIGHTING RECONSTRUCTION HISTORY

Animating Du Bois's passion for retelling the story of Reconstruction is his assessment of the period as Americans' first genuine experiment in democracy. The years that followed the Civil War witnessed not only the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments but also the flowering of black political participation and the writing of more democratic state constitutions across the South. In light of these accomplishments, the susceptibility of Reconstruction history to distortion and glaring omissions suggests to Du Bois a deeper reluctance to admit the capacity of African Americans to inhabit the mantle of citizenship. When he begins his inquiry into "the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century" in *Souls*, he avers that it can be revealed only through the excavation of things that have been "buried" (De Bois [1903] 1997, 34); and the rest of the book is replete with allusions to burial, silences, veils, and ghosts. The subtitle of *Black Reconstruction* promises in a similar vein that the text to follow corrects a crucial absence from the historical record—"a history of the part which black folk played in the attempt to reconstruct democracy in America."⁷ Although he recognizes that his study will inevitably reopen wounds that have barely healed, Du Bois insists that nothing is more dangerous to democracy than a history that merely flatters. By straining "to paint the South as a martyr to inescapable fate" and "to make the North the magnanimous emancipator," accepted accounts of Reconstruction prevent honest evaluation (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 723). *Souls* and *Black Reconstruction* propose instead to restore the memory of African Americans' role in the undoing of their bondage and of the nation's unwillingness to part entirely with the vestiges of slavery that its commitment to democracy made untenable.

Both texts make plain the thinness of most white Americans' commitment to the emancipation of African Americans or their inclusion as equal partners in the polity. Racial slavery was the underlying cause of the Civil War, Du Bois contends, although abolition was not part of the North's original plan. Tracing attempts by the Union Army to deal with the thousands of fugitives who flooded their camps, he notes that the slaves were treated as "contraband" or returned to their masters before being recognized as "a military resource" by the Northern army (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 46; see also Du Bois [1935] 1964, chaps. 4, 5). He uses words uttered by Frederick Douglass in 1865 to capture the

⁵ Support for this view became, briefly, a topic of intense scrutiny during the confirmation hearings of Attorney General John Ashcroft and Interior Secretary Gale Norton. For Du Bois's reflections on the "Lost Cause" tradition, see Du Bois (1935) 1964, 704; for a summary of the history and significance of this tradition, see Blight 2001a.

⁶ Thomas Holt elaborates on this disjunction between the expectations of the former slaves and the Northern industrialists who sought to control them. Using C. B. Macpherson's notion of possessive individualism, Holt (1982) argues that the aim of the Northern "emancipators" was to transform the former slaves into a working class; freedom would thus mean the opportunity to compete in the market, and inequality would be accepted as a "natural" consequence of supply and demand.

⁷ Du Bois indicates the stakes of this kind of recovery when he relates that he was commissioned by *Encyclopedia Britannica* to write "a history of the American Negro," and the editors insisted on deleting any references to Reconstruction. When they refused to publish even a short statement about the different ways the period was remembered by black and white Americans, Du Bois withdrew his article (Du Bois 1964, 713; see also Lewis 2000, 232–35).

deeper meaning of the conflict: "The Civil War was begun 'in the interests of slavery on both sides. The South was fighting to take slavery out of the Union, and the North fighting to keep it in the Union; the South fighting to get it beyond the limits of the United States Constitution, and the North fighting for the old guarantees;—both despising the Negro, both insulting the Negro'" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 61). By this account, the freedom of black Americans was unintended. "It was the price of the disaster of war," according to Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 83), and the program of reconstruction was disabled from the start.

Consequently, the end of the Civil War abandoned the four million former slaves to a nether region between freedom and the deeper hell of slavery. To tell the story of this in-between state, Du Bois marshals an enormous amount of historical and sociological evidence. He captures the challenges posed by racial slavery and the difficulty of reconstructing American democracy with particular poignancy, however, when he distills the significance of a mass of data into a single, vivid image. Most effectively realized in *Souls*, this device reveals Du Bois's sensitivity to the complex claims that the past makes on the present and indicates the inadequacy of formal equality and the legal promise of freedom as a source of redress or a guarantor of future change. The following description of the "two passing figures of the present-past" provides just one example of Du Bois's ([1903] 1997, 54–55) deftness in limning the condition of American democracy as it entered Reconstruction:

... the one, a gray-haired gentleman, whose fathers had quit themselves like men, whose sons lay in nameless graves; who bowed to the evil of slavery because its abolition threatened untold ill to all; who stood at last, in the evening of life, a blighted, ruined form, with hate in his eyes;—and the other, a form hovering dark and mother-like, her awful face black with the mists of centuries, had aforesaid quailed at that white master's command, had bent in love over the cradles of his sons and daughters, and closed in death the sunken eyes of his wife,—aye, too, at his behest had laid herself low to his lust, and borne a tawny man-child to the world, only to see her dark boy's limbs scattered to the winds by midnight marauders riding after "cursed Niggers."⁸

This image, which exposes the violent intertwining of black and white, of past generations and future hopes, indicates the depth and force of the obstacles preventing black Americans from escaping the limbo between slavery and citizenship.

Despite his understanding of these obstacles, Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 703) cautions that there are only two alternatives: "either extermination root and branch, or absolute equality. There can be no compromise."⁹ What

would this "absolute equality" require? In what ways did Reconstruction promise that it could be realized? How was that promise retracted? To respond, I consider three dimensions of Du Bois's work on the period: his argument about the relationship between economic reconstruction and democratic ideals, his delineation of the contributions of black Americans to the nation, and his insistence that a denial of black humanity is at the root of the failure either to endorse the first of these lines of argument or to recognize the second.

Treating the economic claims of *Souls* and *Black Reconstruction* together requires some caution, for the later book is indebted to Marxian theory in a way that the earlier one is not. Whereas *Souls* criticizes the self-help philosophy of Booker T. Washington and blames the nation's abandonment of political and spiritual ideals on the ascendancy of the materialism of the Gilded Age, *Black Reconstruction* offers a full-blown analysis of the role of industrial capitalism in undoing the work of Reconstruction. There are moments when Du Bois's effort to shape the narrative of *Black Reconstruction* into a Marxian framework lends itself to infelicitous description (the former slaves and poor Southern whites become the black and white "proletariat"), but this book essentially fleshes out ideas embedded in the argument of its predecessor. In both texts, the assessment of the economic dimension of Reconstruction's promise and shortcomings is informed by twin convictions: that democracy must be grounded in an economically self-sustaining citizenry and that, through their labor on the land and in the army, the former slaves had more than earned the resources necessary for their independence.

The conception of democracy that animates both texts is characterized by the absence of gross inequality or the dependency that accompanies it.¹⁰ Democratic citizenship, for Du Bois, entails at least a basic education and the economic wherewithal to live a relatively comfortable life free from unearned debt. It encourages mutual cooperation among citizens, inculcates self-respect, and rewards such virtues as thrift and responsibility. Political institutions are served as well when economic self-sufficiency is combined with education and suffrage, Du Bois argues. Tracing the accomplishments of the Reconstruction legislatures, he shows how the entire region benefited from the inclusion of new voices in governmental deliberations and the challenge to the planters' oligarchical control. Although this connection between economic independence and citizenship is certainly not unique to Du Bois, what is distinctive is his examination of these values in the context of Reconstruction. Thus he presents the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, or Freedmen's Bureau, as an agent of large-scale social

⁸ For a more extended treatment of Du Bois's use of imagery to convey the meaning of vast historical events and of this image, in particular, see Blight and Gooding-Williams 1997, 13–16.

⁹ Here, Du Bois echoes Alexis de Tocqueville's ([1835] 1969, 362) assertion that "there is no intermediate state that can be durable between the excessive inequality created by slavery and the complete equality which is the natural result of independence."

¹⁰ Du Bois does not go so far as to call for complete economic equality in *Souls*. Rather his meaning is closer to Rousseau's ([1762] 1978, 75) conception of a society in which "no citizen should be so opulent that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is constrained to sell himself." In *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois goes further, maintaining that economically stratified democracies must find ways of redistributing wealth and income.

change. With responsibilities that included the establishment of schools in the postwar South, the administration of justice, and the dispersal of abandoned lands, the Freedmen's Bureau represents for Du Bois an institution that held out the promise of a lasting independence from the domination of the planters for poor Southerners, black and white. "The Freedmen's Bureau was the most extraordinary and far-reaching institution of social uplift that America has ever attempted," Du Bois insists. "It had to do, not simply with emancipated slaves and poor whites, but also with the property of Southern planters. It was a government guardianship for the relief and guidance of white and black labor from a feudal agrarianism to modern farming and industry" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 219).¹¹ Underfunded and lasting only seven years (from 1865 until 1872, with no budget after 1870), the Freedmen's Bureau was largely unable to accomplish its objectives. A Bureau designed to last for decades and to oversee "a careful distribution of land and capital and a system of education for the children," in contrast, might have translated the promise of Emancipation into genuinely equal citizenship (Du Bois 1910, 785).

To a great extent, Du Bois attributes Americans' inability to recognize the democratic potential of the Freedmen's Bureau to the perverse development of the "American Assumption." That assumption, the conviction that wealth is the reward for hard work and that anyone can achieve material success by dint of his or her own effort, may never have applied in the lives of most Americans (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 182–83). But turned against the freedmen and women, it distanced successive generations from the wrong of slavery and denied that those who profited from that wrong bore any ongoing responsibility for it.¹² "To give land to free citizens smacked of 'paternalism,'" Du Bois relates. "It came directly in opposition to the American assumption that any American could be rich if he wanted to, or at least well-to-do; and it stubbornly ignored the exceptional position of a freed slave" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 601–2). That such gifts were "showered" on the railroads during the same period mattered little (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 212). What the end of the Freedmen's Bureau signifies to Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 182), therefore, is not the triumph of a culture in which labor is rewarded but the ascendancy of a culture of wealth and power. Thus he contends that Northern industry was able to sound the death knell for Reconstruction when black emancipation no longer served its interests (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 187). This is not to say that only white Americans subscribed to this philosophy. Of Booker T. Washington's embrace of the "American Assumption" and his willingness to sacrifice political and civil rights in the name of economic development, Du Bois

([1903] 1997, 72) observes, "His doctrine has tended to make the whites, North and South, shift the burden of the Negro problem to the Negro's shoulders and stand aside as critical and rather pessimistic spectators; when in fact the burden belongs to the nation, and the hands of none of us are clean if we bend not our energies to righting these great wrongs."

One could argue that the "American Assumption," strictly applied, also makes the case for the redistribution of land and other resources to the former slaves. After all, it was their exertions that transformed the land into cotton and tobacco. Not only did black labor provide the underpinning for the antebellum South, Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 5) maintains, but it fueled the industrial development of the northern United States and Europe. To the claim that the former slaves were unwilling to work without the motivation of the lash, he replies with examples of blacks' eagerness to cultivate abandoned lands during the war. The "key to the situation," he writes, is that "the Negroes were willing to work and did work, but they wanted land to work, and they wanted to see and own the results of their toil" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 67; see also Foner 1988, 50–60, and Litwack 1979, 387–408). Furthermore, he discerns African Americans' extraordinary desire for economic independence in the fact that the Freedmen's Bureau—a symbol, to many white Americans, of black dependency and Northern imposition—was funded for its first year by the freedmen themselves through rents collected on the land on which they labored (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 602). Viewed in this light, the promise of "forty acres and mule" represents, not a hand-out, but "the righteous and reasonable ambition to become a landholder, which the nation had all but categorically promised the freedmen" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 56). It is unsurprising, then, that black leaders repeatedly returned to the issue of land distribution as their most fundamental concern, despite the intransigence of most white leaders on the issue (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 368).¹³ Reasonable though it may have been, this "land hunger" of the former slaves was met "with surprise and ridicule" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 602). Whereas the idea of compensating the former *slave owners* for their losses was seriously considered by Abraham Lincoln himself (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 150),¹⁴ proposals to pay the former slaves were generally dismissed as a weapon to punish the South (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 602).¹⁵

One must be careful here not to misread Du Bois's insistence on the value of economic independence and

¹¹ It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a critical account of the notion of racial uplift that informs Du Bois's views at the turn of the twentieth century (see Gaines 1996).

¹² For example, Andrew Johnson's (1908, 399) 1866 veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill appeals to the American Assumption in its criticism of the Bureau for offering aid not enjoyed by "the thousands, not to say millions, of the white race who are honestly toiling from day to day for their subsistence."

¹³ Representative Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) and Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA) were two important exceptions.

¹⁴ Economist William Darity, Jr. (1990, 5), notes that every case of compensation related to losses incurred under slavery in the Western Hemisphere has concerned reparations for slave owners, not the slaves or their descendants.

¹⁵ Recapitulating this logic, recent Supreme Court decisions have, according to Gary Orfield, treated school desegregation plans as a form of punishment for past segregation rather than a means of securing adequate schooling for children of color. The most pernicious aspect of this reasoning is that it redescribes the effort to reconstruct educational opportunities as a short-term fix for a problem of the past (Orfield, Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation 1996, 2).

the historical evidence of black fitness for such independence as an appeal for more scrupulous application of the American Assumption. In *Souls*, his resistance to such an appeal is most clearly manifest in his rejection of "the Gospel of Work and Money" as spiritually cramped, a threat to any higher sense of human aspiration (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 67);¹⁶ and in *Black Reconstruction*, he exposes the inadequacy of idealizing individual effort without attending to structural forms of injustice. In this regard, Du Bois departs from Jennifer Hochschild's (1995, xviii) reluctant conclusion that the best hope for a more democratic future is to accept the ideological dominance of the "American Dream," the components of which resemble Du Bois's American Assumption, and to demand that American society live up to the tenets of that dream.¹⁷ The demand for land and education, the two principal objectives of the freedmen and women, are not simply presented as prerequisites for individual "success." Rather, Du Bois ties this demand—inchoately in *Souls* and explicitly in *Black Reconstruction*—to the larger aspiration to restructure American society so that no group of citizens would be excluded from the concrete promise of freedom.

Connected to Du Bois's view of the centrality of slave labor in the making of the United States are larger claims about the contributions of African Americans to the physical, political, and spiritual creation of the nation. Black Americans, he argues in *Souls*, have offered their neighbors three gifts: "a gift of story and song. . . ; the gift of sweat and brawn. . . ; [and] . . . a gift of the Spirit" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 192–93). Whereas Du Bois's elaboration of "the gifts of black folk" is part of a larger effort to develop a concept of race, my focus here is restricted to the ways in which this language enables him to challenge official memories of slavery, Reconstruction, and the disappointments that followed.¹⁸ By delineating the depth and extent of black Americans' part in the abolition of slavery and the effort to create a more democratic society, Du Bois ([1903] 1997, 192) dispels white assumptions about black passivity, and he provides a resounding answer to his own rhetorical question: "Your country? How came it yours?"

For Du Bois ([1935] 1964, chap. 4), the reconstruction of American democracy began with the initiative of the slaves, thousands of whom participated in a "General Strike" by fleeing from the plantations to the Union army camps. The armies of the North and South and their supporters denied the significance of slavery to the conflict, but the slaves had no such illusions about the stakes of the war. Even before they were welcomed

by the Union as laborers, spies, and, finally, soldiers, their abandonment of their masters created a labor shortage that crippled the Confederacy. The magnitude of the slaves' role in their own emancipation cannot be overstated, Du Bois ([1936] 1985, 105–6) attests, attributing the conclusion of the Civil War to "the largest and most successful slave revolt." Peter Kolchin (1993, 204) builds on Du Bois's analysis, concluding that "by refusing to act like slaves—blacks throughout the South struck a mortal blow to slavery." The claim, which is further borne out by Lincoln's recognition of the strategic value of the Emancipation Proclamation, discredits the characterization of black Americans as helpless or the liberation produced by the war as entirely the gift of the white North. Furthermore, it exposes the danger of any discourse of self-help that obscures the enormity of what African Americans have done to help themselves.

Du Bois goes still further. He credits black Americans with securing new freedom and more substantive equality for *all* Americans during Reconstruction. In *The Gift of Black Folk* (in a chapter entitled "The Reconstruction of Freedom"), he describes the role of African Americans in reestablishing the Union, founding public schools, extending the vote to poor whites, and creating the basis for "industrial democracy in America" (Du Bois 1924, chap. 5). With regard to education, for example, he notes that the idea of public education in the South, which benefited poor whites in the region, grew out of the clamor by black Americans for access to schools (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 638). Additionally, he attributes the elimination of property qualifications for officeholding and the passage of a wide array of social legislation in Southern states to the period of black political power (Du Bois 1910). Recording the contribution of black leaders to the elevation of politics, at the national level, he observes that the words of black representatives "were, perhaps, the last clear, earnest expression of the democratic theory of American government in Congress" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 629).

Despite the arguments in favor of providing the former slaves with the basic resources necessary to secure their freedom and the importance of acknowledging their gifts to the nation, Du Bois perceives a more fundamental obstacle to democratic reconstruction. In the note to the reader with which he begins *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois ([1935] 1964) makes the following proposition: "I am going to tell this story as though Negroes were ordinary human beings, realizing that this attitude will from the first seriously curtail my audience." He is, in other words, warning that any understanding of American history must take seriously the view of that history from the perspective of the former slaves and that, for white Americans, this requires an openness to reevaluating everything they believe. The telling of the story of Reconstruction thus becomes crucial to the work of reconstruction. Its erasure from public narratives reveals the underlying truth that white Americans see their black neighbors as "a thing apart" or a *"tertium quid"* somewhere between human beings and cattle (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 370; [1903] 1997, 90).

¹⁶ According to Arnold Rampersad ([1976] 1990, 86), at the time *Souls* was published, Du Bois held that "to limit life to the achievement of what is called the American dream was teleological pessimism of the most sordid kind."

¹⁷ For further discussion of the reluctance of African Americans—across a wide ideological spectrum—to embrace all of the tenets of what Du Bois calls the American Assumption, see Dawson 2001.

¹⁸ David Levering Lewis (1993, 286, 446) links Du Bois's book-length treatment of the subject, *The Gift of Black Folk* (1924) to the racial theory he begins to articulate with "The Conservation of Races" (1897) and continues to develop throughout his career.

Displaying an acute gift for moral psychology, Du Bois ([1940] 1984, xxx) probes "the vaster and far more intricate jungle of ideas conditioned on unconscious and subconscious reflexes." Plumbing beneath the surface, he argues that a residual resistance to accepting the equal humanity of the slaves made the experiment in reconstruction unthinkable and its undoing vicious. That resistance could not be fully obliterated by the legislative commitments made to the freedmen and women, he writes, and it persists in damaging both black and white citizens.

"Never in modern times," Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 39) writes, "has a large section of a nation so used its combined energies to the degradation of mankind. The hurt to the Negro in this era was not only his treatment in slavery; it was the wound dealt to his reputation as a human being." Du Bois's most famous articulation of the impact of this wound is captured in his formulation of "double consciousness." Although double consciousness implies a kind of gift, the heightened perception that comes with second sight, it exacts a terrible toll. It means living with a "sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 38).¹⁹ For working men and women, such inner turmoil can destroy the motivation to seek better lives and can lead to a variety of social ills. For black leaders, Du Bois argues, it is crippling.

Damaging though the "precept of black inferiority" (Higginbotham 1996) may be to African Americans, Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 52, 166) asserts that it is "fatal" when it infects the minds of whites. To make his point, he quotes a statement issued by black leaders in 1864 that goes to the heart of white Americans' stake in black subordination: "You cannot need special protection. Our degradation is not essential to your elevation, nor our peril essential to your safety" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 235). The result of white dependency on such "special protection" is a distorted sense of self-worth and an incapacity to comprehend the gap between professed ideals and actual practices. Hence the troubles that beset the Freedmen's Bureau (chief among them, lack of funds, time, and adequate force) reveal a deeper truth: "The very name of the Bureau stood for a thing in the South which for two centuries and better men had refused even to argue,—that life amid free Negroes was simply unthinkable, the maddest of experiments" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 54). If the nation as a whole embraced emancipation in response to Southern recalcitrance between 1864 and 1868, that commitment proved weaker than the assumption that black Americans were less than fully human (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 329–30). With Southern planters measuring their value through their continuing capacity to control the labor of others, with white workers accepting the "public and psychological wage" of racial superiority in lieu of adequate payment

for their labor (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 700),²⁰ and with Northern whites believing themselves to be relieved of further responsibility for the aftereffects of slavery, the whole nation found itself at the end of Reconstruction living in a kind of "phantasmagoria" that rendered it unfit for democracy (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 705).

NOTES TOWARD A THIRD RECONSTRUCTION: THE QUESTION OF REPARATIONS

One might accept Du Bois's analysis of the opportunity lost in Reconstruction and acknowledge the parallels between the disappointments of that period and those that followed the era of civil rights and still ask how they bear on contemporary prospects for American democracy. Is it even appropriate at the turn of the twenty-first century to claim, as Du Bois does at the dawn of the twentieth, that Americans are evasive about the importance of slavery and the Jim Crow system that followed from it? If the example of recent scholarship is any indication, the verdict on that question has changed. The prodigious outpouring of historical treatments of American slavery, particularly those that focus on the perspectives of the women and men in bondage, provides just one example of a new attitude and indicates the extent of Du Bois's influence on contemporary scholars. Inquiry into cultural traditions that developed out of the slave experience and the reclamation of slave narratives as a prized literary resource also reflect a departure from the academic traditions of silence and misrepresentation against which Du Bois wrote. Yet these developments, though promising, do not indicate a broader public willingness to address the fundamental questions Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 715) raises in *Black Reconstruction*: "What was slavery in the United States? Just what did it mean to the owner and the owned?"

Implicit in those two questions is a third: What does the United States owe the former slaves and their descendants? That this question has gone largely unasked in American public life suggests a resistance to acknowledging the reach of slavery beyond abolition or the continuing effects of the forms of racial oppression to which the abolition of slavery gave rise. This unwillingness suggests as well the deeper political significance of the quest for reparations: "Closure is not possible. . . . Yet silence is also an unacceptable offense, a shocking implication that the perpetrators in fact succeeded, a stunning indictment that the present audience is simply the current incarnation of the silent bystanders complicit with oppressive regimes" (Minow 1998, 5). Although Minow's words do not identify reparations as the sole or best answer to historic injustices, they emphasize the costs to the present generation of citizens of failing to offer some substantial response to the worst crimes committed in the nation's name. By way of conclusion, therefore, I sketch the beginnings of an argument for reparations as "a structure of memory

¹⁹ The literature concerning Du Bois's concept of double consciousness is so extensive that I do not attempt to summarize it here.

²⁰ For further discussion of the political implications of the "wages of whiteness," see Olson 2002.

and critique" (Soyinka 1999, 39). My aim is not to offer specific proposals. Nor do I mean to imply that reparations alone would be a cure for racial injustice; as the Minow quotation suggests, the obligation to respond does not diminish the incompleteness of any possible response.²¹ Instead I use Du Bois's analysis of Reconstruction as a basis from which to explore whether and how reparations might serve as a component of the broader effort to address the persistence of racial injustice and to imagine anew the demands of democracy in the post-civil rights era.

Before returning to Du Bois's arguments, let me briefly address the larger context of the reparations struggle. Although the idea of reparations is not new, the twentieth century witnessed an explosion of demands that collective injustices be concretely memorialized through some form of restitution. The German program of reparations for victims of Nazi crimes is perhaps the most prominent example, but other efforts include legislation to restore property stolen from indigenous peoples in North America, Australia, and New Zealand; movements to obtain apologies and compensation from Japan for victims of the Nanking massacre and of the "comfort women" system; and calls for compensation for losses sustained by Africans as a result of slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism.²² Within the United States, recent examples include Florida's payments to survivors of the Rosewood massacre and their families, the federal government's reparations to victims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, and the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which allocated \$20,000 apiece to Japanese American internment camp survivors (see Darity 1990 and Yamamoto 1998). The struggle for reparations, in the case of American slaves and their descendants, dates back to the nineteenth century and, according to Vincene Verdun (Verdun 1993, 600–607), can be organized into five periods of activism: the Civil War and Reconstruction period, the turn of the twentieth century, Marcus Garvey's movement in the early twentieth century, the later years of the modern civil rights movement (late 1960s to 1970s), and the years following the passage of the Civil Liberties Act in 1988. Whereas the issue was largely marginalized in the earlier periods and mainstream civil rights organizations once kept their distance, the movement for black reparations has recently acquired momentum and attracted wider attention. For example, Representative John Conyers (D-MI) has introduced a bill in every Congress since 1989 to acknowledge the horrors of slavery and establish a commission

that would study the idea of reparations; other indications of interest include the public attention generated by Randall Robinson's (2000) *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*; the announcement of plans by a group of prominent civil rights lawyers and academics to initiate lawsuits against the U.S. government, corporations, and individuals who benefited from slavery (Ogletree 2002); and the passage of resolutions by several city councils—including Chicago, Detroit, Dallas, and Nashville—to consider possible forms of reparations (Robinson 2002).

Notwithstanding the success of reparations movements around the world and the renewed attention to slavery's lingering questions in the United States, the will required to move from affirmation of principle to implementation in practice remains both inadequate and largely divided along the color line. Mirroring the gap between white support for principles of racial equality and resistance to policies designed to ensure it, approximately 90% of white respondents in a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll opposed cash payments to descendants of slaves; 55% of African Americans polled supported the idea (Zremski 2002). Even proposals for an apology without compensation provoke resistance.²³ The fate of the Conyers bill is telling. Not only has it languished in committee every time it has been introduced, but its cosponsors have been predominantly African American. It is perhaps unsurprising that claims for reparations have had little effect, but it is nonetheless worth inquiring *why* this idea has remained largely inconceivable in the United States, even as sweeping legal, political, and social changes have taken place.

Arguing that the story of reparations is centrally a story of memory's suppression, I return to the submerged questions excavated by Du Bois's history of Reconstruction. Du Bois's analysis of Americans' refusal to come to terms with slavery's persistent political implications and his demonstration of the central role played by African Americans in the making of the United States indicate the urgency of seriously considering the idea of reparations as one element of a third attempt at democratic reconstruction. This is not to say that Du Bois himself would endorse a campaign for reparations. Indeed, he might well dismiss it as a pipedream, much as he did in 1916, when a group of African Americans sought compensation from the U.S. Treasury for a share of the revenues from American cotton production. Of the vow by the group's attorney to seek \$68 million, Du Bois (1916, 133) scoffs, "Of course, he can claim it and anybody else can claim it and they may also claim the moon but the chance of getting

²¹ Dominick LaCapra's distinction between two senses of commensurability helps to clarify this point. Whereas reparations, or any form of compensation for historic injustice, clearly fails the test of commensurability insofar as it cannot equal the suffering wrought by the original wrong, it can nonetheless serve as a "necessarily imperfect translation." "Thus," writes LaCapra (1998, 197, n. 13), "certain acts, including reparations and the public acknowledgment of injustice on the part of perpetrators or those taking up their dire legacy, may be acknowledged by victims as acceptable even if never fully satisfactory or adequate."

²² For a survey of reparations movements, see Barkan 2000 and Brooks 1999. For discussion of African movements for reparations, see Robinson 2000 and Soyinka 1999.

²³ When Representative Tony Hall's resolution calling for an official apology for slavery was first introduced, it elicited hate mail from both white and black Americans. Whites resisted the apology itself; blacks, the failure to link it to material redress (Montgomery 2000). Similarly, Representative Tom DeLay's reaction to Bill Clinton's expression of regret for the slave trade during a 1998 trip to Africa exposes the fury the idea is capable of evoking. DeLay broke with the tradition of not criticizing the president while he was abroad and told reporters that the expression of regret was tantamount to "attacking his own country in a foreign land" (Page 1998).

the one is about as great as that of getting the other."²⁴ Despite Du Bois's own reservations about the costs of succumbing to "the latest craze," his examination of the "splendid failure" of Americans' first attempt to realize their democratic commitments suggests three lines of argument in favor of reparations for slavery and for the decades of segregation that followed from it.

First, reparations could respond to both strands of Du Bois's claims about the economic requirements of a genuinely reconstructed democracy. Conceived as a massive investment in black communities, rather than a per capita payment, and targeted primarily at the poorest African Americans, reparations could create a basis for attacking the deep economic inequality Du Bois understands to be incompatible with democracy and thereby broadening the base of African Americans who can be said to enjoy the fruits of citizenship in a meaningful sense. Du Bois's study of the short-lived experiments that allowed former slaves to work abandoned lands during the Civil War provides a glimpse of the opportunity lost when the Freedmen's Bureau was prevented from carrying out the redistribution of Southern lands and establishing the former slaves as "peasant proprietors" (see Du Bois [1935] 1964, chap. 4, [1903] 1997, chap. 2). Furthermore, his attention to the perspectives of the former slaves enables him to articulate a critique of Reconstruction's shortcomings that speaks to the limits of recent civil rights legislation as well: Without a significant material commitment, the Thirteenth Amendment was just part of a "legalistic formula . . . [that] did not cling to facts" (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 188). Du Bois's account of the link between the subjugation of African Americans at the close of Reconstruction and the concentration of capital in the hands of a small industrial class also serves as a reminder that any argument for reparations, although targeting African Americans specifically, should be conceived as a component of a larger commitment to eliminating disparities of wealth and power among Americans more broadly.

Reparations speaks to the second strand of Du Bois's economic claims by providing some recompense for the years of slave labor and for the exclusion from access to resources that succeeded abolition. By attending to the value of African Americans' labor under slavery and to the continuities between slavery and the neoslavery of the Jim Crow period, Du Bois exposes the roots of present inequalities. What succeeded Reconstruction, he argues, was the disenfranchisement of black citizens, the revival of racial caste distinctions, the systematic exploitation of black workers, the deliberate impoverishment of black schools, the widespread denial of access to health care and other social services, the use of the criminal justice system as a cheap source of black labor, and the condoning of mob violence as an instrument of social control (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 693–708). "We can trace the sedimented material inequality that now confronts us directly to this opprobrious past,"

write Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro (1997, 188) in their study of the wealth gap between white and black Americans.²⁵ Moreover, Du Bois's examination of the ways in which white Americans as a group profited from the oppression of blacks shows that an account of what is owed to African Americans need not reinforce the individualist framework of the "American Assumption." Anticipating recent work by Derrick Bell, Cheryl Harris, George Lipsitz, and others, Du Bois's retelling of the fall of Reconstruction reveals how whiteness provides a kind of "cash value" (Lipsitz 1998, vii), even for those white Americans who disavow racial privilege (see Bell 1993, Du Bois [1935] 1964, 700–701, and Harris 1993). Although it would be impossible to calculate with any exactness what is owed for uncompensated and undercompensated work and the cost to generations of black families of discrimination and restricted access to public resources, Du Bois provides an important reminder that the failure even to consider what kind of recompense might be appropriate represents a kind of continuing "carelessness" and constrains the project of conceiving more democratic practices and institutions.

A second way to link Du Bois's exploration of Reconstruction to an argument for reparations is to consider what he calls "the gifts of black folk." This element of the argument is crucial, for it supplements the language of apology with the language of gratitude. Speaking of the period after the Civil War, Du Bois ([1935] 1964, 188) insists that "Negroes deserved not only the pity of the world but the gratitude of both South and North." Du Bois's comment suggests that it is imperative that the construction of a sincere and long overdue apology not reinforce conceptions of black victimhood or neediness.²⁶ Emphasizing black contributions as a cornerstone of the argument—through careful attention to the rhetoric promoting reparations measures as well as the institution of museums, memorials, and educational programs—would help to allay the well-grounded fear that a campaign for reparations would be interpreted simply as an instance of special pleading. Such a public reimagining of the debt to African Americans could be revolutionary. It would discredit the assumptions that inform traditions of public "charity" for black Americans. Generous charity was, after all, commonplace even in the segregated South (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 145–46), but the impetus behind programs of almsgiving was, and is, misplaced. Not only does it reinforce racial hierarchies but also it perpetuates the erasure of black accomplishments and the fear of black success that often lies behind white efforts to prevent African Americans from enjoying

²⁴ According to reparations activist Queen Mother Audley Moore, Du Bois overcame his earlier reluctance to reparations before his death (Verdun, 1993, 605).

²⁵ Taking institutional barriers to black home ownership as just one measure of the policies and practices that perpetuated racial inequality until well after the passage of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, Oliver and Shapiro (1997, 8–9) estimate that African Americans living today have sustained approximately \$82 billion in losses.

²⁶ In this regard, Du Bois's analysis provides a response to Adolph Reed's (2000) concern that arguments for reparations, which Reed characterizes as a political "nonstarter," reinforce perceptions of poor and working-class blacks as culturally "defective."

political, economic, or social equality (see Du Bois [1935] 1964, 633).²⁷ A form of reparations acknowledging the gifts Du Bois describes, therefore, would not require that black Americans sacrifice their claims to agency in making their claims for the resources necessary to live a decent life.

Moreover, Du Bois's account of the contributions of African Americans to the construction and reconstruction of American democracy provides a rebuttal to charges that the demand for black reparations is necessarily "divisive." Certainly, the purpose of reparations is to advance the prospects and interests of black citizens. Yet Du Bois's historical exploration of the "gifts of black folk" exposes links between the improvement in African Americans' political and economic fortunes and the protection of other vulnerable members of American society. He notes, for example, that members of Congress such as Senator Blanche K. Bruce and Representative John A. Hyman, both former slaves, fought against restricting Chinese immigration and for assistance to the Cherokees, respectively (Du Bois [1935] 1964, 629; Foner 1988, 538). Further, the possibility that the fight for reparations might offer opportunities to bridge, rather than widen, social divisions is suggested more recently by the vocal support of members of the Black Congressional Caucus for reparations in the Japanese American case (Yamamoto 1998, 486). Without concluding that reparations for black Americans will inevitably produce benefits for other citizens or form the basis for new coalitions, Du Bois's historical narrative discredits the claim that redress for slavery and segregation can only divide.²⁸

Perhaps the third element of Du Bois's analysis of Reconstruction, his perception that the failure to acknowledge the equal humanity of black men and women lies at the root of Reconstruction's undoing, appears less compelling in the post-civil rights context. Is Du Bois's appeal for a concrete, public accounting of the crimes of racial slavery and its aftermath as an affirmation of the human worth of the slaves and their descendants still pressing? One could argue that it is precisely this worth that is reaffirmed by the passage of the Civil War amendments and the civil rights legislation of the last century, yet the persistent failure to make adequate progress toward substantive racial equality indicates otherwise. The challenge here is not so much to undermine explicit arguments about racial inferiority as to confront the residual assumptions that sustain public silences and feed the resistance to action in matters of racial injustice.²⁹ In spite of enormous

change in American racial attitudes, there is still political value in investigating why the claim of the ex-slaves to compensation was considered laughable in the nineteenth century and what makes the suggestion (literally) outrageous in the minds of so many Americans today. As Boris Bittker (1973) suggests, the historical *absence* of discussion about proposals for reparations is telling. It reveals what Bill Lawson (1992, 77) calls a "functional lexical gap," a failure of language to express the status and experiences of black citizens.

My reading of Du Bois's claims about the complex entanglement of past and present suggests that filling that gap requires attending not only to the claims of living African Americans but also to what W. James Booth (2001) calls "memory-justice." Justice, according to Booth, requires a responsiveness to crimes of the past; in this case, it demands that Americans today admit the humanity of the "many thousands gone" by examining what Du Bois calls the "buried" truths of slavery and Jim Crow. Not to be confused with individual guilt, the obligations imposed on the current generation of American citizens are better understood as an aspect of their inheritance. "Every generation," writes Hannah Arendt (1964, 298), "by virtue of being born into a historical continuum, is burdened by the sins of the fathers as it is blessed with the deeds of the ancestors."³⁰ This is not to say that present-day politics ought to be consumed by a perfectionist effort to rectify every misdeed of the past. Rather, the political promise of such a conception of justice resides in its rejoinder to automatic dismissals of reparations as unjustly penalizing the innocent. By demanding that Americans examine the collective injustice at the core of the nation,³¹ reparations may help to prevent today's citizens from becoming "the current incarnation of the silent bystanders" with regard to the nation's worst

³⁰ Jürgen Habermas makes a similar point in the context of the Historians' Debate about the relationship between contemporary Germany and the Nazi past: "There is first of all the obligation that we in Germany have—even if no one else any longer assumes it—to keep alive the memory of the suffering of those murdered by German hands, and to keep it alive quite openly and not just in our own minds" (quoted in LaCapra 1998, 198). Thomas McCarthy (2002), who also quotes from this text, considers how the Historians' Debate sheds light on the politics of memory in the United States.

³¹ Sheldon Wolin (1989) and David Blight (2001b) provide powerful accounts of the ways in which American national identity has been constructed, to a significant degree, by the active forgetting of slavery. Any program of reparations would require public engagement with the question of how American national identity has been constituted. It would also require that Americans as a group address the question of *black* national identity. Although debates about the nature and boundaries of black identity are far too complex to be adequately explored here, it is worth remembering Robert Westley's (1998, 469) observation that "the irony posed by the very question of Black national group status is that in ordinary social and political discourse, Blacks are treated as a group for every purpose other than rights-recognition." This is not to say that the history of African Americans provides the only example of the intimate relationship between racial and national identity in the United States. For a discussion of the connections between race and nation in the case of Mexican Americans, see Holt 2000, 49–55.

²⁷ Recent attention to the Tulsa riot of 1921—in which thousands of whites descended on the prosperous African American section of the city, burning its buildings and killing an undetermined number of its residents—reinforces this point (see Brophy 2002, Hirsch 2002, and Staples 1999).

²⁸ Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres (2002) make an analogous point by exposing the limitations of conventional interest-group politics and showing how multiracial coalitions have succeeded in achieving broad social benefits by "enlisting race" rather than attempting to ignore or transcend it.

²⁹ For an acute examination of the phenomenon of unconscious racism and its effects on American law, see Lawrence 1987.

crimes (Minow 1998, 5).³² Properly conceived, a program of reparations for slavery and segregation could help to stretch the bounds of the thinkable by reorienting Americans to see their history from the perspective of the former slaves and their descendants. The promise of such a reorientation resides in its capacity to discredit the lingering impulse to "answer all queries concerning the Negro *a priori*" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 96).

There are, to be sure, dangers to pursuing claims for reparations. Most pernicious are the risk of inciting an antiblack backlash and the possibility that a monetary settlement would fix, once and for all, the public meaning of slavery and segregation, forestalling any thorough-going attempt to consider what needs to be done to effect racial justice. One lesson of the brutality with which the achievements of Reconstruction were undone is that any large-scale attack on racial injustice is perilous. Du Bois's attention to the sources and effects of this brutality suggests that the aspiration to counter centuries of racial hierarchy through reparations must confront a difficult dilemma: Insofar as it fosters an enlarged historical consciousness, reparations could help to generate the kind of political will necessary to attack racial injustice, but without the prior development of such consciousness, Americans are unlikely to support any substantial program of reparations. Furthermore, some forms of reparations—those that aim to close the book on American racial history rather than opening it to scrutiny and revision by successive generations—might be worse than none at all. In this regard, the acceptance, by some white neoconservatives, of reparations as a one-time alternative to affirmative action or other forms of redress surely ought to give its advocates pause (Feagin and O'Brien 1999, 343). "Without change in the material conditions of racial group life," warns Eric Yamamoto (1998, 520) "reparations are fraught with repressive potential. Without attitudinal and social structural transformation of a sort meaningful to recipients, reparations may be illusory, more damaging than healing. No repair. Cheap grace." Beyond these concerns lies a host of technical and strategic questions that would require attention before any program of reparations could be undertaken. My aim is neither to minimize these challenges nor to imply that Du Bois's work provides answers to all of them, but to read his retelling of the story of Reconstruction as a basis for understanding what democracy requires and as a reminder that today's swift dismissals of reparations have a largely untold and ignoble history.

The promise of reparations is not a promise of easy redemption.³³ Rather, Du Bois's narrative suggests how a public commitment to reparations could call attention to Americans' halting, limited, and perpetually unfilled democratic aspirations. By opening the door to a collective exploration of the past's imprint on the present, such a commitment could create the possibility

of new democratic imaginings. That the financial and, for many white Americans, psychological costs of any meaningful program of reparations for racial slavery and segregation would be staggering goes without saying. That no amount would provide adequate recompense for the horrors of slavery, or the forms of racial oppression that succeeded it, ought to be even more obvious. Yet the lesson of Du Bois's postmortem on the nineteenth-century democratic experiment is that the costs of choosing not to face up to the enduring legacies of racial slavery are incalculably high. Although there is much truth to the view that fixating on the past or wallowing in guilt solves nothing, the banishment of centuries of history to the remote past, particularly when those centuries were followed by decades of deliberate policies of racial injustice, is undemocratic; and formal guarantees of racial equality, while a critical element of the move toward democracy, are not only inadequate but potentially regressive when they provide justification for continued forgetfulness. Thus, despite all that has happened since Du Bois investigated the "splendid failure" of Reconstruction, one lesson of his work is that the idea of reparations deserves a serious hearing. Despite all that has changed, his warning to his thoughtless fellow citizens still resonates: "Actively we have woven ourselves with the very warp and woof of this nation,—we fought their battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our blood with theirs, and generation after generation have pleaded with a headstrong, careless people to despise not Justice, Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be smitten with a curse" (Du Bois [1903] 1997, 193).

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³² For an incisive critique of attempts to restrict the responsibility to address the slave past to the descendants of slave owners, see McCarthy 2002.

³³ For an extended exploration and critique of the political dangers that inhere in longings for redemption, see Shulman 1996.

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Black Opinion on the Legitimacy of Racial Redistricting and Minority-Majority Districts

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Minority-majority districts are highly controversial. To assess the degree to which black positions on this controversial matter were well-thought-out and fixed, questions based on Sniderman and Piazza's (1993) "counterargument" technique were included in the 1996 National Black Election Study. Black opinion instability on the issue of race and redistricting reveals the complexity of mass attitudes and the reasoning process and reflects the manner in which a set of clashing interests and core values is balanced and prioritized. Although a large majority of blacks voiced initial opposition to creating districts where blacks and Hispanics are the voting majority, most blacks changed their position in response to the counterargument. This asymmetry suggests that blacks more strongly favor the goal of increasing minority representation than the principle of color blindness in Congressional redistricting. Education and racial identification are key predictors of black opinion on racial redistricting. Less educated blacks and weak racial identifiers were less supportive of minority-majority districts and racial redistricting practices. These results support the revisionist perspective among public opinion scholars that rational, thinking individuals can hold wavering opinions upon questioning because they generally encapsulate a set of contradictory values and interests.

The 1965 Voting Rights Act is set to expire in 2007, but Congress may consider renewing it. Lavishly praised for its effectiveness in extending the franchise to blacks (Alt 1994), the Voting Rights Act nevertheless has become mired in controversy. Congress's 1982 amendment of Section 2 of the Act explicitly prohibited voting procedures that would afford blacks and certain language minorities "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice" (Davidson and Grofman 1994). On the basis of this provision the U.S. Justice Department has denied preclearance to states covered under the Act whose redistricting plans do not include a sufficient number of minority-majority districts.

Researchers have devoted considerable attention to trying to clarify the costs and benefits of minority-majority districts to blacks, Latinos, and non-Latino whites. Some contend that these districts have made Congress less responsive to the interests of minorities (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1997; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993). Others argue that minority-majority districts are the principal means through which minority interests are truly articulated and represented (Canon 1999; Grofman and Davidson 1992; Grofman,

Handley, and Niemi 1992; Kousser 1999; Lublin 1997; Whitby 1998). Research conducted thus far indicates that, all things being equal, blacks prefer to be represented by blacks in Congress (Tate 2001, 2003).

Where do blacks line up in the clash of moral arguments pertaining to the legitimacy of the Act such as those advanced by Thernstrom (1987), Parker (1990), and Guinier (1994), among others? Thernstrom argues that by forcing states to create minority-majority districts, the Act violates the principle of color blindness and fairness. Associate Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took this position in 1993 in invalidating a North Carolina plan that had sent that state's first two blacks since Reconstruction to Congress in *Shaw v. Reno*. Supporters counter by applying the same logic of racial fairness, arguing that, without the Act, blacks and Hispanics would never have won southern Congressional seats in the first place. Voting rights activists such as Parker (1990) point out the inherent racial bias of a system that perpetuates white political domination and the necessity of drawing minority-majority districts to overcome that racial bias. Still others, such as Guinier (1994), reject minority-majority districts as a short-term fix, supporting instead the more radical solution of moving from a single-member plurality system to proportional representation.

Black opinion on the legitimacy of racial-conscious redistricting will weigh heavily on Congress's and the President's decisions of whether to renew the 1965 Voting Rights Act in 2007. In this article I address the controversy from the perspective of blacks, utilizing the 1996 National Black Election Study (NBES). To my knowledge, the 1996 NBES is the only large-scale survey of blacks in which blacks have been queried about the legitimacy of racial redistricting and minority-majority districts. Do blacks endorse race-conscious means to advance the descriptive representation of minorities? Among blacks, who favors minority-majority districts and why? And are the opinions of ordinary

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The research reported in this paper was funded by grants to the author from the National Science Foundation POWRE Program (SBR-9743928) and from the National Science Foundation's Political Science Division (SBR-9796212). An earlier version was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, August 31–September 3, 2000. The author thanks Luis Fraga at Stanford University for his comments as the panel's discussant, as well as the *APSR* Editor, Lee Sigelman, and reviewers for their contributions to this paper. I also thank Bruce Boyd at Computing Services at UCI and Gary King at Harvard University for their technical assistance.

blacks consistent with the position most black leaders take in this debate?

There are important theoretical and political implications in the answers to these questions. One would expect that rank-and-file blacks strongly favor minority-majority districts, as do the vast majority of members of the black political elite. However, opinion congruency between the black masses and the elite is not always the case. Black public opinion has diverged significantly from that of their leaders, including in the matter of Clarence Thomas's confirmation to the Supreme Court by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991 (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). Most recently, the vast majority of black legislators in the House of Representatives voted against the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. However, a full 60% of blacks surveyed in the 1996 NBES favored a five-year lifetime limit for welfare—the centerpiece of the welfare reform legislation (Barker, Jones, and Tate 1998).

Public opinion analysts have grappled with the debate over the role of political elites in opinion formation for decades (Lee 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992). Answering the question of why black mass opinion can diverge from that of members of the political elite is critical to achieving a better understanding of the nature of U.S. citizen opinion. Public opinion analysts have traditionally interpreted the mismatch between mass and elite opinion as rooted in the informational disadvantages suffered by the masses (Converse 1964). Specifically, having relatively little solid information on which to base their policy stands compared to political leaders, members of the mass public, understandably, lack genuine, stable opinions on issues except for those most salient to them (Krosnick 1989, 1991). Revisionists, however, argue that the mass public's attitudes are more stable and coherent than portrayed in early survey work (Kinder 1983; Page and Shapiro 1992). Recently, Lacy (2001) has argued that opinion instability instead reflects "nonseparable preferences," or highly interdependent policy positions, and has uncovered evidence in support of this interpretation, in the form of question order effects: People support raising federal spending on social services prior to being asked about spending on the nation's defense. Additionally, Lacy speculates that instability in citizens' opinions may also arise from exposure to new information. Inconsistency in policy opinions, therefore, is not necessarily a reflection of having no opinion but may be triggered by the respondent's changing set of priorities and calculations, brought about by exposure to new information.

In this study, an experimental counterargument technique developed by Sniderman and Piazza (1993) was employed in the survey instrument to determine how mass opinion is formed. Blacks who took a position in this debate were then given a counterargument and asked whether they would change their position. The counterargument technique makes salient information that respondents had either considered or not. Thus, the counterargument for some respondents may be "new information," prompting them to switch sides in the debate. Having exposure to the full contours of the debate, respondents strive to balance the array of clashing

core values and conflicting interests behind the public policy stands that they take. Some may stick with their original stand, but others may switch sides. Balancing values and interests is a difficult act in public policy debates, in which citizens may be unable to retain highly stable opinion. Depending on how issues are framed—how much information is presented in the debate—people can rationally fluctuate between polarized positions.

The problem of clashing values is made more complicated by research revealing that the universe of black political thought reflects both widely disseminated and shared American values and ideologies that are uniquely rooted in the black experience in America (Dawson 2001). Historically, blacks have voiced dissent to mainstream conservative, free-market ideologies as well as liberal, Lockean doctrines because of American slavery and discrimination. Blacks also have their own alternative source of political information, which Michael C. Dawson (2001) labels a "black counterpublic," that both affirms and challenges the dominant body of knowledge produced and circulated by the overwhelmingly white members of the political elite. In this study, African Americans were asked to endorse race-neutral redistricting practices versus the goal of advancing minority numerical representation. Their position in this debate will inevitably reflect ideologies based on their own experiences as blacks. Thus, blacks may change positions in response to a changing set of calculations and priorities that encompass both mainstream American values and their own group-based ideologies, including radical egalitarianism and black nationalism.

The counterargument technique exposes the real trade-offs involved in creating minority-majority districts, i.e., the costs to Democratic seats versus minority seats in Congress. It reveals which goal or value respondents would advance over the other, such as color blindness or increasing minority officeholding. Finally, the technique can establish which ideological group—blacks taking the color-blind or minority representation position—is more likely to be influenced by counterarguments and change positions. As Sniderman and Piazza (1993) show in their research on affirmative action, the rate of change among the two ideological groups has important political as well as theoretical implications.

MEASURING BLACK OPINION ON MINORITY-MAJORITY DISTRICTS AND RACIAL REDISTRICTING

The 1996 NBES¹ carried three items that measured black attitudes toward minority-majority districts and

¹ The 1996 NBES is a national random-digit-dial telephone survey of African Americans during the 1996 elections (Tate 1998). It contains both pre- and postelection components. A total of 1,216 respondents completed interviews during the preelection component, 854 of whom were reinterviewed for the postelection component. Respondents were drawn disproportionately from four geographic strata, and thus the sample requires weighting. The data set is available to the academic community through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

racial redistricting. Several measures were developed, as opposed to one, because multiple measures can reveal the degree to which black opinion may be sensitive to question wording or issue framing. Before being asked their opinions, respondents were supplied the following background information:

Congressional districts are redrawn every ten years by state legislatures, but how they should be drawn has become very controversial. Please tell me, if you were choosing, which type of district do you think is best?

To simplify the task before the survey respondent, a two-category response format was used in which respondents were asked to choose one side or the other in each question. Arguing that people tend to think in bipolar terms, some have advised survey researchers to reconsider their heavy reliance on continuous rating scales (Ostrom 1987). Sniderman (2000) has argued that citizens exist in a political world that systematically "simplifies" complex public policy issues. "Issue alternatives," he contends, "are organized in advance, typically binary, mutually exclusive, and characteristically exhaustive" (81). The forced-choice bipolar format of the three NBES items is consistent with this viewpoint.

The order of the three questions in the survey was randomized to minimize question order effects. Each question highlighted a different aspect of the debate over minority-majority districts. At the core of the first question is acceptance or rejection of color-conscious policies. In *Whose Votes Counts?* Thernstrom (1987) denounces the extended use of the Voting Rights Act as the basis for creating minority-majority districts because it violates the American constitutional ideal of "color blindness." The law is, in her opinion, affirmative action applied to the political arena. Supporters of the Voting Rights Act argue that color-conscious redistricting is the only way in which blacks and Latinos can win election. The first question explicitly raises the "color consciousness" issue by asking whether districts should be drawn "without regard to race":

Some people think that districts should be drawn so that blacks and Hispanics have their own representatives in government and whites have their own representatives in government. Other people think that districts should be drawn without regard to race. Which one do you think is best—districts drawn so that blacks, Hispanics, and whites all have their own representatives in government, or districts should be drawn without regard to race?

The second question does not explicitly draw attention to the race-conscious means of creating minority-majority districts. It asks instead whether blacks and Hispanics should be voting majorities within districts or should be spread evenly across districts:

Some people think that black and Hispanic voters should be the voting majority in at least some congressional districts. Other people think that black and Hispanic voters should be spread evenly across all congressional districts. Which do you think is best—blacks and Hispanics should represent majorities in some congressional districts, or blacks and Hispanics should be spread evenly across all congressional districts?

It is widely believed that the numerical representation of blacks and Hispanics would be enhanced if the United States switched to a proportional representation system (Amy 1993; Guinier 1994). A proportional representation system would have the advantage of being race-neutral while still advancing the cause of increasing the numerical representation of minorities. Thus, a third consideration is whether one is wedded to the current electoral system or is willing to cast it aside for a system intended to enhance minority descriptive representation:

Some people think that election rules should be changed so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country. Other people think that election rules should remain as they are. Which one do you think is best—election rules should be changed so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country, or that election rules should remain as they are?

Employing the "counterargument" technique developed by Sniderman and Piazza (1993), the survey contained questions designed to test the pliability of opinion on this controversial issue. After stating their position on the three aspects of racial redistricting and minority-majority districts, respondents were read a rejoinder and were asked whether their position would change. The counterargument for blacks who initially favored minority-majority districts was whether they would switch sides if having minority-majority districts meant that fewer Democrats and more Republicans would be elected to Congress. Conversely, interviewers asked blacks who initially opposed minority-majority districts whether their position would change if that meant that fewer blacks and Hispanics would be sent to Congress. For example, respondents who told the interviewer that blacks and Hispanics should be "spread evenly" across Congressional districts were then asked:

Would your position change if having blacks and Hispanics spread evenly across all districts meant that fewer blacks and Hispanics and more whites would be elected to Congress?

Table 1 displays the exact wording of each counterargument.

The introduction of "argument and countervailing considerations," as Sniderman and Piazza (1993) explain, accomplishes two purposes. First, the ease with which one is "talked out" of a position indicates the degree to which the subject has previously thought about the subject matter. Converse (1964) argued that "large portions of [the] electorate do not have meaningful beliefs," and researchers remain very concerned about the problem of "nonattitudes" in survey research. The degree to which attitudes are subject to change in response to a counterargument may indicate that some respondents had no real opinion on the issue. They may have given a response because they were too embarrassed to tell the interviewer in the context of a survey that they had not thought much about the matter and did not have an opinion. In addition, the

TABLE 1. Question Wording of the Counterarguments Following the Respondent's initial Position on Redistricting Items

Original Redistricting Question	Counterargument for	
	Initial Pro-Minority-Majority Districts	Initial Pro-Minority-Majority Districts
QR1. "Some people think that Black and Hispanic voters should be the voting majority in at least some congressional districts. Other people think that black and Hispanic voters should be spread evenly across all congressional districts. Which one do you think is best. . . ?"	QR1a. "Would your position change if having some districts where blacks and Hispanics are voting majorities meant that fewer Democrats and more Republicans would be elected to Congress?"	QR1b. "Would your position change if having Blacks and Hispanics spread evenly across all districts meant that fewer blacks and Hispanics and more whites would be elected to Congress?"
QR2. "Some people think that districts should be drawn so that blacks and Hispanics have their own representatives in government and whites have their own representatives in government. Other people think that districts should be drawn without regard to race. Which one do you think is best. . . ?"	QR2a. "Would your position change if blacks, whites, and Hispanics having their own representatives meant that more Republicans and fewer Democrats would be elected to Congress?"	QR2b. "Would your position change if drawing districts without regard to race meant that blacks and Hispanics would continue to be underrepresented in government?"
QR3. "Some people think that election rules should be changed so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country. Other people think that election rules should remain as they are. Which one do you think is best. . . ?"	QR3a. "Would your position change if changing election rules so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population meant adopting a system currently used in many European democracies, but not in the United States?"	QR3b. "Would your position change if keeping the election rules as they are meant that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress would always be less than their population in the country?"

Source: 1996 NBES.

interviewer's task is to get respondents to state their opinions on issues about which many have given little thought (Converse and Schuman 1974). In the case of the racial redistricting items, telephone interviewers were explicitly instructed to probe for a response after an initial "don't know" on these items. In addition to revealing the extent of nonattitudes, changing one's position in response to a counterargument indicates lack of emotional or intellectual attachment to one's position. People with strong opinions on the matter will remain unpersuaded by counterarguments. The rates of change to the counterarguments thus indicate at once the extent to which respondents have a real opinion on this matter and their commitment to their position on that issue. In the survey-based thought experiment, many blacks may initially reject minority-majority Congressional districts because of the overtly racial manner in which they are constructed. They may also then shift positions meaningfully and rationally in response to the counterargument to support mechanisms that send more minorities to Congress.

Second, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue that one's susceptibility to a counterargument can reveal the reasons why opinion can change. In their study of whites' attitudes on affirmative action policies, determining which group—proponents or opponents—can be talked out of their original position was key. They found that white liberals were less committed to their advocacy of affirmative action than were white con-

servatives once exposed to arguments against it. For Sniderman and Piazza (1993) this asymmetry suggested that the ideological underpinnings for white opposition to affirmative action programs are clearer and stronger than the ideological justification whites employ on behalf of such policies. It appears that a great deal of the opposition to minority-majority districts is based on the American public's aversion to color-conscious practices. The key question, then, is whether color blindness or equality under the law is also a strong and overarching principle that can explain blacks' opposition to minority-majority districts. Furthermore, are the blacks who oppose minority-majority districts less likely than their proponents to switch sides in response to counterarguments?

FINDINGS

Until very recently the vast majority of blacks supported affirmative action policies in employment and education (Schuman et al. 1998; Tate and Hampton 2000). In contrast, respondents in the 1996 NBES emphatically rejected a race-conscious redistricting process. As shown in Table 2, 79% of blacks voiced initial opposition to the idea that some districts should be drawn to enhance the election of blacks and Hispanics, instead endorsing the view that districts should be "drawn without regard to race." Moreover, 69% thought that minorities should be spread evenly

TABLE 2. Three Measures of Black Opinion on Racial Redistricting and Minority Representation

Congressional districts are redrawn every ten years by state legislatures, but how they should be drawn has become very controversial. Please tell me, if you were choosing, which type of district do you think is best?

(1) Some people think that districts should be drawn so that blacks and Hispanics have their own representatives in government and whites have their own representatives in government. Other people think that districts should be drawn without regard to race. Which one do you think is best—districts drawn so that blacks, Hispanics, and whites all have their own representatives in government, or districts should be drawn without regard to race?

Minorities have own representatives	18%	212
Districts drawn without regard to race	79%	929
Don't know	3%	38

(2) Some people think that black and Hispanic voters should be the voting majority in at least some congressional districts. Other people think that black and Hispanic voters should be spread evenly across all congressional districts. Which do you think is best—blacks and Hispanics should represent majorities in some congressional districts, or blacks and Hispanics should be spread evenly across all congressional districts?

Majorities in some	25%	288
Spread evenly	69%	808
Don't know	6%	69

(3) Some people think that election rules should be changed so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country. Other people think that election rules should remain as they are. Which one do you think is best—election rules should be changed so that the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country, or that election rules should remain as they are?

Election rules that favor minorities	60%	709
Election rules remain as they are	35	409
Don't know	5	61

Source: 1996 NBES, weighted data.

TABLE 3. Blacks' Willingness to Change Position on Racial Redistricting Items in Response to Counterarguments

	Original Position on Increasing Minority Representation	
	Favored (%)	Opposed (%)
Minorities have own representatives vs. draw districts without regard to race	43	57
Minorities in some districts vs. minorities spread evenly	42	50
Election rules that favor minorities vs. election rules remain as they are	51	37

Source: 1996 NBES, weighted data.

across Congressional districts instead of concentrated in some districts. Only on the item that asked whether election rules should be changed to favor the election of minorities did a majority (60%) endorse change.²

The thought experiment embedded in these three items reveals a very high degree of subject pliability. Depending on the position initially taken, about 37% to 57% of the respondents said that they would change their position in light of the counterargument (see Table 3). In comparison, in the Sniderman and Piazza (1993) thought experiments, about half of the whites surveyed said that they would change positions on federal aid to blacks, but only about 20% changed positions in response to the counterarguments when the issue was affirmative action.

Table 3 reveals an asymmetry among blacks. Whereas Sniderman and Piazza found that it was harder to talk whites out of their opposition to affirmative action, it was harder to talk blacks out of their support for minority-majority districts. Whereas 43% of those favoring minority-majority districts became opponents in response to the counterargument, 57% of those who initially opposed them became proponents. The asymmetry, however, was reversed in the case of changing election laws to advance minority representation. On this issue, 37% of those who felt that current election rules should be retained switched to support change, as opposed to 51% who switched in the opposite direction.

Could the high degree of pliability on these items have been a function of nonattitudes, or lack of conviction? Based on these responses I created a score for each respondent by summing the number of times that he or she changed positions. A quarter of the respondents stuck with their original position all three times, and another quarter changed positions on all three items. The rest of the sample fell between these

² Only 6% or fewer expressed no opinion on these measures, suggesting that most people could answer the questions and were not confused. Interviewers, however, were instructed to "probe" or repeat the question if respondents initially had no opinion (Converse and Schuman 1974).

TABLE 4. Black Attitudes toward Racial Redistricting Indicating "Soft" and "Hard" Positions Taken (Weighted Data)

	"Minorities Have Own Representatives"	"Minorities in Some Districts"	"Election Rules Changed to Favor Minorities"
Hard opponent	35%	37%	24%
Soft opponent	47%	37%	15%
Soft proponent	9%	11%	31%
Hard proponent	9%	15%	29%
Total N	998	1,058	1,199

Source: 1996 NBES.

two extremes. Previous studies have concluded that education is strongly related to opinionation (Schuman and Presser 1981; Sudman and Bradburn 1974), and political knowledge may also be related to holding to one's position in a policy. Similarly, older people may also have more fixed positions because of their longer exposure to the issues in question. In addition, previous work has found that attitudes on racial topics are sensitive to the race of the interviewer (Bradburn 1983; Sudman and Bradburn 1974), even in telephone surveys (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1994). Accordingly, I used each respondent's level of education, knowledge of politics, and age, along with the perceived race of the interviewer and gender (which I included as an additional control), as predictors of the propensity to switch sides in response to counterarguments. These measures are described in the Appendix. Coefficients were estimated using the ordered-probit procedure in *Stata* (version 6.0).

Only the perceived race of the interviewer was significantly related to the propensity to switch sides in response to counterarguments. Blacks who believed their interviewer to be black were significantly more likely to switch sides, suggesting a sensitivity to group pressure to support group norms. The failure to find education, political knowledge, and age significantly related to the propensity to change positions suggests that the high degree of pliability on these items is not evidence that respondents lacked real opinions about racial redistricting and minority-majority districts. Rather, those who switched sides may not have considered all the issues on this matter initially.

Thus, one can interpret the responses to the counterargument items as an indication of the strength of the respondent's original position. Those willing to change positions in light of new information may be blacks whose attitudes on this matter were not fully crystallized or whose positions were soft. I created scores combining the racial redistricting measures and counterargument response for each respondent. Respondents who changed sides were considered "softly" in favor of or opposed to advancing minority representation through redistricting means or rule change. Respondents who did not change sides were labeled "hard" proponents or opponents.³ The distributions are shown in Table 4. Having been exposed to

critical contours of the debate, approximately one-third to one-quarter of African Americans can be described as "hard opponents" of minority-majority districts and election rule change. A plurality of blacks, from 47% to 37%, can be described as "soft opponents" of minority-majority districts. While only about 20% of blacks favored the creation of minority-majority districts, a majority supported changing election rules to advance minority officeholding.

WHO OPPOSES RACIAL REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY-MAJORITY DISTRICTS AND WHY?

The analytic strength of the counterargument technique is that it provides a basis for understanding why respondents take the position that they do. The initial questions referenced the principle of color blindness as well as minority officeholding, while the consequences or costs were referenced in the counterarguments. The next step is to determine which blacks, when fully exposed to the key arguments and counterarguments present in the debate, line up consistently for or against minority-majority districts. Race consciousness, ideology, education, political knowledge, and party affiliation are all expected to have an effect on where blacks stand in the debate over racial redistricting.

Ample research on blacks has established that having a strong racial identity, measured as the perception that one's fate is tied to the fate of the race, corresponds to liberal policy positions (Dawson 1994; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1994). If the numerical presence of minorities is seen as vital to protecting minority interests (and, indeed, most minority officeholders do present themselves as defending minority interests), then race-identified blacks should be most likely to support race-conscious remedies to advance their representation in Congress and to stick with this position even after exposure to the counterargument. Strongly race-conscious blacks taking the opposition side in this debate initially should also be more likely to switch sides, once it is suggested by the counterarguments that fewer minorities would be elected to Congress.

³ Treating these four response categories as ordinal and, notably, coding the response categories as "2" and "3" were justified by the preliminary results of a multinomial logit analysis that assumes no

order in the outcomes. Finally, α scores were calculated to determine the feasibility of forming a single scale from these items. Cronbach's α score was for all 45 three items and .49 for the first two alone. These scores are not high enough to justify creating a single index, and scales are analyzed separately here.

Next, ideology should be tied to black opinion on this matter, as it likely is for whites. Much white opposition to affirmative action policies is rooted in a political conservatism (e.g., Kuklinski and Parent 1981, Margolis and Hague 1981, and Sniderman et al. 1991). Not only do conservatives think that government should play a limited role in society, but also they increasingly base their opposition to affirmative action on the principle of color blindness. Blacks who are self-declared political conservatives have become visibly active in the drive to eliminate government affirmative action programs. Therefore, ideological identification should exert a strong influence on blacks' position on this hot-button issue.

The degree to which blacks favor affirmative action is based not only on their perceived connection to their racial group, but also on the degree to which they see society as being harmed by racial discrimination. An obvious motivation for supporting minority-majority districts is the sense that blacks are underrepresented in Congress. Included in the 1996 NBES is the question what percentage of representatives in Congress respondents think is black: The mean response to this question was 12%. This figure is somewhat higher than the actual 7% (based on both Houses), but it corresponds with the Census Bureau's estimate of the U.S. black population. Many blacks, however, guessed very badly: The standard deviation for the 12% estimate is 13%, so most blacks would put the percentage of blacks in Congress somewhere between 0% and 25%. Nonetheless, this item can measure to what degree blacks feel numerically present in Congress. Those who believe that Congress consists of a large percentage of blacks would probably not be as supportive of race-conscious remedies to increase their numbers. Also included in this model is an indication of whether or not the respondent is represented by an African American. Other things being equal, the one black in three who already has a black representative in Congress may be less supportive of minority-majority districts.

In addition, a political knowledge measure is included in the model. Blacks having a high degree of political knowledge, as evidenced by their ability to name their representatives in Washington, for example, may be more cognizant of the fact that the vast majority of blacks have won national office only through majority-black districts.⁴ As in the case of political knowledge, high-income and well-educated blacks

might have stronger, more fixed liberal positions on this debate. Highly educated blacks are likely to be aware of the likely cost of drawing districts "without regard to race" to minority seats in Congress and, therefore, to oppose race-neutral practices. Also, once exposed to the counterarguments against "color-blind" districts, college-educated blacks are more likely to switch sides in favor of race-conscious redistricting practices. Education is expected to increase support for minority officeholding among blacks because college-educated blacks are more likely to understand the past difficulties of winning elective office for members of minority groups in majority-white districts.

Although Republicans might prefer minority-majority districts because of the electoral advantage they afford the party, they are expected to oppose race-conscious policies on ideological grounds. Party identification was included in the analysis. Self-declared independents were grouped together with Republicans in the dummy measure for partisanship. Gender and age were also introduced as control variables, as was the "perceived" race of the interviewer.

Table 5 displays the estimates for the ordered-probit coefficients using *Stata* (version 6.0), while Tables 6 through 9 report the changes in probabilities for each dependent measure across the respondent's strength of race identification, ideological identification, level of education, and perceived race of interviewer, holding everything else constant at the median value.

Across the three items, racial identification exerted the most consistent effect. As hypothesized, strong race identifiers were the most likely to support racial redistricting and minority-majority districts. The magnitude of the effect of race identification on support for minority districts and for increasing minority representation in Congress, while statistically significant, was moderate. As shown in Table 6, 60% of African Americans lacking an identity with their race strongly opposed minority-majority districts, in comparison to 46% of strong racial identifiers. Similarly, 18% of weak race identifiers were hard opponents of changing election rules to increase minority representation in Congress, as opposed to 13% of strong race identifiers.

Ideology played a role as well, but for only two of the three measures. Self-declared strong political conservatives were most opposed to drawing districts so

⁴ Political knowledge is an additive index of four items, ranging from zero to four. All of these knowledge items pertain to questions regarding their representative in the U.S. House of Representatives. First, respondents were asked to name their elected representative in the House. Correct answers were coded "1," and incorrect responses were coded "0." Approximately 14% of the sample correctly identified their House representative by name. Second, in the battery of feeling thermometer measures, respondents were asked to rate their House representative on a scale from zero to 100. Responses that indicated that, even given the name of their representative, respondents did not recognize the name or still could not rate the legislator were coded "0," while responses showing the ability to rate the legislator were coded "1." Nearly three-quarters of the sample (73%) were able to rate their legislator.

Third, respondents were asked the political party of their House legislator. Correct answers were coded "1," while incorrect responses were coded "0." About 42% of the respondents correctly identified the political party of their legislator. Finally, after these and other questions, interviewers were asked if respondents had any knowledge of their House representative before moving on to a battery of questions specific to that legislator. If interviewers felt that the respondent had "no knowledge of his or her House representative," could not "recognize him or her," or could not "identify" the political party or race of that legislator, this question was coded "0," and the respondent was skipped from the next set of questions about the legislator. If the respondent had some knowledge of his or her House representative, the item was coded "1." NBES interviewers felt that approximately 55% of the respondents had some knowledge of their House representative and could continue with the battery of questions pertaining to their representative. The political knowledge scale has a mean score of 1.3, with a standard deviation of ± 1.8 .

TABLE 5. Ordered-Probit Analysis of Racial Redistricting Measures (Unweighted Data)

	... Draw Districts so that Racial Groups Have Their Own Representatives		... Minorities Represent Voting Majority in Some Districts		... Change Election Rules to Increase Minority Representation	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Race identification (weak–strong)	.120**	.039	.150***	.040	.097*	.040
Ideological identification (conservative–liberal)	.049*	.020	.025	.021	.050*	.021
Party identification (Republican/Independent)	-.228	.129	-.388**	.131	.125	.124
Education	.111***	.029	.104***	.029	.049	.030
Age	-.004	.003	-.005	.003	-.004	.003
Political knowledge (low–high)	.076**	.028	.053	.028	-.025	.029
R is represented in House by black	-.171*	.087	-.229**	.087	.014	.088
R's gender (male)	-.089	.083	.213*	.084	-.080	.085
R's estimate of black percentage in Congress (low–high)	-.003	.003	-.007*	.003	-.000	.003
Southerner	.067	.082	-.034	.082	-.016	.084
Income	.045**	.017	.035*	.017	-.003	.018
Perceived race of interviewer (black)	.172*	.083	.071	.083	.237**	.086
log-likelihood	-875.184		-933.291		-954.062	
Pseudo- R^2	.05		.05		.02	
Number of cases	790		769		718	

Source: 1996 NBES.

Note: Scale runs from 1 (opponent) to 4 (proponent). R, respondent. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.**TABLE 6. Simulated Probabilities of Response Categories for the Voting Rights Items across Different Levels of Respondent's Level of Racial Identification**

	Simulated Probability			
	No Racial ID	Weak Racial ID	Moderate Racial ID	Strong Racial ID
... Draw districts so that racial groups have their own representatives				
Hard opponent	.59	.55	.50	.46
Weak opponent	.35	.38	.41	.44
Weak proponent	.03	.04	.05	.05
Hard proponent	.02	.03	.04	.05
... Minorities represent voting majority in some districts				
Hard opponent	.66	.60	.55	.49
Weak opponent	.26	.30	.33	.35
Weak proponent	.05	.06	.07	.09
Hard proponent	.03	.04	.06	.07
... Change election rules to increase minority representation				
Hard opponent	.21	.18	.16	.13
Weak opponent	.15	.14	.13	.12
Weak proponent	.33	.33	.33	.32
Hard proponent	.31	.34	.38	.42

Note: The probabilities reported here were calculated from the results of an ordered-probit analysis using *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) with additional control variables as listed in Table 5. These additional measures were fixed at their median values, while racial identification values varied as shown.

that blacks, Hispanics, and whites all had their “own representatives,” as well as changing the election rules to increase the numerical representation of blacks and Hispanics. As shown in Table 7, ideology had a limited

effect on support for minority-majority districts. A scant 3% of strong conservatives favored minority districts. Among self-described strong liberals, only 5% favored creating districts having their “own

TABLE 7. Simulated Probabilities of Response Categories for the Voting Rights Items across Different Levels of Respondent's Ideological Identification

	Simulated Probability			
	Strong Conservative	Weak Conservative	Weak Liberal	Strong Liberal
... Draw districts so that racial groups have their own representatives				
Hard opponent	.56	.52	.48	.44
Weak opponent	.38	.40	.43	.45
Weak proponent	.04	.04	.05	.06
Hard proponent	.03	.03	.04	.05
... Minorities represent voting majority in some districts				
Hard opponent	.38	.36	.34	.32
Weak opponent	.39	.39	.39	.39
Weak proponent	.12	.12	.13	.13
Hard proponent	.12	.13	.14	.15
... Change election rules to increase minority representation				
Hard opponent	.19	.17	.14	.12
Weak opponent	.15	.14	.13	.12
Weak proponent	.33	.33	.33	.32
Hard proponent	.33	.36	.40	.44

Note: The probabilities reported here were calculated from the results of an ordered-probit analysis using *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) with additional control variables as listed in Table 5. These additional measures were fixed at their median values, while ideological identification values varied as shown.

TABLE 8. Simulated Probabilities of Response Categories for the Voting Rights Items across Different Levels of Respondent's Educational Attainment

	Simulated Probability				
	Grade School (1)	High-School Degree (3)	Associate's/2-Year Degree (5)	Some Graduate School (7)	Doctorate/Law Degree (9)
... Draw districts so that racial groups have their own representatives					
Hard opponent	.63	.55	.46	.37	.29
Weak opponent	.33	.38	.44	.48	.50
Weak proponent	.03	.04	.05	.07	.09
Hard proponent	.02	.03	.05	.07	.11
... Minorities represent voting majority in some districts					
Hard opponent	.51	.43	.35	.28	.22
Weak opponent	.34	.37	.39	.39	.37
Weak proponent	.08	.10	.12	.14	.16
Hard proponent	.07	.10	.14	.19	.25
... Change election rules to increase minority representation					
Hard opponent	.19	.17	.15	.13	.11
Weak opponent	.15	.14	.13	.12	.11
Weak proponent	.33	.33	.33	.32	.31
Hard proponent	.33	.36	.40	.44	.47

Note: The probabilities reported here were calculated from the results of an ordered-probit analysis using *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) with additional control variables as listed in Table 5. These additional measures were fixed at their median values, while educational attainment values varied as shown.

representatives" for minority groups. Similarly, 44% of strong liberals who strongly favored changing election rules to increase minority representation, only about 10% more than among strong conservatives.

Education increased support for minority districts and for racial redistricting practices, and its effect was quite strong (see Table 8). For example, 63% of blacks having only a grade-school education, but only 29% with advanced degrees, firmly opposed creating

districts with black and Latino majorities. It may be that high-status blacks, notably college-educated and working professionals, who are also more likely to be politically active, better understand the chances for blacks and Hispanics to win in districts where they are not in the voting majority. Recognizing that historically few blacks have won in majority-white districts, higher-status blacks are more likely to favor the creation of minority-majority districts. Income also

TABLE 9. Simulated Probabilities of Response Categories for the Voting Rights Items across Different Levels of Respondent's Perceived Race of Interviewer

	Simulated Probability	
	Interviewer Believed to Be White or Other	Interviewer Believed to Be Black
... Draw districts so that racial groups have their own representatives		
Hard opponent	.66	.59
Weak opponent	.30	.35
Weak proponent	.02	.03
Hard proponent	.02	.02
... Minorities represent voting majority in some districts		
Hard opponent	.49	.47
Weak opponent	.35	.36
Weak proponent	.08	.09
Hard proponent	.07	.08
... Change election rules to increase minority representation		
Hard opponent	.44	.35
Weak opponent	.18	.18
Weak proponent	.26	.29
Hard proponent	.13	.18

Note: The probabilities reported here were calculated from the results of an ordered-probit analysis using *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) with additional control variables as listed in Table 5. These additional measures were fixed at their median values, while racial identification values varied as shown.

significantly affected black attitudes on minority-majority districts, but its effect, in contrast to that of education, was relatively weak.

The remaining variables had more circumscribed effects on attitudes toward racial redistricting and minority officeholding. Political knowledge, as hypothesized, increased support for minority numerical representation, but only for one of the three measures. Blacks who knew which party controlled the Senate and the name of their representative in the House were more likely to be proponents of drawing districts to increase minority representation. Black men were also more likely to be proponents of racial redistricting than were black women. Similarly, the extent to which blacks saw themselves as underrepresented in Congress influenced black attitudes on only one of the three items. Those who believed that blacks held a large percentage of seats in Congress were more likely to oppose minority redistricting. Because many black respondents overestimated the percentage of members of Congress who are black, this relationship might also indicate a lack of substantive political information about Congress. Finally, as hypothesized, blacks represented in the House by a black member were also less supportive of having districts created where minorities represent majorities. Taken together, lacking a clear understanding of the paucity of black representation in Washington strongly affected attitudes toward minority districts. Those whose knowledge of politics was limited and those who mistakenly believed the numbers of blacks serving in Washington to be high generally opposed efforts to increase minority officeholding through redistricting or election reform.

Table 9 reports the probabilities of voting rights items as a function of whether or not respondents believed their interviewers to be black. Blacks were less likely

to be hard opponents of minority-majority districts and changing election rules when they believed the interviewer to be black, but this effect was modest. Overall, the perceived-race-of-interviewer effect reduced somewhat the percentage of hard opponents among blacks. These race-of-interviewer effects reveal the manner in which respondents adopt more "mainstream" political stands when engaged in an interracial setting, and especially so, as Dawson (2001, 30) points out, "when blacks and whites are directly debating politics."

In summary, black opinion on racial redistricting and minority-majority districts varied according to education, race identification, ideology, and perceived race of the interviewer. Blacks whose politics reflected concern for fellow blacks (strong race identifiers) and those who had some college education were likely to be the strongest advocates for increasing the numerical representation of minorities. Self-identified conservatives were generally those most opposed to changing election rules and creating minority-majority districts to increase minority officeholding. Blacks who believed that their interviewers were white were less likely to favor increasing the numerical representation of minorities in Congress.

THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT'S EXTENSION IN 2007

Politics in America has been characterized as the product of a dynamic clashing of values. The core premise of this paper is that this clash occurs at the level of the individual as well, as public opinion is based on a conflicting set of values and interests. Opinion instability, therefore, reflects less the paucity of political information among members of the mass public

than this competition of values and interests. In this study, minority-group interests were directly juxtaposed against the principle of color blindness and the status quo. The vast majority of African Americans initially supported the principle of "color blindness" and the status quo. However, when subjected to a counterargument, most blacks shifted positions to support minority representation over color blindness. This asymmetrical shift reveals the broad contours of black political thought that embraces mainstream American principles as well as black political ideologies, including black self-determination and autonomy. As Dawson (2001) argues, black liberals believe that equality serves as the cornerstone of a democratic state, but equality to blacks represents not only equality of treatment but real equality as promoted by state policies. When exposed to the counterarguments, race-conscious and highly educated blacks moved to positions where group equality was favored over individual equality under the law. These results reveal that black public opinion strongly favors the classical liberal form of individual rights but that blacks' policy positions can quickly shift in favor of the more radical liberalism of equality, including group rights. These results also support the revisionist perspective that rational, thinking individuals may well hold wavering opinions and express seemingly contradictory points of view.

The Voting Rights Act will expire in 2007, unless renewed. Groups opposed to its renewal will seek black support by emphasizing the standard of color blindness, which blacks strongly embrace. Opponents will also emphasize recent gains in black political office-holding. In 1987, when Abigail Thernstrom first published her stringent attack on the Voting Rights Act no black had won election to the House since Reconstruction in five southern states with sizable black populations: Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Because of the new black- and minority-majority districts created in the 1990 round of redistricting, 13 more blacks were added to the House. In fact, in the aftermath of the 1990 round, some believed that any possibilities for additional majority-black districts had been exhausted. The *Shaw v. Reno* and *Miller v. Johnson* decisions declared some of the new majority-black districts unconstitutional even under the 1982-amended Voting Rights Act. States such as North Carolina and Georgia were forced to redraw their Congressional districts. In Georgia, the two new majority-black districts that had elected blacks were redrawn with small white majorities. These majority-white districts, however, have continued to elect blacks.

Some scholars contend that whites still remain racially biased against black candidates (Reeves 1997). Furthermore, election data show quite plainly and emphatically that the vast majority of blacks have won only in districts where blacks are the majority (Lublin 1997). Nonetheless, critics will still argue that the Act has outlived its usefulness. Blacks could very well join the conservative side on this basis.

Black elected officials and civil rights leaders are most likely to push for renewing the Voting Rights Act and, as such, will be alarmed to learn that support in the black community for racial redistricting and minority-

majority districts is currently weak. Those who favor the Act's renewal, however, have an advantage over their rivals insofar as black support is concerned, for it is stronger and more certain than is black opposition. Blacks opposed to racial redistricting practices and minority-majority districts, after all, were found to be more susceptible to the counterarguments than were those who favored such practices on two of the three measures. Another advantage they have over opponents is the role that racial identification plays in support for racial redistricting and minority-majority districts. Making renewal a civil rights cause will clearly boost support for it within the black community.

It is expected that the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) will aggressively push for the Act's renewal in 2007. Their role in the legislative process will depend on a number of factors, including partisan control of the House. Furthermore, because of the growth in the number of Hispanic members of Congress, Latino political organizations will presumably join with the CBC and voting rights groups to push for its extension. Key to their efforts will be public education efforts designed to convey the likely consequences of drawing districts "without regard to race."

Leaders can exert a large influence on public opinion. The President's position on renewing the Voting Rights Act will be pivotal. Opposition by a Republican president could help mobilize blacks politically in favor of its extension, since blacks remain staunchly loyal to the Democratic party, and debate would become highly partisan. Opposition by a Democratic president, at the same time, might disarm many blacks in a manner not unlike the debate over welfare reform. Had a Republican president sought a similar reform of the welfare program, his or her legislation would likely have met with deep skepticism and serious opposition by blacks.

Finally, if anything, this examination of black opinion on the voting rights controversy underscores the need for the application of more innovative methods in survey design. Opinion instability and inconsistency should no longer be interpreted as reflecting the absence of opinion on topical matters. Instability, instead, may reveal the complexity of mass attitudes and the reasoning process. People rationally switch sides in a given debate as they wade through the complicated nest of benefits and costs to themselves, to their interests, and to other political objectives. The framing of a political issue, therefore, draws its power not simply from the fact that people have yet to form an opinion. Rather, as many political opinions rest, perhaps uncomfortably, on a set of conflicting values and interests, they meaningfully fluctuate upon questioning.

APPENDIX: PREDICTING "NONATTITUDES"

The three minority voting rights questions were recoded such that respondents who changed their positions were coded "1" in response to the counterarguments and those who stayed their original position were coded "0." These three items were then added to create a scale indicating the frequency with which respondents changed sides. This new scale represents the dependent measure in the ordered-probit analysis; the results are listed in Table A1.

TABLE A1. Ordered-Probit Analysis of Rate of Response Change

	Coefficient	SE
R's education	.022	.025
R's age	-.004	.003
R's gender (male)	-.103	.079
Perceived race of interviewer	.237**	.081
log-likelihood	875.185	
Pseudo- R^2	.01	
Number of cases	792	

Source: 1996 NBES.

Note: Scale runs from 0 to 3. R, respondent. ** $p < .01$.

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No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955

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This article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide (political mass murder). A case-control research design is used to test alternative specifications of a multivariate model that identifies preconditions of geno-/politicide. The universe of analysis consists of 126 instances of internal war and regime collapse that began between 1955 and 1997, as identified by the State Failure project. Geno-/politicides began during 35 of these episodes of state failure. The analytic question is which factors distinguish the 35 episodes that led to geno-/politicides from those that did not. The case-control method is used to estimate the effects of theoretically specified domestic and international risk factors measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. The optimal model includes six factors that jointly make it possible to distinguish with 74% accuracy between internal wars and regime collapses that do and those that do not lead to geno-/politicide. The conclusion uses the model to assess the risks of future episodes in 25 countries.

“We must remember not only what happened but why and how it happened.” In remembering the Holocaust “we need to learn its lessons and apply them to contemporary events” (Mattas 1992, 185). What has been learned? We know that genocides and political mass murders are recurrent phenomena; that since WWII nearly 50 such events have happened; that these episodes have cost the lives of at least 12 million and as many as 22 million noncombatants, more than all victims of internal and international wars since 1945;¹ and that human suffering rarely mobilized policymakers into action.

We also know that despite Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, some lessons have been learned. During

recent decades genocide and Holocaust scholars have joined to combat ignorance about the causes of these events, to engage politicians, and to mobilize public empathy. Some have listened. The Clinton Administration, in the aftermath of Rwanda, sponsored the use of social science analysis to explain genocides and ethnic conflict, with an eye to developing early warning systems to detect humanitarian disasters in the making. The study reported here was supported in part by two successive administrations and builds on years of prior research by those involved in the comparative study of genocide and similar phenomena.

During the early 1980s social scientists began to study genocide comparatively (see Fein 1979, 1992; Harff 1987, 1992; Kuper 1981; and Melson 1992). These pioneers, surveyed in Totten and Jacobs 2002, defined the phenomenon, accumulated evidence of past and ongoing cases, and went on to develop explanations for the occurrence of such events (see Fein 1993b, chap. 3, for a review of theoretical approaches). Comparative genocide research has drawn upon conflict analysis. Although a distinct phenomenon, it shares some characteristics and antecedents with ethnic wars and revolutions. Moreover, almost all genocides of the last half-century occurred during or in the immediate aftermath of internal wars, revolutions, and regime collapse. Ideologies that mobilize potential revolutionaries can also incite ethnic hatred and provide incentives to kill real or perceived enemies of the new order. However, despite the explosive growth of the literature, only two published genocide studies systematically test various hypotheses derived from the case and comparative literature (Fein 1993a; Krain 1997).

This article expands on previous theoretical and empirical work by testing the effects of prior conflict, elite characteristics, regime type, and international context on the likelihood of geno-/politicide. The optimum model identifies six preconditions of genocide and politicide (political mass murder) that make it possible, using the case-control procedure and logistic regression, to postdict accurately 74% of episodes that began between 1955 and the late 1990s.

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This study was commissioned in 1998 by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to President Clinton's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention. It was designed by the author and carried out using her data with other data and analytic techniques developed by the State Failure Task Force. Statistical analyses reported here were done by Michael Lustik and Alan N. Unger of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), McLean, Virginia. The author is senior consultant to the Task Force, which was established in 1994 in response to a request from senior U.S. policymakers to design and carry out a data-driven study of the correlates of state failure, defined to include revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse or disruptive regime transitions, and genocides and politicides (for the latest report on Task Force research see Goldstone et al. 2002). The author acknowledges the advice of other Task Force consultants and analysts throughout the research process. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the U.S. government, the U.S. intelligence community, or the Central Intelligence Agency.

The author especially thanks Ted Robert Gurr for his critiquing early drafts and using the findings to construct the table that identifies high-risk countries and groups. His insistence about the importance of the study prompted me to revise the manuscript a number of times, despite my initial reluctance, given the years of work that had gone into its preparation. It was especially hard to condense this effort from its original 75 pages. The paper also benefited from a careful reading by Mark I. Lichbach of a previous report and from comments of anonymous reviewers for the *American Political Science Review*.

¹ Numbers of geno-/politicides and fatalities are tabulated for the list of cases and fatalities in Table 1, with the addition of episodes that occurred between 1945 and 1954 reported in Harff 1992.

DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING EPISODES OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE

From Legal to Empirical Definition

Genocide, according to Article II of the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention, refers to "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group." Points b, c, d, and e specifically refer to conditions whose cumulative effects are conducive to a group's destruction. These points are (b) "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group," (c) "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," (d) "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group," and (e) "forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." This legal definition provides the basis for an operational definition but has four limitations.

First, the Convention does not include groups of victims defined by their political position or actions. Raphael Lemkin (1944) coined the term genocide and later sought the support of as many states as possible for a legal document that would outlaw mass killings and prescribe sanctions against potential perpetrators. Because the first draft of the Convention, which included political groups, was rejected by the USSR and its allies, the final draft omitted any reference to political mass murder (Le Blanc 1988). The concept of politicide is used here to encompass cases with politically defined victims, consistent with Fein's (1993b, 12) line of reasoning that "mass killings of political groups show similarities in their causes, organization and motives."

Second, the phrase "mental harm" in point b is problematic, for it encompasses a vast array of instances of psychological and cultural harm done to groups that have lost their cohesion and identity, but not their lives, as a result of processes of social and economic change. Setting aside this problematic clause, the crime of genocide is delimited to acts that collectively endanger the *physical* life of group members.

Third, the phrase "intent to destroy" raises the question of how observers can reliably infer the intentions of authorities. Perpetrators rarely signal their intentions as clearly as Hutu extremists did in Rwanda in the early 1990s when they characterized Tutsis as vermin and proposed to eradicate them (see Des Forges 1999 and Prunier 1995, chaps. 5, 6). The operational guidelines used here to infer intent and apply them to specific cases are described below.

Fourth, the Genocide Convention does not take into account the possibility that nonstate actors can and do attempt to destroy rival ethnic and political groups. One unambiguous example from the post-Cold War period is the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb nationalists against Muslims in Bosnia (1992–93). A possible case occurred in Congo (Kinshasa) in late 1996 and early 1997. Suspicions are strong that, during and after the Kabila-led revolution that overthrew Mobutu's government, Kabila knew of and probably endorsed the systematic killings of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo by Tutsi members of his army. Therefore the opera-

tional definition of genocide and politicide used here is expanded to include episodes that occur during civil wars when a territorially based nationalist or revolutionary movement targets an ethnic or political group for destruction "in whole or in part." This encompasses situations in which at least one party to a civil war systematically uses deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its opponents, as in Angola's civil wars since the early 1970s.

The following definition summarizes the above points and is used to identify the universe of cases for comparative analysis. Genocides and politicides are *the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.* In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. In common usage the Kurds of Iraq are said to be victims of genocide. In fact many Iraqi Kurds serve in the Iraqi bureaucracy and military and some are members of the ruling Baath Party. The Kurds who were targeted for destruction in the *al Anfal* campaign of 1987 were the mainly rural supporters of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Thus, the event was a politicide (see Makiya 1992).

The definition parallels those developed by other comparative researchers. For example, Fein (1993b, 24) exhaustively reviewed definitional discussions and proposed a sociological definition: "Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectively directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim."² Her definition differs from the one used here mainly in its lack of reference to the identity of the perpetrators, i.e., states or rival authorities (for a similar definition see Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 23).

Operational Guidelines

In genocides and politicides killings are never accidental, nor are they acts of individuals. The key is that they are carried out at the explicit or tacit direction of state authorities, or those who claim state authority. The following guidelines were used to help distinguish cases of genocide and politicide from other kinds of killings that occur during civil conflicts. (1) Is there complicity by the state (or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger human life? (2) Is there evidence, even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities to isolate or single out group members for mistreatment?

² For a detailed analysis of alternative social science definitions and episodes encompassed by them, see Fein 1993b, 8–31, 79–91.

(3) Are victims members of an identifiable group? (4) Are there policies and practices that cause prolonged mass suffering? and (5) Do the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group?

Establishing the Complicity and Intent of Authorities.

Any persistent, coherent pattern of action by the state and its agents (or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities) that brings about the destruction of a collectivity, in whole or part, is *prima facie* evidence of authorities' responsibility. Note that I do not presume that only states can commit genocide. The Kabila-led revolutionary movement in Congo is a recent case in point. In most historical cases, however, the state or its agents have been the perpetrators.

A related issue concerns the duration of a group's victimization. The physical destruction of a people requires persistent, coherent actions authorized by those in power. Brief episodes of killings are not counted. Thus isolated massacres are not included in the list of episodes, such as massacres of Palestinians in Beirut's Chatilla and Sabra refugee camps in September 1982. The shortest episode on the list is Rwanda, where the killing campaign in spring 1994 lasted about 100 days.

The Question of Intent. Human rights scholars frequently argue that there is no need to include intent among the necessary conditions that lead one to conclude that a genocide is in the making. On the contrary, I think that it is important to look for evidence that allows us to infer intent precisely so that genocide can be distinguished from related phenomena. Moreover, early warning efforts depend on detecting signals of intent rather than waiting for information that widespread killings have taken place. How do we detect intent?

- Potential perpetrators are agents of the state or rival authorities, for example, military or police units, or militias authorized by the state or by revolutionary leaders.
- Elites and groups linked to them often use hate propaganda and attack ethnic and political opponents of the state.
- Government repression in response to opposition activities is greatly disproportionate to opposition acts.
- Authorities and security forces ignore isolated killings and abuse of ethnic and political group members.

Rare is a situation such as Nazi Germany, in which Hitler's *Mein Kampf* clearly advocated elimination of a people. Pol Pot comes close, in the sense that Khmer Rouge ideology explicitly identified its future victims.

Identity of Victims. The question is whether the victims belong to an identifiable ethnic, religious, or political group, either a self-defined collectivity or one authoritatively defined as such. In some cases victims may not see themselves as members of a group but have been ascribed characteristics that led to their victimization. In Nazi Germany, people who changed their religion from Judaism to Christianity were still identified and targeted for elimination as Jews. In Latin Ameri-

can politicides, friends and relatives of leftist activists often were killed even though they themselves were politically inactive.

Threat to Group Survival. It is wrong to assume that most or all members of a group have to be eliminated before one can conclude that a genocide occurred. It is enough to "take the life out of the group"—in other words, to eliminate or intend to eliminate so many people that the group ceases to function as a social or political entity. Thus, in politicides perpetrators typically attempt to destroy the ability of opposition groups to challenge or resist the regime by targeting their potential supporters. Again, this point is closely related to intent. It follows that, in principle, "body counts" do not enter the definition of what constitutes an episode. If an authority's motive is to rid itself of unwanted opposition by destroying a group, and if policies with that intent are sustained over a substantial period of time, then a few hundred deaths constitute as much a genocide or politicide as the deaths of tens of thousands. For example, about 900 Iranian Baha'is were victims of genocide, as defined above, during the Khomeini regime.

Cases of Geno-/Politicide from 1955 to 2001

The general definition and operational rules guided the compilation and successive revisions of a list of genocides and politicides since World War II. This list is widely accepted by researchers, several of whom have used it for comparative research, sometimes adding or deleting a few cases.³ The 37 cases cited in this analysis include all those that began after 1955. Several considerations led to the 1955 starting point. Most episodes in the late 1940s and early 1950s were continuations of prior conflicts, e.g., four cases in the USSR that followed through on Stalin's wartime campaigns against disloyal national peoples and potential dissidents. As a consequence of decolonization, many new, conflict-prone states entered the international system beginning in the 1950s, and as a practical matter, reliable data for most independent variables were sparse or nonexistent before then.

A full list of cases used for the analysis appears in Table 1. Three less-known cases are described briefly below, emphasizing the information supporting the inference that authorities intended the target groups' destruction.

Guatemala from July 1978. Revolutionary conflict began in mid-1966. The military-linked death squads responsible for killing leftists were clearly government sponsored. Their actions became systematic and widespread, rather than episodic, after General Lucas Garcia became president in July 1978. The Carter Administration was well aware of government complicity in the killings and imposed restrictions on U.S. military aid because of human rights violations. The most

³ Comparative empirical studies that use this list of episodes include Fein 1993a, Krain 1997, Licklider 1995, and Schmeidl 1997.

TABLE 1. Genocides and Politicides from 1955 to 2001

Country and Dates	Nature of Episode	Estimated Number of Victims
Sudan, 10/56–3/72	Politicide with communal victims	400,000–600,000
South Vietnam, 1/65–4/75	Politicide	400,000–500,000
China, 3/59–12/59	Genocide and politicide	65,000
Iraq, 6/63–3/75	Politicide with communal victims	30,000–60,000
Algeria, 7/62–12/62	Politicide	9,000–30,000
Rwanda, 12/63–6/64	Politicide with communal victims	12,000–20,000
Congo-K, 2/64–1/65	Politicide	1,000–10,000
Burundi, 10/65–12/73	Politicide with communal victims	140,000
Indonesia, 11/65–7/66	Genocide and politicide	500,000–1,000,000
China, 5/66–3/75	Politicide	400,000–850,000
Guatemala, 7/78–12/96	Politicide and genocide	60,000–200,000
Pakistan, 3/71–12/71	Politicide with communal victims	1,000,000–3,000,000
Uganda, 2/72–4/79	Politicide and genocide	50,000–400,000
Philippines, 9/72–6/76	Politicide with communal victims	60,000
Pakistan, 2/73–7/77	Politicide with communal victims	5,000–10,000
Chile, 9/73–12/76	Politicide	5,000–10,000
Angola, 11/75–2001	Politicide by UNITA and government forces	500,000
Cambodia, 4/75–1/79	Politicide and genocide	1,900,000–3,500,000
Indonesia, 12/75–7/92	Politicide with communal victims	100,000–200,000
Argentina, 3/76–12/80	Politicide	9,000–20,000
Ethiopia, 7/76–12/79	Politicide	10,000
Congo-K, 3/77–12/79	Politicide with communal victims	3,000–4,000
Afghanistan, 4/78–4/92	Politicide	1,800,000
Burma, 1/78–12/78	Genocide	5,000
El. Salvador, 1/80–12/89	Politicide	40,000–60,000
Uganda, 12/80–1/86	Politicide and genocide	200,000–500,000
Syria, 4/81–2/82	Politicide	5,000–30,000
Iran, 6/81–12/92	Politicide and genocide	10,000–20,000
Sudan, 9/83–present	Politicide with communal victims	2,000,000
Iraq, 3/88–6/91	Politicide with communal victims	180,000
Somalia, 5/88–1/91	Politicide with communal victims	15,000–50,000
Burundi, 1988	Genocide	5,000–20,000
Sri Lanka, 9/89–1/90	Politicide	13,000–30,000
Bosnia, 5/92–11/95	Genocide	225,000
Burundi, 10/93–5/94	Genocide	50,000
Rwanda, 4/94–7/94	Genocide	500,000–1,000,000
Serbia, 12/98–7/99	Politicide with communal victims	10,000

Note: This list of episodes was compiled in a long-term research effort (see Harff 1992), has been updated and modified for the State Failure Task Force, and is posted on the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management Web platform, <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/stfail>. The list and analysis reported here exclude a few episodes identified in previous studies, for example, in Angola in 1961–62 (because it was then a colony), in Equatorial Guinea in 1969–79 (the country was below the 500,000 population threshold used in the State Failure analyses), in Paraguay against the Ache Indians in 1962–72, and in Nigeria against Ibos living in the North in 1966 (in the latter two cases the government was not complicit in killings carried out by private groups). Estimates of victims are invariably imprecise and often vary widely among scholars, journalists, human rights observers, and spokesmen for the victimized groups. Some of the figures are little more than guesses. If a detailed and reliable study is available, a single figure is used. A single figure is also used when several sources offer similar estimates. When different estimates are reported and there is no basis for choosing among them, a range is shown.

massive rights violations, including multiple massacres and forcible resettlement of Mayan villagers, were carried out by military units whose identities have been publicly identified (a comprehensive bibliography is given in Ball, Kubrick, and Spirer 1999, 135–54; see also Quigley 1999).

Uganda After December 1980. The genocide perpetrated by General Idi Amin's government from 1972 to early 1979 is well known. Less known are events that followed Milton Obote's reinstatement as president in December 1980. His government encouraged massive reprisal killings against ethnic groups that were regarded as loyal to Amin. Killings were carried out by groups allied to Obote as well as by government troops

and militia. From 1983 to 1985 tens of thousands of Bugandan sympathizers of rebel commander Museveni were killed in the "Luwero triangle" north of Kampala (see Kasozi 1994 and Minority Rights Group 1984).⁴

⁴ There were two distinct episodes of genocide in Uganda, each with different perpetrators and victims. But Amin's genocide ended with his overthrow in April 1979, and the onset of Obote's reprisals in late 1980 began less than two years later. For purposes of statistical analysis (below) the events are treated as a single case beginning in February 1972. Similarly in Pakistan, two episodes—against Bengali nationalists in breakaway Bangladesh in 1971 and rebellious Baluchi tribesmen in 1973—were separated by less than two years and are treated in statistical analysis as a single case beginning in January 1971.

Sri Lanka After July 1989. This is one of the very rare contemporary instances of mass murder carried out in a democratic state. The Marxist Sinhalese JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna) organized a revolutionary campaign against the Sinhalese-dominated government in 1971 (which was suppressed) and began again in 1987–89. By mid-1989 they were close to military victory and rejected government efforts to negotiate a settlement. Death squads, made up of military and police and working at night, were authorized in September 1988 to track and execute JVP members but had limited use until July 1989, when the by-now-desperate government gave the military a free hand to do anything necessary to eliminate the JVP. Death squad killings rapidly increased, the targets being Sinhalese youths throughout the poor rural areas where most JVP supporters lived. The leader of the JVP was captured and killed in November and by January 1990 the JVP hierarchy had been eliminated, its support base terrorized into passivity, and the killings stopped (Gunaratna 1990; Human Rights Watch 1991).

Although the last half-century has seen a long-term increase in numbers of geno-/politicides, by the end of 2001 mass killings were ongoing in only two countries, Sudan and Angola, fewer than at any time in the previous 30 years. As Table 1 shows, several countries were responsible for multiple cases. In Burundi the Hutus were victimized in three separate episodes; the Rwandan Tutsis, the Iraqi Kurds, and Southerners in Sudan each were targeted twice. Five other countries, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, had two episodes in which different groups were victimized. Because some countries had multiple episodes, the analysis addresses methodological concerns about the statistical interdependence of cases by estimating alternative models.

PRECONDITIONS FOR GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE: VARIABLES AND INDICATORS

Building and testing a general model of the preconditions for genocide and politicide assume a coherent universe of analysis. The answer is outlined in the previous section: The 37 cases are deliberate and sustained efforts by authorities aimed at destroying a collectivity in whole or in part. The theoretical objective is to identify general conditions under which governments, and rival authorities in internal wars, choose such a strategy. Do genocides and politicides need separate theoretical explanations? Many episodes combine elements of both. The “Cambodian genocide” was both a politicide, because the Khmer Rouge targeted class and political enemies, and a genocide, because they also targeted urban Chinese and the Muslim Cham. The Iraqi regime’s 1987 *al Anfal* campaign aimed to eliminate rural Kurds in rebellious areas but not all Kurds; thus, it was a politicide against some members of an ethnic group. The model tested here combines all cases, although others may choose to test whether the genocide/politicide distinction leads to different results.

Almost all genocides and politicides of the last half-century were either ideological, exemplified by the

Cambodian case, or retributive, as in Iraq.⁵ The scenario that leads to an *ideological genocide* begins when a new elite comes to power, usually through civil war or revolution, with a transforming vision of a new society purified of unwanted or threatening elements. Fein (1984, 18) characterizes such exclusionary ideologies as “hegemonic myths identifying the victims as outside the sanctioned universe of obligation.” The status of the victims is evident in the labels applied to them, such as “class enemies,” “counterrevolutionaries,” and “heretics.” Case studies suggest that the more intense the prior struggle for power and the greater the perceived threat the excluded group poses to the new regime, the more likely they are to become victims of geno-/politicide. Examples of ideologically inspired geno-/politicide occurred in China during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–75, in Marxist Ethiopia in the late 1970s, in Chile after the overthrow of the leftist Allende regime in 1973, and in Iran after the 1981 revolution.

Whereas ideological genocides can be thought of as outcomes of elite succession struggles, *retributive geno-/politicides* are strategies forged during and in the immediate aftermath of civil wars. Some occur during a protracted internal war—whether ethnic or revolutionary or both—when one party, usually the government, systematically seeks to destroy its opponent’s support base. Examples occurred in South Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s; during both phases of the Sudanese civil war; in East Timor after 1975; and in Guatemala, Angola, and Sri Lanka. Some retributive episodes occur after a rebel challenge has been militarily defeated. In Indonesia in 1965–66, for example, a coup attempt supposedly inspired by Communists led to countrywide massacres of party members and other civilians.

Since geno-/politicides almost always occur in the context of violent political conflict and regime change, can they be explained in the framework of theories of revolutionary or ethnic conflict, or of political instability in general? Not directly, because the puzzle addressed here is why some such conflicts lead to episodes of mass murder, whereas most do not. Theories of the etiology of civil conflict, e.g., Goldstone 1991 on revolutions, Horowitz 1985 on ethnic conflict, and Tilly 1978 on political mobilization, do not address this question.⁶ More relevant are analyses of the causes of state repression and maintenance of social order (see Lichbach 1987, 1998). The approach taken here focuses on factors that affect the decision calculus of authorities in conflict situations, in particular, the circumstances that lead to decisions to eliminate rather than accommodate rival groups. Several scholars propose that the greater the threat posed by challengers, the greater the likelihood

⁵ The terms come from Fein (1984, 8–22), who also distinguishes two other historically common types of genocide. *Despotic* episodes were aimed at peoples who resisted the imposition of colonial or imperial rule. *Developmental* genocides targeted indigenous peoples for elimination when they resisted settlement and exploitation of their lands.

⁶ There is no index entry for genocide in any of these books. Nor is there any such entry in a 1980 edited volume that surveys the empirical literature on violent civil and international conflict (Gurr 1980).

that regimes will choose massive repression (Fein 1993; Gurr 1986; Harff 1987). They also argue for the importance of habituation: Successful uses of violence to seize or maintain power establish agencies and dispositions to rely on repression in future conflicts. Krain (1997, 332–37), among others, proposes that regime changes, including those that follow revolutions, open up opportunities for elites to eliminate groups that might challenge them. Numerous researchers point out that democratic norms and political structures constrain elite decisions about the use of repression against their citizens whereas autocratic elites are not so constrained (Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991; Rummel 1995). Others suggest that the international environment is a major source of both incentives for and constraints on the elite's use of repression. Thus a country's peripheral status in the international system can be a permissive condition (Harff 1987), and international war can provide a cover (Melson 1992), whereas international engagement and condemnation can constrain repression. Each of the general factors, below, is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities' choices about whether to resort to mass killings in conflict situations.

Political Upheaval: The Necessary Precondition for Genocide and Politicide

The beginning point is *political upheaval*, a concept that captures the essence of the structural crises and societal pressures that are preconditions for authorities' efforts to eliminate entire groups (Harff 1987; Melson 1992). Political upheaval is defined as *an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, or defeat in international war*. Types of political upheaval include defeat in international war, revolutions, anticolonial rebellions, separatist wars, coups, and regime transitions that result in the ascendancy of political elites who embrace extremist ideologies.

Empirically, all but one of the 37 genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals, as determined from the State Failure's roster of ethnic and revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes:⁷ 24 coincided with ethnic wars, 14 coincided with revolutionary wars, and 14 followed the occurrence of adverse regime changes. As these numbers imply, several geno-/politicides began after multiple state failures of different types. In addition, four of the 37 sequences of state failure followed the establishment of an independent state, either through decolonization or breakup of an existing state.

⁷ The State Failure project's lists of ethnic and revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes are posted at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail>. The one geno-/politicide that did not coincide with a "failure" is the 1981–82 Syrian case in which the Muslim Brotherhood was targeted because its revolutionary objectives were a threat to the regime. The Brotherhood's rebellion is below the threshold of revolutionary war used in the State Failure data set. Since it fits the larger pattern of retributive geno-/politicides, it is included in the count of episodes that coincided with revolutionary war.

The key variable in the analysis is the magnitude of political upheaval; the argument is that the greater the extent of violent conflict and adverse regime change, the greater the likelihood that geno-/politicide will occur. There are two rationales. First, the more intense and persisting conflict has been, the more threatened authorities are likely to be, and the more willing to take extreme measures. Second, following Krain (1997), the greater the extent of political disruption, the greater the opportunities for authorities to seek a "final solution" to present and potential future challenges.

Annual magnitudes of each episode of state failure were estimated via ordinal ratings of the scope and intensity of violent conflict and its impact on governance.⁸ The indicator of political upheaval is the sum of magnitudes of all state failures occurring in the 15 years preceding the onset of geno-/politicide. Conceptually, the 15-year specification was intended to capture the extent of disruption due to long-term conflicts; empirically, the 15-year aggregation gave somewhat better analytic results than 10- and 20-year aggregations. Although it may be that revolutions, ethnic wars, and regime collapse have different effects on the likelihood of geno-/politicide, because the purpose here is to estimate an efficient model for a relatively rare kind of event, the aggregate concept and indicator are used.

Prior Genocides: Habituation to Mass Killings?

Recall that ten countries had multiple episodes of geno-/politicide in the last 45 years. Events that began four or more years after the end of a prior event were treated as separate cases in the analyses reported here. I am mindful of Fein's (1993a) observation that perpetrators of genocide often are repeat offenders, because elites and security forces may become habituated to mass killing as a strategic response to challenges to state security and, also, because targeted groups are rarely destroyed in their entirety. To test for "repeat offender" effects, a binary indicator of whether or not a previous genocide had occurred in the country since 1955 was used.

Political Systems: Exclusionary Ideologies and Autocratic Rule

Political upheaval is a necessary but not sufficient condition for geno-/politicide. Between 1955 and 1996 more than 90 state failures did not lead to geno-/politicide within four years of their onset. Two characteristics of political governance have vital intervening effects—the ideological commitments of elites and the extent of democratic constraints on their actions.

Contending elites usually have many strategic and tactical options for defeating or neutralizing opposition groups. Elite ideologies are crucial determinants of their choices. Episodes of genocide and politicide become more likely when the leaders of regimes and

⁸ The scales used to assess magnitudes of each type of conflict and the annual scores assigned to each failure event are posted on the web site given in footnote 7.

revolutionary movements articulate an *exclusionary ideology*, a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people. In effect, an exclusionary ideology increases elites' opportunities to eliminate groups, including those that pose no obvious threat to the elite—like the Cham who were targeted by the Khmer Rouge. Racism and antisemitism are historical examples. Fein (1993a, 95) observes that “ideologies of exclusion are now masked by new goals: socialist utopias, cults of personality, religious messianism, exclusive nationalisms. . . . Ideology is most apt to be a motivating factor during and after revolutionary upheavals or transfers of power. . . .”

Elites with “exclusionary ideologies” were operationally defined to include the following.⁹

- Adherents of strict variants of Marxism–Leninism, as in the German Democratic Republic throughout its history. Laos, Vietnam, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea all are coded as Marxist–Leninist through 1998. State socialist regimes that tolerated some civil society organizations and/or allowed significant free enterprise are not coded as “exclusionary”; examples are Hungary after the 1960s and Poland throughout the period of Communist rule.
- Rulers of Islamic states governed on the basis of Shari'a law, as in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Islamic states such as Bahrain and Oman that permit some expression of other religions are not coded as exclusionary.
- Advocates of rigid anticommunist doctrines such as those advanced by military-dominated elites in Taiwan and South Korea until the 1980s and “national security” regimes in some Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s (see Lopez 1986 for an analysis of national security ideology and identification of regimes motivated by it).
- Advocates of doctrines of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority or exclusivity, as in Iraq, South Africa during Apartheid, Serbia, and Bhutan. In Indonesia the Suharto regime's doctrine of “Pancasila Democracy” also was treated as an exclusionary ideology.
- Advocates of doctrines of strict secular nationalism that exclude political participation of religious movements, as in Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria (note that Turkey and Egypt exclude only movements that explicitly use Islamic symbols in their advertisements or party platforms).

Democratic and quasi-democratic regimes have institutional checks on executive power that constrain elites from carrying out deadly attacks on citizens, as noted above. Moreover, the democratic norms of most contemporary societies favor the protection of minority

rights and the inclusion of political opponents, while competitive elections minimize the chances for adherents of exclusionary ideologies to be elected to high office. This is the domestic equivalent of the “democratic peace” argument (see Davenport 1999 and Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). There are, however, historical and contemporary instances of geno-/politicide being carried out by governments with a semblance of democratic institutions. Ideologies that excluded indigenous peoples from the universe of obligation and justified their destruction coexisted with democratic institutions for white majorities in nineteenth-century Australia and the United States. Sri Lanka's democratic government carried out a politicide against JVP supporters at a time when the governing elite was seriously challenged. These exceptions aside, the general proposition is that a state that maintains democratic governance in the face of state failure is much less likely to commit geno-/politicide than autocratic regimes.

Autocracy and democracy were indexed using the Polity global data set's 0- to-10 point scales based on coded information on political institutions (Jagers and Gurr 1995). Full democracies have a democracy-minus-autocracy score of 7 to 10, and partial democracies have a score of from 1 to 7; i.e., they have some democratic features but lack others. In autocracies citizens' participation is sharply restricted; chief executives are selected within the political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no institutional constraints. Full democracies rarely fail, and thus have virtually no risk of geno-/politicide, whereas partial democracies, especially poor ones, have a substantially higher risk of failure than autocracies (Esty et al. 1999, 52–55; Goldstone et al. 2002).¹⁰ The question in this study is whether failed states with partial democracies have been less likely than autocratic regimes to commit geno-/politicides since 1955.

Ethnic and Religious Cleavages

Ethnic and religious divisions are often identified as preconditions of civil conflict in general (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000; Kuper 1977), and geno-/politicide specifically (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kuper 1981). I showed above that violent ethnic

⁹ This and other indicators described below are included in the State Failure Task Force's data dictionary and data set posted at the website given in footnote 7. The categories were developed and applied by the author, using information in standard political handbooks; the coding was later replicated by an independent team of coders and discrepancies were resolved by reference to additional sources.

¹⁰ Updated and validated Polity data are posted at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity>. Other indicators of democracy and autocracy have been developed (see Munch and Verkuilen 2002) but lack, in varying degrees, the conceptual distinctions and temporal and geographic coverage of Polity. Validation studies by the State Failure Task Force used Arthur S. Banks's updated time-series data on variables such as legislative effectiveness (coding categories in Banks 1971) separately and jointly with the Polity data (including individual dimensions of Polity such as constraints on the chief executive) to assess the effects of various aspects of democracy and autocracy on various types of state failure. The Task Force also experimented with alternative cutting points on the Polity scales to assess the susceptibility of full and partial democracies and full and partial autocracies to various types of state failure (see Goldstone et al. 2002). A number of these alternatives were used for estimating the geno-/politicide model. Results using the most efficient predictor are reported here.

conflict was a precursor to nearly two-thirds (24 of 37) of the geno-/politicides of the last half-century. But what are the most direct linkages? One possibility is sheer diversity: The greater is ethnic and religious diversity, the greater the likelihood that communal identity will lead to mobilization and, if conflict is protracted, prompt elite decisions to eliminate the group basis of actual or potential challenges. A plausible alternative is that small minorities in otherwise homogeneous societies are at risk, especially when a regime is committed to an exclusionary ideology.¹¹ To test these and similar arguments, indicators of diversity were constructed from a cultural data set that records the size of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups for each state from 1820 through the 1990s, compiled by Philip Shafer of the Correlates of War (COW) project.

A second and more complex connection begins with differential treatment of some groups. Discrimination against a communal (religious or ethnic) minority is likely to increase the salience of group identity and its mobilization for political action (Gurr 2000, 66–72). If political action takes the form of persistent communal rebellion, regimes are likely to respond with repression, which, when other predisposing structural variables are present, can escalate into campaigns to eliminate the group. A country-level binary indicator of active discrimination was constructed for the State Failure project from group-level data collected by the Minorities at Risk project: If any group in a country was subject to active political or economic discrimination in a given year, the country received a positive score.

A third possible connection is the ethnic and religious composition of the political elite. If the elite disproportionately represents one segment in a heterogeneous society, two consequences follow that may lead to genocidal outcomes. Underrepresented groups are likely to challenge the elite's unrepresentativeness, and elites fearing such challenges are likely to define their interests and security in communal terms, e.g., by designing policies of racial exclusion, like the Afrikaner elite in South Africa, or advocating exclusive nationalism, like Serbs and Croats in the Yugoslav successor states. The narrower the ethnic base of a regime, the greater the risks of conflict that escalates to genocidal levels.

A new indicator of *elite ethnicity* was designed to test the latter argument. This variable was coded based on information about interethnic disputes over access to political power. Elite ethnicity is politically salient if the ethnic or religious identity of presidents, prime ministers, and other high officials is a recurring issue of political contention or conflict. If elite communal identity is politically salient, a further distinction is made according to whether the political leadership in a given period represents the largest communal group in a country or a smaller one, using these summary codes:¹² 0 = elite

ethnicity is not salient; 1 = elite ethnicity is salient—the political leadership is representative of the largest communal group or a coalition of several groups that together constitute a majority; and 2 = elite ethnicity is salient—the political leadership is representative of a minority communal group or a coalition of small groups that together constitute less than a majority.

Low Economic Development

The State Failure project has consistently found that armed conflicts and adverse regime changes are more likely to occur in poor countries. This is true globally and for sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim countries, and countries with ethnic wars (Goldstone et al. 2002). The fact that most geno-/politicides of the last 50 years occurred in Africa and Asia suggests that a similar relationship should be included in this structural model. The hypothesis is tested using an indicator of infant mortality: reported deaths to infants under one year per 1,000 live births. Extensive validation analyses by the Task Force suggest that infant mortality rates are a good surrogate for a wide range of indicators of material standard of living and quality of life. They have greater reliability and give somewhat better empirical results in models of risks of state failure than indicators of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/Gross National Product (GNP).

International Context: Economic and Political Interdependence

International context matters for geno-/politicides. Shifting global alliances like those that followed the end of the Cold War decreased the predictability of international responses to instability and gross human rights violations. Post-Cold War international responses to genocidal situations have become more immediate and forceful, but it seems that Bosnian Serb nationalists and Rwandan militants, among others, concluded early in the 1990s that mass killings were not likely to have costly international repercussions.

It also is evident that both during and after the Cold War, major powers and the UN system were selective about the humanitarian crises in which to engage. There was very little international concern with genocides in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi in the 1970s and 1980s—countries of low economic status in which the security interests of the major powers were not threatened. At the other end of the scale, many international actors were concerned about crises in Tibet and Kashmir but lacked means of effective engagement. In the middle were Cold War-linked conflicts with genocidal consequences—in Vietnam, Cambodia,

¹¹ A recent discussion of the human rights consequences of cultural diversity and analysis of alternative indicators is Walker and Poe 2002.

¹² Note that religiously defined communal groups are included in the scope of "ethnicity" (for example, Alawites in Syria). The elite

ethnicity categories were developed and applied by the author, using information in the Minorities at Risk chronologies, political handbooks, and country studies. The coding was later replicated by an independent team of coders and discrepancies were resolved by reference to additional sources. The indicators are included in the State Failure Task Force's data dictionary and data set (see footnote 7).

Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America—in which international rivalries trumped humanitarian concerns.

One underlying principle encompasses the specifics mentioned above: The greater the degree to which a country is interdependent with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-/politicides. The converse is that leaders of isolated states are more likely to calculate that they can eliminate unwanted groups without international repercussions. Interdependency has two dimensions, economic and political. The State Failure studies have consistently shown that countries with a high degree of trade openness—indexed by exports plus imports as a percentage of the GDP—have been less likely to experience state failures. The relationship holds when controlling for population size and density and for productivity indicators. It also has the same effect at the global and regional level. Moreover, trade openness is weakly correlated with other economic and trade variables. The interpretation is that trade openness serves as a highly sensitive indicator of state and elite willingness to maintain the rules of law and fair practices in the economic sphere. In the political sphere a high degree of trade openness implies that a country has more resources for averting and managing political crises (Goldstone et al. 2002).

An indicator of political interdependence is a country's memberships in regional and intercontinental organizations. Countries with greater-than-average memberships in such organizations should be subject to greater influence, and get more political support, when facing internal challenge, and their regimes should be less likely to resort to geno-/politicide. Analysis of the preconditions of ethnic war—a common precursor of geno-/politicide—shows that countries with below-average numbers of regional memberships are three times more likely to have ethnic wars than countries with above-average numbers of memberships (Goldstone et al. 2002).¹³

ESTIMATING A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDES

The empirical work reported here was undertaken in the context of the State Failure project, which uses a case-control research design common in epidemiological research but rare in empirical social science (an exception is King and Zeng 2001b). The basic procedure is to match problem cases—people (or countries) affected by a disorder—to a set of controls that do not have the disorder (see Breslow and Day 1980 and Schlesselman 1982). The State Failure project's researchers selected a set of controls by matching each problem case, in the year it began, with three countries that did not experience failures that year or in the preceding or ensuing several years. In effect, cases are selected on the dependent variable: Those experiencing failure are matched with otherwise similar cases that did not experience failure. Logistic regression is

then used to analyze data on conditions in “problem” countries shortly before the onset of state failure with conditions in the controls.¹⁴ The results are expressed as regression coefficients and as odds ratios that approximate the relative risks associated with each factor.¹⁵

The task here is to distinguish countries where state failures led to genocides from those where they did not. The case-control method was adapted to the estimation of a structural model of geno-/politicide in this manner. First, the universe of analysis consists of all countries already in state failure. The dependent variable represents the conditional probability that a genocide or politicide will begin one year later in a country already experiencing failure. This avoids the problem of comparing the risks of genocide in Rwanda and Sudan with, say, the negligible risks in France and Canada. Instead, the objective is to examine countries experiencing episodes of internal wars and regime collapse and determine why geno-/politicide occurred during such events in Rwanda and Sudan but not, say, in Liberia or Nigeria. Second, the model is estimated using as cases all geno-/politicides since 1955, including multiple episodes that occurred in the same country. Two of the 37 episodes were not sufficiently separated in time to be considered distinct incidents for analytic purposes (see footnote 4).

Results: The Final Structural Model

The general procedure was to estimate a best-fit model that included a limited set of theoretically important variables, then to seek to improve it by testing the effects of adding other variables and alternative indicators. The six-variable model summarized in Table 2 is the culmination of a long process of model estimation and indicator validation. All six variables have significant effects at the .10 probability level; three have significant effects at the .5 level.

¹⁴ In logistic regression binary indicators are used. In practice the analyses reported here use a mixed strategy in which most indicators—including state failures—are binary, but others—magnitudes of upheaval, trade openness, and shared memberships—are analyzed as continuous variables.

¹⁵ There are two widely used alternatives to the case-control method for the analysis of cross-sectional time-series data on conflict. One is simple logit analysis of pooled country-year data, both war and peace (a recent application to civil war data is Sambanis 2001). This approach is widely criticized because cross-national time-series conflict data do not meet major requirements of the method, including nonheterogeneity and temporal independence of the observations. It also is not well suited to analyzing rare events such as the outbreak of armed conflict or, even more rare, geno-/politicide. A better alternative has been proposed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), using logistic regression with dummies to achieve the equivalent of event-history analysis, focusing only on intervals of peace and the risks of transition to armed conflict. Goldstone, in a prepublication paper (2002), applies both the Beck, Katz, and Tucker and the case-control method to hypothetical and real-world data, concluding that the latter appears to be more robust in dealing with unit and temporal heterogeneity and unknown lags—which characterize the State Failure research design and data. King and Zeng (2001a) report a reanalysis of preliminary State Failure data that focuses on problems of drawing inferences from regression coefficients generated in case-control analyses. Subsequent State Failure studies, including this one, base their assessment of risks of failures on odds ratios.

¹³ The Regional (CIOD) and Intercontinental (CIOC) indicators of shared memberships were normalized to annual medians to eliminate time-trend effects.

TABLE 2. Final Genocide Model Results

Variable	Countries at Greater Risk	Countries at Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	p Value	Probability of genocide given a single risk factor
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides	Higher	Lower	1.70	.048	.05	.047
Prior genocide	Prior post-1955 genocide	No prior genocide	3.39	1.220	.09	.090
Ideological orientation of ruling elite	Exclusionary ideology	No exclusionary ideology	2.55	.937	.07	.069
Regime type	Autocracies	Partial or full democracies	3.50	1.223	.03	.090
Ethnic character of ruling elite	Represents an ethnic minority	Represents most or all groups	2.56	.939	.09	.069
Trade openness	Lower	Higher	2.58	-1.242	<.01	.070
Model Summary Statistics						
c	.83					
Number of problems	35					
Number of controls	91					
Threshold	.25	Setting the threshold at .25 rather than .26 increases by one the number of correctly classified genocides				
% of genocides correctly classified	74% (26 cases)	Misclassified genocides: Afghanistan 1978, El Salvador 1980, Chile 1973, Uganda 1972, Iraq 1963, Yugoslavia, 1992, Sudan 1956, Philippines 1972, Sri Lanka 1989				
% of nongenocides correctly classified	73% (66 cases)	Highest-risk nongenocides: Pakistan 1983, Brazil 1961, Algeria 1991, China 1988, Mozambique 1976, Bangladesh 1974, Indonesia 1997				
<i>Note:</i> Political upheaval and trade openness coefficients are calculated using interval data on the full range of scores; other variables are dichotomous. The odds ratio for upheaval is based on the odds associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of upheaval scores relative to the twenty-fifth percentile. The odds ratio for trade openness is based on the odds associated with the twenty-fifth percentile of openness scores relative to the seventy-fifth percentile. The probability of geno-/politicide for a country with no risk factors is .028. Probabilities assume that a country is currently in state failure. The c statistic is used to compare models in case-control analysis without limiting the comparison to one particular choice of model thresholds (Green and Swets 1966; Harrell et al. 1984). It is the fraction of concordant pairs in the data, i.e., the fraction of all possible problem and control pairs for which the model assigns a higher score to the problem than the control.						

Political Upheaval. Consistent with the theoretical argument, the greater the magnitude of previous internal wars and regime crises, summed over the preceding 15 years, the more likely that a new state failure will lead to geno-/politicide. When the magnitude of past upheaval was divided between high and low, in high-magnitude cases the risks of geno-/politicides were nearly two times greater. Similar results were obtained using other indicators of upheaval, e.g., the magnitudes of armed conflict within states.¹⁶

Prior Genocides. Arguments about the recurrence of geno-/politicide also are supported. The risks of new episodes were more than three times greater when state failures occurred in countries that had prior

geno-/politicides. The effects of magnitude of political upheaval were weaker than those of prior genocide—it appears that habituation to genocide adds more to the risks of future genocide than the magnitude of internal war and adverse regime change per se.

Elite Ideology and Regime Type. Theoretical arguments about the importance of elite ideologies and regime type are supported. Countries in which the ruling elite adhered to an exclusionary ideology were two and a half times as likely to have state failures leading to geno-/politicide as those with no such ideology. Failures in states with autocratic regimes were three and a half times more likely to lead to geno-/politicides than failures in democratic regimes. These events, if they occur in the context of other risk factors identified in the model, substantially raise the risks of massive human rights violations.

Ethnic and Religious Cleavages. Numerous indicators of ethnic and religious cleavages were evaluated but only one was significant in the final model. The

¹⁶ A number of alternative indicators of political upheaval were tested. The best results are obtained using the full range of values on an indicator that sums annual magnitudes of state failure for the previous 15 years. The range of the indicator is 0 to 46 (mean, 8.0; median, 4.5). To facilitate interpretation Table 2 reports an odds ratio based on the odds of geno-/politicide associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of upheaval scores relative to the twenty-fifth percentile.

risks of geno-/politicide were two and a half times more likely in countries where the political elite was based mainly or entirely on an ethnic minority.

International Interdependences. Countries with low trade openness had two and a half times greater odds of having state failures culminate in geno-/politicide.¹⁷ High trade openness (and the underlying economic and political conditions it taps) not only minimizes the risks of state failure in general, as shown in other State Failure analyses, but reduces substantially the odds that failures, if they do occur, will lead to geno-/politicides. The results support arguments about the importance of a country's international economic linkages in inhibiting gross human rights violations. Results of analyses using indicators of political interdependence are presented below.

The overall accuracy of the model is shown in the summary statistics and notes. The *c* statistic is used to summarize and compare the discriminatory power of different models in case-control analysis. It is the proportion of all possible problem and control pairs for which the model generates a higher score for the problem than the control. Coefficients from case-control regression analysis are used to generate model scores. Typically a threshold is chosen for the range of model scores that equalizes the proportions of correctly classified problems and controls. The model correctly classifies 74% of all cases as genocides or nongenocides.

The right-hand column in Table 2 shows the conditional effects of each variable on the probability of geno-/politicide in a country with an internal war or regime crisis. Note that, since the analyses include all cases of state failure and all instances of geno-/politicide, issues of sampling error do not arise. The probability of genocide for a country in failure with no risk factors is .028. If the country is an autocracy but has no other risk factors, the probability is increased by .090. If the country has a minority elite but no other risk factors, the probability is increased by .069.

The incremental effects of each risk factor are relatively small; their cumulative effect is large. Analysis of various combinations of risk factors shows that, if all risk factors are present in a failed state, the conditional probability of geno-/politicide is .90, with a 95% confidence interval of .66 to .98. The only such country with all six factors in 2001 is Iraq, as shown in Table 5. A hypothetical country with the following combination of four risk factors—a high magnitude of past upheaval, a minority elite, low trade openness, and autocracy—has a conditional geno-/politicide probability of .52 (confidence interval, .27 to .77). Sierra Leone is a contemporary example. If such a failed state also had a past genocide, the probability increases to .79 (confidence interval, .43 to .95). Contemporary Rwanda and

Burundi fit this pattern, i.e., they are challenged by rebels (are in failure) and have all risk factors except an exclusionary ideology. An example in the lower range of risks is a hypothetical failed state with high political upheaval and low trade openness but no other risk factors: The conditional probability of geno-/politicide in such a state is .11 (confidence interval, .04 to .27). Both Colombia and India have this pattern. If such a state is also autocratic, the conditional probability increases to .30 (confidence interval, .16 to .50).

Efforts to validate the model in Table 2 included refining the list of problem and control cases (not reported here), assessing the effects of interdependence of cases of geno-/politicides, probing the robustness of theoretical findings with different data and alternative indicators, and testing the effects of additional risk factors. The final model that emerges from this process displays less classificatory accuracy than some prior models but engenders greater confidence in terms of theoretical plausibility, accuracy, and reliability as an instrument for generating risk assessments.

The purpose of posting the State Failure data set and dictionary on a web site (see footnote 7) is to enable other researchers to apply other techniques and test alternative models—a number of which have already been done by the Task Force. Following are the results of a few of the alternative case-control analyses done to assess the validity of the geno-/politicide model.

Probing Effects of Interdependence

Interdependence among independent variables and among cases of geno-/politicide are potential threats to the stability of the model. Bivariate tests of relationships among the independent variables showed few significant associations. The exceptions were that exclusionary ideologies were twice as common among autocracies as among democracies, and the magnitude of past upheaval was significantly higher in autocracies and in regimes with exclusionary ideologies. However, these exceptions are not strong enough to affect the stability of the model.

The fact that multiple genocides occurred in ten countries raises questions about the statistical independence of cases. This was tested by reestimating the model with a reduced set of cases: Only the first geno-/politicide in a country was included; subsequent cases were excluded. This had virtually no effect on odds ratios, the *c* statistic, or the classification accuracy. The conclusion from these and other analyses not reported here is that the model is not significantly affected by interdependencies.

Probing Societal Cleavage and Elite Ethnicity Effects

The study is particularly concerned with the effects of alternative patterns of ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination on the risks of geno-/politicide. For example, the (COW) Cultural data set was used to construct dichotomous indicators of low, medium, and

¹⁷ Trade openness is used as a continuous variable for calculating coefficients and estimating model scores. The range of the indicator is 7 to 137 (mean, 49; median, 43). For purposes of reporting odds ratios in Table 2 for this variable the odds of geno-/politicide associated with the twenty-fifth percentile of openness scores are shown relative to the seventy-fifth percentile.

TABLE 3. Probing the Structural Model: Testing Effects of Alternative Elite and Societal Cleavage Indicators

Variable and Predicted Direction of Effect	Model with Salient Elite Ethnicity		Model with Minority Elite		Model with Ethnic Discrimination	
	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides (+)	1.65	.05	1.70	.05	1.66	.08
Prior genocide (+)	3.30	.11	3.39	.09	2.71	.17
Exclusionary elite ideology (+)	2.26	.11	2.55	.07	2.35	.10
Autocracy (+)	3.38	.03	3.40	.03	3.66	.03
Elite ethnicity is salient (+)	(1.48)	(.53)				
Elite is ethnocultural minority (+)			2.56	.09	2.59	.09
Active ethnic discrimination					(2.08)	(.24)
Trade openness (–)	2.43	<.01	2.56	<.01	2.53	<.01
Model Summary Statistics						
<i>c</i>	.83		.83		.84	
Number of problems	35		35		35	
Number of controls	91		91		91	
Threshold	.24		.25		.26	
% of genocides correctly classified	74% (26 cases)		74% (26 cases)		77% (27 cases)	
% of nongenocides correctly classified	76% (69 cases)		73% (66 cases)		75% (68 cases)	

Note: See Table 2 for explanatory notes. Only odds ratios and *p* values are shown here to simplify comparison across alternative models.

high ethnic diversity. The low-diversity indicator tests whether small ethnic groups are likely to be targeted; the medium-diversity indicator provides a test of the thesis that the presence of several relatively large ethnic groups is associated with relatively intense interethnic contention and genocide. Bivariate analyses showed that neither pattern of ethnic diversity had any effect on the likelihood of geno-/politicide. This supports Krain's (1997) empirical finding that ethnic fractionalization was uncorrelated with the onset of geno-/politicide. It is also consistent with Walker and Poe's (2002) cross-national analysis showing that cultural heterogeneity was not related to political repression.

But two other indicators of ethnic cleavage did correlate significantly (in bivariate analysis) with geno-/politicide: active ethnic discrimination and elite ethnicity. To assess their effects better, three alternative models were estimated as shown in Table 3. The first two models differ in that the first uses the "elite ethnicity is salient" indicator, while the second uses the "elite represents an ethnic minority" indicator. "Elite represents an ethnic minority" is significant, whereas the "salience" indicator is not. Ethnic discrimination is added to the model in the last column in Table 3. It has weak effects in the predicted direction ($p = .24$). Thus the final model includes only the "elite ethnic minority" indicator. The theoretical implication is important: Ethnic heterogeneity is likely to lead to geno-/politicide only if an ethnic minority dominates the elite.

Probing International Interdependence and Quality-of-Life Effects

Genocide scholars almost invariably advocate international action including preventive diplomacy by the UN and major powers, engagement by nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), and reactive or preventive military action (see Heidenreich 2001, Kuper 1985, and Riemer 2000). To test whether international political linkages are more important than economic interdependency in checking the escalation of internal wars and adverse regime changes into geno-/politicides, two indicators of countries' shared membership in international organizations were constructed. The assumption is that the greater a country's international political connections, the more likely it is to accept help in managing conflict and the more susceptible it is to pressures to minimize human rights violations. Indicators of country memberships in regional and intercontinental (i.e., global) organizations were substituted in the structural model for trade openness, with the results shown in Table 4. Neither is statistically significant, and neither adds to the classificatory accuracy of the model, but both reduce the impact of the minority elite indicator. This suggests that minority elites are less likely to have dense networks of political ties with other countries, and thus are more free to commit human rights violations, but the direction of causality is uncertain.

This does not mean that political linkages are irrelevant to the analysis and prevention of geno-/politicide. The critical question, in my view, is whether states and international organizations do in fact engage in preventive actions in the early stages. What counts is the political will to engage—and as Powers (2002) shows in her recent study, major international actors have repeatedly chosen not to do so.

Finally, the indicator of infant mortality was evaluated in the model because other analyses consistently show that high infant mortality rates contribute to the risks of state failure (Goldstone et al. 2002). The results in the last two columns in

TABLE 4. Revising the Structural Model: Testing Effects of International Political Interdependencies and Quality of Life

Variable and Predicted Direction of Effect	Regional IOs Replaces Trade Openness		Intercontinental IOs Replaces Trade Openness		Infant Mortality Added to Model with Trade Openness	
	Odds Ratio	p Value	Odds Ratio	p Value	Odds Ratio	p Value
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides (+)	1.53	.10	1.60	.06	1.65	.08
Prior genocide (+)	3.93	.05	3.78	.05	3.50	.08
Exclusionary elite ideology (+)	2.47	.07	2.47	.07	2.47	.09
Autocracy (+)	2.93	.05	2.85	.06	3.45	.04
Elite is ethnocultural minority (+)	(1.66)	(.33)	(1.73)	(.30)	2.64	.10
Trade openness (–)					2.60	<.01
Intercontinental IO memberships (+)	(1.00)	(.99)				
Regional IO memberships (+)			(1.38)	(.33)		
Infant mortality (–)					(.94)	(.89)
Model Summary Statistics						
c	.79		.80		.83	
Number of problems	35		35		34	
Number of controls	91		91		91	
Threshold	.25		.23		.26	
% of genocides correctly classified	71% (25 cases)		71% (25 cases)		74% (25 cases)	
% of nongenocides correctly classified	71% (65 cases)		71% (65 cases)		72% (66 cases)	

Note: See Table 2 for explanatory notes. Only odds ratios and p values are shown here to simplify comparison across alternative models. IO, international organization.

Table 4 show that, unlike trade openness, infant mortality (and the basket of quality-of-life indicators it represents) has no independent effects on the odds of geno-/politicide once a state failure has occurred. The conclusion is that low development is a generic risk factor for civil conflict and regime instability, whereas the effects of economic interdependence are both global and specific to the risks of geno-/politicide.

False Negatives, False Positives

The nine misclassified cases identified at the bottom of Table 2 ("misclassified genocides") are diagnostic of problems with data error and model specification. Sudan 1956 is misclassified, probably because the genocide is dated from the beginning of the Southern rebellion, whereas mass killings began an indeterminate number of years later. If the onset of genocidal policies were dated from the mid-1960s, when the regime was no longer democratic and the magnitude of upheaval was high, it would be correctly classified. There were similar lags before the onset of geno-/politicides in Afghanistan (1978) and El Salvador (1980). Two other cases are misclassified because of the lag structure in the data used to estimate the model: Chile 1973 (targeting the left) and the Philippines 1972 (targeting rebellious Moros). Both regimes are classified as democracies because all model variables are measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. In fact, both geno-/politicides were carried out by authoritarian leaders after they suspended democratic rule: General Pinochet overthrew the democratic Allende government, and Marcos effec-

tively ended Philippine democracy by declaring martial law.

Thus, five of the nine misclassified cases can be accounted for by variables within the model. An example of an exception is Iraq in 1963, when the military first resorted to indiscriminant violence to suppress a rebellion by separatist Kurds; it may be questioned whether the case meets the key criterion of intent to destroy the group. If five cases that are misclassified because of temporal inconsistencies in the data and research design are added to the 26 correctly classified geno-/politicides, the classification accuracy increases to a very substantial 89%.

The false positives, in contrast, are the control cases of state failure incorrectly classified as impending genocides. Case-by-case inspection suggests that several could easily have escalated into politicides. Algeria after the onset of militant Islamic insurgency in 1991 is a case in point. Algeria's Islamic militants, a rival authority in a civil war situation, carried out a campaign of murder against civilians but seem not to have targeted any specific group; therefore the campaign does not qualify as a politicide. Similarly, in Mozambique in 1976, widespread killings were carried out by Renamo rebels, but they did not target a definable communal group. The most intriguing of the recent false positives is Indonesia. The failure was the dissolution of the Suharto regime in 1997 and the model shows a high risk of impending genocide. In fact, it took international intervention in East Timor to prevent a resumption of genocidal killings following the independence referendum of 1999, and the risks of a future episode in Aceh province remain high (see Genocide Prevention Center 2001).

CONCLUSION: USING THE MODEL TO ASSESS RISKS OF FUTURE GENOCIDES AND POLITICIDES

All episodes of genocide and political mass murder of the last half-century have been carried out by elites or rival authorities in the context of internal war and regime instability. The motive common to such elites is the destruction "in whole or part" of collectivities that challenge their claim to authority or stand in the way of an ideology-driven desire to create a society purified of undesirable classes or communal groups. The structural model tested here identifies six causal factors that jointly differentiate with 74% accuracy the 35 serious civil conflicts since 1955 that led to episodes of genocide and politicide from 91 others that did not have genocidal consequences. The risk factors include the extent of political upheaval and the occurrence of prior geno-/politicides. The probability of mass murder is highest under autocratic regimes and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who advocate an exclusionary ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both. International economic interdependencies sharply reduce the chances that internal war and regime instability will have genocidal consequences.

Implications for Theory

Some theoretical arguments about the causes of genocide are called into question by the results. First, indicators of ethnic and religious cleavages had ambiguous effects in the final model. Active discrimination against ethnic minorities is a significant causal factor leading to ethnic war, consistent with theories of ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000; Horowitz 1985), but once ethnic and other civil wars have begun, discrimination does not help explain which of them are likely to lead to geno-/politicide. Second, levels of economic development, indexed here by infant mortality, make no difference in the likelihood of geno-/politicide once internal wars and adverse regime changes have begun. Low economic development and societal cleavages may predispose societies to intense conflict but it is characteristics of the political system and elites, and a country's international linkages, that determine whether those conflicts culminate in geno-/politicide. It was also found, contrary to expectations, that economic interdependence is more important than international political linkages. The reason, I suggest, is that the international will to act is more important than political linkages in preventing escalation to geno-/politicide.

The findings are all the more significant in light of the fact that it was not possible to test effects of some other causal factors postulated by genocide scholars for which comparative historical data are currently lacking. In future structural analyses it would be desirable to assess the presence and expansion of private militias, paramilitary units, and state security agencies that operate with few restraints. Such entities often are implicated in the targeting of civilians. External support for a targeted group also has complex effects that merit closer analysis. Material support for politically

active groups is likely to prolong internal wars and may increase the risks of geno-/politicide. Also, empty threats from the international community against perpetrators may signal to elites that they can get away with mass murder without international repercussions. Another promising avenue for research is the "accelerator" approach in which event data analysis is applied to pregenocidal situations to identify patterns and sequences of political events that signal the onset of mass killings (see Harff 2001 and Harff and Gurr 1998).

Policy Implications

The model provides a framework for assessing and comparing the vulnerability of countries with state failures to genocide and politicide. When the model is applied to current information, it provides the basis for a global "watch list" that identifies countries in which the conditions for a future episode are present.

Table 5 provides an illustration. It lists 25 countries with armed conflicts circa 2001, based on an ongoing survey by Marshall (see Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001). Each country is categorized on the six risk factors using data for the year 2000 compiled by the State Failure project. Possible victim groups are identified based on country-specific information on civil conflicts, minority groups, and political opposition movements. The countries are ranked according to their numbers of positive risk factors.

Eleven countries currently are high on four or more of the risk factors for genocide and politicide. Iraq is the only one in which all six risk factors are present; Afghanistan also had all six factors prior to the overthrow of the Taliban regime but still faces considerable risks depending on the outcome of efforts to reconstruct a nonideological coalition government. The three countries with five factors are Burma, Burundi, and Rwanda. Another five African countries have four factors, as does Algeria. China, responsible for three previous episodes, has three risk factors, along with Liberia and Pakistan. For this approach to be useful for policy analysis, tabulation of risk factors must be complemented by assessment of the political circumstances in which they might be activated, as suggested in the following sketches of Burma and China.

Burma. The SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council), the military council that controls Burma, has relied mainly on repression to control its domestic opponents, including communal separatists such as the Karen and Shan and the urban-based democratic opposition. The government also targeted the Muslims of the northwest Arakan region for destruction or expulsion in 1978 and, again, in the early 1990s, precipitating large-scale refugee flows. The potential that any of these conflicts might escalate into geno-/politicide is moderated by several factors. First, the SLORC has sought negotiated settlements with most regional separatists, indicative of a shift away from exclusive reliance on repression. Second, it is seeking an accommodation with the democratic opposition, partly in response to international pressures. Finally, the country is being

TABLE 5. Risks of Genocide and Politicide in Countries with Armed Conflicts in 2001

Countries (No. of Risk Factors) ^a	Prior Geno-/Politicides	Upheaval since 1986 ^b	Risk Factor			Type of Regime	Trade Openness ^c	Possible Target Group(s)
			Exclusionary Ideology	Minority Elite				
Iraq (6 of 6)	Yes: 1961–75, 1988–91 Yes: 1978–89	High Very high	Yes: <i>Secular nationalist</i> Yes: <i>Islamist</i>	Yes: <i>Sunni Arabs dominate</i> Yes: <i>Pushtuns dominate</i>		Autocracy Autocracy	Very low Very low	Kurds, Shi'a, political opponents of Hussein Hazaris, Tajiks, Uzbeks
Afghanistan 2000 (6 of 6)	Yes: 1978–89	Very high	No	No: Coalition in formation		No effective regime	Very low	Supporters of Northern Alliance
Burma (5 of 6)	Yes: 1978	High	Yes: <i>Nationalist</i>	No: Burman majority dominates		Autocracy	Very low	Democratic opposition; Karen, Shan, Mon; Arakenese Muslims
Burundi (5 of 6)	Yes: 1965–73, 1993, 1998	Very high	No	Yes: <i>Tutsis dominate</i>		Autocracy	Low	Hutus
Rwanda (5 of 6)	Yes: 1963–64, 1994	High	No	Yes: <i>Tutsi dominate</i>		Autocracy	Low	Supporters of exiled Hutu militants
Congo-Kinshasa (4 of 6)	Yes: 1964–65, 1977	Very high	No	Yes: <i>Narrow coalition of Kabila supporters</i>		No effective regime	Medium	Hutus, Tutsis, political and ethnic opponents of Kabila regime
Somalia (4 of 6)	Yes: 1988–91	Very high	No	No: Clan rivalries		No effective regime	Very low	Isaaq in Somaliland; clan rivals in South
Sierra Leone (4 of 6)	No	Very high	No	Yes: <i>Mende dominated</i>		No effective regime	Low	Supporters, opponents of Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Ethiopia (4 of 6)	Yes: 1976–97	High	No	Yes: <i>Tigreans dominated</i>		Autocracy	Medium	Supporters of Oromo, Somali secessionists
Uganda (4 of 6)	Yes: 1972–79, 1980–86	High	No	No		Autocracy	Low	Supporters of Lords Resistance Army
Algeria (4 of 6)	Yes: 1962	Very high	Yes: <i>Secular nationalist</i>	No		Autocracy	Medium	Islamists, government supporters
Liberia (3 of 6)	No	High	No	No		Autocracy	Low	Krahn, Mandingo; political opponents of Taylor regime
Pakistan (3 of 6)	Yes: 1971, 1973–77	Medium	No	No: Punjabi majority dominates		Autocracy	Low	Sindhis, Hindus, Shi'a, Christians
China (3 of 6)	Yes: 1950–51, 1959, 1956–75 Yes: 1989–90	Medium High	Yes: <i>Marxist</i>	No		Autocracy	Medium	Uighers, Tibetans, Christians
Sri Lanka (2 of 6)	Yes: 1989–90	High	No	No: Sinhalese majority dominates		Partial democracy	High	Supporters of Tamil separatists
Philippines (2 of 6)	Yes: 1972–76	Very high	No	No		Democracy	High	Supporters of militant Moros, NPA
Colombia (2 of 6)	No	Very high	No	No		Partial democracy	Low	Peasants in FARC-controlled areas
Turkey (2 of 6)	No	High	Yes: <i>Secular nationalist</i>	No		Partial democracy	Medium	Kurds, Islamists
India (2 of 6)	No	High	No	No		Democracy	Low	Muslims; Christians
Israel (2 of 6)	No	Very high	Yes: <i>Ethnic nationalism</i>	No		Democracy	High	Palestinians, Arab-Israelis
Indonesia (1 of 6)	Yes: 1965–66, 1975–92	Medium	No	No: Javanese dominate		Partial democracy	Medium	Aceh, Chinese, Christians
Russia (1 of 6)	Yes: 1943–45, 1947–50	Low	No	No		Partial democracy	Medium	Chechens
Nigeria (0 of 6)	No	Low	No	No: Muslim majority dominates		Partial democracy	High	Christians in North; Niger Delta peoples
Nepal (0 of 6)	No	Medium	No	No		Partial democracy	Medium	Maoist insurgents and supporters
Macedonia (0 of 6)	No	None	No	No: Macedonian majority dominates		Partial democracy	High	Ethnic Albanians

^a Countries are listed according to their number of risk factors, as identified in the final model in Table 2. Prior genocides are from Harff 1992; other data are from the State Failure data set. All indicators use 2000 information except that trade openness is for 1999. Boldface italic entries are high-risk conditions. The table includes most countries with armed conflicts circa 2001 (from Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001) but excludes Angola and Sudan because they had ongoing geno-/politicides in 2001. Possible victim groups are identified based on country-specific information from case files on countries, minority groups, and political opposition movements.

^b Categories used for upheaval scores: low, 1–9; medium, 10–20; high, 21–34; very high, 35–60.

^c Categories used for trade openness scores: very low, 2 or less; low, 21–40; medium, 41–70; high, 71–100; very high, >100.

opened up to foreign investment in ways that will continue to reduce its rulers' future options about how to deal with opponents.

China. Three geno-/politicides have been carried out during Communist rule in China, one after the Communists took power in 1950–51, the second in Tibet in 1959, and the last during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1975. Some risk factors remain high but appear to be declining. Beijing's rulers are more pragmatic in doctrine and practice than their predecessors. China is more engaged economically with the rest of the world, with the likely long-term result of constraining domestic policies that offend trading partners and investors. Nonetheless, the regime has responded harshly to resistance by Tibetans and by Muslim Uighers in Xinjiang province and to imagined security threats from Christians and the Falun Gong movement. Unless the Chinese government becomes more willing to accommodate national minorities and unauthorized religious sects, the risk remains that repression may escalate into policies aimed at eliminating the offending groups.

These two sketches help make another point about the policy implications of the structural model. Some factors are historically inescapable, including the occurrence of prior genocides, but most are susceptible to external influence. For example, promoting the observance of minimal human rights standards and the practice of inclusiveness should continue to be on the policy agenda of governments and organizations that care what happens in countries such as Burma and Burundi. Attempts to force democratization are problematic because such attempts in poor, heterogeneous countries often fail. Nevertheless, those failures usually prompt efforts to redesign and rebuild democratic institutions. Once in place, democratic institutions—even partial ones—reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-/policide. Moreover, economic connectedness appears to have at least one positive effect in poor countries: The greater their interdependence with the global economy, the less likely that their elites will target minorities and political opponents for destruction.

The risk assessments generated using this approach not only signal possible genocides, but flag the actual and potential victims of human rights abuses in conflict-ridden countries everywhere. Timely and plausible assessments of these situations should make it easier to convince policymakers of the need to engage proactively in high-risk situations. Anticipatory responses should save more lives at less cost than belated responses after killings have begun.

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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War

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An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic and religious antagonisms. We show that the current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system. We also find that after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence in this period. We argue for understanding civil war in this period in terms of insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas. The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty—which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment—political instability, rough terrain, and large populations.

Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that killed at least 1,000 and had at least 100 dead on each side. These wars involved just 25 states that suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative estimate of the total dead as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states—more than a third of the United Nations system—and had a median duration of roughly six years.¹ The civil conflicts in this period surely produced refugee flows far greater than their death toll and far greater than the refugee flows associated with interstate wars since 1945. Cases such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon testify to the economic devastation that civil wars can produce. By these crude measures, civil war has been a far greater scourge than interstate war in this period, though it has been studied far less.

What explains the recent prevalence of violent civil conflict around the world? Is it due to the end of the Cold War and associated changes in the international system, or is it the result of longer-term trends? Why have some countries had civil wars while others have not? and Why did the wars break out when they did? We address these questions using data for the period 1945 to 1999 on the 161 countries that had a population of at least half a million in 1990.

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We wish to thank the many people who provided comments on earlier versions of this paper in a series of seminar presentations. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (Grants SES-9876477 and SES-9876530); support from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences with funds from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; valuable research assistance from Ebru Erdem, Nikolay Marinov, Quinn Mecham, David Patel, and TQ Shang; sharing of data by Paul Collier.

¹ The interstate war data derive from Singer and Small 1994, updated to include the Kargil and Eritrean wars. The bases for the civil war estimates are discussed below.

The data cast doubt on three influential conventional wisdoms concerning political conflict before and after the Cold War. First, contrary to common opinion, the prevalence of civil war in the 1990s was *not* due to the end of the Cold War and associated changes in the international system. The current level of about one in six countries had already been reached prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union and resulted from a steady, gradual accumulation of civil conflicts that began immediately after World War II.

Second, it appears *not* to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity—or indeed any particular cultural demography—by itself makes a country more prone to civil war. This finding runs contrary to a common view among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds “plural” societies to be especially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms.

Third, we find little evidence that one can predict where a civil war will break out by looking for where ethnic or other broad political grievances are strongest. Were this so, one would expect political democracies and states that observe civil liberties to be less civil war-prone than dictatorships. One would further anticipate that state discrimination against minority religions or languages would imply higher risks of civil war. We show that when comparing states at similar levels of per capita income, these expectations are not borne out.

The main factors determining both the secular trend and the cross-sectional variation in civil violence in this period are not ethnic or religious differences or broadly held grievances but, rather, conditions that favor *insurgency*. Insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. As a form of warfare insurgency can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations, and grievances. The concept is most closely associated with communist insurgency, but the methods have equally served Islamic fundamentalists, ethnic nationalists, or “rebels” who focus mainly on traffic in coca or diamonds.

We hypothesize that financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local

policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices. These often include a propensity for brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive noncombatant locals into rebel forces. Police and counterinsurgent weakness, we argue, is proxied by a low per capita income. Shocks to counterinsurgent capabilities can arise from political instability at the center or the sudden loss of a foreign patron. On the rebel side, insurgency is favored by rough terrain, rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the government's, and a large population. All three aid rebels in hiding from superior government forces. Foreign base camps, financial support, and training also favor insurgency.

Our data show that measures of cultural diversity and grievances fail to postdict civil war onset, while measures of conditions that favor insurgency do fairly well. Surely ethnic antagonisms, nationalist sentiments, and grievances often motivate rebels and their supporters. But such broad factors are too common to distinguish the cases where civil war breaks out. Also, because insurgency can be successfully practiced by small numbers of rebels under the right conditions, civil war may require only a small number with intense grievances to get going.

Using data on about 45 civil wars since 1960, Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 2001) find similarly that measures of "objective grievance" fare worse as predictors than economic variables, which they initially interpreted as measures of rebel "greed" (i.e., economic motivation).² More recently, they argue that rebellion is better explained by "opportunity" than by grievance (cf. Eisinger 1973 and Tilly 1978) and that the main determinant of opportunity is the availability of finance and recruits for rebels. They proxy these with measures of primary commodity exports and rates of secondary-school enrollment for males. We agree that financing is one determinant of the viability of insurgency. We argue, however, that economic variables such as per capita income matter primarily because they proxy for state administrative, military, and police capabilities. We find no impact for primary commodity exports, and none for secondary schooling rates distinct from income. Our theoretical interpretation is more Hobbesian than economic. Where states are relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to "tax" for themselves and, often, for a larger cause.

CIVIL WAR SINCE 1945

Building on similar efforts by other civil war researchers,³ we constructed a list of violent civil conflicts

that we presently believe to meet the following primary criteria. (1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition.⁴

These criteria are broadly similar to those stated by the Correlates of War (COW) project, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and several others. We developed our own list (working from these and other sources) mainly because we wanted data for the whole 1945–99 period and because of doubts about particular inclusions and exclusions in each list.⁵

In one respect our data differ significantly from most others: We see no reason in principle to exclude anti-colonial wars, such as the French versus the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. We count these as occurring within the colonial empire. Thus, the French state/empire looks highly civil war-prone by our list, with six colonial wars occurring in the 1950s. But to drop such cases would be like dropping the current conflict in Chechnya as a civil war in Russia if the Chechens succeed in gaining independence. Alternatively, it would make even less sense to include them as wars within "states" that did not exist (such as "Algeria" in 1954).


There are both practical and theoretical considerations pointing the other way, however. In practical terms, to include the anticolonial wars in the analysis requires that we form estimates of possible explanatory factors for whole empires, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy scores. Further, these estimates must change almost by year, as the colonial empires gradually diminished in size. We are able to use country-level data to produce such estimates for ethnic fractionalization, but our estimates for per capita income are more

⁴ We used the following secondary criteria to deal with several other coding issues. (4) The start year is the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria. (5) If a main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets a new civil war after Siad Barre is defeated in 1991). (6) War ends are coded by observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace. (7) Involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are satisfied. (8) We code multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination. (9) If a state seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized state, we consider it a "civil war" only if the fighting continues after the state begins to govern the territory (thus, Indonesia/East Timor 1975, yes, and India/Hyderabad 1947, no).

⁵ Sambanis (2002) discusses a number of conceptual and operational ambiguities and problems with the COW civil war data. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) base their list on COW data, breaking a number of COW civil wars into multiple wars according to unspecified criteria and including some colonial wars (coded in nonexistent "states," such as Angola 1961) but not others.

² There are 79 wars in their sample, but they lose about 34 due to missing values on explanatory variables, which are mainly economic. Standard economic data tend to be missing for countries that are poor and civil war-torn. This highly nonrandom listwise deletion may account for some of the differences between our results.

³ In particular, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Esty et al. (1998), Gleditsch et al. (2002), the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (2000), Licklider (1995), Singer and Small (1994), Sivard (1996), and Valentino (2002).

FIGURE 1. Number and Percentage of Countries with Ongoing Civil Wars by Year from 1945 to 1999

problematic and the question of how to code the empires on a democracy index is vexed. Regarding theory, the colonial empires differed so radically from other independent states, and faced such an inhospitable international environment after the war (with pressure from the United States and the new United Nations system), that we need to be cautious about any empirical results that depend wholly on these cases. Thus we analyze the data both with and without the anticolonial wars.

Descriptive Statistics

We identified 127 conflicts that meet the above criteria, of which 13 were anticolonial wars.⁶ This makes for 127 civil war starts in a sample of 6,610 country years, a rate of 1.92 per 100. The periods following major international systemic change had the highest onset rates. Civil wars broke out in the late 1940s and the 1950s at 4.6 and 2.2 per 100 country-years, respectively, followed by the 1990s, at 2.0. In absolute terms, the largest number of civil wars began in the 1990s (31), followed by the 1960s and 1970s (19 and 25, respectively).

Omitting the anticolonial conflicts, most civil wars occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (34) and Asia (33), followed by North Africa/the Middle East (17), Latin America (15), Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (13), and "the West" (2). The rate of outbreak was highest in Asia, at three per 100 country-years; Africa, North Africa/the Middle East, and Latin America all had rates of about two per 100 country-years. "France," Indonesia, and the Soviet Union/

Russia are the most civil war-prone countries in the sample, with six onsets each.⁷

Trends over Time

Figure 1 shows the number of countries with ongoing civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999. Since the number of independent states grew sharply in this period, it also shows the proportion of countries with at least one ongoing war in each year.

The graph indicates that, contrary to popular belief, the prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is *not* due to effects of the end of the Cold War. The 1999 level of 25 ongoing wars had already been reached by the mid 1980s. Conflicts associated with the Soviet collapse were partly responsible for the sharp increase in the early 1990s, but a marked *decline* has followed.⁸

One might conjecture that more and more civil wars are breaking out over time, thus producing the secular increase. This is incorrect. The rate of outbreak is 2.31 per year since 1945, highly variable but showing no significant trend up or down. The secular increase stems from the fact that civil wars have ended at a rate of only about 1.85 per year. The result has been a steady, almost-linear accumulation of unresolved conflicts since 1945.

Put differently, states in the international system have been subject to a more or less constant risk

⁷ Four outbreaks are coded in the Soviet Union in 1946, in the Baltics and Ukraine, plus Russia's two Chechen wars in the 1990s.

⁸ Gurr (2000) notes the late-1990s decline in ethnic war and argues that the trend reflects improved management strategies by states and international organizations. The basic pattern in Figure 1 is not an artifact of the way we have coded "civil war"; it is observed in a broad range of other data sets on violent domestic conflict for this period (e.g., Gleditsch et al. 2002).

⁶ See Fearon and Laitin 2003 for a list of the conflicts.

of violent civil conflict over the period, but the conflicts they suffer have been difficult to end. The average duration of the civil wars in progress has increased steadily from two years in 1947 to about 15 years in 1999. From a policy perspective this suggests caution about seeing as a temporary "blip" the sorts of military and political problems Western foreign policy makers have faced recently in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Colombia, and elsewhere.

ETHNICITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND GRIEVANCES

During the Cold War, political scientists and sociologists often sought to trace rebellion to economic inequality (Muller 1985; Paige 1975; Russett 1964), to rapid economic growth said to destabilize traditional rural social systems (Huntington 1968; Scott 1976), or to frustrations arising from the failure to gain expected benefits of economic modernization (Gurr 1971). A few scholars argued that the real source of rebellion was often ethnic nationalism (Connor 1994), and a rich literature on the sources nationalist mobilization developed in comparative politics (e.g., Anderson 1983, Deutsch 1953, and Gellner 1983). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, such culturalist perspectives became a dominant frame for interpreting inter- and intranational conflict (e.g., Huntington 1996).

Using a broad brush, we can distinguish between perennialist and modernist (or constructivist) positions on the nature and sources of ethnic nationalism. Given in purest form by nationalist politicians and journalists reporting on nationalist conflicts in progress, perennialist arguments stress long-standing cultural practices said to define and distinguish ethnic groups. Differences between these practices are argued to have made conflict more likely. Academics rarely make such arguments as baldly as do nationalist leaders. But authors who stress the long-standing, "deep" nature of ethnic differences and suggest that these make domestic peace difficult include Huntington (1996), Ignatieff (1993), Moynihan (1993), Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), and Smith (1986). Arguably, the main message of Horowitz's (1985) influential book on ethnic conflict is that plural societies face a host of pathologies that render them especially prone to conflict and, at the extreme, violence.

In contrast, modernist theories see the thoroughgoing politicization of cultural difference that ethnic nationalism represents as a development of the last 200 to 500 years. The core argument is that economic modernization and the development of the modern state make upward social mobility possible, but contingent on sharing the culture of the group that dominates state or society. When the state or society poses ascriptive barriers to upward mobility for minority groups, they may develop separatist nationalist movements: All the more so, according to Anderson (1983), Deutsch (1953), and Gellner (1983), the greater the preexisting cultural differences between the minority group and

the dominant group. (When preexisting differences are slight, assimilation is more likely.)

The two approaches thus imply the same hypothesis about the relationship between cultural diversity and civil conflict.

H_1 : Measures of a country's ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war.

Seeking to explain anticolonial nationalist movements in countries barely affected by economic modernization, Gellner (1983, 108, n1) argued that even "the advance shadow" of modernization was sufficient to start nationalist dynamics in motion. For Anderson, nationalism quickly became a "modular form" that could be easily "pirated," even under conditions quite different from those during its origination. Nonetheless, if one took the modernist approach literally one might infer that more modernization should imply more discrimination and thus more nationalist contention in culturally divided countries.

H_2 : The effect of ethnic diversity on the probability of civil war should increase at higher levels of per capita income (a proxy for economic modernization).

Horowitz (1985) and several others argue that the relationship between ethnic diversity and severe ethnic conflict is nonmonotonic, with less violence for highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. The politics of a highly diverse country might be strategically similar to those of a homogeneous one, since small ethnic groups must join coalitions to have political influence, and there are many possibilities for cross-cutting and shifts in coalition membership. Horowitz suggests that the most severe ethnic conflicts will arise in countries where a substantial ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority that can, given ethnic voting, win for sure in any national election. Such arguments yield the following hypothesis.

H_3 : Countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at greater risk for civil war.

We consider several measures for these concepts. For H_1 we use (1) the commonly employed ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index based on data from *Atlas Narodov Mira* 1964, which gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups;⁹ (2) a measure of the share of population belonging to the largest ethnic group that we constructed from the CIA Factbook and other sources (Fearon 2002); (3) the number of distinct languages spoken by groups exceeding 1% of

⁹ For this and several other variables we filled in values for missing country years whenever possible based on our own research; often the sources were the CIA Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Library of Congress Country Studies, though we used country-specific sources when necessary.

the country's population, based on Grimes and Grimes 1996; and (4) a measure of religious fractionalization (analogous to the ELF) that we constructed using data from the CIA Factbook and other sources. For H_2 we interact these measures with per capita income. For H_3 , we use a dummy variable marking the 74 countries whose largest and second-largest ethnic groups exceed 49% and 7% of the population, respectively.¹⁰

The *mechanism* that gives rise to nationalist contention in modernist arguments is state or societal discrimination along the lines of cultural difference, which is thought to create the grievances that motivate rebellions. Grievances are difficult to measure independently of our knowledge of the actions we are trying to explain (rebellions, civil war), but measures of average levels of discrimination are feasible. Other things being equal, political democracy should be associated with less discrimination and repression along cultural or other lines, since democracy endows citizens with a political power (the vote) they do not have in dictatorships. Even more directly, measures of state observance of civil rights such as freedom of association, expression, and due process should be associated with less repression and thus lower grievances. State policies that discriminate in favor of a particular group's language or religion should be associated with greater minority grievances. Finally, it is often argued that greater economic inequality creates broad grievances that favor civil conflict (e.g., Muller 1985). Thus, we have the following hypotheses.

H_4 : Measures of political democracy and civil liberties should be associated with lower risks of civil war onset.

H_5 : Policies that discriminate in favor of a particular language or religion should raise the risk of civil war onset in states with religious or linguistic minorities.

H_6 : Greater income inequality should be associated with higher risks of civil war onset.

We consider both the Polity IV and the Przeworski et al. 2000 democracy measures, along with the Freedom House indicator of the observance of civil liberties.¹¹ For income inequality we interpolated and extended as necessary the Gini coefficients assembled

by Deininger and Squire (1996); using the country-average of Gini values produced the same results. For policies on religion, we coded, by decade, indicators for whether the state had an official religion, gave resources to one religion not available to others, regulated missionary activities, required religious groups to get official approval for religious activities, or singled out for or permitted harassment of a particular religious group. For policies on language, we coded by year whether a language spoken by at least 5% of the population received no official recognition at any level of government.¹²

One might argue, contrary to H_1 above, that we should expect an association between measures of ethnic diversity and the occurrence of *ethnic* strife, but not between ethnic diversity and civil war more broadly. In the limit this argument borders on tautology, since it would not be surprising if ethnic wars are rare in countries whose citizens think of themselves as ethnically homogeneous. However, one might ask if "ethnic wars" become more likely as ethnic diversity increases *among* those countries that have at least one nontrivial ethnic minority.

H_7 : Among countries with an ethnic minority comprising at least 5% of the population, greater ethnic diversity should associate with a higher risk of *ethnic* civil war.

The measurement problem here is to say what an "ethnic" civil war is, and we suspect that under any plausible statement of the concept there will be numerous cases that are mixed or ambiguous. We coded as "ethnic" conflicts in which the fighters were mobilized primarily along ethnic lines, marking off 53 (51%) as ethnic, 20 (18%) as mixed or ambiguous, and 36 (32%) as not ethnic (excluding the anticolonial conflicts).

INSURGENCY

If many post-1945 civil wars have been "ethnic" or "nationalist" as these terms are usually understood, then even more have been fought as *insurgencies*. Insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. To explain why some countries have experienced civil wars in this period one needs to understand the conditions that favor insurgency, which are largely independent of cultural differences between groups and even group grievances. These conditions are best summarized by way of a brief statement of the logic of insurgency.¹³

The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are

¹⁰ Alternative thresholds for the second-largest group, such as 10%, make no difference in the results.

¹¹ Freedom House codes countries annually from 1972 on a seven-point scale based on a "checklist" that awards points for government observance of a long list of civil liberties and rule of law, including freedom of the press, religion, and association, independent judiciary, equal treatment under the law, civilian control of police, "protection from political terror," secure property rights, and equality of opportunity. "Freedom from war and insurgency" is one element of their checklist, so we are careful to lag this independent variable. For Polity IV, we use the difference between the 11-point democracy and autocracy scales. Following the Polity coders' suggestions, we interpolate values for "transition period" years (–88), treat foreign occupation years (–66) as missing, and treat "interruptions" (–77) as zeros. See <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/>.

¹² "Official recognition" implies use by some public officially sanctioned entity. For language we relied mainly on Asher 1994 and Gunnemark 1992; and for religion, the U.S. State Department's 1999 *Annual Report on Religious Freedom*.

¹³ Though our formulations differ, we have been influenced here by Stathis Kalyvas's work on the Greek civil war. The literature on guerrilla warfare is extensive; see, for examples, Desai and Eckstein 1990, Griffith 1961, and Laqueur 1976.

fighting, at least at the start of operations. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is true even in states whose military and police capacities are low. The total number of active rebels in many wars in which thousands of civilians have been killed (through the actions of both governments and rebels) is often in the hundreds or low thousands.

The numerical weakness of the insurgents implies that, to survive, the rebels must be able to hide from government forces. Several hypotheses follow.

H_8 : The presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, cross-border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents.

Much scholarly writing holds that ethnic or class solidarity and grievances are necessary for H_{8c} , the local population's support of active rebels. In line with Kriger (1992) and some analysts of communist insurgencies (e.g., Clutterbuck 1967, Leites and Wolf 1970, and Thompson 1966), we argue that while grievances and ethnic solidarity can be helpful in this regard, they are not necessary. Instead, the key to inducing the local population not to denounce the active rebels is *local knowledge*, or information about who is doing what at the village level. Local knowledge allows the active rebels to threaten retribution for denunciation credibly.¹⁴ Ethnic insurgents use this informational advantage to great effect, often threatening and inflicting unimaginably harsh sanctions on "their own" people (Kalyvas 1999; Kriger 1992). The presence of an ethnic insurgency does not imply that the members of the ethnic group are of one mind in their determination to fight the state till they realize a nationalist dream. The immediate concern is how to survive in between government forces using violence to gain information or punish alleged rebel supporters and rebel forces using violence to punish alleged informants, "moderates," or government sympathizers.

An empirical implication of the importance of local knowledge is hypothesis H_{8d} : Having a *rural base* should greatly favor insurgency. In the city, anonymous denunciation is easier to get away with, giving the government an advantage in its counterinsurgent efforts.

Given the basic constraints posed by numerical weakness—the need to hide and not be denounced—various factors determine insurgents' ability to wage war. To survive, rebels need arms and matériel, money to buy them, or smugglable goods to trade for them. They need a supply of recruits to the insurgent way of

life, and they may also need information and instruction in the practical details of running an insurgency.¹⁵

Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are *the government's police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas*. Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper if the government and military they oppose are relatively weak—badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level.

Effective counterinsurgency requires government forces to distinguish active rebels from noncombatants without destroying the lives and living conditions of the latter. This is an extremely difficult political, military, and organizational problem even for well-equipped and well-paid modern militaries; witness the U.S. military's failures in Vietnam (Avant 1994; Krepinevich 1986), early British efforts in Northern Ireland (Kennedy-Pipe 1997), or Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. For less well-financed and bureaucratically competent states, the problem appears to be nearly insoluble. Such states either cannot prevent the abuse of local powers by field commanders or may even permit these abuses as a sort of tax farming to the military. That is, they "pay" the soldiers with the opportunity to loot and pillage, a practice that tends to sustain rather than end insurgencies (see Keen 1998 for examples). Thus, we have the following hypothesis.

H_9 : Proxies for the relative weakness or strength of the insurgents—their odds of being killed or captured for a given level of counterinsurgent effort by the government—should be associated with the likelihood that a country develops a civil war. In particular, a *higher per capita income* should be associated with a lower risk of civil war onset because (a) it is a proxy for a state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities, and (b) it will mark more developed countries with terrain more "disciplined" by roads and rural society more penetrated by central administration.

There is an additional reason why a lower per capita income should favor the technology of insurgency: (c) Recruiting young men to the life of a guerrilla is easier when the economic alternatives are worse. Though we try below, it is difficult to find measures to distinguish among these three mechanisms associating a low per capita income with civil war onset. We believe that the strong results for per capita income reported below are due largely to its acting as a proxy for state military and police strength relative to potential insurgents (a and b in H_9). The fact that measures such as the percentage of young males and male secondary schooling rates predict less well than per capita income is consistent with this conjecture, though not definitive.

¹⁴ A "second-order" mechanism by which ethnicity may favor insurgency is that ethnic minorities are sometimes marked by dense social networks that are isolated from dominant group networks, thus giving an informational advantage to local rebels (Fearon and Laitin 1996). But such an advantage does not require ethnic distinctiveness.

¹⁵ In the case literature one frequently finds either that rebels leaders have spent time at guerrilla training camps in, for example, Libya, Afghanistan, Lebanon, or Mozambique (in the 1970s) or that they gained guerrilla experience in one insurgency that they apply in pursuing another.

Additional factors that would be expected to affect (or proxy) the strength of an insurgent band relative to a state follow.

H_{10} : The political and military technology of insurgency will be favored, and thus civil war made more likely, when potential rebels face or have available the following.

- (a) A newly independent state, which suddenly loses the coercive backing of the former imperial power and whose military capabilities are new and untested (Fearon 1998).
- (b) Political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization and weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion.
- (c) A regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features, as this is likely to indicate political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state incapacity. (In contrast, pure autocracy tends to reflect the successful monopolization of state coercive and administrative power by an individual or group.)
- (d) A large country population, which makes it necessary for the center to multiply layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local level and, also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a given level of income.
- (e) A territorial base separated from the state's center by water or distance—for example, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan or Angola from Portugal.
- (f) Foreign governments or diasporas willing to supply weapons, money, or training.
- (g) Land that supports the production of high-value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, diamonds, and other contraband, which can be used to finance an insurgency.
- (h) A state whose revenues derive primarily from oil exports. Oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues—a political “Dutch disease” (Chaudhry 1989; Karl 1997; Wantchekon 2000). At the same time, oil revenues raise the value of the “prize” of controlling state power.

Partially excepting f, none of these conditions crucially involves cultural differences, ethnic minority status, or group grievances. We do not claim that these factors provide no help to would-be insurgents in specific cases. But, to reiterate, grievances and ethnic differences are too common to help distinguish the countries and years that see civil wars, and in any event the technology of insurgency does not require strong

popular grievances or ethnic solidarities to operate effectively. The latter point suggests a contrast to H_4 – H_6 .

H_{11} : After controlling for per capita income (or other measures of state strength), neither political democracy, the presence of civil liberties, higher income inequality, nor nondiscriminatory linguistic or religious policies should associate strongly with lower odds of civil war. Given the right environmental conditions, insurgencies can thrive on the basis of small numbers of rebels without strong, widespread, popular support rooted in grievances and, hence, even in democracies.

As for measures, for “rough terrain” we use the proportion of the country that is “mountainous” according to the codings of geographer A. J. Gerard.¹⁶ This does not pick up other sorts of rough terrain that can be favorable to guerrillas such as swamps and jungle, and it takes no account of population distributions or food availability in relation to mountains; but it is the best we have been able to do for H_{8a} . For H_9 we use Penn World Tables and World Bank data on per capita income, estimating missing values using data on per capita energy consumption.¹⁷ For H_{10a} (new states) we mark countries in their first and second years of independence; for H_{10b} (political instability) we use a dummy variable indicating whether the country had a three-or-greater change on the Polity IV regime index in any of the three years prior to the country-year in question.¹⁸ For countries that mix democratic and autocratic features (called “anocracies” or “semidemocracies” in the international relations literature and “praetorian regimes” by Huntington 1968) we mark regimes that score between -5 and 5 on the difference between Polity IV's democracy and autocracy measures (the difference ranges from -10 to 10). Country population (H_{10d}) is based largely on World Bank figures. For oil exporters we marked country-years in which fuel exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, using World Bank data.¹⁹ We coded a dummy variable for states with noncontiguous territory ourselves (H_{10e}).²⁰

¹⁶ Gerard produced this measure for the DECRG project on civil wars at the World Bank. Our sample of countries differs slightly, so we estimated values for 21 missing countries using the difference between the highest and the lowest point of elevation in each country, which is well correlated with the mountains measure (0.78 in logs).

¹⁷ We used income growth rates from the World Development Indicators 2001 to extend the estimates in the Penn World Tables 5.6 and then used the per capita energy consumption estimates provided by the COW project to estimate additional missing values. For details see Fearon and Laitin 2003.

¹⁸ For this variable, “transition periods” and “interruptions” (which indicate a “complete collapse of central authority”) are coded as instability; foreign occupations are treated as missing.

¹⁹ The data are for five-year intervals beginning in 1960; we interpolated for years after 1960, set the value to that in 1960 for years prior to 1960, and used country-specific sources for a few countries without World Bank coverage.

²⁰ Countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 km of water were coded as “noncontiguous.” Ignoring the colonial empires, 25 of our 161 countries meet this criterion at some time since 1945.

The remaining hypotheses (H_{8b} – H_{8d} , H_{10f} and H_{10g}) present more difficult measurement challenges. Whether availability of a rural base favors civil war (H_{8d}) is better tested in a research design where ethnic groups are the unit of analysis, so that groups with different geographic concentrations can be compared.²¹

Although it is possible to code rebellions in progress for whether the rebels receive shelter and support from foreign countries (H_{8b} , H_{10f}), the potential availability of these aids to rebel strength is difficult to observe prior to the onset of fighting. In two special cases, the potential availability of support from a foreign power to governments is observable—in Soviet policy (the “Brezhnev doctrine”) in Eastern Europe and French policy with regard to its former colonies in subSaharan Africa.²² We would expect such support to increase the relative advantage of government forces against potential insurgents and thus associate with lower rates of civil war onset. We also consider a more tenuous measure of potential support to rebels—the number of civil wars ongoing in neighboring countries—which might yield more easily available weapons, training, or the presence of experienced guerrillas.²³

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Our central hypotheses concern the relationship between ethnic and religious diversity or structure, on the one hand, and the susceptibility of a country to civil war, on the other. Several multivariate analyses of the country-year data are presented below, but the main story emerging from them is made clear by the contour plot in Figure 2.

Are More Diverse Countries Prone to Civil War?

Figure 2 shows how probabilities of civil war onset vary at different percentiles for country income (on the x axis, measured in lagged 1985 dollars) and ethnic homogeneity (on the y axis, measured by the population share of the largest ethnic group). The lines in the plot show the probability of war onset in the next five years for a country at the given level of income and ethnic homogeneity. For example, countries at the twentieth percentile in terms of the size of their largest ethnic group—thus quite ethnically *diverse*—but at the eightieth percentile on income have had about a 5%

chance of civil war outbreak in the next five years. In contrast, countries at the eightieth percentile on ethnic homogeneity and at the twentieth percentile on income had a 15% chance of war in the next five years.²⁴

Note that for *any level of ethnic diversity*, as one moves up the income scale (to the right in Figure 2), the odds of civil war decrease, by substantial factors in all cases and dramatically among the most homogeneous countries. The richest fifth is practically immune regardless of ethnic composition. In contrast, for given levels of country income, no consistent effect is associated with variation in ethnic homogeneity (i.e., moving up or down the figure). Among the poorest countries where we observe the highest rates of civil war, the data indicate a tendency for *more homogeneous* countries to be more civil war-prone. Among the richest countries there may be a weak tendency for the most homogeneous countries to have fewer civil wars, but the size of the effect, if any, is small.

The empirical pattern is thus inconsistent with H_1 , the common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major and direct cause of civil violence. Nor is there strong evidence in favor of H_2 , which expects ethnic strife to be activated as modernization advances. Ethnic diversity could still cause civil war *indirectly*, if it causes a low per capita income (Easterly and Levine 1997) or a weak state. But then the mechanisms that actually produce the violence would more likely be those of the insurgency perspective than the culturalist arguments in either perennialist or modernist forms.

The data for Figure 2 omit the anticolonial wars, and the analysis does not control for other possible influences on civil strife enumerated earlier. We consider these issues next.

Multivariate Results

We coded a variable *onset* as “1” for all country-years in which a civil war started and “0” for all others.²⁵ Model 1 in Table 1 shows the results of a logit analysis using onset as the dependent variable and a fairly full specification of independent variables discussed above. *Prior war* is a control variable indexing whether the


²¹ Using the Phase III Minorities at Risk (MAR) data, Fearon and Laitin (1999) found that groups without a rural base area were far less likely to be engaged in violent conflict with the state, even after controlling for various country- and group-specific factors. Toft (1996) was the first to note and examine the strong bivariate relationship in the MAR data.

²² U.S. support to rightist regimes in Latin America during the Cold War might also qualify, although this was perhaps more offset by support for armed insurgency in this area from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

²³ The presence of valuable minerals or the suitability of land for the cultivation of narcotics is also codable in principle, but at present we lack such measures (H_{10e}). Nor do we have measures for the comparative disadvantage of governments in access to village-level information (H_{8c}).

²⁴ The figure was produced using R’s *locfit* package, with a smoothing parameter of 0.9, and transforming annual probabilities of outbreak to five-year equivalents. The figure looks highly similar if we use other measures of ethnic diversity, such as fractionalization.

²⁵ We do not code as ones years in which a civil war continues, which would be relevant if our focus were causes of war duration rather than onset. Nor do we drop country-years that have an ongoing war (as in Collier and Hoeffler 2001), since this would omit the 14 wars in our data that start while another war is in progress. Other approaches to the dependent variable and estimation—such as making the dependent variable “1” for all war years and using dynamic probit or Poisson models that interact independent variables with a lagged dependent variable (Jackman 2001; Przeworski et al. 2001)—produce virtually identical results. Only one country-year in the data has more than one onset (Soviet Union 1946, with one Ukrainian and three Baltic rebellions). We treat this as a one in the analyses reported here, though there are no significant changes if we use Poisson regression instead (treating the dependent variable as a count) or weight this observation four times in the logit likelihood. Using “rare events logit” (King and Zeng 2001) had no appreciable impact on any estimates reported.

FIGURE 2. Probability of Civil War Onset per Five-Year Period

country had a distinct civil war ongoing in the previous year.²⁶

Per Capita Income. Per capita income (measured as thousands of 1985 U.S. dollars and lagged one year) is strongly significant in both a statistical and a substantive sense: \$1,000 less in per capita income is associated with 41% greater annual odds of civil war onset, on average. Holding other variables at their median values, a country in the tenth percentile on income has an 18% chance of a civil war outbreak over a decade, compared to an 11% chance for a country at the median income and a 1% chance for a country at the ninetieth percentile (\$573, \$1,995, and \$9,505, respectively). The income variable is not just a proxy for “the West,” whose states

might have low rates of civil war for reasons of culture or history that have little to do with income. The estimated coefficient drops only to -0.28 when a dummy for the West is included and remains strongly significant despite the high correlation between the two variables. The relationship holds even within the poorest regions. Among the (mainly) former colonies of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, we estimate that \$1,000 less in income corresponds to 34% greater annual odds of outbreak.²⁷

Ethnic and Religious Composition. The estimates for the effect of *ethnic* and *religious fractionalization* are substantively and statistically insignificant. Alternative measures of ethnic and religious diversity—such as the

²⁶ With onset as the dependent variable, the data are grouped duration data and we need to consider the possibility of temporal dependence between observations. One approach is dynamic probit; see footnote 25. We also tried Beck et al.’s (1998) method of including dummies for each successive “peace year” prior to an onset, or fitting natural cubic splines. This had no appreciable effect on the estimates, and the splines were jointly insignificant.

²⁷ Contrary to Hibbs 1973 and Hegre et al. 2001, adding the square of per capita income does not significantly improve the fit of the model. Regarding H_2 , the interaction of income and ELF has the expected sign but is not significant. For lack of space, we report the details of these and other “nonresults” mentioned below in the tables included in Fearon and Laitin 2003.

TABLE 1. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Civil War Onset, 1945–99

	Model				
	(1) Civil War	(2) "Ethnic" War	(3) Civil War	(4) Civil War (Plus Empires)	(5) Civil War (COW)
Prior war	–0.954** (0.314)	–0.849* (0.388)	–0.916** (0.312)	–0.688** (0.264)	–0.551 (0.374)
Per capita income ^{a,b}	–0.344*** (0.072)	–0.379*** (0.100)	–0.318*** (0.071)	–0.305*** (0.063)	–0.309*** (0.079)
log(population) ^{a,b}	0.263*** (0.073)	0.389*** (0.110)	0.272*** (0.074)	0.267*** (0.069)	0.223** (0.079)
log(% mountainous)	0.219** (0.085)	0.120 (0.106)	0.199* (0.085)	0.192* (0.082)	0.418*** (0.103)
Noncontiguous state	0.443 (0.274)	0.481 (0.398)	0.426 (0.272)	0.798** (0.241)	–0.171 (0.328)
Oil exporter	0.858** (0.279)	0.809* (0.352)	0.751** (0.278)	0.548* (0.262)	1.269*** (0.297)
New state	1.709*** (0.339)	1.777*** (0.415)	1.658*** (0.342)	1.523*** (0.332)	1.147** (0.413)
Instability ^a	0.618** (0.235)	0.385 (0.316)	0.513* (0.242)	0.548* (0.225)	0.584* (0.268)
Democracy ^{a,c}	0.021 (0.017)	0.013 (0.022)			
Ethnic fractionalization	0.166 (0.373)	0.146 (0.584)	0.164 (0.368)	0.490 (0.345)	–0.119 (0.396)
Religious fractionalization	0.285 (0.509)	1.533* (0.724)	0.326 (0.506)		1.176* (0.563)
Anocracy ^a			0.521* (0.237)		0.597* (0.261)
Democracy ^{a,d}			0.127 (0.304)		0.219 (0.354)
Constant	–6.731*** (0.736)	–8.450*** (1.092)	–7.019*** (0.751)	–6.801*** (0.681)	–7.503*** (0.854)
N	6327	5186	6327	6360	5378

Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 7.0. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a Lagged one year.

^b In 1000's.

^c Polity IV; varies from –10 to 10.

^d Dichotomous.

proportion of the largest group and the log of the number of languages spoken by at least 1%—prove to be just as unrelated. The ethnic diversity measures show a strong bivariate relationship with civil war onset (not so for the religion measures), but this evaporates when we control for income.²⁸

Nor are countries that are ethnically or religiously polarized in the sense of H_3 more likely to experience major civil violence. When we add dummy variables for countries that have an ethnic or religious majority and a minority of at least 8% of the country's population, both are incorrectly signed and neither comes close to statistical significance. This finding does not depend on which other variables are included in the model.

Ethnic War. The strong effect of per capita income remains even when we restrict attention to "ethnic wars,"

while evidence of an independent effect of cultural diversity is surprisingly weak. In Model 2 (Table 1), the dependent variable marks the onset of wars that we coded as "ethnic" or partially "ethnic," and we consider only countries with at least a 5% ethnic minority. The coefficient for ethnic fractionalization barely changes. The same is true for our other measures of ethnic diversity. Our two measures for religious diversity give weak and inconsistent results, and support for H_7 diminishes further if we code the "partially" or "ambiguously" ethnic wars as nonethnic.²⁹

Democracy and Civil Liberties. Broad social and political grievances should be lower, on average, in political democracies. But contrary to H_4 and consistent with H_{11} , civil war onsets are no less frequent in democracies after controlling for income, as shown by the positive and statistically insignificant coefficient for *democracy*,

²⁸ Collier and Hoeffler (2001) find the interaction of ethnic and religious fractionalization to be negatively related to onset. Others find that fractionalization has a nonmonotonic relation to conflict. Neither relationship appears in these data; we suspect that one reason may be listwise deletion on missing economic data in other data sets.

²⁹ Coefficients for political instability and mountains diminish in this subsample, partly because the associations appear to have been weaker for ethnic wars and partly due to the omission of highly homogeneous countries.

the (lagged) Polity IV measure. The results are the same if we use Przeworski et al.'s dichotomous measure instead (available for 1950–91) or the lag of Freedom House's measure of observance of civil liberties (available for 1972–99). In the former case the sign is "wrong," while in the latter the sign is consistent with H_4 but the coefficient on civil liberties is thoroughly insignificant.

Some past studies of civil strife found an "inverted-U" relationship with democracy and sought to explain this by the observation that the most autocratic regimes can repress dissent and thus avoid civil violence despite facing the highest levels of popular grievance (Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). This observation does not explain why the leaders of a partially democratic regime are not able to implement full autocracy or democracy to avoid conflict and opposition. As suggested in H_{10c} , we suspect that the answer is often that "anocracies" are weak regimes, lacking the resources to be successful autocrats or containing an unstable mix of political forces that makes them unable to move to crush nascent rebel groups. Consistent with this hypothesis and with the prior studies, Model 3 (Table 1) shows that a dummy variable marking anocracies takes a positive coefficient. In substantive terms the estimate suggests that these regimes have about 68% greater odds of civil war outbreak in any given year than would a full autocracy. This is so despite the fact that we are controlling for recent political instability, which is much more common in anocracies.³⁰

Linguistic and Religious Discrimination. Added to Model 3, our measures of state discrimination against regional languages or against minority religions are not associated with systematically higher risks of civil war onset.³¹ This nonresult persists when we restrict the sample to those countries with at least a 5% religious or ethnic minority.

Inequality. Whether in a bivariate model or added to Model 3, the Gini coefficient estimates of income inequality do not come close to either statistical or substantive significance. The poor quality of the inequality data, available for only 108 countries, does not allow us to go beyond the claim that there appears to be no powerful cross-national relationship between inequality and onset, consistent with H_{11} .

³⁰ In Model 3 *Democracy* is a dichotomous variable marking regimes that scored higher than 5 on the Polity scale; the excluded category is autocracies. For Model 3 we followed Polity IV's suggestion in coding regime "interruptions" as anocracies; if these values are instead interpolated, the resulting anocracy indicator gets a smaller estimated coefficient that is not quite significant at the 5% level, while that for political instability increases. Another issue, raised by Hegre et al. (2001), is that the observation of some violence may lead Polity IV to code democracies as less "democratic" and autocracies as less autocratic (since there is mobilized opposition). So if there is low-level violence preceding the reaching of our thresholds, some of the effect of "anocracy" may be that it is picking up nascent civil war.

³¹ We tried the several religion indicators both separately and as a single measure based on a factor analysis of the components. Discrimination against regional languages is in fact associated with slightly lower odds of civil war onset, consistent with Laitin 2000.

New States and Political Instability. Consistent with H_{10a} , the odds of civil war onset are estimated as 5.25 times greater in the first two years of a state's independent existence than in other years, a huge effect (Model 3). For the "median country," this translates to an 11% chance in its first two years. Political instability at the center matters in other years as well. The odds of onset in a given year are estimated to increase by 67% if there was instability in governing arrangements in any of the previous three years.³²

Mountains and Noncontiguous Territory. Mountainous terrain is significantly related to higher rates of civil war. A country that is about half "mountainous" (ninetieth percentile) and otherwise at the median has an estimated 13.2% chance of civil war over the course of a decade. A similar country that is not mountainous at all (tenth percentile) has a 6.5% risk. The estimated sign for states with noncontiguous territory is consistent with H_{10e} , but its 95% confidence interval includes the possibility of no effect.³³

Population. Holding other variables at medians, the estimated risk of civil war over the course of a decade for a country at the tenth percentile in population is 6.4%, versus 16.4% for a country at the ninetieth percentile (1.4 versus 56.3 million, e.g., Botswana versus Iran). This effect is *not* due to large states being more ethnically diverse. We are controlling for ethnic diversity, and in any event it turns out that there is essentially no correlation between diversity measures and log of size, even if we omit the relatively homogeneous China.³⁴

Oil, Islam, Young Males. Consistent with H_{10h} , deriving at least one-third of export revenues from fossil fuels is estimated to more than double a country's odds. Based on Model 3, the "median country" had a 10% chance of civil war over a decade, whereas the same country as an oil exporter would have an estimated 21% chance.

Oil producers are disproportionately Middle Eastern, which raises the question of whether this variable might proxy some other relevant attribute of these countries. But a dummy for the North Africa/Middle East region is insignificant when added to Model 3, while the estimate for oil is barely affected. Huntington (1996) argues that "Islam has bloody borders" and "bloody innards" because Islamic societies have cultural and demographic features that make them violence-prone. When we add a variable

³² Snyder (2000) argues that democratization puts states at greater risk for civil war, ethnic in particular. Coding variables for three-or-greater moves toward and away from democracy on the Polity index, we find in these data that moves *away* from democracy are much more strongly associated with civil war onset in the next year than moves toward it, though both forms of instability elevate the risk. Hegre et al. (2001) found the same thing using COW civil war data.

³³ Dropping this or other "insignificant" variables from Model 3 barely affects the remaining estimated coefficients.

³⁴ Huntington (1996) argues that rapid population growth puts states at greater risk for civil war. Using the average growth rate for the three prior years, we find no significant impact.

measuring the percentage of Muslims in each country to our main specification,³⁵ it takes a positive sign but is not statistically significant. The effect of oil remains strong.

Huntington also argues that societies with a surfeit of young males will be prone to civil violence, suggesting this as a part of the explanation for Islam's "bloody innards." Given that young males have physical and perhaps psychological characteristics that make them apt guerrillas, our arguments on insurgency point in the same general direction. If we include a lagged measure of the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 in the population in Model 3, it has the expected positive sign,³⁶ but the estimate is highly uncertain ($p = .21$); one problem is that percentage of young males has a strong negative correlation with income, and income gets the better of it when both are included. The same is true for male secondary schooling rates (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Foreign Support. One determinant of the prospects for insurgency is the availability of third-party support to either the rebels or the government of the state in question. "Availability" is difficult to observe *ex ante*, however. A possible proxy is the number of civil wars ongoing in neighboring countries in the previous year, which might increase the availability of arms, support, and seasoned guerrillas. Adding the lagged version of this variable to Model 3, its sign is as predicted, but it is not significant ($p = .33$). Civil war next door is too common, occurring in 44% of the country-years in the sample.

Another possible proxy is foreign support to *governments* against domestic challengers. A dummy variable for "Soviet bloc" prior to 1991 cannot be included in the logit analysis because it perfectly predicts peace. But by itself this observation is consistent with our argument.³⁷

In the late 1980s, Mitterand's government departed from long-standing French foreign policy by supporting, to a limited extent, democratization in some of its former sub-Saharan colonies. This involved encouraging "national conferences," elections, and some political opposition, which all suggested that the prior policy of immediate military support for French-speaking dictators might have changed. Civil war rates for former French African colonies had been much lower than those for other sub-Saharan states. The 25 others saw 17 civil war onsets before 1990, a rate of 2.4 per 100 country-years. The 16 former French colonies had only three onsets in the same period, for a rate of 0.65 per 100 country-years (Chad in 1965, Senegal [Casamance] in 1989, and Mali in 1989). If a variable marking former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa prior to 1990 is included in Model 3, its estimated coefficient is -1.0 , which implies an almost-threefold reduction in the annual odds of civil war onset ($p = .11$;

the other estimates remain stable). A dummy variable for *all* former French colonies is unrelated to civil war onset, which suggests that the observed effect in sub-Saharan Africa is due to the mechanism behind H_{10f} rather than the effects of French colonial administration or law.

Other Variables and Robustness Checks

Anticolonial Wars. Figure 2 and the multivariate analyses above omitted the 13 anticolonial wars in five colonial empires (Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and The Netherlands). Including them is problematic for both theoretical and empirical reasons, but so is ignoring them. The main practical obstacle is the lack of comparable data. However, by using the ethnic fractionalization, population, mountainousness, and income data for each colony in its first year of independence, we were able to produce annual estimates of these variables for each empire. The income estimates are systematically too high—we use, for example, Nigerian GDP per capita in 1962 as an estimate of its income as a British colony in 1945. This creates some bias against the income variable and in favor of the ELF, which has a median value of 0.83 for the 114 "empire years," compared to 0.34 for nonempire years.

Model 4 reports a logit analysis parallel to our specification in Model 1 (Table 1), omitting only the democracy variable and religious fractionalization (which is hard to estimate for the empires due to shared religions between colonies and metropolises). Given that the empires were quite civil war-prone and highly diverse, it is not surprising that the estimated coefficient for ELF increases. Surprisingly, though, it remains statistically indistinguishable from zero, while, excepting noncontiguity, the others change little. Noncontiguous states are now estimated to have had 2.2 times the odds of civil war in this period, other things being equal. Because the empires are all noncontiguous and because noncontiguity otherwise does a better job than the ELF at picking out civil wars onsets, it is given greater substantive and statistical significance by the logit. If we drop noncontiguity, the estimate for ELF increases to 0.62—which corresponds to a 59% increase in risk moving from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile—but still fails statistical significance at the 5% level ($p = .07$). Thus even if we include the anticolonial wars, the evidence that ethnic diversity directly causes states to be more civil war prone remains slim at best.³⁸

Stepping back from the statistical analysis, we observe that these five imperial states managed their empires for many years before World War II with fairly little active rebellion despite the same levels of ethnic fractionalization, noncontiguity, and mountainousness. Nor did discrimination and oppression suddenly increase in the empires after the war, causing

³⁵ Coded from the CIA Factbook and a variety of country-specific sources.

³⁶ Data from the World Bank, linearly interpolated for missing years within countries.

³⁷ Foreign support may be at least as important as communist party structure in explaining Huntington's (1968) observation that the communist countries rarely faced insurrections.

³⁸ We created a democracy estimate for the empires by taking a weighted average of the metropole's lagged Polity democracy score and -10 , weighting by the metropole's proportion of total imperial population. Adding this or dummies for "anocracy" and democracy to Model 5 has no substantive impact.

anticolonial movements as a response. Rather, the war greatly weakened the main imperial states materially, and the new international legal order (the U.N. system) gave support to anticolonial movements. These shocks to the relative power of the metropolises help explain "civil war onset" in these cases (Fearon 2001).

Regional Effects. Different regions of the world share a variety of historical, cultural, and economic traits. It is reasonable to wonder if any of the variables considered in the multivariate analysis just proxy for such factors. Further, if regional dummy variables do not add to the model's explanatory power, then we have managed to account for the influence of regional characteristics with our more general independent variables. We find that if we add all (but one) regional dummies to Model 3, the coefficients and significance levels for our other variables are little affected. A likelihood-ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that "regions do not matter" beyond the included variables ($p = .22$). Including region dummies individually reveals that none has a rate of civil war onset significantly different from what one would expect on the basis of the country characteristics already included in the model.

Period and Fixed Effects. If added to Model 3, dummy variables marking each decade (but one) are jointly significant in a likelihood-ratio test ($p = .04$), showing evidence of a general upward trend in civil war risk after the 1940s. Adding a dummy for the 1940s and a variable marking the year indicates that from 1950 the odds of civil war outbreak rose about 2% per year, controlling for the other variables. As noted earlier, there is no secular trend when we do not control for other factors. Part of the explanation is that the median of country incomes roughly doubled from 1950 to 1999, which "should have"—based on Model 3—reduced the onset odds for the "median country" by about 35%. The fact that the rate of outbreak remains fairly constant while incomes generally increased in effect penalizes income in Model 3. When *year* is added, the effect estimate for income increases to -0.36 (the other effect estimates stay steady, except for noncontiguity, which becomes statistically significant at $p = .035$). We do not know what accounts for steady rates of outbreak despite increasing incomes. Increased international inequality (so that there is a set of persistently poor countries at risk for civil war), greater availability of small arms, and diffusion of insurgency "know-how" come to mind, but are just conjectures.

This observation also raises the question of how much the estimated impact of income is due to cross-country comparisons and how much to increasing income within given countries associating with civil peace. Applying conditional fixed effects logit to Model 3 without the variables that have little or no temporal variation (mountains, noncontiguity, ethnic and religious fractionalization) and with a control for year, we find that the estimated coefficient for income drops only to -0.24 but is no longer significant ($p = .16$). Using log of income, however, returns the same co-

efficient that log of income takes in the standard logit on the full sample (-0.78), significant at $p = .02$.³⁹ In addition, the effect estimates for the other variables are, with one exception, virtually identical to the estimates in the full, "pooled" model, the significance remaining high for all but anocracy and oil (which has little temporal variation). The exception is population, which varies vastly more across countries than within them over time. While bigger countries are more civil war-prone, there is no evidence that population growth within a country raises the risk.

Primary Commodity Exports. Using an "expanded" version of the COW data, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) find that the risk of civil war onset is maximized when primary commodity exports comprise about 32% of the country's GDP, with risk declining on either side of this figure. They propose that, up to a point, higher levels of primary commodity exports provide more motivation and opportunity for rebels to support themselves through "looting." Beyond this point, the revenue gains available to the state are said to be large enough to make civil war less likely.

We find little evidence of such a relationship in our data. Neither the share of primary commodity exports in GDP nor its square is remotely significant when added to Model 3.⁴⁰

We agree with the general argument behind Collier and Hoeffler's hypothesis. In our terms, insurgency should be more feasible if sources of financing are readily available. But we doubt that primary commodity exports are a good measure of financing potential for rebels. This measure combines oil, agricultural products, and metals and minerals, which, except for some minerals, are hard to exploit without control of a national distribution system and ports. Oil exports may be relevant not so much because they finance rebel groups but, as we argued, because they mark relative state weakness at a given level of income.⁴¹ A better measure for financing potential would focus on the presence of minerals or contraband that can reward control of a small enclave with huge profits (Leonard and Strauss 2001).

Trade Openness. Using a measure of "state failure" that includes both civil war and "disruptive regime transitions," Esty et al. (1998) found that trade share of GDP strongly predicted civil peace. Using the Penn World Tables measure of trade as a share of the GDP, we find no such relationship in our data. Trade is related to civil peace in a bivariate logit, but this is because smaller countries have more trade and less civil war.

³⁹ Whether we use income or logged income in the standard logit makes for no significant differences.

⁴⁰ The data series on primary commodity exports begins in 1960 and is available only at five-year intervals. We interpolated missing values and extended the 1995 values through 1999. We also tried Collier and Hoeffler's procedure of grouping the data by five-year periods beginning in 1960, again finding no relationship.

⁴¹ Our oil variable is moderately correlated with the primary commodities measure, at $r = .46$, but the latter and its square remain insignificant when oil is dropped from the model.

Alternative Definitions and Coding for "Civil War."

Our coding rules admit civil conflicts in which at least 1,000 have been killed. Some might argue that this threshold is too low to distinguish properly between "civil war" and, say, terrorism. When we recode the 30 conflicts in our sample estimated to have killed fewer than 5,000 as zeros, the results for Model 3 are nearly identical.⁴²

We also checked to see how our results differed if we based the coding of civil war onset on the lists given by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), the COW project, and Doyle and Sambanis (2000). As shown in Model 5 (Table 1), which bases onset on the COW data (1945–92), the coefficients and significance levels for the "insurgency" variables are remarkably stable.⁴³ We obtain quite similar results for the other two coding schemes. Although these four civil war lists differ on many specific start years and, to some extent, on what cases constitute "civil wars" at all, there proves to be substantial shared variation. For example, 53 of the 93 COW civil wars in the sample start in the same year as an onset in our data, and 68 start within two years of one of our onsets. At the country level, the bivariate correlation between our estimate of the total number of wars by country and the equivalent for the others ranges from 0.71 with Collier and Hoeffler to 0.82 with Doyle and Sambanis.

CONCLUSION

The prevalence of internal war in the 1990s is mainly the result of an accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system. Decolonization from the 1940s through the 1970s gave birth to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak states. These states have been at risk for civil violence for the whole period, almost entirely in the form of insurgency, or rural guerrilla warfare. Insurgency is a mode of military practice that can be harnessed to various political agendas, be it communism in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Algeria, or Kashmir, right-wing "reaction" in Nicaragua, or ethnic nationalism in a great many states. The conditions that favor insurgency—in particular, state weakness marked by poverty, a large population, and instability—are better predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions or languages.

⁴² The coefficient on income increases 21%, noncontiguity becomes significant, and anocracy weakens slightly. We coded total deaths ourselves, based on Brogan 1998, Institute for International and Strategic Studies 2000, Sivard 1996, Valentino 2002, and country-specific sources.

⁴³ The one exception is religious fractionalization, which just manages significance at the 5% level here. This does not occur in the other data sets, and even with the COW data the estimate for religious fractionalization is highly sensitive to which other variables are included in the model.

How could democracy and cultural or religious homogeneity fail to associate with civil peace across countries? Viewing "ethnic wars" as a species of insurgency may help explain this paradoxical result. If, under the right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2,000 active guerrillas can make for a long-running, destructive internal war, then the average level of grievance in a group may not matter that much. What matters is whether active rebels can hide from government forces and whether economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2,000 young men. Grievance may favor rebellion by leading nonactive rebels to help in hiding the active rebels. But all the guerrillas really need is superior local knowledge, which enables them to threaten reprisal for denunciation.

If our analysis is correct, then policy makers should not assume that civil wars and the "failed states" they sometimes produce are temporary phenomena of the immediate post-Cold War world. Nor should policy makers or academics infer that ethnic diversity is the root cause of civil conflict when they observe insurgents in a poor country who mobilize fighters along ethnic lines. Instead, the civil wars of the period have structural roots, in the combination of a simple, robust military technology and decolonization, which created an international system numerically dominated by fragile states with limited administrative control of their peripheries.

Regarding policy implications, the spread of democracy and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities should be major foreign policy goals because they are desirable for their own sake, but not with the expectation that they are "magic bullets" for the prevention or resolution of civil war. Sometimes recommended as a general international policy for resolving ethnic civil wars (e.g., Kaufmann 1996), ethnic partitions should be viewed as having large international implications and high costs. International support for partition would increase the expected benefits for rebels, who, we have argued, may be able to get a nasty civil war going on the basis of small numbers when the conditions for insurgency are right.

Policies to redress grievances, or, in the limit, partition, *could* be important to resolve ongoing conflicts. We cannot say on the basis of this research, which focused on civil war onset rather than termination. We find little evidence that civil war is predicted by large cultural divisions or broadly held grievances. But it seems quite clear that intense grievances *are produced* by civil war—indeed, this is often a central objective of rebel strategy. These could well pose obstacles to settlement.

Regarding prevention, our analysis suggests that while economic growth may correlate with fewer civil wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a well-financed and administratively competent government. In specific terms, international and nongovernmental organizations should develop programs that improve legal accountability within developing world militaries and police, and make aid to governments fighting civil wars conditional on the state observing

counterinsurgency practices that do not help rebels recruit militias. Governments that follow horrible, war-perpetuating counterinsurgency practices or are so corrupt as to be hopeless should be left on their own or, when there are major implications for regional stability or international terrorism, be viewed as candidates for "neotrusteeship" under the United Nations or regional military and political organizations such as NATO and the European Union. The latter system, which we already see operating, in effect, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, should be rationalized so as to improve internal coordination among the many players involved in such operations.

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Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy

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The origins of fascism remain a major concern to social scientists. Because fascism emerged in societies seeking transitions to democracy, a better understanding of these failed attempts at democratic transitions improves our understanding of both democracy's possibilities and the strengths and weakness of democratic theory. Indeed, theoretical arguments employed to explain fascism have their analogues in theories of democracy. Three arguments have been advanced to explain both democracy and fascism: class, civil society, and rational choice. This research examines the rise of fascism in Italy, 1919–21. The evidence contradicts the class theory of fascism and offers mixed evidence for the civil society theory, while supporting the rational choice theory.

Fascism will always be a minority movement. It cannot move beyond the cities.

Mussolini (1919)

What social and economic conditions foster successful transitions to democracy, or conversely, in what circumstances do democratic transitions fail? Social science theory has long held that these questions represent two sides of the same coin: The conditions supporting democracy are found lacking where nondemocratic politics succeeds. For example, civil society theorists tie democracy to a robust civil society, and, using the obverse argument, theorists of fascism cite links between a weak civil society and the rise of fascism. Parallels exist for the class and rational choice theories of democracy and fascism. Thus, the theoretical arguments employed to explain fascism have their analogues in theories of democracy. These three theories—class, civil society, and rational choice—may explain the rise of Italian Fascism, 1919–21, but a fuller understanding of the explanations requires a clear statement of the hypotheses and the construction of adequate measures.

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This paper is developed from research sponsored by the National Science Foundation under Grant SBR-94-2281. The Foundation's support is gratefully acknowledged. The Istituto Cattaneo of Bologna, the Dipartimento di Politica, Istituzioni, Storia of the University of Bologna, the Ministero dell'Intero, and the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica in Rome also provided invaluable assistance. Preliminary findings of this research were presented at the Organization and State Building Workshop, University of Chicago, May 11, 1998, and the Workshop on Political Processes and Spatial Analysis, Florida International University, March 5–6, 2001. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshops in Torino, Italy, March 22–28, 2002. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation, the Istituto, the Dipartimento, or the Ministero. Particular thanks are extended to Professor William Brustein of the University of Pittsburgh for his comments on early drafts and for sharing his data. Additional gratitude is extended to Professors Paolo Pombeni and M. Serena Piretti of the Dipartimento di Politica, Istituzioni, Storia of the University of Bologna, to Professors John Grove and Rob Preuhs of the University of Denver, and to Gary King of Harvard University for comments on an early version.

Fascism emerged in many countries and in several forms, but the most intensive research has focused on Weimar Germany as the prime case of the implosion of democracy and the rise of fascism. "[S]cholars have long viewed the Weimar Republic and its collapse as a crucial theoretical testing ground. The disintegration of democracy in inter-war Germany is so central to our understanding of comparative politics and so critical for the history of modern Europe that we should at least be wary of any theory of political development that cannot explain it" (Berman 1997b, 406). By the same logic, however, we must test our understandings in a variety of national and historical settings; otherwise, we risk overgeneralizing from a single case.

ANALOGUES IN THEORIES OF FASCISM AND DEMOCRACY

Class Theories of Fascism and Democracy

Class interpretations emphasize that democracy and fascism result from different class alliances and that democracy emerged where a strong bourgeoisie opposed the landed interests and, to some degree, successfully coopted the working class. Fascism arose where a weak bourgeoisie aligned itself with the landed classes against the working class, with the rural sector remaining crucial in determining the outcome (Huber and Stephens 1999; Lipset 1960; Moore 1968). The "Red Menace" thesis, central to this analysis, stresses that fascism was a reaction of classes threatened by socialism (Linz 1976, 26, 28–29). Rural lower-class radicalism, in particular, provoked an alliance between the rural landlords and the urban bourgeoisie, and this reactive alliance explained fascism's initial appeals (Childers 1983; Elazar 1996; Luebbert 1991, 296ff.).

Civil Society Theories of Fascism and Democracy

Analysts from de Tocqueville ([1840] 2000, 486–87) to Putnam (2000) have stated that individuals well integrated into a robust civil society consisting of dense networks of secondary, voluntary associations develop the trust essential to democracy and are less "likely to be swayed by their worst impulses" (Putnam 2000,

289). The obverse thesis has long been a staple interpretation of fascism. If a robust civil society supports social trust and democracy, then a weak civil society facilitates distrust and fascism. Early formulations of this "mass society thesis" held that fascism drew its supporters from the socially marginal, alienated, isolated, or rootless, particularly the newly enfranchised and newly mobilized voters (Arendt 1961, 305; Bendix 1952; Kornhauser 1959). Initially, Burnham (1972) and, later, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 147–51, 175–81, 283) found that civic organizational density and electoral instability were inversely related during the interwar period. Critics challenged the supposed weakness of civil society in Weimar Germany, countering that a robust civil society divorced from political life might heighten mobilization but, coupled to low trust and political institutionalization, contributed to the collapse of democracy (Berman 1997b, 402).

Rational Choice Theories of Fascism and Democracy

Rational choice theories of democracy emphasize the voter's rational self-interests, with material interests comprising a significant component of rational voting. From Downs (1957, 36) to Dahl (1989, 180), the rational voter looms large in democratic theory. Whereas democracy and fascism were frequently contrasted as rational and irrational, more recently rational choice theorists have advanced notions of the "rational fascist" and the "rational autocrat" (Brustein 1991; Olson 1993). Olson (1993, 570) assumed that "democratic political leaders are just as self-interested as the stationary bandit and will use any expedient to obtain majority support. Observation of two-party democracies tells us that incumbents like to run on a 'you-never-had-it-so-good' record." Brustein (1996) incorporated rational choice to argue that fascism appealed to voters' "commonplace and rational factors—namely their material interests" (viii) and demonstrated that the Nazis gained support by offering voters "the best prospects for a better life" (181). Fascism succeeded by tailoring its appeals to the material interests of particular groups. The "rational fascist" challenged the association of rationality and support for democracy because fascist "supporters were no different from average citizens, who usually select a political party or candidate they believe will promote their interests," with the implication that "evil as an *outcome* may have very logical origins and that evil is not always easily discerned—a chilling prospect" (Brustein 1996, xii).

Trust in Civil Society and Rational Choice Theories

Trust plays a central role in both civil society and rational choice theories, but its character differs in each. In civil society theory, trust approximates de Tocqueville's "Habits of the Heart"—an unconscious, deeply felt, unconditional, optimistic worldview that "the world is a benevolent place with good people, and that things are going to get better, and that you are master of your fate"

(Uslaner 2002a, 6). Civic and political associations foster trust, and, in turn, trust encourages civic associations (de Tocqueville [1840] 2000, 491; Putnam 2000, 288–89). In rational choice theory, trust is strategic, conditional, and dependent on reciprocity. Civic and political associations foster trust through repeated reciprocity. The endurance of trust also differs. In civil society theory, trust is more deeply held, durable, and stable; in rational choice theory, trust is more conditional and subject to erosion when reciprocity fails (Uslaner 2002b, chap. 3).

The Context and Nature of Fascism

Although fascism was an immediate response to the economic crisis of the interwar period, its intellectual and organizational precursors emerged before and during World War I. In contrast to atomistic bourgeois liberalism and class-based socialism, fascism, under a new doctrine of "society as factory," sought a harmonious, hierarchically integrated, functionally dependent, and efficient order (Maier 1987, 19–69). Fascism, however, encountered a congested political landscape. Following the war, nineteenth-century liberal and socialist rhetoric continued to dominate the "language of class anxiety," preempting the ideological space and limiting entry points for newcomers. Moreover, not only was the ideological space occupied, but the existing parties claimed much of the political landscape as well. Yet the advantages of the "latecomer" ensured that fascism had few initial claimants and, hence, was freer to experiment with its language and appeals. Moreover, the same organizational density that underlay the existing political parties also limited their maneuverability (Linz 1980, 155–56).

Under these conditions, fascism defined its place by incorporating and synthesizing both new and existing political ideas, while claiming new organizational principles. Fascism's protean form generated a long-standing debate on its character. No single rigid definition predominates, but most agree that fascism embodied a unique mix of ideology, tactics, and organizational forms. Ideologically, fascism relied on extreme nationalism, secular idealism, and vitalism. It propagated a myth of national rejuvenation and rejected rationalism, materialism, and egalitarianism. Tactically, fascism emphasized the use of violence and rejected parliamentary democracy. Organizationally, it drew on organic and corporatist notions espousing ideals of harmony, hierarchy, and national efficiency (Bosworth 1998; Linz 1976, 12–13). Fascism's "anti" character, newness, and experimentation made it attractive to a variety of groups, consequently, its sources of support shifted across time.

Italy: Fascism and Democracy

Italian Fascism developed in a society characterized by deep social divisions and a long history of traditional patrimonial politics during a period of transition to mass democracy. Thus, the Italian experience (1919–22) is highly appropriate for examining an unsuccessful democratic transition, although it is less suitable to study democratic breakdown (Tarrow 1995, 210). In

this sense, Italy shared conditions with other candidates for fascism—Spain, Portugal, and Germany. Italian Fascism's early appearance, rapid success, and agrarian popular support mark its distinctive elements. In less than four years, the Fascists seized power and Fascism's electoral success in May 1921 aided its march to power. Thus, the keys to understanding the Fascist's success lie in the years between 1919 and 1921, a period marked by violence and labor unrest known as the "Biennio Rosso" (the Red Two Years).

The Italian case is less researched and understood than its German counterpart. Unlike Germany, the triumph of Italian Fascism depended on the conquest of the countryside, as Mussolini himself noted in 1919. Although the Nazis made inroads into rural areas, by 1925, Germany was a predominantly industrial economy. Also unlike Germany, where in 1925 about 30% of the economically active population engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, in 1921 90% of the economically active population in Italy engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, with 66% involved in land cultivation. Moreover, the Italian and German land tenure systems differed markedly. In Germany, 90% of the agricultural holdings were owner occupied, but in Italy, only 21% of the agricultural economically active population consisted of owner-occupiers, while 12% were sharecroppers, and 24% were landless wage laborers. In Germany, 62% of owner-occupied holdings were five to 100 hectares; the comparable figure for Italy was 16%. On the other hand, 82% of Italian owner-occupied holdings were less than five hectares, with 42% less than one hectare. In Italy, 0.4% of the holdings occupied 50% of the farmland. Thus, the rise of Italian Fascism depended heavily on the rural sector, and the key to understanding rural political behavior rests in the data drawn from several observation levels using strategies and techniques discussed below.

EXPLAINING FASCISM: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The data analyzed here are ecological and nested or hierarchical, i.e., the data are available for different, but not the individual, levels of observation. Some variables are available only at the parliamentary electoral district level ($N = 54$), while others exist at the administrative district level ($N = 214$) and still others at the local or municipal level ($N = 6,110$). To exploit these data, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) within and across levels to capture those contextual variables most predictive of fascism¹ and, in the second stage, ecological infer-

ence (EI) (King 1997) to estimate individual electoral behavior in 1919 and 1921.

Concepts and Measures

The dependent variables are electoral support for pre-fascist and fascist parties leading up to the electoral breakthrough of Fascism in 1921. Thus, electoral dynamics among the contending political parties and shifts of support across levels, time, and parties rest at the center of the analysis.

In Italy, Fascist success meant triumphs in the rural sector (DeFelice 1966, 6ff.; Lyttelton 1987, 54–76). Four independent variables figure prominently. (1) Class theories emphasize the importance of land tenure as an indicator of property and class status. Rational choice interpretations also place importance on property but emphasize the maldistribution of land as a condition that the Fascists exploited in their rise to power. (2) Civil society theories stress the density of associational memberships as an indicator of the robustness of civil society. Typical indicators include measures of voluntary civic associations, e.g., trade unions, charitable associations, cooperative movements, and mutual benefit societies. (3) Class theories give particular emphasis to the 1919–21 agrarian strike activity, the "Biennio Rosso," as a measure of rural lower-class mobilization. (4) Both class and civil society theories underline the importance of violence during this same period. For class interpretations, violence indicated the reaction of bourgeois society to the "Red Menace." For both theories, violence served to destroy civil society and ensure the rise of Fascism.

Data and Data Treatment

Hierarchical or Nested Data Structure. Although the data are nested at three levels, two-level models generate the best-fitting HLM results. Fifty-four electoral districts constitute the Level Two units and the 6,110 local municipalities form the Level One units, with all units constant across time.² Level Two variables consist of three general categories: land tenure arrangements, rural strike activity, and violence. Land tenure and cultivator arrangements derive from the 1921 and 1930 census materials.³ *Family farmers* were small proprietors

¹ Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) avoids the drawbacks of the two most common methods applied to nested data. If the electoral districts' characteristics are assigned to the local municipalities, the assumption of independence of the municipalities is violated, and contextual effects of districts on the municipalities are ignored. If the municipalities are aggregated into the districts, the variance of the municipalities is discarded. HLM models capture all the information in the data by estimating both intercepts and slopes across and within districts. In addition, HLM can estimate contextual and cross-level effects.

² The municipal units are "comuni," local administrative centers that usually include several smaller villages, termed "frazioni." Size may range from a few hundred to over a million inhabitants; Roma, Milano, and Napoli, for example, are comuni. Over time the boundaries of comuni change, as larger ones may be subdivided or smaller ones united to form new comuni. Because there is no way of knowing the profile of those areas affected by boundary changes, I aggregate any municipality into another municipality when any part of it is combined or subdivided. Because both prewar and 1921 census measures are necessary for the analysis, I exclude territories acquired by Italy after the war.

³ The census officials noted that the four principal types were not distinct categories. Particularly in the South, tenure patterns were hybrids. However, the census officials made every effort to classify tenure patterns by the dominant mode of production. In these and other variables only males are used, because they more closely approximate the enfranchised population.

who farmed their own land, usually relying on family labor, although some employed part-time or full-time labor. *Sharecroppers* and *tenants* labored under various in-kind rental arrangements, generally lived on the land they worked, and usually lived in a house supplied by the employer. *Renters* were similar to croppers, but cash payments formed the basis for the use of land and the sale of produce.

Laborers worked for hourly or daily cash wages, occupied the least secure tenure, and constituted the lowest rung in the rural hierarchy. They were either *contract laborers* or *day laborers*. Contract laborers were "under contract to work for a specific employer whenever required, the employer being bound, in turn, to give them first chance of work" (Schmidt 1966, 11). With widespread unemployment, contract laborers had the promise of steady work but generally were paid a lower hourly wage than casual day laborers. At the very bottom of rural life were the day laborers, who formed the majority of agricultural wageworkers. In the Po Valley, day laborers outnumbered contract laborers by a ratio of 15:1. Day laborers generally were paid hourly or daily, or sometimes by piecework, and they accepted employment wherever available, often at great distances from their homes, and sometimes worked in nonagricultural activities.

Agrarian strike activity engaged 2.2% of the rural population in 1919 and 4.6% in 1920 during the "Biennio Rosso." The variables are *1919 agrarian strike density* and *1920 agrarian strike density*. Several possible measures capture Fascist violence, but the most effective measure is the number of deaths and injuries in political clashes between January 1920 and May 1921, *1920–21 violence* (Gentile 1989, 472–74).⁴

Level One (municipal) variables include rural organizational density in 1910 and electoral data for the parliamentary elections of 1919 and 1921. Rural organizations fall into two main types, trade unions and cooperatives. The latter included consumer and producer cooperatives, labor cooperatives, and rural savings banks, among others. Most trade unions and cooperatives were officially affiliated with the Socialist and Catholic parties. Others, however, were officially independent of any political party, although they generally supported the Socialists. Their organizational strength is measured by their membership densities: *Socialist rural membership density*, *Catholic rural membership density*, and *unaffiliated rural trade union membership density*. The rural trade union movement was deeply divided, but by 1910 the political and regional differences were clear. The Socialist and the unaffiliated

trade unions and cooperatives dominated Central Italy, particularly the Po Valley, while the Catholic organizations were most successful in the North (Horowitz 1963, 78ff.; Roberts 1979, 53ff.).

Electoral data for 1919 and 1921 parliamentary elections at the municipal level are a product of field research in local archives. Electoral measures are votes for party blocs defined by Giusti (1921, 11–13) and Piretti (1995, 221, n18, 232ff.). According to these guidelines there were four voting blocs in the 1919 election: the center-right *Constitutional bloc*, the *Center-Left bloc*, the *Catholic bloc*, and the *Socialists*. In the 1921 election, there were the *Fascists*, the rightist *National bloc*, the *Center-Left bloc*, the *Catholics*, and the *Left bloc* (the Official Socialists, the Independent Socialists, and the Communists).

Incomplete Data Treatment

All data are complete for the level at which they appear in the models, with the exception of the electoral data. Here incomplete data average 20% across the electoral variables. I use the multiple imputation method (King et al. 2001) to estimate incomplete observations. A second data limitation is that in most districts in the May 1921 election, the Fascists ran in coalition with the National bloc. Although the Fascist vote within the National bloc was not reported separately, Brustein (1991) reconstructed the Fascist vote. With this as an indicator of likely Fascist vote, the multiple imputation method estimates the full data.⁵

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

These three theories offer differing hypotheses on Fascist support. The class theory holds that property holders and 1919 Centrist voters, reacting to the "Red Menace," shifted to the Fascists. Because violence occupies a crucial explanatory role in the class theory, Fascist support should be greater and Left support less where violence was more intense. The civil society theory suggests that the Fascists attracted support among those at the social margins, such as those less integrated into networks of civic voluntary associations, the politically inexperienced, and the apathetic, e.g., newly enfranchised voters and previous nonvoters. The rational choice theory states that Fascist voters acted on their material interests in responding to the Fascist program. The Italian Fascist agrarian program offered numerous material appeals including land redistribution, higher wages, cooperative land leasing arrangements, credit, and marketing supports, among others. Those most responsive to such appeals would be those most economically disadvantaged, i.e., the landless rural laborers. Of

⁴ Violence figures prominently in several of the best-known analyses of Fascism (DeFelice 1966; Lytelton 1987; Tasca 1966). I test several measures of violence including injuries and deaths in political clashes between January 1920 and May 1921, with data drawn from the Interior Ministry archives (Gentile 1989, 472–74), and Fascist–Socialist clashes between January 1 and May 8, 1921, also from the Interior Ministry archives (DeFelice 1966, 36–39). A third measure consists of Fascist attacks on Socialist-affiliated organizations between January and May 1921, initially compiled by the Fascists themselves but later augmented by the Socialists (Tasca 1966, 120). Both injuries and deaths and Fascist–Socialist clashes measures exist by electoral district ($N = 54$).

⁵ Brustein (1991, 659) compiled the vote for the official Fascist candidates endorsed by Mussolini. He then "totaled the votes for each Fascist candidate from the preference votes (voti di preferenza) and from votes from the other lists (voti aggiunti riportati in altre liste) and divided that sum by the province's total preference vote and vote from other lists for all candidates." Municipal Fascist vote is estimated by the multiple imputation method from the electoral district returns and municipal returns.

course, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, e.g., if Fascism did appeal to the material interests of the landless, those who were members of civic voluntary organizations should be more immune. However, violence and intimidation might reduce this immunity. These and other subsidiary hypotheses are examined below.

CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Estimates of cross-level effects between electoral districts and local measures identify the contextual effects giving rise to Fascism. The estimation process involves several steps: estimating the variance in Fascist vote at the local and district levels, selecting the strongest predictor variables of Fascist vote, testing regression models with means as outcomes, and testing a random coefficient model. The final model below estimates the intercepts and slopes as outcomes.⁶

⁶ An analysis of variance (ANOVA) model estimates that 87% of the variance of Fascist vote occurs across the electoral districts and 13% within the electoral districts, an expected result since Fascism was centered in selected districts. The estimated grand mean of the Fascist vote in 1921 is 0.088, with a standard error of 0.0160. The reliability coefficient of 0.997 indicates that the estimated mean is a highly reliable estimate of the true mean. Variables most predictive of Fascism are presented in Table 1. Given the standard histories of Italian Fascism, some variables are noticeably absent, particularly property arrangements, violence, and rural class mobilization. In the class interpretation of Fascism, these are central explanatory variables, so I return to these questions below.

The regression model with means as outcomes estimates the mean Fascist vote as a function of the electoral district variables found to be most significant in the step above. The results show highly significant associations between the mean Fascist vote and Socialist vote in 1919 and the mean Socialist rural organizational membership. This, of course, confirms the obvious, i.e., Fascism occurred in the presence of Socialist electoral and rural organizational density. The two variables account for 56% of the electoral district variance. The conditional intraclass correlation of 0.87 in the ANOVA model is reduced to 0.25 and measures the remaining degree of dependence among the observations having the same scores on these predictor variables. The conditional reliability coefficient of 0.993 indicates that the ability to discriminate among the electoral districts with the same scores on the predictor variables is very high.

The random-coefficient model estimates the regression equations within each electoral district, i.e., Fascist vote estimated as a function of the municipal variables centered about the electoral district means and proving significant in step 2 above. The results indicate that both municipal vote variables are significant predictors of Fascist vote. The coefficients are the average regression slope within the electoral district controlling for the other predictors. The 1919 Center-Left vote is the most significant and possesses the highest slope. Both the intercepts and the slopes are highly reliable, indicating that the data provide considerable power to examine the effect of the electoral district characteristics on the mean Fascist vote within the districts. This model accounts for 18% of the variance across the municipalities. Since in the previous model the district variables of 1919 Socialist vote and Socialist rural organizational membership density accounted for 56% of the district variance, the results confirm that the district variables are stronger predictors of Fascist vote than the municipal variables. The correlation of the intercepts and the slopes demonstrates a strong association between the mean Fascist vote and the slopes of the 1919 Center-Left vote (0.919) and 1919 Socialist vote (0.695) and confirms the importance of districts as a powerful context for analyzing Fascism.

Modeling Contextual Effects: Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes

This model integrates the previous results and estimates the effects of the electoral district context on the local Fascist vote in 1921. The coefficients are the cross-level effects of the district predictors on local intercepts and slopes within the electoral districts. The model estimates contextual effects, permitting the disentanglement of local and compositional effects.

Table 1 presents the results in which the previous findings are confirmed. The mean Fascist vote across the electoral districts was 8.8%. The Fascist vote was significantly higher where the 1919 Socialist vote and rural organizational membership density were higher. The average slopes, γ_{10} and γ_{20} , indicate that 1919 Center-Left voters, in districts where the 1919 Socialist vote and Socialist rural organizational density were higher, were more likely to vote Fascist. These results are entirely consistent with the class and "Red Menace" interpretation.

The new information in the model confirms the above interpretation and highlights the cross-level interactive effect of the district-level 1919 Socialist vote and Socialist rural organizational membership density on both the 1919 Center-Left vote and the 1919 Socialist vote. Both relationships are powerful and significant.⁷ The results indicate that the municipalities more likely to vote Fascist were those located in districts where the 1919 Center-Left and Socialist vote was higher and where the Socialist rural organizational membership density was higher. In other words, there was an interactive effect between the district and the local dynamics.

The model also contains the contextual effects defined as the difference between the aggregate electoral district effects and the local effects. In the group-mean model above, the contextual effects are the differences between the across-electoral district and the within-electoral district effects. The most significant contextual effects for predicting Fascist vote are 1919 Socialist vote and organizational membership.

The model successfully accounts for 51% of the total variance, 56% of the electoral district variance, and 18% of the municipal variance in the 1921 Fascist vote. These results are consistent with the "Red Menace" thesis: 1919 Center-Left voters voted Fascist in 1921 in districts where the 1919 Socialist vote and rural organizations were stronger.

If the analysis ceased here, it would confirm one strain of the previous research, however, prior analyses were severely limited by a lack of electoral data at the local level and any measures of civil society. Hence the analyses exist only for electoral district or provincial level and cannot test the civil society theory. This study overcomes both these limitations. In addition, this research draws on newer techniques to approach the EI problem.⁸ Finally, although the results above confirm

⁷ The robust standard errors are consistent even when the HLM distributional assumptions are violated.

⁸ While a powerful tool, EI has limitations and has invigorated the debate on ecological inference (Freedman et al. 1998; King 1999; McCue 2001).

TABLE 1. Fascist Vote, 1921: HLM Intercept-and-Slopes-as-Outcome Model

Final Estimation of Fixed Effects (with Robust Standard Errors)					
Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T Ratio	Approx. df	p Value
For mean Fascist Vote, 1921, β_0					
Intercept, γ_{00}	0.088050	0.010526	8.365	51	0.000
Socialist19, γ_{01}	0.305691	0.082151	3.721	51	0.001
SocRuralOrg10, γ_{02}	0.755273	0.198178	3.811	51	0.001
For slope Cen-Left19, β_1					
Intercept, γ_{10}	0.207185	0.029195	7.097	51	0.000
Socialist19, γ_{11}	0.651115	0.193358	3.367	51	0.002
SocRuralTUM10, γ_{12}	2.843301	0.513767	5.534	51	0.000
For slope Socialist19, β_2					
Intercept, γ_{20}	0.027417	0.011142	2.461	52	0.017
SocRuralTUM10, γ_{21}	1.381421	0.242176	5.704	52	0.000
Final Estimation of Variance Components					
Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	χ^2	p Value
Intercept, μ_0	0.07912	0.00626	47	9,435.93214	0.000
Cen-Left slope, μ_1	0.20000	0.04000	47	548.34222	0.000
Socialist slope, μ_2	0.07649	0.00585	48	234.79946	0.000
Level-1, r	0.04074	0.00166			
Description of Variables in HL Model					
Variable Name	Description	Mean	SD		
Fascist Vote, 1921	% Fascist vote, 1921 (as a proportion of enfranchised population, 1921)	0.0519	0.08286		
Cen-Left19	% Center-Left vote, 1919 (Piretti 1995, 221) (as a proportion of enfranchised population, 1921)	0.0871	0.13169		
Socialist19	% Socialist vote, 1919 (as a proportion of enfranchised population, 1921)	0.3154	0.22432		
SocRuralTUM10	Density Socialist rural trade union membership, 1910 (as a proportion of enfranchised population, 1921)	0.0069	0.04338		
SocRuralOrg10	Density Socialist Rural Organization Membership, 1910, as a Proportion of Enfranchised Population, 1921.	0.0917	0.17451		

previous research, certain anomalies in these findings raise additional concerns. Although these results are consistent with the class theory, several variables central to that theory—property holding arrangements, violence, and rural strike activity—are poor predictors of Fascism. In addition, several variables crucial to the civil society theory—Catholic vote and Catholic rural organizational density—are not significant. Finally, conclusions based upon relatively few, large aggregate units raise concerns about the ecological fallacy. Although the municipal units employed here are ecological units, they are smaller, are more numerous, and display greater variance than the district units.

ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE MODELS

Identifying and Mitigating Bias

Ecological inference seeks valid inferences from aggregate data to individual behavior. Behavioral variance exists at both the contextual and the individual level. The HLM analysis offered above modeled the contextual variance of Fascism, while in this section, the parsing of these contextual effects generates inferences about individual behavior.

Endogeneity and Causality. Tarrow (1996) criticized the civil society interpretation (Putnam 1993) for ignoring reciprocal causality and endogeneity. Whereas Putnam (1993, chap. 5) argued for causality running from civil society to government performance, Tarrow (1996, 394) suggested an alternative model in which “the operative cause of regional political institutions in both North and South is neither cultural nor associational but political.” Tarrow’s alternative hypothesis states that “nineteenth-century popular politics in north-central Italy are themselves the source of both civic community and positive political performance of its regional governments” (394). Tests for endogeneity show insignificant endogenous effects.⁹ The alternative

⁹ Reciprocal causality takes several forms. Three questions must be addressed: Is the bias logically plausible? Is it empirically verifiable? and If so, can it be mitigated? Tarrow’s alternative model suggested endogeneity between the Socialist vote and the Socialist organizations. Because these organizations had the explicit purpose of mobilizing electoral support for the party, reciprocal causality is plausible. Less plausible, but still possible, is aggregation on the dependent variable, i.e., Socialist sympathizers gravitated to districts where the Socialist vote was higher. Similar questions apply to other dependent variables. Several techniques can identify and then parse reciprocal causality; the most commonly used are two-stage least

model is rejected, however, even these small endogenous effects are parsed in the ecological inference models below.

Violence- and Intimidation-Induced Bias. The 1921 election occurred during the period of violence known as the “Biennio Rosso.” As a consequence, scholars have debated the impact of violence on electoral outcomes.¹⁰ Empirical tests of violence’s systematic effects offer mixed evidence.¹¹ Tests using HLM and

squares with instrumental variables (TSLS-IV) (Gerber 1998; Kenny and McBurnett 1994) and nonrecursive structural equation modeling with instrumental variables (SEM-IV). The SEM-IV technique has several advantages over the TSLS-IV method (Wong and Law 1999). One advantage is that it generates the reciprocal effects coefficients and measures their stability (Bentler and Freeman 1983). In the SEM technique, the IVs are exogenous variables used to identify the model properly. The SEM-IV models should meet the following conditions: The sample size is adequate ($N > 200$), disturbance terms are free to covary, moderate temporal stability exists, and instrumental variables have significant and equal effects on their respective endogenous variables.

I use the SEM-IV method to estimate and then parse several reciprocal effects. For example, of particular interest are the reciprocal effects of Socialist organizational membership density and Socialist vote, a test of the Tarrow alternative model. The coefficients of interest show that Socialist rural trade union membership density has a positive effect (standardized coefficient = 0.27) on 1919 Socialist vote, but the reciprocal effect of 1919 Socialist vote on Socialist trade union membership is insignificant (0.08). The interactive effect is highly stable at 0.020. The model is identified by specifying directed relationships from IV₁, *voter turnout in 1919*, to 1919 Socialist vote (0.29) and IV₂, *non-Socialist trade union contract labor membership density*, to Socialist trade union membership density (0.20). The covariance of the disturbance terms of the IVs is 0.02, and the covariance of the disturbance terms of the endogenous variables is -0.16. The residual error variances of the endogenous variables are 0.036 for 1919 Socialist vote and 0.010 for Socialist trade union membership density. Because the coefficients of the IVs to the endogenous variables and endogenous variable residual error variances differ from the desired conditions described above, I test for the significance of these differences. A comparison of two models, one in which the directed coefficients are free and one in which they are constrained to equality, shows no statistically significant difference. Thus, the model meets the necessary conditions and the results are robust. Similar models test for endogeneity for other variables. When endogeneity exists, the variables are reestimated as in the TSLS-IV technique.

¹⁰ Although the Catholics were a target of Fascist violence, the majority of the violence was committed against the Socialists. Figures on political deaths and injuries from January 1920 to May 31, 1921, show that 70% were Socialists, 18% Fascists, and 12% Catholics (Gentile 1989, 472–74). Scholars disagree on its significance. For some (DeFelice 1966, 35ff.; Gentile 1989, 202–8; Smith 1959, 345) violence was central to Fascist electoral success, but others (Lyttelton 1987, 67; Maier 1975, 327) are more qualified, noting that the Socialist vote held despite violence. Still others noted additional factors. Corner stated (1975, 144) that “to attribute so much to the actions of the squads would be to miss something.” He continues, “In fact the movement towards Fascism by the mass of the provincial population was far more articulated than is suggested by an explanation solely in terms of violence. Some people were beaten into submission, certainly, but many came to Fascism spontaneously and for varying reasons” (146). In Bologna, which had by far the highest levels of violence, Cardoza (1982, 342) concluded, “Fascist achievements were considerably more modest [compared to Ferrara]. Here six months of punitive expeditions did not succeed in substantially altering mass political loyalties.” In a review of the debate, Bernabei (1975, 151–53) concluded that promises of land redistribution were as important as violence for mobilizing 1921 Fascist electoral support.

¹¹ Szymanski (1973, 399) found a correlation of 0.45 between violence and Fascist vote at the regional level ($N = 20$). More recent

structural equation models show no significant systematic effects of violence on the 1921 Fascist or Socialist vote at the electoral district or municipal level.¹² The high-water mark for violence in 1920–21 followed the Socialist victories in the September–October 1920 administrative elections, however, the intensity of violence leading up to the May 1921 election (January 1, 1921, to April 7, 1921) was half that of the three months following the 1920 elections (Gentile 1989, 472–74).

An alternative explanation holds that landlords isolated and intimidated their wage laborers, however, agricultural labor relations in this region fail to support this interpretation. The typical agricultural enterprise was a nonfamily, small to medium-sized, labor-intensive, capital-intensive farm raising highly commercial crops and employing wage labor.¹³ These “factories in the field” drew upon a vast, and chronically

studies (Elazar 2000, 317; Elazar and Lewin 1999, 197) suggest that, although significant, violence was not the decisive factor. These studies used DeFelice’s (1966, 36–39) measures of violence.

¹² See footnote 4 for the measures of violence. The tests are as follows. (1) Test 1 examines correlation coefficients. The correlation between 1919 Socialist vote and 1921 Fascist vote at the electoral district level ($N = 54$) is 0.625; controlling for violence, the partial correlation is 0.618. The correlation between violence and Fascist vote is 0.133 and is not significant. (2) Test 2 reexamines the HLM results discussed above: Violence did not enter as a significant predictor of either slopes or intercepts in the relationship between 1919 Socialist vote and 1921 Fascist vote. (3) Test 3 tests an HLM model for the effect of violence on intercepts and slopes of 1921 Left vote predicted by 1919 Socialist vote. (4) Test 4 selects those 11 districts ranking above the grand mean on those variables most predictive of Fascism in Test 2—1919 Socialist vote and Socialist rural organizational membership density. For these districts, HLM examines the effects of violence on the intercepts and slopes of Fascist vote for 11 districts and 570 municipalities. The resulting estimates are the effects of violence on the across-district mean Fascist vote and the within-district slopes between Fascist vote and 1919 Socialist vote, Socialist rural organizational density, Socialist rural trade union density, and unaffiliated trade union density controlling for the effects of the other variables. (5) Test 5 examines the effects of violence on the intercepts and slopes of 1921 Left vote predicted by 1919 Socialist vote and the other variables in Test 4. (6) Test 6 follows the logic of a quasi-experimental treatment design. The design matches two electoral districts on the key independent variables: 1919 Socialist vote, Socialist rural organizational density, Socialist rural trade union density, and unaffiliated trade union density. The matched districts differ on Fascist–Socialist Deaths and Injuries in 1919–21 by a factor of 2:1. Structural equation models alternatively free and impose equality constraints on the within-district directed relationships among the variables. The intercepts and covariances are permitted to vary across the districts. Both models employ 200 bootstrap samples. The resulting test statistics estimate if the differences in the constrained and unconstrained directed effects coefficients across the districts are significant. Retesting the models using the subcategories of rural trade union membership and alternative violence measures yields the same results.

¹³ Forty-three percent of all enterprises employing wage labor were less than 20 hectares, and an additional 21% were 20 to 50 hectares. The density of wage laborers per hectare of cultivated land employing wage labor averaged 80 workers in the Po Valley and 29 workers per hectare in the remainder of Italy. This could mean that an enterprise of 50 hectares in the Po Valley had a potential labor force of 4,000 wage laborers—far too large to house on the estate. Under conditions of persistently high unemployment and seasonal fluctuations in labor demand, employers took advantage of the resulting highly competitive, unskilled labor market to minimize labor costs through competitive labor markets or hiring halls. Later the Socialist organized the hiring halls, Chambers of Labor, upon which the Socialist unions founded their strength. In the Po Valley plain,

underemployed, wage labor force (a ratio of 80 wage laborers per hectare of commercially cultivated land typified the Po Valley). Overall, wage laborers made up 40% of the total economically active rural population, with casual day laborers outnumbering contract laborers by a ratio of 15:1. Typically, laborers lived in "agrotowns" along the roads outside the farms and met farm overseers at roadside "hiring halls" each day to bid for work. Gradually, the Socialists organized these hiring halls (termed Chambers of Labor), which became the foundation of Socialist trade unions in the countryside. Fascist violence aimed to destroy these organizations, but Fascist successes were uneven. In the province of Bologna, the Chambers remained intact until well after the 1921 election. If measures of overt violence and the nature of labor relations argue against the intimidation hypothesis, what about covert pressures? Measuring covert pressure is more difficult, but a more detailed examination of Fascism in Bologna provides helpful insights and follows the EI results.

Ecological Inference Results

Fascist support is best explained by 1919–21 voter transitions within Socialist-dominated districts. Because the two best predictors of the mean Fascist vote—1919 Socialist vote and Socialist organizational membership density—were centered on the grand mean in Table 1, I selected those districts above the grand mean for a more detailed examination of Fascist voting. This data subset consists of 11 electoral districts, 29 administrative districts, and 570 municipal units, and I used EI analysis to estimate the coefficients of individual behavior.¹⁴

Districts supporting Fascism in 1921 differ substantially from the national average. Particularly in the rural sector, electoral turnout was higher, religious and

class divisions were deeper, and voter transitions across the elections were larger. Table 2 presents individual behavior estimates for the administrative districts and municipalities. The Commercial and Industrial Census of 1927 provided information for the municipal units, but cultivation arrangements were available only for the district units in the 1921 Population Census. For Table 3 and Table 4 the estimates use the municipal units. Three statistics provide the information in each table. The figure below each row and column heading, in parentheses, is the observed mean value for that variable. For example, in Table 2 commercial, industrial, and public employees made up 10% of the labor force, and 58% of enfranchised voters voted in the 1919 election. Each cell in the table contains two figures. The upper figure is the estimate; the lower figure is the standard error. In Table 2 an estimated 50% of the enfranchised electorate employed in commercial, industrial, and public activities voted in 1919, with a standard error of 0.1222.

Table 2 clearly shows Fascism's agrarian base. An estimated 19% of the electorate employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing voted Fascist, and, in contrast, only 3% of those in commercial, industrial, and public employment voted Fascist. In other words, 86% of the Fascist vote came from the rural sector, where the voter turnout was substantially higher than the nationwide average. Nationally, property holders had higher rates of turnout than landless rural laborers in both the 1919 and the 1921 elections, but where Fascism was more successful the opposite occurred. Overall, 66% of family farmers and 40% of day laborers voted in 1919, but in areas of greater Fascist success 37% of family farmers and 73% of day laborers voted. Similarly, in 1921, turnout, particularly for the contract laborers and day laborers, was higher than the national average in areas supporting Fascism.

Additionally, both class and religious divisions were deeper in areas of higher Fascist voting. Family farmers and day laborers particularly demonstrated greater partisan voting. Family farmers divided almost equally between the Constitutional bloc and the Catholic parties, while day laborers allied themselves to the Socialists. However, in the 1921 election an estimated 70% of the contract laborers and 56% of the day laborers voted Fascist, consequently, support for the Left declined dramatically among these laborers. In 1919, 64% of contract laborers had voted Socialist, but in 1921 only 45% voted for the Left, and among day laborers Socialist support declined from 61% to 22%. Sharecroppers shifted from the Center-Left in 1919 (34%) to the Fascists in 1921 (31%; but note the high standard error), and only 9% of sharecroppers continued to vote for the Center-Left in 1921. Family farmers showed the smallest shift to Fascism. Meanwhile, the Catholic and the Left parties retained their support among renters and sharecroppers, and the Catholics retained most to their support among family farmers. These results strongly contradict the class theory of fascism.

Table 3 presents the voter transition matrix for the 1919–21 elections. The estimates indicate that 20% of Constitutional bloc voters, 64% of Center-Left voters,

day laborers made up 40% of heads of households in agriculture; 20% were owner-occupiers, 12% renters, 13% sharecroppers, and the remainder noncultivators (Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1935). Zamagni (1993, 198–99) estimates that in 1910–14 an agrarian day laborer had to work 280 days a year for subsistence, but the figure was usually 180–200 days and fell to 100–120 days in Bologna in some periods. Zangheri (1960, xi–xix) cites 90 days in Ferrara as typical. Seventy percent of all chemical fertilizers and 70% of all agricultural machinery in Italy in 1913 were employed in the Po Valley (Zamagni 1993, 61–68). Rice, hemp, sugar beets, and wheat constituted the main commercial crops and all were subject to high protective tariffs and subsidies (Ministero dell'agricoltura, industria e commercio 1914; Perdisa 1938; Pugliese 1926; Zattini 1922). The Po valley produced 50% of hemp, 25% of tomatoes, and 80% of sugar beets in 1911. Profits on sugar beets and hemp were four and 10 times that on wheat, respectively (Cardoza 1982, 128).

¹⁴ The selected electoral districts/provinces from the region of Emilia-Romagna are Piacenza, Reggio nell'Emilia, Bologna, Modena, Ferrara, Ravenna, and Forlì; and from the region of Lombardia, they include Cremona, Mantova, and Pavia, as well as Rovigo from the Vento region. Together these constitute most of the Po Valley's rich agricultural region and make up Putnam's (1993, 150) "most civic" region; this correspondence raised questions about the social capital theory and democracy (Tarrow 1996, 393; Wellhofer 1994, 335). I employ males only since they more closely approximate the enfranchised population. The exception is the 1927 employment data, for which gender is not available.

TABLE 2. Agrarian Base of Electoral Behavior, 1919–21 (Percentages)

Vote	Municipal Units (N = 570) ^a			District Units (N = 29) ^b				
	Commercial, Industrial, Public Employment (10.3%)	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing Employment (89.6%)	Family Holdings (15.6%)	Renters (7.0%)	Sharecroppers (15.8%)	Contract Laborers (2.2%)	Day Laborers (30.0%)	Other Noncultivators (21.5%)
Voted 1919 (58.1%)	50.1 0.1222	55.3 0.0181	37.2 0.1203	50.0 0.3203	60.4 0.0815	45.5 0.3170	72.6 0.0792	66.4 0.0470
Constitutional 1919 (14.5%)	0.9 0.0026	17.2 0.0004	55.0 0.0875	37.0 0.3324	7.2 0.0605	57.9 0.3126	16.7 0.1148	20.0 0.0092
Center-Left 1919 (6.6%)	8.2 0.0104	5.4 0.0015	2.9 0.0343	2.6 0.0264	34.0 0.0841	0.2 0.0006	0.0 0.0001	5.9 0.0271
Socialist 1919 (58.2%)	53.4 0.0885	62.1 0.0131	11.2 0.0856	57.4 0.2990	31.9 0.1459	64.4 0.3080	60.9 0.2498	62.4 0.1157
Catholic 1919 (20.9%)	16.3 0.0673	18.4 0.0099	57.0 0.0861	37.0 0.3621	26.3 0.0937	51.7 0.3617	17.1 0.0432	21.7 0.0596
Voted 1921 (64.5%)	68.1 0.0780	59.2 0.0115	42.8 0.1210	78.9 0.2389	58.0 0.0859	98.0 0.0218	82.2 0.0552	77.0 0.0103
Fascists 1921 (17.2%)	35.1 0.0429	21.4 0.0063	23.8 0.0369	32.5 0.1933	31.4 0.2126	70.3 0.1077	56.2 0.1004	26.4 0.1071
National Bloc 1921 (13.8%) ^c	7.0 0.0229	11.5 0.0061	10.5 0.0850	22.2 0.1796	12.9 0.0433	3.4 0.0468	14.2 0.0924	17.1 0.0456
Center-Left 1921 (3.0%)	4.0 0.0039	2.2 0.0088	4.9 0.0367	4.3 0.0381	8.6 0.0319	35.8 0.2679	0.2 0.0006	2.9 0.0201
Left 1921 (43.0%)	67.1 0.0258	42.9 0.0038	23.0 0.1053	48.8 0.2871	50.6 0.0982	44.9 0.2715	21.5 0.1179	45.0 0.0787
Catholic 1921 (20.0%)	10.2 0.0249	19.4 0.0037	46.0 0.0301	34.3 0.2767	33.9 0.1681	46.0 0.3131	11.6 0.0409	16.4 0.0362

^a Data for males and females.^b Data for males only.^c Excludes Fascist vote.

26% of Socialist voters, 13% of Catholic voters, and 25% of nonvoters in 1919 shifted to the Fascists in 1921. Interpolating these figures, the distribution of the Fascist vote in 1921 can be compared to the 1919 electorate. The Constitutional bloc represented 10% of the 1919 electorate and 14% of the total 1921 Fascist vote. The figures for the other blocs are as follows: Center-Left, 6% and 5%; Socialists, 41% and 40%; Catholics, 15% and 6%; and nonvoters, 30% and 35%. Constitutional bloc voters and nonvoters in 1919 were overrepresented among Fascist voters, but Catholic voters were underrepresented. Most overrepresented were those who did not vote in 1919 but did vote in 1921. An estimated 10% of those who voted in 1919 voted Fascist in 1921, but 22% of those who did not vote in 1919 and did vote in 1921 voted Fascist. While the Fascists benefited most from the mobilization of previous nonvoters, the Left bloc benefited least. Overall, the Socialists retained 54% of their 1919 support and the

Catholics 47%. These voter transitions are crucial to understanding the rise of Italian Fascism.

Table 4 presents the estimates for the vote of rural organizational members. The ability of these organizations to deliver votes to their party allies in 1919, particularly the Socialist organizations and unaffiliated rural trade unions, is dramatic. However, equally striking is the weakness of these same organizations to constrain the shift to the Fascists in 1921. In the 1919 election, an estimated 63% of all Socialist rural organization members and 60% of Socialist rural trade union members voted Socialist. In addition, an estimated 76% of the unaffiliated trade union members voted Socialist. For the Catholic rural organizational and trade union members, the results are more mixed. Although 60% of all Catholic rural organizational members voted Catholic, only 44% of Catholic rural trade union members voted Catholic. In each case, 41% voted Socialist. Thus, the Catholics were less successful than the Socialists in

TABLE 3. Voter Transition Matrix, 1919–21 (*N* = 570; Percentages)

Vote	Constitutional 1919 (14.5%)	Center-Left 1919 (6.6%)	Socialist 1919 (58.2%)	Catholic 1919 (20.9%)	Voters 1919 (58.1%)	Nonvoter 1919 (41.9%)
Nonvoter 1921 (35.5%)	40.3 0.0688	47.0 0.0776	36.2 0.0139	45.9 0.0267	17.4 0.0135	66.9 0.0191
Voted 1921 (64.5%)	61.8 0.0512	53.9 0.0690	63.7 0.0154	53.3 0.0240	82.9 0.0139	33.2 0.0168
Fascist 1921 (17.2%)	20.2 0.0750	64.1 0.0590	25.6 0.0350	13.2 0.0249	20.8 0.0086	25.9 0.0104
National Bloc 1921 (13.8%) ^a	36.8 0.0219	10.3 0.0434	11.1 0.0157	6.4 0.0402	13.1 0.0242	9.9 0.0292
Center-Left 1921 (3%)	3.2 0.0032	7.8 0.0217	2.0 0.0024	3.0 0.0042	2.5 0.0020	2.4 0.0024
Left 1921 (43%)	3.5 0.0110	23.8 0.0902	53.5 0.2216	25.1 0.3191	62.6 0.0311	26.0 0.0375
Catholic 1921 (20%)	17.9 0.0148	32.7 0.0685	9.4 0.0247	47.1 0.0532	16.3 0.0091	20.6 0.0110

^a Excludes Fascist vote.**TABLE 4. Rural Organizational Base of Socialist, Catholic, and Fascist Vote, 1919–21 (*N* = 570; Percentages)**

Vote	Catholic Rural Organizational Density 1910 (1.2%)	Catholic Rural Trade Union Density 1910 (0.5%)	Socialist Rural Organizational Density 1910 (3.8%)	Socialist Rural Trade Union Density 1910 (3.6%)	Unaffiliated Trade Union Density 1910 (7.3%)
Voters 1919 (58.1%)	70.0 0.0198	60.0 0.1781	62.6 0.0584	56.2 0.0961	70.1 0.1525
Constitutional 1919 (14.5%)	7.4 0.0298	13.8 0.0382	5.6 0.0380	6.8 0.0261	0.8 0.0022
Center-Left 1919 (6.6%)	5.1 0.0155	4.4 0.0273	2.0 0.0069	4.6 0.0410	15.8 0.0130
Catholic 1919 (20.9%)	59.6 0.1986	44.2 0.0109	16.5 0.1785	5.5 0.0286	8.6 0.0540
Socialist 1919 (58.2%)	41.0 0.0094	41.0 0.0083	62.8 0.1246	59.8 0.2271	76.2 0.0174
Voters 1921 (64.5%)	68.7 0.1150	67.8 0.1580	58.4 0.1390	55.7 0.1709	73.9 0.0313
Fascist 1921 (17.4%)	35.3 0.1928	17.0 0.0733	50.7 0.2709	56.4 0.0671	33.9 0.0440
National Bloc 1921 (13.8%)	2.0 0.0048	7.8 0.0180	7.0 0.0367	8.1 0.0315	3.0 0.0195
Center-Left 1921 (3.0%)	1.1 0.0078	6.5 0.0449	3.8 0.0122	4.6 0.0092	6.1 0.0078
Catholic 1921 (20.0%)	42.6 0.0852	42.1 0.0765	9.3 0.0604	11.3 0.0735	0.6 0.0010
Left 1921 (43.0%)	21.6 0.0856	44.1 0.0037	42.0 0.1050	54.8 0.0279	67.6 0.0207

using organizations to mobilize partisan voting, and these results reflect a region variously designated anticlerical, "Red," and de-Christianized.

However, in 1921 the situation is reversed. Catholic rural trade unions (78% of whose members were sharecroppers and tenants) were more successful in delivering the vote to the Catholic party than the Socialist unions were in delivering their members' votes to the Left. An estimated 17% of Catholic rural trade union members voted Fascist, but 56% of Socialist trade union members voted Fascist, as did almost half of all Socialist rural organizational members. Unaffiliated rural trade unions were more successful in mobilizing their members' votes for the Left (68%), but still 34% voted Fascist. Because the unaffiliated unions were also targets of Fascist violence for their Socialist support in 1919, the differences between the Socialist and unaffiliated estimates discount the effects of that violence and make it necessary to examine alternative hypotheses.

Because Fascist electoral support came disproportionately from landless wage laborers, the class interpretation of fascism is not supported. Although contract and day laborers made up 30% of the electorate, they constituted 46% of the total Fascist vote. An estimated 56% of all day laborers and 70% of contract laborers voted Fascist, with the differences between contract and day laborers examined below. Moreover, the class thesis that Fascist support came disproportionately from family farmers fails. Although the Fascists did gain support from family farmers, they constituted only 5% of the total Fascist vote, although they formed 16% of the electorate. Because these results so clearly contradict a central interpretation of Fascism, it is all the more important to test alternative hypotheses. Events in the Province of Bologna offer a more detailed perspective on the rise of Fascism.

Fascism in Bologna Province

Several factors make Bologna, the agricultural capital of the Po Valley, a good test case. Bolognese agriculture ranked among the most progressive and prosperous in Italy, and four commercial crops—sugar, wheat, hemp, and rice—generated the province's wealth. Although the province also had a long history of Socialist politics and trade unionism, the Fascists won 23% of the vote in the May 1921 election, and Mussolini himself won a parliamentary seat. In the months leading up to the election (January 1920 to May 1921), the province experienced the highest rate of political violence in the Po Valley; "[i]n the most important agricultural areas of the province, however, Fascist violence and agrarian pressures, unlike Ferrara, had not significantly weakened the allegiance of the mass of day laborers to the leagues by the summer of 1921 . . ." (Cardoza 1982, 370). Nevertheless, an estimated 18% (standard error = 0.040) of 1919 Socialist voters, 33% (0.070) of Socialist unionized day laborers, and 25% (0.024) of all unionized day laborers voted Fascist in 1921. Because the shift of Socialist voters to Fascism cannot be at-

tributed to overt violence, alternative explanations are required. Two possibilities are covert intimidation by land owners and the impact of the 1919–20 agricultural strikes.

Covert intimidation by definition remains unobservable, however, two plausible indirect, observable measures for the municipal units ($N = 49$) are *reports of intimidation leading up to the May 1921 election and spread of Fascist nuclei across the province's municipalities from December 1920 to May–June 1921* (Cardoza 1982, 290–386, 318–19). The analysis assumes that the greater the presence of these two observed variables, the greater the likelihood of covert intimidation. This unobservable or latent variable extracts the common variance of the observed variables. Although the two indicators of intimidation load strongly (0.780 and 0.540) and significantly on the *intimidation latent variable* and a SEM with 200 bootstrap samples generates an excellent fit to the data (normed fit index = 0.936) with stable coefficients, the model shows no significant effect of intimidation on the Left vote or Fascist vote in 1921.

An alternative explanation may be found in Bologna's agricultural production modes and the destructiveness of the 1919–20 strikes. The province was divided into three agricultural zones, with the two highly commercial zones operated on a four-year crop rotation cycle (Robertson 1938; Zattini 1925, 72–73). The lower Po plain (consisting of nine municipalities) generated the highest *value per hectare* (698 lire), specialized in *rice* (45% of the cultivated area) and *sugar beets* (48%), and had 59% of the rural workforce employed as wage laborers. The upper Po plain (consisting of 10 municipalities) was less productive (585 lire), focused on *wheat* (20%) and *hemp* (24%), and had 31% of the rural workforce employed as wage laborers. The third agricultural zone, consisting of mountains and foothills, was the least productive (394 lire), possessed mixed agriculture, and had 36% of the workforce employed as wage laborers.

Politics, trade unionism, and Fascist diffusion also differed across the three zones. In 1919, the Socialists gained 79% of the vote in the rice and sugar zone, 78% in the wheat and hemp zone, and 62% in the mixed agricultural zone. Trade unionism also was concentrated in the two commercial zones. In the sugar and rice zone, 50% of the rural laborers were organized; in the wheat and hemp zone, 54%; and in the mixed agricultural zone, 16%. Fascist nuclei first sprouted in the mixed agricultural zone, later spread to the wheat and hemp zone, and appeared last in the sugar and rice zone. By May–June 1921, all of the municipalities in the sugar and rice zone had nuclei, but they existed in only 77% of the municipalities in the wheat and hemp zone and 50% of the municipalities in the mixed agricultural zone. Why did Fascist nuclei arrive later, but with broader penetration, in the more commercial and more unionized agricultural zones? The answer may be found in the destructiveness of the 1919–20 rural strikes. The strikes were particularly damaging in the sugar and rice zone, with 58% of the rice and 19% of the sugar crops destroyed (Cardoza 1982, 287; Perdida 1938, 258).

Lower, but substantial, losses occurred in the wheat and hemp zone, where wheat yields declined by 33% (Zattini 1920, 21). Overall unemployment in the province doubled from January–May 1920 to January–May 1921, with the higher rates in the commercial zones (Tremelloni 1923, 15).

The estimated voter transitions suggest a reaction against the Socialist-led strikes, their destructiveness, and the resulting unemployment. In municipalities in the rice and sugar zone, the estimate shows that 22% (0.043) of the 1919 Socialist voters voted Fascist and 59% (0.121) voted Left in 1921; in the wheat and hemp zone, 17% (0.055) voted Fascist and 62% (0.145) voted Left. On the other hand, in the mixed crop zone, 14% (0.046) of 1919 Socialist voters voted Fascist and 75% (0.015) voted Left. Four conditions produced the shift of Socialist voters to Fascism: a higher density of wage laborers, a higher 1919 Socialist vote, a higher trade union membership density, and more destructive strikes in 1920.

EXPLAINING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR FASCISM

Popular support, particularly “working-class” support, for fascism has long been controversial because it goes to the core of the debate on the character and appeals of fascism. The major scholarly explanations of popular support for fascism include intimidation, tactical miscalculations by the Left, and material self-interest, the latter being the essence of the rational fascist thesis. The first of these explanations, overt violence and covert intimidation, received no support, but the second and third require additional scrutiny.

Political Tactics of the Left: A Trust Broken?

Did the increased militancy of the Left indirectly and unintentionally aid Italian Fascism? Did the leaders’ militancy produce defections to Fascism? During this period in Italy, as in most all of Europe, the Socialists were divided among the Communists, the Maximalists, and the Official Socialists, foreshadowing the formation of the Communist Party in 1921.¹⁵ The war and the Russian Revolution inflamed the passions of those arguing for the “proletarianization” of rural workers, the collectivization of land, and the promotion of revolution. The 1919 Congress of *La Federazione nazionale dei lavoratori della terra* (The National Federation of Land Laborers) in Bologna urged the abolition of rural working-class distinctions that hindered worker unity (Zangheri 1960, lxxiv, 350). These debates heightened the tensions within the Socialist agrarian trade unions and culminated with the Socialist labor contracts of 1920 abolishing the distinctions between contract laborers and day laborers (Cardoza 1982, 283ff.; Corner 1975, 150–59; Serpieri 1930, 305–6). Proletarianization

meant loss of the contract laborers’ right of first-hire and forced them into the same precarious status and poverty as day laborers. The 1920 labor pact, therefore, deepened the divisions within the Socialist agrarian unions (Cardoza 1982, 366–67; Corner 1974, 22–23). Meanwhile, the Catholic unions and the Fascists took up the cause of the contract workers (Serpieri 1930, 314–19). The relative strength of contract and day laborers in the trade unions was also highly significant because both the Socialist and the unaffiliated agrarian unions organized workers by cultivator status, with separate organizations for contract laborers and day laborers. Overall 19% of day laborers were unionized, with 12% in Socialist and 7% in unaffiliated unions. Fifty-nine percent of contract laborers were unionized, with 45% in Socialist and 14% in unaffiliated unions. In both labor movements, day laborers made up the largest proportion of the membership, constituting 54% of the Socialist and 18% of the unaffiliated agrarian trade union membership, respectively. Day laborers constituted a significant 30% of all cultivators. Although the contract laborers constituted only about 2% of the cultivators, their numbers made up 14% of the Socialist and 3% of the unaffiliated agrarian trade union members, resulting in their influence in the agrarian unions far exceeding their numbers in the workforce. Hence, their transition to Fascism was highly significant.

Socialist contract laborers’ sense of betrayal made them prime candidates for Fascism as shown by the estimates of the contract and day laborer trade union members’ electoral behavior in 1919 and 1921 listed in Table 4 (also see Corner 1975, 159). The standard errors suggest some caution, but the estimates are strongly in the expected direction. Although all four groups voted Socialist in 1919, the Socialist unionized laborers defected to Fascism, while the unaffiliated trade union members did not. On the whole, contract laborers were overrepresented among Fascist rural voters by a ratio of 2.2:1 compared to their proportion in the potential electorate, while Socialist unionized contract laborers were overrepresented by a ratio of 1.1:1. Taken as a whole, day laborers were overrepresented in the Fascist vote by a ratio of 1.5:1 compared to their proportion in the potential electorate, while Socialist unionized day laborers were overrepresented by a ratio of 1.2:1.¹⁶ In contrast, unaffiliated unionized contract and day laborers, not subject to the 1920 Socialist labor pact, were underrepresented by ratios of 0.88:1 and 0.48:1, respectively.

The Socialists’ heightened militancy, calls for proletarianization, and demands for land collectivization may account for these defections. In Bologna, where violence and intimidation show no effect on Fascist voting, Fascist support was higher where the 1920 strikes were more destructive. In Ferrara, a city at the center of both labor unrest and Fascist violence, the Socialist press, in April 1921, noted that “the present defections [of day laborers] are the work of those who came last to the proletarian organization because they are

¹⁵ At the January 1921 Congress, the party split on the question of the Third International: 53% for the Communists, 31% for the Maximalists, and 16% for the Official Socialists. The 1921 election took place in May 1921.

¹⁶ The ratios are the proportion in the electorate weighted by the likely turnout weighted by the probability of voting Fascist.

unhappy with the regime of social and working-class justice brought about through the labor exchanges" (Corner 1975, 159). In May 1921, a Socialist leader in Ferrara resigned in protest because the party failed to counter "the daily enthusiastic adhesion of large masses of labourers to the programme of *fascio*" (1975, 144). In June 1921, following the election, the same paper wrote that day laborers possessed "only partial class-consciousness, an inadequate preparation for sacrifice" in the struggle against Fascism (1975, 159–60).

Leaders on the Left expressed exasperation at these defections. In June 1921, Gramsci remarked, "... In Emilia, in Polesine, in Veneto, many leagues of *contadini* [generally referring to peasants, but particularly *contadini obbligati*, contract laborers] have torn up the red flag and passed to Fascism" (Bernabei 1975, 123). Gramsci also noted that while violence played a part in Socialist defections, "it is not all exaggeration, it is not always a case of compulsion" (Corner 1975, 144). Togliatti attributed Fascist support to "a certain mass base in the countryside, particularly Emilia" (Bernabei 1975, 123). Although the defections of Socialist trade union members were significant, they can account for only a proportion of the total Fascist vote.

Prospects for a Better Life: A Rational Choice?

All the parties offered prospects for a better life. The Socialist vision rested on collectivized land promised to landless wage laborers (Serpieri 1930, 290–93), while the Catholic movement offered an alternative tailored to its own social base. Significantly, 78% of the Catholic rural cooperative movement and trade union members were sharecroppers and tenants in 1920 (Horowitz 1963, 124), and, with few exceptions, e.g., Cremona (Foot 1997), the Catholic trade unions had ignored the landless laborers. The Catholic party's electoral strategy was motivated by a desire to avoid alienating their supporters among small holders and sharecroppers, the Church's long-standing commitment to the sanctity of private property, and the Catholic view that economic differences must be reconciled within the harmonious hierarchy of society (Agocs 1988, 153–63; Caponi 1974, 46–55). These differing visions made attempts at a Catholic-Socialist rural trade union alliance very difficult, and Catholic union members acted as strike breakers against the Socialists in 1919 (Snowden 1989, 52).

The Fascists also promised a better life by proposing land redistribution to create private holdings. As early as the 1919 election, the Fascist program of the Piazza San Sepolcro advocated the eight-hour day for all workers. By late 1920, as the economic circumstances of the day laborers deteriorated, the Fascists launched their agrarian program.¹⁷ In January 1921, the Fascists be-

gan tailoring their appeals to the landless workers for the upcoming May 1921 election with such slogans as "To every peasant his land! To every peasant the entire fruit of his sacred work" (Cardoza 1982, 326–27), and "The single most important idea of our farm workers is not the collective ownership of land, but the individual ownership of property" (Corner 1974, 13).

Fascist strategies varied according to the land ownership patterns, the makeup of the labor force, and the political traditions of the region.¹⁸ Rational choice theory

agricultural workers declined by 9% from 1919 to 1920 (Zamagni 1993, 238). In addition, take-home wages declined because of prolonged strikes and rising unemployment (Hobson 1925, 429; Serpieri 1930, 415). Serpieri (1930, 144) concluded that of all cultivator types in the Po Valley, laborers dependent only on wages, a phenomenon most characteristic of the Po Valley, suffered the most.

¹⁸ The tactics included (1) the creation of producer, credit, and consumer cooperatives; (2) the intervention in strikes and the securing of more favorable terms than the Socialist or Catholic unions had offered, (3) the creation of alternative hiring halls to the Socialist Chambers of Labor, (4) the restitution of fines imposed by Socialist unions on members for breaking boycotts, and (5) the redistribution of land, among others. These tactics varied with the local conditions. Legislation of February 1918 and September 1919 permitted the requisitioning of underutilized land for use by cooperative movements. Socialist, Catholic, and later Fascist organizers sought to take advantage of the law. The cooperatives offered credit, insurance, and marketing assistance (Cardoza 1982, 337; Corner 1975, 159; Hobson 1926; Serpieri 1921). Adapting to local conditions, the Fascists settled strikes on more favorable terms than the Socialists or the Catholics proposed. For example, in June 1921 in Cremona, after a long and bitter strike, the Fascists opposed collective ownership of the land favored by the Catholic rural unions in opposition to the Catholic party's position (Foot 1997) and offered profit sharing (Serpieri 1930, 319–20). The agreement was popular because it gave the former contract laborers more secure access to land. In contrast, in Tuscany, where sharecropping was more prevalent, the Fascists sided with sharecroppers in some areas and with day laborers in others, sometimes shoring up tenant rights and at other times demanding land reform (Snowden 1989, 97ff.). In the Po Valley, where day laborers predominated, the Fascists created alternative hiring halls and syndicates, provided legal services, and offered more favorable wage agreements than the Socialists. In other areas, profit sharing contracts were advanced (Cardoza 1982, 337; Snowden 1989, 101). The Fascists also offered protection against fines imposed by Socialist unions (Cardoza 1982, 337–38). Actual redistribution of land appeared in several regions. In Ferrara by September 1921, the Fascists claimed to have redistributed 18,000 hectares, a little less than 10% of the productive surface of the province, and claimed to have resettled 4,000 families (Corner 1975, 157–58; also see Lyttelton 1987, 63, 460, n. 107). Similarly in Tuscany, prominent landlords on the Pisa plain, in the Chiana Valley, and in the Sienna region made land available to the Fascists for resettlement of landless workers (Snowden 1989, 97). In July 1921, the Fascists in Bologna also made land available for leasing (Cardoza 1982, 354). In Brescia, Turati, a native of Po Valley syndicalism, advocated land redistribution as well (Kelikian 1986, 140–41). The Fascists also capitalized on local political traditions. Particularly in the Po Valley, with a strong syndicalist tradition, major leaders of agrarian fascism passed through syndicalism—Grandi, Bottai, Turati, Balbo, and Pajunzio, among others (Roberts 1979, 182–212). Usually landlords cooperated with the Fascists in the joint effort to blunt Socialism, but in other cases pressure was also applied (Corner 1975, 157; Kelikian 1986, 144–53; Snowden 1989, 64–65). In at least one case, Santa Maria in Veneto, the Fascists seized and occupied the land in 1920 (Evans 1976, 36–41, 51–53). Most of the land distributions took place after the 1921 election and before the consolidation of the regime following the Matteotti Crisis. Most parcels were of poor quality and unable to support the new cultivators, who eventually sought reemployment as sharecroppers and laborers. Nevertheless, between 1921 and 1936 (years of censuses), the proportion of day laborers in agriculture

¹⁷ Sharecroppers, renters with fixed contracts, and small farmers fared better than laborers, whose situation deteriorated markedly (Serpieri 1930, 117–20, 144). Although nominal wages improved because of reductions in the working day, increased staffing requirements, and wage adjustments (Arcari 1936, 679–80), real wages of

would predict Fascism's success in the most economically destitute regions and among the most desperate—wage laborers in the Po Valley—and Table 2 shows this to be the case. An estimated 70% of contract laborers and 56% of day laborers voted Fascist, whereas 64% and 61% had voted Socialist in 1919 (but note the high standard errors). Among rural occupations, day laborers are overrepresented by 1.5:1 given their proportion in the likely electorate, but all other rural strata are underrepresented, especially family farmers, at a ratio of 0.34:1.

CONCLUSIONS

The questions raised at the start of this paper focused on the conditions fostering transitions to democracy or fascism. How do we account for these alternative outcomes? Class, civil society, and rational choice interpretations offer potential answers. This research strongly contradicts the class interpretation of fascism as an alliance of the urban bourgeoisie and rural landholders against the urban and rural working classes. Small property holders, supposedly the bulwark of fascism in the countryside, were underrepresented among Italian Fascist voters, while day laborers were overrepresented. Neither violence nor intimidation explains these results.

This research finds only mixed support for the civil society thesis. Newly mobilized voters have often been portrayed as among those most susceptible to extremism. Although 1919 nonvoters were overrepresented (1.3:1) among Fascist voters, 1919 Socialist voters were equally overrepresented (1.3:1). Did organizational membership stem the movement to Fascism? The evidence is mixed. Socialist trade union members were overrepresented among Fascist voters, but independent trade union members were underrepresented. The defection of Socialist trade unionists is best explained as a response to the party's militancy and its proletarianization strategy. This suggests a weakness in the civil society explanation. If civil society is predicated on trust fostered by civic organizations, trust appears to be more strategic than unconditional and, when broken, decays markedly.

Rational choice explanations emphasize both the material appeals of fascism and the strategic nature of trust. Fascist voters came disproportionately from the most impoverished segment of the rural population, who stood to gain the most materially from the Fascist agrarian program and whose trust was strained, if not broken. During the war, the government vowed agrarian reform to bolster sagging morale but failed to deliver.¹⁹ After the war, Socialist militancy, prolonged and destructive strikes, and rising unemployment left

many Socialist unionized laborers disenchanted and destitute by 1921.²⁰ In addition, the Socialists abandoned their unionized contract laborers under the new labor contracts of 1920. Differing estimates for Socialist and unaffiliated union members support this interpretation.

The findings of this research are generally most consistent with the rational fascist interpretation. The civil society thesis receives support because under some conditions organizations restrained the shift of their members to fascism. These specific conditions, however, suggest that members' organizational loyalties were more strategic than unconscious "Habits of the Heart." When individuals are disillusioned, the newcomer gains the advantage. Fascism was just such a newcomer, joining the political fray unfettered by a past and opportunistic about the future. While its support no doubt shifted over time, Italian Fascism initially found its popular base among the disillusioned and impoverished rural laborers in the Po Valley. Focused on a short time horizon, the Fascists had few reasons to weigh the future of the society and many reasons to become "roving bandits" on the road to becoming "rational autocrats."

Here we have to note two things; first, that the people often, deceived by an illusive good, desire their own ruin, and, unless they are made sensible of the evil of the one and the benefit of the other by some one in whom they have confidence, they will expose the republic to infinite peril and damage. And if it happens that the people have no confidence in any one, as will be the case when they have been deceived before by events or men, then it will inevitability lead to the ruin of the state.

...

If we consider now what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a people to, we may make this distinction: either what you wish to persuade them to represents at first sight gain or loss, or seems brave or cowardly. And if you propose to them anything that upon its face seem

to the peasants, so every hero who has fought bravely in the trenches can become economically independent. That will be the Fatherland's reward to its brave sons" (Schmidt 1966, 27; also see Cardoza 1982, 246–47). The statement was widely distributed at the front. Commenting on the consequences of these promises, Gioletti, President of the Cabinet, in a speech at the meeting of the Senate, September 26, 1920, stated, "All parties vied with one another, just then, in giving promises, vague, indeterminate, and alluring. They promised land to the peasant and factories to the soldiers; promises that meant nothing to those who made them, while those who received them considered them their just deserts" (Por 1923, 37n).

²⁰ In 1920, 44 strikes by day laborers occurred in the Po Valley, with the average strike involving 33% of the day laborers (Direzione Generale del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale and Ministero dell'Economia Nazionale 1924, 295). As noted in the discussion of Bologna above, the strikes were extremely violent and devastated productive capacity. All major commercial crops suffered significant destruction. In addition, July 1920 witnessed the collapse of the international hemp market (Cardoza 1982, 288). From January–May 1920 to January–May 1921, unemployment increased by about 100% in Emilia, 200% in Lombardia, over 300% in Piemonte, and over 800% in Veneto (Tremelloni 1923, 15). Corner (1975, 159, n. 3) notes, "The decline [in the number of *obbligati*] before 1921 and the rise thereafter suggests there were possibly several thousand displaced *obbligati* eager to return to their former privileged position once it was clear that socialism had passed its peak."

declined from 39% to 14% of the agricultural economically active labor force (Corner 1979, 244).

¹⁹ Following the defeat of the Italian forces at Caporetto in 1917, the government sought to motivate the peasant-soldiers with promises of land reform under the slogans "Fight for Italy and she is yours!" and "The land to the peasants!" Prime Minister Salandra declared, "After the victorious end of the War, Italy will perform a great deed of social justice. Italy will give land and everything that goes with it

profitable and courageous, though there really be a loss concealed under it that will involve the ruin of the republic, the multitude will ever be most easily persuaded to it. But if the measure proposed seems doubtful and likely to cause loss, then it will be difficult to persuade the people to it, even though the benefit and welfare of the republic were concealed under it. (Machiavelli [1531] 1950, 247–48)

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The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia

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Blame plays an important role in motivating many human activities, but rarely has the attribution of blame been analyzed for its effects on protest behavior. I argue that how people understand causal relationships and attribute blame for a grievance plays a crucial role in their decision to redress the grievance through protest. The greater the specificity of blame attribution, the greater the probability of protest. Among the less specific attributors of blame, political entrepreneurs have more opportunities to mobilize protest, especially if they can aid in blame specification. I test these hypotheses using evidence from an original nationwide survey of 2,026 adult Russians conducted in 1998 during the height of the Russian wage arrears crisis. Russians who attributed blame for the crisis to specific culprits or problem-solvers protested more than Russians who did not, and the mobilizing efforts of entrepreneurs had a greater impact on the less specific attributors.

Individuals throughout the world suffer severe hardship and injustice. The theory of collective action accurately predicts that their typical response is to suffer in silence rather than protest. Aggrieved individuals are usually unwilling to accept protest's unpalatable mixture of high, certain, and concentrated costs and low, uncertain, and dispersed benefits. Yet individuals occasionally do protest. What explains the behavior of these relatively rare individuals?

Political scientists have not offered a persuasive answer to this question. This is regrettable because the occurrence of protest is arguably the more important component of the protest puzzle. The theory of collective action appears to be falsified each time a disadvantaged or disenchanted individual decides to accept the supposedly unacceptable costs and benefits of protest. Furthermore, the theory suggests to these individuals that their plight is hopeless. The collective action problem is so insurmountable that passivity is the only rational response to even the harshest political and economic crises.

The two main attempts to explain why individuals occasionally protest are each based on a proposed "solution" to the collective action problem (Hardin 1982; Olson 1965). First, organizations are said to encourage members to protest by providing gifts, special access to information, and other selective incentives conditional on participation. The difficulty with this explanation is that many groups are "latent" or nonexistent prior to the emergence of their collective grievance. There is no organization to provide selective incentives, since the supposed members have no further connection to one another or to the group beyond the grievance itself. In

addition, many grievances are so grave as to preclude the effective use of selective incentives. Aggrieved individuals are interested solely in grievance satisfaction, not in a magazine subscription, discount air fare, or other trivial perk (e.g., Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991).

Political entrepreneurs offer another "solution" to the collective action problem. Political entrepreneurs bear the cost of organizing collective action, presumably because they incur private benefits such as elective office or other career or material enhancements. The difficulty with this solution is that it does not explain how political entrepreneurs convince aggrieved individuals to protest. How do entrepreneurs reduce the costs of collective action for would-be free riders so that participating in a strike or demonstration or other event seems like a worthwhile investment of time and energy?

Thus neither selective incentives nor political entrepreneurs sufficiently explain why some individuals overcome collective action problems and attempt to redress grievances through protest. Without a better explanation, political scientists are left with a theory of collective action contradicted by empirical evidence. More importantly, individuals suffering from hardship and injustice are left with a theory that suggests no hope. Taking action to end suffering is futile.

This article offers a new approach to the puzzle of protest. Analyzing the Russian response to their most trying economic grievance, chronic wage delays and nonpayment, I show that the attribution of blame plays an important role in collective action, as does the interaction between the attribution of blame and entrepreneurial efforts to mobilize individuals.

CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS TREATMENT RESPONSIBILITY

The literature on blame attribution distinguishes between two types of blame, blame for causing a problem and blame for failing to treat or rectify a problem (e.g., Iyengar 1989, 1991). Aggrieved individuals may seek culprits to hold accountable, and they may also or instead seek problem-solvers. Specificity in either type of blame should theoretically facilitate collective action.

Specific causal attribution, or the identification of a specific culprit, facilitates collective action to the extent

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An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. I would like to thank the Office of Research at the U.S. Information Agency (now State Department) for making the collection of these data possible and Vanessa Baird, Tami Buhr, Ray Duch, Steve Hanson, Will Moore, Cliff Morgan, Bob Stein, Randy Stevenson, Ric Stoll, and Andy Stock for their helpful advice. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent official positions of the State Department or the U.S. Government. The data and documentation necessary to replicate this analysis can be obtained from the National Archives.

that protest is an expression of anger, frustration, or moral indignation against the source of harm or suffering (e.g., Gurr 1970). Expressive behavior is "narrowly rational" in the sense that it is noninstrumental but still provides the aggrieved with the satisfaction of venting or going on record as objecting to an injustice (Chong 1991, chap. 4). It is more likely when the source of the injustice has been specified. Thus, for centuries mobs vented their frustration over famine by taking "retributive action" against individual merchants and Jews whom they blamed for raising prices and hoarding (Tarrow 1998, 33–34, 162; Thompson 1971).

The specific attribution of treatment responsibility facilitates collective action to the extent that protest is instrumental—that is, an efficient means to achieve a public good or eliminate a public bad by convincing a particular actor to redress a grievance. For example, workers are among the most frequent subpopulations of protesters because their problems usually can be solved by a specific known party, their employers. On the other hand, the lack of specific attribution of blame—both causal and treatment—hinders collective action. For example, the passive response of black Americans to widespread problems in housing can be explained in part by the large and confounding number of culprits and potential remedies for the problems (Wilson 1961, 295–96).

Note that the distinction between specific and un-specific attributors of blame does not rest on the accuracy of the attribution. Blame is a subjective phenomenon, and its important feature as a motivator of protest rests in its range. Narrowly attributed blame is a more powerful motivator than diffuse blame, even if diffuse blame is warranted by the objective fact that several actors caused or could treat the grievance. An aggrieved individual who attributes blame specifically but incorrectly is still a more likely protester than the aggrieved individual who attributes blame unspecifically due to a thoughtful and accurate assessment of the origins of his/her problem or its potential solutions. Indeed, thoughtful and accurate assessment of a problem's origins and solutions can often get in the way of collective action because many problems of the contemporary social and economic world have highly complicated origins and solutions and are likely to defy simple explanations. The task of simplifying a problem and identifying a culprit and/or problem-solver is part of the task of collective action.

WHY SPECIFIC BLAME ATTRIBUTION IS DIFFICULT

Why is the task of simplifying a problem and attributing blame specifically often so difficult? One reason is suggested above. Real-world problems are often complicated. They are born and potentially remedied in political and economic systems where power is diffuse. Policymaking is often dispersed among several political parties or several institutions, and within any one institution, rules often prevent intense concentration of power or rapid decision making. These arrangements

allow political actors to "point fingers" or "pass the buck," making it difficult for outside observers to draw lines of accountability for problems. Voters, for example, face this difficulty in blame attribution when casting their ballots (e.g., Powell and Whitten 1993).

More generally, psychologists have shown that the task of blame attribution for even simple, everyday problems requires rather difficult "multivariate thinking" or "cognitive control" and that most people lack the necessary level of sophistication to apply knowledge from a variety of sources (Fischhoff 1976, 432; Hammond and Summers 1972). Unlike the difficulties posed by the complexity of a real-world problem, however, the difficulties posed by cognitive abilities do not affect all aggrieved individuals equally. Cognitive abilities vary from person to person and therefore might make it more difficult for some individuals to attribute blame with specificity than for others.¹ There is a variety of other individual characteristics that exhibit similar variation. For example, personality types, personal circumstances, and political sympathies vary from person to person. One individual might be naturally indecisive or feel personal conflict due to the role played by a friend, relative, patron, or hero or feel guilt or complicity due to the role played by a political party that he/she supported. Specific blame attribution will likely be more difficult for this type of individual than for others.

Given the difficulties of blame attribution, individuals often get it wrong. Their perceptions of accountability are not accurate (e.g., Nisbett and Ross 1980 and Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1980). However, such errors in attribution do not concern us here. Here "successful" blame attribution is specific blame attribution, right or wrong from an objective standpoint.

A more important implication of the difficulties of specific blame attribution is that the difficulties might discourage individuals from attempting to make such an attribution in the first place. Or individuals might attempt to attribute blame specifically but not succeed. That is, they might conclude that multiple parties are accountable for their grievance or that it is impossible to disentangle the web of accountability (Snyder and Wicklund 1981, 198).

WHY SPECIFIC BLAME ATTRIBUTION IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT IN PROTEST SETTINGS

The difficulty of specific blame attribution is less pronounced in some settings than in others. Political candidates competing in elections, for example, are relatively easy to identify for blame. Formal elections tend to facilitate specific blame attribution in three ways. First,

¹ How exactly cognitive abilities affect blame attribution is not clear and is worthy of further investigation. Research by Zaller (1992) suggests the following plausible hypothesis: While a very low cognitive ability may be associated with unspecific blame attribution, a very high cognitive ability may lead to accurate but complicated and diffuse assessments of blame and therefore also be associated with unspecific blame attribution.

voting takes place in a purposely informative political environment. Campaigns and media coverage directly address the issue of culpability for problems and thereby provide the aggrieved with shortcuts to information gathering (Abramowitz et al. 1988, 860; Popkin 1991, 41). Second, this information is provided in a finite amount of time. Campaigns and campaign coverage end with the election, so office-seekers have every incentive to get their versions of blame to the public quickly and clearly. Third, voting provides very limited options for the expression of blame. Aggrieved individuals may blame their president, but they cannot express this blame through voting if their president is not currently up for reelection. Aggrieved individuals may not initially have blamed their legislator, but it is their legislator they must now remove or return to office.

The potential or latent protest setting enjoys none of these advantages for facilitating blame attribution. First, there may or may not be an informative political environment to help cut the costs of information gathering about culpability for their grievance. Certainly there is nothing systemic or systematic like an electoral cycle to ensure public discussion. There is also no set deadline to provide incentives for political leaders and the media to get their versions of culpability to the aggrieved quickly and clearly. The decision to protest can be taken at any time, and if anything, the indefinite nature of the activity provides incentives for politicians to conceal or confuse information and thereby buy time to prevent protest altogether. Third, protest allows far more options for the expression of blame. Aggrieved individuals are not presented with a list of potential targets from which they must choose one. Instead, their options are as numerous or as limited as they decide. Executives, legislators, managers, and others are never "up for protest," but neither are they ever fully excluded from selection as a blameworthy target.

The implications of the special difficulties of blame attribution in protest settings are similar to the implications for any other activity. Difficulty in blame attribution decreases the likelihood of specific blame attribution. Without information shortcuts and parameters limiting the time for attributing blame and the pool of potential culprits, few aggrieved individuals contemplating protest attribute blame specifically.

BLAME AND THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

I assume that participation in collective action is partly a function of the expected utility of that participation, and I define utility as the relative size of costs and benefits. Other things being equal, an individual is more likely to protest when the potential benefits of protest seem to outweigh the costs. The difficulty of specific blame attribution is important because specific attributions of blame, both causal and treatment, lower the costs of collective action, increase the potential benefits, and thereby facilitate protest.

Specificity in both types of attribution increases the potential benefits of collective action in similar but not identical ways. For collective action against the cause

of a problem, the potential benefit is the gratification felt from expressing anger, frustration, or discontent (Chong 1991, chap. 4). Specific attributions make this outcome more likely by directing emotions at a concrete target rather than vaguely or diffusely. For collective action against the solver of a problem, the potential benefit is the successful redress of grievances. Specific attributions make this outcome more likely by calling to task only a single political actor, who is then forced to answer. Theoretically, unspecific attributions might seem advantageous because they challenge more than one actor to redress the grievance, but unspecific attributions also allow the possibility that blame is diffuse and thus encourage these actors to use finger-pointing and other "blame avoidance" techniques rather than providing the public good (Weaver 1986).

Specificity in both causal and treatment attribution also reduces the costs of collective action, which I assume to be the costs of information, organization, and opportunity. Here both dimensions of blame operate in much the same way, and I refer to them jointly.

Specific attributions of blame lower information costs because specific attributions allow individuals to focus their assessments of the risks and rewards of protest on a single target. If aggrieved individuals attribute blame solely or mostly to the failings of the country's executive, they need only size up the likely outcome of protest against that single political actor. How gratifying will it feel to vent frustration against the executive? What rewards or solutions can the executive offer as appeasement? How capable is the executive of cracking down and repressing the protest? How likely is the executive to do either?

If, on the other hand, aggrieved individuals attribute blame unspecifically, their information-gathering task is far less manageable. Now they must size up the likely outcome of protest against several political actors. How gratifying will it feel to vent frustration against the country's executive, the country's legislature, the city council, the mayor, or any number of other actors? What rewards or solutions can be offered by each of these actors? How capable is each of these actors of repression? How likely is each to appease or repress? The costs of this information gathering might even increase at a higher-than-additive rate for each additional potential target of protest since the aggrieved individuals might also need to evaluate whether these actors will respond jointly in either appeasement or repression, whether only some actors will join together, or whether some actors will appease at the same time that others will repress.

This same line of reasoning explains why specific attributions of blame lower organizational and opportunity costs. Specific attributions allow individuals to focus and therefore limit the scope of their proposed collective action. Aggrieved individuals who blame the country's executive organize to protest against that executive and no other. Since the boundaries of their action are relatively finite, their costs of mobilization are also relatively limited.

Conversely, aggrieved individuals who are not specific in attributing blame for their grievance must incur

a cost of decision making that other individuals can avoid. Since no clear target of protest emerges from these individuals' attribution of blame, their options are (1) to invest in identifying and protesting against some single target, (2) to protest against some randomly selected single target, (3) to protest against multiple targets, or (4) to protest without naming any target. In each case, mobilization is more costly.

In the first two options, aggrieved individuals settle on one political actor as their target of protest. They can do this in one of two ways. First, they can engage in an information search, sort through the many potential causes of the grievance and the many potential problem-solvers, and narrow the field to a concrete target. In other words, these individuals can solve their attribution problem and move from being unspecific attributors of blame to specific attributors. These tasks demand time, energy, and even money, raising the costs of collective action relative to those for individuals who had a conviction about blame attribution at the outset.

Alternatively, aggrieved individuals can ignore their attribution problem and simply join a protest with no regard for the protest target, that is, no *a priori* conviction that the specific chosen target is indeed the guilty party and/or capable of delivering the sought-after rewards. In this case, however, the individuals will be less convinced than more specific attributors that the proposed protest will be either emotionally satisfying or effective in rectifying the problem. These individuals will therefore expect fewer benefits and greater opportunity costs of wasted time from protest than specific attributors and, thus, will be less likely to protest.

In the third option, aggrieved individuals who are unspecific in attributing blame protest against multiple targets. Here again, the individuals expect greater costs because a dispersed protest demands more time, energy, and money for organization and for gathering information on the risks and rewards associated with the various targets and because a dispersed protest increases the likelihood of repression by at least one of the targeted political actors. These increased costs decrease the likelihood of protest.

In the fourth option, aggrieved individuals accept that they cannot or do not attribute blame for their grievance to a specific actor, and they consider a vaguely defined protest with an unnamed target. Here again, though, the individuals' costs are higher in that their assessment of the risks and rewards of protest is far more murky and laborious. Indeed, without a target as a point of reference, their assessment of risks and rewards might be laborious to the point of impossible. For example, these individuals could ask themselves, "What is the likelihood of retaliation?" but the question does not get them very far without consideration of specific political actors. The better question is "What is the likelihood that the *country's executive* will retaliate?" or "What is the likelihood that the *mayor* will retaliate?" or "What is the likelihood that my *manager* will retaliate?" because these different actors probably have different personalities, different sympathies, and different incentive structures. Since these individuals have chosen not to ask the more specific questions, they cannot

make reasonable calculations of the costs and benefits of protest, and consequently, they are less likely than more specific attributors of blame to respond favorably to calls to action.

Concerns about retaliation, ineffectiveness, and lost time and opportunity are common to all aggrieved individuals, regardless of how specifically they attribute blame, and the concerns are likely to dissuade most from protesting. However, the magnitude of the concerns varies depending upon the specificity in blame attribution, so some individuals are more dissuaded than others. The more specific the attribution of blame, the easier it is to believe that the outcomes of protest—emotional gratification, successful redress of grievances, retaliation by the authorities, disappointed expectations, wasted time, etc.—fall within a reasonably limited range and that the protest is worth pursuing. The less specific the attribution of blame, the more likely it is that a proposed protest is preemptively declared a futile time-sink with unpleasant consequences for participants.

THE WAGE ARREARS CRISIS IN RUSSIA

The crisis of wage arrears in Russia provides the perfect laboratory to test these propositions. The crisis began as occasional delays of salaries and peaked in 1998 when a quarter of the Russian workforce was owed back wages in the ruble equivalent of about \$10 billion. The delay or nonpayment of wages affected two-thirds to three-quarters of Russian workers directly and an even larger percentage indirectly through unpaid family members. The crisis aggravated the already difficult economic situation by increasing poverty, particularly in regions and industries that were already suffering the most. It forced a reduction in consumption and savings and an increase in the sale of personal belongings, intrafamily transfers of food and money, and subsistence farming (Desai and Idson 2000; Javeline 2003). These activities alleviated the crisis to some extent, but they did not compensate for the lost wages themselves or for the stress, frustration, and other psychological accompaniments to feelings of hardship and injustice. In survey after survey, Russians expressed dismay over their country's economic collapse, naming the wage arrears crisis as the single most serious problem (Javeline 2003).

The public reaction to the wage crisis, however, was underwhelming. True, the late 1990s saw a rise in strike activity, not to mention other forms of collective action such as demonstrations, rallies, hunger strikes, and sit-downs on railroad tracks, and the impetus for the vast majority of these activities was the nonpayment of wages. However, the rise in collective action hardly kept pace with the more dramatic rise in wage debt, or at least it did not keep pace in a consistent manner, and even generous estimates of protest turnout still put the number at only 1% or 2% of all Russian workers and also a small percentage of workers actually owed wages.

The question, then, is why this small percentage protested while the rest of their comrades in suffering

did not. What accounts for the different reactions of aggrieved Russians?

Explanations of the Russian public's response to wage arrears are usually sought in economic, organizational, psychological, cultural, and other theories.² A widely overlooked piece of the puzzle is in the difficulty of specifying blame for the crisis. Wage arrears is a highly complicated problem requiring time, energy, and a tremendous amount of information to understand. Several parties might have had a hand in creating the problem, and several parties might potentially contribute to its solution.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov explains, for example, that wage arrears is "a joint problem, generally speaking. On the one hand, the government—and I mean general government, including regional governments, everybody, municipal governments, general government—does not pay salaries to teachers, to scientific workers, to everybody, because of the absence of money in the budget. On the other hand, companies did bad and do bad and produce nothing and steal a lot of money, and they can't pay taxes. That's why [the cause] is a combination."³ Similarly, economists Earle and Sabirianova (2002, 661) note that "a combination of peculiar conditions has tended to raise the relative attractiveness to managers of not paying their workers on time. [The conditions include] the economic decline and liquidity problems of the Russian economy . . . the poor monitoring of managerial behavior, the lack of contract enforcement, the crowding out by government borrowing of many financial flows, the effects of worker ownership in privatized firms, and the generalized 'culture of non-payment.'" Economist Gimpelson (2001) also cites "a number of interdependent reasons" for wage arrears, including leaders who feared the political implications of mass unemployment and thus avoided radical fiscal adjustment and hardening budget constraints, political institutions that provided incentives for inflating the total public sector wage bill, and employees who feared unemployment more than wage nonpayment. Vaughan-Whitehead's (1998, 28–29) "great variety of factors" for wage arrears includes the collapse of demand, the problem of production and profitability, interenterprise arrears and state arrears to enterprises, skewed managerial priorities, artificially high prices set by monopolistic enterprises, heavy taxation, and restrictive monetary policies. Economists Desai and Idson (1998, 3–4) offer no fewer than 10 separate explanations for wage arrears in Russia. These include (1) poor tax collection and an unrevised tax code; (2) the diversion of wage funds by local governments and military generals; (3) interenterprise debt; (4) cutbacks in state orders, especially from military factories and energy suppliers; (5) budget deficit targets specified by the International Monetary Fund and approved by the Duma, which lowered then ruled out (by the end of 1995) bor-

rowing from the Central Bank; (6) prohibitive interest rates for enterprise borrowing; (7) the unwillingness of government and enterprises to lay off workers; (8) workers' willingness to settle for the nonwage benefits of being attached to a factory, such as low-cost housing and school, hospital, and day-care services; (9) 51% of stock ownership by managers and workers at most factories; and (10) the government's failure to enforce bankruptcy.

These public officials and economists attest to the difficulty of accounting for the missing \$10 billion worth of unpaid rubles and the difficulty of explaining why Russian workers have not been getting paid regularly. The preceding theoretical discussion of blame attribution and collective action suggests that Russians who have made sense of the confusion, narrowed the sources of accountability, and chosen a most guilty culprit should be more likely to protest than those who have not.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

I now turn to testing this argument using data from a nationwide survey of 2,026 adult (18+) Russians that I conducted for the United States Information Agency (USIA; now State Department) between September 27 and October 12, 1998.⁴ More information on the sampling scheme, weighting, and other aspects of the survey is provided in the Appendix.

The dependent variable is individual-level protest activity, and I measure this in three ways. One measure is a dichotomous variable indicating participation in either a strike or a demonstration during the nationwide protests of March 1997. The second measure is a similar dichotomous measure indicating participation in either a strike or a demonstration during the nationwide protests of April 1998. The third measure is also dichotomous but is more general. It indicates participation in any strike or demonstration in the three years prior to the survey.

The main explanatory variable is specificity in blame attribution. Here we consider both causal attribution and treatment attribution and the relative specificity of each. There are many ways to measure specificity, and different manipulations of the variable produce substantively similar results in analysis, so I have chosen two simple measures that still make meaningful distinctions among individuals.

The first measure is a three-tiered ordered categorical variable of causal attribution. In the first category are those who did not make specific attributions of causal responsibility for the nonpayment of wages. They were asked, "Who or what do you think is mainly guilty for causing the 'nonpayments' problem?" and they could choose from major response categories that were developed after pretests using open-ended questions. The response categories were the central authorities, the local authorities, enterprises and enterprise managers, the general economic situation and the

² These alternative theories are discussed at length and tested in Javeline 2003.

³ Author's interview with Boris Nemtsov, February 16, 1999, Cambridge, MA.

⁴ After weighting, the sample size is 2,021. See Appendix.

transition process, international organizations or foreign governments, and the Russian people themselves. Depending on their answers, these individuals were asked a follow-up question. For example, if they named the central authorities as mainly guilty, they were asked the follow-up question, "More specifically, who or what in the central government do you think is mainly guilty for causing the 'nonpayments' problem? Parliament, Central Bank, Chernomyrdin, Chubais, Yeltsin, etc." Those who answered "don't know" or who blamed the central authorities in general but no one individual or institution in particular are considered not to have made specific causal attributions and are placed in this first category.

In the second category, I place individuals who made specific causal attributions by identifying President Yeltsin, the State Duma, a misguided reform process, or other specific individuals, institutions, or circumstances as the main source of blame for wage arrears. In the third category, I place individuals who go even further in their level of specificity. They not only identify a distinct individual, institution, or circumstance as the main cause of wage arrears, but also prove to be consistent in their opinions and in the narrowness of their attributions. When asked to provide independent ratings of guilt to each of the major parties mentioned above, those in this third category named one and only one party "very guilty" (compared to 61% who called two or more parties "very guilty" and 13% who did not call any party "very guilty"). Individuals in this third category also provide the same answer to differently phrased but substantively similar questions. If they answered "the central authorities" to the question "Who or what do you think is mainly guilty for causing the 'nonpayments' problem?" they gave the same answer to the later question, "Generally speaking, to the extent that government is to blame for workers not getting paid, do you think the blame rests more with the central government or more with the local government?" Similarly, if they blamed the local authorities in the first question, they blamed the local authorities in the second question as well.⁵

Distinguished in this way, 34% of survey respondents fall in the first category of unspecific causal attributors of blame, 54% fall in the second category of moderately specific attributors of blame, and 11% fall in the third category of specific attributors of blame. If we consider only Russians who were not paid regularly, the distribution is roughly the same: 33%, 54%, and 13% fall in the first, second, and third categories, respectively.⁶

TABLE 1. Blame Attribution and Protest Activities

	Participation in Strikes or Protests (%)			
Specificity in	March 1997	April 1998	Last 3 Years	% of Sample
Causal attribution				
Unspecific	5	3	9	33
Moderately specific	9	7	12	54
Specific	25	19	23	13
Treatment attribution				
Unspecific	6	3	9	34
Moderately specific	12	9	14	65

Note : N = 1,189 unpaid Russians.

Note: $N = 1,189$ unpaid Russians.

The second measure of blame is a dichotomous measure of treatment attribution. This measure parallels the measure of causal attribution but, due to the limitations of the survey data, distinguishes only between unspecific attributors and moderately specific attributors. Russians were asked, "Who or what do you think is now most responsible for solving the nonpayments problem?" and they could choose from the same categories described above. They were also asked a follow-up question with response categories similar to that above, such as "Who or what in the central government do you think is now most responsible for solving the nonpayments problem?" Those who answered "don't know" or who blamed the central authorities in general but no one individual or institution in particular are considered not to have made specific treatment attributions and placed in one category, whereas those who identified Yeltsin, the Duma, or another specific problem-solver are placed in another category.

Since the data do not allow us to distinguish further by even greater degrees of specificity, we should expect that the distribution of specificity in treatment attribution should resemble the distribution of only the first two categories of specificity in causal attribution. Indeed, 34% of survey respondents fall in the first category of unspecific treatment attributors, and 65% fall in the second category of moderately specific treatment attributors. Given that the attribution of causal responsibility and the attribution of treatment responsibility are highly correlated (0.43 ; $p < 0.01$), we can reasonably assume that only a minority (probably between 10% and 15%) of the 65% would attribute treatment responsibility even more specifically if given the opportunity.

When Russians are placed in these three simple but distinct categories based on the specificity of their attributions of causal responsibility, we see that the level of participation in collective action increases with the level of specificity. Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of protest events with causal attribution for Russians who

⁵ Only two-thirds (64%) of those who blamed the central authorities in the first question also blamed them in the second version, and fewer than half (43%) of those who blamed the local authorities in the first question also blamed them in the second version.

⁶ In Javeline 2003, chap. 3, I provide greater detail on which particular individuals and institutions were held accountable by the specific and moderately specific attributors of blame, and I explain the likely reasons why those individuals and institutions were singled out. For example, information shortcuts based on the historical tendency for centralized decision making and a media focus on the executive, as well as thoughtful appraisals of Yeltsin's role, probably account for the 54% of specific attributors who identified the former President as

the main culprit in the wage arrears crisis. Still, only 15% of unpaid Russians and 9% of the population as a whole singled out Yeltsin. The lack of specificity in blame attribution, causal and treatment, is the main story of the arrears crisis.

TABLE 2. Effects of Specific Blame Attribution on Protest Among Unpaid Russians: Logit Estimates

	March 1997		April 1998		Last 3 Years	
Specificity in causal attribution	0.87*** (0.21)		1.14*** (0.24)		0.55*** (0.19)	
Specificity in treatment attribution		0.70* (0.34)		1.11** (0.48)		0.56* (0.28)
Education	0.43*** (0.09)	0.45*** (0.09)	0.43*** (0.11)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.08)
Gender	0.13 (0.32)	0.10 (0.32)	-0.27 (0.38)	-0.24 (0.39)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.25)
Age	-0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Urban	1.29*** (0.42)	1.31*** (0.41)	2.65*** (0.64)	2.68*** (0.64)	1.41*** (0.34)	1.43*** (0.35)
Income	-0.29* (0.14)	-0.30* (0.15)	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.27* (0.16)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)
Constant	-2.12* (1.13)	-1.90* (1.03)	-0.61 (1.42)	-0.60 (1.28)	-0.49 (0.78)	-0.45 (0.77)
log likelihood	-326.79	-336.90	-236.11	-245.51	-401.78	-403.72
N	1,180	1,181	1,166	1,167	1,184	1,183

Note: All dependent variables are dichotomous (1 = participated, 0 = did not participate). Most explanatory variables are ordered categorical variables, including "specificity in causal attribution" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame, 2 = specific in attributing blame), "education" (1 = seven grades or fewer, 2 = incomplete secondary, 3 = complete secondary, 4 = specialized secondary, 5 = incomplete higher, 6 = higher), "age" (1 = 18–29, 2 = 30–39, 3 = 40–49, 4 = 50–59, 5 = 60+), and "income" (1 = no household income last month, 2 = household income of 500 rubles or less, etc., 17 = more than 5,000 rubles). The others are dichotomous variables: "specificity in treatment attribution" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame), "gender" (1 = female, 0 = male), and "urban" (1 = urban, 0 = rural). * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed); ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.005$.

were paid more than a month late or not at all during the six months prior to the survey.⁷ For each of the three measures of protest, Russians who attributed causal responsibility specifically were more likely to participate than Russians who were less specific or unspecific attributors of blame. Notably, only about a tenth of Russians match the description of specific attributors of causal responsibility and are therefore relatively receptive to calls for collective action.

Table 1 also shows similar results for the relationship between treatment attribution and protest. For all three measures of protest, Russians who attributed treatment responsibility moderately specifically were more likely to participate than unspecific attributors. Greater precision in the measure of treatment responsibility would presumably show even higher participation rates for more specific attributors.

Multivariate analyses confirm these findings. In the following models, I use logit analysis on the subsample of Russians experiencing wage arrears, that is, those who were paid more than a month late or not at all during the six months prior to the survey and who were therefore most aggrieved and likely to protest. The dependent variables are the dichotomous measures of protest described above. The main explanatory variable is alternately the categorical variable for causal attribution and the dichotomous variable for treatment attribution also described above. Finally, I include some traditional demographic variables—education, gender,


age, urban or rural residence, and income—known to have some association with protest behavior.⁸

In all the analyses, specificity in blame attribution is statistically significant at a high level of confidence (Table 2).⁹ All else being equal, a Russian who could identify at least some concrete individual or institution as the principal culprit to blame for the nonpayments crisis—either for causing it or for failing to treat it—has been more likely to strike or protest than a Russian who could not identify a principal culprit in the crisis. (The seemingly greater statistical significance of causal attribution over treatment attribution is probably due to the greater precision with which causal attribution is measured and the resulting lower standard errors.) The relationship between blame attribution and protest holds true for participation in the events of March 1997

⁸ One relevant variable, job position, is purposefully omitted. Although highly skilled white-collar workers have been among the most active protesters against wage arrears, many Russians who experience payment arrears are retired and depend on pensions or stipends. The inclusion of job position as an explanatory variable would eliminate the retired from the analysis. Furthermore, there is a high correlation between education and job position (0.65 [$p < 0.01$] overall or 0.69 [$p < 0.01$] for those experiencing wage arrears), and inclusion of both in the model would bias the results.

⁹ A more complex and fully specified model of protest confirms these findings. Specificity of blame attribution remains statistically significant when we add control variables for a wide variety of alternative explanations for protest and passivity in Russia, such as the receipt of nonwage benefits like housing and health care, payment in barter instead of money, second sources of income, a sense of efficacy about the impact of protest, the presence of a trade union at the workplace, confidence in the Communist Party, and interest in politics. See Javeline 2003, chap. 5.

⁷ The cross-tabulation and subsequent analyses are similar if we consider all Russians, including those regularly paid.

FIGURE 1. Effects of Specific Causal Attribution on Protest Among Unpaid Russians

and April 1998 and for more general participation in the last three years.¹⁰

Using the parameters generated by the logit models in Table 2, we can estimate the probability of protest for individuals given their specificity, or lack thereof, in blame attribution (Figure 1). To generate predicted probabilities, all explanatory variables are held constant at their means, except for specificity in blame attribution, which is varied according to the three or two different values assigned for degree of specificity.¹¹

All else being equal, the probability that a Russian participated in the March 1997 protest actions is 0.04 if he/she was unspecific in attributing causal responsibility for his/her predicament. The probability that this Russian participated in these same protests increases to 0.08 if he/she was moderately specific in attributing causal responsibility to some concrete individual or institution, and it increases further to 0.17 if he/she attributed causal responsibility even more specifically and consistently to the same individual or institution. That is, clear and consistent causal attribution multiplies the probability that an individual would attempt to redress the grievance through protest by over four times. For the April 1998 events, the differences are even greater. The probability of participation jumps

from 0.01 for someone unspecific in attributing causal responsibility to 0.04 for someone moderately specific in attributing causal responsibility and to 0.12 for the most specific attributors. For more general protest and strike activity in the last three years, the probability increases from 0.07 to 0.11 to 0.18.¹² Variation in the specificity of treatment attribution, like this variation in the specificity of causal attribution, generates almost identical increases in the probability of protest.¹³

In absolute terms, these probabilities are not terribly large, nor should we expect them to be. Given the many forces always working *against* collective action, the odds are usually very high that any single individual will *not* protest against even the most egregious injustice. A variable that substantially multiplies the likelihood that an individual will reject the opportunity to free ride and actually take the risks that protest entails is highly significant. In the aggregate, it could mean that a strike or demonstration attracts three or four or 12 times as many people from the pool of the aggrieved.

¹² The predicted probabilities are similar when analyzing the entire sample, including the regularly paid. Where they differ, the general relationship still holds. The probability of protest increases along with increases in the specificity of blame attribution.

Note that the survey questions on the March 1997 and April 1998 nationwide protests asked about events with the specific topic of wage delays and nonpayment, whereas the generic question about strike and protest activity did not specify the cause or topic of the strike or protest. The latter question therefore probably contains more measurement error. Some Russians who claim to have participated in protest activities in the last three years could have been protesting against less widespread grievances. This might account for the somewhat smaller effect on this one measure of the attribution of blame specifically for arrears.

¹³ Results not shown but available on request. The changes in probability resemble the changes from unspecific attribution to moderately specific attribution only, since the data on treatment attribution do not allow for further distinctions of the most specific attributors.

¹⁰ A case could be made that the explanation for protest based on blame attribution has the causal arrow in the wrong direction. The ability to attribute blame may be endogenous to, or result from, political protest. Structural equation models suggest that effects of the ability to attribute blame on protest are independent of the effects of protest on the ability to attribute blame, and vice versa. (Results not shown but available on request.)

¹¹ The predicted probabilities were generated using a program developed by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenburg, and Gary King (CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Analyzing Statistical Results, version 1.2, Harvard University, September 16, 1998). See King, Tomz, and Wittenburg 1998.

In Russia, where anywhere from one-half to three-quarters of the roughly 110 million adults have been in this pool of aggrieved, the difference between a population that attributes blame unspecifically and a population that attributes blame specifically could be millions of protesters. Two of every three Russians (69%), or just over 75 million people, reported that they were currently owed back wages, pensions, or stipends. If these people were unspecific in attributing blame and the probability of protest was only 0.04, disturbances would likely involve 3 million people. If a greater specificity in blame attribution increased the probability of protest to 0.17, the disturbances would likely involve almost 13 million people. Considering that the non-payments crisis has affected most Russians at least indirectly through arrears to family members and that all 110 million adults might put themselves in this pool of aggrieved, the difference in turnout could jump from 4.4 million to 18.7 million protesters.

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON PROTEST OVER WAGE ARREARS

Political participation often proceeds from the simple request to do so (Varese and Yaish 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 5). Accordingly, in addition to specificity in blame attribution, Russian political entrepreneurs have a significant independent effect on political protest. As Table 3 shows, unpaid Russians who have been asked to protest have done so at far higher rates than unpaid Russians who have not been asked. The effect of political entrepreneurship, however, is masked by the fact that entrepreneurial efforts to encourage protest in Russia are scarce: Only 23% of aggrieved Russians have been asked to protest by any political entrepreneur, and a far smaller percentage have been asked by trade union activists (11%), Communist Party members (6%), co-workers (14%), managers (1%), or another person (9%). Still, in the rare cases when these entrepreneurs rise to the occasion, they are often effective and confirm the idea that entrepreneurs can provide a "solution" to the collective action problem.

Effective entrepreneurs "prospect" for participants, sizing up the potential responses of individuals and targeting the most likely activists (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999). In the United States, targeted individu-

als are usually those already most likely to participate spontaneously. However, there is some evidence that targeted individuals for social movements, as opposed to more conventional forms of participation, are often the *least* likely to participate spontaneously (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999, 154).

Since the least likely to participate spontaneously are those who are least specific in attributing blame, we should expect an interaction effect between entrepreneurial requests to protest and blame specificity, with effective entrepreneurs targeting these least specific attributors. The least specific attributors are better targets because their probability of protest is often so low that mobilizing efforts could only have a positive effect, whereas there is less marginal utility in targeting the most specific attributors. Further analysis supports this hypothesis.

Table 4 shows the results of logit analysis as in Table 2 but with two new variables added to the model. One is a dichotomous variable representing whether or not the individual has been asked by a political entrepreneur to protest. The other variable accounts for the possibility that mobilizing efforts are less effective when entrepreneurs target those who are already specific attributors of blame. It is an interaction term measured two ways: The first variant represents the combined effects of specific causal attribution and political entrepreneurship in a three-tiered ordered categorical variable. Survey respondents who were unspecific attributors of causal responsibility and/or not asked to protest comprise one category, those who were moderately specific attributors of causal responsibility and asked to protest comprise another category, and those who were specific attributors of causal responsibility and asked to protest comprise the final category. The second variant represents the combined effects of specific treatment attribution and political entrepreneurship in a dichotomous variable. Survey respondents who were unspecific attributors of treatment responsibility and/or not asked to protest are distinguished from those who were moderately specific attributors of treatment responsibility and asked to protest.

As in Table 2, in all the analyses, specificity in blame attribution—both causal and treatment—is statistically significant at a high level of confidence. The more specifically an individual attributes blame, the more likely he/she is to protest. Similarly, in all the analyses, a request to protest by a political entrepreneur is statistically significant at a high level of confidence. An individual who is asked to protest is far more likely to do so than an individual not asked. The joint effect of specificity in blame attribution—both causal and treatment—and requests to protest is also statistically significant at a high level of confidence for all but one model, but notably the effect is negative. The more specifically an individual attributes blame, the smaller the impact that a request to protest by an entrepreneur can have. Aggrieved individuals who are less specific about their attributions of blame at the outset are much more receptive to mobilizing efforts.

Figure 2 allows us to see the magnitude of these differences. It shows the predicted probabilities of protest

TABLE 3. Political Entrepreneurship and Protest Activities


	Participation in Strikes or Protests (%)			% of Sample
	March 1997	April 1998	Last 3 Years	
Not asked	6	4	5	72
Asked	22	16	33	23

Note: $N = 1,189$ unpaid Russians. Percentage of sample adds to less than 100 due to missing data.

TABLE 4. Effects of Specific Blame Attribution and Political Entrepreneurship on Protest Among Unpaid Russians: Logit Estimates

	March 1997		April 1998		Last 3 Years	
Specificity in causal attribution	1.64***		1.81***		0.78***	
	(0.32)		(0.33)		(0.29)	
Specificity in treatment attribution		2.13***		3.43***		1.44**
		(0.70)		(0.58)		(0.57)
Asked to protest by entrepreneur	3.05***	3.42***	2.78***	4.24***	2.47***	3.19***
	(0.57)	(0.77)	(0.64)	(0.73)	(0.51)	(0.67)
Interaction: causal attribution and asked to protest	-1.30***		-1.18**		-0.17	
	(0.43)		(0.47)		(0.41)	
Interaction: treatment attribution and asked to protest		-2.33***		-3.33***		-1.16*
		(0.86)		(0.85)		(0.70)
Education	0.40***	0.44***	0.41***	0.46***	0.29***	0.32***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Gender	-0.12	-0.07	-0.52	-0.43	-0.20	-0.25
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Age	0.17	0.22	0.05	0.15	0.20*	0.25*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Urban	1.21***	1.24***	2.57***	2.59***	1.31***	1.32***
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.66)	(0.64)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Income	-0.32*	-0.33*	-0.25	-0.27*	-0.28***	-0.29***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	-3.89***	-4.14***	-2.15	-3.67**	-2.48***	-3.05***
	(1.35)	(1.35)	(1.58)	(1.52)	(0.93)	(1.00)
log likelihood	-282.78	-292.33	-213.11	-218.65	-323.06	-321.35
N	1,134	1,133	1,121	1,120	1,136	1,134

Note: All dependent variables are dichotomous (1 = participated, 0 = did not participate). Most explanatory variables are ordered categorical variables, including "specificity in causal attribution" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame, 2 = specific in attributing blame), "interaction: causal attribution and asked to protest" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame and/or not asked to protest, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame and asked to protest, 2 = specific in attributing blame and asked to protest), "education" (1 = seven grades or fewer, 2 = incomplete secondary, 3 = complete secondary, 4 = specialized secondary, 5 = incomplete higher, 6 = higher), "age" (1 = 18-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50-59, 5 = 60+), and "income" (1 = no household income last month, 2 = household income of 500 rubles or less, etc., 17 = more than 5,000 rubles). The others are dichotomous variables: "specificity in treatment attribution" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame), "asked to protest by entrepreneur" (0 = not asked, 1 = asked), "interaction: treatment attribution and asked to protest" (0 = unspecific in attributing blame and/or not asked to protest, 1 = moderately specific in attributing blame and asked to protest), "gender" (1 = female, 0 = male), and "urban" (1 = urban, 0 = rural). * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed); ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.005$.

FIGURE 2. Effects of Specific Causal Attribution and Political Entrepreneurship on Protest Among Unpaid Russians

when all variables are held constant at their means except for specificity in causal attribution, political entrepreneurship, and the interaction of the two, which were varied according to their different values. For unspecific attributors of causal responsibility, all else being equal, the probability of participating in the March 1997 protest actions is 0.01 if they were not asked to protest by a trade union activist, Communist Party member, or other political entrepreneur, but the probability jumps to 0.15 if they received such a request. Similarly, for moderately specific attributors of causal responsibility, all else being equal, the probability of participating in the March 1997 protest actions is 0.04 if they were not asked to protest and a much larger 0.19 if they were. For specific attributors of causal responsibility, however, the probability of protest in March 1997 is already a high 0.18 without being asked to participate, so it increases only slightly, to 0.26, with the request.

We see the same pattern for participation in the April 1998 protest events. An entrepreneur's request to protest increases the probability of protest for unspecific attributors of causal responsibility from 0.004 to 0.06, for moderately specific attributors of causal responsibility from 0.02 to 0.09, but for specific attributors of causal responsibility only from 0.12 to 0.17. Only for protest within the last three years did an entrepreneur's request to protest lead to a substantial increase in participation even for the most specific attributors of causal responsibility. However, as I describe in footnote 12, this finding probably reflects some error in this particular measure of protest. Unlike for the March 1997 and April 1998 protests, protests during the last three years may or may not have concerned wage arrears, in which case the effects of blame specificity precisely for wage arrears are more difficult to interpret.

If we substitute the attribution of treatment responsibility for the attribution of causal responsibility and assign it different values along with political entrepreneurship and the interaction of the two, the predicted probabilities look similar. A request to protest greatly and significantly increases the likelihood of protest for unspecific and moderately specific

attributors of treatment responsibility. The data do not allow us to test for the effects of a request on even more specific attributors of treatment responsibility, but two factors suggest that the effects would be less significant or not significant at all. First, the sign on the interaction term for treatment attribution and a request to protest in Table 4 is negative, suggesting that a higher level of specificity in treatment attribution at a constant level of political entrepreneurship is associated with lower levels of protest. Second, the predicted probability of protest increases more extremely for unspecific attributors of treatment responsibility who are asked to protest than for moderately specific attributors, suggesting that requests to protest would have an even smaller effect, if any, on specific attributors. For example, the probability of participating in the March 1997 protest actions for unspecific attributors of treatment responsibility jumps from 0.01 to 0.21 based on a request to protest, whereas for moderately specific attributors of treatment responsibility, the probability still increases but more modestly, from 0.07 to 0.17.

Further evidence that the mobilizing efforts of entrepreneurs are more meaningful for unspecific and moderately specific attributors of blame than for specific attributors of blame is given by the statistical significance of the changes in probability shown in Figure 2 (Table 5). For unspecific attributors of causal responsibility and for moderately specific attributors of causal responsibility, changes in the probability of protest thanks to entrepreneurial requests are statistically significant at a high level of confidence for all three measures of protest, the events of March 1997, the events of April 1998, and protest within the last three years. The same holds true for unspecific and moderately specific attributors of treatment responsibility. For *specific* attributors of causal responsibility, however, changes in the probability of protest thanks to entrepreneurial requests are statistically significant only for protest within the last three years. For March 1997 and April 1998, the changes in probability are not statistically significant, and the small increases that accompany being asked to protest by an entrepreneur could be due to chance.

TABLE 5. Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Protest Due to Variation in Political Entrepreneurship

Specificity in	March 1997				April 1998				Last 3 Years			
	Change in Prob.	SE	95% Conf. Interval		Change in Prob.	SE	95% Conf. Interval		Change in Prob.	SE	95% Conf. Interval	
Causal attribution												
Unspecific	0.14	0.04	0.07,	0.24	0.05	0.02	0.02,	0.11	0.19	0.06	0.09,	0.31
Moderately Specific	0.15	0.04	0.08,	0.23	0.07	0.03	0.03,	0.14	0.28	0.05	0.19,	0.38
Specific	0.08	0.08	-0.07,	0.26	0.05	0.07	-0.06,	0.20	0.37	0.10	0.18,	0.57
Treatment attribution												
Unspecific	0.20	0.08	0.08,	0.36	0.09	0.05	0.02,	0.23	0.25	0.08	0.12,	0.42
Moderately specific	0.10	0.04	0.03,	0.19	0.05	0.03	0.01,	0.12	0.26	0.05	0.16,	0.37

Note: Not asked to protest → asked to protest. Interaction term (specificity in blame and asked to protest) also varies accordingly.

TABLE 6. Effects of Political Entrepreneurship on Blame Attribution

Specificity in	Asked to Protest	
	Not Asked	Asked
Causal attribution		
Unspecific	33	34
Moderately specific	54	53
Specific	14	13
Treatment attribution		
Unspecific	35	32
Moderately specific	65	68
% of sample	72	23

Note: $N = 1,189$ unpaid Russians.

THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BLAME

Given that political entrepreneurs have greater success mobilizing less specific attributors of blame, we might expect that the reason for their effectiveness lies in their ability to solve the blame attribution problem. Entrepreneurs might shoulder the information-gathering costs of collective action, identify a specific culprit, and convince the aggrieved to blame that culprit. As Table 6 shows, however, this probably does not describe the situation in Russia. Requests to protest by a Russian political entrepreneur have had little or no impact on an individual's specificity in blame attribution. If Russian political entrepreneurs have been trying to frame attributions of blame for wage arrears, they have been ineffective.

Table 6 distinguishes aggrieved individuals by whether they have been asked to protest by a trade union activist, Communist Party member, co-worker, manager, or other person, and it shows that those who were asked to protest by any of these political entrepreneurs were no more or less likely to attribute causal responsibility specifically than individuals who were not asked to protest. Nor were those asked to protest more or less likely to attribute treatment responsibility. These conclusions hold true when we control for other variables in multivariate analysis and when we examine the impact of different categories of political entrepreneurs individually. Ordered logit analysis with and without a variety of other variables does not reveal any significant effect of Russian political entrepreneurs on specificity of blame attribution, and a variety of bivariate and multivariate analyses with individual entrepreneurs such as trade union activists and Communist Party members substituted for the aggregate entrepreneur variable also does not reveal any significant effect on specificity of blame attribution.¹⁴ It is not the case that the requests to protest by some potential entrepreneurs in Russia make the aggrieved more likely to attribute blame specifically and that the positive impact of these entrepreneurs is being diluted

by including them in the general pool of all potential entrepreneurs.

To the extent that Russian entrepreneurs have an effect on protest, therefore, it is not an indirect effect through the ability of entrepreneurs to convince the aggrieved about specific blame attribution. The effect of Russian entrepreneurs on protest is largely a direct effect: Entrepreneurial requests to protest create a simple, selective incentive of satisfying the requestor, fulfilling an obligation, or relieving guilt through participation. Entrepreneurial requests have a smaller effect on specific attributors of blame probably because specific attributors are already more predisposed to protest, rendering the selective incentive of obligation fulfillment weak, unnecessary, and occasionally even counterproductive, if the named culprit in the request to protest conflicts with the aggrieved's preconceived attribution of blame.

These findings about Russian political entrepreneurs need not apply to political entrepreneurs at other times and other places. The empirical point made here is simply that Russian political entrepreneurs are less effective than they could be. They rarely ask the aggrieved to protest, and when they do, their mobilizing efforts seem limited to simple requests rather than labor-intensive information dissemination to promote greater blame specificity. Indeed, the results suggest that Russian entrepreneurs might do better at solving collective action problems if they first solved blame attribution problems. If they can convince the aggrieved to attribute blame to a specific culprit, they should reduce the costs of participation, and the aggrieved should be more likely to protest.

In general, political entrepreneurs who do not include persuasion about blame attribution in their requests to protest may be somewhat effective in encouraging protest thanks to the simple selective incentive of obligation fulfillment that a request creates. On the other hand, political entrepreneurs who do include persuasion about blame attribution in their requests offer not only a selective incentive of obligation fulfillment but also cost-cutting information. It is reasonable to expect that further empirical testing would show that these stronger requests generate a much higher level of protest.¹⁵

IMPLICATIONS: BLAME ATTRIBUTION AND THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

The major empirical findings of this study are that Russians who most clearly and specifically attribute

¹⁴ Results not shown but available on request.

¹⁵ Of course, there are many other variables that play a role in determining individual decisions to protest, including education, urban or rural residence, income, organization, and even idiosyncratic factors such as the pursuit of entertainment or self-actualization (Lichbach 1995, 121, 281). These and other variables are discussed at length in Javeline (2003, chap. 5). Alternative theories are consistent with a theory about blame attribution, and most importantly, specificity in blame attribution proves to be a very robust explanatory variable, remaining statistically significant and substantively meaningful even with the addition of a wide range of variables to the model.

blame for their grievances have been more active in strikes, demonstrations, or other acts of protest than Russians who do not attribute blame specifically and that those less specific in their attributions of blame have been relatively receptive to requests by entrepreneurs to protest. The vast majority of Russians do not attribute blame specifically and have not been asked to protest. They have therefore not taken collective action.

The implications of these findings are that individuals faced with any grievance should be more likely to protest if they can make specific attributions of blame for the grievance and that one mechanism by which entrepreneurs might solve collective action problems is by first solving blame attribution problems. Conclusions about the effects of blame attribution on the public response to a particular economic problem in Russia should apply more broadly to other issues at other times and in other countries. For example, the limited public outcry over unemployment and other grave but complicated problems should be explained partly by the wide range of possible causes and solutions for the problems. On the other hand, the great social unrest experienced in unequivocal dictatorships like Iran in 1979, the Philippines in 1986, China in 1989, and Indonesia in 1998 should be explained partly by the simplicity of political systems that draw clear lines of accountability to a single ruler for all decisions. In either scenario, those who specify a culprit or problem-solver should be more easily mobilized than those who attribute blame diffusely or not at all (Javeline 2003, chap. 6).

The concept of blame attribution thus has much to contribute to studies of collective action and social movements. First, blame has independent effects on protest. Individuals who attribute blame specifically—whether because their problems have objectively clearer origins or because they have the motivation to sort through their problems and identify a specific culprit or because they are naturally impulsive—are more likely to protest than individuals who do not attribute blame specifically—whether because they are unable to make the attribution or unwilling to try.

The concept of blame attribution also enhances many existing explanations that already serve as the foundation for collective action and social movement theories. For example, decades ago, scholars focused on the perceptions of deprivation among the aggrieved (e.g., Gurr 1970), but it turns out that individuals with comparable levels of perceived deprivation respond differently to calls for collective action. Variation in the specificity of blame attribution helps explain why. Since only some deprived actors attribute blame specifically, only some engage in collective action.

Resource mobilization theory focused on the resources that organizations and their leaders mobilize on behalf of grievances, such as time and money. These resources are used to inform members about impending collective action and to encourage participation. Blame attribution theory suggests that another chief function of these resources is to inform members about the source of their grievance and, especially when the grievance is complicated, to simplify it for them by at-

tributing blame to a specific culprit. Indeed, mobilizing resources to answer the question of whom to blame may precede these other tasks in importance. Blame attribution theory also suggests that the amount of resources needed to mobilize the aggrieved may vary according to preconceptions of the complexity of the grievance and the clarity of culpability. Some grievances may compel the use of more resources than others to inform or convince members about blame successfully.

Many contemporary theories of collective action focus on the construction of collective action “frames” (e.g., Snow and Benford 1988 and Snow et al. 1986). These frames make a grievance comprehensible to the aggrieved by demonstrating that their situation is unjust and shared by many others. The frames convey information such as the number of people affected by the grievance, planned actions to redress the grievance, previous actions to redress the grievance, and the outcome of these previous actions. They thus help inspire collective action. Blame attribution theory can enhance the notion of collective action frames by identifying another critical task for framing. Frames need to convey information about the origins of the grievance: Why did the grievance come about? Who or what is the guilty culprit? Who is the “us,” and who is the “them”? (Hardin 1995; Tarrow 1998, 21–22).

Contemporary theories also focus on the risks and rewards of collective action. As mentioned earlier, blame attribution theory can enhance these theories by describing how calculations of risks and rewards vary among similarly aggrieved individuals. Specificity in blame attribution facilitates the calculations. Aggrieved individuals who identify a specific person or institution as the cause of a grievance face fewer costs in assessing the ability and willingness of that specific culprit to redress the grievance or impose sanctions. They are thus more likely to bear the costs and ultimately engage in collective action than individuals who are unspecific in attributing blame and must shoulder a larger burden in information gathering and organization. Political entrepreneurs can help facilitate collective action by focusing on these less specific attributors of blame and convincing them to blame more specifically.

Still other contemporary theories focus on the role of the political system in fostering or hindering collective action. The political system provides incentives and constraints for collective action through the relative openness of the institutions of governance, the relative stability of elite alignments, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. These determine the “structure of political opportunities” available to would-be protesters (e.g., Eisinger 1973, McAdam 1982, and Tilly 1978). Blame attribution theory suggests another aspect of the political system that influences opportunities for collective action, the transparency of the system. When lines of authority are clear and distinct in a political system, aggrieved individuals can more easily make specific attributions of blame and therefore mobilize. When lines of authority are confused, due to either institutional design or the machinations of self-preserving elites, aggrieved individuals are less likely

to make specific attributions of blame and less likely to mobilize.

Note here that this claim runs counter to some intuitions in the literature on political opportunity structures. The literature usually suggests that a divided elite is conducive to collective action because it signifies weak and vulnerable leadership. Blame attribution theory instead suggests that a divided elite hinders collective action because the divisions cloud the source of blame. They legitimize finger-pointing and passing the buck. Similarly, theories about state strength usually suggest that decentralized states are more conducive to collective action than centralized states because decentralized states are weaker and more vulnerable at several points of contact (Lichbach 1995, 68–74). Blame attribution theory instead suggests that decentralized states hinder collective action because they cloud the source of blame. By definition, decentralized states involve multiple sources of power and decision-making, and they raise the cost of information gathering for the aggrieved to isolate the most important one. Centralized states might be stronger, but they also make clear where the buck stops for accountability (Tarrow 1998, 81–82, 209).

As these examples show, blame plays an important role in protest and other forms of collective action, and further study of the attribution of blame should advance the collective action research program.

APPENDIX: HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED

This study is based on findings from a nationwide survey of 2,026 adult (18+) Russians. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between September 27 and October 12, 1998, by the Moscow-based research firm, the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI) for the United States Information Agency (USIA). The survey design involved a multistage stratified cluster sample. For the first stage of sampling, Russia was divided into six geographically based strata: Center + North, Volga + Volgo-Vyatsky, North Caucasus, Urals, West Siberia, and East Siberia + the Far East, except for the two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were treated as self-representing strata.

The non-self-representing strata were each divided into substrata of high-protest urban areas, low-protest urban areas, and rural areas, based on official data from the Russian State Statistical Committee (*Goskomstat*) for the number of people and enterprises involved in strikes in the last four years. Cities from oblasts in which 3.5% of the population or more engaged in strikes from 1995 through June of 1998 were classified as “high protest” (Kemerovo, Komi, Rostov, Kurgan, Buryatia, Kostroma, Amur, Irkutsk, Archangelsk, and Bryansk). Cities from the remaining oblasts were classified as “low protest.”¹⁶ In the resulting design, the Volga + Volgo-Vyatsky stratum does not have a high-protest substratum, but

two strata, Center + North and East Siberia + Far East, have two high-protest substrata each to maximize the chances for a wide dispersion of sampling points within these strata. The total number of strata, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, is 21.

To ensure that comparisons of politically active and less active Russians could be made with reasonably high levels of confidence, the sampling scheme was designed to achieve a greater number of interviews from politically active Russians than might otherwise be achieved through random sampling in proportion to the size of each stratum. The high-protest strata were systematically oversampled, and the low-protest and rural strata were systematically undersampled. Fifty percent of the interviews were allocated to the high-protest strata, and 50% to the low-protest and rural strata. The data were later reweighted to reflect more closely the true probability of selection based on population size and adjusted to reflect educational distributions within strata.

The number of interviews assigned was based on an assumed response rate of approximately 70% for cities and 85% for villages for a targeted achieved sample of at least 1,800 respondents. Twenty-eight interviews were assigned for every 20 achieved interviews in urban primary sampling units (PSUs) (and thus 14 for every 10 achieved interviews in urban sampling points), and 24 interviews were assigned for every 20 achieved interviews in rural PSUs (and thus 12 for every 10 achieved interviews in rural sampling points).

Primary sampling units in the urban areas were cities, and sampling points were electoral zones. Primary sampling units in the rural areas were regions (*raiony*), and sampling points were villages. In the self-representing strata, PSUs and sampling points were electoral zones. In all cases, PSUs and sampling points were selected by the method of probability proportionate to size. Households were selected randomly, and individuals were selected randomly using Kish grids. The final sample contained 92 PSUs and 184 sampling points, with approximately 10 interviews per sampling point.

The overall response rate was 81% of the 2,516 targeted individuals, or 2,026 respondents. After weighting, the final sample size was 2,021. The margin of error for a simple random sample of this size would be $\pm 2.2\%$ at the 95% confidence level. Although stratification tends to reduce sampling error, clustering—by sampling among PSUs and sampling points—tends to increase it. We thus multiplied the sampling error for a simple random sample by the square root of two, as a reasonable approximation of the design effect of clustering. The margin of error was then estimated as $\pm 3.1\%$.

The questions on the survey were written by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction. The Russian translation was prepared partly by the Office of Research and partly by CESSI. All translations were double-checked by both organizations.

A few events occurred before or during the survey that might have influenced responses about economic behavior, attitudes toward economic and political reform, and protest and strike activities. Approximately 6 weeks before the survey began, the ruble was devalued, prices and exchange rates soared, and Russians began scrambling for cash. Approximately 4 weeks before the survey, Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko and most of his reformist government were fired by President Yeltsin, who tried twice unsuccessfully to reappoint former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as Kirienko's replacement. Finally, Yeltsin appointed and the State Duma approved a compromise candidate, Yevgeny Primakov, which brought some calm to the political scene but little relief to Russia's ailing economy. Although Primakov was already settling into office before any interviews occurred, it is possible that this turmoil heightened Russians' sensitivity to questions

¹⁶ The data from 1995–98 for the number of strikers in each oblast were added and then divided by the population in that oblast. This is not a precise method of determining the true percentage of the population that has participated in strikes because some workers could have participated in many strikes and therefore been counted several times. We used these numbers only as rough approximations for the purpose of classifying oblasts and their cities into high- and low-protest strata.

about their economic survival such that they reported their current state of affairs in light of anticipated continued decline.

During the course of the survey, the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR) and other organizations were planning and promoting nationwide strikes and demonstrations scheduled for October 7. Originally the goal of these events was to protest the chronic delays and nonpayment of wages, but the recent heightened crisis encouraged Communists and other groups to redirect the protests toward Yeltsin's resignation. Given the publicity of these events, it is conceivable that some respondents were more prone than usual to problems of recall for past strike and protest activities or intentionally misreported past behavior. Three-quarters of the interviews (77%) occurred between October 1 and October 6, the days leading up to the protests. Only 48 respondents (2%) were interviewed on the day of protests, October 7, and 100 respondents (5%) were interviewed in the days after the protests, between October 8 and October 12.

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The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States

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Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common rationalist explanation is that war results from private information and incentives to misrepresent it. By modeling warfare as a costly bargaining process, I show that inefficient fighting can occur in equilibrium under complete information and very general assumptions favoring peace. Specifically, I assume that peace can be supported in equilibrium and that fighting brings no benefits to either state, only costs. Although there exist agreements that Pareto-dominate the final settlement, states may prefer to fight. The result turns on the ability of states to impose costs on their opponents and bear costs in return. The existence of a range of acceptable settlements and the threat to revert to particularly disadvantageous ones make inefficient equilibria possible. A diminished ability to hurt the enemy, not simply military victory, is a major reason to stop fighting.

Why do wars occur? Because fighting is always inefficient *ex post*, it should be possible to design an agreement that both sides would accept in lieu of going to war and negotiating thereafter. Fearon (1995) conceptualized war as bargaining failure and identified rationalist explanations of this puzzle: Possessing private information about one's capabilities and incentives to misrepresent it during negotiations can lead to bargaining failure, as can the inability to commit not to use one's current gains to extract further concessions in the future.¹

Two crucial assumptions underlie these explanations: Common models treat crisis negotiation as a single-shot bargaining event, and war as a costly lottery over exogenously fixed outcomes. These assumptions, however, are problematic as approximations of war as usually conceptualized by practitioners and historians. A classic statement in this regard is that of von Clausewitz (1832, 87), who argued that "war [...] always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another." Schelling (1966, 7) is blunt: "War [is] a bargaining process—dirty, extortionate, and often quite reluctant as a bargaining process on one side or both—nevertheless a bargaining process." Modeling conflict using the two common assumptions misses the point that war is a process in which players can condition their strategies depending on past play. Recent formal theoretical advances have begun to address these issues. Although closer to nonformal treatments, they still depend on asymmetric information to explain conflict.²

Posing the question in terms of a bargaining process that occurs in the shadow of fighting is useful in

addressing the related puzzle of war termination: If fighting is costly, why do the sides delay in reaching a settlement to end it?³ Most wars end not in complete military victory that eliminates the opponent's ability to continue fighting, but in some negotiated settlement (Pillar 1983). Focusing on victory and defeat, as the costly lottery approach does, can therefore be misleading in this respect as well.

I model war as a process instead of an outcome and allow outcomes to be endogenous. One of the goals is to examine the strategic incentives for inefficient behavior in the absence of asymmetric information, especially as it relates to ending costly conflict. To this end, I stack the model against war by making several assumptions: (i) peace can be supported in equilibrium; (ii) peace is the most preferred outcome; (iii) fighting produces costs and no direct benefits; and (iv) there is complete information. Therefore, in this model war is not profitable by assumption. I find that even under these strict assumptions there exist inefficient equilibria, in which fighting occurs. This provides another plausible explanation of why states may fight despite the inefficiency.

Once war is disaggregated from a lottery over exogenous outcomes into a process where war aims arise endogenously, it is possible to make a subtle distinction between two types of costs that are associated with conflict: the ability to bear costs and the ability to impose costs. To my knowledge, there exists no theory in international relations, either formal or nonformal, that alludes to such a difference or that is even capable of conceptualizing it within its framework.⁴ This distinction

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This article is a shorter version of the first chapter of my dissertation. I thank Randall Stone, Curt Signorino, John Duggan, and Robert Westbrook for valuable comments. Previous versions were presented to the Peace Science Society, October 2001, and the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2002.

¹ Although there are several works that explain conflict as a dynamic commitment problem (e.g., Powell 1997), it is the asymmetric information argument that seems to have received most attention.

² See Filson and Werner 2001, Kim 2001, Powell 2001, Smith and Stam 2001, and Wagner 2000.

³ There are relatively few works on this topic. General ones include Dunnigan and Martel 1987, Iklé 1971, Kecsckemeti 1958, Kegely and Raymond 1999, and Smith 1995. Two recent interesting empirical works are Goemans 2000 and Stam 1999.

⁴ These abilities are related but not isomorphic. That is, it is not the case that state A's ability to impose costs on state B is the same as state B's ability to bear costs. This is because state A must in turn incur costs when it imposes costs on B, which determines the extent to which A can hurt B. These costs are not entirely dependent on B's defenses because they depend on other factors, such as A's domestic politics or international situation. During the Vietnam war, the American administration proscribed bombing certain targets, such as irrigation installations, which could have proven effective in imposing costs on Hanoi. This was a result of Johnson's well-founded fear that it could draw China into the war.

is relevant because it induces bargaining strategies that produce outcomes that cannot be predicted from the usual models.

These results draw attention to two underappreciated areas in research on war: the endogeneity of war aims and the ability of states to inflict pain on their adversaries. Although coercion has been recognized as perhaps the premier instrument of wartime politics, theories of war have generally ignored the possibilities that states condition negotiation strategies on their performance in the war and that such strategies depend on their ability to impose costs in unforeseen ways.

Uncertainty is a pervasive feature of international politics, and almost all models in which war occurs in equilibrium rely on asymmetric information to explain war (Powell 2001). As Goemans (2000, 24) notes, "If both sides knew how the pie would be divided after the war, both would be better off if they divided accordingly before the war."⁵ However, simply knowing how the pie would be divided does not necessarily mean that the division is the only one that can be supported in equilibrium *ex ante* even if such outcome is preferable because it is Pareto-improving (that is, at least one player can be made better off without anyone else being made worse off). Inefficiency can occur under complete information because (i) a range of negotiated agreements can be supported as outcomes of efficient equilibria; (ii) some of these leave players distinctly worse off; and (iii) the threat to switch to one of these different equilibria, depending on the path of play, can support a variety of inefficient equilibria that involve fighting.

The result of inefficiency under complete information has much in common with several formal models of wage bargaining in economics. These models have also normally invoked asymmetric information as the cause of delay and suboptimal outcomes, but there have been several recent developments. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) study a complete information model in which a firm and a union bargain over wages and in which the union can go on strike. They are able to demonstrate that inefficient equilibria exist in which the union strikes (see also Haller and Holden 1990). Unlike such a model, in which only one player can impose costs on the other, I allow both players to engage in a conflict game after any offer is rejected.

My approach is similar to that of Busch and Wen (1995), who study a more general model, where a disagreement game is embedded in a Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game. They also demonstrate that inefficient behavior can occur when the disagreement game, which is played after an offer is rejected, meets certain conditions. Muthoo (1999), on whose work my analysis relies heavily, provides a slightly different version of some proofs. I extend these models by allowing players to have different discount rates, which turns out to be a nontrivial assumption. In addition to this extension,

which is of interest for theoretical reasons, my discussion of the substantive implications points to areas that are not developed (or even recognized) in much of the literature on international relations.

THE MODEL

Consider two states, $i \in \{1, 2\}$, that are bargaining over a two-way partition of a flow of benefits with size π . An agreement is a pair (x_1, x_2) , where x_i is state i 's share. The set of possible pairs is

$$\mathcal{X} = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathcal{R}^2 : x_1 + x_2 = \pi \text{ and } 0 \leq x_i \leq \pi \text{ for } i = 1, 2\}.$$

States have strictly opposed preferences and each is concerned only with the share of benefits it obtains from the agreement. A status quo distribution of benefits, (s_1, s_2) with $s_1 + s_2 = \pi$, exists prior to any agreement. Because a share x_i in a proposal identifies a distribution uniquely, I write x_1 , which is equivalent to the pair $(x_1, \pi - x_1)$, and x_2 , which is equivalent to the pair $(\pi - x_2, x_2)$.


The two players bargain according to the alternating-offers protocol. Players act in discrete time with a potentially infinite horizon, with periods indexed by $t (t = 0, 1, 2, \dots)$. Players have time preferences with constant interest rates, so the discount factors are $\delta_i \in (0, 1)$. In even-numbered periods, player 1 proposes a division $x_1 \in \mathcal{X}$ to player 2. If player 2 accepts that proposal, an agreement is reached, and players obtain their share in $(x_1, \pi - x_1)$, respectively, in every following period.

If player 2 rejects the proposal, then both states play the conflict game Γ . The description of this game is abstract. Let Γ be some game in normal form where each player i has an action space A_i . Given a profile of actions (a_1, a_2) with $a_1 \in A_1$ and $a_2 \in A_2$, the player's payoff is $r_i(a_1, a_2)$.

To stack the model against fighting, assume that (i) peace is one of the outcomes in Γ ; (ii) peace is the most preferred outcome for both players—that is, fighting is costly and brings no benefits to either player in Γ ; and (iii) peace is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of Γ . Let the peace payoff to player i be its share of the status quo distribution of benefits. If either player attacks, any outcome results in some payoff strictly less than the peace payoff. The payoffs for the worst outcome are normalized to 0. Thus, for all $a_1 \in A_1, a_2 \in A_2$, $r_i(a_1, a_2) \in [0, s_i]$, where the payoff s_i is obtainable only if neither player fights in Γ . The payoffs in the conflict game constitute per-period payoffs in the bargaining game.

After Γ finishes, time advances to the next period where player 2 makes a counteroffer, $x_2 \in \mathcal{X}$. Player 1 can either accept it, in which case the players obtain $(\pi - x_2, x_2)$, respectively, or reject it, in which case they play Γ again. The game continues until an agreement is reached. Figure 1 shows the schematic for two periods of the negotiation game. Each state's objective is to maximize its average intertemporal

⁵ This is almost identical to Fearon's (1995, 380–88) conclusion.

FIGURE 1. Two Periods of the Negotiation Game

payoff $(1 - \delta_i) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta_i^t z_{it}$, where z_{it} is state i 's per-period payoff at time t and equals its share of the benefits if an agreement is reached or r_{it} otherwise.

Since Nash equilibria may rely on noncredible threats, the solution concept I use is that of subgame perfect equilibrium SPE, which is a refinement of Nash in that it requires each player's strategy to be optimal in every proper subgame, whether or not this subgame is ever reached when players follow their strategies (Selten 1975). In other words, an equilibrium is subgame perfect if the strategies it induces are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.

EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIA: THE THREAT TO HURT

An SPE in the bargaining game is *stationary* if players always make the same proposals regardless of history and time. An SPE is *no-delay* if a player's equilibrium proposal is immediately accepted by the other player. Assume that if a player is indifferent between accepting a proposal and continuing the game, it accepts the proposal. The following proposition establishes the existence of stationary efficient equilibria.⁶

Proposition 2.1. *For each SPE of Γ , the bargaining game has a unique stationary no-delay SPE in which, for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ and $i \neq j$, state i always proposes x_i^* , accepts $x_j \leq x_j^*$, rejects $x_j > x_j^*$, and chooses its SPE strategy a_i^* in Γ , and where*

$$x_i^* = r_i^* + (1 - \delta_j)w,$$

with $r_i^* \equiv r_i(a_1^*, a_2^*)$ and $w = (\pi - r_1^* - r_2^*) / (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2) \geq 0$. The outcome in all cases is that agreement is reached immediately on the division $(x_1^*, \pi - x_1^*)$ and no fighting occurs.

Because the peace outcome is an SPE of Γ , this proposition implies that the bargaining game has at least one stationary no-delay SPE (SSPE), which is efficient: Agreement is reached immediately at $t = 0$ and no fighting occurs.

Corollary 2.2. *The status quo distribution (s_1, s_2) can be supported in SSPE.*

Although this game has efficient peaceful equilibria, they are not the only ones. Any inefficient SPE involves some playing in Γ that is not Nash. The analysis that follows is analogous to the standard "equilibrium switching" method commonly used to establish Folk Theorems for repeated games (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986).⁷ First, I show that a minimum payoff smaller than the status quo can be supported in an efficient equilibrium. Then I show how the threat to revert to the efficient SPE that yields this payoff to the deviating party can keep states from deviating in inefficient equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which costly fighting occurs for nonzero periods of time.

Because payoffs are time-invariant, all subgames that begin with a proposal by player i are structurally identical, which implies that the sets of SPE are the same. Let G_i denote a subgame that begins with a proposal by player i . Because any outcome that involves conflict is, by assumption, worse than peace, state 2 can keep state 1 strictly below its status quo payoff by fighting in Γ . We can therefore define the minimax payoffs of Γ as follows.

Definition 2.1. Let $v_1 = \min_{a_2} \max_{a_1} r_1(a_1, a_2) < s_1$ be player 1's worst payoff that player 2 can impose. Define $v_2 < s_2$ analogously.

Denote an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of Γ by σ^* and note that $v_i \leq r_i(\sigma^*) \leq \bar{v}_i$. Because peace can be produced by an SPE in Γ , I define two relevant action profiles.

Definition 2.2. Let $\sigma \equiv (a_1, a_2)$ be an action profile in Γ such that $r_1(\sigma) = v_1$. Let $\bar{\sigma} \equiv (\bar{a}_1, \bar{a}_2)$ be the SPE in Γ , such that $\bar{v}_i = s_i$.

Because any player can attack in the conflict game and fighting is costly, it follows that $v_i < s_i = \bar{v}_i$. I now turn to the main proposition of this section, which establishes that player 1's worst (respectively, player 2's best) payoff can be supported in SPE. The proof is in the Appendix.

Proposition 2.3 (Extremal SPE). *With sufficiently little discounting, the following hold.*

1. If $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$, the following strategies support an SPE in which agreement $(x_1^*, \pi - x_1^*)$ is obtained immediately.
 - (A) Player 1 always offers $x_1^* = v_1 + (1 - \delta_2)w_1$, accepts $x_2 \leq x_2^*$, and rejects $x_2 > x_2^*$, where $w_1 = (\pi - v_1 - \bar{v}_2) / (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2)$. Player 2 always offers $x_2^* = \bar{v}_2 + (1 - \delta_1)w_1$, accepts $x_1 \leq x_1^*$, and rejects $x_1 > x_1^*$. If player 1 rejects an offer, then play σ in Γ , and if player 2 rejects an offer, then play $\bar{\sigma}$. If player 2 offers $x_2 > x_2^*$, rejects

⁶ The analysis relies heavily on Muthoo 1999, which is in turn based on Busch and Wen 1995. Proposition 2.1 is an adapted version of Proposition 6.5 in Muthoo's (1999) book, and the proof requires only straightforward modifications.

⁷ It is relatively easy to obtain inefficient outcomes in repeated games. The model of war as a bargaining process, however, is not a repeated game because agreement ends it, and the standard Folk Theorems therefore do not apply.

$x_1 \leq x_1^*$, or plays differently in Γ , then switch to phase B.

(B) Play the SSPE from Corollary 2.2.

2. If $\delta_1 \leq \delta_2$, the following strategies support an SPE in which agreement is obtained only in G_2 .

(A) Player 1 always makes nonserious offers (e.g., $x_1^* = \pi$), accepts $x_2 \leq x_2^*$, and rejects $x_2 > x_2^*$. Player 2 always offers $x_2^* = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\pi - v_1 + \delta_1 v_2)$, accepts $x_1 \leq \bar{x}_1 = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1 v_1)$, and rejects $x_1 > \bar{x}_1$. If player 1 rejects an offer, then play σ in Γ , and if player 2 rejects an offer, then play $\bar{\sigma}$. If player 2 offers $x_2 > x_2^*$, rejects $x_1 \leq \bar{x}_1$, or plays differently in Γ , then switch to phase B.

(B) Play the SSPE from Corollary 2.2.

In a Type I equilibrium from Proposition 2.3, when δ_2 becomes sufficiently high, the equilibrium payoff converges to v_1 , which is the smallest payoff from Γ . The strategies do not support an equilibrium if $\delta_1 < \delta_2$. However, notice that when $\delta_1 = \delta_2$ both equilibria are payoff-equivalent, implying that in a Type II equilibrium and with sufficiently high δ_1 , the payoff is arbitrarily close to the payoff from a Type I equilibrium.

Proposition 2.3 highlights two important features of the bargaining model. First, regardless of the relationship of the two discount factors, it is possible to sustain in equilibrium payoffs that are strictly smaller than the peaceful SSPE from Corollary 2.2. This is an essential result because the threat to revert to an extremal SPE (ESPE) with the low payoff is sufficient to support fighting in equilibrium, as the next section demonstrates. Second, this proposition illustrates that the common assumption of equal discount factors is not harmless. Although intuitively one should expect the results to depend on how the two players value the future, and especially on whether their valuations diverge, bargaining models often assume away the difference. The richness of this model, however, introduces a level of complexity that must somehow be reduced. I now examine the implications of the two types of extremal SPE identified by Proposition 2.3 and how a player's smallest payoff differs between them.

INEFFICIENT EQUILIBRIA: THE FEAR OF SETTLEMENT

Consider player 1's smallest and largest sustainable payoffs. If $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$, then, using Type I ESPE, the smallest payoff obtained immediately in a subgame beginning with player 1's offer is

$$v_1 + \frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}(\pi - v_1 - \bar{v}_2) = v_1 + \frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}(\bar{v}_1 - v_1).$$

Because player 2's smallest payoff that can be supported by a Type II ESPE is $(1 + \delta_2)^{-1}(\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2 v_2)$, the largest payoff that player 1 can get is

$$\pi - \frac{\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2 v_2}{1 + \delta_2} = \bar{v}_1 + \frac{\delta_2(\bar{v}_2 - v_2)}{1 + \delta_2}.$$

If $\delta_1 < \delta_2$, then, using Type II ESPE, the smallest payoff obtained in games beginning with player 1's offer is

$$(1 - \delta_1)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1(\pi - x_2^*) = \frac{\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1 v_1}{1 + \delta_1}.$$

Note that the payoff includes the first term because agreement is obtained only in the subgame that begins with player 2's offer. Because player 2's smallest payoff that can be supported by a Type I ESPE is $v_2 + (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2)^{-1}(1 - \delta_1)(\bar{v}_2 - v_2)$, the largest payoff that player 1 can get is

$$\pi - v_2 - \frac{(1 - \delta_1)(\bar{v}_2 - v_2)}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2} = \bar{v}_1 + \frac{\delta_1(1 - \delta_2)}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}(\bar{v}_2 - v_2).$$

To condense these results to manageable definitions, let player 1's minimum payoff that can be sustained in ESPE be

$$\underline{s} = \begin{cases} v_1 + (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2)^{-1}(1 - \delta_2)(\bar{v}_1 - v_1) & \text{if } \delta_1 \geq \delta_2, \\ (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1 v_1) & \text{if } \delta_1 < \delta_2, \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

and let player 1's maximum payoff that can be sustained in ESPE be

$$\bar{s} = \begin{cases} \bar{v}_1 + (1 + \delta_2)^{-1}\delta_2(\bar{v}_2 - v_2) & \text{if } \delta_1 \geq \delta_2, \\ \bar{v}_1 + (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2)^{-1}\delta_1(1 - \delta_2)(\bar{v}_2 - v_2) & \text{if } \delta_1 < \delta_2. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Claim 3.1. $\underline{s} < \bar{s}$ for all $\delta_1, \delta_2 \in (0, 1)$.

Proof. Consider the case $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$. Because for any $\delta_1 < 1$, $\alpha \equiv (1 - \delta_1 \delta_2)^{-1}(1 - \delta_2) < 1$, it follows that $\alpha \bar{v}_1 + (1 - \alpha)v_1 < \bar{v}_1$, where the inequality follows from $\bar{v}_1 > v_1$. Thus, $\underline{s} < \bar{v}_1$ for all $\delta_1 < 1$. Moreover, $\bar{s} > \bar{v}_1$ from (2) because the second term is positive. Therefore, $\underline{s} < \bar{s}$, as required.

Consider now the case $\delta_1 < \delta_2$. Because $\underline{s} < \bar{v}_1$ for any $\delta_1 > 0$, and $\bar{s} > \bar{v}_1$ for any $\delta_2 < 1$, the result is established. \square

With these results, I now state the principal result.

Proposition 3.1 (Inefficient SPE). For any distribution of benefits $s \in (\underline{s}, \bar{s})$, some period $\tau > 0$, and sufficiently little discounting, equilibria of the following type exist: In all periods $t = (0, 1, \dots, \tau - 1)$, both players make nonserious offers, reject all proposals, and fight in Γ . In period τ , they agree on the distribution $(s, \pi - s)$. If either player deviates, then immediately play the ESPE from Proposition 2.3 that supports that player's smallest payoff.

Proof. Recall that the payoff from each player's worst outcome from fighting is normalized to 0. If player 1 follows the proposed strategy, then its payoff is at least $\delta_1^\tau s$. If it deviates in some $t < \tau$, then its payoff is at most $(1 - \delta_1^t)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1^t \underline{s}$, which in the limit, as $\delta_1 \rightarrow 1$, converges to $\underline{s} < s$. Thus, for sufficiently high δ_1 , deviation is not profitable. The proof for player 2 is equivalent, *mutatis mutandis*. \square

Although many agreements would be Pareto-improving (such as s reached in periods prior to τ),

these settlements cannot be had because of the way players respond to deviations. It is the threat to revert to an efficient SPE, which yields the potential deviator its worst possible payoff, that sustains these inefficient equilibria. The result does not disappear when the time between periods becomes arbitrarily small, as is usually the case with bargaining models. This is because shortening the periods between offers not only makes alternation faster, but also decreases the costs that players suffer due to fighting. Players still fight because not doing so means obtaining a worse settlement. There is no incomplete information in the model, so fighting cannot serve as a signal to separate types. Thus, even with quickly alternating offers, equilibria exist with delays in reaching an agreement. This inefficiency is contrary to the so-called Coase (1972) Conjecture in economics, which posits that even with incomplete information the ability to alternate offers quickly should produce agreements without costly delay.

It is worth noting that there are other equilibria in which fighting is sporadic, and they are all supported by similar strategies. As Busch and Wen (1995) note, strategic interaction outside the bargaining process will generally generate multiple equilibria. This indeterminacy makes empirical testing difficult. However, as my purposes are to demonstrate a logical result and point to a mechanism that is neglected in explanations of conflict, this is no great handicap.

DISCUSSION

The range of distributions supportable in an inefficient SPE varies with the costs of fighting. From equation (1), it is evident that \bar{s} is increasing in player 1's minimax payoff v_1 . Thus, when the cost of fighting decreases, so that player 1 can guarantee itself a higher payoff during conflict, the lower bound on possible agreements increases, improving player 1's worst-case payoff. This result is hardly surprising and is consistent with findings supporting the conclusion that decreasing the costs of fighting improves a state's bargaining position.

From equation (2), the upper bound on possible agreements is decreasing in v_2 . In other words, as player 2's minimax payoff increases, player 1's best payoff decreases. Because the minimax payoff is by definition the worst payoff that player 1 can impose on player 2, it follows that the capacity to impose costs on its opponent improves player 1's bargaining position by expanding the upper bound on the range of agreements.

This highlights an important aspect of conflict: The ability to bear costs associated with the opponent's effort to inflict pain influences how much a state can be expected to give up in a bargain. The capacity to inflict pain on the opponent, determined by the ability to bear costs associated with this effort, influences how much a state can demand in a bargain. Thus, the two types of costs jointly determine the bargaining range that opens up during fighting.

The capacity to hold the enemy to its smallest (minimax) payoff and the magnitude of costs a state must pay when the enemy is holding it to its smallest (minimax)

payoff emerge as central elements in the explanation for war. The bargaining strategies that depend on fighting behavior and these costs can result in equilibria that may explain many puzzling cases, such as those where states have given up fighting after suffering relatively minor casualties or continued fighting in the face of mounting losses.

For example, in 1940 the French surrendered Paris to Germany after suffering about 90,000 dead and 250,000 wounded. This was the same nation that had defended the fortress of Verdun in 1916 at the cost of about 400,000 casualties against the same enemy (Keegan 1999, esp. 71–137). The crucial difference was that, unlike its effect in the First World War, the German onslaught in the Second managed to destroy the organizational capacity of the French high command and damaged beyond repair the French ability to inflict substantial losses on the Germans (May 2000).

Facing circumstances in which fighting is hopeless because it cannot induce the other side to accept a settlement makes surrender a rational choice. On the other hand, the continued resistance of North Vietnam despite the heavy toll extracted by the United States can also be explained by the ability of North Vietnam to cause enough damage to induce their opponent to withdraw. Similarly, the Afghani rebels could outlast the Soviet occupational forces despite heavy casualties for essentially the same reasons, as demonstrated by the immediate damaging effect of Gorbachev's *glasnost* on the Russian popular support for the war.

Continuing with the French surrender, it is instructive to note that the French government retained some residual power to inflict costs on the Germans. It could choose to flee to Algiers and continue to direct the war from there, a prospect Hitler recognized and wanted to avoid. On one hand, the Germans had devastated the French military to the point where France could not expect to inflict enough pain on the Third Reich to secure more benefits (the upper bound on the possible agreement was very low). On the other, the residual capacity to fight meant that the Germans could have been made to pay more unless they offered something (the lower bound on agreements was higher than zero).

This concession turned out to be the French fleet, which the Germans promised not to appropriate for wartime use. Perhaps surprisingly, this was the rare promise that Hitler kept. How important this concession was is illustrated by Britain's reaction to the deal. Churchill was so apprehensive that the Germans would use the captured fleet in their war on the isle nation that, after the French refused either to scuttle it or to put it to a British port, he ordered it bombed, which the Royal Air Force promptly did.

The process of war can be usefully viewed as a contest, in which both sides attempt to reduce the opponent's ability to impose costs on them while simultaneously trying to impose costs on the opponent, thereby improving their own bargaining position. Although destroying personnel and matériel may be conducive to diminishing state capacity to fight, it is not necessarily the optimal way of doing so. If a state is weak and/or cannot gain access to the opponent's homeland,

its recourse may be to attempt outlasting the enemy. No country, even the richest, can sustain an indefinite involvement in war. Therefore, if a state can deny the opponent the power to hurt and simultaneously inflict enough damage to cause the enemy to expand its economic and troop involvement, then even a weaker state has good chances of success.

Three central implications emerge from this analysis. First, *states may fight as long as they believe that seeking peace prematurely means accepting an unpalatable settlement*. I should emphasize that in the model presented here, it is not the threat to use force, but the *realization* of the power to hurt, or the *compellent* use of force, that is important (Art 1980). As Schelling (1966, 3) notes, "Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it." However, it is not that states are unsure about each other's power (after all, this is a model of complete information). Rather, it is their commitment to particular strategies that produces the unhappy outcome. As in the familiar Prisoner's Dilemma, the strategies that result in the bad outcome are best responses to each other, so states cannot improve the outcome by deviating and, for example, not fighting. The problem is precisely the existence of efficient, but less preferable, bargains and the fact that if a state does not fight, then it will have to accept a diplomatic solution it likes least.

The rationale for forming such expectations empirically can be justified on the basis of a limited information argument that involves signaling behavior. Standard arguments from signaling models demonstrate that players can use costly actions to signal privately known parameters, such as cost and resolve, to other players. In such an environment, states can conceivably prolong the fight to convince their opponents about privately held information. In particular, they might choose to fight when they believe that if they quit to make an offer instead, their opponent would interpret this as a revelation of weakness and exploit it by demanding more. A logic roughly analogous to this operates in the full information model, the only difference being that states know exactly what worse bargain they will have to accept if they deviate from the fighting strategy. It is worth noting that this is one possible way to arrive at such strategies. Others, such as public opinion and the anticipation of the effect of this opinion, can also be invoked.

Second, *the diminished or eliminated capacity to hurt the enemy is a major reason to terminate war and seek a negotiated settlement*. This is a far cry from conventional notions of victory and defeat because it may not involve the complete destruction of the opponent, only of its ability to retaliate. Ho Chi Minh stated, "You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and I will win." The key in this statement is not, as usually interpreted, the Vietnamese willingness to suffer, although this undoubtedly played a role (Rosen 1972).⁸ Rather, it is their ability to kill one

American soldier even if it took 10 Vietnamese to do so. The Vietnamese correctly surmised that this power to hurt would eventually compel the United States to withdraw. It is doubtful that such a policy would have succeeded had the United States been able to limit the number of casualties and expenses.

Schelling (1966) observed that "the power to hurt [...] is a kind of bargaining power." Although as a rule formal models of conflict feature the costs of war as an explanatory variable, and despite the prominent role of that variable in solutions, it is always state ability to *bear* costs that is discussed, but not state capacity to *impose* costs on others. The costs associated with these actions are analytically distinct and not necessarily related in a straightforward manner.

Third, *because the power to hurt is a kind of bargaining power, the denial of such power undermines the bargaining position of the opponent*. It is partially for these reasons that the NATO aerial attacks on Kosovo could succeed. Even the most determined opponent would yield if there were no way to hurt the enemy and thus influence the outcome of negotiations. In some respects, this argument also shows why a ground invasion would have been ill advised: The mountainous terrain, very much unlike the desert in the Persian Gulf, would not have allowed the easy application of NATO military superiority. There can be no question about the eventual outcome of such an engagement, but it is quite possible that mounting casualties might have tempted the United States into a more accommodating position. Stam (1999) estimates that the probability of success of a ground invasion was 49% and argues that this is why it was not attempted. I find the argument doubtful. Even if the probability of success were 100%, a ground invasion would have entailed significant casualties and, thus, given Belgrade bargaining power. Air strikes were ideal precisely because they denied Milosevic the power to hurt NATO forces and, thus, maneuver Yugoslavia into a better position at the negotiation table. This also illustrates why Saddam Hussein's plan "to draw the Coalition into a premature ground offensive in the hope that heavy casualties would lead Western publics to demand an early ceasefire" could not work (Pape 1996, 357).

These three points are interconnected insofar as fighting is a way to influence the final outcome, but as such, it depends on the power to hurt the opponent. It is useful to explore several historical cases in some detail to see how this logic operated in causing the termination of war and in influencing the form of settlements. These cases are only illustrations and serve as checks on the plausibility of the arguments developed here.

First, the Japanese decision to surrender in August 1945 is shown to have arisen, at least in part, from the realization that the military was unable to inflict sufficient damage on the U.S. forces in a land invasion. Second, I also examine the Vietnam War, showing that because both sides expected to have to accept worse settlements should they stop fighting, they continued the costly conflict until the United States was forced to quit due to domestic pressure (the threat of reversion to an efficient but unpalatable agreement). These cases

⁸ Rosen incorrectly implies "American" soldiers when Ho had referred to the French.

illuminate certain features of the model and are useful examples of how the causal logic might work in practice. I do not claim that the model provides a complete explanation, only that it reveals a mechanism and a relationship that are often neglected.

Japan's Surrender in 1945

Japan's decision to surrender in 1945 provides a good example of the complex interaction between the (loss of) power to hurt and the expectations for a better settlement.⁹ Significantly, at the time of surrender Japan still had over 2 million men armed and ready to fight. Neither the incendiary raids on the major cities nor the nuclear attacks had undermined morale to any perceptible degree.¹⁰ Moreover, despite the Allied success in "Operation Iceberg," which captured Okinawa, the major islands still remained in Japanese hands. The unconditional¹¹ surrender on August 15 is thus a rare instance of a nation capitulating before most of its home territory had been conquered and while an army still existed that could potentially defend it.

Foreign Minister Togo began the peace overtures in late spring through the Japanese Moscow ambassador by trying to get the Soviets to mediate with the Allies. Although Stalin was not forthcoming with the information, the United States was aware of the approach. However, even after the direct message of the July 12 cable, which stated the Emperor's desire to end the war, no positive steps were taken in that direction. Togo urged the continuation of the war in an effort to improve the diplomatic situation (Butow 1954, 77–78).

Japan was in a precarious position by the early summer. Admiral Suzuki had become Prime Minister on April 6, but his attempts to find a way to conclude the war did not have enough support in the cabinet where, despite the bitter divisions, the hawks still held the upper hand. It is arguable that it may have been possible to bring about an earlier surrender through a more assertive action, but the undisputed fact remains that War Minister Anami and the Army Chief of Staff Umezu were formidable opponents very much opposed to cessation of hostilities. On June 6, the document entitled "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of War" was introduced in the Supreme Council. It flatly called for continuation of fighting in the homeland, stating that this was the only way to preserve the nation. Few believed that Japan could turn the tide of Allied victory, but many thought that an operational success would provide a better basis to negotiate a settlement. In fact, this possibility "became

a key point in the military's demand to continue the war through an Allied invasion of the home islands" (Butow 1954, 93–96).

This policy stemmed from the conviction that despite enormous expected Japanese losses, the Allies would also be badly hurt (Kennedy 1983, 193). Thus, the idea was not to defeat U.S. forces militarily (such a thing was "beyond all expectation," as General Miyazaki admitted), but to "inflict tremendous losses, forcing [the enemy] to realize the strong fighting spirit of the Japanese Army and people [and thus] bring about the termination of hostilities on comparatively favorable terms."¹² The success of this strategy clearly depended on the ability of the Army to inflict the necessary amount of damage.

The illusory nature of this hope was revealed by two events: The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6 and the Soviet declaration of war on August 9 (intercepted at dawn). The militarists, who had refused to convene the Supreme Council after the destruction of Hiroshima when Togo and Suzuki wanted to meet urgently (Asada 1998, 488), now agreed to discuss whether Japan should accept the Potsdam declaration.¹³ Even then Umezu claimed that "we would be able to inflict extremely heavy damage on the enemy," but Togo clearly did not believe it, and it is doubtful that the General believed it himself (Brooks 1968, 62–63). Upon hearing the news about the debacle of the Manchurian army, Suzuki remarked, "Is the Kwantung army that weak? Then the game is up" (Brooks 1968, 17). The unexpected but complete collapse of what was supposed to be the elite Japanese fighting force finally convinced even the staunchest militarists that their hopes of inflicting sufficient casualties in a ground invasion of the main islands were wishful thinking.

It is worth noting that the timing of this meeting undermines the standard claim that the nuclear bomb was the main factor in the Japanese decision to surrender. The people who were seeking ways to terminate the war simply used it as another reason that the Army's plan was impossible to implement. The militarists, on the other hand, either refused to believe the news or simply ignored it. While the Council was debating whether the United States had more than one bomb at its disposal, the news of Nagasaki arrived, enhancing further the claims of the peace party. However, "the news of the Nagasaki bombing notwithstanding, a heated argument continued" (Asada 1998, 492) and it required two more meetings for the decision to be accepted. Anami claimed that "the appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of war. . . . We are confident about a decisive homeland battle against American forces" but then went on to admit that "given the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry, there is no chance of winning on the

⁹ For a recent authoritative discussion, see Sigal 1988. Two other classic studies are Brooks 1968 and Butow 1954. For an analysis of the factors that contributed to the decision to surrender and an evaluation of competing explanations, see Pape 1996. For an argument about the psychological impact of the atomic bomb, see Asada 1998.

¹⁰ Although there was some absenteeism from work due to massive flight from the cities, as a whole industrial workers turned up at about the same rate as in the United States (Pape 1996, 129–30).

¹¹ The omission of the Emperor's fate from the Potsdam Declaration has been routinely interpreted as the Allies implicitly agreeing to his retention.

¹² Lieutenant General Arisue. His and Miyazaki's statements are in Sigal 1988, 228.

¹³ The atomic bomb moved Emperor Hirohito toward decisive action but the army still would not budge, claiming that Hiroshima had been destroyed not by a nuclear weapon but by a "conventional bomb with extraordinary destructive power" (Asada 1998, 485).

basis of mathematical calculation" (finally concluding that a fanatical and hopeless fight to save the Yamato race was the only remaining option) (Asada 1998, 494). Thus, despite the importance of the atomic bomb argument, it was the Soviet intervention, which the Japanese had anticipated with trepidation ever since Stalin repudiated the prewar nonaggression pact, that precipitated the crucial reevaluation of the situation.¹⁴

Despite claims to the contrary, credible estimates of the number of U.S. casualties for an invasion of Kyushu, one of the home islands, range between 63,000 and 100,000.¹⁵ Some apprehensiveness was caused by the loss in the Okinawa campaign, which took the heaviest toll of the war in the Pacific, and it was used as an early excuse for the atomic bomb (especially by an euphoric Churchill, who called it "a miracle of deliverance"). However, the firm stand that the Allies took with respect to Japanese demands to negotiate terms reveals that they were prepared to bear this cost to secure unconditional surrender.

Thus, although a party sought the termination of war early on, its efforts were thwarted by the hardliners, who believed that Japan had sufficient capability to defend the home islands. Much of Japanese intransigence in the face of overwhelming odds depended on the belief in their remaining power to hurt the United States sufficiently to soften the terms of surrender. As Kecskemeti (1958) points out, the residual capacity to impose costs on the victor makes negotiation desirable by both sides before the ultimate showdown. In August 1945, the Japanese military finally seems to have realized that estimates of their ability to inflict pain on the United States were fantastically exaggerated. The entry of the USSR into the war and the consequent collapse of the vaunted Kwantung Army were perhaps the momentous events that revealed the hollow hopes of the "hawks." This provided enough ammunition for peace-seekers to overcome the opposition to unconditional surrender and finally end the war.

This case illustrates the logic of fighting to impose costs to obtain a better settlement even when the prospects of military victory are dim. While the formal model shows why such a plan can work, the complete information requirement postulates that players are actually able to engage in costly fighting. The Japanese

abandoned the strategy when they realized that they did not have the ability to inflict enough pain on the Allies. The model cannot account for this event, but it illuminates the strategic thinking that led first to the decision to stand firm and then to the reason why it was abandoned. The next case is one where the strategy did work as planned.

The Vietnam War

Recall that the inefficient (fighting) equilibrium is supported by strategies that require a deviating player to "suffer" the worst acceptable agreement. The Vietnam War illustrates a case in which both sides believed that ending hostilities early would give the other an undue negotiating advantage. The leitmotif of the engagement under Johnson was that neither side made serious attempts to begin negotiations (recall that in the inefficient equilibrium, both sides make nonserious offers throughout the war). Both the United States and North Vietnam wanted to secure enough battlefield success to ensure a favorable outcome of diplomacy. However, the Jason Study indicated as early as 1966 that bombing had no measurable impact on the agricultural economy of North Vietnam and was unlikely to succeed in breaking Vietnamese morale. The Enthoven report of 1967 was even more frank in concluding that the Vietnamese strategy was to keep their losses at "a level low enough to be sustained indefinitely, but high enough to tempt us to increase our forces to the point of U.S. public rejection of the war" (Karnow 1983, 519).

General Giap, the principal architect of the 1968 Tet offensive, had a long-range strategy whose principal objective "was to continue to bleed the Americans until they agreed to a settlement that satisfied the Hanoi regime" (Karnow 1983, 549). The U.S. anti-war movement had played only a secondary role in Giap's planning but, once discovered, was exploited to the full as an additional means to impose costs on the United States. Giap remarked in the 1990s that he wanted to demonstrate "that if Vietnamese blood was being spilled, so was American blood [...] and more and more Americans renounced the war" (Karnow 1983, 557).

As Pape (1996, 177–94) concluded, the failure of Rolling Thunder's (1965–68) alternation among a Schelling strategy of increasing risk to Hanoi's industrial base, a denial by interdiction, and a Douhet plan that focused on increasing current costs was due simply to North Vietnam's low vulnerability to these types of coercion strategies. It was not until 1972, when Hanoi switched to conventional warfare (which was militarily vulnerable to U.S. bombing), that coercive air power could compel them to return to the negotiating table. However, even then Kissinger's first attempt failed when South Vietnam's Thieu refused to sign the agreement. The North Vietnamese used this as a pretext to back out of negotiations, which precipitated Nixon's "Christmas" bombing (Linebacker II) to break the deadlock and the attempt to blackmail a better agreement.

¹⁴ Kecskemeti (1958) reaches the same conclusion about the impact of Stalin's declaration, but for different reasons. He contends that the Soviet entry in the war dispelled the last illusions the Japanese had of using Stalin as a mediator for extracting better terms from the Americans and thereby forced them to accept whatever was being offered. This seems to require a whole lot of unwarranted hoping by the Japanese high command, especially since Stalin had refused to renew the prewar nonaggression pact earlier in the year, had promised to enter the Pacific War several months after concluding the war in Europe, and could be expected to want to take part in the division of the spoils in Asia.

¹⁵ There is a common belief that the dogged defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa caused the United States to update its beliefs about the costs of invasion, which in turn precipitated the use of the atomic bombs (Giangreco 1997; MacEachin 1998). However, as the military commanders argued, complete victory was a foregone conclusion (Miles 1985). The military buildup on Kyushu may have altered the initial cost estimates and may even have prevented operation Olympic in favor of some alternative against northern Honshu (Bernstein 1999).

The Communists considered battlefield victories the "key factor 'for the attainment of a political settlement'" and believed that they could force the United States out by breaking its ties with the Saigon regime and exploiting the antiwar movement. Nixon was convinced that quitting unconditionally would spell the end of Saigon and perhaps his own reputation and that it would damage the U.S. international position. Despite Nixon's claims that the United States had "finally achieved peace with honor," the Paris treaty of 1973 was an admission of defeat. Although the North Vietnamese demand for a coalition government was dropped, the agreement allowed their troops to remain in the South and virtually guaranteed the overthrow of Saigon that occurred two years later.

The U.S. administration firmly believed that it could not quit the war because leaving Communist aggression unchecked would encourage similar movements elsewhere. It also worried about U.S. political standing in the international arena, especially with regard to its European allies (Strong 1992, 93–94). However, relentless bombing could not coerce Hanoi into negotiations, and the domestic situation was hardly favorable for a full-scale land invasion. Saigon could not exist without U.S. support, Vietnamization had failed, and the war had no end in sight. The ability of the United States to hurt North Vietnam was severely limited by the guerilla tactics of the Viet Cong, the agricultural economy (which, unlike industrialized economies, cannot be hurt by destroying identifiable objects), the unsophisticated (and easily repairable) infrastructure, the constant influx of supplies from the USSR and China, and the politically motivated limitations placed upon the military.¹⁶

On the other hand, North Vietnam's power to hurt the United States increased with time and the extent of U.S. involvement in the war. The war was costly, in both economic and humanitarian terms. The fearsome combination of rising taxes and a climbing death toll was the nightmare of the administration, which was also harangued by the antiwar demonstrators. Without prospects of winning or the means to coerce Hanoi, the United States could do little more than withdraw. Even though both sides believed that quitting early would give undue advantage to the enemy, the power to hurt rested with North Vietnam, and so did the eventual settlement.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that it is misleading to regard war as a costly lottery over exogenously fixed outcomes. After noting that both practitioners of war and scholars have posited that war is a kind of bargaining process, I constructed a stylized model that incorporates the simultaneous occurrence of negotiation and fighting to allow players to condition their strategies on their past behavior. I completely stacked the model against

conflict by assuming that peace can be supported in equilibrium and that fighting brings only costs and no benefits to both sides.

Despite these fairly generous assumptions about peace, inefficient fighting can occur in equilibrium and there may be a delay in reaching an agreement. This result does not require incomplete information and does not depend on any of the mechanisms from standard rationalist explanations of war. Instead, war becomes possible when states utilize conditional strategies that make war aims dependent on actions in the model.

The existence of these inefficient equilibria depends on two types of costs of war. The first is the cost that a state can be made to pay when its opponent tries to hurt it. The second is the cost that a state must pay to hurt its opponent. The power to hurt, which turns on the relative magnitude of these costs, and the conditional strategies open up a bargaining range that can produce fighting in equilibrium under complete information.

The power to hurt should not be treated in simple military terms. Throughout Napoleon's wars, England, which kept raising and resurrecting coalition after coalition against him, was his principal enemy (Fuller 1961, 55–56). Without a means of striking at the island itself, Napoleon resolved to strangle it economically, fully aware that if he could hurt British exports, he would undermine their credit and their ability to pay for the wars against him. The Continental System was designed for precisely that purpose. Lacking a capability to hurt his main enemy through direct military engagement, Napoleon correctly inferred that his troubles would never be over unless he found another way of doing so: The System was the weapon to do it. Thus, the power to hurt can take many forms, from military victory, to economic coercion, and humanitarian losses.

The idea that the power to hurt may not translate directly into factors commonly used to measure force, such as military capabilities, geopolitical configurations, economic resources, and features of the political system, provides further clues as to why costly conflict may erupt between sides with severe power asymmetries (e.g., the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians). These conclusions also put in doubt common statistical models of war, which rely on aggregate military and economic capabilities of states. As demonstrated by the empirical cases, these rough indicators may be completely wrong in predicting outcomes. The power to hurt can take many forms.

APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 2.3

This establishes the result for the extremal SPE that support player 1's worst payoff. The result for player 2 follows from a symmetric argument. The optimality of phase B in both cases follows from Proposition 2.1.

Consider player 1's strategy in Γ . Suppose player 1 has rejected an offer. Given that player 2 is minimaxing, player 1 cannot profitably deviate. Suppose player 2 has rejected an offer. Since next period 2 offers $\pi - x_2^*$ regardless of 1's actions in Γ , where the proposed strategy yields the highest

¹⁶ George Ball's memo to Johnson (July 1, 1965) is fairly incisive with respect to the prospects of victory and the costs of alternative outcomes. Excerpts are given in Strong 1992, 108–9.

payoff of \bar{v}_1 there, no deviation is profitable. Thus, the rule for player 1's actions in Γ is optimal.

Case 1: $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$. Consider player 1's strategy in G_1 . Following the proposal rule yields x_1^* . Player 1 will not deviate by offering $x_1 < x_1^*$ because player 2 accepts such offers. Suppose player 1 deviates with $x_1 > x_1^*$, which player 2 rejects. Player 1's payoff from such deviation is $(1 - \delta_1)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1(\pi - x_2^*) \leq \bar{v}_1 + (1 - \delta_2)w_1 = x_1^*$. Because this inequality holds when $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$, such deviation is not profitable. Thus, the proposal rule is optimal.

Consider player 1's strategy in G_2 . Suppose player 1 responds to some $x_2 < x_2^*$ by deviating and rejecting. Its payoff will be $(1 - \delta_1)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1 x_1^* = \pi - x_2^* < \pi - x_2$ and, hence, not profitable. Suppose now player 1 has to respond to some $x_2 > x_2^*$, in which case the game switches to phase B. If player 1 follows the proposed strategy, the payoff is at least $(1 - \delta_1)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1[\bar{v}_1 + (1 - \delta_2)w_1] = \pi - x_2^* > \pi - x_2$. Hence, player 1 cannot profitably deviate by accepting. Thus, the acceptance rule is optimal.

Since this exhausts all possible subgames, the proposed strategy for player 1 is a best response to player 2's strategy.

Consider player 2's strategy in Γ . If it follows the proposed strategy, the payoff in the next period is $\min\{x_2^*, \pi - x_1^*\} = \pi - x_1^*$. Therefore, 2's payoff from following the strategy is at least

$$(1 - \delta_2)r_2(\underline{v}) + \delta_2 \left[\bar{v}_2 + \frac{\delta_2(1 - \delta_1)}{1 - \delta_1\delta_2}(\pi - \bar{v}_1 - \bar{v}_2) \right]. \quad (3)$$

If player 2 deviates, then the game switches to phase B, where player 2's payoff is s_2 . Hence, the deviation payoff is at most \bar{v}_2 . As $\delta_2 \rightarrow 1$, the expression in (3) converges to $\pi - \bar{v}_1 > \pi - \bar{v}_1 = \bar{v}_2$. Therefore, for each δ_1 sufficiently high, there exists $\delta_2' \leq \delta_1$ such that for all $\delta_2 \in [\delta_2', \delta_1]$ deviation is not profitable. Thus, the rule for play in Γ is optimal.

Consider player 2's strategy in G_2 . If player 2 follows the proposed strategy, the payoff is x_2^* . Player 2 will not deviate by offering $x_2 < x_2^*$ because player 1 accepts all such offers. Suppose player 2 deviates and offers some $x_2 > x_2^*$. Player 1 always rejects such proposals and the game switches to phase B. Player 2's payoff from such deviation is at most

$$(1 - \delta_2)r_2(\underline{v}) + \delta_2 s_2 < \bar{v}_2, \quad (4)$$

where the inequality follows from $r_2(\underline{v}) < \bar{v}_2$. Since x_2^* is strictly greater than (3), it follows that there exists some $\delta_2'' \in (0, 1)$ such that for all $\delta_2 \in (\delta_2'', 1)$, x_2^* is strictly greater than (4). Hence, such deviation is not profitable. Taking $\delta_2 = \max\{\delta_2', \delta_2''\}$ yields the discount factor for the proposition. Thus, the proposal rule is optimal.

Consider player 2's strategy in G_1 . Suppose player 1 offers some $x_1 < x_1^*$. If player 2 follows the proposed strategy and accepts, the payoff is

$$\bar{v}_2 + \frac{\delta_2(1 - \delta_1)}{1 - \delta_1\delta_2}(\pi - \bar{v}_1 - \bar{v}_2). \quad (5)$$

If it deviates and rejects, the game switches to phase B, and its best payoff is \bar{v}_2 , which is smaller than (5) and, therefore, strictly smaller than $\pi - x_1$. Hence, such deviation is not profitable. Suppose that now player 1 offers some $x_1 > x_1^*$. If player 2 follows the proposed strategy and rejects, the payoff is $\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2(1 - \delta_1)w_1 > \pi - x_1$, where the last term is the (unprofitable) deviation payoff from accepting. Thus, the acceptance rule is optimal.

Since this exhausts all possible subgames, the proposed strategy for player 2 is a best response to player 1's strategy. Therefore, the strategies stated in the proposition indeed constitute an SPE of the bargaining game.

Case 2: $\delta_1 \leq \delta_2$. Consider player 1's strategy in G_1 . Given player 2's strategy, if player 1 always makes nonserious offers and rejects all proposals, then it can guarantee a payoff of \bar{v}_1 in any period, which begins with its offer, and \bar{v}_1 in any period, which begins with player 2's offer. Thus, player 1 can get at least $(1 - \delta_1)(\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1^2\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1^3\bar{v}_1 + \dots) = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_1) = \bar{v}_1$. Since player 2 only accepts $x_1 \leq \bar{v}_1$, player 1 cannot improve its payoff from making a proposal that will be accepted. Therefore, player 1's strategy of making a nonserious offer is optimal.

Consider player 1's strategy in G_2 . Suppose player 2 offers $x_2 \leq x_2^*$. Since it is not the case that $x_2^* < (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\pi - \bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_2)$, it cannot be profitable for player 1 to deviate and reject. Suppose player 2 offers $x_2 > x_2^*$, in which case the game switches to phase B. If player 1 deviates and accepts, the payoff is $\pi - x_2 < \pi - x_2^* = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_1) \leq (1 - \delta_1)\bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_1$, and so such deviation is not profitable. Therefore, the acceptance rule is optimal.

Since this exhausts all possible subgames, the proposed strategy for player 1 is a best response to player 2's strategy. I now show that player 2's strategy is also optimal.

Consider player 2's strategy in Γ . If it deviates, the game switches to phase B, so the maximum payoff is $(1 - \delta_2)\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2\bar{v}_2 = \bar{v}_2$. If player 2 follows the proposed strategy, then the payoff is at least $(1 - \delta_2)r_2(\underline{v}) + \delta_2[(1 - \delta_2)\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2x_2^*]$. As $\delta_2 \rightarrow 1$, this converges to $x_2^* > \bar{v}_2$. Therefore, there exists $\delta_2' \in (0, 1)$ such that for all $\delta_2 \in (\delta_2', 1)$, deviation is not profitable. Thus, the rule for play in Γ is optimal.

Consider player 2's strategy in G_1 . Since player 1 never offers $x_1 < \bar{v}_1$, player 2 must decide whether to reject some $x_1 \geq \bar{v}_1$. Because $\delta_1 \leq \delta_2$, it follows that it is not the case that $\pi - \bar{v}_1 > (1 - \delta_2)\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2x_2^*$, and so player 2 cannot profitably deviate by accepting the offer. Suppose that now player 1 offers some $x_1 \leq \bar{v}_1$. If player 2 follows the proposed strategy and accepts, the payoff is

$$\begin{aligned} \pi - x_1 &\geq \pi - \bar{v}_1 = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}[\bar{v}_2 + \delta_1(\pi - \bar{v}_1)] \\ &> (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\bar{v}_2 + \delta_1\bar{v}_2) = \bar{v}_2. \end{aligned}$$

If it deviates and rejects, then the game switches to phase B, where the payoff is \bar{v}_2 . Hence, the largest deviation payoff is $(1 - \delta_2)\bar{v}_2 + \delta_2\bar{v}_2 = \bar{v}_2$, which is not profitable. Thus, the acceptance rule is optimal.

Consider player 2's strategy in G_2 . If it follows the proposed strategy, the payoff is x_2^* . Deviation by offering $x_2 < x_2^*$ is not profitable because player 1 accepts all such offers. Suppose player 2 deviates by offering $x_2 > x_2^*$, which player 1 always rejects. Since the game switches to phase B, the payoff then is $(1 - \delta_2)r_2(\underline{v}) + \delta_2\bar{v}_2 \leq \bar{v}_2$. But since $\bar{v}_1 < \bar{v}_1 \Rightarrow \pi - \bar{v}_1 > \pi - \bar{v}_1 = \bar{v}_2$, we have $x_2^* = (1 + \delta_1)^{-1}(\pi - \bar{v}_1 + \delta_1\bar{v}_2) > \bar{v}_2$. Hence, deviation is not profitable. Thus, the proposal rule is optimal.

Since this exhausts all possible subgames, the proposed strategy for player 2 is a best response to player 1's strategy. Therefore, the strategies stated in the proposition constitute an SPE of the bargaining game. Note that any offer $x_1 > \bar{v}_1$ will be rejected by player 2, and therefore there exists a continuum of SPE, in which player 1 makes different nonserious offers. All these SPE are payoff-equivalent. \square

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Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles

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Richardson's finding that the severity of interstate wars is power law distributed belongs to the most striking empirical regularities in world politics. This is a regularity in search of a theory. Drawing on the principles of self-organized criticality, I propose an agent-based model of war and state formation that exhibits power-law regularities. The computational findings suggest that the scale-free behavior depends on a process of technological change that leads to contextually dependent, stochastic decisions to wage war.

Since Richardson's (1948, 1960) pioneering statistical work, we know that casualty levels of wars are power law distributed. Power laws tell us that the size of an event is inversely proportional to its frequency. Among earthquakes, for example, there are many with few casualties, fewer large ones, and very few huge disasters. Among wars, doubling the severity in terms of casualties leads to a decrease in frequency by a constant factor regardless of the size in question. This remarkable finding is among the most accurate and robust to be found in world politics.

This pattern has important consequences for both theory and policy. With respect to the latter, regularities of this type help us predict the size distribution of future wars and could therefore assist force-planning (Axelrod 1979). Focusing on war-size distributions also shifts attention from an exclusive reliance on micro-based arguments to a more comprehensive view of the international system. Given the decline of systems-level theorizing in international relations, this is a helpful corrective. As I show below, the implications of the power-law regularity challenge conventional equilibrium-based arguments, which currently dominate the field.

Despite the importance of Richardson's law, scholars of international relations have paid little attention to it. Some recent confirmatory studies exist, but to my knowledge, few, if any, attempts have been made to uncover the underlying mechanisms. Drawing on recent advances in nonequilibrium physics, I argue that concepts such as "scaling" and "self-organized criticality" go a long way toward providing an explanation. Relying on the explanatory strategy utilized by physicists, I regenerate the regularity with the help of an agent-based model, called GeoSim, that traces transitions between equilibria. The formal framework itself belongs to a well-known family of models pioneered by Bremer and

Mihalka (1977) that has not previously been used for this purpose. Thus, my goal is to modify existing theoretical tools to confront a well-known empirical puzzle.

RICHARDSON'S PUZZLE

In 1948, the English physicist and meteorologist Lewis F. Richardson published a landmark paper entitled "Variation of the Frequency of Fatal Quarrels with Magnitude" (Richardson 1948). Richardson divided domestic and international cases of violence between 1820 and 1945 into logarithmic categories $\mu = 3, 4, 5, 6$, and 7 corresponding to casualties measured in powers of 10. Based on his own updated compilation of conflict statistics, Richardson (1960) recorded 188, 63, 24, five, and two events that matched each category, respectively, the latter two being the two world wars. His calculations revealed that the frequency of each size category follows a simple multiplicative law: for each 10-fold increase in severity, the frequency decreased by somewhat less than a factor of three.

To investigate whether these findings hold up in the light of more recent quantitative evidence, I use data from the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Geller and Singer 1998) while restricting the focus to interstate wars. Instead of relying on direct frequency counts for each order of magnitude as did Richardson, my calculations center on the cumulative relative frequencies of war sizes $N(S > s)$, where S is the random variable of war sizes. This quantity can be used as an estimate of the probability $P(S > s)$ that there are wars of greater severity than s . Thus, whereas for small wars the likelihood of larger conflicts occurring has to be close to one, this probability approaches zero for very large events because it is very unlikely that there will be any larger calamities.

In formal terms, it can be postulated that the cumulative probability scales as a power law:


$$P(S > s) = Cs^D,$$

where C is a positive constant and D is a negative number.¹ Using double logarithmic scales, Figure 1 plots the cumulative frequency $P(S > s)$ as a function of the severity s of interstate wars between 1820 and

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Early drafts of this paper were prepared for presentation at the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, Ohio State University, Yale University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Cornell University. I am grateful to the participants in those meetings and to Robert Axelrod, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Fredrik Liljeros, and the editor and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for excellent comments. Laszlo Gulyas helped me reimplement the model in Java and Repast. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Nevertheless, I bear the full responsibility for any inaccuracies and omissions.

¹ Power laws are also referred to as " $1/f$ " laws since they describe events with a frequency that is inversely proportional to their size (Bak 1996, 21–24; Jensen 1998, 5). This is a special case with $D = -1$.

FIGURE 1. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Severity of Interstate Wars, 1820–1997

Source: COW data.

1997. If a power law operates, the fit should be linear:

$$\log P(S > s) = \log C + D \log s,$$

with the intercept $\log C$ and the slope coefficient D .

As can be readily seen in Figure 1, the linear fit is strikingly good ($R^2 = 0.985$), confirming that the distribution follows a power law. The data points in the lower right-hand corner represent the world wars. The vast majority of all other wars reach considerably lower levels of severity, though without straying very far from the estimated line. The slope estimate (-0.41) implies that a 10-fold increase in war severity decreases the probability of war by a factor of 2.6 ($=1/10^{-0.41}$).

This regularity appears to be robust. It can be shown that these findings generalize beyond the two last centuries covered by the COW data. Similar calculations applied to Levy's (1983) compilation of European great power wars from 1495 to 1965 yield a similarly straight line in a log-log diagram with an R^2 of 0.99, though with a steeper slope (-0.57 instead of -0.41).²

² The slope was estimated from severity 10,000 and above because Levy's (1983) exclusion of small-power wars would lead to under-sampling for low levels of severity. Preliminary analysis together with Victoria Tin-bor Hui has yielded promising results for Ancient China, 659–221 BC, despite very incomplete casualty figures (for data, see Hui 2000). In this case, the slope becomes even steeper.

Given these strong results, it may seem surprising that so few scholars have attempted to account for what seems to be an important empirical law. In fact, the situation is not very different from the economists' failure to explain the power law governing the distribution of city sizes, also known as Zipf's law. Using urban population data from many countries, researchers have established that the rank of city size typically correlates astonishingly well with city size.³ In an innovative book on geography and economics, Krugman (1995, 44) admits that "at this point we have to say that the rank-size rule is a major embarrassment for economic theory: one of the strongest statistical relationships we know, lacking any clear basis in theory."

Richardson's law remains an equally acute embarrassment. Although the law has been known for a long time, the vast majority of researchers have paid scant attention to it. For example, Geller and Singer (1998) make no mention of it in their comprehensive survey of quantitative peace research dating back several decades (see also Midlarsky 1989 and Vasquez 1993). Those scholars who have focused explicitly on the relationship between war severity and frequency have observed an inverse correlation but have typically

³ Since rank is closely linked to the cumulative density function, this relationship is equivalent to the power laws reported in Figure 1.

not framed their findings in terms of power laws (e.g., Gilpin 1981, 216; Levy and Morgan 1984). To my knowledge there are extremely few studies that address Richardson's law directly.⁴

Given the discrepancy between the strong empirical findings and the almost-complete absence of theoretical foundations on which to rely to account for them, we are confronted with a classical puzzle. This scholarly lacuna becomes all the more puzzling because of the notorious scarcity of robust empirical laws in political science or international relations. Despite decades of concerted efforts to find regularities, why have so few scholars followed in the footsteps of Richardson, who, after all, is considered to be one of the pioneers of the systematic analysis of conflict? Postponing consideration of this question to the concluding section, I instead turn to a literature that appears to have more promise in accounting for the regularity.

SCALING AND SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY

Natural scientists have been studying power laws in various settings for more than a decade. Usually organized under the notion of self-organized criticality (SOC), the pioneering contributions of Per Bak and others have evolved into a burgeoning literature that covers topics as diverse as earthquakes, biological extinction events, epidemics, forest fires, traffic jams, city growth, market fluctuations, firm sizes, and, indeed, wars (for popular introductions, see Bak 1996 and Buchanan 2000). Alternatively, physicists refer to the key properties of these systems under the heading of "scale invariance" (Stanley et al. 2000).

Self-organized criticality is the umbrella term that connotes slowly driven threshold systems that exhibit a series of meta-stable equilibria interrupted by disturbances with sizes scaling as power laws (Jensen 1998, 126; Turcotte 1999, 1380). In this context, thresholds generate nonlinearities that allow tension to build up. As the name of the phenomenon indicates, there must be elements of both self-organization and criticality. Physicists have known for a long time that, if constantly fine-tuned, complex systems, such as magnets, sometimes reach a critical state between order and chaos (Buchanan 2000, chap. 6; Jensen 1998, 2–3). What is unique about SOC systems, however, is that they do not have to be carefully tuned to stay at the critical point where they generate the scale-free output responsible for the power laws.⁵

Using a sandpile as a master metaphor, Bak (1996, chap. 3) constructed a simple computer model that produces this type of regularity (see Bak and Chen 1991 and Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1987). If grains of sand

trickle down slowly on the pile, power law-distributed avalanches will be triggered from time to time. This example illustrates the abstract idea of SOC: A steady, linear input generates tensions inside a system that in turn lead to nonlinear and delayed output ranging from small events to huge ones.

Whereas macro-level distributions emerge as stable features of scale-free systems, at the micro level, such systems exhibit a strong degree of path dependence (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000). To use the sandpile as an illustration, it matters exactly where and when the grains land. This means that point prediction often turns out to be futile, as exemplified by earthquakes. This does not mean, however, that no regularities exist. In particular, it is important to distinguish complex self-organized systems of the SOC kind from mere chaos, which also generates unpredictable behavior (Axelrod and Cohen 1999, xv; Bak 1996, 29–31; Buchanan 2000, 14–15).

All this is interesting, but do these insights really generalize to interstate warfare? Though useful as a diagnostic, the mere presence of power laws does not guarantee that the underlying process is characterized by SOC. Like any other class of explanations, such accounts ultimately hinge on the theoretical and empirical plausibility of the relevant causal mechanisms. This is precisely the weakness afflicting the few attempts that have so far been made to explain why wars are power law distributed. Recently, Turcotte (1999, 1418–1420) has observed that Richardson's result resembles a model of forest fires (see also Roberts and Turcotte 1998). Computational models of such phenomena are known to produce slope coefficients not unlike the one in Figure 1. If forest fires start when lightning ignites sparks that spread from tree to tree, Turcotte (1999, 1419) suggests, "a war must begin in a manner similar to the ignition of a forest. One country may invade another country, or a prominent politician may be assassinated. The war will then spread over the contiguous region of metastable countries" (see also Buchanan 2000, 189).

Though suggestive, this analogy cannot serve as an explanation in its own right, because at the level of mechanisms, there are simply too many differences between forests and state systems. Nevertheless, Turcotte's conjecture points in the right direction. The key to any explanation of war sizes depends on how wars spread, and we therefore need to explore what is known or suspected about this topic.

EXPLAINING THE SCOPE OF WARFARE

Accounting for the size of wars is equivalent to explaining how conflicts spread. Rather than treating large wars, such as the world wars, as qualitatively distinct events requiring separate explanations (e.g., Midlarsky 1990), it is preferable to advance a unified theory that explains all wars regardless of their size (e.g., Kim and Morrow 1992). Apart from the inherent desirability of more general explanations, the stress on SOC encourages us to search for scale-invariant explanations.

⁴ Among the exceptions, we find Cioffi-Revilla and Midlarsky (n.d.), who suggest that the power-law regularity applies not only to interstate warfare but also to civil wars (see also Weiss 1963 and Wesley 1962).

⁵ Yet it is not required that SOC holds for *any* parameter values. At least to some extent, the question of sensitivity depends on the particular domain at hand (Jensen 1998, 128).

Although most of the literature focuses on the causes of war, some researchers have attempted to account for how wars expand in time and space (Siverson and Starr 1991). Most of these efforts center on diffusion through borders and alliances. Territorial contiguity is perhaps the most obvious factor enabling conflict to spread (Vasquez 1993, 237–40). Evidence indicates that states exposed to “warring border nations” are more likely to engage in conflict than those that are not so exposed (Siverson and Starr 1991, chap. 3). Geopolitical adjacency in itself says little about how warfare expands, however. The main logic pertains to how geopolitical instability changes strategic calculations by altering contextual conditions: “An ongoing war, no matter what its initial cause, is likely to change the existing political world of those contiguous to the belligerents, creating new opportunities, as well as threats” (Vasquez 1993, 239; see also Wesley 1962). Henceforth, I will refer to this mechanism as *context activation*.

The consensus among researchers is that alignment also serves as a primary conduit of conflict by entangling states in conflictual clusters (see Vasquez 1993, 234–37). In fact, the impact of “warring alliance partners” appears to be stronger than that of warring border nations (Siverson and Starr 1991). Despite the obvious importance of alliances, however, I consider only contiguity. Because of its simplicity, the alliance-free scenario serves as a useful baseline for further investigations. Drawing on Vasquez’ reference to strategic context, I assume that military victory resulting in conquest changes the balance-of-power calculations of the affected states. The conqueror typically grows stronger while the weaker side loses power. This opens up new opportunities for conquest, sometimes prompting a chain reaction that will stop only when deterrence or infrastructural constraints dampen the process (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Liberman 1996).

What could turn the balance of power into such a period of instability? The list of sources of change is long, but I highlight one crucial class of mechanisms relating to environmental factors. Gilpin (1981, chap. 2) asserts that change tends to be driven by innovations in terms of technology and infrastructure. Such cases of *technological change* may facilitate both resource extraction and power projection. In Gilpin’s words, “technological improvements in transportation may greatly enhance the distance and area over which a state can exercise effective military power and political influence” (57).

As Gilpin (1981, 60) points out, technological change often gives a particular state an advantage that can translate into territorial expansion. Even so, “international political history reveals that in many instances a relative advantage in military technique has been short-lived. The permanence of military advantage is a function both of the scale and complexity of the innovation on which it is based and of the prerequisites for its adoption by other societies.” Under the pressure of geopolitical competition, new military or logistical techniques typically travel quickly from country to country until the entire system has adopted the more

effective solution. It is especially in such a window of opportunity that conquest takes place.


Going back to the sandpile metaphor, it is instructive to liken the process of technological change to the stream of sand falling on the pile. As innovations continue to be introduced, there is a trend toward formation of larger political entities thanks to the economies of scale. Context activation, in turn, provokes “avalanches” as contingent chains of war decisions. If the SOC conjecture is correct, the wars erupting as a consequence of this geopolitical process should conform with a power law.

MODELING GEOPOLITICS: GEOSIM

How can we move from models of sandpiles and forest fires to more explicit formalizations of war diffusion? Because the power law in Figure 1 stretches over two centuries, it is necessary to factor in Braudel’s *longue durée* of history. But such a perspective raises the explanatory bar considerably, because this requires a view of states as territorial entities with dynamically fluctuating borders rather than as fixed billiard balls (Cederman 1997, 2002; Cederman and Daase 2003). Levy’s data, focusing on great power wars in Europe, for example, coincide with massive rewriting of the geopolitical map of Europe. In early modern Europe, there were as many as 500 independent geopolitical units in Europe, a number that decreased to some 20 by the end of Levy’s sample period (Tilly 1975, 24; cf. also Cusack and Stoll 1990, chap. 1).

It therefore seems hopeless to trace macro patterns of warfare without problematizing the very boundaries of states. Fortunately, a family of models exists that does precisely that. Bremer and Mihalka (1977) introduced an imaginative framework of this type featuring conquest in a hexagonal grid, later extended and further explored by Cusack and Stoll (1990). Building on the same principles, the current model, which was originally coded in Pascal (Cederman 1997) and is here implemented in the Java-based toolkit Repast (see <http://repast.sourceforge.net>), differs in several respects from its predecessors (see also Cederman 2001a). These models are all agent-based. Agent-based modeling is a computational methodology that allows scientists to create, analyze, and experiment with, artificial worlds populated by agents that interact in non-trivial ways and that constitute their own environment (see Axelrod 1997; Epstein and Axtell 1996).

Most importantly, due to its sequential activation of actors interacting in pairs that hardwires the activation regime, Bremer and Mihalka’s framework is not well suited for studying the scope of conflicts. In contrast, the quasi-parallel execution of the model presented here allows conflict to spread and diffuse, potentially over long periods of time. Moreover, in the Bremer–Mihalka configuration, combat outcomes concern entire countries at a time, whereas in the present formalization, they affect single provinces at the local level (see Cederman 1997, 82–83). Without this more

FIGURE 2. Technological Change Modeled as a Shift of Loss-of-Strength Gradients

fine-grained rendering of conflicts, it is difficult to measure the size of wars accurately.

The standard initial configuration consists of a 50×50 square lattice populated by about 200 composite, state-like agents interacting locally. Because of the boundary-transforming influence of conquest, interactions among states take place in a dynamic network rather than directly in the lattice. In each time period, the actors allocate resources to each of their fronts and then choose whether or not to fight with their territorial neighbors. Half of each state's resources is allocated evenly to its fronts and the remaining half goes to a pool of fungible resources distributed in proportion to the neighbors' power. This scheme assures that military action on one front dilutes the remaining resources available for mobilization, and this dilution in turn creates a strong strategic interdependence that ultimately affects other states' decision-making. The Appendix describes this and all the other computational rules in greater detail.

For the time being, let us assume that all states use the same "grim-trigger" strategy in their relations. Normally, they reciprocate their neighbors' actions. Should one of the adjacent actors attack them, they respond in kind without relenting until the battle is won by either side or ends with a draw. Unprovoked attacks can happen as soon as a state finds itself in a sufficiently superior situation vis-à-vis a neighbor. Set at a ratio of three to one, a probabilistic threshold defines the decision criterion for such attacks.


Context activation is implemented as an increased alertness to geopolitical changes in case of conflict in a state's immediate neighborhood. Due to the difficulties of planning an attack, actors challenge the status quo with a probability per period as low as 0.01. If fighting involves neighboring states, however, the contextual activation mechanism prompts the state to enter alert status, during which unprovoked attacks are attempted in every period. This mechanism of contextual activation captures the shift from general to immediate deterrence in crises (Huth 1988, chap. 2).⁶

When the local capability balance tips decisively in favor of the stronger party, conquest results, implying that the victor absorbs the targeted unit. This is how composite actors form. If the target was already a part of another multiprovince state, the latter loses its province. Successful campaigns against the capital of composite actors lead to their complete collapse.⁷

Territorial expansion has important consequences for the states' overall resource levels. After conquest, the capitals of conquered territories are able to "tax" the incorporated provinces. As shown in Figure 2, the

⁶ As a way to capture strategic consistency, states retain the focus on the same target state for several moves. Once it is time for a new campaign, the mechanism selects a neighbor randomly.

⁷ Because the main rationale of the paper is to study geopolitical consolidation processes, the current model excludes the possibility of secession (although this option has been implemented in an extension of the model; see Cederman 2002).

FIGURE 3. The Sample System in Time Period 500

extraction rate depends on the loss-of-strength gradient, which approaches one for the capital province but falls quickly as the distance from the center increases (Boulding 1963; Gilpin 1981, 115; cf. Cederman 1997, 129). Far away, the rate flattens out around 10% (again, see Appendix for details). This function also governs power projection for deterrence and combat. Given this formalization of logistical constraints, technological change is modeled by shifting the threshold to the right, a process that allows the capital to extract more resources and project them farther away from the center. In the simulating runs reported in this paper, the transformation follows a linear process in time.


Together these rules have four consequences. First, the number of states decreases as the power-seeking states absorb their victims. Second, as a consequence of conquest, the surviving actors increase in territorial size. Third, decentralized competition creates emergent boundaries around the composite actors. Fourth, once both sides of a border reach a point at which no one is ready to launch an attack, a local equilibrium materializes. If all borders are characterized by such balances, a global equilibrium emerges. Yet such an equilibrium is likely to be temporary because decision-making always involves an element of chance, and, in addition, technological change affects the geopolitical environment of the states.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE RUN

The experimental design features two main phases. In the initial stage until time period 500, the initial 200 states are allowed to compete without technological change. Figure 3 shows a sample system at this point. The lines indicate the states' territorial borders; the dots, their capitals. Because of some cases of state collapse, the number of states has actually gone up to 205.

After the initial phase, technological change is triggered and increases linearly for the rest of the simulation until time period 10,500. At the same time, the war counting mechanism is invoked. The task of operationalizing war size involves two problems. First, spatiotemporal conflict clusters have to be identified as wars. Once they have been identified, their severity needs to be measured. Empirical studies usually operationalize severity as the cumulative number of combat casualties among military personnel (Geller and Singer 1998; Levy 1983). To capture this dimension, the algorithm accumulates the total battle damage incurred by all parties to a conflict cluster. The battle damage amounts to 10% of the resources allocated to any particular front (see Appendix).

The question of identification implies a more difficult computational problem. In real historical cases, subject matter experts bring their intuition to

FIGURE 4. Technological Change and Warfare in the Sample System at Time Step 3,326

bear in determining the boundaries of conflict clusters. Although determining what constitutes a “case” is not always straightforward (Ragin and Becker 1992), wars tend to be reasonably well delimited (but see Levy 1983, chap. 3). In an agent-based model, in contrast, this task poses considerable problems because of the lack of historical intuition. The model therefore includes a spatiotemporal cluster-finding algorithm that distinguishes between active and inactive states. Active states are those that are currently fighting or fought in the last 20 time periods. The latter rule introduces a “war shadow” that blurs the measurement so that brief lulls in combat do not obscure the larger picture. A cluster in a specific period is defined as any group of adjacent fighting states as long as conflictual interaction binds them together. This allows for the merger of separate conflicts into larger wars. The temporal connection is made by letting states that are still fighting in subsequent periods retain their cluster identification. Once no more active state belongs to the conflict cluster, it is defined as a completed war and its accumulated conflict count is reported.

Figure 4 illustrates the sample system at time period 3,326. The three highlighted areas correspond to conflict clusters that remained local. Whereas most conflicts involve two or three actors, some engulf large parts of the system.

The technological diffusion process starts as soon as the initial period is over, as indicated by the states with

capitals marked as rings rather than filled squares in Figure 4. These states have experienced at least one shift of their loss-of-strength gradient. This process has dramatic consequences over the course of the simulation. Figure 5 depicts the final configuration of the sample run in time period 10,500. At this stage, only 35 states remain in the system, some of which have increased their territory considerably. Smaller states manage to survive because, as a rule, they have fewer fronts to defend and are in some cases partly protected by the boundary of the grid.

Having explored the qualitative behavior of the model, I can address the question of whether the model is capable of generating robust power laws.

REPLICATIONS

Let us start by exploring the output of the illustrative run. Based on the same type of calculations as in the empirical case, Figure 6 plots the cumulative frequency against corresponding war sizes. It is clear that the model is capable of producing power laws with an impressive linear fit. In fact, the R^2 of 0.991 surpasses the fit of the empirical distribution reported in Figure 1.⁸ Equally importantly, the size range extends over more

⁸ This analysis excludes war events that fall below 2.5 on the logarithmic scale, because the clustering mechanism puts a lower bound on the wars that can be detected.



FIGURE 5. The Final State of the Sample Run at Time 10,500**FIGURE 6. Simulated Cumulative Frequency Distribution in the Representative Sample Run**

TABLE 1. Replication Results Based on 15 Runs of Each System

TABLE 1. Replication Results Based on 15 Runs of Each System								
	Slope Coefficient D			R^2			Range (Median)	N Wars (Median)
	Min.	Median	Max.	Min.	Median	Max.		
<i>Main results</i>								
1. Base runs	-0.64	-0.55	-0.49	0.975	0.991	0.996	4.2	204
2. Smaller shocks ^a	-0.71	-0.62	-0.56	0.968	0.980	0.993	3.7	267
3. No shocks	-1.43	-1.32	-1.17	0.878	0.941	0.975	1.4	132
4. No context activation	-1.52	-1.34	-1.20	0.835	0.882	0.934	1.6	696
<i>Sensitivity analysis</i>								
5. warShadow=10	-0.69	-0.60	-0.53	0.966	0.990	0.996	4.2	325
6. warShadow=40	-0.60	-0.50	-0.45	0.970	0.989	0.997	4.2	148
7. supThresh=2.5 ^a	-0.62	-0.53	-0.46	0.965	0.984	0.991	4.3	210
8. propMobile=0.9	-0.65	-0.58	-0.53	0.954	0.987	0.992	4.3	250
9. distOffset=0.2	-0.72	-0.52	-0.43	0.908	0.990	0.995	4.4	211
10. distSlope=5	-0.60	-0.53	-0.46	0.974	0.986	0.991	4.3	217
11. nx × nv=75 × 75	-0.67	-0.59	-0.54	0.987	0.993	0.996	4.6	502

Note: See Table A1 for explanations of the parameter names.

^a Based on runs with shockSize=10 instead of 20.

than four orders of magnitude, paralleling the wide region of linearity evidenced in the historical data. Moreover, with a slope of -0.64 , the inclination also comes close to the empirical levels.

The choice of the sample system is not accidental. In fact, it represents a larger set of systematic replications with respect to linear fit. More precisely, the illustrative run corresponds to the median R^2 value of a pool of 15 artificial histories, which were generated by varying the random seed that governs all stochastic events,

including the initial configuration. Each replication lasted from time zero all the way to time period 10,500. As reported in line 1 in Table 1, regression analysis of these series yields R^2 values ranging from 0.975 to 0.996, with a median of 0.991, corresponding to the sample run. The table also reveals that although the linear fit and the size range of this run are typical, its slope is far below the median of -0.55 . As a complement, Figures 7 and 8 summarize the replication findings graphically. The former histogram confirms



FIGURE 7. Distribution of Linear Fits R^2 for the 15 Base Runs

FIGURE 8. Distribution of Slope Coefficients D for the 15 Base Runs

that the linear fit of all the runs falls around the median at 0.991. The slope distribution, shown in Figure 8, is somewhat more scattered, but it is not hard to discern a smoother distribution describing the general behavior of the system.

These findings are encouraging. Yet establishing the presence of power laws in a small set of runs is not the same thing as highlighting their causes. Therefore, I now turn to a set of experiments that will help identify the underlying causes of the regularities.

WHAT DRIVES THE RESULTS?

The previous section showed findings based on one specific set of parameters. Table A1 (Appendix) reminds us that there are many knobs to turn. Indeed, the calibration process is rather difficult. Given that war has been a rare event in the Westphalian system, the trick is to construct a system that “simmers” without “boiling over” into perennial warfare. Here I describe a series of experiments that suggest that technological change and contextual activation, rather than other factors, are responsible for the production of power laws.

The easiest way to establish the result relating technological change is to study a set of counterfactual runs with fewer, or no, such transformations. Reflecting a loss-of-strength gradient shifted 10 steps instead of 20, the runs corresponding to line 2 in Table 1 indicate that

the linearity becomes somewhat less impressive, with a median R^2 of 0.980 and a less expansive size range of 3.7. Furthermore, the median slope becomes as steep as -0.62 . Once the process of technological change is entirely absent, the scaling behavior disappears altogether, as indicated in line 3. With a representative R^2 of 0.941 and a range of 1.4, the linear fit falls well short of what could be expected from even imperfect power laws. Experiments with systems lacking contextual activation show that power-law behavior is unlikely without this mechanism. In these runs, the linearity drops to levels even lower than without technological change (see Table 1, line 4).

These experiments confirm that technological change and contextual decisionmaking play crucial roles in generating progressively larger conflicts. However, the findings say little about the general robustness of the scale-free output. It is thus appropriate to investigate the consequences of varying other dimensions of the model. Keeping all other settings identical to the base runs except for the dimension under scrutiny, lines 5 through 11 in Table 1 reveal that the power laws generated in the base runs are not artifacts of a unique parameter combination. Within bounds, these regularities do not seem to be very sensitive to changes in the “war shadow” of the war-counting mechanism (lines 5 and 6), the states’ “trigger happiness” (line 7), the fungibility of resource allocation (line 8), the shape of the distance gradient (lines 9 and 10), or

the size of the grid (line 11). The last section in the Appendix provides more precise information about these experiments.

Obviously, the point of the sensitivity analysis is not that the power laws hinge exclusively on technological change and the contextual activation mechanism. It is not hard to make the scale-free output vanish by choosing extreme values on any of the dimensions relating to lines 5 to 11 in Table 1, or other parameters for that matter. Because finding this intermediate range of geopolitical consolidation requires considerable parameter adjustment in the current model, the pure case of parameter insensitivity characterizing SOC cannot be said to have been fully satisfied. Yet the qualitative behavior appears to remain for a reasonably large range of values and dimensions. Ultimately, extensive empirical calibration of these parameters and mechanisms will be required to reach an even firmer conclusion about the causes of Richardson's law.

In general terms, it is clear that scaling behavior depends on both a logistical "brake" slowing down the states' conquering behavior and an "acceleration effect," in this case represented by the contextual activation mechanism. What self-correcting mechanisms could render the scale-free behavior even less sensitive to parameter variations? It should be noted that I have made a number of simplifying assumptions, which might render the computational power laws less robust than they are in the real world. First, attention must turn to alliances since, as noted above, they have been singled out in the theoretical and empirical literature on war diffusion. More generally, interaction has been restricted to contiguous neighbors. Relaxing that assumption would allow great powers to extend their reach far beyond the neighboring areas. Such a mechanism would help explain how large conflicts spread.

At the structural level, it would be necessary to consider secession and civil wars (see Cederman 2002). These constraints could slow down positive-feedback cycles of imperial expansion through implosion. The exclusive focus on local, contiguous combat assumes away far-reaching interventions by great powers both on land and at sea. Moreover, nationalism affects not only the extractive capacity but also the boundaries of states through national unification and secession.

CONCLUSION

Despite the complications introduced by parameter sensitivity, the GeoSim model in its present "stripped" form has fulfilled its primary purpose of generating power laws similar to those observed in empirical data. The current framework may well be the first model of international politics that does precisely that. In addition, technological change and contextually activated decision-making go a long way toward explaining why power laws emerge in geopolitical systems. Without these mechanisms, it becomes very hard to generate scale-free war-size distributions. These findings take us one step closer to resolving Richardson's original puzzle, first stated more than half a century ago. The

computational reconstruction of this regularity should strengthen confidence in the conjecture that interstate warfare actually follows the principles of self-organized criticality. However, stronger confidence does not equal conclusive corroboration, which requires considerably more accurate portrayal of the causal mechanisms generating the phenomenon in the first place.

If we nevertheless assume that the SOC conjecture holds, important consequences for theory-building follow. By using the method of exclusion, we have to ask what theories are capable of generating regularities of this type.⁹ Most obviously, the logic of SOC casts doubt on static equilibrium theories as blueprints for systemic theorizing. If wars emanate from disequilibrium processes, then these theories' narrow focus on equilibrium is misguided. It is not hard to find the main reason for this ontological closure: Micro economic theory has served as a dominant source of inspiration for theory builders, and this influence has grown stronger with the surge of rational choice research (Thompson 2000, 26).

At the level of general theorizing, Waltz (1979) epitomizes this transfer of analogies by stressing the prevalence of negative feedback and rationality in history. Yet if SOC is a correct guide to interstate phenomena such as war, it seems less likely that static frameworks such as that suggested by Waltz are the right place to start in future attempts to build systems theory. In fact, his sweeping anarchy thesis remains too vague to be particularly helpful in explaining particular wars or any aggregate pattern of warfare for that matter (Vasquez 1993).

This reasoning does not render realist analysis of warfare obsolete, but it does tell us that such theorizing needs to rest on explicitly spatiotemporal foundations. In fact, Gilpin's (1981) analytical sketch of war and change may offer a more fruitful point of departure than does Waltz's. Partly anticipating the SOC perspective, Gilpin (1981) advances a dialectical theory that interprets wars as releases of built-up tensions in the international system: "As a consequence of the changing interest of individual states, and especially because of the differential growth in power among states, the international system moves from a condition of equilibrium to one of disequilibrium" (14). Once the tension has been accumulated, it will sooner or later be released, usually in a violent way: "Although resolution of a crisis through peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war" (15). Yet, rather than adopting an exclusively revolutionary approach to warfare, Gilpin realizes that most adjustments produce much smaller conflicts. By adopting an explicit nonequilibrium focus, Gilpin provides a more helpful analytical starting point for dynamic systems theorizing than does Waltz (see also Organski and Kugler 1980).

Viewed as a source of theoretical inspiration, then, the sandpiles of nonequilibrium physics may prove

⁹ For a similar critique of conventional theorizing, see Robert Axtell (2000), who proposes a simple model to account for power law-distributed firm sizes in the economy.

more useful as master analogies than either the billiard balls of classical physics or the “butterfly effect” of chaos theory. Earthquakes, forest fires, biological evolution, and other historically formed complex systems serve as better metaphors for the broad picture of world history than “ahistorical” pool tables or intractable turbulence. It may not be a coincidence that scholars trying to make sense of historical disruptions have been prone to use seismic analogies. According to Gaddis’s (1992, 22) analysis of the end of the Cold War, “[W]e know that a series of geopolitical earthquakes have taken place, but it is not yet clear how these upheavals have rearranged the landscape that lies before us.”

Following in the footsteps of contemporary natural science, computational modeling enables theory in political science and international relations to move from such intriguing, yet very loose, analogies to detailed investigations of how causal mechanisms interact in time and space. System effects, though well understood by qualitative theorists (e.g., Jervis 1997), have not been integrated into a comprehensive theory. Most importantly, careful modeling may help us avoid the pitfalls of the simplistic analogizing that has so often haunted theory. For example, a seismic analogy supported by statistical parallels between wars and earthquake magnitudes could tempt realist “pessimists” to conclude that wars are as unavoidable as geological events. Yet such a conclusion does not follow from SOC at all, for democratic security communities can emerge. Whereas some areas of the world are prone to frequent outbreaks of interstate violence, in others, catastrophic events are virtually unthinkable. But unlike continental plates, the Pacific regions are socially constructed features of the international system. As conjectured by Kant, the emergence of democratic security communities over the last two centuries shows that the “laws” of geopolitics can be transcended (Cederman 2001a, 2001b).

If SOC provides an accurate guide to world politics, it can be concluded that disaster avoidance through the “taming” of *Realpolitik* by promoting defensive mechanisms or by avoiding “bandwagoning behavior” may be as futile as hoping that the “new economy” will prevent stock market crashes from ever happening. In the long run, we may be willing to pay the price of market upheavals to benefit from the wealth-generating effect of decentralized markets. In contrast, it is less obvious that the world can afford to run the risk of catastrophic geopolitical events, such as nuclear wars. The only safe way of managing security affairs is to transform the balance of power into a situation of trust, which is exactly what happened between France and Germany during the last half-century. Nuclear calamities would further vindicate Richardson’s law, but few people would remain to appreciate the advances of social science should the ostensibly “impossible” turn out to be just another huge low-probability event.

APPENDIX: DETAILED SPECIFICATION OF THE GEOSIM MODEL

The model is based on a dynamic network of relations among states in a square lattice. Primitive actors reside in each cell

of the grid and can be thought of as the basic units of the framework. Although they can never be destroyed, they can lose their sovereignty as other actors come to dominate them hierarchically. In such a case, the result is a composite actor constituted by a capital and provinces.

All sovereign actors, whether primitive or composite, keep track of their geopolitical context with the help of a portfolio holding all of their current relationships. These can be of three types:

- *Territorial relations* point to the four territorial neighbors of each primitive actor (north, south, west, and east).
- *Interstate relations* refer to all sovereign neighbors with which an actor interacts.
- *Hierarchical relations* specify the hierarchical link between provinces and capitals.

Whereas all strategic interaction is located at the interstate level, territorial relations become important as soon as structural change happens. Combat takes place locally and results in hierarchical changes that are described below. The order of execution is quasi-parallel. To achieve this effect, the list of actors is scrambled each time structural change occurs. The actors keep a memory of one step and thus in principle make up a Markov process.

Triggered by a model-setup stage, the main simulation loop contains five phases that are presented in the following. In the first phase, the actors’ resource levels are calculated. In the second phase, the states allocate resources to their fronts, followed by a decision procedure, during which they decide on whether to cooperate or defect in their neighbor relations. The interaction phase determines the winner of each battle, if any. Finally, the structural-change procedure carries out conquest and other border-changing transformations.

This Appendix refers to the parameter settings of the base runs reported in line 1 in Table 1. Table A1 provides an overview of all system parameters, with alternative experimental settings in parentheses. The last section of the Appendix, which is devoted to the sensitivity analysis reported in rows 5 through 11 in Table 1, details these settings.

Model Setup

At the beginning of each simulation, a square grid with dimensions $n_x = n_y = 50$ is created and populated with a preset number of composite actors: $\text{initPolarity} = 200$. The algorithm lets these 200 randomly located actors be the founders of their own composite states, the territory of which is recursively grown to fill out the intermediate space until no primitive actors remain sovereign.

Resource Updating

As the first step in the actual simulation loop, the resource levels are updated. The simple “metabolism” of the system depends directly on the size of the territory controlled by each capital. It is assumed that all sites in the grid are worth one resource unit. A sovereign actor i begins the simulation loop by extracting resources from all of its provinces. It accumulates a share of these resources determined by a distance-dependent logistical function dist (see Figure 2):

$$\text{dist}(d, t) = \text{distOffset} + (1 - \text{distOffset}) / \{1 + (d / \text{distThresh}(t))^{(-\text{distSlope})}\},$$

where $\text{distOffset} = 0.1$ sets the flat extraction rate for long distances, and $\text{distSlope} = 3$ the slope of the curve

TABLE A1. System Parameters

Parameter	Description	Values ^a
nx, ny	Dimensions of the grid	50 × 50 (75 × 75)
initPolarity	Initial number of states	200 (450)
initPeriod	Length of initial period	500
duration	Duration of simulation after initial period	10,000
resChange	Fraction of new resources per time period	0.01
propMobile	Share of mobile resources to be allocated as opposed to fixed ones	0.5 (0.9)
pDropCampaign	Probability of shifting to other target state after battle	0.2
pAttack	Probability of entering alerted status	0.01
pDeactivate	Probability of leaving alerted status	0.1
supThresh	Logistic threshold for unprovoked attacks	3.0 (2.5)
supSlope	Slope of logistic curve for unprovoked attacks	20
victThresh	Logistic threshold for battle victory	3.0 (2.5)
victSlope	Slope of logistic curve for battle victory	20
propDamage	Share of damage inflicted on opponent	0.1
distOffset	Offset level for distance function	0.1 (0.2)
distThresh	Logistic threshold for distance function at time 0	2
distSlope	Slope of distance function	3 (5)
pShock	Probability of technological change	0.0001
shockSize	Final size of technological shocks at time 10,500	20 (0, 10)
warShadow	Period until next separate war can be identified	20 (10, 40)

^aThe first values correspond to the base runs, and the parenthesized values to the other runs used in the sensitivity analysis (see Table 1).

(higher numbers imply a steeper slope). Technological change governs the initial location of the threshold $\text{distThresh}(t)$, which is a function of time t . To simulate technological development, the threshold of the distance function $\text{dist}(d, t)$ is gradually shifted outward starting as a linear function of the simulation time, where

$$\text{distThresh}(t) = \text{distThresh} + (t - \text{initPeriod}) \times \text{shockSize} / \text{duration}$$

and $\text{distThresh} = 2$, $\text{initPeriod} = 500$, and $\text{duration} = 10,000$, the overall duration of the simulation run after the end of the initial period. The added displacement $\text{shockSize} = 20$ determines the final location of the threshold. This shift represents the state of the art of technological change with which each state catches up with a probability $p\text{Shock} = 0.0001$ per time period. This probability is contextually independent of the strategic environment.

In addition, the battle damage is cumulated for all external fronts (see the interaction module below). Finally, the resources $\text{res}(i, t)$ of actor i in time period t can be computed by factoring in the new resources (i.e., the nondiscounted resources of the capital together with the sum of all tax revenue plus the total battle damage) multiplied by a fraction $\text{resChange} = 0.01$. This small amount assures that the resource changes take some time to filter through to the overall resource level of the state:

```
tax=0
for all provinces j of state i do
  tax=tax+f(dist(i,j),t).

totalDamage=0.
for all external fronts j do
  totalDamage=totalDamage+damage(j,i).

res(i,t)=(1-resChange)*res(i,t-1)+
  resChange*(1+tax-totalDamage).
```

Resource Allocation

Before the states can make any behavioral decisions, resources must be allocated to each front. Whereas unitary

states possess up to four fronts, composite ones can have many more relations. Resource allocation proceeds according to a hybrid logic. A preset share of each actor's resources is considered to be fixed and has to be evenly spread to all external fronts. Yet this scheme lacks realism because it underestimates the strength of large actors, at least to the extent that they are capable of shifting their resources around to wherever they are needed. The remaining part of the resources, $\text{propMobile} = 0.5$, is therefore mobilized in proportion to the opponent's local strength and the previous activity on the respective front. Fungible resources are proportionally allocated to fronts that are active (i.e., where combat occurs), but also for deterrent purposes in anticipation of a new attack. Allocation is executed under the assumption that only one new attack might happen (see Cederman 1997, 117–21).

For example, a state with 50 mobile units could use them in the following way assuming that the five neighboring states could allocate 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30, respectively. If the previous period featured warfare with the second and fourth of these neighbors, these two fronts would be allocated $15/(15+25) \times 50 = 18.75$ and $25/(15+25) \times 50 = 31.25$. Under the assumption that one more war could start, the first, third, and fifth states would be allocated, respectively, $10/(15+25+10) \times 50 = 10$, $20/(15+25+10) \times 50 = 20$, and $30/(15+25+10) \times 50 = 30$.

Formally, resource allocation for state i starts with the computation of the fixed resources for each relationship j . A preset proportion of the total resources res is evenly spread out across the n fronts:

$$\text{fixedRes}(i, j) = (1 - \text{propMobile}) * \text{res} / n.$$

The remaining part, $\text{mobileRes} = \text{propMobile} * \text{res}$, is allocated in proportion to the activity and the strength of the opponents. To do this, it is necessary to calculate all resources that were targeted against actor i :

$$\text{enemyRes}(i) = \sum \{j\} \{ \text{res}(j, i) \}.$$

The algorithm of actor i 's allocation can thus be summarized:

```

for all relations  $j$  do
  in case  $\text{enemyRes}(i)=0$ , then [actor not under attack]
     $\text{res}(i, j) = \text{fixedRes}(i, j) + \text{mobileRes}$ ;
  in case  $i$  and  $j$  were fighting in the last period then
     $\text{res}(i, j) = \text{fixedRes}(i, j) + \text{res}(j, i) / \text{enemyRes}(i) * \text{mobileRes}$ ;
  in case  $i$  and  $j$  were not fighting in the last period then
     $\text{res}(i, j) = \text{fixedRes}(i, j) + \text{res}(j, i) / (\text{enemyRes}(i) + \text{res}(j, i)) * \text{mobileRes}$ .

```

Decisions

Once each sovereign actor has allocated resources to its external fronts, it is ready to make decisions about future actions. This is done by recording the front-dependent decisions in the corresponding relational list. As with resource allocation, this happens in parallel through double-buffering and randomized order of execution. The contextual activation mechanism ensures that the actors can be in either an active or an inactive mode depending on the combat activity of their neighbors. Normally, the states are not on alert, which means that they attempt to launch unprovoked attacks with a low probability, $p_{\text{Attack}}=0.01$. If they or their neighboring states become involved in combat, however, they automatically enter the alerted mode, in which unprovoked attacks are contemplated in every round. Once there is no more action in the neighborhood, an alerted state reenters the inactive mode with probability $p_{\text{Deactivate}}=0.1$ per time step.

All states start by playing unforgiving "grim trigger" with all their neighbors. If the state decides to try an unprovoked attack, a randomly chosen potential victim j' is selected. In addition, a battle-campaign mechanism stipulates that the aggressor retains the current target state as long as there are provinces to conquer unless the campaign is aborted with probability $p_{\text{DropCampaign}}=0.2$. This rule guarantees that the states' target selection does not become too scattered.

The actual decision to attack depends on a probabilistic criterion $p(i, j')$ that defines a threshold function that depends on the power balance in i 's favor (see below). If an attack is approved, the aggressor chooses a "battle path" consisting of an agent and a target province. The target province is any primitive actor inside j' (including the capital) that borders on i . The agent province is a province inside state i (including the capital) that borders on the target. In summary, the decision algorithm of a state i can be expressed in pseudo-code.

Decision Rule of State i .

```

for all external fronts  $j$  do
  if  $i$  or  $j$  played D in the previous period then
     $\text{act}(i, j) = D$ ;
  else
     $\text{act}(i, j) = C$  [grim trigger].
if there is no action on any front and with
 $p_{\text{Attack}}$  or if in alerted status or campaign then
  if ongoing campaign against then
     $j' = \text{campaign}$ ;
  else
     $j' = \text{random neighbor } j'$ ;
  with  $p(i, j')$  do

```

```

     $\text{change to act}(i, j') = D$  [launch attack against  $j'$ ],
    randomly select target  $(i, j')$  and
    agent  $(i, j')$ ,
    campaign =  $j'$ .

```

The precise criterion for attacks $p(i, j')$ remains to be specified. The model relies on a stochastic function of logistic type in which the local power balance plays the main role:

$$\text{bal}(i, j') = \text{dist}(d, .) * \text{res}(i, j') / (\text{dist}(d', .) * \text{res}(j', i)),$$

where $\text{dist}(d, .)$ is the time-dependent distance function described above and d and d' are the respective distance from the capitals of i and j to the battle site (here the temporal parameter is suppressed to simplify the exposition). This discounting introduces distance dependence with respect to power projection. Hence, the probability can be computed as

$$p(i, j') = 1 / (1 + (\text{bal}(i, j') / \text{supTresh})^{(-\text{supSlope})}),$$

where $\text{supTresh}=3.0$ is a system parameter specifying the threshold that has to be transgressed for the probability of an attack to reach 0.5, and supSlope a tunable parameter that determines the slope of the logistic curve, which is set to 20 for the runs reported in this paper.

Interaction

After the decision phase, the system executes all actions and determines the consequences in terms of the local power balance. The outcome of combat is determined probabilistically. If the updated local resource balance $\text{bal}(i, j')$ tips far enough in favor of either side, that side wins the battle. In the initial phase, the logistical probability function $q(i, j')$ has the same shape as the decision criterion with the same threshold set at $\text{victThresh}=3$ and with an identical slope, $\text{victSlope}=20$:

$$q(i, j') = 1 / (1 + (\text{bal}(i, j') / \text{victThresh})^{(-\text{victSlope})}).$$

This formula applies to attacking states. In accordance with the strategic rule-of-thumb that stipulates that an attacker needs to be about three times more powerful than a defender to prevail, the threshold of the latter is set to $1/\text{victThresh}=1/3$.

Each time step in a battle can generate one of three outcomes: It may remain undecided, or one or both sides could claim victory. In the first case, combat continues in the next round due to the grim-trigger strategy in the decision phase. If the defending state prevails, all action is discontinued. If the aggressor wins, it can advance a territorial claim, which is processed in the structural change phase.

The interaction phase also generates battle damage, which is factored into the overall resources of the state (see above). If state j attacks i , the costs incurred by j amount to $\text{propDamage}=10\%$ of j 's locally allocated resources, or $0.1 * \text{res}(j, i)$. The total size of a war is the cumulative sum of all such damage belonging to the same conflict cluster.

Structural Change

Structural change is defined as any change in the actors' boundaries. This version of the framework features conquest as the only structural transformation, but extensions include both secession and voluntary unification (see Cederman

2002). Combat happens locally rather than at the country level (cf. Cusack and Stoll 1990). Thus structural change affects only one primitive unit at a time. The underlying assumption governing structural change enforces states' territorial contiguity in all situations. As soon as the supply lines are cut between a capital and its province, the latter becomes independent. Claims are processed in random order, with executed conquests locking the involved units to avoid territorial anomalies.

The units affected by any specific structural claim are defined by the target (i, j) province. If it is

- a unitary actor, then the actor is absorbed into the conquering state.
- the capital province of a composite state, then the invaded state collapses and all its provinces become sovereign.
- a province of a composite state, then the province is absorbed. If, as a consequence of this change, any of the invaded states' other provinces become unreachable from the capital, these provinces regain sovereignty.

Sensitivity Analysis

This section contains a brief description of the sensitivity analysis (see Table 1). I start by testing whether the granularity of the cluster-finding algorithm makes a difference. Lines 5 and 6 in Table 1 correspond to runs with the warShadow of the war-counting mechanism set to 10 and 40 steps, respectively, as opposed to the 20 steps used in the base runs. The linear fit does not change significantly in response to these tests, but the slope of the regression line in log-log space varies somewhat with the size of the smallest war that can be detected. As would be expected, the finer the granularity, the steeper the line: As opposed to a median slope of -0.55 in the base system, the coefficients become -0.60 and -0.50 with war shadows of 10 and 40, respectively.

Does the location of the decision-making threshold for unprovoked attacks influence the output? Line 7 in Table 1 reflects a series of runs in a system with the threshold `supThresh` and `victThresh` set to 2.5 rather than to 3. To prevent these runs from degenerating into one big conflict cluster, I chose a lower level of technological change of 10, but otherwise the settings were identical to those in the base runs. Again, fairly impressive power laws emerge, in these cases with a median R^2 of 0.984. The continued sensitivity analysis reported in line 8 increases the resource fungibility `propMobile` from 0.5 to 0.9 in the routine for resource allocation. As indicated in Table 1, this change does little to alter the scaling behavior of the model.

Another set of tests pertains to distance dependence. Robustness checks with a higher level of long-distance offset, `distOffset` = 0.2 (line 9), and a steeper slope, `distSlope` = 5 (line 10), produce outcomes similar to those in the base model. Finally, the findings reported in line 11 indicate that the size of the grid does not appear to affect the process significantly. In fact, with an expanded 75×75 grid and `initPolarity` = 450, the scaling behavior reaches an even higher level of accuracy, with a median R^2 of 0.993 and a wider median range of 4.6. The slopes become somewhat steeper in these larger systems.

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Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions

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Political institutions translate inputs—in the form of changed preferences, new participants, new information, or sudden attention to previously available information—into policy outputs. In the process they impose costs on this translation, and these costs increase institutional friction. We argue that the “friction” in political institutions leads not to consistent “gridlock” but to long periods of stasis interspersed with dramatic policy punctuations. As political institutions add costs to the translation of inputs into outputs, institutional friction will increase, and outputs from the process will become increasingly punctuated overall. We use a stochastic process approach to compare the extent of punctuations among 15 data sets that assess change in U.S. government budgets, in a variety of aspects of the public policy process, in election results, and in stock market returns in the United States. We find that all of these distributions display positive kurtosis—tall central peaks (representing considerable stability) and heavy tails (reflecting the punctuations, both positive and negative). When we order institutions according to the costs they impose on collective action, those with higher decision and transaction costs generate more positive kurtosis. Direct parameter estimates indicate that all distributions except budget data were best fit by the double-exponential probability distribution; budgets are Paretian.

On August 28, 1950, President Truman enthusiastically signed Social Security reforms he had urged for years, reforms that expanded Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits by 77%, expanded the covered population dramatically, and decreased the required contributions in the system. The result was a transformation in the program from a small system covering only 6% of the elderly in 1940 into a program “firmly established as part of American public policy” (Sparrow 1996, 34).¹

The 1950 legislation radically transformed the small program established in major amendments to the Social Security Act in 1939. The 1950 statutory changes caused an explosion in Social Security expenditures. From FY (fiscal year) 1949 to FY 1950, real expenditures grew 3%. From FY 1950 to FY 1951, they grew 25%, and the next fiscal year they grew 37%—the largest two-year percentage increase in the history of the program—even though most payments would come much later as the newly covered retired. By 1952, expenditures had increased by an astounding 71%, and expenditures increased 10% a year or more for the next three fiscal years (True 1999).

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This project was funded by the Political Science Program of the National Science Foundation, Award SES9904700. We appreciate the support of Frank Scioli, the program officer, and various political science program directors. We benefited from comments by Frank Baumgartner, John Brehm, Chris Mackie, Peter John, John Padgett, Bat Sparrow, Jim True and John Wilkerson.

¹ This account relies heavily on Sparrow 1996 and True 1999.

Between these two landmarks, Congress enacted only two very minor adjustments to the program. This almost-complete absence of legislative output was not for lack of trying. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman urged change; major advisory commission reports indicated the desirability of reform, many bills were introduced, and both House and Senate committees held hearings and reported legislation. Sporadic, but vocal and persistent, calls for reform emerged immediately after the 1939 enactments and continued until 1950.

Moreover, there were good objective reasons for action. Sparrow (1996, 39) calls the failure to enact reform “puzzling” and points out that “a further expansion in the Social Security system would have guaranteed a large net increase in federal revenues, since most of the government’s obligations would not be incurred until contributors retired. In the meantime, the government would receive desperately needed funds and would ease inflationary pressures by limiting consumer spending.” In other words, a “window of opportunity” existed; the issue occupied the national agenda before, after, and during the war, and great effort was expended in proposals, bill writing, and hearings, yet Congress, nevertheless, failed to pass legislation. When Congress finally acted, the result was not incremental adjustment, but major policy reform.

In democracies at least, it is easier to talk about an issue than to get serious action on it. In the United States, executive support or even support of legislative leaders may not ensure passage of a popular act; the system requires concurrent majority support in both houses of the legislature in addition to the President’s acquiescence. In the case of Social Security, Republicans posed important counterarguments to Social Security expansion based on wartime revenue need—a kind of “lockbox” argument mimicked 60 years later. Airing of arguments takes time; opposition to change can be entrenched, and even extraordinarily good ideas can be thwarted for a long time.

The general lesson is that policymaking institutions are “sticky”—they do not respond simply or directly to demands or needs. Social, economic, and political changes are not automatically registered in public policies in democratic systems. Moreover, agenda access itself may also exhibit “stickiness,” albeit on a less dramatic scale. The agenda space is severely limited, and many issues can compete for the attention of policymakers. In the case of Social Security, during the “missing decade” (Sparrow’s term) many bills were introduced in some years (54 in 1941), while very few were introduced in others (17 in 1943) (Sparrow 1996, 60). Executive and legislative attentiveness shifted from intense to absent during the long period of policy inactivity as other matters clamored for governmental attention.

Political institutions impose costs on policy action in direct proportion to how far a policy proposal has proceeded in the lawmaking process. It is easier to get an issue discussed than it is to get serious attention for a specific line of policy action; it is easier to get a hearing on a bill than to schedule it for a vote; it is easier to get one house of Congress to pass a bill than to get it enacted. These institutional costs act in a peculiar way. They keep the course of public policy steady and unvarying in the face of lots of changes; that is, they do not allow for continuous adjustment to the environment. Early decision theorists termed this pattern “incremental.” But these costs also cause major policy changes when dynamics are favorable—a “window of opportunity” opens, in the language of Kingdon (1995). These major policy shifts against an incremental backdrop are termed *policy punctuations* (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; True et al. 1999).

In this paper we examine this institutional friction in a more general framework than has normally been the case. We may think of policy processing within an institutional framework somewhat analogous to the geophysicists’ plate tectonics. The earth’s crust is divided into major segments, or plates, that slide against one another. Plate tectonics explains continental drift; it also accounts for earthquakes.

If we order observed earthquakes from the smallest to the largest, we will observe many, many, very small earthquakes (the incremental) and a number of very large ones (the punctuations) but very few moderate quakes proportionately. The earth’s surface plates slide against one another, driven by powerful forces in the earth’s core (the “inputs”). Even in the face of powerful dynamics, however, much of the time plate friction holds them together, allowing small magnitude quakes to release some of the pressure. But as time progresses, and the pressure builds, at some point a potentially disastrous “jump” must occur, bypassing a more moderate response to the pressure and resulting in the large magnitude quake. The inputs of plate pressure are not directly translated into “outputs” of earthquakes.

The Social Security story parallels this description of plate tectonics. During the 1940s focused demands resulted in minor adjustments to the 1939 basic

statutory structure—minor incremental adjustments.² When reform came in 1950, it came in monumental fashion. No moderate adjustments occurred anytime during the period.

Geophysicists do not observe the friction of plates directly. Instead, they measure the outputs from the process (the earthquakes) and study their frequency distribution. We are in a similar position, but with one important advantage. It is relatively easy to order political institutions according to the extent to which they impose decision costs on policymaking activity. To the extent that a political institution adds decision costs to collective action, the outputs from that institution will exhibit periods of stability (“gridlock”) interspersed with periods of rapid change. The higher the decision costs that must be overcome to achieve a collective goal, the more punctuated the outputs are likely to be.

Here we examine distributions of change in a number of key American political institutions, under the thesis that the more friction that an institution or social process adds to a collective decision-making situation, the more punctuated will be the outcomes produced. Our primary focus is the policymaking process. We study the nature of change in agenda setting (Congressional hearings, *New York Times*, and *Congressional Quarterly* [CQ] coverage), lawmaking (statutes enacted and Presidential executive orders issued), and budgetary commitments. In addition, we study U.S. elections (Presidential, Congressional, and Senatorial) and, for comparative purposes, the U.S. stock market. Some idea of the magnitude of this task is suggested by the fact that the total number of observations upon which these distributions are based sum to 305,486.

The key question is how people interacting in political institutions process and respond to signals from the environment. If institutions add friction to informational inputs, then outputs will not be directly related to inputs. But how will inputs and outputs differ in policymaking systems? We posit that whatever the input flow, the output flow will be both more stable (ignoring many important signals) and more punctuated (reacting strongly to some signals). Institutional analyses show that a “policy core” exists that is not responsive to changes in preferences (for example, through replacement of legislators in elections), but when preferences change enough to move the pivotal legislator’s preferences outside the core, then major punctuations in policy can occur (Hammond and Miller 1987; Krehbiel 1998). Policy process scholars have argued that policy agendas change when attentiveness and mobilization are directed at particular aspects of a complex environment, raising the probability of major policy innovations based on new ideas. Again, stability (when attention is not directed at the issue) and punctuation (when it is) occur in a single process (Baumgartner and

² Seamen affiliated with the War Shipping Administration were added to the system in 1943 and survivors of veterans killed in the war were added as beneficiaries in 1946 (Sparrow 1996, 36).

Jones 1993). Similarly, in elections, first past the post voting systems and partisan identifications by voters operate together to add great stability to election patterns, which are, nevertheless, occasionally disrupted by realignments.

STOCHASTIC PROCESSES AND PUNCTUATED CHANGE

The methods we use to study the general properties of policy change are stochastic process approaches. In stochastic process models, randomness is fundamental to the model rather than assuming the position of an "error term" in a model that otherwise would exactly predict particular outcomes. Stochastic process models try to ascertain what kinds of probability distributions could have accounted for an observed frequency distribution of outcomes. They are most useful when the exact specification of a model is not possible, either because of the essential complexity and uncertainty or because of the current state of scientific knowledge. While political scientists have tended to gravitate more to point prediction models and regression studies, stochastic process approaches have become increasingly popular in the natural and biological sciences. A major reason is the recognition of the key importance of extreme values in the determination of the time paths of complex systems (Sornette 2000). The more traditional regression studies often relegate these critical values to the error structure of "unexplained variance."

There is stochastic process work in political science, however. For the purposes of this paper, the most important studies are the budgetary studies by John Padgett (1980, 1981). Padgett derives and then estimates empirically the probability distributions associated with boundedly rational budgetary decision-making, showing that traditional incremental approaches will yield a normal distribution but that a sequential search model in which actors serially search for options (such as bigger and bigger budget cuts) until one satisfies the constraints they face will yield a double or two-sided Paretian distribution (because decision-makers can enjoy growth as well as suffer cuts). Also called the power distribution, it is characterized by a slender peak and heavy tails; it is the most famous of the punctuated distributions in science (Bak 1997; Mandelbrot 1997, 1999).

An idea of how frequency distributions can be used to study punctuated change is illustrated in Figure 1. There we plot the frequency distribution of inflation-adjusted annual percentage changes in U.S. Congressional Budget Authority from FY 1947 through FY 2000, pooled across Office of Management and Budget (OMB) subfunctions (Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1996).³ Each entry for the figure is the inflation-adjusted expenditure in a budget category in a year, mi-

nus that expenditure the year before, divided by the earlier expenditure. The entire distribution, then, is a set of year-to-year percentage change scores aggregated over all budget categories.

The clear pattern of stability coexisting with punctuations is striking. We have noted the Social Security expenditure changes discussed above in Figure 1 as an illustration of the pattern. The empirical distribution exhibits great stability around the mean; most changes are very small indeed. But the distribution also exhibits the signature "heavy tails" pattern: There are a considerable number of cases that are very far from the mean, indicating very large annual changes. As might be expected, there are more large budget increases than decreases—note the extraordinarily large positive tail. Most of the quantitative changes in the time series underlying the data come not from the incremental changes but from the extreme values.⁴ While understanding both punctuation and stability is critical, the punctuations are far more important in accounting for aggregate change.

Frequency distributions with this general shape are characterized as having *positive kurtosis*. Kurtosis is defined statistically as the fourth moment around the mean; the variance and skew are the second and third moments. A unit-free measure of kurtosis somewhat analogous to the coefficient of variation measure of variance (the standard deviation divided by the mean) was developed by Karl Pearson; it is the raw fourth moment divided by the square of the variance (Anscombe and Glynn 1983).⁵

This standardized kurtosis has a value of three for the normal distribution; distributions with positive kurtosis (termed *leptokurtosis*) tend to have slender peaks and heavy tails as in Figure 1. Focusing on kurtosis offers a way of directly comparing the distributions we study, but in practice it encounters some difficulties in interpretation and application. As a consequence, we first examine kurtosis tests and then move to more accurate direct parameter estimates of the underlying probability distributions that are hypothesized to underlie the frequency distributions we study.⁶

COSTS IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS


An *institution* may be defined as a set of individuals acting according to common rules resulting in

³ Political scientists are in the unfortunate situation of lacking both a comparative unit of measurement for policy change and time series long enough to focus only on changes in a single policy. As a consequence, we are forced to rely on percentage changes to achieve the necessary aggregation across policy content categories.

⁴ We assess the extensiveness of punctuations by the occurrences of "extreme values." This is not strictly correct, because there could exist a pattern of extreme values that are temporally contiguous, suggesting large-scale instability rather than intermittent punctuations. Inspection of our data distributions suggests that this kind of instability is not common, but we cannot do here the case studies of the distributions necessary for a more complete analysis. The statistical study of extreme values now has a robust intellectual history (Kotz and Nadarajah 2000).

⁵ $k = (\sum (X - \mu)^4 / n) / (\sum (X - \mu)^2 / n)^2$, where μ is the mean.

⁶ Moreover, the dynamics of peaks (stability) and tails can differ, stochastically, theoretically, and empirically. It is not currently clear how kurtosis, which attempts to assess both within a summary measure, is affected in such circumstances. Direct parameter estimates can aid us in detecting differences in the dynamics associated with tail and peak.

FIGURE 1. Severe Leptokurtic Distribution: Pooled Percentage Change in Real U.S. Congressional Budget Authority, FY 1947–FY 2000

collective outcomes. Institutional rules are not neutral, in the sense that different rules often lead to different outcomes (Jackson 1990, 2). These aggregations of individuals interacting according to rules react to information from the environment and come to a collective response (even if the collective response is simply the sum of individual actions, as it is for markets and elections and roll-call voting in legislatures).

Decision-making systems impose four kinds of costs in making decisions in response to a changing environment: decision costs, transaction costs, information costs, and cognitive costs. *Decision costs* are costs that actors trying to come to agreement incur. They include bargaining costs and institutionally imposed costs, such as those built into a separation of powers governing arrangement (Bish 1973; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). *Transaction costs* are costs that parties incur after they come to agreement (North 1990). In market transactions, these involve such items as the cost of ensuring compliance to contractual agreements and other payments to third parties to complete the transaction. It ought to be clear that in advanced democracies decision costs in the policymaking process heavily outweigh transaction costs. The costs of bringing relevant parties to agreement in a system of separated powers (decision costs) generally out-

weigh the costs of holding hearings, enacting statutes, or changing budgetary allocations once agreement has been reached (transaction costs). In any case, we combine these costs in our analysis, terming them together "decision costs."

Information costs are search costs—costs of obtaining information relevant to making a decision. These are costs that exist when a person (or an organization) *wants* to make a decision. *Cognitive costs* are costs associated with the limited processing capacity of any social institution comprised of human beings. These are costs that occur because people *do not know* they need to make a decision. If one is not attending to a key component of the environment, then he or she cannot decide whether or not to incur search or information costs.

We posit here that these costs act similarly on the capacity of political institutions to process the flow of information. Institutional costs in politics may approximate the manner in which friction operates in physical models. When friction is introduced into idealized physical models, nonlinear systems result (Bak 1997). Such open systems result in an output pattern that is episodic and punctuated, with extraordinary difficulty in making point predictions. Earthquakes are an example. Predicting a particular earthquake is not currently possible, but the patterning of earthquakes follows a lawlike

pattern—the power function of the Guttenberg–Richter law (Bak 1997; Rundle, Turcotte, and Klein 1996; Schroeder 1991; Sornette 2000; West and Deering 1995).

AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS

A hypothetical fully efficient decision-making institution that imposed no costs would respond seamlessly to the world around it. That is, it would incorporate all relevant aspects of the information it encountered and would “use up” all the information in its decision-making process. The outputs of such a system would perfectly reflect the information flows coming from its environment (Simon 1996). The major example of such a cost-free system is the classical model of a competitive economy.

In such a pure system,

$$R = \beta S, \quad (1)$$

where

R = response = ΔO = change in output,

S = information (signal),

β = benefits derived from the information flow (<1).

The system reacts directly to the input flow by changing its output. If costs are assumed to act linearly on the system, then

$$R = \beta S - C. \quad (2)$$

Our hypothetical system continues to respond directly to the input flow. Now, however, it will not act until it recovers the costs that must be invested in reacting to the flow of information.

In idealized frictionless systems, the output (decision) result is entirely a function of the information received. This is a standard against which other processes may be compared. In such a system, if the information flow were distributed in a normal or Gaussian fashion, then the output flow would be normal, as the normal distribution is invariant under a linear transformation. There is good reason to expect the Gaussian as an input distribution. If participants in an institution receive information from independent diverse streams and weight and sum these diverse streams in an index, then the resulting distribution would be normal by the central limit theorem, at least in the limit. This is an important standard, because in most situations we cannot observe the flow of information into a policymaking system with any precision. Without a complete model of the policy system, something we lack at present, there is no way of knowing which aspects of a complex situation will be judged relevant (of benefit).⁷

The input flow, however, may not be normal because whatever processes generate that flow do not approximate the central limit theorem.⁸ In that case, we lose a convenient standard, but the basic argument should, nevertheless, hold: The higher the institutional costs on collective action, the more punctuated the outcome pattern.

Let us now turn to less-than-perfect human systems. If individual decision-makers rely on a limited set of indicators to monitor their environments, and update them or include newly salient aspects of the environment in the decision-making calculus episodically, the result will be a flow of “news” (that is, the information flow to which the decision-maker attends) that is not normal (Jones 2001, chap. 7). This kind of decision-making underlies agenda-setting studies. In effect, the decision-maker locks choice into a set of facts based in the past and must update in a punctuated manner in the face of change that cannot be ignored. The “news” is leptokurtic. If the news is leptokurtic, outputs in completely efficient institutions will be leptokurtic. Since collective outputs from markets and elections are simple aggregates of individual decisions, outputs will follow news flows.

Institutional decision costs will add to the kurtosis of output distributions. Difficulty in changing the status quo results in incremental decision-making rather than reform. This shows up in output distributions as the tall central peak associated with leptokurtic distributions. When change occurs, it requires substantial mobilization to overcome the stasis associated with the workings of political institutions and the tendency of humans to adopt rules of action that are difficult to change. As a consequence, when change occurs, it tends to be relatively extreme. This results in the characteristic “heavy tails” and “weak shoulders” of leptokurtic distributions. This leads to our first key hypothesis.

H₁: *Output change distributions from human decision-making institutions will be characterized by positive kurtosis.*

If our reasoning is correct, we expect *always* to find positive kurtosis in the outputs of human institutions—elections, lawmaking, budgeting, media coverage, scheduled hearings on bills, etc.

INSTITUTIONAL FRICTION

Some institutions impose higher decision and transaction costs than others. We hypothesize that the higher the institutional costs imposed, the more leptokurtic the output distribution.

There would exist considerable friction in policymaking systems even if they were informationally efficient, because American political institutions are not


⁷ One response is to think of news coverage as an input variable and to try to relate policy outputs to “the news.” This is not an appropriate strategy, however, because media scholars have shown that in many cases the news responds to what policymakers are doing, and is subject to manipulation by them (Bennett 1990).

⁸ Three central limit theory assumptions can lead to difficulties. They are the independence assumption (which we discuss later in the paper), the assumption that a decision-maker does not rely too heavily on a single source, and the finite variance assumption (very extreme values can occur).

H₂: *The more friction an institution imposes, the more leptokurtic its output distribution will be.*

Elections are more problematic. In the past, high transaction costs have been imposed on some voters: non-property holders, blacks, women. The 2000 Presidential election, as conducted in Florida, indicates that transaction costs may still be imposed on some groups, even though the systematic exclusion practiced in the past no longer exists. The long periods we use for elections in the United States make the changing nature of the cost structure problematic. In the modern era, however, transaction costs have been relatively low, and theories of electoral choice have emphasized cognitive friction (in the form of partisan identification and, more recently, heuristic reasoning) to the virtual exclusion of institutional costs. In any case, whatever transaction costs have been imposed in the past should be imposed similarly for the three kinds of elections we study, and they should differ among themselves only in cognitive stickiness. We hypothesize that Congressional elections, because of their low visibility, will be more subject to leptokurtosis than either Senatorial or Presidential elections and that Senatorial

Now we turn to the policymaking distributions. Policy process scholars find it useful to divide the policymaking process into stages such that an issue must access one stage before moving to the next. For example, an issue must access the agenda before it is enacted into law, and it must be enacted before a budgetary allocation (deLeon 1999). The process looks roughly like this:



In sum, we rank the various social processes we study in terms of institutionally imposed costs (least to most) as follows.

1. **Markets.** Pure markets have low transaction and decision costs; modern stock and bond markets come very close to this ideal. Information is freely available. (Appendix 2 details a smattering of the long history of the empirical study of financial markets.)
2. **Elections.** Voting in modern times has low transaction and decision costs, but elections themselves differ in the extent to which they impose information costs. In Presidential elections, information is more available (but can cost cognitive resources in organizing it). Less information is available in most House races.
3. **Policy processes.** Policy-stage theory implies the following ranking, from the least to the most costly.
 - a. *News coverage.* We assess the systemic agenda via general news coverage. Changing from one topic of coverage to another is not cost-free, but it is relatively easy compared to lawmaking.
 - b. *Congressional hearings.* We assess the policy or governmental agenda through the scheduling of hearings. The topic of scrutiny must attract attention (a cognitive cost) and incur some institutional costs (the minority party cannot schedule hearings alone).
 - c. *Congressional quarterly coverage.* The coverage of inside-the-beltway coverage of issues likely mimics the salience of issues on the governmental agenda. The specialized press has no independent agenda-setting power; rather it indexes the law-making activity of Congress.
 - d. *Executive orders.* The president alone acts, but executive orders often have major policy impacts

(Mayer 2001). Decision costs are high but are concentrated within a single branch of government.

- e. *Statutes*. Both houses of Congress and the President must cooperate in the lawmaking process; decision costs imposed by the structure are very high.
- f. *Budgets*. The literature indicates a complex interaction between cognitive and institutionally imposed costs. Institutionally, large changes are subject to the same dynamics as statutes. Cognitively, budget routines and operating procedures dominate the proceeding, and these tend to be highly resistant to change.

Aspects of this ranking may be debatable, but at least it provides a starting point for comparing the outputs of diverse institutional arrangements. In any case, it is clear that political institutions impose decision and transaction costs because of their deliberate design and operation and that this facet of political life can be examined empirically.

Table 1 indicates the nature and sources of the data we employ. We noted above that what we term cognitive costs interact with institutionally imposed costs, so that it is somewhat artificial to try to disentangle them. However, in cases where institutionally imposed costs are very low, leptokurtosis in output distributions very likely indicates that cognitive costs are operative. It is always possible, of course, that the distribution of

information is leptokurtic in such circumstances, so in this case we rely on the argument above concerning implicit indicators. That implies that, in the limit at least, information is normally distributed, and hence deviations from normality in such institutions are due mostly to cognitive costs. Elections and asset markets (stock and bond markets) are both characterized by very low decision costs (generally the buyer or voter has control over the decision) and transaction costs.

FINDINGS

All of the distributions we studied are first-difference change scores or percentage changes; our theory applies to changes. For all distributions, we pool the time series change scores across the basic units. (See Appendix 1 for a discussion of measurement and analysis strategies employed here.)

There is no ideal method for comparing distributions regarding their punctuations, so we settled on a three-stage approach. First, we ran Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests on all the distributions; then we examined the sample kurtosis for the distributions; finally, we moved to the direct parameter estimate approach.

The K-S test compares the values of a distribution of data to a theoretical probability distribution; significance implies that the observations do not follow the distribution of interest. This test is not particularly powerful; it is fairly easy to reject the null hypothesis.

TABLE 1. Distributions Studied

Distribution	Description	Source
Asset markets (stock market average returns)	Daily percentage change in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, 1896-1996	Dow-Jones and company (1996)
Elections		
U.S. President	Election-to-election swing in the two-party vote for President, pooled across counties, 1828-1992	Made available by Peter Nardulli (see Nardulli 1994)
U.S. House of Representatives	Election-to-election swing in the two-party vote for the House of Representatives, pooled across districts, 1998-92	King (1997)
U.S. Senate	Election-to-election swing in the two-party vote for the U.S. Senate, pooled across seats, 1920-98	Calculated from the U.S. Senate web site
Media coverage	Annual percentage change of the number of <i>New York Times</i> stories on political topics, pooled across 19 major content categories, 1946-94	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
Policy agenda processes	Annual percentage change in the number of scheduled hearings, pooled across 19 major content categories, 1946-98	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
Specialized coverage of lawmaking	Annual percentage change in the number of stories, and (separately) in the length of those stories, in the <i>Congressional Quarterly</i> , pooled across 20 content categories, 1946-94	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
U.S. lawmaking	Annual percentage change in the number of enacted laws by the U.S. national government, pooled across 19 content categories, 1946-98	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
U.S. executive orders	Annual percentage change in the number of executive orders issued by the President, pooled across 19 content categories, 1946-2000	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
Public budgets	Year-to-year percentage changes in budget allocations, U.S. Congressional Budget Authority, FY 1947-2000, pooled across OMB subfunctions	Tabulated from the Policy Agendas Project
Congressional Budget Authority	Year-to-year percentage changes in U.S. budget outlays, 1800-1994	U.S. Bureau of the Census
Outlays		

TABLE 2. Sample Kurtosis Calculated on Raw Data

Distribution	Kurtosis	SE
Budget Authority	85.29	0.100
Budget Outlays	59.55	0.342
Statutes	23.81	0.159
Executive orders	9.75	0.151
CQ stories	23.54	0.165
House hearings	29.28	0.154
Senate hearings	28.42	0.154
<i>New York Times</i> stories	10.18	0.162
House elections	3.67	0.035
Senate elections	4.52	0.137
Presidential elections	5.85	0.00022
Dow-Jones Industrials	7.63	0.00087
Averages		
Budgets (2)	72.42	
Policy processes (5)	22.84	
Input distributions (5)	6.37	

Note. Policy data distributions were calculated using the percentage-percentage method (see Appendix 1). The Presidential elections kurtosis estimate was calculated on grouped data; the SE was estimated from the entire sample. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average kurtosis estimate was averaged across four time periods; the SE, estimated from the entire sample. Policy distributions include statutes, executive orders, CQ stories, and hearings. Input distributions include newspaper coverage, elections, and markets. We have eliminated change data of more than 1000% because of the extraordinary sensitivity of the sample kurtosis to extreme values.

Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that the underlying probability distribution is either normal or lognormal is easily rejected for all the distributions we studied.

Armed with this information, we examined the standardized kurtosis values for each of the distributions we studied. These results are presented in Table 2. Kurtosis has suffered from difficulties in interpretation (Finucan 1963; Moors 1988) and is flawed as an empirical measure (Balanda and MacGillivray 1988; Groeneveld 1998). In effect, it is too sensitive to the extreme values to estimate the full shape of the distribution properly. But it is the best direct comparative measure we have.

Table 2 generally supports our institutional friction hypothesis. First, all distributions suffer from what finance economists term the "excess kurtosis problem" (Mills 1995)—each and every one of the values exceed that expected from the normal distribution. We can test the statistical hypothesis that the observed sample kurtosis exceeds the expected three⁹ and would reject it in each and every case.

We can say more. Let us divide the distributions into three groups: those assessing final output commitments (the budget distributions), those indicating public policy processes, and those independent of policymaking institutions (here termed "input distributions"). We see great differences in the average sample kurtosis—over 72 for the budget distributions and almost 23 for

the policy process distributions, but only 6.37 for the input distributions.¹⁰ The kurtosis measures generally order the distributions according to institutional friction.

There are, however, several "out-of-order" distributions within these groups. The most glaring of these is the kurtosis for executive orders, which falls closer to the values characteristic of the input distributions than to the policy distributions. Also noteworthy is that the kurtosis for statutes is less than that for hearings. For the input distributions, elections seem to exhibit less kurtosis than markets. Again, however, these results cannot be viewed as solid without confirming evidence.

We now move to estimate directly the form of the probability distributions underlying the frequency distributions. It is technically not possible to study all types of possible probability distributions by directly estimating parameters, but it is appropriate for two important classes of distributions—the double exponential (or Laplace) and the double Paretian.¹¹ As Figure 2 shows, these distributions may be arrayed along a continuum from thin to heavy tails, or from "mild" to "wild" randomness in Mandelbrot's (1997, 1999) terms, with the normal being the mildest—the thinnest tails and hence the fewest punctuations—and the Paretian the wildest—the heaviest tails and more probable punctuations.¹² Each probability distribution is actually a family of distributions depending on certain parameters. The normal distribution is completely characterized by its mean and variance (higher moments—skew and kurtosis—do not vary within the normal family). Skew and kurtosis do vary within the other two families of curves. A Paretian distribution becomes more and more wild as the absolute value of the exponent increases (essentially fattening the tails of the probability distribution and weakening the shoulders). Similarly, the slope parameter for the exponential assesses wildness—the shallower the slope, the more punctuated the tails of the distribution. Unfortunately, the parameter for the exponential is not scale-invariant (that is, its comparability depends on the units of measurement, similar to an unstandardized regression slope).

We present below selected frequency distributions and their associated scatterplots used to estimate the type of probability distribution with the highest likelihood of generating the empirical frequency distributions. Paretian and exponential distributions may be estimated by examining the fit of the frequency distribution (frequencies versus category midpoints) in log-log and semilog plots, respectively.¹³ We plot the


¹⁰ The policy process distributions include statutes, executive orders, CQ stories, and House and Senate hearings. Input distributions include *New York Times* coverage, elections, and markets.

¹¹ "Double" because change can occur in a positive or a negative direction. Direct estimates differ from the more familiar quantile comparisons ("q-q" plots). Direct parameter estimation allows researchers to distinguish among distributions within a family.

¹² Indeed, theoretically the Paretian is so punctuated that its variance is infinite. This applies to the theoretical distribution; in empirical practice all moments may be estimated.

¹³ For the Paretian, $y = aX^b \Rightarrow \ln(y) = \ln(a) + b\ln(X)$; for the exponential, $y = ae^{bx} \Rightarrow \ln(y) = \ln(a) + bX$, where X represents the category midpoints of the variable of interest, and y represents the frequencies associated with the midpoints.

⁹ The sample kurtosis is distributed normally with variance equal to $24/n$ in the limit (Anscombe and Glynn 1983).

FIGURE 2. Thin to Heavy Tails Among Empirically Estimated Distributions

category midpoints against the number of cases in each category, yielding a simple scatterplot. It is generally easy to see which of the transformations best fit the data. The plots will display distinct curvature if the estimated distribution is inappropriate.¹⁴ Standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression procedures are used to compare directly the goodness of fits, and these are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

All of the distributions we studied except for government budgets were best approximated by a double-exponential probability distribution. In almost all cases, the fits were exceptionally good, although the right (positive-change) tails for the policy distributions display better fits than the left (negative) tails.

Policy Process. We expect to find more pronounced punctuations in policy commitment distributions than in agenda-setting distributions. Early in the policy process, when proposals struggle to gain agenda access, cognitive costs are high but institutional costs are reasonably low. The scheduling of a policy topic for a hearing is indicative that policymakers are taking the topic seriously—the topic has accessed the policy or governmental agenda, but holding the hearing requires paying only limited decision and transaction costs. Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution for Senate hearings, along with the log-log and semilog plots for the distribution. The hearings data are skewed toward the positive side. The slopes for the left side of the scatterplots have been reversed in sign for purposes of comparison. The fit for the log-log plot displays a distinct downward curvature, indicating that the fit is not good; basically the distribution is less 'wild' than the Paretian. The semilog plot fits much better. The slope estimates for the two tails are distinctly of different absolute magnitudes; this indicates that punctuations are more likely in a positive direction than a negative one.

Figure 4 depicts the frequency distribution and the associated scatterplots for lawmaking. The frequency distribution is not as well structured as the other policy distributions, but a right long tail is clearly present, and the right tail displays an excellent fit. The left tail fits less well, a phenomenon that characterizes all of the policy

frequency distributions. Moreover, the strong central peak is not as much in evidence in the distribution—it is overshadowed by the extended tail. This is characteristic of exponential distributions as the parameter increases in absolute magnitude. One interpretation of this finding is that when major statutory change occurs, it tends to shift activity from the existing set of policy concerns to new ones.

Table 3 presents the exponential fits for policy data (except government budgets), as well as for the elections data. Because of differences in measurement, the market, elections, and policy data are not directly comparable, but they are comparable within sets. The policy output data can be ranked by using the parameter value—essentially lower values indicate more extended tails.¹⁵

As hypothesized, accessing the systemic agenda, assessed by the *New York Times* coverage of politics and government, displays more moderate change—essentially more flexibility—in moving from policy topic to policy topic than distributions assessing later stages in the policy cycle. Accessing the policy or governmental agenda, assessed by the scheduling of hearings, comes next, with House hearings slightly more punctuated than Senate hearings. This can be due to constitutional facets that require hearings in certain categories—appropriations, for example. In any case, the difference is not large, and both fit the general pattern.

Inside-the-beltway specialized coverage by the *CQ* displays a higher kurtosis than press coverage or the scheduling of hearings. This may be a surprise at first glance, but it became clear that *CQ*'s coverage is indexed to the lawmaking activities of Congress. As hypothesized, statutes are the most punctuated of all the exponential policy distributions. Lawmaking requires the cooperation of three separate policymaking institutions and, as a consequence, should be exceptionally sticky. Presidential executive orders occupy a position between the agenda-setting variables and the statutes.

¹⁴ As is common practice, we use the cumulative frequencies to estimate the plots. Each side of the distribution is cumulated from its extreme (tail) to the middle category. This makes no difference in the estimation procedure and displays the fundamental aspects of the distribution by stabilizing the "chatter" at the tails of the distributions.

¹⁵ There are difficult statistical issues associated with direct parameter estimates. First, cumulated plots will not yield independent errors, but the error seems to be trivial (Sornette 2000, 141). Second, the number of cases is not properly represented by the number of points plotted. We report "pseudo-standard errors" to indicate that we adjust these for the actual number of cases studied. This is not entirely correct either, because the extreme values are estimated by fewer points than the points closer to the center of the distribution.

TABLE 3. Exponential (Semilog) Fits for Policy and Election Frequency Distributions

Distribution	Total <i>N</i> (Categories by Year)	Parameter Estimate (Right Tail/Left Tail)	<i>R</i> ² (Right Tail/Left Tail)	Pseudo Standard Error (Right Tail/Left Tail)
Statutes (1948–98)	17,041	–0.448	0.995	0.0013
	(950)	2.137	0.838	0.0466
Executive orders (1945–2000)	3,659	–0.507	0.932	0.0054
	(1,045)	2.238	0.820	0.0845
CQ article lines (1948–94)	12,580	–0.538	0.999	0.0019
	(874)	2.238	0.928	0.0623
CQ stories (1948–94)	12,580	–0.550	0.975	0.0037
	(874)	2.781	0.893	0.0541
House hearings (1946–99)	41,977	–0.575	0.960	0.0049
	(1,007)	2.774	0.960	0.0272
Senate hearings (1946–99)	24,149	–0.647	0.983	0.0047
	(1,007)	2.586	0.949	0.0272
New York Times stories (1946–94)	34,149	–0.885	0.991	0.0035
	(911)	2.850	0.936	0.0429
House elections (1898–1992)	19,387	–1.451	0.992	0.0013
		1.480	0.992	0.0013
Senate elections (1920–98)	1,277	–1.920	0.983	0.0099
		1.993	0.999	0.0028
Presidential elections (1824–92)	110,003	–2.480	0.985	0.0013
		2.173	0.998	0.0005

Note: *N*'s refer to the number of cases studied for each distribution. For the policy distributions, the raw data were transformed into changes across categories, yielding a lower number on which the frequency distributions were based. These *N*'s are in parentheses. The parameter estimate is the estimate of *b* in the equation for the exponential distribution given in footnote 13. Estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients for semilog plots for each distribution. Pseudo-standard errors are standard errors adjusted for the actual *N*'s involved in the calculation of the coefficients.

TABLE 4. Goodness-of-Fit Measures for Paretian Distribution for Government Budget Data

Budget Distribution	<i>N</i>	Exponent (Right Tail/Left Tail)	<i>R</i> ²	Pseudo-Standard Error
U.S. Budget Authority, FY 1947–FY 2000 (all policy subfunctions)	3,024	–0.924	0.990	0.00038
		1.525	0.875	0.0314
U.S. Outlays, 1800–1994	195	–0.996	0.988	0.00005
		1.205	0.954	0.0817
U.S. Budget Authority (exponential fit)	3,024	–0.019	0.984	0.0002
		8.149	0.885	0.0002

Note: Parameter estimates are for *b* in the equations given in footnote 13.

Presidential attention must be engaged for him to issue an executive order, but he commits the nation to a policy change with his signature (Mayer 2001). While he need not secure the cooperation of other branches of government in the process, he must deal with intrabranched cooperation among affected agencies, the OMB, and the Justice Department.

Public Budgets. Next we examine resource commitment. Figure 5 presents scatterplots for U.S. Congressional Budget Authority, pooled across OMB subfunctions, for 1947–96 (Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution). We have focused on policy subfunctions, eliminating financial transactions, and have adjusted for inflation. Figure 6 presents the full set of graphs for U.S. Budget Outlays, 1800–1994. Table 4 describes the log–log fits for the two budget series we examined. In each case, the Paretian fit better than the exponential. For U.S. Budget Authority, available only for the modern era, an exponential fit the left, negative change tail better than the Paretian. That is, program curtail-

ment is less punctuated than program growth since the Second World War.

Growth and Retrenchment in Public Policy. A close look at the semilog plots for the policy distributions suggests a slight upward curvature for the right (positive-change) tail. This is suggestive of a “stretched exponential”, which may be viewed as more leptokurtic than the pure exponential (Laherrere and Sornette 1998).¹⁶ (This is also the case for the stock market data.) On the other hand, the left side (negative change) of the policy distributions curves down in the semilog fit, indicating a “truncated exponential,” one less leptokurtic than the pure exponential.¹⁷ In essence, policy

¹⁶ This phenomenon affects many natural and economic series, as Laherrere and Sornette (1998) show, and may have accounted for a premature classification of many phenomena as power functions.

¹⁷ The downward curve is not a consequence of the constrained range of the data due to our use of percentage changes; the end point of these tails occurs prior to the theoretical minimum of –100%.

TABLE 5. Exponential Fits for Dow-Jones Daily Returns, Various Periods, 1896–1996

Dow-Jones Industrial Average	N	Parameter Estimate (Right Tail/Left Tail)	R^2 (Right Tail/Left Tail)
1896–1921	7,244	-1.33 1.15	0.997 0.992
1921–46	7,463	-0.83 0.64	0.992 0.942
1946–71	6,469	-1.73 1.56	0.968 0.965
1971–96	6,418	-1.43 1.47	0.997 0.983

Note: Parameter estimates are for b in the equation for the exponential given in footnote 13.

expansions are more punctuated than policy retrenchments, which are more orderly and moderate. The budget and policy data support a general proposition: There seems to be a rush as government enters new domains of activity, taking on new responsibilities, but there is a more cautious approach in withdrawing from previously supported activities. In particular, there is less evidence of the large lurches that characterize new policy activity.

We have conceived of institutional friction as imposing stability but being subject to occasional punctuations. We generally associate it with distributional kurtosis. But there may be an element of institutional friction associated with skew: Affected interests may be able to retard retrenchment punctuations.








FIGURE 3. Yearly Percentage Change in Senate Hearings by Major Topic, 1946–99. Frequency Distribution: Semilog Plot (Bottom Left); Log-Log Plot (Bottom Right)

FIGURE 4. Yearly Percentage Change in Statutes by Major Topic, 1948–98. Frequency Distribution: Semilog Plot (Bottom Left); Log-Log Plot (Bottom Right)

Elections. Elections in general should be characterized by less institutional friction than policymaking processes, and our distributional analysis shows that is indeed the case. Figure 7 presents the results for House elections; similar results were obtained from the analyses of Senate and Presidential elections. As is the case for the policy distributions, the exponential is the proper fit for this distribution. The slopes for each side of the double exponential are similar in absolute value, indicating that change is about as likely in one direction as the other.

Within elections, Presidential contests are the least punctuated, while House contests are the most (see Table 3). House elections are characterized by long periods of very little deviation in the voting patterns for the incumbent, punctuated by occasional large swings. Missing is the moderate adjustment that is expected with the normal. It is of course well-known that legislators may make themselves safer than might be predicted by the policy attitudes of the represented, but our approach offers a method of comparison not available when we examine distributions in isolation. It is likely

FIGURE 5. Real U.S. Budget Authority, FY 1947–FY 2000, Pooled across OMB Subfunctions, Semilog and Log-Log Plots



that information in Presidential elections leads to more frequent updating, and hence more moderate change, than in House elections.

Markets. Markets, in theory, should be the most friction-free of the major political and economic institutions in America. Figure 8 presents the results for U.S. stock market returns as a composite diagram across 100 years of the Dow–Jones Industrial Average. We estimated exponential fits for daily returns for the Dow–Jones Industrial Average for four separate periods and for the entire series, 1896 through 1996. Table 5 presents these results.

Financial economists have studied the kurtosis associated with stock returns (beginning with Mandelbrot 1964). Direct empirical estimates of the distributions have been rarer than time series studies, and occasionally analysts have rushed to conclude that stock markets follow power functions (Peters 1991, 1994). Table 5 shows that stock markets, like much political data,

follow an exponential probability distribution. The upward curvature is suggestive of the stretched exponential.


SOME CAVEATS IN STUDYING DYNAMICS

The distributions we have studied order themselves clearly into three groups: the “input distributions” (elections, markets, and news coverage), with relatively low kurtosis and shorter tails; the “policy process” distributions (hearings, *CQ* coverage, executive orders, and statutes), with higher kurtosis and somewhat more extended tails; and the budget distributions, with very high kurtosis and both relatively high stability and thick tails. Within the policy process distributions, there are relatively more extreme values later in the policy cycle (statutes) compared to earlier (hearings).

The finding of so many exponential distributions among those we studied is intriguing but causes some modification of the institutional friction theory. Technically statisticians categorize the exponential distribution as (relatively) thin-tailed, sometimes using the exponential as the dividing point between thin- and thick-tailed distributions. In addition, in the case of the exponential, peakedness and stretched tails (a better term than “thick tails” for the exponential) are inversely related. Empirically this means that, within the exponential family of distributions, major changes or punctuations must be compensated for by “giving up” some stability or peakedness. That is not the case for the Paretian, where both stability and punctuations can increase at the expense of the shoulders.

As the parameter for the exponential increases, then, the tail becomes more “stretched out” and there are relatively more extreme changes. But this is at the cost of stability. Both stability and punctuations occur relatively less in any exponential distribution than in Pareto distributions, but the exponential parameter is an important governor of the extensiveness of punctuations within the exponential family. As the exponential parameter increases, there are relatively more punctuations and relatively less stability. This seems to be the dynamic characteristic of most policymaking distributions, even statutes. It suggests that policymaking systems following an exponential path are more adaptive to incoming information than systems following a Paretian path.

A second issue relates to the causal dynamics that underpin the distributions we have studied. We have relentlessly pursued the notion that political change is affected by institutional friction, and it is clear that there is considerable evidence for the hypothesis. This cannot be the whole story of punctuated political distributions, however. Most importantly, heavy tails in frequency distributions can be caused by cascades—bandwagons and fads, for example. In such situations, there exists interdependency among the cases. Such “chain reaction” dynamics is most in


FIGURE 6. Real U.S. Budget Outlays, 1800–1994. Frequency Distribution: Semilog Plot (Bottom Left); Log-Log Plot (Bottom Right)

evidence in the budget data, where clearly program budgets are not completely independent, nor are they dictated solely by macro budgeting concerns (which would induce case dependency). More generally, any process that induces interdependency (such as the familiar monitoring and mimicking behaviors observed in markets and in lobbying) result in "thick-tailed" distributions. We cannot address just how these cascading processes are intertwined with friction-related institutional costs here, but we believe that this ought to be a major avenue of future research in policy processes.

While our direct parameter tests indicate that the double exponential fits both the elections data and the

stock market data, the distribution for elections is more centrally peaked than that for stock market data. As a consequence, the punctuations for the stock market are relatively more extreme and the central stability is relatively less rigid. Election swings are bounded, while stock market returns are not, which can account for the difference. But other factors may be at work. Both institutions aggregate individual choices in a straightforward manner, but Tip O'Neil's dictum, "All politics is local," suggests that elections for the House of Representatives, at least, are less subject to national election trends than stock markets. As markets become more linked, they could be more subject to cascades even as information is more and more widely available. One

FIGURE 7. Election-to-Election Change in House Vote Margin by District. Frequency Distribution: Semilog Plot (Bottom Left); Log-Log Plot (Bottom Right)






fruitful line of inquiry would be to examine more thoroughly the “anchoring” effect of local forces in Congressional elections. It stands to reason that election distributions will be more strongly anchored by the incumbency effect, something that does not exist for markets.

The general point here is that it is difficult to isolate the effects of institutional friction, which leads to punctuated outputs, from cascade dynamics, which also leads to punctuated outputs. And of course there

are other potential causal processes that could account for the distributions we analyze in this paper. A disadvantage of the stochastic process approach is that it is less amenable to ruling out alternate causal models than the more familiar regression-based structural modeling approach. On the other hand, examining distributions can lead to radically different understandings of causal mechanisms, to fresh tests of causal processes, and to new directions of research.

FIGURE 8. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) Daily Percentage Returns, 1896–1996. Frequency Distribution: Semilog Plot (Bottom Left); Log-Log Plot (Bottom Right)



CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have demonstrated the following.

1. All of the distributions display distinct positive kurtosis that exceeds that of the normal distribution.
2. If we order institutions in terms of the institutional costs they impose on taking collective action, then the associated output distributions are increasingly leptokurtic.
3. Where institutionally imposed costs are very low, positive kurtosis is still in evidence.

4. All of the distributions are best approximated by the exponential except for budgets, which are Paretian.
5. In the case of policy change, entering new policy domains is more punctuated than withdrawing from old ones.

Such empirical regularities require a general approach, based in how institutionally imposed costs and the cognitive limitations of participants act to affect how information coming from the environment is processed. This moves us to a high level of abstraction, one incapable of assessing the details of how institutions

operate but that allows comparison among institutions currently addressed in a separate, disjoint manner. In the case of U.S. national policymaking institutions, our approach implies that “gridlock” is an incomplete description of policy processes and that institutions with higher costs on action display a greater tendency to lurch between stability and punctuations.

A few particulars may be addressed. It may be noted that if one institution’s outputs serves as information for a second, the second must have a leptokurtic output distribution. But normally institutions are not so tightly linked; a degree of choice and attention accompanies any decision-making process. Similarly if institutions follow a uniform news source to access information, then they all are hostage to the distribution of outputs produced by that source. This strategy would violate our early assumption about implicit indicators as a strategy for information acquisition, but in any case it would not vitiate any key finding in this paper. For example, it cannot account for the ordered kurtosis we find related to institutionally imposed costs.

Because of the small number of observations, in most cases we needed to pool observations across time and subcategories. It is possible that our pooling approach has, in effect, resulted in a mixture of different stochastic processes. We did some rudimentary tests—looking at budgetary functions rather than subfunctions and examining the outlays data across the longer time period; in each case, no differences emerged. It is also the case that mixing a set of similar probability distributions often yields a different observed distribution.¹⁸ These matters are best left to better models directed at understanding each separate process; such studies could well modify the findings we present here.

Perhaps most importantly, our central finding that institutions act to cause greater punctuations than would be expected based on the information flow seems directly at odds with the notion that institutions regularize human interactions. First, the series we have studied are limited to the United States. *Given* a liberal democratic system, it is the case that institutions add friction to human choices in a predictable way—they cause greater stability but more severe change when it does occur. The right balance between stability and change is elusive, but too much stability can lead to major disruptions, even revolutions, when change occurs, whereas hyperresponsiveness to incoming information may not allow for any continuity and future planning (Jones 1994). Moreover, because decision costs, unlike transaction costs, impose policy choices on the unwilling, ensuring that major policy shifts are based on large majorities, seems normatively justifiable.

Why do liberal democratic social processes apparently display less extreme behavior than natural phenomena? We noted that many scientists have claimed that Paretian or power distributions characterize many

physical phenomena. There have been dissents (Laherere and Sornette 1998), but these studies have found stretched exponentials, reaching toward the extreme values of the Paretian. Excepting positive change in government budgets, we report none of the extreme distributions found in natural sciences. A possible answer may be found in the openness of the system examined. Forest fires are far less likely to be catastrophic if regular lightening strikes ignite fires; if fires are contained, and fuel builds (that is, the system is more “closed” to inputs), then the likelihood of extreme fires may increase. Similarly, dykes on rivers may prevent moderate floods but inadvertently increase the (still small) probability of major floods.

We have noted that “exponential” policymaking systems in effect give up peakedness in order to achieve punctuations. Paretian policymaking systems can give up shoulders for both peakedness and punctuations. It is likely, then, that exponential policy systems are more adaptable to changing real-world circumstances. That certainly seems to be the case from the distributions we have studied in this paper.

In human systems, intervention may act to move a previously well-behaved system into a more punctuated one (as in the case of forest fires or river engineering), but the opposite may occur as well. The key may be to think of tuning a system toward regular disruption, suffering dislocations but avoiding the catastrophe. This notion has been advanced for policymaking subsystems (Jones 1994). This kind of system may be better modeled by the exponential than the Paretian.

In any case, the empirical regularities that underlie political (and perhaps economic) change are so pervasive that a general approach is warranted. At present, an information-processing approach that is sensitive to both the cost structure imposed by institutions and the cognitive limits of actors seems most promising.

APPENDIX 1: MEASUREMENT AND DATA

As noted above, our measures are change scores—either first differences or percentage changes—usually pooled across subcategories. In this Appendix we detail the measurement strategies used here. Particularly important for the policy data is the different ways to calculate percentage changes; each is legitimate but they have different theoretical implications.

For Presidential elections, we pool across counties; for House elections, across election districts; and for Senate elections, across seats. Electoral data are swing ratios, basically first differences for electoral margins.¹⁹ For the policy data, we calculated percentage changes across the Policy Agendas Major Topic Codes (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1998). In the project’s data sets, a wide variety of policy-related events (i.e., Congressional hearings, statutes, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* stories, *New York Times* stories, and executive orders) is coded into one of 19 major topic categories. When we calculate year-to-year change in attention to each topic and then aggregate across topics, the resulting distribution illustrates the patterns of change. The total number of cases

¹⁸ Padgett (1980) shows that a mixture of Paretian distributions results in an exponential distribution, for example.

¹⁹ The swing ratio is calculated as the election-to-election differences in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote across House elections (by District) and Senate elections (by seat).

in each distribution is thus calculated by multiplying the number of topic categories by the number of years in the series. This essentially measures how a focus of attention shifts from one policy category to another. Similarly, budget authority data was pooled across OMB subfunctions. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average and the U.S. Budgetary Outlays were not pooled.

We calculate our year-to-year percentage change scores in the amount of attention paid to each major topic using the following formula:

$$(\text{count at time 2} - \text{count at time 1}) / \text{count at time 1}.$$

Thus, if there were 24 hearings on health care in 1946 and 12 in 1947, the year-to-year change would be -0.50 . We use this method because it enables us to capture both change in attention to issues *and* the overall growth of the agenda over time.

We could also choose a relative measure of change; for example, calculating the percentage of the total agenda comprised by each issue area in each year and then calculating difference or percentage change scores:

$$(\text{percentage at time 2} - \text{percentage at time 1}) / \text{percentage at time 1}.$$

For example, if health comprised 10% of the agenda in 1946 and 12% in 1947, we could measure the amount of change as $12\% - 10\% = 2\%$ or as $(12\% - 10\%) / 10\% = 0.20$. These two approaches actually have different theoretical implications. The first, the *percentage-count* method, allows for growth in the total size of the policy agenda. It does so by basing change on what has occurred before within the policy area. The second, the *percentage-percentage* method, treats the agenda space as constant through time. It bases change on both what went before in a policy arena and what is happening in other policy arenas. We generally prefer the first, because an expanded capacity of government seems to imply a growing capacity to process issues, but use the second for the direct tests of kurtosis, since the skewed distributions from the percentage-count method cause estimation problems.

The results we report here are robust with respect to the choice of methods for calculating change—this does not influence the functional form of the aggregate change distributions. However, the specifics of the parameter estimates are affected. The positive and negative tails of the policy distributions are approximately symmetrical for the percentage-percentage method, but for the percentage-count method the positive (growth) tail is more punctuated.

APPENDIX 2: NOTES ON THE EFFICIENT MARKET THESIS

Markets for assets such as stocks and bonds in modern capitalist economies impose few transaction costs (and no decision costs) on participants. Informational inputs should be efficiently translated into outputs (returns). This notion has been around for a century. In 1900, Louis Bachelier articulated what was to become the *efficient market thesis* (EMT), (Maikel, 1992). If market returns (defined as the difference between prices at time₂ minus prices at time₁) were independent, identically distributed random variables, then they would follow a random walk (dubbed Brownian motion by Einstein five years later). The modern literature may be dated to the early 1960s, when Eugene Fama formalized the EMT (Cootner 1964). Soon after Samuelson formulated the problem as a martingale, which implied that "information contained in past prices is

instantly, fully, and perpetually reflected in the asset's current price" (Campbell, Lo, and McKinley 1997, 30). This formulation implies that, given the available information, the conditional expectation of future price changes is zero.

The EMT, as codified by 1970 (Fama 1970), implies that market returns ought to follow a random walk (perhaps with drift) and, hence, be normally distributed (by the central limit theorem). The problem is that market returns do not display such behavior. Rather, market returns in many empirical studies display pronounced positive kurtosis (and less pronounced skew) in comparison to the normal (Lux 1998; Peters 1991, 1994). This anomaly has led researchers to postulate different underlying distributions and stochastic processes to account for the empirical findings, but there has been a tendency to avoid full discussion and examination of the substantive interpretations of these deviations (Lux 1998) or to claim that somehow they are rational (Hersheleifer 1995). It is hard, however to escape the interpretation that markets are just not fully efficient, that this inefficiency is rooted in the cognitive capacities of actors, and that these cognitive costs result in leptokurtosis (Plott and Sunder 1982; Shiller 2000; Shleifer 2000).

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Coping with Uncertainty: Analyzing Risk Propensities of SEC Budgetary Decisions, 1949–97

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Students of public organizations acknowledge that administrative agencies make decisions in an uncertain policy environment. Existing research on public bureaucracy either makes simplifying a priori assumptions about such behavior or completely ignores this fundamental issue. This study proposes a statistical test of agency risk-bearing behavior to shed light on bureaucratic decision making under conditions of uncertainty. An analysis of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) agency budget requests for the 1949–97 period yields risk coefficients that are compatible with analytically derived results. The empirical findings indicate that the SEC exhibits relatively greater concern about organizational maintenance when the type of uncertainty that it experiences is external to the decision-making purview of the organization than when it is internal to the agency. However, mixed statistical evidence is obtained that the SEC places comparatively greater value on organizational maintenance, as reflected in its budgetary decisions, during an era of greater political instability induced by divided party government than under unified government.

Political scientists' current understanding of principal–agent relationships in the study of public bureaucracy centers on how politicians control policy administration via delegated authority to bureaucratic organizations. A major element of inquiry on this topic involves the analysis of information asymmetries that constrain political principals' ability to shape the performance of bureaucratic agents (e.g., Banks 1989, Hammond and Miller 1985, and Miller and Moe 1983). Niskanen's (1971) seminal research on agency budget maximization, for example, maintains that bureaucratic organizations are able to exploit politicians' information deficiencies to extract budgetary resources that exceed the level of output that they produce.

Information problems, however, are not limited to political principals. Bureaucratic agents also face a similar dilemma because of their uncertainty concerning budgetary resources and task activities, among other items relevant to organizational performance, including the future needs of the agency, the nature of outputs and outcomes (March 1988), and the spatial ideological location of political actors (Krause 2003a). Thompson (1967, 159) claims that uncertainty is the fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with this issue is at the core of the administrative process (see also Crozier 1964). A bureaucratic agency's decision-

making response to uncertainty can inform our understanding of how it chooses to cope in the presence of imperfect information (e.g., Downs 1967, Simon 1976, Stinchcombe 1990, and Wilson 1989). This, in turn, can provide us with direct insight into its risk-bearing behavior, rather than merely treating it as a simplifying fixed assumption or ignoring it altogether, as has been done in existing scholarship. Notwithstanding research on parallel systems and redundancy in bureaucratic organizations (Bendor 1985; Heimann 1997), political scientists have yet to place much effort in assessing how administrative agendas respond to uncertainty (but see Carpenter 2000 for a notable exception). The requisite first step toward understanding how administrative agencies handle these information limitations involves proposing theory-laden criteria that can enable scholars empirically to demarcate risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, and risk-acceptant decision making.

Estimating these agency risk propensities can uncover the extent to which bureaucratic agencies value organizational maintenance in the face of an uncertain world. Specifically, an agency that behaves in a more (less) risk-averse (risk-acceptant) manner places a greater premium on its own organizational maintenance, all else being equal. This is consistent with the view that bureaucratic agencies wish to buffer themselves from uncertainty (e.g., Crozier 1964, Downs 1967, and Thompson 1967). Conversely, an agency behaving in a more (less) risk-acceptant (risk-averse) manner places less emphasis on its own organizational maintenance when confronting uncertainty, *ceteris paribus*. Such behavior might reflect an agency's greater willingness to act in a risk-acceptant fashion either because it is performing beyond its own expectations (March 1999, 20) or because it desires to appease politicians' preference for limiting administrative resources (Banks 1989; Miller and Moe 1983).

The main contribution of this study is providing a direct statistical test of agency risk-bearing behavior. This test is derived from a simple theoretical analysis of bureaucratic budgetary decision making under uncertainty developed elsewhere (Krause 2002).

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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the 1999 Public Choice Society, March 12–14, 1999, Hotel Monteleone, New Orleans, Louisiana. The author wishes to thank Janice Boucher Breuer, Charles Cameron, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Dan Carpenter, Jeffrey Cohen, Stephen Dilworth, Jim Douglas, David Epstein, Brad Gomez, Chris Kam, David Lewis, Ken Meier, Tom Romer, Andy Whitford, B. Dan Wood, LeeAnne Krause, and seminar participants at Columbia University and the University of South Carolina, and the anonymous APSR reviewers for their helpful suggestions and comments at various stages of this project. I thank Tim Groseclose and Dan Ponder for providing some of the ADA voting score data used in this paper. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Sherry Ann Krause. Any errors that remain are my own.

It is predicated on the utility that the agency receives from seeking greater funding¹ vis-à-vis the utility it derives from the uncertainty (i.e., volatility) that it experiences. For the purposes of this study, uncertainty is synonymous with resource and task volatility. This conceptualization of uncertainty, which is compatible with scholarship on organizational decision making (March 1999, 180–83; Thompson 1967), follows from agencies' desire to protect or buffer their technological cores from environmental influences (Thompson 1967, 67).² Rather than treating budgetary resources as an "end" to be maximized in order to create organizational wealth (e.g., Niskanen 1971; but see Blais and Dion 1991 and Miller and Moe 1983), I focus on how agencies view these resources as a "means" of coping with omnipresent uncertainty (e.g., Cyert and March 1963; Downs 1967, 138–39; and Wilson 1989). The aim here is to examine the behavioral range of possibilities employed by an agency in handling resource and task uncertainty in its policy environment.³

In addition, I posit that bureaucratic agencies formulate budget requests in a heterogeneous fashion with respect to uncertainty in two distinct ways. First, agencies should behave in a relatively more risk-averse fashion in response to uncertainty that is determined outside of their decision-making locus than to uncertainty emanating from within. This is because an agency will

possess relatively less information and ability to handle external uncertainty, which is determined by elected officials outside of its purview, than internal uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Therefore, an agency should exhibit relatively greater uncertainty avoidance when it possesses less formal authority over its environment (Cyert and March (1963: 166–167); Thompson 1967, 12). Agency budgetary behavior is also hypothesized to be at least as, if not more, risk-averse during divided government for a given discrete form of risk-bearing behavior, all else being equal. This expectation reflects the weaker policy coherence and less stable policy expectations in the political environment associated with divided government.

DERIVING A STATISTICAL TEST OF AGENCY BUDGETARY RISK-BEARING BEHAVIOR FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES

In the United States, an agency's funding request serves as a choice variable that is distinct from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/Presidential request. Agency budget requests represent one of the few mechanisms whereby bureaucratic preferences are actually revealed. These items provide an appropriate vehicle for analyzing the risk-bearing proclivities of administrative organizations. These funding requests yield insight into how agencies seek fiscal resources with the purposes of creating slack resources for their organizational and policy missions (Cyert and March 1963; Downs 1967; Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989). The perspective advanced in this study differs from Niskanen's (1971) budgetary maximization principle by viewing these resources as a hedge against uncertainty (Downs 1967, 138–39). An agency preoccupied with uncertainty (risk) avoidance, for instance, will seek resources to remove dependence upon other institutional actors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

In constructing a statistical test of agency risk propensities, it is preferable to link it to the theoretical microfoundations of such behavior. I argue elsewhere (Krause 2002) that an agency's utility is a function of two variables—its budgetary residual (BR; i.e., the difference between its request in the current year and actual appropriation from the prior year) and the uncertainty that it experiences (σ). By holding the agency utility at some fixed positive level (\bar{U}), thus serving as an implicit budget constraint, one can isolate the relationship between agency budgetary decisions reflected in the BR and uncertainty (σ). To reiterate, my aim is not to set forth a full-blown model of the budgetary process explaining appropriation outcomes, but to determine how an agency copes with uncertainty via its budget request, for a given fixed level of utility. I formally derive comparative-static analytical results consistent with the theoretical conditions of budgetary risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, and risk-acceptant behavior within the context of divided and unified party government elsewhere (Krause 2002). As in other treatments of uncertainty in bureaucratic organization settings (March 1988, 1999), risk aversion (risk acceptance) implies that an agency

¹ As a general rule, this implicitly presumes that an agency's actual funding will be a monotonically increasing function of its own budget requests distinct from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/Presidential figures. Thus the agency will always obtain positive marginal utility from the BR since it is presumed that the agency will prefer more money as opposed to less, all else being equal. What the agency does not ask for in terms of budgetary resources, it will not likely acquire from political principals. This is because it is generally rare for agencies to receive greater appropriations than are directly requested. Data on the SEC for the 1949–97 period support this view.

² Thompson specifically uses the concept of buffering applied to boundary spanning of organizational subunits, whereas in this study it pertains to agency resource preferences. Both usages treat buffering as a means of coping with uncertainty experienced by administrative organizations.

³ The approach adopted here is decision theoretic, as opposed to game theoretic. This is because the purpose of this study is to gauge the risk-bearing preferences or proclivity of agency decisions, rather than to explain equilibrium outcomes from the budgetary process. Furthermore, game theoretic models require *a priori* assumptions concerning risk-bearing behavior underlying decision making, such as the risk-averse agent and risk-neutral principal applied in standard principal-agent theory (Miller and Whitford 2002). As a result, one can neither derive nor infer variable risk propensities from such decisions since they are treated as the initial conditions for such models. Game theoretic models try to determine the strategy undertaken by an actor while assuming a particular form of risk-bearing behavior in his/her decision making. The aim here is both to identify analytically and to quantify empirically the nature of risk-bearing involved in agency decision making, which is often assumed from the outset rather than investigated in its own right. Therefore, my concern is with directly analyzing the first principles of agency risk-bearing behavior, which provides both theoretical and substantive insight into how bureaucratic agencies cope with uncertainty. Legislative influence, however, is not ignored here since the agency budget request residual (BR) is operationalized in relation to what it received last year via appropriations in both the theoretical and the empirical analysis. In addition, political factors that might affect the manner in which an agency seeks budgetary resources are controlled for in the statistical estimation of agency risk coefficients analyzed later in this study.

will disfavor (favor) uncertainty, while risk neutrality connotes indifference to uncertainty.

For purposes of brevity, I characterize the basic theoretical foundations by a simple power function that assumes agency budgetary risk aversion:⁴

$$U = c + BR^\alpha - \sigma^\beta, \quad (1)$$

where agency utility is an additive function of the agency's BR,⁵ that is, the difference between its request for the current year and what it received for last year's congressional appropriation—i.e., $BR_t = [(F_{Rt}) - (F_{At-1})]$, and also the level of uncertainty that it experiences (σ). I assume that the agency seeks a level of funding that is greater than what it received the previous year—i.e., $BR > 0$.⁶ Further, the agency will always obtain positive marginal utility from the BR—i.e., agency utility increases as the BR rises—since it is safe to presume that more funding is preferable to less funding, all else being equal.⁷ This is because budgetary resources that are not sought by the agency will typically not be granted to them by political principals, all else being equal. This proposition is assumed to be true, irrespective of the type of agency budgetary risk-bearing behavior. A risk-averse agency is assumed to obtain *increasing* positive marginal utility from the BR since it places greater emphasis on budgetary resources, and thus organizational maintenance, than do agencies acting in accordance with risk neutrality and

risk acceptance. Likewise, a risk-neutral agency is assumed to exhibit *constant* positive marginal utility from the BR, while a risk-acceptant agency is assumed to possess *decreasing* positive marginal utility from the BR.

Uncertainty is defined as the degree of budgetary appropriations or task volatility experienced by the agency (March 1999, 180–83; Thompson 1967). This definition reflects a generalized form of uncertainty that is germane to the operation of bureaucratic organizations (Downs 1967; March and Olsen 1976; Wilson 1989). Uncertainty is assumed to be inversely related to agency utility under risk-aversion, orthogonal with respect to agency utility under risk-neutrality, and positively related to agency utility under risk-acceptant behavior. These assumptions are consistent with standard applications found in financial economics (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992; Tobin 1958).

These alternative forms of risk-bearing behavior are captured by allowing the theoretical model's parameters to take on either negative, zero, or positive values. Solving for BR from (1) and also holding agency utility equal to a fixed positive level ($U = \bar{U}$) yields

$$BR = (\bar{U} - c + \sigma^\beta)^{1/\alpha}, \quad (2)$$

where

$$0 < c < \bar{U},$$

thus \bar{U} serves as a supremum for c by definition since $BR > 0$ by assumption. Before proceeding any further, the parameters α and β , representing the first principle assumptions concerning the relationship between BR and σ with respect to agency utility, are substituted with the derived parameters of the predicted theoretical relationship between BR and σ , denoted by the corresponding terms α^* and β^* .⁸ Dropping the fixed terms (\bar{U}, c) in (2) for simplicity's sake, without any loss of generality, the simple deterministic nonlinear relationship between BR and σ is obtained:

$$BR = \sigma^{\beta^*/\alpha^*}. \quad (3)$$

Taking the natural logarithm of (3) not only linearizes this relationship, but also provides a fixed-elasticity interpretation to β^*/α^* :

$$\ln BR = \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} \ln \sigma. \quad (4)$$

A 1% change in uncertainty results in a (β^*/α^*) % change in BR. The β^*/α^* parameter term represents a *risk coefficient* that generally reflects the ratio impact on agency utility attributable to uncertainty (β) and the agency BR (α), respectively.⁹ On a substantive level,

⁴ Equation (1) can also be recast for risk-acceptant behavior, where agency utility is a positive function of uncertainty—i.e., $U = c + BR^\alpha + \sigma^\beta$ (see also footnote 13). The power function is employed here for ease of interpretation regarding empirically testable propositions. The mathematical results for the general solution for each type of risk-bearing agency budgetary behavior are robust to alternative functional forms. A full technical exposition of this theoretical analysis can be found elsewhere (Krause 2002).

⁵ The budgetary residual (BR) refers to the marginal increment being sought by the agency compared to what it obtained in appropriations the previous year. This concept differs from (positive) economic rents that remain once an organization's functional needs are met (Niskanen 1971). The BR is premised on a linear decision rule that is commonplace in budgetary decision-making models (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966; Padgett 1980, 355)—i.e., $F_{Rt} = F_{At-1} + \xi_t$, where ξ_t is defined as the BR sought by the agency. Rearranging terms yields $BR \equiv \xi_t = F_{Rt} - F_{At-1}$. This is a plausible assumption consistent with the adaptive nature of administrative behavior.

⁶ This simplifying assumption is for purposes of mathematical tractability because a negative root might exist in certain circumstances when using a power functional form. However, an actual budget appropriation reduction from one year to the next is not precluded since the current year budgetary appropriations are not germane for this assumption to hold. Relaxing this assumption does not alter the analytical results generated from the comparative statics (see footnote 4).

⁷ The positive marginal utility assertion does not necessarily imply that agencies will actually pad budgets in a conspicuous manner since there are other factors that can constrain this type of behavior, including the ideological orientation of political institutions, macro-level budgetary constraints induced by macroeconomic performance, and agency task activities. The present theoretical analysis treats these items and other considerations as being fixed in order to have a tractable problem that can be analytically solved. As stated in footnote 3, political factors are controlled for in the statistical analysis to ensure that the empirical risk coefficients represent valid estimates of agency budgetary risk-bearing behavior.

⁸ While α and β play a determinative role for the predictions derived from comparative-static analysis in Krause 2002, these "assumption" parameters are not mathematically equivalent to the "prediction" parameters α^* and β^* , capturing the direction and shape of the theoretical relationship between BR and σ .

⁹ This direct interpretation is valid, except for budgetary risk-acceptant behavior during unified government. This special case entails a more complex relative positive marginal utility expression

the risk coefficient value captures the agency's relative desire for organizational maintenance in response to changing uncertainty. Therefore, the BR represents the agency's aggregate organizational response to the uncertainty that it encounters.

The agency's budgetary risk propensity might also uniquely vary between a divided and a unified government regime since these particular states are assumed to infer differential effects that uncertainty has on agency utility. This is due to the agency's less stable expectations about its political environment resulting from the weaker institutional stability often associated with divided government (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966). Under this regime, bureaucracies are also supplied with less policymaking flexibility via the contents of enacting legislation (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, 77–81). This, in turn, creates a greater challenge for bureaucratic units to construct coherent public policies during such political regimes. This qualitative distinction in agency risk-bearing behavior is consistent with the admonition that risk preferences should be supplemented with context-dependent considerations, rather than being treated in a generic fashion (March 1999, 244–45).

The effect of the divided/unified government distinction portrayed here suggests that the *relative* extent to which the agency wishes to be protected from political and policy uncertainty varies by context. Therefore, bureaucratic agents, like political principals, confront information asymmetries of their own when making decisions whose effects are accentuated under divided government. This is distinct, however, from the "power accrual" hypothesis, which predicts that an agency will seek to exploit the greater discretion that it enjoys under divided government because of the greater collective action and information asymmetry problems experienced by political institutions in such circumstances, all else being equal (e.g., Bryner 1987, Dahl and Lindblom 1953, and Hammond and Knott 1996).¹⁰ These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive since the former pertains to the contextual, indirect impact divided government has on agency budgetary behavior in relation to uncertainty, while the latter refers to the direct effect this political regime has on such decisions. Theoretical attention is placed on the former issue, which emphasizes the information asymmetry facing bureaucratic agents, since this study is concerned with the decision making of these organizations under conditions of uncertainty.¹¹

(RPMUE) involving these "assumed" parameters relative to σ , discussed later in this section.

¹⁰ Even if the typical adopted policy is of a more moderate ideological nature, and perhaps closer to the agency's ideal point, due to the presence of divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1996), this partisan configuration will also result in greater conflict among political principals during such eras. Hence, it is not unreasonable to surmise that greater variance exists surrounding the equilibrium ideal point under divided government compared to unified government, all else being equal.

¹¹ The direct effect reflecting the "power accrual" hypothesis will be the coefficient on the divided government dummy variable. This is accounted for later in the regression analysis.

Summary information on the comparative-static results analytically derived in Krause 2002, and its implications for empirical hypothesis testing are given in Table 1. Under risk aversion, agencies must seek greater increases in BR when σ rises—i.e., $\beta^*/\alpha^* > 0$. Risk-averse behavior implies that administrative agencies place a greater relative emphasis on organizational maintenance because it is assumed that they receive increasing positive marginal utility from the budgetary residual and negative utility from uncertainty. Thus, organizational slack serves as a rational response for obtaining bureaucratic flexibility in the face of uncertainty (Cyert and March 1963; Downs 1967, 138–39; Wilson 1989). Moreover, changes in uncertainty during divided government will have a relatively more adverse impact on the rate of change of the agency's marginal utility since the stability of its institutional environment, and hence agency expectations, is comparatively weakened.

Under divided government, risk-averse agency budgetary decision making can be $\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* > 1$, $\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = 1$, or $0 < \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* < 1$. The risk coefficient value depends upon whether the relative rate of positive utility accrued to the agency by seeking additional funding (α) outweighs the rate of disutility from rising uncertainty (β). When uncertainty has a greater (lesser) impact on agency utility relative to that of the BR being sought by the agency, the risk-averse agency will seek a larger (smaller) than proportional increase in BR compared to the rise in σ —i.e., $\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* > 1$ ($0 < \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* < 1$). If uncertainty and the agency BR each have the same magnitude of impact on agency utility, then the BR will rise proportionally with σ —i.e., $\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = 1$. During unified government, the risk-averse agency will seek increased budgetary funding that is less proportional than changes involving uncertainty—i.e., $0 < \beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* < 1$. This is because uncertainty will have a less deleterious impact on agency utility relative to the positive utility garnered from the BR. When $\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* = 1$ is empirically observed under unified government, this implies that uncertainty has a regime-neutral effect on agency utility (i.e., $\beta_{\text{Unified}} = 1$) and, also, that the increasing positive marginal utility of the BR is sufficiently small such that it approaches a constant positive marginal utility of BR so that $\lim_{\alpha_{\text{Unified}} \rightarrow 1^+} (\beta_{\text{Unified}}/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}) = 1$. A clear empirical distinction cannot be made between the unified government regime and a general form of budgetary risk aversion under this limiting case. To summarize, budgetary risk aversion indicates that agency requests will rise less than proportionally to a unit increase in uncertainty (*inelastic risk aversion*) during times of unified government, whereas it might do likewise, rise proportionally (*unit elastic risk aversion*), or greater than proportionally (*elastic risk aversion*), under divided government.¹²

¹² This holds true for the analytically derived theoretical results, except when $0 < \frac{\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*}{\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^*} < \frac{\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*}{\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^*} \leq 1$ under risk-aversion and $-1 \leq \frac{\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*}{\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^*} < \frac{\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*}{\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^*} < 0$ in the risk-acceptance case.

TABLE 1. Summary of Comparative Statics Corresponding to Agency Budgetary Risk Coefficients

Risk-Bearing Condition & Political Regime	Theoretical Relationship		Theoretical Prediction (Parameter Value)
	Direction	Shape	
Risk-averse agency budgetary behavior General	$BR'(\sigma) > 0$	$BR''(\sigma) \geq 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} > 0$
Divided government	$BR'(\sigma) > 0$	$BR''(\sigma) > 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} > 1$
	$BR'(\sigma) > 0$	$BR''(\sigma) = 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} = 1$
	$BR'(\sigma) > 0$	$BR''(\sigma) < 0$	$0 < \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < 1$
Unified government	$BR'(\sigma) > 0$	$BR''(\sigma) < 0$	$0 < \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < 1$
Risk-neutral agency budgetary behavior General, divided, and unified government	$BR'(\sigma) = 0$	$BR''(\sigma) = 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} = 0$
Risk-acceptant agency budgetary behavior General	$BR'(\sigma) < 0$	$BR''(\sigma) \geq 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < 0$
Divided government	$BR'(\sigma) < 0$	$BR''(\sigma) > 0$	$-1 < \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < 0$
Unified government	$BR'(\sigma) < 0$	$BR''(\sigma) > 0$	$-1 < \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < 0$
	$BR'(\sigma) < 0$	$BR''(\sigma) = 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} = -1$
	$BR'(\sigma) < 0$	$BR''(\sigma) < 0$	$\frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} < -1$

Note: Two outcomes are incompatible with the comparative-static analytical results derived from first principles: $\beta^*/\alpha^* < -1$ (elastic risk acceptance: divided government) and $\beta^*/\alpha^* > 1$ (elastic risk aversion: unified government). Risk-averse behavior under unified government is not empirically distinguishable from general risk aversion, which does not differentiate between political regimes if $\beta^*/\alpha^* = 1$. Likewise, risk-acceptant behavior under divided government is not empirically distinguishable from general risk acceptance, which fails to distinguish between political regimes if $\beta^*/\alpha^* = -1$. See Krause 2002 for details concerning the analytical derivations.

Under risk neutrality, the agency's budgetary decision making will not be responsive to uncertainty in any circumstances—i.e., $\beta^*/\alpha^* = 0$. Risk-neutral budgetary behavior suggests that administrative agencies will obtain a constant positive marginal utility from additional funding, yet utility remains unaffected by uncertainty. This type of risk-bearing behavior implies that bureaucratic agencies are indifferent with respect to uncertainty and, hence, place neither a greater nor a lower premium on organizational maintenance as uncertainty changes. Therefore, a risk-neutral agency will refrain from altering its funding request as an organizational response to uncertainty.

General risk-acceptance budgetary behavior will be reflected by an inverse relationship between the agency's BR and the uncertainty it experiences—i.e., $\beta^*/\alpha^* < 0$, whereby it is assumed to receive a declining positive marginal utility from the BR and positive utility from uncertainty.¹³ Agency budgetary

risk-acceptance behavior indicates that organizational maintenance is deemphasized, as reflected by a smaller BR in response to rising uncertainty, all else being equal.¹⁴ This type of agency behavior might be indicative of the stronger preference it holds for meeting politicians' desire to limit funding growth (e.g., Banks 1989 and Miller and Moe 1983). This is because politicians' concern for inefficiency and undesirable policy effects that risky budgetary investments can bring about exceeds their preference for creating slack resources as a means to help the agency cope with a rising tide of uncertainty. Conversely, budgetary risk

¹³ Recall from footnote 4 that budgetary risk acceptance will possess the opposite sign in front of σ than what appears in Eq. (1) since $U = c + BR^\alpha + \sigma^\beta$ and, hence, subsequently yields $BR = -\sigma^{\beta^*/\alpha^*}$.

¹⁴ Although risk-acceptance behavior by administrative agencies is atypical (Thompson 1967), it is unwise falsely to preclude this possibility on a theoretical level. Research has documented certain situations in which administrative agencies will seek smaller gains in budgetary resources as a response to the conditions of their policy environment relating to uncertainty or other factors affecting agency budgetary decision making (Johnson 1992; Khademanian 1992). Thus one cannot preclude the theoretical possibility of budgetary risk-acceptant behavior, whereby administrative agencies might request relatively smaller increases in budgetary resources in response to rising uncertainty.

acceptance might reflect the agency's willingness to return some amount of slack resources to politicians since they possess a high degree of confidence that it is performing above expectations (March 1999, 20).

Like risk aversion, risk-acceptant behavior might also contextually vary depending upon the presence of a divided or unified government regime. Divided government is assumed to exert a less positive impact on the agency's rate of marginal utility with respect to uncertainty than unified government. Thus, agency budgetary decisions that entail risk-acceptant behavior will reflect less than proportional changes in the BR sought by the agency in response to a change in uncertainty during the divided government regime—i.e., $-1 < \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* < 0$ (*inelastic risk acceptance*). This is because uncertainty will have a greater adverse impact on agency utility during periods of divided government vis-à-vis unified government. In the special case where $\beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = -1$ (*unit elastic risk acceptance*) under divided government is observed, no clear empirical distinction can be inferred between this regime and a general form of budgetary risk acceptance for analogous reasons discussed earlier regarding unit elastic budgetary risk aversion under unified government.

In an era of unified government, risk-acceptant behavior will be $\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* < 0$ by definition. This is because the second derivative (shape) of the BR with respect to uncertainty is indeterminate and can be positive, zero, or negative. The shape of this relationship depends upon the level of uncertainty in relation to the relative balance between the rate of positive marginal utility attributable to uncertainty and the ratio of positive marginal utility with respect to both uncertainty and the agency's BR—or *relative positive marginal utility expression* (RPMUE).¹⁵ If the level of uncertainty is less than the RPMUE, then $\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* < -1$ (*elastic risk acceptance*); and $-1 < \beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* < 0$ when the converse is true. Finally, if the level of uncertainty is equal to the RPMUE, then the BR will decline proportionally with increasing σ —i.e., $\beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* = -1$.

To ensure that the ensuing statistical estimate of the risk coefficient (β^*/α^*) is valid, the deterministic bivariate relationship captured in (4) can be viewed within the context of a statistical model by including an intercept parameter (γ), a k -dimensional column vector of control variables (X_k) with corresponding parameter vector (π_k), and a random disturbance (ϵ),

$$\ln \text{BR} = \gamma + \frac{\beta^*}{\alpha^*} \ln \sigma + \pi_k X_k + \epsilon. \quad (5)$$

Equation (5) represents a general log-log econometric specification with respect to the empirical relationship between BR and σ yet takes on a semilogarithmic form for the vector of control variables, which are initially assumed not to require a logarithmic transformation for data or substantive reasons.¹⁶

¹⁵ The logic and interpretation of these analytical results are elaborated on elsewhere (Krause 2002).

¹⁶ This issue is explicitly considered when the vector of control variables are introduced later.

HETEROGENEITY OF AGENCY BUDGETARY DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

An agency's risk-bearing behavior can vary in relation to the *source* of uncertainty and, also, the *context* in which it is experienced (March 1999, 244–45). Specifically, an agency's desire for organizational maintenance might well vary based on distinctions between external and internal sources of uncertainty, as well as along the contextual lines of divided versus unified party government. Regarding the former distinction, uncertainty can either be completely outside of the agency via decisions made by political principals (external uncertainty) or occur within the administrative organization in a manner that is beyond its full decision-making authority (internal uncertainty). For instance, appropriations volatility is one type of external uncertainty since congressional appropriation decisions are not made by the agency but, instead, are legally determined by the President and Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Task or enforcement workload volatility captures the internal uncertainty that occurs within the agency's organizational sphere. One might be skeptical of enforcement workload volatility as a valid measure of agency task uncertainty. Public organizations, however, do not perfectly control the volume of regulatory enforcement violations that transpire in a given year because these activities are largely conditioned as a response to the policy environment. The budget request reflects the agency's organizational expectations of its task activities for the upcoming year, subject to imperfect and incomplete information. These measures are compatible with the view that an administrative organization is part of a larger environment in which it has imperfect control over (Barnard 1938; Selznick 1949).

Agencies should be in a comparatively weaker position when attempting to cope with external uncertainty relative to internal uncertainty. This leads to the first hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 1. *An administrative agency will behave in a relatively more risk-averse manner in response to external (appropriations) uncertainty vis-à-vis (internal) task uncertainty, ceteris paribus.*

The logical basis to this hypothesis is simple—a bureaucratic agency will be relatively less concerned with organizational maintenance in relation to those factors that it possesses greater information and decision-making influence over (e.g., enforcement outputs) compared to those decisions that are made explicitly outside of the organization (e.g., appropriations). This is because an agency has less capacity in coping with uncertainty in which it possesses no formal authority compared to when it possesses limited organizational control (Thompson 1967, 12). As a result, one should observe an agency placing greater emphasis on organizational maintenance with respect to appropriations uncertainty relative to enforcement workload uncertainty. Put simply, an agency will place a stronger premium on the creation of slack resources as a means to

cushion the agency from dealing with budgetary (external) uncertainty compared to task (internal) uncertainty, all else being equal.

Shifting budgetary decision rules reflect the contextual nature of such decisions (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Wildavsky 1988). As elaborated elsewhere (Krause 2002), the contextual distinction between divided and unified party government is assumed to manifest itself through the rate of change in marginal utility with respect to uncertainty. Uncertainty is assumed to exert a more deleterious impact on agency utility during periods of divided government than under unified government, all else being equal.¹⁷ Therefore, agency budgetary risk aversion reflects marginally greater agency disutility from uncertainty under divided government compared to unified government, while agency budgetary risk-acceptant behavior exhibits marginally smaller gains in positive agency utility from a rise in uncertainty during a time of divided government relative to unified government. The analytical results, however, show that it is also possible under certain conditions for agency budgetary risk-bearing behavior to be observationally equivalent for unified and divided government contexts.

Notwithstanding this observational equivalence condition, one should expect relatively greater risk-averse agency behavior under divided government compared to unified government because of less stable policy expectations (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966).¹⁸ Bureaucratic agencies will also experience a more difficult time administering public policies in a coherent fashion since less discretionary authority is afforded by political institutions, which prefer the use of legislation to policy delegation in these circumstances (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, 80–81). Administrative agencies will become relatively more protective of their organizational interests and mission and will act accordingly. Put simply, bureaucracies will seek comparatively greater slack resources under divided government as a rational means to obtain administrative and policy flexibility (Downs 1967) and, also, to increase the coherence of their organizational mission (Wilson 1989), *ceteris paribus*.¹⁹

Therefore, an administrative agency should *typically* exhibit an equal or a greater discrete preference for organizational slack during periods of divided government compared to unified government, all else being equal. This leads to the second hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 2. *An administrative agency will generally behave in the same or a relatively more discrete risk-averse manner under divided government compared to unified government, ceteris paribus.*

¹⁷ Risk-neutral behavior is unaffected by this particular divided/unified government distinction since it is perfectly inelastic (i.e., unresponsive) with respect to uncertainty by definition.

¹⁸ To reiterate, under special conditions mentioned in footnote 12, one might observe the opposite pattern in a *discrete* sense constrained to the inelastic risk-averse and risk-acceptant cases, respectively.

¹⁹ Please refer to footnote 10 for a logical justification of this line of reasoning.

In other words, one should expect agencies to behave in a relatively more risk-averse fashion under divided government for substantive reasons discussed earlier. The analytical results listed in Table 1, however, demonstrate that risk propensities under both risk aversion and risk acceptance will be observationally equivalent in discrete terms (i.e., inelastic agency response) when the analytical values range between zero and unity in absolute terms. In extremely restricted special cases, it remains possible for the agency operating during a time of divided government to be less risk averse (risk-aversion case) or, conversely, more risk acceptant (risk-acceptance case) in its budgetary decision making (see footnote 12). Nonetheless, Hypothesis 2 suggests that bureaucratic agencies will typically place at least as much, if not a relatively greater, emphasis on organizational maintenance during times of divided government compared to unified government, all else being equal. This is because agencies will be operating in a less stable policymaking environment with less delegated authority during divided government.

EMPIRICAL LABORATORY: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the empirical vehicle used to test these two hypotheses and, more generally, determine the risk propensities underlying agency budgetary decisions. The SEC was established as an independent regulatory commission in 1933 by Congress. This agency's creation was the result of public demand for increased economic regulation following the stock market crash of 1929 and Great Depression in the United States during the 1930s. The SEC's policy mandate is to enforce the securities and commodities laws under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and its subsequent amendments (Khademian 1992).

The SEC is a suitable choice for empirically analyzing the risk-bearing nature of agency budgetary decisions. The SEC case provides a more conservative test of Hypothesis 2 since this agency has typically received strong bipartisan political support (Khademian 1992). Any notable distinction in agency budgetary risk-bearing behavior between eras of divided and eras of unified government will be more difficult to discern than if an agency were analyzed whose policy tasks elicit strong partisan cleavages from political institutions. The SEC, like many other regulatory agencies commonly studied by political scientists, can be classified as a production agency whose outputs and outcomes are easily observable (Wilson 1989, 158–71). One expects production agencies to behave in a relatively less risk-averse manner compared to craft or coping organizations, whose outputs are difficult to discern, and, to a lesser extent, procedural organizations, whose outputs are observable but whose outcomes are not. This is because production agencies experience less severe information asymmetries (i.e., less uncertainty) concerning production technologies than other agency types. Thus, investigation of SEC budgetary decision making should

be relatively less likely to reveal empirical evidence of risk aversion, compared to investigation of a procedural, craft, or coping agency. This is not a trivial issue given that bureaucratic agents are assumed to be risk averse in standard principal-agent theories (Miller and Whitford 2002), and most agencies examined by political scientists involve production-oriented agencies engaged primarily in regulatory policymaking.

Another advantage of studying the SEC is that it is an independent regulatory commission. This means that SEC funding requests submitted to political overseers represent a more accurate measure of its true budgetary preferences, compared to executive bureaus that can internally adjust these funding requests within the larger executive department before their eventual submission to the OMB.²⁰ Each new President appoints his own SEC chair, yet other commission members who served a previous administration will occasionally stay on. The final reason for studying the SEC pertains to data availability. Data on agency budgetary requests is rather difficult to obtain for a time series since it does not appear in *The Budget of the U.S. Government*, and other data sources such as congressional hearings do not contain this information on a consistent basis.²¹ The SEC has published its own budgetary requests since 1949 in its *Annual Report of the (SEC) Commission*.

MEASUREMENT AND ANCILLARY HYPOTHESES FOR CONTROL VARIABLES

To reiterate, the budgetary residual (BR) variable captures agency budgetary decision making by measuring the first difference between its current real funding request (F_{Rt}) and the actual real Congressional appropriation obtained from the previous year (F_{At-1}). The dependent variable is then transformed into logged first differences such that $\ln BR_t = [\ln(F_{Rt}) - \ln(F_{At-1})] \times 100$ for the purposes of linearizing the relationship with uncertainty consistent with (4). Multiplying this expression by a constant of 100 also has the advantage of providing an annual percentage change interpretation to this variable.

The external uncertainty measure is operationalized as the unconditional standard deviation of the first difference in actual SEC budget appropriations based on a moving average from the preceding three years.²²

Internal uncertainty is defined as the unconditional standard deviation of the first difference from a lagged three-year moving average of SEC annual enforcement workload outputs comprised of summing up administrative proceedings, investigations, and injunctive actions. Both uncertainty measures are transformed in the same logarithmic fashion as the dependent variable to facilitate meaningful comparisons when assessing the relationship between BR and σ consistent with (4). The presumption that agencies respond in a retrospective manner to uncertainty is consistent with commonly accepted models of budgetary processes grounded in naive or sophisticated adaptive behavior that reflects limited cognitive and information processing capabilities (Bendor and Moe 1985; Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966; March and Simon 1958; Simon 1976; Wood and Waterman 1993).²³ In other words, the agency is assumed to formulate its budget request for the current year (t) by observing the volatility of actual real budget appropriations (external uncertainty) or agency aggregate enforcement workloads (internal uncertainty) from the previous three years. In the regression models testing for varying risk propensities under unified and divided party government, the uncertainty measure(s) is interacted with a dummy variable that equals one when agency budgetary decisions are made under divided government and zero otherwise.²⁴ This binary variable is accounted in a separate manner to assess the direct impact of this political regime on agency budgetary decision making. The "power accrual" hypothesis is empirically substantiated if the coefficient corresponding to this binary variable is significantly greater than zero since the BR should be higher under divided government.

A vector of control variables is incorporated to ensure reliable risk coefficient estimates that accurately

ences occur between the results of these measures and those reported in this article the former set of findings is entirely consistent with the analytically derived results listed in Table 1. These statistical results are also compatible with the two hypotheses proposed in this study, except with respect to the SEC's response to appropriations uncertainty (combined-regime models only). A comparative summary of these results can be obtained from the author.

²³ In the preliminary analysis an alternative uncertainty measurement scheme was considered that viewed the agency's information processing capabilities in a more sophisticated manner. This approach involved utilizing relevant available information to generate a prospective forecast of uncertainty at a single point in time consistent with Bayesian updating. These measures were generated from a GARCH (1,1) process by computing a one-step-ahead conditional standard deviation for appropriations and task uncertainty. With few exceptions, these measures produced multivariate results that did not differ substantively from those generated from the lagged adaptive measurement approach adopted in this article. The exceptional cases provide SEC risk coefficient estimates that are compatible with the analytically derived results and, also, yield substantively similar inferences with respect to Hypotheses 1 and 2 compared to the findings presented here. A comparative summary of these results can be obtained from the author.

²⁴ Alternative divided government dummy variables constructed involved making ordinal distinctions between the extent of supermajority control of Congressional institutions by the party which did not occupy the White House. These alternative results neither alter the general conclusions drawn regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2 nor are incompatible with the analytical comparative-static results. A comparative summary of these results can be obtained from the author.

²⁰ Executive-branch agencies that do not possess the budgetary bypass authority enjoyed by independent regulatory commissions can be empirically analyzed (see Padgett 1980). Their budgetary decisions, however, might contain measurement bias that plagues statistical estimates of the risk coefficients.

²¹ The *Budget of the U.S. Government* has Presidential (OMB) budgetary request and Congressional appropriation information but does not contain data on budgetary requests submitted by federal agencies.

²² This time frame is chosen on substantive grounds. Carpenter (1992, footnote 19), for instance, notes that Presidents are cognizant of this three-year window for administrative agencies, as evident, for example, in Eisenhower's statements when submitting his final budget to Congress (*Budget of the United States Government*, FY 1962, M53-M54). Regression analysis employing four-year weighted moving-average measures of appropriations and task uncertainty was conducted in preliminary data analysis. While some substantive differ-

capture agency budgetary risk-bearing behavior. Task activities placed on the agency include a three-year moving average of the annual percentage growth rate (in log-first differences) of the SEC's enforcement workload outputs. This measure accounts for the positive impact of recent past workload activity on current budget requests submitted by the agency.²⁵ This variable provides a crude, yet insightful empirical test of Niskanen's (1971) thesis that a bureaucracy wishes to extract positive real economic rents from its political overseers by seeking resource growth that exceeds its recent level of average output growth. The Niskanen thesis is corroborated by the data if task growth yields a greater than proportional rise in BR—i.e., this variable's coefficient will be greater than positive unity.²⁶ Also, the natural log of the number of individuals employed in the securities and commodities industry at year $t - 1$ captures the effect that industry size has on SEC budget requests. The three-year moving average of the annual percentage growth rate in SEC real budgetary appropriations captures the positive impact of recent past budgetary resources on current budget requests submitted by the agency. Inclusion of this variable ensures that a potential spurious relationship between BR and σ is avoided when uncertainty is amplified due to a period of sustained robust annual budget growth experienced by the agency.²⁷

The SEC has experienced two notable surges in administrative responsibility for the sample period. The 1964 Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act were a response to the rapid growth in the volume of industry transactions and scandals of the 1950s and early 1960s imposing SEC disclosure requirements on a majority of the firms whose stocks were traded on the market (Khademian 1992, 53, 62–64, 140). A dummy variable that equals zero for the 1949–64 period and takes on a value of one for the 1965–97 period accounts for the impact of the 1964 Amendments. Also, the SEC was required by Congress in 1987 to create a separate office within the agency for the Electronic Data and Gathering Retrieval (EDGAR) Management system instead of its remaining in the Executive Director's Of-

fice (Khademian 1992, 190–96). This had the net effect of the SEC's seeking additional resources so as not to shortchange funding of its other agency activities (Khademian 1992). This dummy variable equals one in the 1988–97 period and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient associated with this dummy variable indicates that the SEC budgetary residual has risen with the advent of a separate office and operations within the agency for the EDGAR system.

The ideological preferences of elected officials are also important for understanding bureaucratic decision making (e.g., Scholz, Headrick, and Twombly 1991 and Wood and Waterman 1993). This is measured by five separate variables representing the real Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores for the President, the median House (sub)committee member score pertaining to both oversight and appropriations separately, and the median Senate (sub)committee member score for both oversight and appropriations in year $t - 1$ when the request is being submitted by the agency.²⁸ The hypothesized relationship is ambiguous. A positive relationship between each of these variables and the SEC budget request is indicative of more positive (liberal) scores, resulting in higher resource demands. Conversely, the SEC may seek higher budget requests as electoral institutions become more conservative as a way of offsetting the latter's relative preference for lower government spending and support for administrative agencies. A vibrant economy can provide the agency an incentive to seek greater budgetary resources. The general state of the economy is measured as real gross national product (GNP) growth from year $t - 2$ to year $t - 1$. Finally, short-lived or nonsystemic political shocks experienced by the agency should result in larger budgetary requests. These effects are controlled for by a dummy variable that equals one in a given year when partisan control of the White House or at least one chamber of Congress changes hands and zero otherwise.

STATISTICAL FINDINGS

Figure 1 shows graphical plots of the time series for the log ratio of BR to σ —i.e., $\ln BR / \ln \sigma$ —with respect to budgetary appropriations (APP) and enforcement


²⁵ Given that budget requests made on behalf of the agency for fiscal year t actually occur in year $t - 1$, these agency performance measures reflect observable information at time $t - 1$ from the time when the actual decision was made. This same logic is also the basis for using GNP growth at time $t - 2$. For the industry size and political variables, it is reasonable to presume that this effect is contemporaneously observed in the period when the actual budget request is being submitted in year $t - 1$ given that both the ideological behavior of elected officials and the industry size are known at the time of the request.

²⁶ If this coefficient is equal to positive unity, then zero economic rents (in real terms) are sought by the agency based on the enforcement workload that it handled over the previous three years. When its value lies between zero and positive unity, the agency seeks negative economic rents (in real terms) since their resource preferences are increasing at a rate slower than the recent growth in task activities.

²⁷ Supplemental SEC agency appropriations are not considered because they pertain to statutory mandated pay increases for existing agency personnel that are of a nondiscretionary nature not subject to agency choice. These ancillary resources do not affect the agency's production process through either increasing staff personnel or non-human (e.g., capital) inputs vital to organizational performance.

²⁸ The Senate Banking and House of Representatives Energy and Commerce committees are used for the 1948–54 period, and the Senate Securities subcommittee and House Oversight subcommittee of these committees are employed for all subsequent years in the sample period. The appropriations (sub)committee data for the 1948–54 period come from the entire House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and those for subsequent years come from the subcommittees (House—Independent Offices, 1955–66; Independent Offices and/or Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 1967–72; HUD, Space, and Science, 1973–74; and Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, 1975–96; Senate—Independent Offices, 1955–70; HUD, Space, and Science, 1971–74; and Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, 1975–96). The real ADA scores for Congress come from Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999), and the real Presidential ADA scores for the 1948–94 period are from Krause (2000, footnote 12). The Presidential ADA scores for 1995 and 1996 were generously provided to me by Dan Ponder. The 1996 measure is the inverse of the ACU Presidential score since this datum is unavailable for that particular year.

FIGURE 1. Univariate Time Series Plots: Log Ratio of SEC Budgetary Residual–Uncertainty, 1949–97 (Appropriations and Enforcement Workload Uncertainty)



workloads (EW) volatility during the 1949–97 annual period. The most striking specific aspect of both graphs is the large spike that occurs in 1963 with respect to the latter measure. This data point reflects a year with a very large agency budget request (22.63% growth over 1962 appropriations) under Manuel Cary's activist tenure as SEC chairman, coupled with only modest changes in task activities around this time. This resulted in an insufficient administrative enforcement apparatus for effectively regulating an ever-expanding and increasingly complex industry.²⁹ Two broader features, however, are also of interest. Even when allowing for the presence of a large spike in the log ratio of BR to σ_{EW} for 1963, this measure still has a smaller median value than the corresponding log ratio of BR to σ_{APP} (median_{APP} = 2.34, median_{EW} = 0.79; Mann–Whitney U -test statistic = 4.16, $p \approx 0.00$).³⁰ This pattern is compatible with Hypothesis 1 since agency budgetary decisions reflect an overall higher level of responsiveness to appropriations (external) uncertainty compared to enforcement workload (internal) uncertainty in a positive direction. Relatedly, visual inspection

of these graphs indicate that the log ratio of BR to σ_{APP} appears noticeably more volatile compared to the log ratio of BR to σ_{EW} .³¹ In addition, the log ratio of the SEC's BR–appropriations volatility is noticeably higher under divided government compared to unified government consistent with Hypothesis 2 (median_{APP–Divided} = 2.51, median_{APP–Unified} = 1.71; U -test statistic = 2.13, $p \approx 0.034$). This hypothesis is also supported in terms of the log ratio of the SEC BR to its enforcement workload volatility (median_{EW–Divided} = 0.93, median_{EW–Unified} = 0.45; U -test statistic = 2.41, $p \approx 0.016$).

The regression results and corresponding Wald coefficient restriction tests are listed in Tables 2–4.³² The first set of findings in Table 2 examines whether the SEC seeks additional or fewer resources in response to appropriations uncertainty.³³ These findings suggest that the SEC typically prefers additional organizational resources as the recent past appropriations it has received becomes more volatile. These positive risk coefficients indicate that the SEC exhibits budgetary risk aversion in a general form, i.e., $\beta^*/\alpha^* > 0$, but also under unified government, i.e., $0 < \beta_{Unified}^*/\alpha_{Unified}^* \leq 1$ (Model 3), as well as under divided government, i.e., $\beta_{Divided}^*/\alpha_{Divided}^* > 0$, $\beta_{Divided}^*/\alpha_{Divided}^* = 1$ (Model 4). In an inferential sense, the SEC's budgetary risk aversion when confronting external uncertainty is unit elastic since the hypothesis that these risk coefficients are equal to positive unity cannot be rejected by the data. This suggests on an empirical level that the SEC's dispreference for appropriations uncertainty (β) is proportional to its preference for obtaining additional funding (α) in Models 1–4. Furthermore, these parameter estimates are compatible with the hypothetical parameter values based on the theoretical predictions displayed in Table 1. The SEC's budgetary behavior during divided government lies inconclusively somewhere between no effect (i.e., risk neutrality) and unit elastic responsiveness to uncertainty (i.e., risk aversion)—i.e., $0 \leq \beta_{Divided}^*/\alpha_{Divided}^* \leq 1$. The risk coefficients pertaining to each regime are not statistically discernible from one another based on the parameter

³¹ If one drops the overly influential observation in 1963, a Brown–Forsythe (B–F) equality-of-variance test supports this conjecture (mean absolute median difference for the log ratio of BR to σ_{APP} = 1.43, mean absolute median difference for the log ratio of BR to σ_{EW} = 0.80; B–F test statistic = 4.93 [$p \approx 0.03$]).

³² The BR variable is a stationary time series based upon the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root test: ADF(1) = –4.05 ($p < 0.01$). Also, residual normality and heteroskedasticity assumptions are not violated for these estimated models. When at least one of the lags involved in computing the Ljung–Box Q statistic is significant at $p \leq 0.10$, the covariance matrix of the standard errors is corrected via the Newey and West (1987) approach with $\ell = 3$, where ℓ is the truncation lag parameter chosen based on their analytical suggestion that $\ell = 4 \cdot (T/100)^{1/5}$.

³³ A skeptic might claim that these uncertainty variables are a by-product of spurious long-term trends in the moving-average growth variables from which they are derived, as opposed to capturing the true volatility that the agency is experiencing. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root tests performed on the moving average of SEC real appropriations and agency enforcement workload growth variables refute this claim: appropriations, ADF(2) = –3.78 ($p < 0.01$); enforcement workload, ADF(5) = –4.22 ($p < 0.01$).

²⁹ This issue is highlighted in the House's Securities Markets Special Study of 1961–63, which resulted in the enactment of the 1964 Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act (Khademian 1992, 60–62).

³⁰ The difference-in-medians Mann–Whitney U test is preferred over the less conservative difference-in-means t test since these variables are heavily skewed based on Jarque–Bera normality test results.

TABLE 2 Baseline and Regime-Based Statistical Models of SEC Budgetary Decision-Making Behavior, 1949–97 (Appropriations Volatility Model Specifications)

Independent Variable	Model 1, Baseline (Full)	Model 2, Baseline (Reduced)	Model 3, Regime (Full)	Model 4, Regime (Reduced)
Constant	59.04 (52.45) [0.27]	10.73** (4.19) [0.01]	57.71 (63.84) [0.37]	17.27*** (6.38) [0.01]
Appropriations uncertainty _t	0.70** (0.35) [0.05]	0.97** (0.37) [0.01]	0.75* (0.44) [0.10]	0.80 (0.53) [0.14]
Appropriations uncertainty _t × Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	-0.18 (0.79) [0.83]	0.22 (0.74) [0.77]
Moving average of % Δ Real appropriations _t	0.25 (0.18) [0.18]	0.25 (0.21) [0.24]	0.23 (0.20) [0.25]	0.23 (0.18) [0.22]
Moving average of % Δ Enforcement workload _t	0.20* (0.11) [0.09]	0.23** (0.11) [0.04]	0.24* (0.13) [0.07]	0.29** (0.12) [0.02]
% Δ GNP _{t-2}	0.72** (0.29) [0.02]	0.71* (0.36) [0.06]	0.65* (0.33) [0.06]	0.63* (0.36) [0.09]
log(industry size) _{t-1}	-4.13 (4.79) [0.40]	—	-3.74 (6.03) [0.54]	—
EDGAR _{t-1}	11.01*** (3.81) [0.007]	6.30** (2.81) [0.03]	11.35** (4.48) [0.02]	7.18** (2.83) [0.02]
Median House oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	-0.14 (0.09) [0.12]	-0.16*** (0.06) [0.008]	-0.16* (0.10) [0.10]	-0.18*** (0.06) [0.004]
Median Senate oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.06 (0.04) [0.20]	0.01 (0.05) [0.84]	0.06 (0.04) [0.17]	—
Presidential ideology _{t-1}	-0.10*** (0.03) [0.002]	-0.08*** (0.03) [0.006]	-0.12** (0.05) [0.02]	-0.12*** (0.04) [0.006]
Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	-1.60 (5.86) [0.79]	-5.29 (5.49) [0.34]
Median House appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.02 (0.10) [0.81]	—	0.04E-01 (0.12) [0.98]	—
Median Senate appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.04 (0.14) [0.79]	—	0.05 (0.15) [0.73]	—
1964 Amendments _{t-1}	-2.42 (4.01) [0.55]	—	-2.46 (4.42) [0.58]	—
Partisan change of political institutions _{t-1} (political shocks)	2.94* (1.75) [0.10]	3.26 (2.30) [0.16]	2.49 (2.11) [0.25]	3.16 (2.42) [0.20]
$H_0: \beta^*/\alpha^* = 1$	0.78 [0.38]	0.01 [0.93]	—	—
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* = 1$	—	—	0.33 [0.57]	0.15 [0.70]
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = 0$	—	—	0.71 [0.41]	3.84* [0.06]
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = 1$	—	—	0.41 [0.53]	0.01E-01 [0.97]
Adjusted R^2	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.43
Ljung–Box Q statistic: $\chi^2 \sim (7)$	9.59 [0.21]	8.12 [0.32]	8.53 [0.29]	7.71 [0.36]
Jarque–Bera test for normality	0.54 [0.77]	0.88 [0.64]	0.84 [0.66]	1.09 [0.58]
White heteroskedasticity test	21.52 [0.55]	17.44 [0.36]	24.13 [0.57]	16.72 [0.47]

Note: All coefficients, corresponding standard errors, and probability values are rounded to the nearest hundredth unless noted otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are Newey–West (1987) standard errors (Models 1 and 3) and ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors (Models 2 and 4). The numbers in brackets are probability values. * $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

TABLE 3 Baseline and Regime-Based Statistical Models of SEC Budgetary Decision-Making Behavior, 1949–97 (Enforcement Workload Volatility Model Specifications)

Independent Variable	Model 5, Baseline (Full)	Model 6, Baseline (Reduced)	Model 7, Regime (Full)	Model 8, Regime (Reduced)
Constant	88.26 (67.87) [0.20]	90.03** (36.57) [0.02]	82.62 (68.89) [0.24]	50.12 (62.12) [0.43]
Enforcement workload uncertainty _t	0.01* (0.20) [0.96]	0.02E-01 (0.16) [0.99]	0.21 (0.22) [0.37]	0.23 (0.22) [0.30]
Enforcement workload uncertainty _t × Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	-0.48 (0.31) [0.13]	-0.40 (0.31) [0.20]
Moving average of % Δ Real appropriations _t	0.30 (0.27) [0.29]	0.32 (0.21) [0.14]	0.40 (0.28) [0.16]	0.37 (0.24) [0.14]
Moving average of % Δ Enforcement workload _t	0.22* (0.12) [0.09]	0.22* (0.12) [0.06]	0.21 (0.14) [0.15]	0.19 (0.14) [0.19]
% Δ GNP _{t-2}	0.76* (0.42) [0.08]	0.72* (0.38) [0.06]	0.52 (0.43) [0.24]	0.44 (0.43) [0.31]
log(industry size) _{t-1}	-6.26 (5.80) [0.29]	-6.35** (3.04) [0.04]	-5.91 (6.04) [0.34]	-3.12 (5.37) [0.57]
EDGAR _{t-1}	13.89*** (4.28) [0.003]	14.77*** (3.71) [0.000]	12.63*** (4.28) [0.006]	12.66*** (4.23) [0.005]
Median House oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	-0.18** (0.09) [0.05]	-0.15** (0.06) [0.01]	-0.18** (0.09) [0.05]	-0.15** (0.07) [0.04]
Median Senate oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.06 (0.06) [0.35]	0.05 (0.05) [0.36]	0.09 (0.06) [0.16]	0.09 (0.06) [0.14]
Presidential ideology _{t-1}	-0.10*** (0.04) [0.007]	-0.11*** (0.03) [0.002]	-0.12** (0.05) [0.03]	-0.11** (0.04) [0.01]
Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	5.36 (6.69) [0.43]	4.72 (6.55) [0.48]
Median House appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.01 (0.10) [0.95]	—	-0.02 (0.11) [0.87]	—
Median Senate appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.08 (0.10) [0.40]	—	0.12 (0.10) [0.24]	—
1964 Amendments _{t-1}	-2.60 (4.87) [0.60]	—	-4.51 (4.92) [0.37]	-4.32 (4.87) [0.38]
Partisan change of political institutions _{t-1} (political shocks)	2.28 (2.44) [0.36]	2.28 (2.31) [0.33]	1.83 (2.44) [0.46]	1.58 (2.41) [0.52]
$H_0: \beta^*/\alpha^* = 1$	25.92** [0.000]	38.02*** [0.000]	—	—
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Unified}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Unified}}^* = 1$	—	—	12.57*** [0.001]	11.91*** [0.002]
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = 0$	—	—	0.99 [0.33]	0.38 [0.54]
$H_0: \beta_{\text{Divided}}^*/\alpha_{\text{Divided}}^* = -1$	—	—	6.72** [0.01]	9.98*** [0.003]
Adjusted R^2	0.38	0.41	0.40	0.40
Ljung–Box Q statistic: $\chi^2 \sim (7)$	8.53 [0.29]	7.95 [0.34]	8.31 [0.31]	6.51 [0.48]
Jarque–Bera test for normality	1.32 [0.52]	1.55 [0.46]	1.10 [0.58]	1.40 [0.50]
White heteroskedasticity test	21.81 [0.53]	15.68 [0.62]	20.05 [0.79]	15.92 [0.82]

Note: All coefficients, corresponding standard errors, and probability values are rounded to the nearest hundredth unless noted otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are OLS standard errors. The numbers in brackets are probability values. * $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

TABLE. 4 Baseline and Regime-Based Statistical Models of SEC Budgetary Decision-Making Behavior, 1949–97 (Combined Appropriations and Enforcement Workload Volatility Model Specifications)

Independent Variable	Model 9, Baseline (Full)	Model 10, Baseline (Reduced)	Model 11, Regime (Full)	Model 12, Regime (Reduced)
Constant	78.03 (69.83) [0.27]	10.18** (4.47) [0.029]	72.10 (80.63) [0.38]	13.82* (7.52) [0.07]
Appropriations uncertainty _t	0.75*** (0.27) [0.008]	0.90** (0.42) [0.04]	0.65 (0.45) [0.16]	0.73 (0.58) [0.22]
Appropriations uncertainty _t × Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	0.11 (0.84) [0.90]	0.33 (0.83) [0.69]
Enforcement workload uncertainty _t	-0.09 (0.23) [0.70]	0.06 (0.15) [0.71]	0.12 (0.27) [0.67]	0.15 (0.19) [0.45]
Enforcement workload uncertainty _t × Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	-0.48 (0.31) [0.14]	-0.26 (0.30) [0.40]
Moving average of % Δ Real appropriations _t	0.26 (0.18) [0.17]	0.26 (0.21) [0.23]	0.37 (0.25) [0.14]	0.27 (0.24) [0.27]
Moving average of % Δ Enforcement workload _t	0.20 (0.12) [0.11]	0.24** (0.11) [0.04]	0.18 (0.12) [0.15]	0.28** (0.13) [0.03]
% Δ GNP _{t-2}	0.78** (0.30) [0.01]	0.68* (0.38) [0.08]	0.55 (0.39) [0.17]	0.48 (0.41) [0.25]
log(industry size) _{t-1}	-5.69 (5.88) [0.34]	—	-5.34 (6.96) [0.45]	—
EDGAR _{t-1}	11.37*** (4.10) [0.009]	6.88** (3.21) [0.04]	10.10** (5.01) [0.05]	6.89* (3.69) [0.07]
Median House oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	-0.14 (0.09) [0.12]	-0.16*** (0.06) [0.009]	-0.14 (0.09) [0.14]	-0.17*** (0.06) [0.007]
Median Senate oversight (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.05 (0.04) [0.22]	0.01 (0.05) [0.78]	0.08 (0.05) [0.11]	0.03 (0.06) [0.61]
Presidential ideology _{t-1}	-0.10*** (0.03) [0.002]	-0.08*** (0.03) [0.006]	-0.11** (0.03) [0.03]	-0.12** (0.04) [0.01]
Divided government _{t-1}	—	—	5.35 (7.62) [0.49]	-1.71 (6.78) [0.80]
Median House appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.02 (0.10) [0.84]	—	0.02 (0.12) [0.99]	—
Median Senate appropriations (sub)committee ideology _{t-1}	0.04 (0.14) [0.75]	—	0.08 (0.14) [0.60]	—
1964 Amendments _{t-1}	-1.44 (3.72) [0.70]	—	-3.49 (4.77) [0.47]	—

Note: All coefficients, corresponding standard errors, and probability values are rounded to the nearest hundredth unless noted otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are Newey–West (1987) (Models 9 and 11) and OLS standard errors (Models 10 and 12), respectively. The numbers in brackets are probability values. * $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

TABLE 4—Continued

Independent Variable	Model 9, Baseline (Full)	Model 10, Baseline (Reduced)	Model 11, Regime (Full)	Model 12, Regime (Reduced)
Partisan change of political institutions _{t-1} (political shocks)	3.23* (1.69) [0.06]	3.09 (2.37) [0.20]	2.88 (1.83) [0.13]	3.05 (2.59) [0.25]
$H_0: (\beta^*/\alpha^*)_{APP} = 1$	0.85 [0.36]	0.06 [0.81]	—	—
$H_0: (\beta^*/\alpha^*)_{EW} = -1 (=1: \text{Model 10})$	16.19*** [0.000]	40.77*** [0.000]	—	—
$H_0: (\beta^*/\alpha^*)_{APP} = (\beta^*/\alpha^*)_{EW}$	9.14*** [0.005]	2.74* [0.106]	—	—
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Unified}/\alpha^*_{Unified})_{APP} = 1$	—	—	0.59 [0.45]	0.22 [0.65]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{APP} = 0$	—	—	1.25 [0.27]	3.04* [0.09]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{APP} = 1$	—	—	0.13 [0.72]	0.01 [0.92]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Unified}/\alpha^*_{Unified})_{EW} = 1$	—	—	10.69*** [0.003]	19.48*** [0.000]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{EW} = -1$	—	—	7.73*** [0.009]	14.49*** [0.001]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{EW} = 0$	—	—	2.55 [0.12]	0.23 [0.64]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Unified}/\alpha^*_{Unified})_{APP} = (\beta^*_{Unified}/\alpha^*_{Unified})_{EW}$	—	—	0.79 [0.38]	0.76 [0.39]
$H_0: (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{APP} = (\beta^*_{Divided}/\alpha^*_{Divided})_{EW}$	—	—	3.14* [0.09]	2.49 [0.12]
Adjusted R^2	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.40
Ljung–Box Q statistic: $\chi^2 \sim (7)$	10.97 [0.14]	7.65 [0.36]	12.36* [0.09]	7.39 [0.39]
Jarque–Bera test for normality	0.68 [0.71]	0.69 [0.71]	1.18 [0.55]	1.10 [0.58]
White heteroskedasticity test	22.10 [0.63]	16.68 [0.55]	23.76 [0.78]	18.58 [0.73]

estimates involving the interaction term for the Appropriations Uncertainty_t × Divided Government_{t-1} variables in both Model 3 and Model 4. Put simply, the SEC is no more budgetary risk-averse during periods of unified government than under divided government in response to appropriations uncertainty. The relevant Wald coefficient restriction tests appearing at the bottom of Table 2 corroborate this finding in the fully specified model (Model 3), yet this result is rejected by the data in the reduced specification (Model 4) consistent with Hypothesis 2.

The other exogenous variables capture the other information affecting SEC budgetary decisions. The findings from the baseline-full model (Model 1) reveal that agency budget requests are inelastically responsive to variations in its enforcement workload over the preceding three-year cycle. For instance, each 1% rise in this task variable in the full model produces a 0.20% rise in the SEC's BR per annum during the sample period. This coefficient is noticeably less than positive unity, thus indicating that the SEC prefers less than proportional increases in budgetary resources with respect to task outputs. One possible explanation for this finding is that, as a production agency, the SEC enjoys economies of scale that allows it to economize task activities relative to those organizations with differ-

ent processes for generating outputs. Based on this crude empirical test of the budget–output relationship, Niskanen's (1971) rent seeking hypothesis can be rejected for the SEC case.³⁴ Economic growth also exerts a positive impact on agency budgetary decisions, with each 1% increase in GNP growth resulting in a 0.72% rise in the BR. The movement of the EDGAR system from the Executive Director's Office to its own special unit corresponds to an 11.01% and a 6.30% per annum rise in the agency BR on average since the late 1980s in Models 1 and 2, respectively. Moreover, the ideological preferences of the President and the legislative branch's oversight (sub)committees also play a vital role in shaping SEC budgetary decisions.³⁵ This relationship, however, is negative concerning both House oversight and Presidential ideological preferences. As House oversight (sub)committee ideology becomes more conservative (i.e., declines) by one ratings point in the

³⁴ Based on the reported and preliminary data analysis, the coefficient associated with this variable ranges between 0.19 and 0.51. These values are well below the break-even point of positive unity.

³⁵ Alternative specifications omitting these variables produced a substantially weaker fit to the data (R^2 declined by the amount ranging between 0.13 [32.5%] and 0.24 [58.5%]) and also generated an omitted variable bias problem.

baseline-reduced model (Model 2), the SEC's BR rises by an average of almost 2% ($-0.16 \times 11.863 = -1.90$) per annum.³⁶ Likewise, as Presidential ideology becomes more conservative by one rating unit, the SEC's BR increases in a given year by a little more than 1% ($-0.10 \times 11.863 = -1.19$) per annum in Model 1. The countervailing relationship between SEC budgetary decisions and the ideology of political institutions has two interpretations. It might infer that the SEC will seek additional funding because conservative elected officials will support stricter enforcement of securities laws and regulations relative to more liberal counterparts (Moe 1982; but see Kohlmeier 1969 and Khademian 1992). An alternative, yet more plausible interpretation of these findings is that the political component of SEC budgetary decision making is made in a countercyclical fashion with respect to its political environment. Therefore, the SEC engages in a form of "ideological counterbalancing" analogous to that which voters employ (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1996), whereby it seeks additional slack resources from a more conservative House oversight committee or Presidential administration. The basis for this type of agency behavior might lie with the SEC's desire to compensate for the ideological composition of political institutions that they do not endogenously determine yet must obtain resources from as a means of smoothing the funding stream that it receives through time. The ideological compositions of the Senate oversight (sub)committee and both the House and the Senate Appropriations (sub)committees all consistently fail to influence SEC budgetary decision making.³⁷ This pattern also holds true regarding the divided government dummy variable's direct impact on agency budgetary decisions. The "power accrual" hypothesis, which suggests that an agency will seek to exploit the greater fragmentation of political actors under divided government, is not supported by the data on SEC budgetary decision making.³⁸

Table 3 contains the regression results that examine how SEC budgetary decisions are affected by internal uncertainty, defined in terms of the three-year moving standard deviation in the SEC's enforcement

workload. Both t and Wald restriction tests of the risk coefficient lead one to infer that the SEC exhibits budgetary risk neutrality with respect to task uncertainty—i.e., $\beta^*/\alpha^* = 0$. In other words, the SEC's desire to seek budgetary resources is indifferent with respect to changes involving uncertainty coming from its task activities. This result provides additional support for Hypothesis 1 by showing that the SEC's response to appropriations volatility (external uncertainty) is noticeably more risk-averse than its response task volatility (internal uncertainty).³⁹ In fact, statistically discernible differences in SEC budgetary risk propensities between unified and divided government do not transpire since each political regime substantively reflects risk-neutral behavior.

The other exogenous variables produce results that are generally consistent with those in Table 2. SEC budget requests are influenced by the enforcement workload of the agency, the ideological preferences of the President and House oversight committee, and policy innovation emanating from within the agency in the form of EDGAR. Once again, neither the ideology of Congressional appropriations committees nor the moving-average growth in agency real appropriations affects SEC budgetary decisions. Neither the size of the industry that the SEC is responsible for regulating, nor divided government influences its budgetary decision making. These results conform to existing wisdom on the politics of the SEC (Khademian 1992; Kohlmeier 1969; Moe 1982).

The final set of regression models in Table 4 incorporates both appropriations and enforcement workload uncertainty measures into the same specification.⁴⁰ The risk coefficients for appropriations uncertainty are generally higher than the corresponding ones for task uncertainty, except under both regimes in Model 12 and during only unified government in Model 11. Generally, the SEC displays budgetary risk aversion with respect to appropriations (external) uncertainty, while behaving in a manner consistent with budgetary risk neutrality in response to task (internal) uncertainty. This implies that the SEC's disutility obtained from uncertainty (β) vis-à-vis the utility acquired from budgetary resource preferences (α) is comparatively greater for appropriations volatility than it is for task volatility. These findings corroborate the previous sets of empirical results showing that the SEC is indifferent to task uncertainty under its administrative jurisdiction. At the same time, however, this agency's distaste for external uncertainty is at most equal to, if not less than, its preference for obtaining additional budgetary resources.⁴¹ The regression evidence does not reveal any significant difference for agency risk-bearing

³⁶ The political ideology coefficients have a semilogarithmic interpretation. The average slope coefficient for these variables is computed as $\beta \cdot \bar{Y}$, where β is the unstandardized regression coefficient appearing in the table and \bar{Y} is the average value of the dependent variable (see Gujarati 1995, 169–178 for more details).

³⁷ Besides the statistically insignificant divided government dummy in each model specification, political-institutional ideological fragmentation effects on SEC budgetary decisions were also examined in a preliminary analysis not reported here. Variables consisting of the median ideological difference between Presidents and each Congressional oversight (sub)committee, and between Presidents and each appropriations (sub)committee, were shown to have no independent effect on the dependent variable and not to alter the risk coefficients in any statistically meaningful way in any case except in a revised version of the baseline (full) Model 1, where its p value rises from 0.05 to 0.22. However, the overall fit of this revised specification is inferior to the one reported in Table 2 that does not consider these measures.

³⁸ There was also a paucity of consistent statistical evidence in favor of the "power accrual" hypothesis in preliminary data analysis. A summary of these results can be obtained from the author.

³⁹ The evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 is further corroborated by the univariate log ratio results presented earlier.

⁴⁰ Preliminary analysis indicated that the estimates of appropriations and workload uncertainty do not suffer from multicollinearity because of their joint inclusion in these model specifications. This is hardly surprising given the modest bivariate correlation coefficient between these variables ($r = 0.33$).

⁴¹ While this finding is obvious based on the t tests of the regression coefficients, Wald coefficient restriction tests yield more precise

behavior between eras of divided and eras of unified government compatible with the derived propositions embodied in Hypothesis 2. Therefore, the SEC's less stable policy expectations and, hence, eroding institutional stability under divided government do not translate into relatively less budgetary risk aversion compared to that under unified government.

DISCUSSION

In the realm of administrative politics, uncertainty is regarded as the major obstacle limiting a political principal's ability to control a bureaucratic agent to whom it has delegated policymaking authority. Although this standard perspective is useful for understanding how political institutions can effectively shape policy administration in a top-down hierarchical manner, it also gives short shrift to analyzing the uncertainty that is experienced by bureaucratic agents. This is especially troubling because the predominant paradigm used to analyze this principal-agent problem fails to provide sufficient detail concerning how public bureaucracies arrive at decisions. For instance, Niskanen's (1971) seminal research on the "budget maximizing bureaucrat" emphasizes the uncertainty that politicians experience with respect to monitoring administrative agencies. This line of research does not consider the substantive uncertainty that poses an inherent challenge to bureaucratic decision making. This is not a trivial oversight since seminal scholarship on public organizations concurs that the manner in which administrative agencies make decisions in response to uncertainty is, perhaps, the most fundamental act that they undertake (Crozier 1964; Downs 1967; March 1999; Simon 1976; Stinchcombe 1990; Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989).

With few exceptions, this topic has received scant scholarly attention within both political science and public administration. In a handful of studies that do explicitly consider bureaucratic responses to uncertainty, agency risk-bearing behavior is either treated as a fixed *a priori* simplifying assumption (Bendor and Moe 1985; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985, 1987) or derived in a manner in which the agency's range of responses to this uncertainty is restricted to the risk-neutral case (Carpenter 2002). Thus, little is actually known on either the theoretical or the empirical level regarding how bureaucratic agencies make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. If scholars wish to understand how public bureaucracies cope with uncertainty, then it is essential that the risk propensities underlying agency decisions are directly examined, rather than merely assumed or omitted altogether.

corroborative evidence. In the baseline models, the difference between appropriations and task uncertainty-generated risk coefficients is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.005$, Model 9; $p = 0.106$, Model 10). Moderate support exists for this hypothesized pattern under divided government ($p = 0.09$, Model 11; $p = 0.12$, Model 12). However, no discernible difference in agency risk-bearing decision making between these sources of uncertainty during periods of unified government transpires ($p = 0.38$, Model 11; $p = 0.39$, Model 12).

This study addresses this issue by proposing a statistical test of agency risk-bearing behavior that is formally derived from a comparative-static analysis of budgetary decision making. This test is predicated on the relative change in the rate of agency utility accrued from uncertainty vis-à-vis the budgetary resources that it wishes to obtain. Consistent with seminal research on organizational theory (Cyert and March 1963; Downs 1967; Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989), budget requests serve as a way for the agency to acquire slack resources for organizational maintenance purposes. These resources create administrative flexibility by allowing the agency to hedge against the uncertainty that it encounters (Downs 1967, 138–39). The willingness of a bureaucratic agency to extract additional (or fewer) slack budgetary resources in response to uncertainty cannot be determined unless its risk-bearing behavior can be theoretically articulated in a manner that lends itself to empirical inquiry.

The formulation of the agency's utility function in this study has allowed for a qualitative distinction between divided and unified party government regimes. As a result, heterogeneous agency budgetary decision making can be considered by treating an agency's risk propensities as conditionally varying in relation to the context in which uncertainty is experienced (March 1999, 244–45). The agency's response to two types of uncertainty is also investigated—that over which it possesses no formal decision-making authority (external uncertainty) and that over which it has some limited formal decision-making power (internal uncertainty). The empirical results indicate that the SEC's budgetary decision making generally reflects risk aversion concerning appropriations (external) uncertainty, while it exhibits risk neutrality regarding task (internal) uncertainty. These empirical findings challenge the common generic assumption implicit in principal-agent models that bureaucratic agents are risk-averse with respect to the task that they are obligated to perform (e.g., see Miller and Whitford 2002). On a broader level, this statistical evidence suggests that while agencies might wish to balance organizational mission goals with a desire for maintaining a positive reputation with their political principals (Kaufman 1981; Wilson 1989), the former goal takes greater precedence with respect to external uncertainty. This is borne out by the SEC's risk coefficient estimate regarding appropriations uncertainty being consistently less than positive unity yet greater than zero. This inelastic budgetary risk aversion is suggestive less of a distaste for uncertainty by the agency than of a preference for obtaining additional funds.

Although the SEC is a single case that involves an independent regulatory commission that fits the profile of a production agency (Wilson 1989, 157–71), the approach proposed in this study is applicable for analyzing the risk propensities of bureaucratic decision making for other types of administrative agencies. This line of inquiry, for instance, can be extended to the study of public agencies exhibiting varying degrees of political insulation. One might expect that less insulated agencies should experience greater instability

arising from the vagaries of the political process than agencies that possess greater independence from the executive branch (Lewis 2003). Therefore, one can infer that executive-branch agencies should be expected to behave in a relatively more risk-averse fashion in relation to external uncertainty compared to independent regulatory commissions. This difference is attributable to the structural characteristics of the latter type of agency design, which enhances its autonomy, including staggered appointment terms, legislative and budgetary bypass authority, and partisan balance requirements for commissioners.

Likewise, agencies that yield outputs that are not easily observable should also exhibit relatively greater risk aversion with respect to internal task uncertainty for a given type of risk-bearing behavior. This is because it will be more difficult for the agencies to gauge their task demands in these circumstances. Since the approach proposed in this study allows for varying decision rules within an uncertain decision-making environment, it has broad applicability for analyzing the information asymmetries that bureaucratic agents experience for other types of agency decisions, such as the willingness to obtain discretion from political principals (Krause 2003b) or the handling of administrative policy actions. In closing, bureaucratic agents possess their own information problems. Analyzing this dilemma not only is substantively important for the study of decision making by public organizations, but also has vital implications for understanding how institutional politics shapes policy administration.

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



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



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


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
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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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


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


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
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

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
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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

ARTICLES

- Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops189
Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett
- Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the
Political Economy of Rearmament203
Kevin Narizny
- Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of
Open versus Closed Amendment Rules221
Guillaume R. Fréchette, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer
- Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance233
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
- Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States245
Gary Miller and Norman Schofield
- A Behavioral Model of Turnout261
Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting
- The Construction of Rights281
Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees
- Identity and Liberal Nationalism295
Evan Charney
- Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data311
Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry

FORUM

- Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation333
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam
- Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists339
Mark Peceny and Caroline C. Beer

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Subscription Information: *American Political Science Review* (ISSN 0003-0554) is published quarterly in February, May, August, and November by Cambridge University Press for the American Political Science Association. Annual institutional electronic-only subscription rate (2003) in US\$392 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK£253 elsewhere. Annual institutional print-and-electronic subscription rate (2003) is US\$435 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK£280 elsewhere. Periodicals postage rate is pending at New York, NY and additional mailing offices. Institutional subscription orders and address changes should be sent to: *American Political Science Review*, Cambridge University Press, 110 Midland Avenue, Port Chester, NY 10573, USA.

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American Political Science Review

Volume 97, Number 2, May 2003

Table of Contents

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR iii

ARTICLES

Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting
Stops

Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett 189–202

Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the
Political Economy of Rearmament

Kevin Narizny 203–220

Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of
Open versus Closed Amendment Rules

Guillaume R. Fréchette, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer 221–232

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level
Governance

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks 233–243

Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States

Gary Miller and Norman Schofield 245–260

A Behavioral Model of Turnout

Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting 261–280

The Construction of Rights

Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees 281–293

Identity and Liberal Nationalism

Evan Charney 295–310

Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words
as Data

Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry 311–331

FORUM

Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and
Dispute Initiation

Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam 333–337

Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists

Mark Peceny and Caroline C. Beer 339–342

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Notes from the Editor

It is well known that the bulk of the economic cost of a war is incurred many years after the armed hostilities themselves have ceased. By any reasonable and humane accounting, the human cost of a war is likely to far outweigh the economic cost. The immediate human toll, tallied in body counts, is apt to be terrible. But how much of the human cost, like the economic cost, does not become clear until long afterwards? That question, applied to one particular form of armed conflict, civil war, motivates the chillingly-titled "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops" by Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. Analyzing death and disability data for 1999, Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett paint a grim picture of the impact of the civil wars that were fought earlier in the decade and show how this impact was manifested in particular diseases and conditions and how it affected particular groups of non-combatants. This is not a pleasant article to read, but it is undeniably an important one.

Conventional wisdom associates support for military spending with conservative parties and support for social welfare programs with liberal parties. In "Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament," Kevin Narizny stands the conventional wisdom on its head by proposing the unconventional hypothesis that, when confronted with international threat, liberal governments should be more likely than their conservative counterparts to support rearmament policies, while conservative governments should be more likely to pursue strategies of alliance-formation or appeasement. Narizny tests this hypothesis, which builds on the class bases of liberal and conservative parties, against the historical experiences of France, Britain, and the U.S. His findings are bound to evoke widespread comment and debate, as they bear directly on issues about which feelings run high and careful analysis is frequently lacking.

A key question for political science—some would even say *the* key question—is how institutional arrangements, or rules, affect decisions or outcomes. In "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," Guillaume R. Fréchette, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer bring experimental methods to bear on a specific institutional arrangement that shapes legislative decision-making in many nations: the "closed" or "open" process by which legislation is amended. How are legislators' decisions affected by the operation of a "closed" amendment rule, in which proposals must be voted on without being subject to change, as opposed to an "open" rule, in which amendments can be offered that alter the substance of legislation? The answer that Fréchette, Kagel, and Lehrer provide will, of course, be of interest to legislative scholars. However, those interested more broadly in the impact of institutional arrangements should regard this as a pertinent case in point and may also discover in it a new and useful way to approach their subject matter.

The focus on institutional arrangements carries over, albeit in an altogether different light, in Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks's "Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance." The reallocation of authority away from central states has raised as yet unresolved questions about how multi-level governance should be organized. Hooghe and Marks distinguish between two types of multi-level governance: in one, jurisdictions are general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable; in the other, they are task-specific, intersecting, and flexible. This framework sets out the basic institutional options for organizing multi-level governance and provides an analytical basis for assessing these options.

The next two articles in this issue shift the focus from politics inside the "black box" to the input side of the political process. In "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States," Gary Miller and Norman Schofield offer an explanation of partisan realignments that is tied to the balance among competing values, e.g., the free use of private property versus the pursuit of equality, or protection of individual freedom versus advancement of a good society. In Miller and Schofield's account, politicians reach out to activists who are not currently part of their party's electoral coalition. These attempts, when successful, alter the pattern of electoral support that parties receive; a new electoral coalition then gains control of government; and policy directions change as a consequence. By shifting the extent to which different values are realized in policy outcomes, such changes produce a new set of disaffected citizens, and the activists among them become inviting targets for politicians seeking to produce a new electoral coalition. Employing this activist-based approach, Miller and Schofield produce an account of electoral support for U.S. political parties over the last century that is capable of explaining why the Democratic and Republican parties switched sides on overarching economic and social issues.

Of course, the formation of electoral coalitions presupposes that people take the trouble to vote in the first place. In "A Behavioral Model of Turnout," Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting confront what has been called the "paradox that ate rational choice": Why do people vote even though the probability that they will be pivotal in deciding the outcome is too small to make this costly act rational? Several different answers have been proposed in the past—most notably, perhaps, by grafting onto the rather cold-blooded cost-benefit calculus the idea that people derive psychic benefits from voting. By contrast, Bendor, Diermeier and Ting strike out in a provocative new direction, attempting to marry rational choice and behavioral approaches to individual decision-making by portraying citizens as rational adapters rather than optimizers. The resulting account holds great promise as a resolution of the paradox of voting and, more broadly understood, as a step toward synthesizing

analytical approaches that are often viewed as contradictory.

"In what sense, if any, do rights exist?" So begins "The Construction of Rights," by Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees. If one has a right to do x but cannot exercise it, does one really "have" that right? That question may sound suspiciously like the age-old poser about whether, if a tree falls in an uninhabited forest, it makes a sound, but it is actually one of the bases of Dowding and Van Hees's framework for understanding the extent to which individuals have and can exercise rights—a framework in which rights are viewed as being built on a foundation of more fundamental moral values.

Political philosophers devote much of their attention to timeless questions like the one that Dowding and Van Hees ask, but in "Identity and Liberal Nationalism," Evan Charney weighs in on some especially timely issues: the relative values of cultural identity and individual liberties. How, Charney asks, can a nation or nation-state pursue the benefits of forging and maintaining a collective identity without sacrificing the benefits of pluralism and commitment to individual rights? Charney contends that recent liberal attempts to justify the elevation of collective identity as a means of nurturing the self-worth of individuals founder due to their inconsistency and to their promotion of an undesirable view of what it means to be an autonomous individual. This assessment takes on a special resonance as we weigh the costs and benefits of post-September 11 policies and practices.

All political science researchers, including (or especially) political philosophers, engage in textual analysis of one sort or another. Recently, though, with the vastly increased availability of massive textual data bases and the advent of high-speed computers, systematic techniques for analyzing texts have proliferated rapidly. In some of these, human "coders" conduct word or phrase counts "by hand," while in others, computers perform this drudgery. Similarly, some of these techniques score texts according to pre-defined categories or dimensions, while others operate more inductively in an attempt to coax the underlying meaning out of a set of texts. In "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts: Using Words as Data," Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry present a new computer-based, inductively-oriented technique of content analysis and demonstrate it by extracting policy positions from party manifestos and legislative speeches. The most striking characteristic of this novel technique is that it is "language-blind." That is, it does not even require knowledge of the language of the texts that are being analyzed. Although that characteristic makes the technique an unusual (some might even say "bizarre") way to try to capture the meanings of texts, the logic of the technique is straightforward and its applicability is potentially broad.

Finally, in the March, 2002, issue of the *Review*, Mark Peceny, Caroline Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry considered what they called the "dictatorial peace," arguing that some of the same factors that help produce peaceful relations between democratic nations

also produce peace among authoritarian regimes. In a follow-up analysis in our "Forum" section ("Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation"), Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam dispute the claim that democracies are likely to be the aggressors in interstate conflicts with personalistic dictatorships, and report results that support the opposite conclusion. The exchange between Reiter and Stam, on the one hand, and Peceny and Beer ("Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists"), on the other, raises several important issues. Is the willingness of personalistic dictatorships to initiate conflict a consequence of their perception that other types of regimes are institutionally constrained and unwilling to go to war, or does it stem from a lack of institutional constraints that enables personalistic dictators to go to war without carefully considering the consequences? Should we be asking instead "What causes personalistic dictatorships to initiate conflicts they are likely to lose?"

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Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops

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Political scientists have conducted only limited systematic research on the consequences of war for civilian populations. Here we argue that the civilian suffering caused by civil war extends well beyond the period of active warfare. We examine these longer-term effects in a cross-national (1999) analysis of World Health Organization new fine-grained data on death and disability broken down by age, gender, and type of disease or condition. We test hypotheses about the impact of civil wars and find substantial long-term effects, even after controlling for several other factors. We estimate that the additional burden of death and disability incurred in 1999, from the indirect and lingering effects of civil wars in the years 1991–97, was approximately equal to that incurred directly and immediately from all wars in 1999. This impact works its way through specific diseases and conditions and disproportionately affects women and children.

The direct and immediate casualties from civil wars are only the tip of the iceberg of their longer-term consequences for human misery. That civil wars kill and maim people is hardly surprising. But it is not just a matter of direct war casualties during the conflict. Civil wars continue to kill people indirectly, well after the shooting stops. These new deaths (and disabilities) are overwhelmingly concentrated in the civilian population.¹ The health effects during specific civil wars are relatively well known,² but the general and longer-term impact is not. Our aim is to examine the systematic longer-term effects of civil wars on public health. This study is part of a larger research program on the comparative analysis of the political determinants of public health condi-

tions in many countries. We believe that politics plays an important role in shaping public health, but there is only limited systematic research by political scientists on the topic (recent examples are Price-Smith 2002 and Przeworski et al. 2000). Here we focus on the impact of political violence on public health by developing and testing hypotheses about the long-term consequences of civil war for civilian populations.

In prior research we found that civil wars significantly reduced aggregate measures of national health performance (Ghobarah et al. 2001). In that study we worked with national-level data on all countries compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO) on DALE, or disability-adjusted life expectancy. This measure takes into account both years of life lost to disease and injury and years of healthy life lost to long-term disability. In this study we build on these initial findings to examine more fully both theoretically and empirically the ways in which civil wars produce longer-term impacts on public health conditions in countries. Specifically, we use another WHO data set: one on DALYs, or disability-adjusted life-years, which contains detailed information on 23 major diseases and conditions on categories of the population distinguished by gender and five age groups. We focus on the effects of civil war in increasing the subsequent incidence of death and disability due to particular infectious diseases and conditions in the different population subgroups.

Overall, WHO (2000, 168, 174) estimates that 269,000 deaths and 8.44 million DALYs were incurred in 1999 as direct and immediate effects of all wars, civil and international. Based on the results we report in this paper, we estimate that nearly as many additional DALYs—another 8.01 million—were lost in 1999 indirectly under various disease groups, as a result of the lingering effects of civil wars during the years 1991–97.

We address two important gaps in existing research on war: (1) the consequences of armed conflict and war for civilian populations (Stein and Russett 1980) and (2) the study of peace building in the aftermath of civil war. Concerning the first gap, the systematic study of war focuses heavily on the onset of armed conflict, with additional literatures addressing various aspects of the

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We thank the Weatherhead Initiative on Military Conflict as a Public Health Problem, the Ford Foundation, and the World Health Organization, NIA (P01 17625-01), for financial support and Gary King, Thomas Gariepy, Melvin Hinich, Kosuke Imai, Roy Licklider, Jennifer Leaning, Greg Huber, Lisa Martin, Christopher Murray, Joshua Salomon, and Nicholas Sambanis for comments. Our data are available at <http://www.yale.edu/unsy/civilwars/data.htm> and at the Virtual Data Center web site, <http://TheData.org>, when it becomes operative.

¹ Estimates run as high as 90% of all war deaths in the late twentieth century being civilians (Ahlstrom 1991), but such estimates are not reliable (Goldstein 2001, 399–402). Davis and Kuritsky (2002) report that severe military conflict in sub-Saharan Africa cut life expectancy by more than 2 years and raised infant mortality by 12 per thousand.

² The one-year impact of infectious disease and health system breakdowns associated with refugees is well established (Toole 1997). War-related deaths from tuberculosis during the war in Guinea-Bissau are documented by Gustafson et al. (2001); Roberts et al. (2001) report war-derived disease deaths in Congo during the war as six times more frequent than those from direct violence. Effects beyond the war period are less clear, though the longer-term risk from tuberculosis, respiratory infections, and malaria is well recognized (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1992).

military conduct and outcome of wars in which states and national armed forces are the primary unit of observation. Political scientists rarely address the wartime consequences for civilians, and even more unusual are studies of the postwar consequences for civilian populations. This is an important omission, since the severity of war for civilians in both the immediate and the longer term varies considerably across wars and deserves careful theoretical and empirical analysis. We begin to address this gap by focusing on the civilian consequences of civil wars that extend into postwar periods.

Regarding the second gap, the literature focuses largely on outside intervention into civil wars and its impact on the termination of wars and the prospects for successful peace building in post-civil war periods (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Hartzell et al. 2001, Regan 2000, and Walter 2002). This valuable peace-building literature addresses political consequences such as political stability, the recurrence of violence, and democratization. Our work addresses post-civil war developments, but instead of focusing on political outcomes as dependent variables, we concentrate on public health conditions and performance as the outcomes to be explained. These outcomes are important in their own right and also have consequences for more familiar political variables (e.g., Price-Smith 2002, chap. 2).

NEW MEASURES OF PUBLIC HEALTH

WHO's new measure of overall health achievement (DALE) discounts the total life expectancy at birth in each country by the number of years the average individual spends with a major disability as the burden of disease or injury—the gap between total life expectation and expected years without disability. It is estimated from three kinds of information: the fraction of the population surviving to each age level (calculated from birth and death rates), individual-level data on the incidence and prevalence of various diseases and disabilities at each age, and the weight assigned to debilitation from each type of condition. The result is the proportion of the population dying or suffering from disabilities, given the average number of years of healthy life that a newborn member of the population could expect to live.

The measure taps the concept of years of healthy and productive life, and so is expressed in intuitively meaningful units. It varies substantially by region of the world and income level. In rich countries, more disabilities are associated with chronic conditions of old age—and, at that point, relatively short life expectancies. In contrast, in poor tropical countries infant mortality is much higher, and more health problems derive from the burden of infectious diseases, such as malaria and schistosomiasis, which are carried by children and young adults who may live a long time with seriously impaired health and quality of life. Empirically, the share of simple life expectancy lost to disability varies from under 9% in the healthiest regions of the world to over 14% in the least healthy ones (WHO 2000, 28).

This information-intensive measure requires not just vital registration data for births and deaths, but expensive health surveys of death, disease, and disability by age and gender—in principle in each country. These data began to be collected on a global basis by WHO only for the year 1990 (Murray and Lopez 1996), with a comprehensive report being its 1999 survey (WHO 2000). Life tables for 1999 for all 191 WHO members were developed from surveys supplemented by censuses, sample registration systems, and epidemiological analyses of specific conditions. WHO experts provided estimates of their degree of uncertainty about the data's accuracy, subjected it to a variety of statistical tests for incompleteness and bias, and adjusted it accordingly. Then they estimated disease-specific disability rates for all countries in each of 14 regions of the world defined geographically and epidemiologically and used these to adjust available data on death rates at different age levels and life expectancy for each country (Mathers et al. 2000). The index of expected disability-free life ranges from 74.5 (Japan) to 29.5 (Sierra Leone), with a median of 60.9 (Belize).

While the limitations need to be borne in mind, these data are the best that have ever been available and permit us to make some plausible systematic inferences about the influences on health conditions across countries.³ Our dependent variable is disaggregated by WHO from the summary DALE estimates. This measure (DALY) measures the effect of death and disability on population groupings comprised of each gender in five age groups (zero–four, five–14, 15–44, 45–59, and 60 and older). These breakdowns are valuable because vulnerability to different diseases varies widely by age and gender. The data were initially compiled on the number of deaths in a year from each of more than 100 categories of disease or health condition. To the deaths are added estimates of the years of healthy life typically lost due to disability from the incidence of the condition and the estimated number of new cases in the period. The number of years of healthy life lost is obtained by multiplying the average duration of the condition (to remission or death) by a severity weight for the disability. Thus the DALYs for 1999—aggregated by WHO into 23 major disease categories for analysis—reflect the life-years lost due to deaths from a particular condition contracted during the year plus the expected disability to be incurred by other people who suffered from the same condition in that same year.⁴ In other words, these are not disabilities incurred from conditions contracted in earlier years directly from wartime violence.⁵

³ See Williams 1999, Murray and Lopez 2000, and Filmer and Pritchett 1999, 1312.

⁴ More information on the procedures can be found in WHO 2000, 145–46, and DALYs are displayed by disease category, gender, and region in WHO 2000, 170–75. DALE and life expectancy correlate highly ($r = .99$); DALE's attractiveness is its breakdown, in DALYs, of specific disease effects by age and gender.

⁵ Though our civil war data stop at the end of 1997, in 10 of the 34 cases the civil war continued as late as 1999, and our analysis takes it into account.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In developing hypotheses about the longer-term effects of civil war on public health, we draw on a general theoretical framework for studying the causes of public health. Within this framework we begin by discussing the general relationships between politics and public health and then elaborate the more specific causal connections linking civil war to public health. In broad theoretical terms, there are four major influences on public health in societies, and political conditions and processes in turn are important causes of each of these major influences on health. To summarize, health conditions are shaped by the interplay of exposure to conditions that create varying risks of death and disease for different groups in society and the ability of groups in society to gain access to health care and receive the full range of benefits produced by the health-care system. Public health performance thus reflects the political competition among groups over investment and resource decisions regarding the level and distribution of health services.

The Extent to Which Populations Are Exposed to Conditions That Increase the Risk of Death, Disease, and Disability. At the most basic level, populations across and within countries are exposed in varying degrees to the risk of disease, injury, and death. Geography and levels of economic development are basic factors. People in tropical climates are at greater risk of many infectious diseases. In poor countries much of the population lives in rural areas where access to health care and its quality are generally lower than in urban areas. As a result, preventive care is less available and the treatment of disease and injury is less extensive and effective. At the same time, health-care systems often lag in large urban areas experiencing rapid population growth, with the result that some urban populations are at greater risk to a variety of health problems (Foege 2000; Garrett 2001; Shah 1997).

The Financial and Human Resources Available for Addressing the Public Health Needs of Populations. Higher levels of income and wealth provide a larger pool of financial and human resources on which to draw. Public and private actors can afford to spend more on health care needs and to support the development and purchase of more advanced medical technologies. A larger pool of available financial resources will enable greater investments in developing human resources for medical care through training more doctors and health-care specialists. One major influence of politics on the pool of available resources for the public health-care system stems largely from the disruptive effects of political instability on economic growth. Irregular transfers of political power and political unrest in nondemocratic systems reduce growth rates (Przeworski et al. 2000, chap. 4).

The Level of Resources Actually Allocated to Public Health Needs by the Private and Public Sectors. Public health analysts consistently argue that education levels in society affect public health (e.g., Evans et al.

2000a). A more educated population is likely to be more knowledgeable of health risk factors, to support greater investments and expenditures, and to utilize health-care services. But claims to resources for public health compete with other demands, and politics can prove crucial in deciding how resources are allocated. Political leaders wish to retain power. They must form a winning coalition and satisfy a sufficient portion of those who are politically active. To do so they distribute private goods to their supporters and provide collective goods widely for the population. All leaders provide both private and collective goods in some degree. But since democratic leaders have to satisfy a wider range of supporters, not just a small segment of their cronies and the military, they are less able than authoritarian leaders to extract rents for the private benefit of small groups and must respond more to broad demands for public well-being (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Lake and Baum 2001; Olson 1993). They are more likely to invest in public goods such as better public health services because populations will hold them accountable for failing to address basic and pressing health-care problems. For example, famines are much more common in authoritarian states (Sen 1981), which spend less either to prevent them or to relieve their consequences. Przeworski et al. (2000, 239) report that the strong effect of democracy in lowering infant mortality operates largely through health expenditures, and our previous research found a strong impact of democracy on increasing public health expenditures (also Dasgupta 1993; Ghobarah et al. 2001; Moon 1991, chap. 6).

The Degree to Which Resources Actually Allocated to Public Health Are Efficiently Utilized. Public health services may not be directed to groups with the greatest need. Political institutions and practices increase or decrease health risk factors for populations by influencing their access to services offered by the public health-care system. Political influence plays a crucial role in determining who has full or limited access to the benefits offered by the health-care system. For example, income inequalities in society often translate into political inequalities; consequently the health needs of low-income groups may be neglected (Foege 2000; Moon 1991; Moon and Dixon 1992; Szreter 2001; Wilkinson 1996). Although lower-income groups are often at greater risk of health problems and therefore in need of public health services, such groups are likely to be less effectively represented in the political competition for scarce resources. Consequently, access to health-care services is skewed in favor of wealthy segments of the population that, on average, are healthier and less at risk.

HYPOTHESES ON CIVIL WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH

This outline of general causal connections between politics and public health allows us to focus specifically on the theoretical linkages between civil war and long-term health. Our central claim is that civil wars produce adverse longer-term consequences for public health

that extend well beyond immediate wartime effects to the postwar period. We posit two related hypotheses.

H1: More DALYs are lost with the occurrence and increasing severity of civil wars within a country.

H2: More DALYs are lost if a geographically contiguous state has had a civil war.

The logic behind these hypotheses corresponds to the four major influences on public health identified above.

Civil Wars Raise the Exposure of the Civilian Populations to Conditions that Increase the Risk of Disease, Injury, and Death. Prolonged and bloody civil wars are likely to displace large populations, either internally or as refugees. The Rwanda civil war generated not only 1.4 million internally displaced persons, but another 1.5 million refugees into neighboring Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Often these people do not return to their original homes after the war ends but remain in makeshift camps for years. Epidemic diseases—tuberculosis, measles, pneumonia, cholera, typhoid, paratyphoid, and dysentery—are likely to emerge from crowding, bad water, and poor sanitation in camps, while malnutrition and stress compromise people's immune systems. As a result, in many countries ravaged by civil wars the crude mortality rates among newly arrived refugees were five to 12 times higher than the normal rate (Toole 2000). Children may be especially vulnerable to infection.

Nondisplaced populations are at greater risk, as the camps become vectors for transmitting disease to other regions. Prevention and treatment programs already weakened by the destruction of health-care infrastructure during civil wars become overwhelmed as new strains of infectious disease bloom. For example, efforts to eradicate Guinea worm, river blindness, and polio—successful in most countries—have been severely disrupted in states experiencing the most severe civil wars. Drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis can develop and, in turn, weaken resistance to other diseases. It is likely that the spread of AIDS in Africa has been greatly increased by war-induced refugee movements (Epstein 2001; Reid 1998).

Finally, violence is likely to rise in the aftermath of long and severe civil wars (Bracken and Petty 1998; Pederson 2002). Homicide and other crime rates rise within countries during international wars, tending to peak in the first year after the war (Archer and Gartner 1976; Stein 1980). Gerosi and King (2002) report a significant rise in homicides and suicides, transportation deaths, and other unintentional injuries (both the latter are likely to include misclassified suicides) in the U.S. population immediately following the Korean and Vietnam wars. If international war has this effect, certainly the direct and immediate experience of civil war will do so. These social and psychological changes are magnified by the widespread availability of small arms after many civil wars. The victims as well as the perpetrators may be disproportionately among young men.

Civil Wars Produce Longer-Term Negative Consequences for Public Health by Reducing the Pool of Available Financial Resources for Expenditures on the Health-Care System. Civil war is an extreme form of political instability that reduces economic growth. Poor economic performance cuts the pool of tax revenues that governments can draw upon to finance health care. One study concludes that civil wars typically have a severe short-term (approximately five-year) negative impact on economic growth (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). A weak economy and lower profit margins also decrease the contributions the private sector can devote to employee health and the resources individuals can draw on to compensate for reductions in state or employer contributions to health care.

Civil wars also deplete the human and fixed capital resources needed for a health-care system. For example, heavy fighting in urban areas is likely to damage or destroy clinics, hospitals, and health-care centers; rebuilding this infrastructure is unlikely to be completed quickly in the postwar period. Finally, severe civil wars may induce a substantial flight of highly trained medical professionals, and this loss of human capital may not be reversed by their prompt return or replacement by newly trained health workers until long after the wars end.

Civil Wars Produce Strong Pressures to Constrain the Level of Resources Allocated to the Public Health-Care System in the Aftermath of War. Leaders in post-civil war governments face multiple and pressing competing demands for public expenditures. Long and destructive civil wars produce such fundamental needs (a) for a broad range of economic reconstruction, (b) to reform and rebuild army and police forces, judicial systems, and the state administrative capacity, and (c) for military and security spending in response to continuing military threats. Pressures to devote resources to military capabilities raise the classic question about trade-offs between military spending and non-defense needs such as public health (e.g., Adeola 1996, Ball 1988, DeRouen 2000, and Mintz 1989). Security threats may derive from internal insurgent groups, or from a powerful military force built up by a neighboring state to fight its own civil war. (See Braveman et al. 2000 on Nicaragua and Grobar and Gnanaselvam 1993 on Sri Lanka, as well as Collier and Hoeffler 2001 and Murdoch and Sandler 2002.) Despite needs for better health care, the multifaceted demands of post-civil war peace building and recovery make resource trade-offs involving health-care spending hard to avoid (Collier 1999; Stewart 1993).

Civil Wars Reduce the Efficient Use of Resources That Are Allocated to Public Health, and These Reductions in Efficiency Extend into the Post-Civil War Period. The destruction of a health infrastructure that supported surveillance and control programs for diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, and yellow fever sows the seeds of both short- and long-term health problems. Civil wars reduce the productivity of the entire economy, especially of facilities needed to maintain

previous levels of health care. Wartime destruction and disruption of the transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroad systems; communications and electricity) weakens the ability to distribute clean water, food, medicine, and relief supplies, both to refugees and to others who stay in place. It also means, as previously noted, the destruction of hospitals and other health-care facilities and the departure of medical personnel. Military forces often deliberately target health-care facilities so as to weaken the opposition. Much of this takes years to restore. Shortages and limited access severely strain health-care professionals' ability to deliver treatment and aid efficiently.

These theoretical underpinnings for the causal impact of war on health lead us to the measurement of our key variable: civil wars. For *H1* we use deaths from civil war in the years 1991 to 1997, which becomes a measure of both the existence and the severity of civil war when expressed as the number of deaths per 100 people in the country.⁶ Civil wars are defined as armed conflicts resulting in 1,000 or more fatalities per year among regular armed forces, rebel armed forces, and civilians directly targeted by either. Years and fatality figures were derived from the leading data sets on civil war compiled by scholars (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Licklider 1995; Regan 2000; Singer and Small 1994; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). For most countries the value is 0; for the 34 countries experiencing civil war during the period it ranges from 0.2 to 9.69 (Rwanda).

Using civil war deaths in the years 1991–97 gives us a lag to the DALY rates for 1999. Theory does not tell us that there is a single correct lag. For most infectious diseases—which we hypothesize as the principal cause of indirect civil war deaths—the lag time would seem short (less than five years), while the effects of damage to the health-care system would probably last longer (between five and 10 years). The lag for some cancers could be so long that we cannot reasonably test for many of them.⁷

For *H2* the operational measure is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if any contiguous state experienced a civil war in the period 1989–98 and 0 if not.⁸ Contiguity

is defined as sharing a land border or being separated by 12 miles or less of water.

CONTROLLING FOR OTHER CAUSES OF PUBLIC HEALTH

While our primary focus is on the impact of civil wars on public health, we need to control for several other factors that public health scholars and health economists have argued are important causes of cross-national variation in public health.

H3: The higher the level of total health expenditures, the fewer DALYs are lost.

Higher income improves health *through* public and private decisions to spend money on hospitals, preventive and curative health care, sanitation, and nutrition. Earlier work by economists such as Pritchett and Summers (1996) showed that “wealthier is healthier,” and we build on their findings with a wider set of countries and a finer-grained causal argument about *how* higher income leads to better health. Per capita income does not directly determine the production of health outputs. Rather, it permits a high level of health expenditures, and though highly collinear ($r = .90$) with income, expenditure levels are also influenced by the political process and institutions. And expenditures are subsequently distributed in a political process that produces actual health outcomes. Thus our full two-stage model, in the economics tradition of production function analysis, treats income as a key variable in explaining the level of health expenditures. In this analysis we follow WHO (Evans et al. 2000a, 13) in using total health expenditures per capita (1998) as a theoretically satisfying variable to incorporate those prior political processes that affect spending, which in turn makes a direct impact on health outcomes.⁹

We use the estimates of total health expenditure compiled by WHO, which began with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources, supplemented by national accounts data from United Nations and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sources and household surveys and WHO estimates (Pouillier and Hernandez 2000). Total health spending per capita ranges from \$4,055 (United States) to \$11 (Somalia), with a median of \$197 (Thailand). WHO authors estimate that it is very difficult for countries to provide good health outputs below a total expenditure of about \$60 per capita and that it would cost just over \$6 billion per year to bring up to this threshold the 41 countries with lower expenditures (Evans et al. 2000a, 24). Because these distributions are skewed we use the natural logarithms, which also reflect the declining marginal product of additional dollars at higher levels of spending. Following WHO's practice, we use total health expenditures as an

⁶ Duration and severity are moderately correlated ($r = .41$). Further research might look for a difference in effects between long but smoldering conflicts and short but intense ones.

⁷ We ran several sensitivity checks for the results reported in the section below on data analysis. As expected, very long lag structures such as 1977–90 produce much weaker findings in which the coefficient for the civil war variable is only about one-fourth as large as for 1991–97 and not statistically significant. A break between 1991–95 and 1996–97 shows a greater impact for the latter period, but the standard error is higher. Eliminating all countries whose civil wars extended past 1997 reduces the impact of wars in 1996–97 but not that of earlier wars. It is also possible that victorious rebels may redistribute health-care resources so as to redress previous inequalities in the system, ultimately producing lower death and disability rates. These effects, however, are likely to be “long term and cumulative” (Dixon and Moon 1989, 187), with lags approaching 20 years. With our shorter lags we found no significant beneficial effects from civil wars in any of our estimations.

⁸ A better measure, to be explored in further research, might include the proportion of a country's borders occupied by states experiencing civil war, the severity of those wars, and perhaps the permeability of borders (Starr and Thomas 2002).

⁹ Note that this comes after the time for which civil wars are measured. Since it picks up the indirect effect of civil war in reducing income and health spending, it probably contributes to understating the full effect of our civil war variable.

explanatory variable in this equation, rather than public or private spending alone. There is some complementarity between public and private health spending in achieving health goals, and the measure of total health expenditures has more explanatory power than either does alone.

H4: The more educated the population, the fewer DALYs are lost.

At higher levels of education, preventive and treatment programs become more widespread and effective; i.e., the demand for better health care rises as does more knowledgeable and affective consumption throughout the population. Education is strongly associated with the health of both children and adults in both rich and poor countries. It constitutes the other independent variable, with total health expenditures, in WHO analyses of health attainment (Evans et al. 2000a, 13).

WHO regards the average level of schooling in the adult population as the most widely available and sensitive measure, logged to correct skewness and to reflect the declining marginal impact of education.¹⁰ It ranges from only 1.04 years of education (Mali) to 11.5 years (United States), with a median of 6.03 years (Costa Rica).

H5: The higher the pace of urbanization, the more DALYs are lost.

New urban residents will be exposed to new disease vectors, and will lack adequate access to care since the supply of health services to large numbers of new residents is likely to lag behind the surge in need (Garrett 2001; Szreter 2001). Surveillance, immunization, and the provision of safe water all become more difficult. A high rate of urbanization often reflects the influx of poor and marginalized people from rural areas. These new city dwellers (largely in urban slums) are underorganized in unions and underrepresented in established political parties. They find it hard to create effective pressure for health care either politically or in the workplace, leaving a gap between need and delivery. Marginal utility analysis predicts that individuals or groups receiving less than an equal supply of health care lose more DALE than is gained by those receiving more than an equal share of care.

Our measure of recent urbanization is the average annual percentage change in the urban portion of the population, 1990–95 (United Nations 1998, 132–35). It ranges from –0.41% (Belize) to 7.35% (Botswana), with a median of 0.88% (Grenada).

H6: The more unequal the distribution of income, the more DALYs are lost.

The more unequal the income distribution, the fewer public resources will be committed to the health-care system and the more unequal will be access to health facilities. Economically advantaged groups will be more

able to dominate the political system for their own benefit rather than that of the majority. As a result, state spending is diverted from public to private goods; what is spent is more concentrated on the privileged and politically powerful segments of the population. The large poor segment of the population will have lower incomes, less leverage with employers, and fewer private resources for health. High-quality health care is thus limited to a smaller segment of the general population, producing lower overall levels of health performance. The rich get more access—at low marginal utility—and the poor get less.

The measure of inequality is the Gini index of income distribution in 1997. This common index is derived from a Lorenz curve of the actual distribution of income by households, with the index representing the total area between the curve and the 45° line of a totally equal distribution of income. We have estimates for 111 countries published by the World Bank, supplemented by WHO with multiple imputation estimates using information on socioeconomic development and life expectancy at birth (Evans et al. 2000b). Theoretically the Gini index ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 1.00 (one person has all the income); in practice our national Gini indices for income distribution range from a very equal 0.187 (Slovakia) to 0.609 (Sierra Leone), with a median of 0.374 (Uganda).

H7: Tropical countries will suffer from more DALYs lost.

Tuberculosis, other infectious respiratory and diarrheal diseases, and malaria are often endemic to tropical countries, where conditions for their spread are more favorable despite public health programs to contain them.¹¹ If civil wars are more likely to occur in such countries, we risk mistakenly identifying civil wars as the cause of diseases that are already prevalent because of these background conditions. To protect against this inferential error we add a dummy variable, *tropical*, with all countries where the majority of the population resides in tropical regions coded 1 and all other countries coded 0.

H8: The more democratic countries are, the fewer DALYs are lost.

H9: The more ethnically and linguistically diverse the population, the more DALYs are lost.

Finally, we include two additional control variables that may be causes of civil wars. One might argue that our measure for the incidence and severity of civil wars is simply a proxy for other economic and political variables likely to be associated with civil wars. To answer this fully we would also need a model to explain the incidence and severity of civil wars. The systematic

¹⁰ Some observations were estimated by multiple imputation from other data on educational attainment. For sources and methods see Evans et al. 2000b.

¹¹ WHO (2000, 164) reports that, among infectious disease categories, the major causes of deaths in Africa are, in descending order, HIV/AIDS, respiratory infections, malaria, diarrheal diseases, measles, and tuberculosis.

empirical literature lacks consensus, but several influences emerge as probable contributors to the likelihood of civil war. In a cursory overview of this research we discuss some possible variables to control for the structural conditions that may promote civil wars and relate them to variables already in our model.

The influences affecting the initiation of civil war are not necessarily the same as those affecting its continuation or intensity. For our purposes the intensity of war is more relevant than its initiation or mere occurrence. Our measure of deaths over the duration of the war, controlling for size of population, captures duration and, especially, severity. The control for population also addresses the likelihood that large states will have more potentially disaffected groups able to mount a war effort.

The initial level of economic development raises the opportunity costs of violence. In richer countries employment opportunities are better, and governments have more resources to satisfy discontented elements of the population. Whereas some analyses find that a low rate of economic growth contributes to the likelihood of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), a low level of development seems to be a more robust influence (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Sambanis 2001, 2002). Although we do not include GDP per capita as a direct influence in this model, it makes a prior contribution through its influence on total health expenditures per capita and, also, is closely related to educational attainment. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) also identify low educational level as a key influence. Thus our model already controls for level of development.

Political system affects health as discussed in our initial theoretical framework, and it also probably influences the incidence of civil war—especially for ethnic wars since lack of democratic rights can threaten the core of ethnic identity and reduce the chances for redress of grievances (Gurr 1993, 2000). Whereas there is some evidence that civil wars are more likely to break out in countries that are between the extremes of full democracy and full autocracy (Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002), that distinction is less important in the continuation of wars (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). So a linear measure—better to ascertain the direct effect of democracy on health—should suffice for a first cut.

We measure political system type by the Polity project's average score for 1997 and 1998, using the Polity IV data from their web site (www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity). For the 22 countries in our sample with no regime score in the Polity database, we imputed a regime score from the Freedom House scores, which correlate highly ($r = .95$) with Polity where both exist. Following common practice (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993) we create a 21-point index for each state from two scales—one degree of autocracy ranging from -10 (most autocratic) to 0 (least autocratic) and one for democracy from 0 (least democratic) to $+10$ (most democratic)—and then produce the composite index by summing the two components. This scale, which we treat as interval, runs from -10 (e.g., North Korea, Myanmar) to $+10$ (Japan, Norway), with a median of

7 (Ukraine). Other measures of contemporary democracy correlate highly with it (Vanhnen 2000).

Ethnic heterogeneity may contribute to discrimination, which in turn increases the risk of ethnic war. Again, there is some evidence of nonlinearity, in that ethnically polarized societies may be more war-prone than either homogeneous ones or highly fragmented states, whose small minorities may suffer from collective action problems in organizing for violence (Bates 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Horowitz 1985; Reynal-Querol 2002). As with democracy, using different functional forms might help, but a linear measure serves as an approximation.

We use Vanhanen's (1999) index of racial-linguistic-religious heterogeneity. This index, stable over moderate time periods, measures the percentage of the largest ethnic group identified by each of these three criteria, giving each equal weight by summing the three percentages and subtracting the sum from 300 (a completely homogeneous state by all three criteria). It is conceptually somewhat different from Taylor and Hudson's (1972) index of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, when logged correlating with an r of .69 with Taylor and Hudson's, but it was created with their effort in mind and covers more countries. It ranges from a high of 177 (Suriname) to a low of 0 (North Korea; completely homogeneous), with a median of 38 (Uzbekistan). Because the index is skewed, we use its natural log.

Other influences on the ability to sustain a dissident group at war may include rugged terrain and the availability of "lootable" natural resources—particularly for nonethnic wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Ethnic wars may derive from a different mixture of influences than do nonethnic wars. But since over 70% of all civil wars between 1960 and 1999 can be characterized as wars between ethnic groups (Sambanis 2001), we pay more attention to the causes of ethnic wars. In sum, we believe that our key explanatory variable—deaths from civil wars—is not simply a proxy for the structural conditions that produce civil wars and that the diseases bringing death and disability after civil wars are not simply a consequence of those conditions.

A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF ALL DEATHS AND DISABILITIES

We test these hypotheses using cross-sectional least-squares regression analysis on data for 177 countries: nearly all the 191 members of the WHO, omitting only some small states lacking data on several of the explanatory variables. Table 1 shows in separate rows 10 equations for deaths and disabilities from *all causes combined* by the five age groups for each gender. Thus 10 regressions are presented as rows in Table 1. The explanatory variables are listed across the top, and each column gives the estimated coefficient and then the t ratio. Coefficients and t ratios that reach the .05 level of significance (one-tailed) are in boldface. Remember that DALY represents years of healthy life *lost*, so we anticipate positive coefficients for all variables except health expenditures and education.

TABLE 1. DALYs Lost to All Disease Categories

Gender	Age Group	DALYs Lost per Year per 100 People	Statistic	Civil War		Contiguous Civil War	Total Health Spending	Urban Growth	Income Gini	Tropical	Polity Score	Ethnic Heterogeneity	Adjusted R^2	σ
				Intercept	Deaths, 1991-97									
Male	4 or less	63.57	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	264.89 9.38	5.45 2.02	2.13 0.35	-21.10 -6.26	0.49 0.16	11.86 0.30	-8.33 -1.08	0.64 1.35	1.58 0.58	.72	35.92
Female	4 or less	58.3	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	240.63 9.02	4.19 1.65	4.48 0.78	-18.35 -5.77	1.58 0.56	5.16 0.14	-7.29 -1.01	0.55 1.23	1.77 0.69	.72	33.92
Male	5-14	9.05	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	26.51 6.33	1.11 2.78	0.14 0.15	-2.92 -5.84	0.87 1.96	11.49 1.99	0.14 0.12	0.13 1.91	0.20 0.50	.68	-5.33
Female	5-14	8.31	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	25.17 6.12	1.31 3.35	0.59 0.66	-2.73 -5.56	0.94 2.16	8.96 1.58	-0.44 -0.39	0.12 1.77	0.35 0.89	.67	5.23
Male	15-44	26.1	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	6.65 0.50	2.15 1.71	7.84 2.74	-2.12 -1.35	5.93 4.26	52.24 2.88	4.61 1.29	0.22 0.98	0.62 0.50	.46	16.75
Female	15-44	25.67	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	5.99 0.34	2.99 1.78	12.52 3.27	-1.56 -0.74	8.54 4.57	50.10 2.06	4.34 0.90	0.05 0.18	0.59 0.35	.44	22.48
Male	45-59	23.95	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	34.29 3.42	1.52 1.59	5.60 2.57	-4.16 -3.47	4.09 3.85	25.73 1.86	1.12 0.41	0.22 1.31	1.11 1.16	.50	12.77
Female	45-59	30.78	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	37.48 5.30	1.52 2.25	2.85 1.86	-2.63 -3.12	2.38 3.18	10.64 1.09	2.73 1.42	-0.01 -0.09	0.70 1.04	.62	8.99
Male	60+	36.32	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	48.31 5.38	0.33 0.39	1.00 0.51	-2.75 -2.57	2.02 2.13	14.80 1.19	-2.09 -0.86	-0.05 -0.32	0.69 0.80	.26	11.43
Female	60+	39.75	Coefficient <i>t</i> ratio	48.54 4.81	0.86 0.90	0.46 0.21	-1.79 -1.49	1.79 1.68	24.55 1.77	-1.53 -0.56	-0.42 -2.44	0.46 0.48	.39	12.83

Note. $N = 177$. Boldface values are significant at the .05 (one-tailed) level.

First, note that most of our hypotheses are supported. For seven of the 10 equations, total health spending has a strong and statistically significant impact in reducing the loss of healthy life expectancy. Only for females and males in the 15- to 44-year age group is there no effect. A high average level of education also strongly reduces DALYs in six of the groups. Rapid urbanization is strongly correlated with increased loss of healthy life expectancy (highly significant in six categories, significant at a lower level in two). So too is high income inequality (five groups at $p < .05$, and three at $p < .06$). The direct impact of democracy is marginal (significant as hypothesized for one group and in the opposite direction for two others). This confirms the findings of our earlier research on the primary effect of democracy on public health; it operates earlier in the causal chain by influencing the level of resources allocated to health expenditures (Ghobarah et al. 2001). Likewise, ethnic heterogeneity has the expected positive sign in every group, but its direct effects are never significant, in accordance with previous research that found that its effects operate largely indirectly, by reducing the total spending allocated to health. Simply being in a tropical country had no discernible impact, which may attest to the success of the public health systems in several tropical countries in neutralizing this risk factor.

These relationships are not, however, the focus of attention in this article—*civil war* is. For that, we do see some strong effects. Experiencing a civil war earlier in the 1990s is strongly associated with a subsequent increased loss of healthy life for six groups ($p < .05$ or better), and $p < .06$ for two others. Only for the aged does civil war have no significant impact. Three of the four most statistically significant impacts are among children. Furthermore, the substantive impact is very severe for the two youngest groups, females and males under five years of age. For instance, the coefficients mean that the impact in 1999 of living in a country that had experienced an intense civil war a few years earlier (such as Bosnia, with 6.8 civil war deaths per 100 people) rather than in a median country with no war at all is a loss of about 28.5 healthy life-years in 1999 per 100 girls under five years of age—long after the war ended in a settlement. In Rwanda's extreme case (9.7 civil war deaths per 100 people, mostly in 1994), the subsequent losses amounted to a staggering 53 DALYs per 100 children under five—and that is in addition to the impact of all the other sociopolitical and economic variables in our model.

Finally, even living in a country adjacent to a state that experienced a civil war made a big difference for four of these groups, together encompassing men and women aged 15–59. These huge impacts on the economically productive parts of the population (substantively, a loss of healthy life-years from about three to over 12 per 100 people, depending on age and sex) are over and above the negative effects they experienced if there had also been a civil war in their own country.¹² We can evaluate this better by looking at the impact

of civil wars on the incidence of specific diseases and conditions.

THE WHO AND HOW OF CIVIL WAR EFFECTS

We proceed to do just that. The WHO data on impacts of various diseases by age and gender allow us to compute 210 equations.¹³ Using a threshold of $p < .05$ for a one-tailed test of statistical significance, we would expect, purely by chance, to find that 10 or 11 equations produced a “significant” relationship for civil war's impact on an individual grouping. In fact, we find many more than that: 48 equations in which the civil war coefficient is significant at $p < .05$. Furthermore, most of the significant coefficients make sense in terms of our expectations. Table 2 shows the effects of the variable for preceding civil war deaths (using the same model as in Table 1, but listing only the civil war deaths coefficients for clarity). It gives a row for each such equation, arraying the equations by major disease/condition groups and, within groups, in descending order of the t ratios. The columns show the coefficient for the effect of civil wars first, followed by the t ratio.

By far the most common impact is through infectious diseases, as is consistent with our theoretical expectations and our review of the case study material on the effects of civil wars. Seven of the 10 age-gender groups are affected by malaria, essentially all but those aged 60 years and over. In fact, by t value, five of the 25 groups most impacted by civil wars are from the increased incidence of malaria. At their highest, the coefficients for impact indicate 15 years (per 100 people in the case of Rwanda) of healthy life lost in 1999 by very young children, controlling for all other factors. Regrettably, that is the lingering impact of civil war for only one disease of 23; the misery accumulates with each of the other 22 categories of disease.

The three other most affected disease groups are tuberculosis, respiratory infections, and other infectious diseases—each reaching statistical significance for six of 10 possible age and gender groups. The age and gender group effects are strikingly similar, for each category affecting older children and adults 15–59 more than the very young or the old. The coefficients for the impact of war on tuberculosis are generally much lower (ranging around 0.1) than for malaria. Almost exactly the same pattern applies to respiratory infections, with coefficients of about 0.1 for civil wars and 0.4 to 0.8 for the dummy variable. For other infectious diseases—something of a catch-all category—the impact of civil

analysis shows the effect of an adjacent civil war whether or not the country itself had a civil war. Previous analysis (Ghobarah et al. 2001) found that the effect is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of countries that themselves experienced civil war.

¹³ Twenty-three disease or condition groups, times five age groupings and two genders, would give 230 equations. Some categories, however, are empty: for males, five each for maternal conditions, breast cancer, and cervical cancer; three for maternal conditions for females under 15 and over 44; and two for suicide by children under five years. The equations are too space-consuming to print here but are available with the data at the web site noted in the title-page footnote.

¹² Conflict involving a neighbor is a strong predictor of subsequent conflict at home (Ward and Gleditsch 2002). Nevertheless, this

TABLE 2. The Long-Term Impact of Civil Wars: DALYs Lost by Disease Category

Cause Name	Gender	Age Group	Civil War Deaths per 100 People (1991–97)		
			Coefficient	<i>t</i> Ratio	Adjusted <i>R</i> ²
Malaria	Female	0–4	1.3706	2.07	0.53
Malaria	Male	0–4	1.5259	2.33	0.52
Malaria	Female	5–14	0.2945	2.44	0.51
Malaria	Male	5–14	0.2978	2.38	0.51
Malaria	Female	15–44	0.0370	3.03	0.57
Malaria	Male	15–44	0.0528	2.49	0.56
Malaria	Female	45–59	0.0080	2.08	0.54
Tuberculosis	Female	5–14	0.0910	2.80	0.56
Tuberculosis	Male	5–14	0.0782	2.37	0.54
Tuberculosis	Female	15–44	0.1089	2.33	0.58
Tuberculosis	Male	15–44	0.1198	2.00	0.61
Tuberculosis	Female	45–59	0.0996	1.70	0.58
Tuberculosis	Male	45–59	0.1387	1.81	0.69
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Female	5–14	0.1196	2.20	0.65
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Male	5–14	0.1196	2.31	0.63
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Female	15–44	0.1012	2.69	0.58
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Male	15–44	0.1024	2.10	0.54
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Female	45–59	0.1081	2.37	0.57
Respiratory diseases, infectious	Male	45–59	0.1040	2.09	0.61
Other infectious	Male	0–4	1.8168	1.79	0.72
Other infectious	Female	5–14	0.4344	2.94	0.64
Other infectious	Male	5–14	0.3374	2.43	0.66
Other infectious	Female	15–44	0.3803	2.43	0.65
Other infectious	Male	15–44	0.3615	1.88	0.60
Other infectious	Female	45–59	0.2681	2.29	0.62
Other infectious	Male	45–59	0.2127	1.91	0.65
Transportation accidents	Female	5–14	0.0695	4.08	0.28
Transportation accidents	Female	15–44	0.0492	3.78	0.23
Transportation accidents	Male	15–44	0.1523	2.12	0.34
Transportation accidents	Female	45–59	0.0609	1.99	0.17
Transportation accidents	Male	45–59	0.0962	1.76	0.19
Homicide	Female	5–14	0.0256	5.30	0.33
Homicide	Male	15–44	0.1414	2.23	0.41
Other unintentional injuries	Male	15–44	0.1913	1.79	0.33
Other unintentional injuries	Female	45–59	0.1068	1.70	0.11
Suicide	Female	15–44	0.0316	2.26	0.10
Maternal conditions	Female	15–44	0.6577	2.82	0.64
Maternal conditions	Female	45–59	0.0509	2.26	0.53
Respiratory disease, chronic	Female	5–14	0.0340	1.80	0.03
Cervix cancer	Female	5–14	0.0001	1.86	0.46
Cervix cancer	Female	45–59	0.0389	2.15	0.65
Cervix cancer	Female	60+	0.0618	2.01	0.60
Breast cancer	Female	0–4	0.0007	1.95	0.33
Liver cancer	Female	45–59	0.0170	1.83	0.54
Liver cancer	Female	60+	0.0301	1.70	0.55
Other malignant neoplasms	Male	5–14	0.0174	2.78	0.45
Cardiovascular disease	Female	5–14	0.0362	2.83	0.54
Digestive disease	Female	5–14	0.0121	2.25	0.30

wars is greater (from about 0.2 to 1.8). Together, the four groups of infectious disease account for 26 of the 48 equations showing a significant effect of civil wars.

The next most common effect is from transportation accidents and may in part reflect the deterioration of roads and vehicles. But it is also consistent with our expectations of an increase in stress and a breakdown of law and order in post-civil war societies. We cannot satisfactorily map the causal relationships without detailed micro-level analysis. Nonetheless, while the impact is small (0.05 to 0.15 years), it affects five of the

10 groups: mostly young and middle-aged adults. More obvious from an expectation of a breakdown of social order is the elevated homicide rate, the victims being girls between five and 14 years old and, especially, men between 15 and 44. The substantive effect (0.02 on girls and 0.14 on men) is similar to that of transportation accidents.

The two entries for unintentional injuries may also derive from stress and may include unreported suicides. With a lower level of statistical significance ($p < .12$), three more adult age groups would make it into the

TABLE 3. The Long-Term Impact of Contiguous Civil Wars: DALYs Lost by Disease Category

Cause Name	Gender	Age Group	Contiguous Civil War		Adjusted R^2
			Coefficient	t Ratio	
AIDS	Female	0-4	3.624	3.69	0.29
AIDS	Male	0-4	3.531	3.78	0.30
AIDS	Female	5-14	0.200	3.90	0.30
AIDS	Male	5-14	0.204	4.03	0.30
AIDS	Female	15-44	9.275	3.51	0.24
AIDS	Male	15-44	6.839	3.35	0.25
AIDS	Female	45-59	1.960	3.35	0.27
AIDS	Male	45-59	3.837	3.65	0.27
AIDS	Female	60+	0.113	3.53	0.27
AIDS	Male	60+	0.267	3.59	0.27
Homicide	Male	0-4	0.141	1.67	0.03
Homicide	Female	5-14	0.019	1.76	0.33
Homicide	Male	5-14	0.020	2.36	0.45
Homicide	Male	15-44	0.248	1.72	0.41
Homicide	Male	45-59	0.137	2.03	0.17
Other unintentional injuries	Female	0-4	0.494	2.01	0.21
Other unintentional injuries	Male	0-4	1.100	2.27	0.05
Other unintentional injuries	Female	5-14	0.229	2.06	0.37
Other unintentional injuries	Male	5-14	0.271	2.43	0.50
Digestive disease	Female	0-4	0.611	1.85	0.05
Digestive disease	Male	0-4	0.780	1.79	0.08
Digestive disease	Female	5-14	0.038	3.09	0.30
Digestive disease	Female	15-44	0.091	2.21	0.31
Cervix cancer	Female	0-4	0.056	1.67	-0.01
Lung cancer	Female	0-4	0.012	1.78	-0.02
Lung cancer	Male	0-4	0.031	1.74	0.00
Cancer of mouth, esophagus	Female	0-4	0.016	1.85	-0.02
Stomach cancer	Male	0-4	0.034	1.90	0.03
Other malignant neoplasms	Male	0-4	0.162	1.68	0.05
Other malignant neoplasms	Female	5-14	0.025	1.86	0.23
Liver cancer	Female	5-14	0.001	2.20	0.50
All other diseases	Female	5-14	0.187	1.99	0.07

table for unintentional injury. Notice also the item for suicides of women of childbearing age, perhaps reflecting the trauma of rape. They also are subject to postwar maternal ills. Chronic respiratory diseases not included elsewhere (such as tuberculosis and respiratory infections) for girls aged 5-14 may reflect a stress-induced loss of resistance.

We also find an apparent effect of civil wars in raising the rate of cervical cancer for three of the four female groups above age four (plus the other, weakly, at $p < .16$, for women aged 15-44). While cervical cancer may develop too slowly for the time lag used in our analysis, there may be two possible connections to civil wars. First, it fits our expectation of a breakdown in social norms, in these cases norms against forced sexual relations, though the coefficients are very low (no larger than 0.06). Second, recent medical research indicates that in low-income countries infection plays an important etiologic role in cancer and our other results show that civil wars increase the incidence of infectious disease.¹⁴ It is also likely that other sexually transmitted

diseases of women in traditional societies are reported as cervical cancer.

The six remaining statistically significant groupings show little pattern, and with this lag we have no explanation. Overall, females constitute 33 of the 54 affected groups, and the two gender groups of children aged five to 14 account for 15 (chance would mean nine or 10 groups). *Whomever the actual combat deaths during the war may represent, in their long-term impact the greatest victims are women and children.*

CONTIGUOUS CIVIL WARS

Finally, Table 3 shows the effect of civil war in a contiguous country, above any effect of civil war at home. The presentation corresponds to that in Table 2. Our initial analysis found that having a civil war in an adjacent

¹⁴ Research in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the human papilloma virus (HPV) is linked to cancer of the cervix (Feachem, Jamison,

and Bos 1991, 17). HPV infection is necessary for development of low-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions (LSIL), which in turn may develop into cervical cancer. Every new sexual partner greatly increases the risk of HPV, with the risk of developing LSIL in the first three years after HPV infection (Moscicki et al. 2001); however, further progression to cancer is slower.

country was itself a major contributor to loss of healthy life expectancy overall. The disease-specific analysis finds 32 disease-age-gender groups for which a contiguous civil war significantly increased death and disability. This too is well above the 10 or 11 we would expect by chance to cross the line of statistical significance in 210 equations.

The enormous impact of a neighboring civil war on HIV/AIDS is immediately apparent, as it occupies all top 10 slots of statistical significance in Table 3. If anything, the *t* ratios understate the impact. For the susceptible age groups of both genders (very young children, infected through their mothers, and young and middle-aged adults), the coefficients are higher than for any other DALY disease or condition in the table. For these groups the average loss of healthy life ranges from more than two years to nearly 10 years (for women aged 15–44).¹⁵

Recall that, in contrast with the effects of civil wars at home on most infectious diseases, we found no impact of a civil war at home in raising AIDS rates in that state. This is true even in an equation without the variable for contiguous civil war. However, most civil wars have a neighboring civil war as well. A civil war at home may have some decelerating effects—such as war deaths among young males—on HIV transmission. Infection may be slowed as communities become isolated by war and the disruption of commerce and transportation, but following the war, the resumption of normal interactions within and across borders may spread the disease to neighboring states that did not experience the initial reduction (Mock and Mathys 2002; Davis and Kuritsky [2002] report lower HIV rates for countries in civil conflict). Also, most DALYs from HIV/AIDS are derived from reports of HIV infections rather than deaths. Infections likely are underreported in countries themselves undergoing civil wars. At this stage in the analysis, collinearity and data questions make it impossible to sort out fully the relative impact of own and neighboring civil wars in HIV/AIDS rates.

After AIDS, another major effect of neighboring civil war is in raising the incidence of homicide. Males of all but the oldest age group are the principal victims, with a coefficient of 0.25 per men aged 15–44. Unintentional injuries (other than transport) have a serious impact on young children of both sexes and, to a lesser extent, on older children (about 0.3 to 1.1 years per 100 people). This too probably reflects political and social tensions in the society. Digestive disease may also be a product of stress. Cancers of various types show up eight times among children, but the coefficients are usually small. They do not fit any of our expectations, and it is too soon to attribute much importance to them without further research.

Overall, the strongest effect of civil war in a contiguous country is to boost drastically the rate of infection

from HIV/AIDS. Its devastating impact is concentrated in the most economically productive age-groups and in very young children, striking both genders more or less equally. When we tally all the effects in Table 3, both genders are affected more or less equally (17 female groups, 15 male), but with 10 in the two gender categories for children aged five to 14 and 13 more for children zero to four. As with civil wars at home, many of the long-term victims of contiguous civil wars are the young.

CONCLUSION

We developed the argument that civil wars should produce long-term damage to public health-care systems that extend well beyond the period of active warfare and tested it in the context of a more general political-economic model of conditions affecting death and disability cross-nationally. Using newly available data on DALYs lost from various diseases and conditions by age and gender groups, we found that, controlling for the other influences, civil wars greatly raise the subsequent risk of death and disability from many infectious diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious respiratory diseases. We have some evidence, though weaker, that civil wars increase the risk of death and disability through the breakdown of norms and practices of social order, with possible increases in homicide, transportation accidents, other injuries, and cervical cancer. The disability and death from AIDS are much greater if a neighboring country recently experienced a civil war.

Overall, women and children were the most common long-term victims. For all categories we estimate that 8.01 million disability-years were lost in 1999 from civil wars during the period 1991–97. This is only slightly below WHO's estimate for the immediate losses from all the wars fought in 1999. The victims will bear these burdens for the rest of their lives. Moreover, our estimate of death and disability from previous civil wars applies only to those incurred in 1999. Since that is a single cut into a lag structure of new deaths and disabilities that probably extends over a decade, the total could be an order of magnitude higher yet.

These results are intriguing though not conclusive. Certainly we need to comprehend better the micro-level political, social, and epidemiological processes. We also must elaborate theories that accommodate complex interrelations and drive backward in the full system of influences to understand how civil wars may interact with income inequality, ethnic diversity, and type of political system to affect people's health and well-being. One improvement in subsequent research should be a more nuanced and medically informed consideration of appropriate lag times. Our rather crude one-size-fits-all lag, of civil war deaths from 1991 to 1997 to explain DALYs 1999, is not a bad fit to the descriptive literature on the spread of many diseases, and it gives the best empirical fit for DALE overall. Still, something more fine-grained is necessary for further analysis of specific diseases, notably AIDS and

¹⁵ One-third of all DALYs lost from communicable disease in Africa are due to HIV/AIDS (WHO 2000, 170). Of course not all such losses stem from civil war. Conditions of urbanization and income and ethnic inequality—included in our model—may be causally related to both AIDS and civil war.

long-term noninfectious conditions (e.g., cancers) that are slow in developing. Cross-temporal analysis will provide better guidance when the necessary data become available.

The kind of information analyzed here must be combined with more contextual information and field reports from countries that have experienced civil wars. Further analyses could provide projections on the likely effect of major civil violence that could be used by peacekeeping and postconflict peace-building missions, national governments, and nongovernmental organizations. They could help in predicting the effects of civil violence and may suggest possible key interventions, such as in caring for refugees and assessing priorities for postconflict efforts to rebuild devastated and overburdened health-care systems. They indicate the number of long-term deaths and disabilities to be anticipated from various diseases, which in turn can be used, in cost-benefit analyses, to estimate the price of averting each death or disability through the best postconflict allocations to prevention and treatment. Knowing the type and magnitude of the effects is an essential step in preventing or mitigating the misery.

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Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament

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A major rearmament program can have a lasting effect on the balance of political and economic power between societal groups. It will typically require the expansion of progressive taxation and government interference in the economy, both of which are disproportionately harmful to the interests of the upper classes. Consequently, conservative governments that face a sharp increase in international threat should be more likely than their leftist counterparts to try to substitute alliances and appeasement for arms. I test this hypothesis on Great Britain in 1895–1905, 1907–14, and 1931–39, France in 1904–14 and 1935–39, and the United States in 1938–41, 1948–60, and 1979–86. In all but one of these cases, I find that leftist governments did more to strengthen their countries' militaries than conservatives.

A state that is confronted with a grave external threat has three basic options of response, each of which involves certain trade-offs. First, it can strengthen its military. Rearmament, or “internal balancing,” allows it to maintain its diplomatic freedom of action, but its economy may suffer from the strain of accelerating the production of weapons of war. Second, it can join forces with another power. Alliances may obviate the need for an arms buildup, but they carry the risk that the state will be abandoned by its partners or drawn into undesired conflicts. Finally, it can attempt to reconcile with its adversaries by conceding to some of their demands. Appeasement may be the least troublesome way to eliminate a threat, but it is also the most risky because it transfers valued resources to a potential opponent. After weighing these options, the state should choose the policy, or combination of policies, that will provide an acceptable level of security at the lowest overall cost.¹

The foregoing account is appealingly parsimonious, but it captures only part of the story. States are frequently racked by bitter internal debates over how to deal with international pressures, and changes in their political leadership sometimes bring about sudden shifts in their behavior. Of the three strategies described above, rearmament is often the most acutely divisive. It requires a sharp increase in the extraction and mobilization of resources from society, so it can become highly politicized. Some groups will inevitably bear a heavier burden than others, and their discontent may eventually endanger the regime's hold on power or its ability to prepare for war. To ensure domestic

stability, state leaders may have to pursue diplomatic alternatives to rearmament, even when doing so will result in a suboptimal international outcome.

Over the past decade, scholars have produced an impressive array of work on the internal political and institutional factors influencing policymakers' strategic calculus.² This literature has generated many important insights into the motives behind states' responses to threat. However, it has paid scant attention to the theoretical foundations of a key variable in the domestic origins of security policy: class.³ In lieu of systematic analysis, the dominant view of class in international relations is based on a longstanding conventional wisdom. Parties on the left have developed a reputation for being naively antimilitaristic, even pacifist, in the face of foreign aggression. Their insatiable desire to expand social welfare programs, coupled with their idealistic outlook on the causes of international conflict, is assumed to make them prioritize butter over guns. Meanwhile, parties on the right are thought to be more nationalistic and realistic than their counterparts, hence more willing to make economic sacrifices for the sake of security. These images are reinforced by contemporary debates in American politics, in which Republicans criticize Democrats for being “soft on defense.”

Yet, the facts of the matter are not so clear cut. Quantitative analyses have found limited evidence of a guns–butter trade-off during the Cold War (Mintz 1989). In the United States, only during the Reagan years was

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This paper was made possible by the generous support of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. I would also like to thank Ben Fordham, P. R. Goldstone, Greg Mitrovich, Talbot Imlay, Brad Lee, Ken Schultz, Deborah Boucoyannis, Mark Haas, Sean Lynn-Jones, and the participants in the Olin Institute's National Security Seminar Series and the Belfer Center's International Security Program Seminar Series for their helpful comments and advice.

¹ On the relationship between arms and alliances, see Lake 1999 and Most and Siverson 1987. On the costs and benefits of appeasement, see Powell 1996.

² There are two distinct approaches to the study of domestic politics in international security. One school of thought conceives of executives as having only two basic goals, defending the national interest and maintaining their political power. For example, see Barnett 1992, Christensen 1996, David 1991, Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1989, Lamborn 1991, Rosecrance and Stein 1993, Rowe 1999, and Stein 1978. The other school rejects the concept of national interests entirely and views executives as being representatives of their partisan coalitions' economic interests and ideological biases. For example, see Fordham 1998a, McKeown 1991, Morrow 1993, Narizny 2003, and Trubowitz 1998. Both perspectives draw from an earlier literature on the domestic politics of military spending and foreign policymaking. For example, see Hilsman 1967, Huntington 1961, and Snyder, Schilling, and Hammond 1962.

³ Two notable exceptions are Halperin 1997 and Fordham 1998b. A few other works, including Lamborn 1991 and D'Lugo and Rogowski 1993, explain how class interests constrain resource extraction in particular cases but do not theorize specifically about class as an independent variable.

there definite substitution between these two goods. Indeed, in the presidential election of 2000, the Democrat Al Gore proposed higher defense spending and a more actively interventionist foreign policy than the Republican George W. Bush (O'Hanlon 2000). To evaluate the impact of domestic politics on rearmament, it is necessary to set aside the conventional wisdom and closely examine both the historical record and the theoretical logic of class interests. Under greater scrutiny, it quickly becomes apparent that parties' rhetoric on militarism and preparedness is not always a reliable indicator of the strategies they adopt in response to foreign threats.

Though the empirical findings of the guns–butter literature cast doubt on the idea that governments consistently sacrifice military strength for social welfare (or vice versa), it would be premature to conclude that class interests are entirely irrelevant to the question. Rearmament should produce conflict between the rich and the poor because it directly affects two of the most important issues over which their political representatives normally compete. First, a rapid buildup in a state's armed forces requires steep increases in government spending, which raises the eternal question: Who pays? Second, the sudden reorientation of an economy from civilian to military production has different implications for the long-term goals of labor and capital. In the following pages, I argue not only that class interests have a critical impact on governments' decisions to rearm in the face of grave international threats, but that the effect is precisely the opposite of what the conventional wisdom dictates.

Rearmament and Taxation

The redistribution of wealth has always been politically divisive. Parties that represent the economic interests of the upper and upper-middle classes, which I refer to as conservative or "right" coalitions, tend to favor regressive taxation, while parties devoted to the lower and lower-middle classes, which I refer to as labor or "left" coalitions, usually support progressive taxation. Whenever a state's political system is divided by class, its parties almost invariably clash over the direction of fiscal policy. Of course, most parties are not devoted exclusively to the advancement of class interests, and many voters support parties that do not represent their class interests. However, one need not accept the crudely monocausal logic of Marxism to conclude that class plays a vital role in domestic political competition. Voters care about a whole spectrum of ideological and cultural issues, but distributional questions are still important enough at the margins to influence policy debates and election outcomes.

The struggle over fiscal policy has not been fought on an even playing field. In every modern democracy, the left derives a powerful advantage from the fact that there are many more lower-class voters than upper-class voters (Meltzer and Richard 1978). Conservative parties cannot win elections based on a platform of "tax the poor," but labor parties can often take office with

a mandate to "soak the rich." Since the late nineteenth century, this imbalance has produced a clear trend in the fiscal politics of democratic states. Government programs have consumed a rising share of their societies' economic output, while the structure of taxation has become increasingly progressive (Higgs 1987; Peacock and Wiseman 1961; Sawyer 1982). Consequently, the state has become an instrument for the redistribution of wealth from the upper classes to the lower classes. The trend has not been perfectly consistent, but tax hikes on the poor and the elimination of major social welfare programs have been exceedingly rare. When conservative governments do manage to make the structure of taxation significantly more regressive, they usually do so by cutting the top rates on income, land, or capital, not by increasing the burden at the lower end of the scale.

The political costs of regressive taxation create a serious dilemma for conservative leaders facing an international threat. If they raise taxes on the lower classes to pay for rearmament, they court disaster in the next election. In the interim, their policy may provoke social unrest, such as mass protests and strikes, that impedes their ability to unify the country and mobilize the economy for war. On the other hand, if they attempt to raise taxes on the rich, they run the risk of a revolt within their own coalition. Fellow conservatives in the government and legislature may block their proposals, challenge their leadership, or splinter into polarized factions. Meanwhile, their wealthy supporters will express their discontent by withholding campaign contributions. A compromise solution, such as balancing mildly progressive tax increases across income brackets, might meliorate some of these problems, but it also might make matters worse by offending the entire electorate. In short, the right should have great difficulty finding both the will and the capacity to extract enough revenue to pay for a major rearmament program.

Of course, taxes are not the only way to finance arms production. Governments can also borrow the funds needed to build up their militaries, then gradually pay off the debt once the international crisis has passed. Since voters tend to discount future costs and benefits, this option may be less politically painful to the right than sudden increases in taxation. However, it does have some critical limitations. First, loans merely defer the problem; they do not solve it. Debt must be repaid at some point, and interest will add significantly to the bill. If voters have sufficiently long time horizons, loans will still produce a serious distributional controversy. Second, conservatives face the prospect that the debt they incur will be used by successive leftist governments to justify progressive tax reform. To compensate, they might try to cut taxes on the wealthy while borrowing for rearmament, but this combination is usually politically infeasible. Finally, large-scale deficit spending can quickly overheat an economy and cause inflation. The most effective solution to this problem, raising taxes to rein in private consumption, simply returns conservatives to their original dilemma. Another possible response, price controls, can be quite damaging to the interests of the upper class (see below). In sum, loans

may help conservative parties to overcome the political risks of rearmament, but they are no panacea.

In contrast, labor governments should find it relatively easy to pay for the rapid expansion of their military capability when confronting an adverse international environment. From their perspective, a grave foreign threat presents opportunity as well as danger. It gives them the pretext of a "national interest" to raise taxes on the rich, allowing them to assert that reform is necessary for reasons other than the confiscatory self-interest of the poor. Of course, a massive rearmament program will make it difficult for them to fund welfare policies, but if it allows them to "ratchet up" the extractive capacity of the state, they will be in a better position to carry out their agenda after the threat has passed. In short, labor parties may take consolation in the idea that rearmament contributes to the long-term growth of the welfare state, even if it does not serve their domestic goals in the short term. Whether or not they view these trade-offs in such Machiavellian terms, they will still find the extraction of wealth to be far less politically problematic than conservatives.

There is one potential complication in the logic connecting budgetary politics to rearmament. Voters' tolerance for taxation and deficit spending is influenced in part by popular theories, or "policy paradigms," about how the economy responds to government intervention (Blyth 2002; Hall 1989). In exceptional circumstances, it is conceivable that unconventional economic ideologies might interfere with the causal mechanisms discussed above. However, there are also compelling reasons to think that new policy paradigms will not override class interests, assuming that the two variables can be usefully disentangled. The most important economic idea of the twentieth century, Keynesianism, has tempered orthodox opposition to debt, but it has not solved the problem of distribution. Even if voters agree that large-scale deficit spending benefits the economy, they should still recognize that it increases their taxes over the long term and threatens inflation in the short term. Leftist governments will be eager to compensate the lower classes for these burdens by enacting progressive reforms, whereas the right will not. Consequently, conservative leaders will encounter strong mass resistance to funding rearmament with loans regardless of whether their supporters subscribe to Keynesian ideas. Meanwhile, the left should have an advantage in extractive capacity even if it adheres to fiscal orthodoxy, because it should have few qualms about substituting progressive taxation for borrowing.

Rearmament and Controls

Leaving aside the politics of extraction, a major rearmament program causes two types of distortion in the economy that are particularly harmful to the owners of capital (Porter 1994, chaps. 5, 7). First, unless it is financed primarily with taxes, thereby depressing consumer demand, it will divert resources normally allocated to the production of civilian goods, leading to inflation. As numerous economic studies have demon-

strated, inflation disproportionately hurts the wealthy (Hibbs 1987, 77–89). It does not substantially reduce standards of living among wage earners, but it cuts deeply into the income of bondholders, landlords, and other capital-owning rentiers. Second, in all but the most resource-rich countries, rearmament will require a massive increase in imports. If exchange rates are fixed, the resulting imbalance in payments will drain the central bank's reserves, which will weaken international confidence in the currency and result in capital flight. Again, this affects the upper classes more directly than the poor. The lower classes' greatest concern in a financial crisis, unemployment, is unlikely to pose a serious problem when the entire economy is being mobilized for military production.

States have various tools to combat the negative externalities of rearmament, but each one entails heavy-handed intervention in the economy. Price controls can be used to prevent inflation, but they disrupt the normal market mechanisms by which businesses make profits. Currency devaluation and exchange controls can be used to stop capital flight, but only at great cost to the competitive position of the financial sector. Alternatively, the state can generate foreign currency by confiscating and selling off its nationals' foreign property, but this also injures wealthy investors. In short, rearmament may harm the upper classes not only through taxation, inflation, and exchange-rate instability, but also through the imposition of controls that result in the dissipation and devaluation of their capital.

Industrial mobilization creates additional pressures for intervention in the economy. If defense industries lack the capacity to increase production quickly, it may be necessary for the government to broaden its regulatory authority or nationalize certain sectors. Even if rearmament is left in the hands of private contractors, the government may have to impose a tax on excess profits, dictate the allocation of raw materials, and ration consumption. Businessmen tend to oppose such measures because any retreat from the principle of *laissez-faire* opens the door to future attacks on the privileges of capital. It is not only progressive taxation that has been ratcheted upward in modern democracies; so too has economic dirigisme. The expansion of state control over markets may not impose an immediate burden on the upper class, but it can have important long-term consequences for the balance of power between labor and capital.

Hypotheses

The differences between left and right class-based coalitions' willingness to raise taxes, tolerate monetary instability, institute economic controls, and regulate industrial mobilization have clear implications for their responses to grave international threats. Conservative governments that attempt a strategy of rearmament will soon find themselves caught in a budgetary impasse. They will face strong political opposition and high electoral costs to raising taxes on the poor, but they will be reluctant to ask for similar sacrifices from their

wealthy supporters. To lessen the burdens of defense, as well as to avoid economic distortions and regimentation, they will resort to alliances or appeasement. Only if these alternative strategies prove insufficient, leaving potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities in their homeland defenses, will they slowly begin to rearm.

Labor coalitions should find it much easier to accept the social and fiscal consequences of rapid, large-scale rearmament. It allows them to rally public support for two of their most important domestic goals, raising taxes on the rich and extending the power of the state over the economy. As long as they are able to carry out this agenda, they should be willing to respond to threats with a massive arms buildup. Under extreme conditions, they may decide that it is also necessary to seek allies or attempt appeasement, but they will not use these strategies as a substitute for rearmament. Only if their domestic reforms are blocked, leaving the burden of military spending on the poor, should they be inclined to rely on diplomatic expedients as their first line of defense. Even then, however, their class interests will give them strong incentives to continue fighting for social change. Once they finally succeed, they should be fully prepared to rearm.

To these hypotheses must be added three caveats. First, the theory should accurately predict the behavior of the governing coalition, but it will not necessarily account for the position taken by parties out of power. Conservatives in opposition might criticize a leftist government for both insufficient defense spending and high taxes, then choose to prioritize the latter when they win the next election. Conversely, a labor party in opposition might object to a rearmament proposal that is funded with regressive taxes, then, once in office, reform the structure of taxation and allocate more revenue to the military. Furthermore, parties out of power may have reasons not to register their true preferences over rearmament. If a proposal will pass without their support, they may decide to vote against it to protest specific provisions or to make a statement about some other aspect of the government's policies.

Second, the nature of the party system and constitutional division of power within states may complicate matters. For the purpose of analytic clarity, the ideal polity would have only two major parties, tight discipline within them, and a cabinet selected by a unicameral parliament. When policymaking authority is shared between a legislature and an independently elected executive, or when a parliament is split into two separate houses, conservatives may be able to block the fiscal requisites of rearmament without having full control over the government. Even if a left-leaning coalition holds a majority of seats in the legislature, centrist elements within it might side with conservatives over economic issues if party discipline is weak. In such cases, a leftist executive may have to defer rearmament or settle for half-measures until elections, institutional reform, or changes in the external environment provide it with greater political bargaining leverage. In the interim, it may have no choice but to respond to threats in the manner hypothesized for conservatives, using alliances or appeasement as a substitute for rearmament.

Finally, class is not the only important source of partisanship over foreign policy. I argue that class constrains the *means* by which governments deal with threats, not that it determines their fundamental *goals* in the international system. To address the latter question, it is often necessary to look at the sectoral interests underlying political coalitions (Fordham 1998b; Narizny 2003; Trubowitz 1998). A party's position over rearmament may be overdetermined by a combination of class and sectoral interests, or it may be the product of a compromise between competing economic imperatives. Unfortunately, it would be wholly infeasible to evaluate the relative impact of the two explanatory variables within the space constraints of this essay. Rather than pit them against each other, I simply note whenever they clearly intersect.

Case Selection

Though I have presented the theory in broad terms, it is limited by several scope conditions. First, it applies only when rapid changes in a state's strategic environment create a sharp increase in threat. This criterion excludes cases in which relatively minor changes in the international system lead to calls for a modest or short-term rearmament program. France in the late nineteenth century falls into this category because, despite periodic war scares with Germany, the level of threat it faced was fairly constant until 1905. In such circumstances, conservatives may have a number of reasons to support moderately higher levels of defense spending than the left. For example, their sectoral coalition might derive greater benefits from policy objectives that require the use of force, such as imperial expansion or the protection of overseas trade, or they might have closer socioeconomic ties to the military. The cleavages that form over defense spending under a static threat environment may correspond quite well to the conventional wisdom of leftist pacifism and conservative militarism. However, the marginal changes in spending at stake in these cases should not create such profound stresses on the state's economy and system of taxation as to activate the causal mechanisms addressed in this paper.

States at war, or rapidly approaching the point thereof, must also be treated with caution. When the probability of conflict is high, it will be exceptionally difficult for leaders to find diplomatic alternatives to rearmament. Furthermore, military considerations will come to dominate concerns about the redistribution of wealth. Partisan differences over taxation and economic controls might not disappear entirely, but all domestic groups should become more willing to make sacrifices for the common good under the shadow of war. For these reasons, I do not address spending programs designed primarily to cover the operations, maintenance, and replacement costs of an ongoing conflict, such as the post-9/11 increases proposed by President George W. Bush (Thompson 2002), nor those intended to prepare for a war that is seen as nearly inevitable.

Second, I limit my empirical analysis to great powers. The underlying logic of the argument should apply

equally well to small states, but, given space constraints, I focus on the most salient actors in the international system. This restriction is somewhat arbitrary, but it should not create any selection bias. Indeed, great powers may actually constitute a "hard case" for the theory. According to Michael Barnett and Jack Levy (1991), great powers are less likely to experience internal conflict over resource mobilization than third world countries. The legacies of imperialism and underdevelopment have left postcolonial states with illegitimate regimes, weak instruments of extraction, and inadequate arms industries. To build the political and economic institutions needed to rearm effectively, they must upset the existing balance of power between domestic groups. Great powers tend to more stable and self-sufficient, so their plans for rearmament should not provoke as much societal resistance.

Third, the distributive politics of the state under consideration must be divided by class, in which at least one major party represents the working poor and another serves the material interests of a wealthy elite. In Great Britain, no such cleavage existed until the early 1890s, when the Liberals began to appeal directly to the lower classes (Emy 1972, 105–13). In the United States, this transition began in the late 1890s, when William Jennings Bryan and the agrarian populists wrested control of the Democratic Party from Grover Cleveland and the probusiness conservatives (Sundquist 1983, chaps. 7–10). The two factions struggled for dominance until 1912, when they were reunited by Woodrow Wilson's centrist "New Freedom" platform. Labor did not finally take a preeminent position in the party until the Great Depression, so the defense buildups that preceded the Spanish–American War and World War I must be excluded from this study.

Fourth, the state's leaders must be elected, either directly by voters or indirectly by the legislature, and its franchise must include the lower classes. In less democratic societies, the government may be able to ignore or repress societal opposition to extraction, thereby bypassing the causal mechanisms that underlie the theory. This condition disqualifies at least two semidemocratic great powers, Wilhelmine Germany and France under Napoleon III. The theory may still help to explain these regimes' strategic behavior, but I do not address them here. The remaining universe of cases, taking into account all of the restrictions discussed above, is fairly limited: Britain at the turn of the century, both Britain and France prior to the two World Wars, and the United States prior to World War II, at the beginning of the Cold War, and in the early 1980s.

Finally, a methodological note is in order. In the ideal world, it would be possible to test the theory simply by looking at changes in defense spending as a share of national income. However, reality is not so simple. First, quantitative measures cannot control for the precise level of threat. Without detailed qualitative analysis, there is no way to determine exactly how much money a state should have been allocating to its military at any particular point in time, given what its leaders believed about the strength of its adversaries, the value of its alliances, and the likelihood of conflict. Second,

defense burden indicators may be distorted by the operational costs of lesser conflicts that run concurrent with or immediately prior to the primary increase in threat. As noted above, the funding of war tends to be much less politically controversial than the funding of rearmament, so aggregate figures may paint a misleading picture of both the objects of defense spending and the difficulties of increasing it. To overcome these problems, I rely principally on the judgments of historians and defense experts when evaluating military preparedness and rearmament programs. If the theory is correct, it should be readily apparent even without the aid of quantitative measures: Leftist governments should respond to sharp increases in threat with a proportional expansion of their military capacity, while conservative governments should either seek allies or attempt appeasement as a partial substitute for internal strengthening.

GREAT BRITAIN

Fiscal and Imperial Retrenchment, 1895–1905

At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain faced a more dangerous international environment than at any point since the Napoleonic Wars. Almost simultaneously, all of the great powers except Austria-Hungary embarked upon major fleet-building programs, and many sought to carve out overseas empires of their own. In the span of only two decades, Britain went from a position of unchallenged dominance over much of the world outside Europe to facing hostile competitors on nearly every one of its imperial borders. The greatest threat came from France and Russia. The 1894 alliance between these two countries may have been intended primarily as a defensive measure against Germany, but it inspired great fear among British military planners. France and Russia's combined maritime power posed a direct challenge to the Royal Navy, and both countries had many serious colonial disputes with Britain. The defense of India was of particular concern, since Russia's expansion into Central Asia brought its enormous armies menacingly close to the frontiers of the Raj. Clearly, Britain had strong incentives to undertake a major rearmament program.

The Conservative government of 1895–1905 steadily increased naval appropriations, but the growth of external pressures soon began to outpace Britain's defensive capabilities (Friedberg 1988; Marder 1940, 380–84, 398–413; Sumida 1989, 18–28). The party had working majorities in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, so there were no institutional obstacles to rearmament. The problem, quite simply, was the budget. From the very outset, the Treasury argued that there would be serious political costs to a substantial increase in regressive indirect taxes; and it considered progressive direct taxes to be too high already (Emy 1972, 112–15; Friedberg 1988, 108–9). The Boer War of 1899–1902 temporarily dampened societal opposition to extraction, but the Conservatives' response was

quite modest—rate hikes on income, tea, tobacco, and alcohol, plus new duties on coal exports and imports of sugar and grain (Douglas 1999, 84–86; Friedberg 1988, 109–10, 115–16; Mallet 1913, 148–98). They paid for more than two-thirds of the cost of the war by issuing new loans and suspending repayment of the existing debt. The resulting spike in revenue helped tide the government through the war, but it did nothing to address the long-term imbalance between Britain's military resources and the rising threat posed by the other great powers.

Nevertheless, at the end of the Boer War, the Conservatives reduced the standard rate on income and eliminated their politically unpopular tax on grain. By 1904, the combination of tax cuts and the pressing need for greater defense spending produced a severe budgetary crisis (Friedberg 1988, 114–28; Mallet 1913, 199–253). The Conservatives refused to increase the proportion of revenue collected from progressive direct taxes, but Liberal opposition and fear of electoral disaster prevented them from significantly raising regressive indirect taxes. Their reluctance to balance the budget on the backs of the poor proved to be quite justified: In the election of 1906, they tentatively proposed the creation of a new system of tariffs and were soundly defeated at the polls. To get through the fiscal crisis of 1904, they made marginal adjustments to existing taxes on tea, tobacco, and income, then initiated a major strategic retrenchment to cut future military expenditures.

Unable to fund an adequate program of rearmament, the Conservatives attempted to protect the British Empire through other means (Friedberg 1988, 116–18, 169–82; Marder 1940, chaps. 21, 23, 25; Monger 1963, esp. 110–11). First, they broke from Britain's long tradition of "splendid isolation" by signing an alliance with Japan in January 1902. This agreement limited their diplomatic and military freedom of action in East Asia, but it nevertheless allowed the Admiralty to divert ships to the European theater. Second, the Conservatives petitioned the Dominions to shoulder a greater share of the burdens of defense. Finally, they sought to appease two of Britain's strongest maritime competitors. In the span of only a few years, they ceded *de facto* hegemony over the entire Western Hemisphere to the United States and settled almost all of their outstanding colonial disputes with France, leading to the creation of the Anglo-French Entente in April 1904. Though these measures were not costless, they substituted reasonably well for rearmament, allowing Britain to muddle through the first challenge to its declining imperial hegemony.

The People's Dreadnoughts, 1907–14

When the Liberals came to power in December 1905, the international environment was considerably less dangerous than it had been in the previous 10 years. The Conservatives' strategy of alliances and appeasement had sacrificed some of Britain's independent influence in the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, but it had nevertheless succeeded in reducing the threat

from France and Russia. Luck also played a critical role. Japan's military victories over Russia in 1904–5 benefited Britain greatly, eliminating a naval competitor and allaying fears of an overland invasion of India. Taking advantage of Britain's improved position, the Liberals continued to cut military spending through the first few years of their new government (Massie 1991, 499; Sumida 1989, 186–87).

The next challenge was soon to follow. In 1907, Germany set out to achieve parity with Britain in dreadnoughts, the latest and most expensive advance in battleship design. At first, the Admiralty was confident in Britain's maritime superiority, but by early 1909 it was rapidly revising its estimates of the German construction program (Massie 1991, 611–24). To meet the new threat, it decided that Britain needed to build eight new dreadnoughts, twice as many as originally anticipated. However, fearing that the government would reject this proposal out of hand, it asked for only six. Just as the rise of imperial competition had caused chronic budgetary crises for the Conservatives at the turn of the century, the expansion of the German fleet threatened to overwhelm the Liberals' balance sheet in 1909.

Yet the two parties' responses were quite different. The Liberals could have tried to add to their military strength by concluding a formal alliance with France, or they could have accepted the Kaiser's offer to halt German naval construction in return for pledging neutrality in a future Franco-German war (Sweet 1977). However, they were unwilling to sacrifice Britain's freedom of action in continental politics with either alliances or appeasement. After much debate, the cabinet decided to build four dreadnoughts immediately and reserve the option to build four more if circumstances warranted doing so. Six months later, it exercised this option, despite the strenuous resistance of the Treasury. To pay for this massive increase in defense spending, as well as new social welfare programs, the Liberals sought to raise taxes on Britain's upper class.

Their proposal, the "People's Budget" of 1909, was so historically unprecedented and politically controversial that it provoked a constitutional crisis within Parliament (Emy 1972, 122; Massie 1991, chap. 35; Murray 1980). The Liberals entered the fight with a sizable majority in the House of Commons, having won the election of 1906 by a landslide. After making a few modifications in the bill for party backbenchers, the government had little trouble securing the assent of that body. The unelected House of Lords, on the other hand, was dominated by Conservatives. By tradition, the Lords' power to veto legislation did not extend to finance measures, but it nevertheless voted overwhelmingly to reject the People's Budget. In response, the Liberals decided to call an election in January 1910, making it an unofficial referendum on the issue. The outcome left them with only a plurality of seats in the Commons, but they managed to pass the bill again with the support of Labour and the acquiescence of the Irish Nationalists. With both the Commons and the British public clearly behind the Liberals' policy, and with the threat of constitutional reform looming, the House of Lords finally conceded in April 1910.

The People's Budget's progressive elements included rate hikes on income, inheritance, real estate capital gains, stock transactions, and automobiles, while its regressive increases were limited to liquor and tobacco. It not only provided for the extension of the welfare state, but also produced more than enough revenue for the rapid expansion of Britain's dreadnought fleet through 1914 (Marder 1961, 214–21, 283–85, 311–27; Sumida 1989, 188–96). From 1909 to 1914, spending for social welfare increased from £2.1 million to £19.7 million, while naval appropriations grew from £32.2 million to £48.7 million (Sumida 1989, 189). Even members of the far left wing of the party, who had resisted their leaders' initial moves toward rearmament, dropped their objections once it became evident that the People's Budget would allow defense to coexist with old age pensions, national health insurance, and unemployment benefits (Weinroth 1971, esp. 117–18). The Budget also helped fund debt repayment averaging more than £10 million per year between 1906 and 1913, making the government the most fiscally orthodox of the entire Victorian era (Peden 2000, 40–41). Several months before the onset of war, the Treasury began to come under pressure from Britain's ever-increasing military needs, so the Liberals raised taxes on the upper class yet again (Emy 1972, 129–30; Murray 1980, 303–10).

As David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski (1993, 91–92; see also Lamborn 1991, chap. 7) explain, the difference between Britain's behavior in 1895–1905 and in 1907–14 can be attributed directly to the economic interests of its ruling coalitions:

The Conservatives believed their maximum budget of 1904–5 was politically unsustainable, while there is no indication that the Liberals regarded the amount they reached in 1914–15 as even approaching the maximum they could attain. . . . Liberals were able to increase government revenues without antagonizing any of their major sources of electoral support. Conservatives failed because they could not adequately raise taxes without suffering a devastating blow at the polls.⁴

Meanwhile, in Germany, constitutional arrangements that favored the right were too well entrenched to permit a similar fiscal revolution (D'Lugo and Rogowski 1993; Ferguson 1994; Lamborn 1991, chap. 6). Conservatives were better able to block progressive tax reform than their British counterparts but were equally incapable of further burdening the poor. Even with substantial loans, the German government was forced to cut its military's five-year spending estimates by nearly 40% in 1912 (D'Lugo and Rogowski 1993, 82). It was not until June 1913, facing the inevitability of war, that Kaiser Wilhelm II and Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg pushed through a major new tax, on capital

gains, against the opposition of conservative parties. By then, the naval arms race was already effectively over, with the antimilitaristic Liberals having decisively outbuilt the Reich.⁵

Avoiding the Costs of Confrontation, 1931–39

After World War I, the Liberal Party was supplanted by Labour, leaving British politics even more sharply divided by class interests. Throughout the interwar period, Labour railed against militarism just as emphatically, if not more so, than the Liberals had in earlier years. Even in the mid-1930s, the party consistently called for reductions in the service estimates. Yet, as John Naylor (1969, 71) explains, its position was primarily a "parliamentary tactic," designed "to register disapproval of government foreign policy rather than as outright opposition to the existence of armaments." The party abandoned its protest in July 1937 and soon thereafter began to criticize the ruling Conservatives for the inadequacies of their rearmament program. A few prominent Labourites were pacifists, but most actually wanted Britain to take a harder line against Japanese, Italian, and German violations of international law.⁶ They believed in collective security and multilateral arms reductions, not unilateral disarmament. If Clement Attlee had carried the party to victory in the election of 1935, it is quite likely that he would have adopted a more aggressively internationalist foreign policy to counter fascist challenges to world order. Once confronted with the military risks of such a strategy, he should have had little compunction about raising taxes on the rich to pay for improved defenses (Toye 2001).

Labour's prior record in office provides additional support for this point. Though the party had the great misfortune of governing Britain in 1929–31, at the onset of the Great Depression, it did not sacrifice the military for the sake of budgetary parsimony or social welfare. In 1930, it negotiated a naval arms limitation treaty with the United States and Japan, but it insisted on the inclusion of a safeguard clause that would allow it to exceed its quota if confronted with new threats from states like Germany or Italy (Babij 1995; Kennedy 1992; O'Brien 1998, 179–218). The next year, the Treasury pressed for a major reduction in spending on the fleet, but Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald refused. With the

⁴ The comparison is even more remarkable considering that the Conservatives had a greater sectoral interest than the Liberals in naval superiority. The Conservatives' primary sectoral constituency, financiers and traders in southeast England, was much more economically dependent on the British Empire than the Liberals' primary sectoral constituency, the manufacturing and coal industries of northern England, Wales, and Scotland (Narizny 2003).

⁵ The Liberals were less well prepared for the ground war, but few Britons foresaw the need for a major continental commitment (French 1982, esp. 36, 129).

⁶ The peak of Labour's antimilitarist sentiment came after the election of 1931, in which the party was reduced to only 52 seats in parliament. The collapse temporarily strengthened the position of its ultraleftist, ideologically motivated wing, resulting in the selection of a pacifist leader, George Lansbury. It makes little sense to ask whether Lansbury would have rearmed if he had been the prime minister in 1931–35, because he almost certainly could not have maintained control of a Labour Party that was enlarged sufficiently to return to power. Even before the revival of Labour's fortunes in the election of 1935, he was forced to resign because of his opposition to economic sanctions on Italy during the Abyssinian crisis (Naylor 1969, chaps. 1–4).

international situation beginning to deteriorate, he insisted that Britain must enter future disarmament talks from a position of strength. Labour cut some auxiliary expenditures, including training and maintenance, but continued the pace of naval construction at the level adopted by the Conservatives in 1924–29, when the revenue outlook had been far less bleak. To maintain a balanced budget, Labour increased the duty on oil and created a new tax on land, which was scheduled to take effect in 1933–34 (Douglas 1999, 118).

In August 1931, the ongoing economic crisis led to the formation of a “National” government that, though initially headed by MacDonald, was effectively controlled by the Conservatives after their landslide victory in the election of November 1931. From the moment the National government took power to the outbreak of war in 1939, it faced an ever more dangerous international environment. In September 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, endangering Britain’s predominant position in China and ultimately all of East and South Asia. In the early 1930s, Italy undertook a major naval and air arms production program, menacing Britain’s Mediterranean fleet and imperial line of supply through the Suez Canal. Then, in October 1935, it invaded Abyssinia, provoking an international crisis that eventually drove Mussolini into alliance with Hitler. Finally, of course, Germany repeatedly assailed the European status quo after the Nazis’ rise to power in January 1933.

Britain’s response to each of these challenges was deeply constrained by its military inferiority. Its fleet was spread too thin in the Far East to antagonize Japan, its defenses in the Mediterranean were too weak to withstand a surprise attack from Italy, and its army was wholly unprepared for a continental commitment in response to German aggression (Haggie 1981; Quartararo 1977). Yet, throughout the decade, the cabinet allowed the Treasury to exert a powerful restraining influence on defense estimates. The National government’s disinterest in rearmament during the fiscal collapse of 1931–32 was understandable, even in the face of growing international threats. However, its behavior subsequent to that point is difficult to justify in terms of economic necessity, even taking into account its orthodox opposition to deficit spending (McKeown 1991, 269–72; Price 2001).

Contrary to what one might expect, the Conservatives did not believe that they could not raise taxes in the middle of a depression. They were willing to make exceptional sacrifices to keep the budget balanced, an issue of great importance for the international financial market’s confidence in the pound. In September 1931, when the economic crisis was at its apex, they agreed to a sizable combination of progressive and regressive tax hikes. The National government increased the standard rate on income from 22.5% to 25%, raised the surtax on upper incomes by 10%, reduced allowances to nearly double the number of citizens required to pay income taxes, and increased rates on beer, tobacco, gasoline, and entertainment. Then, in 1932, the Conservatives managed to introduce a 10% duty on all manufactured goods imported from outside the Commonwealth (Douglas 1999, 119–21; Sabine 1966, 176–77). Com-

bined with spending cuts, these measures sent a clear signal of the solvency of the British government and thereby helped tide London’s financial sector through the worst years of the Great Depression.

In contrast, the military was not high on the Conservatives’ list of priorities.⁷ The economy gradually improved, yet they insisted that the rate on income imposed in 1931 was unsustainable. In 1934, the Treasury cut it back to 22.5% and repealed Labour’s land tax; then, in 1935, it rewarded the poor by reducing taxes on lower incomes (Douglas 1999, 122; Sabine 1966, 185–86). Consequently, defense spending had to be held at a constant 2.7%–3.0% of Britain’s GNP through 1935–36, far below what the services requested (Peden 1979, 67–71; Shay 1977, chaps. 1–2). The Conservatives finally began to rearm in 1936, but their response was not at all in proportion to the rapidly growing threat. Their fears of inflation and a balance of payments crisis greatly restrained the extent of their borrowing, and their reluctance to extract wealth directly from the upper class compounded the problem. Indeed, they could not even bring themselves to raise the standard rate on income to 25%, at which it had stood in 1931–34, until April 1937. In every year between 1934 and 1938, Germany spent at least twice as much of its GNP on its military as did Britain (Peden 1979, 8), but the cabinet consistently accepted Treasury recommendations to scale down proposals to increase defense appropriations (Peden 1979, 87–92; Shay 1977, chaps. 45).

The problem of finance was not the only impediment to rearmament; the Conservatives’ unwillingness to expand government control over the economy also weakened their response to the mounting threat. They argued that if Britain rearmed too quickly, it would face inflation and ruinous trade deficits (Cain and Hopkins 1993, 93–99; Newton 1996, 66–73, 116–17; Peden 1979, chap. 3; Shay 1977, 75–79). There existed several policy options to address these concerns—i.e., controls on foreign exchange, consumption, or capital investment, or substantial tax increases to dampen private sector spending—but the Conservatives refused to consider any of them in peacetime. Another complication was that Britain’s expanding defense industries had to compete with civilian manufacturing for labor and material resources, resulting in severe shortages. Rather than confront the issue directly, the government left it to be resolved slowly by market forces. It avoided interfering in the private sector or enlarging its regulatory capacity, even at the cost of serious bottlenecks in the production of needed armaments (Parker 1981; Postan 1952, chaps. 2, 3; Rollings 2001; Shay 1977, chap. 3).

The Conservatives’ primary response to the growing threat from Germany, Italy, and Japan was, of course, appeasement. Though this strategy was risky, it promised to solve Britain’s problems at a much lower cost than rearmament alone. The third option, alliances, was less appealing. If the Conservatives had given too much encouragement to France, it might have taken

⁷ On the specific shortcomings of each of the services, see Postan 1952, chap. 1.

an unreasonably hard line against Germany, as it did in the Ruhr crisis of 1923–24. War might have resulted, and Britain would have been forced to defend its ally. To avoid entrapment by the French, Conservatives did not begin to organize an expeditionary force for Europe until February 1939 (Young 1978, 213–15, 221–29). Having decided against both rapid rearmament and a stronger continental commitment, their only remaining option was appeasement.

FRANCE

The Centrist Stalemate, 1905–14

After its humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, France faced the unenviable task of maintaining a defensive balance against an adversary that not only was more powerful than itself but also was growing more rapidly in population and wealth. To compensate for these disadvantages, it began to cooperate with Russia over military affairs in 1891, then signed a formal alliance with it in 1894. France could not ensure its security with absolute certainty, but it was nevertheless able to establish a tolerable *modus vivendi* (Ralston 1967, 133–34). By the turn of the century, its generals were reasonably confident in their ability to repel another invasion (Porch 1981, 43–44), and the economic burdens of defense were not much greater for French taxpayers than for Germans (Stevenson 1996, 6).

In 1904–5, France's strategic environment took a dramatic turn for the worse. First, Russia's defeat in war with Japan seriously constrained its ability to come to France's aid in a prospective war with Germany (Krumeich 1984, 25–26; Porch 1981, 228; Stevenson 1996, 68–80). Russia was expected to recover eventually, but in the meantime France would have to assume much greater responsibility for its own defense. Second, Germany took advantage of the situation by initiating a crisis over the expansion of French influence in Morocco. Its willingness to threaten war over such a minor issue signaled the beginning of a dangerous period of diplomatic brinkmanship. In a very short period of time, France went from a position of relative strength to one of ominous vulnerability, giving it an unambiguous imperative to undertake a major rearmament program.

Unlike Great Britain, France did not have a well-defined two-party system. Its parliament was fragmented into numerous factions and splinter groups, encompassing everything from socialists to centrist independents to monarchist reactionaries. The entire range of class interests in French society was quite well represented, and most parties could easily be ranked on a left-right continuum. However, there was no fixed point in the middle at which they naturally divided. The two largest blocs, the center-left Radicals and center-right Republicans, usually found it easier to compromise with each other than with extreme elements at their own ends of the political spectrum (Wileman 1994). The party system clearly embodied class cleavages, but it did not produce ideologically polarized

governments. Most premiers were Radicals, but they depended on the support of Republicans to keep a working majority in the parliament. Consequently, they had to tread lightly on the issue of taxation.

The constitutional division of power within the Third Republic complicated matters further. The lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, was responsible for selecting the government, but it could not authorize legislation on its own. Even if a premier managed to win the approval of a reform bill in the Chamber, he would still need the consent of the upper house of parliament, the Senate, which was consistently the more conservative of the two institutions. In 1909, an income tax proposal finally made it through the Chamber of Deputies, but it was buried by the Senate. Hence, France retained its highly regressive system of tariffs and excise taxes (Callet 1962; Owen 1982, chaps. 1, 2).

In this centripetal political environment, there was very little flexibility in fiscal policymaking, resulting in chronic deficits and constant downward pressure on military expenditures (Owen 1982, 89, 127, 217–18; Ralston 1967, 134–35). In 1905, the parliament eliminated most exemptions from conscription and cut the term of service from three years to two, which had the net effect of reducing the active army from 580,000 to approximately 545,000 men after 1907 (Ralston 1967, 307; Stevenson 1996, 93–95, 303). Even more troubling than the manpower shortage was the severe underfunding of matériel, particularly heavy artillery, munitions, and fortifications (Joffre 1932, chap. 3; Mitchell 1981; Porch 1981, 238–40, 242–44; Stevenson 1996, 176–77, 217, 220–24). In 1908, it was determined that “Germany spent the equivalent of 1,770 francs per soldier, while France spent only 914” (Porch 1981, 227). French generals warned their civilian leadership that there was a strong possibility of defeat in war (Porch 1981, 166), but, aside from emergency reequipping measures during the Agadir crisis of 1905–6 (Stevenson 1996, 71, 94–96), efforts at rearmament were quite limited.

Instead of providing adequate funding for defense, France's centrist governments turned to alliances. Russia could not provide much help over the short term, so instead they pinned their hopes on their traditional colonial rival, Britain. This alternative strategy was only partially successful. The British agreed to secret military staff talks, but they refused to make any formal commitment to the continent. As a result, France remained insecure. The breaking point came in early 1913, when news began to leak out that Germany would expand its army to 850,000 men. The gradual recovery of Russia provided little consolation; it would not be able to put pressure on Germany until after the critical first few weeks of the war, and even then it might decide to focus its attentions on Austria (Cairns 1953, 274–76; Krumeich 1984, 25–30). Facing a potential military catastrophe, France's politicians could no longer ignore the need for decisive action.

In response, Premier Louis Barthou proposed that the term of conscription be lengthened by a year, enlarging the standing army by 180,000 men (Krumeich

1984, 50).⁸ The Three Year Law sparked a fierce political debate. Radicals and Socialists feared that it would reinforce the army's role as an instrument of social control, used to repress strikes and indoctrinate conscripts, without substantially increasing military effectiveness. Since the program would not affect the sum total of France's mobilized manpower, they argued, it would be better to devote resources to equipment, fortifications, and the strengthening of the reserves (Chapman 1971, 95–97, 105–7; Krumeich 1984, 135–36, 214; Michon 1935, 144–45; Ralston 1967, 348–50). In hindsight, this critique was essentially correct (Becker 1987, 20–26; Porch 1981, 210), but the French general staff was unyielding in its demand to prioritize service extension. To win over the left, Barthou tentatively offered to pay for the Three Year Law with a new "National Tax" of up to 3% on upper incomes (Krumeich 1984, 72–73, 78, 86–87, 100–101, 117; Owen 1982, 238–41). The Socialists remained unpersuaded, but a majority of Radicals reluctantly accepted this trade-off and joined with conservatives to vote for it.

Once the Three Year Law had been approved, Barthou backtracked on his tax proposal. Under pressure from the right, he sought to fund the expansion of the army with an enormous new loan while scaling back the National Tax to the point at which it would barely pay for interest on the loan (Krumeich 1984, 57–58, 138–40; Owen 1982, 241–47). The Radicals revolted, and Barthou resigned in December 1913 with the budget question still unresolved and without even having presented to the parliament a program for material rearmament. Shortly thereafter, the left made a political breakthrough, forming a government that excluded the right entirely (Chapman 1971, 121–35; Krumeich 1984, 145–48, 158–61, 211–13; Owen 1982, 247–54). It did not last long, but it sent a clear signal that the tide was turning. As the Radicals drew closer to the Socialists, Senate conservatives realized that continued resistance to the income tax would eventually lead to electoral disaster and perhaps, as in Britain, the curtailment of their constitutional prerogatives (Chapman 1971, 193–99; Owen 1982, 259–62). In the spring of 1914, they accepted a moderate compromise on tax reform, which was accompanied by long-term funding for the Three Year Law (655 million francs) and, at long last, a major rearmament program (754 million francs) (Michon 1935, 191–92; Stevenson 1996, 313). The resulting budget finally won the consent of the Senate on July 15, barely two weeks before Germany invaded.

Of course, by then, it was far too late to address the critical material shortcomings of the army. Nine years of inadequate rearmament left France's fate hanging by a thread in the desperate first month of the conflict. Its alliance strategy saved it from total collapse, but it still needed a disastrously premature Russian offensive in

the east, the uncertain aid of the British Expeditionary Force, and the "miracle" of the battle of the Marne to keep it from being overrun by its far better-equipped opponent.

Between France and the Franc, 1935–39

After the rise of Hitler and the rapid rearmament of Germany, France found itself in a very similar position as in 1905–14. It faced a clearly hostile enemy that had a much larger population and economy than its own, and its potential allies were either weak or unreliable. By March 1935, when Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and announced a return to conscription, France had a clear imperative to undertake the modernization and strengthening of its military. However, its political system was still immobilized by strong centripetal tendencies. Premiers came to power not by proposing dramatic changes to the status quo, but by forging moderate coalitions between center-left Radicals and center-right Republicans. If France were to rearm in proportion to the new threat, the left would need to make a similar political breakthrough as it had in 1913–14.

Between June 1935 and June 1936, the centrist governments of Pierre Laval and Albert Sarraut prioritized the defense of the overvalued franc over the defense of the country. They imposed strict austerity measures on the budget, leaving the military with critical vulnerabilities in nearly every major category of equipment (Frankenstein 1982, 37, 120–28; Thomas 1992; Young 1978, 178–79). Rather than rearm, Laval tried desperately to maintain France's alliance with fascist Italy, while Sarraut passively accepted Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland (Frankenstein 1982, 37, 124–28; Young 1978, 99–129, 133–34). France would not have a government that could respond fully and uncompromisingly to changes in the international environment until it experienced two momentous shifts in its domestic politics. The first was the formation in July 1935 of the Popular Front, an unprecedented coalition of Radicals, Socialists, and Communists.⁹ The second was the elections of spring 1936, in which the Socialists displaced the Radicals as the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies.

⁹ While out of power in the early 1930s, the Socialists in France followed a similar path over rearmament as Labour in Britain. The party was divided into left and right wings, which were further subdivided into pacifist and prodefense groups. The two factions of pacifists, led by Paul Faure and Marceau Pivert, gained the upper hand in debates over military spending in France in 1931 (Greene 1969, 6–9). Yet, by the time the Popular Front came to power, Faure had accepted the need for rearmament and Pivert's followers were in the minority in the left wing (Baker 1971, esp. 35–36; Greene 1969, 111, 199, 205). The Communists also switched from opposing defense spending to supporting rearmament, but their position was dictated by Josef Stalin and the Comintern, not their voters' economic interests (Brower 1968, chaps. 2, 3). Consequently, the theory cannot account for their behavior. In any case, the party remained on the margins of French politics even during the Popular Front era. It declined to participate in the government, and a Socialist–Radical coalition probably could have come to power even without the Communists' support in the Chamber of Deputies (Pickersgill 1939).

⁸ Several scholars, including Krumeich, argue that the overriding but unstated purpose of the Three Year Law was to reassure the Russian government that the French army would remain capable of taking the offensive against Germany. In this light, it can be seen more as an attempt to shore up France's low-cost alliance strategy than as a self-reliant rearmament program.

The leftward turn gave the Popular Front a clear majority in the Chamber and allowed the leader of the Socialist Party, Léon Blum, to form the inaugural Popular Front government in June 1936. In his first few weeks in office, he focused almost exclusively on social reform. The more conservative Senate resisted a few elements of his agenda (Minot 1981, 39), but Blum ultimately got most of what he wanted from the parliament. The Popular Front authorized 20 billion francs over three years for public works, instituted a 40-hour work week, mandated two weeks of paid vacation, enacted collective bargaining laws, and supported the negotiation of broad-based wage increases (Colton 1987, 162–63). The government promised even greater changes to follow, but its domestic agenda was suddenly waylaid by international events. On August 24, Hitler announced that the term of conscription in the German army would be raised from one year to two, thereby doubling its active manpower. Faced with this new danger, Minister of War Edouard Daladier instructed the army to produce a plan for rearmament.

At that point, the increase in threat was so great that any French government would have had to respond with some kind of a military buildup. However, only the Popular Front would have done so much, so quickly. In response to Daladier's request, the army proposed to spend nine billion francs over the next four years, arguing that this was the maximum that France's industries could sustain (Hoff 1982, 178). Such a massive appropriation would preempt further efforts at social reform, but the left did not shy away from the burdens of defense. Quite to the contrary, Daladier rejected the army's estimates as wholly inadequate. On September 7, only two weeks after Hitler's announcement, the cabinet approved a spending plan of 14 billion francs for the service. In the following months, it continued to pour money into the military, spurred in part by the signing of the Rome–Berlin Axis and the Belgian declaration of neutrality. To supplement its army program, the government added nearly eight billion francs for the navy and seven billion for the air force (Frankenstein 1982, 71–82, 312; Young 1978, chap. 7), all of which was authorized by its parliamentary coalition.

Blum, who was somewhat of a Keynesian, resolved that the buildup should be funded primarily with loans. However, he did not ignore the question of redistribution. In addition to the social legislation already enacted, the Popular Front made inheritance and income taxes more progressive, reformed some indirect taxes, and created a new tax on businesses (Cuvillier 1978, 40–42, 103–4; Sauvy 1967, 247). It also nationalized certain armaments industries and asserted controls over others, allowing France to produce supplies far in excess of what that army had assumed possible (Clarke 1977, 423–26; Hoff 1982, 191–203; Thomas 1992, 661–62). The forty-hour work week complicated matters somewhat, but the net effect of Blum's policies was a rapid advance in the military's effectiveness.

Yet there was also a serious downside to rearmament, just as the right had feared. The combination of deficit spending, domestic reform, and an overvalued franc resulted in capital flight. On September 25, Blum de-

valued the franc, but the problem returned after only a few months. To reassure investors, he announced a "pause" in social legislation and cut public works outlays in the spring of 1937 (Colton 1987, 192–93). After another brief recovery, the financial crisis worsened, so Blum finally asked the parliament for emergency powers to decree economic controls and new taxation. The measure easily passed the Chamber of Deputies, but it proved to be too much for centrist Radicals, who held the balance of power in the Senate Finance Committee, to accept. Unwilling to compromise, Blum resigned (Colton 1987, 270–73; Minot 1981).

The next government, though nominally under the auspices of the Popular Front, returned to the control of the centrist Radicals. Led by premier Camille Chautemps and finance minister Georges Bonnet, it chose to restore business confidence at the expense of the military (Frankenstein 1982, chap. 8). It did not halt Blum's multiyear programs, but it did scale back on them considerably. Appropriations for the air force were reduced by 24%, while funding for the navy was slashed by 41%. The "pause" in rearmament, combined with an increase in indirect taxes, temporarily had the desired effect of bringing gold back into the Treasury. This left France better prepared for the financial burdens of the war, but only at the cost of letting its military readiness fall further behind Germany and Italy.

Blum became premier once more before the war, taking over after the Anschluss crisis in March 1938 (Colton 1987, 297–304; Frankenstein 1982, 180–87). He was able to hold on to power for less than a month, but in that time he focused all of his efforts on accelerating the defense buildup. After Blum came Daladier, who remained in office until the outbreak of war. With Bonnet as his foreign minister, he followed Britain's lead in appeasing Hitler at Munich in September 1938 and abandoning Czechoslovakia entirely in March 1939. However, Daladier did carry out Blum's new rearmament program, albeit with a more laissez-faire approach that slowed production and inhibited economic planning. Despite continuing social and political conflict over the burdens of industrial mobilization, the need to step up the pace of military spending became less controversial as the financial crisis passed and the likelihood of war increased (Frankenstein 1982, chaps. 9, 10, 14; Imlay 1997, 56–65, 187–97).

Though the French right did eventually accept the necessity of full-scale rearmament, the country would not have been nearly as well prepared for war in 1939–40 if the Popular Front had not come to power in 1936–37. At that time, only a pure left-wing coalition would have gone as far as it did to prioritize defense over business interests. As a result of Blum's actions, both then and in the spring of 1938, France entered the war with a modernized, well-equipped military. Its defeat was not the result of its material weakness but, rather, gross strategic blunders (Jordan 1998; May 2000, 448–60; Stolfi 1970; Young 1978, chap. 10). If only France had possessed better military leadership, Blum's rearmament programs might well have saved the country from defeat at the hands of a much more populous and economically powerful adversary.

UNITED STATES

Militarizing the New Deal, 1938–41

Unlike Great Britain and France, the United States had little reason to undertake a major rearmament program in the mid-1930s. Its homeland borders were protected by thousands of miles of ocean, while its only imperial competitor, Japan, was occupied with China. Consequently, there was a broad consensus within American politics to keep defense spending to an absolute minimum. With little dissent, the army was cut to a mere skeleton force. Between 1927 and 1934, it reached a trough of only 130,500 men, and there was almost no money available for modernization (Ehrhart 1975, 11). Even the Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became president in 1933, consistently allowed the Bureau of the Budget to pare down defense estimates. Congress was slightly more generous in its appropriations bills, but the differences between the two parties and branches of government were slight. The right wanted to cut the military as part of an overall reduction in government spending, while the left tried to shift funding to New Deal programs (Ehrhart 1975, 73–76). Only the navy was kept at a reasonable level of preparedness, in part because the United States was far more likely to face a threat to its maritime interests than an attack on its shores and in part because Roosevelt used naval construction as an unemployment relief program (Levine 1988).

Defense spending nearly doubled between 1934 and 1937, but it began at such a low level that the additional sums had little impact. By the end of this period, national security consumed only 12.1% of the budget and 1.0% of the GDP (United States, Bureau of the Census 1954, 241; United States, Department of Commerce 2002). The regular army was expanded to 178,500 men, but there was a severe shortage of officers and the air corps was desperately underfunded. After so many years of neglect, it would take a much greater financial commitment to prepare even this undersized force for battle (Ehrhart 1975, chaps. 2–4). The bipartisan consensus against rearmament did not really begin to break down until 1938, when Europe was rapidly approaching the brink of war. In January, Roosevelt asked Congress for modest increases, directed primarily toward the navy. Then, after the Munich Conference of September 1938, he began demanding ever-larger sums for both branches of the military.

The constitutional structure of the United States, combined with the vagaries of its party system, greatly complicated Roosevelt's task. Every spending bill had to be approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, where independent-minded legislators could substantially revise his proposals. Democrats consistently controlled both institutions by sizable margins, but the party was internally divided, having only recently become representative of the lower classes (Patterson 1967). Among its ranks were many Southern conservatives, who opposed the fiscal requisites of rearmament, as well as Midwestern isolationists, who opposed the functional goals of rearmament. The

president was not nearly as constrained as he would have been if Republicans had controlled Congress, but he could not assume unproblematically that the Democrats' dominance would give him free rein.

Roosevelt's drive to increase defense spending was both preceded and accompanied by the New Deal, which vastly expanded the government's role in the economy and society. The Works Progress Administration and Civilian Conservation Corps redistributed revenue to the unemployed, the Securities and Exchange Commission and National Recovery Administration greatly enhanced the executive's capacity to regulate businesses and markets, and the Wagner Act strengthened the power of unions. Between 1935 and 1937, Roosevelt also pressed for the progressive reform of taxation. Despite stiff opposition from Republicans and conservative Democrats, he raised rates significantly on high income brackets, increased corporate taxation, and closed loopholes on rampant evasion among wealthy taxpayers (Brownlee 1996, 72–82; Lambert 1970). Though congressional conservatives cut his corporate taxes in 1938 and 1939, he had done more than enough by then to ensure that a military buildup would not be overly burdensome to the lower classes.

Most Americans agreed on the necessity of rearmament by 1938, but they fought bitterly over its extent. Business journals were filled with dire warnings about the dangers of industrial mobilization, arguing that it would be used to justify the imposition of sweeping new economic controls (Stromberg 1953, 63, 68–70; Weinrich 1971, 31–38, 167–221).¹⁰ Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress accused Roosevelt of using defense expenditures as a deceptive form of New Deal "pump priming." Between late 1938 and early 1940, they consistently sought to scale back on his rearmament proposals (Ehrhart 1975, 223–29, 367; Westerfield 1955, 130–35).¹¹ It was not until after the defeat of France in May 1940 that they set aside partisanship to vote overwhelmingly for a massive new spending program.

Republicans were not yet ready to fall in lockstep behind the president, however. The partisan debate exploded again in the summer of 1940, when Roosevelt called for peacetime conscription for the first time in the country's history. The Selective Service Act passed the House of Representatives with 86% of Democrats voting in favor and 65% of Republicans voting against (O'Sullivan 1982, 259). The following year, there was a similar partisan divide over the Service Extension Act, which passed by only one vote. In short, as Robert Ehrhart (1975, 375) writes, "While Roosevelt did not go so far as he might have, the opposition party

¹⁰ Weinrich emphasizes that some prominent businessmen advocated greater military preparedness. However, both his and Stromberg's analyses of the editorials of trade journals reveal that the greater business community had strong objections to Roosevelt's rearmament program.

¹¹ As it became evident that Roosevelt was planning for intervention in Europe, not just homeland defense, sectoral interests become more salient to the debate. Since Democratic constituencies generally had a greater economic stake in Europe than Republicans, sectoral interests reinforced the existing class cleavage (Ehrhart 1975, 353–55; Trubowitz 1998, chap. 3).

attacked vociferously even those measures he did propose . . . [H]ad the leadership of the Republican Party controlled the Government or even the Congress, the state of the national defense would have been worse." Fortunately, the president's efforts were largely successful. By 1941, the United States was spending 5.0% of its GDP on its military, a fivefold increase from only four years prior.

The Cold War "Consensus," 1948–60

In the first few years following the end of World War II, most Americans felt secure enough to support deep cuts in defense spending, and politicians from both parties were all too willing to oblige. Democratic President Harry S. Truman prioritized debt reduction and price stability, leaving the services with only enough funding for what he considered to be their "minimum requirements." As late as January 1948, he proposed to spend only \$9.8 billion on the military, or 3.6% of the GDP, with little political opposition (Reardon 1984, 312; United States, Department of Commerce 2002). At the same time, however, the consensus for budgetary parsimony was beginning to be shaken by changes in the international environment. In the late 1940s, Americans witnessed a rapid series of advances in the power of the Soviet Union, including its testing of an atomic bomb, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and Mao Tse-tung's triumph over the Chinese nationalists. Fearing that the United States would soon find itself in military conflict with the Soviets, defense experts called for a major rearmament program (Friedberg 2000, 103, 107–9; Hogan 1998, chap. 7; Huntington 1961, 43–53).

Truman began to accept the need for rearmament in March 1948, when he added more than \$3 billion to his initial budget request. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted much more, but the president was highly constrained. The business community consistently attacked his military spending proposals, insisting that tax cuts and the elimination of wartime economic controls should take priority (Hill 1980; Lo 1982). Its interests were well represented in Congress, where Republicans and the right wing of the Democratic Party often joined forces to defeat the president's initiatives. Both the House and the Senate had Republican majorities in 1947–48, and the left remained in the minority even when Democrats controlled the legislature in 1949–52 (Amenta and Skocpol 1988, 117–18). To keep expenditures down, conservative legislators advocated cutting not only New Deal social welfare programs but also the Marshall Plan and defense (Friedberg 2000, 98–102; Hogan 1998, 86, 93, 291, 326–29; Huntington 1961, 253–59, 264–67).

Between 1947 and 1948, Truman vetoed tax cuts three times, but Congress finally overrode him in April 1948, eliminating \$5 billion of revenue annually (Lee 1970; Witte 1985, 133–36). Over the following two years, he asked for progressive tax increases and the power to reimpose economic controls to sustain greater spending on both welfare and the military, but he was repeatedly rebuffed (Friedberg 2000, 101–2, 104–5;

Reardon 1984, 327–28). Thus, he had no choice but to hold his defense estimates to approximately the same level advocated by conservatives. Even if he had been willing to incur deficits, which he was not, there was no chance that he could have persuaded Congress to consent. It was during these lean years that he agreed to the formation of NATO, using the alliance in part to compensate for U.S. military weakness in Europe.¹²

The breakthrough in rearmament finally came in June 1950, when Truman decided to commit to the defense of South Korea (Friedberg 2000, 115–24; Hogan 1998, chap. 8; Huntington 1961, 53–56; Leffler 1992, 371–74, 451–53). At that point, he asked for massive outlays to bolster American conventional forces throughout the globe, particularly in Europe. Though his proposals went far beyond what was needed for the war in Korea (Leffler 1992, 374), he was able to pressure his opponents in Congress to make major concessions. In the first year of the conflict, Truman managed to reinstitute the wartime excess profits tax, increase income, corporate, and excise taxes, and reimpose wage and price controls (Huntington 1961, 271–75; Witte 1985, 137–44). These measures provided an additional \$14 billion in revenue, but it was still significantly less than what he wanted, so he reluctantly decided to fund rearmament in part through deficit spending.¹³ In fiscal year 1953, defense consumed \$50.3 billion, amounting to 13.2% of the GDP (United States, Bureau of the Census 1954, 366; United States, Department of Commerce 2002), and the administration left office with plans to increase appropriations to a peak of approximately \$60 billion in 1955 (Friedberg 2000, 125–26).¹⁴

The election of 1952, which gave Republicans control over both the White House and Congress, marked a dramatic reversal in priorities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to power promising to eliminate economic controls, cut taxes, prevent inflation, and balance the budget. Even after negotiating an end to the Korean War, he could not carry out this agenda without sacrificing defense and foreign aid (Friedberg 2000, 124–39; Huntington 1961, 64–88; Leighton 2001; Morgan 1990; Sloan 1991, chap. 4). Though his advisors argued that the nuclear stalemate with the Soviet Union necessitated a buildup in conventional forces, he flatly refused to accept Truman's rearmament program. Instead, he set his military and foreign aid budget by first subtracting the cost of tax cuts and domestic programs

¹² Truman formed several other alliances, but none of them can be considered a substitute for rearmament. The Rio Pact (1947) and ANZUS (1951) did not face a direct military threat, the U.S.–Japan Treaty (1951) was designed primarily to keep Japan aligned with the West and provide forward military bases for the United States, and the U.S.–Philippines Treaty (1951) simply ratified the existing American presence in the Philippines (Leffler 1992, 172–73, 346–47, 430–33, 463–65).

¹³ Gaddis (1982, 92–94) argues that Truman's decision to accept NSC-68 was influenced by a sudden conversion to Keynesian ideas, but his evidence is highly circumstantial and has not been supported by other scholars (Pollard 1989, 233).

¹⁴ Figures include national security programs outside the Department of Defense, such as atomic energy, military foreign aid, and strategic stockpiling.

from revenue, then spending whatever was left over (Friedberg 2000, 131–33).¹⁵ This “remainder method” brought national security appropriations down to \$40.6 billion, or 9.8% of the GDP, by 1955 (United States, Bureau of the Census 1960, 369). Not only was it two-thirds of what Truman had planned, but also it was far less than Eisenhower’s Chiefs of Staff demanded, leading two generals to resign in protest (Sloan 1991, 78). Congressional Democrats also mounted a harsh critique of the president’s economic and defense policies, arguing that his fiscal miserliness had caused serious weaknesses in the nation’s military (Friedberg 2000, 139–40; Huntington 1961, 259–64; Morgan 1990, 36). Meanwhile, congressional Republicans pushed him to make even deeper cuts in both taxes and national security than he had originally proposed (Bowie and Immerman 1998, 107–8; Reichard 1975, 69–77, 97–108).

To compensate for the lack of funding, Eisenhower initiated his “New Look” defense strategy. Whereas Truman had based his spending estimates on the requirements of fighting a conventional war with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower insisted that nuclear deterrence would have to suffice. He sought to contain communism not by committing American troops to conflicts throughout the globe but, rather, by creating several new alliances, including SEATO and CENTO, to which the U.S. nuclear umbrella and technical assistance would be extended (Gaddis 1982, 152–53). To promote European military self-reliance, which he hoped would allow the withdrawal of American forces from the continent, he proposed giving each of the major powers, including West Germany, the means to produce and deploy its own nuclear weapons (Trachtenberg 1999, 147–65, 193–247, 261–62). Even upon the launch of Sputnik, which many analysts believed would usher in a new era of homeland vulnerability, the president sought to keep supplemental appropriations down to the bare minimum level that would be politically acceptable (Friedberg 2000, 137; Huntington 1961, 88–113; Morgan 1990, 90–93). Had the Democrats not regained control of Congress in 1955, defense budgets would have been even lower. In short, Republicans consistently sought to spend less on the military than Democrats throughout the 1948–60 period, when the international environment was most uncertain and the danger of war with the Soviet Union was greatest.

Reaganomics and Rearmament, 1979–86

An improvement in relations between the two superpowers, combined with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, led to an almost-continuous decline in American military spending between 1968 and 1978. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet Union was steadily expanding its arsenal of both conventional and nuclear arms (Lee and Staar 1986, 107–17). In the late 1970s, its foreign policy became increasingly aggressive, culminating in

the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Fearing that the balance of power had turned against the United States, many defense experts called for rearmament. In response, Democratic president Jimmy Carter initiated a major military buildup. Shortly thereafter, however, he was replaced by a Republican, Ronald W. Reagan.

The new president’s reaction to the threat was quite unlike that of any other conservative in this study. With the full support of his party, Reagan demanded massive increases in military appropriations, beyond even what Carter had deemed acceptable (Wells 1983). Though Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, many joined with Republican legislators to vote for the program. As a result, the share of the nation’s GDP consumed by defense rose from 5.1% in 1980 to 6.5% in 1986 (United States, Bureau of the Census 1996, 351). Viewed in the context of the entire Cold War, this new peak was not a particularly impressive sum; it only matched the levels of the early 1970s and was barely half of what Truman had spent. Nevertheless, it presented a major challenge to the decrepit Soviet economy and, in doing so, may have helped to bring the Cold War to an end on terms that decisively favored the United States (Zakaria 1990).

Reagan’s behavior clearly violates the hypothesis that conservatives will be less likely than the left to respond to foreign threats with rearmament. However, it is in some ways actually quite consistent with the underlying logic of the theory. Through a historically unprecedented combination of circumstances, Reagan managed to overcome all of the standard dilemmas of rearmament.¹⁶ First, he proposed a new paradigm, supply-side economics, that promised to increase revenue by decreasing taxes (Hibbs 1987, 280–87, 296–326). Despite its questionable logic, the sheer novelty of the idea gave Reagan greater leeway in budgetary politics than the public normally would have accepted (Modigliani and Modigliani 1987; Peterson 1985). As a result, he was able to undertake a rapid military buildup while providing an enormous financial windfall to the upper class. He had only a brief window of opportunity before supply-side economics was discredited by staggering budget deficits, but in that time he succeeded in defying the electoral logic that usually precludes politicians from simultaneously exploding the debt and making the structure of taxation significantly more regressive.

Second, Reagan took advantage of the fact that, following the turmoil of the 1970s, the Federal Reserve was determined to restore price stability at any cost (Hibbs 1987, 287–89). Its decision to raise interest rates to extraordinarily high levels created a severe recession in 1981–82, but it also allowed the president to overstimulate the economy without having to worry about inflation. If the Federal Reserve had not had the occasion to take such drastic action, Reagan’s deficit spending would likely have sparked inflation, and

¹⁵ Hogan (1998, 367–68) emphasizes that both Truman and Eisenhower opposed deficit spending, but he neglects the gulf in their willingness to increase taxation to pay for defense.

¹⁶ Sectoral interests also had a critical impact on partisan preferences over rearmament in the 1980s, since Republican states in the South and West had more defense industries and stronger export prospects than Democratic states in the Northeast (Trubowitz 1998, chap. 4).

the Republican elite would quickly have become disenchanted with rearmament. In short, the convergence of events that made the Reagan buildup possible was so unusual that such an outcome is unlikely to be repeated, at least not on the same scale. This case contradicts the theory's base prediction, but it is an exception that proves the rule.

CONCLUSION

Aside from one revealing outlier, there is a clear empirical regularity in the history of democratic great powers' responses to grave international threats: Leftist coalitions have been much more likely to undertake massive increases in defense spending than parties on the right. Conservative governments' attempts to rearm were consistently inhibited by their unwillingness to raise taxes on the wealthy and inability to raise taxes on the poor, as well as by their opposition to the kind of controls and regulation that were needed to deal with problems caused by the rapid mobilization of societal resources. In contrast, labor governments found that demands for rearmament created opportunities for progressive tax reform and the expansion of state power over markets. The left has not been overly predisposed to trade security for social welfare programs, whereas the right has often been willing to sacrifice military preparedness for the sake of tax cuts. In the only case that the theory fails to explain, the United States in the late Cold War, conservatives managed the extraordinary feat of enacting both tax cuts and rearmament simultaneously.

The Reagan buildup demonstrates that ideology cannot automatically be dismissed as a potential intervening variable in the political economy of rearmament. However, it does not indicate that Keynesian ideas, rather than class interests, have been the primary causal force behind partisan differences over responses to threat. Quite to the contrary, in all of the cases covered here except France under Blum and the United States under Roosevelt, the left was nearly as concerned with fiscal orthodoxy as the right. For example, in Great Britain in the late 1930s, Conservatives paid for their limited rearmament primarily with loans, while Labourites countered that the program should be greatly extended and that progressive tax increases should be used to fund it. As future party leader Hugh Gaitskell argued, they could "not only concentrate on winning the war, but also on achieving a greater equalization of income, national income control, and avoid increasing the National debt" (Toye 2001, 320).¹⁷ In short, governments' ability to rearm depended far less on their tolerance for deficit spending than their class interests.

These results have three broad implications for international relations theory. First, they tear down long-held stereotypes about class coalitions' relative willingness to prepare for war. The conventional wis-

dom, that the left is weak on defense, has been reinforced by politicians at both ends of the political spectrum. Leftist parties often declaim the evils of militarism, while the right usually emphasizes its commitment to facing foreign aggression from a position of strength. When the level of international threat is low or moderate, such rhetoric may correspond well to parties' actual policy choices. Partisan disagreement over marginal changes in defense spending may be influenced by a variety of factors, including sectoral interests and the politicization of the military. However, in times of great danger, class cleavages over taxation and economic controls dictate a full reversal in politicians' positions over arms production.

Second, this study seeks to wrest the concept of class interests from the dying clutches of Marxism. Though class is often used as an independent variable in comparative politics and international political economy, it has been almost universally ignored in mainstream security studies. Given the glaring errors of Marxist theories of imperialism, this neglect is not entirely surprising, but it is nevertheless an overreaction. Class is by no means the organizing principle of international politics, as Marxists assert, but its impact on great powers' responses to foreign threats puts it squarely in the middle of some of the most prominent cases of twentieth-century foreign policy. Two recent works by historians also testify to the importance of class interests in great power diplomacy. Niall Ferguson (1994) argues that German conservatives' unwillingness to accept progressive tax reforms to pay for rearmament against Russia prompted their leaders' decision to provoke a preventive war in 1914, while Bruce Kent (1989) demonstrates that British and French conservatives' opposition to progressive taxation motivated their demands for an enormous indemnity on Germany after the war. In short, the deficiencies of Marxism are no excuse to assume the irrelevance of class interests in security studies.

Finally, the existence of partisan cleavages over great powers' responses to grave external threats directly challenges the common assumption that states can be treated as unitary actors pursuing objective "national interests." The cases addressed here, in which the provision of security was both a public good and an urgent necessity, should have been most likely to fit this analytic ideal, yet they clearly did not. In periods of critical military weakness, British, French, and American grand strategy was highly politicized, serving parochial interests as much as national ones. All governments try to find some way to secure their state from foreign threats, but their choice of arms, alliances, or appeasement is profoundly influenced by the material preferences of their domestic coalitions.

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¹⁷ On Labour's ambivalence toward Keynesianism in the 1930s, see Booth 1996, 17–21.

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Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules

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We investigate the differential effects of open versus closed amendment rules within the framework of a distributive model of legislative bargaining. The data show that there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the open amendment rule, the proposer gets a larger share of the benefits than coalition members under both rules, and play converges toward minimal winning coalitions under the closed amendment rule. However, there are important quantitative differences between the theoretical model underlying the experiment (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) and data, as the frequency of minimal winning coalitions is much greater under the closed rule (the theory predicts minimal winning coalitions under both rules for our parameter values) and the distribution of benefits between coalition members is much more egalitarian than predicted. The latter are consistent with findings from shrinking pie bilateral bargaining game experiments in economics, to which we relate our results.

One of the fundamental questions legislatures deal with is how to allocate government resources between constituencies that have different and sometimes conflicting preferences. The formal rules under which this legislative bargaining process takes place are universally recognized to play a major role in the budget allocation process, both within the specialized standing committees assigned to draft legislation and within the parent legislature itself. Although no legislative bargaining model can fully capture the complex nature of this bargaining process, at a minimum it is important to distinguish between situations where a proposal can be amended many times before being brought to a vote (open amendment rule) and situations where the agenda setter exercises greater control and manages to bring unamended proposals to the floor (closed amendment rule).

A good deal of theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to understanding the basis for legislatures ceding substantial authority to specialized standing committees and to the impact of the amendment

rules these committees adopt on legislative outcomes. One branch of the literature involves distributive models of the bargaining process, which postulate that legislative processes are organized in such a way as to facilitate rent extraction. As a result committees are usually composed of members who have the most to gain from the committees actions, with the rules under which legislation is brought to the floor having a substantial impact on the extent of this rent extraction.

The question posed in the experiment reported here is, Do these legislative rules—open versus closed amendment rules—of and by themselves have the impact that the literature suggests? Do closed amendment rules favor minimum winning coalitions with proposers obtaining greater benefits than under open amendment rules? Do open amendment rules facilitate a more widespread and egalitarian distribution of benefits and lead to greater delays in the legislative bargaining process? Answers to these questions are of growing practical importance, as recent years have seen a sharp increase in the application of some sort of restrictive amendment rules attached to legislation in the United States Congress.¹ Answers to these questions have significant implications for the efficiency of the legislative bargaining process. For example, Baron (1991) argues that open amendment rules tend to limit inefficient pork barrel legislation compared to closed amendment rules. Substantially farther afield, and much broader in its implications, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that open versus closed amendment rules have implications for whether or not national governments will have balanced budgets, along with the overall composition of those budgets.

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Research support from the Economics Division and the DRMS Divisions of NSF and the University of Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged. We have benefited from comments by David Cooper, Massimo Morelli, Jack Ochis, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Harvard University, Indiana University, ITAM, Université de Montréal, Université du Québec à Montréal, University of Pittsburgh, Joseph L. Rotman School, University of Toronto, Ohio State University, Texas A&M University, Tilburg University CENTER, Western Michigan University, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, the 2000 Public Choice Meetings, the 2000 Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics, the 2000 Econometric Society World Congress meetings, and the CEA 35th Annual Meetings. We are responsible for all remaining errors.

¹ Rules for considering legislation in the House of Representatives changed from primarily simple open rules in the mid-1970s to frequently restrictive and complex rules by the mid-1980s; 15% of the bills in the 95th Congress (1977–78) were subject to restrictive rules, with this proportion increasing steadily over the years so that by 1991–92, 66% of the bills were subject to some sort of restrictive amendment rules (Sinclair 1995).

Experiments provide a direct and powerful tool for investigating the differential effect of open versus closed amendment rules. In the laboratory we are able to create a controlled environment in which the only difference between treatments is the amendment rule in place. Our experiment is conducted within the framework of the Baron–Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining, which yields strong qualitative and quantitative differences contingent on the amendment rule adopted. We implement the model in terms of a “divide the dollar” game with majority rule and an infinite time horizon.

The present paper is, to our knowledge, the first experimental comparison of open versus closed amendment rules in the legislative bargaining process. Although there have been other experimental investigations of the Baron–Ferejohn model, these have both involved strictly closed amendment rule procedures (Diermeier and Morton, 2000; McKelvey 1991). We compare our results, where appropriate, with results from these other experiments in the main body of the text.

THEORETICAL MODEL AND PREDICTIONS

The Baron–Ferejohn (1989) (hereafter BF) model is intended to reflect, in a stylized manner, the sequential nature of proposal making, amending, and voting in legislative settings, modeling it as a noncooperative, multisession game. The legislature consists of (1) n members, each representing a legislative district, (2) a recognition rule that determines the standing proposal in each round of the election, (3) an amendment rule, and (4) a voting rule. “Members” can be thought of as either individuals or unified blocks of legislators who have the same preferences.

The legislature allocates a fixed quantity of divisible benefits among legislative districts according to majority rule, with no side payments. Each member is assumed to have risk-neutral preferences that depend only on the benefits allocated to their district. Preferences and legislative rules are assumed to be common knowledge, with all actions observable, so that the model involves perfect information.

In our experiment we employ a random recognition rule, with each legislator having an equally likely chance of having her proposal recognized and voted on. BF recognize that random recognition rules are not generally observed in real legislatures but employ it in their benchmark model since (i) some rule must be employed, and (ii) under the random recognition rule proposer power is the same for all members, so that it serves as a benchmark against which to assess more complicated recognition rules.

At the beginning of an election each member i has a probability $p_i = 1/n$ of being recognized and, if recognized, makes a proposal specifying how benefits will be distributed. A proposal x^i is a distribution $x^i = (x_1^i, \dots, x_n^i)$ such that $\sum_{j=1}^n x_j^i \leq 1$, where x_j^i is the share that i allocates to voter j . This proposal is then the

motion on the floor. The status quo corresponds to no allocation of benefits, $x = (0, \dots, 0)$.

Under a closed amendment rule the motion is voted on immediately. If the proposal is approved the legislature adjourns. If not, the legislature moves to the next round and the process repeats itself. This process repeats itself until a proposed distribution receives a majority vote.

Under an open amendment rule another member, $j \neq i$, is recognized with probability $p_j = \frac{1}{(n-1)}$ who may either amend the proposal or move the previous question. Moving the previous question brings the proposal on the floor to an immediate vote.² If the proposed distribution is approved, the legislature adjourns; if it is rejected, the legislature moves to the next round and the process repeats itself.

An amendment involves a substitute distribution of benefits. BF consider a simple open rule allowing no more than one amendment at a time on the floor. If an amendment is offered, there is a runoff election between the amendment and the standing proposal. If the amendment fails, the proposal remains on the floor and the next round begins with further opportunity for amendment or moving the previous question. If the amendment wins the runoff election, it becomes the standing proposal and the next round begins with further opportunity for amendment or moving the previous question. This process repeats itself until a proposed distribution receives a majority vote.

If members fail to vote for a proposal that gives them a sufficiently large positive share of the benefits, they run the risk that in the next round a proposal will be passed allocating no benefits, or smaller benefits, to their district. If the proposed share is at least as large as can be expected from future rounds, members vote in favor of the proposal. Otherwise they vote against it. Because the legislature may not distribute benefits in the first round, time preferences may play a role in voting. BF assume that members have a common discount factor $\delta \leq 1$, which reflects the political imperative from reelection concerns to distribute benefits sooner rather than later. Alternatively, δ may represent the probability that a member will not be reelected to office in the next round. In the experiment we employ a discount factor $\delta = 0.8$ and $n = 5$.

There are multiple Nash equilibria for this game and multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The solution concept that generates unique predictions for the game is that of stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SSPE). This is a refinement of subgame perfection for which the strategies are time independent. BF argue that nonstationary equilibria involve overly complex (history dependent) strategies, whereas the unique SSPE is supported by relatively simple strategies. Table 1 provides the point predictions for the SSPE with our parameter values for a legislative session that continues indefinitely until a final allocation of benefits is achieved.

² BF note that ending the amendment process once a motion has been seconded differs somewhat from typical congressional usage but employ this representation as a simplifying device.

TABLE 1. Theoretical Predictions for Stationary Subgame Equilibrium Outcome with Five Subjects and a Discount Factor of 0.8

Prediction	Closed Rule	Open Rule
Number of voters receiving a positive payoff besides the proposer	2	2
Number of voters receiving zero payoff	2	2
Share to the proposer (\$ amount, round 1)	0.68 (\$17)	0.52 (\$13)
Share to each coalition member (\$ amount, round 1)	0.16 (\$4)	0.24 (\$6)
Probability of proposal being approved in round 1	1	0.5

The closed rule always predicts a minimal winning coalition. Shares of coalition members are determined by the proposer providing payments just equal to the expected value of rejecting the proposed distribution rather than coalition partners taking their chances in later rounds of being the proposer and, if not, being excluded from the winning coalition. Under the SSPE benefits are always allocated in the first round.

Under the open rule, and our parameters values, the model also predicts a minimal winning coalition. Noncoalition members, if recognized in the seconding/amendment process will, of course, amend the proposal: hence the 50% probability that the proposal will be accepted in round 1. However, given the discount rate and the number of legislators, it does not pay, in an expected value sense, for the proposer to try and buy off these votes. The share of benefits that coalition members receive is larger than under the closed rule since rejection of a proposal is less costly (in expected value), because should they be excluded from future coalitions, voters have a chance to amend these later proposals.

EXPERIMENT 1

Experimental Design

Five subjects were recruited for each experimental session. The amendment rule remained constant within a given experimental session but differed between sessions (four closed rule and four open rule sessions).³ To minimize the possibility of repeated play game effects, at the start of each election each of the five "legislators" was randomly assigned a new subject number, which was known only to that legislator and changed across elections (but not between rounds of a given election). The number of elections (15) was announced at the start of each session.

Procedures were as follows. First, all subjects filled out a proposal form for allocating the \$25.00. After these forms were collected, a roll of a five-sided die determined the standing proposal. This proposal, along with the subject number of the proposer, was posted on the blackboard so that, prior to the voting, subjects

saw the amount of money allocated to themselves and to every other voter.


In closed rule sessions each subject immediately voted on the proposed allocation. If a simple majority accepted the proposal, the payoff was implemented and the election ended. If the proposal was rejected, the process repeated itself *after* applying the discount rate of 0.8 to the total benefits. (Discounting was done by the experimenters, with the total amount of money to be allocated in the next round posted on the blackboard.) Voting results were posted on the blackboard underneath each proposal. These consisted of the total number of votes for and against the proposal but not the votes of individual electors. The blackboard contained information for each of the last several elections.

In open rule sessions, after a proposal was selected, each legislator completed a form either seconding or amending the proposal. If amending a proposal voters were required to propose an alternative distribution of the benefits provided. Although "seconding" forms were collected from everyone (to preserve the identity of the proposer), a roll of a four-sided die determined which legislator, other than the proposer, would be recognized. If the proposal was seconded, an election was held following the same procedures as in the closed rule sessions. If the proposal was amended, the amendment was posted on the blackboard along with the original proposal, and a runoff election was held. The winner of the runoff election became the standing proposal in the next round of the election. Benefits following a runoff election were subject to discounting, so that following a runoff the dollar amounts of the standing proposal were multiplied by 0.8, with the total amount to be allocated posted as well. Election in open rule sessions continued in this way until a proposal was seconded and approved by a simple majority.

Subjects were recruited through announcements in undergraduate classes and advertisements in student newspapers at the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie-Mellon University. This resulted in recruiting a broad cross section of graduate and undergraduate students from both campuses. At the end of each experimental session four elections were randomly selected, with subjects paid the sum of their earnings in these four elections. Subjects also received a participation fee of \$5.

In each session an additional subject was recruited to roll the dice to help assure subjects that the

³ The first session in each treatment had 10 elections. As it was immediately obvious that play was still evolving by election 10, we extended all subsequent sessions to 15 elections.

FIGURE 1. Proportion of Proposals Accepted in Round 1 (Four Sessions Up to Election 10, Three Sessions from Then On)

outcomes were indeed randomly determined. This subject received a fixed fee of \$15. Practice elections were held first to familiarize subjects with the procedures and accounting rules. All experimental sessions were conducted using pencil and paper. Copies of the instructions are posted on the Web site <http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/fklinstructions.pdf>.

Results

We report results in terms of a series of conclusions. This is followed by the data supporting the conclusions reached.

Conclusion 1. *Once voters gain some experience with the procedures, all proposals are accepted without delay under the closed amendment rule, and are accepted with delays under the open amendment rule, as the theory predicts. However, delays are less frequent than predicted under the open rule.*

Figure 1 reports the frequency at which proposals were accepted in round 1. This occurs in 96.4% (53/55) of the closed rule elections, close to the 100% the theory predicts, the two rejections both occurring early in a session. The open rule, on the other hand, exhibits failures to accept in round 1 throughout, with the failure rate averaging 25.5% (14/55) over all elections and 13.3% (2/15) over the last five elections. These differences between open and closed rules are significant at the 1% level ($Z = 3.245$) over all elections and are significant over the last five elections as well ($Z = 1.464$, $p < .10$).⁴ Nevertheless, the failure rate under the open amendment rule was much lower than the predicted 50%. As will be shown, the proximate cause for this is that supermajorities were the norm in these elections.

Conclusion 2. *Play begins with supermajorities under both closed and open amendment rules. With experience, play converges toward minimal winning coalitions*

under the closed amendment rule, but supermajorities remain the norm under the open rule.


Figure 2 provides Kernel density estimates of the sum of the two lowest offers in round 1 for the first and last five elections.⁵ Distributions are remarkably similar in the first five elections, with a single prominent peak near the \$10 level in both cases representing a near-egalitarian distribution of shares across voters. However, clear differences between treatments have emerged by the last five elections. Under the closed rule there is now a prominent peak near the \$0 level, as the theory predicts, and a much smaller peak around the \$10 level. In contrast, under the open rule there is a single prominent peak spanning the \$6–\$10 range. As a result the average sum of the two lowest offers over the last five elections is \$3.29 under the closed rule versus \$7.06 under the open rule ($p < .05$, Mann-Whitney test).

These different outcomes in the last five elections are supported by substantially different strategies for allocating the two lowest shares. These can be classified into the following three simple categories. (1) In the double zero (DZ) strategy, the sum of the two lowest offers is less than or equal to \$2.00 (e.g., an offer of \$9, \$7.50, \$7.50, \$0, \$1). Clearly, the \$1 share in this example is similar to a \$0 share, since voters receiving such shares always rejected them; see Figure 5. This strategy is employed in 65.3% (49/75) of the last five elections under the closed rule versus 4.0% (3/75) under the open rule. Further, a breakdown of offers within the DZ category shows that 51% (25/49) of them gave exactly two zeros to two voters, with 96% (47/49) of them giving at least one zero to one voter and \$1 or less to another voter. (2) In the single zero (SZ) strategy, one voter is allocated \$1 or less. This occurred almost exclusively under the open rule: 44.0% (33/75) of all open rule offers in the last five elections versus 4.0% (3/75) of closed rule offers. (Of the SZ offers under the open rule, 66.7% (22/33) provided one zero to one player.) (3) In equal

⁴ These tests use election as the unit of observation. The remaining tests reported use average amount offered by subject as the unit of observation. One-tailed tests are reported when the theory predicts a difference between treatments; two-tailed tests when there are no predicted differences.

⁵ All computations and estimations are performed using Stata 7. Kernel density estimates are obtained using the `kdensity` command and random-effects probits are estimated using the `xtprobit` command.

FIGURE 2. Kernel Density Estimates of the Sum of the Two Lowest Amounts Offered per Proposal Form in Round 1 (100 Observations for the First Five Elections and 75 for the Last Five)



split (ES) strategy, all voters are given at least \$4 in round 1. This occurred 29.3% (22/75) of the time under the closed rule, compared to 40.0% (30/75) under the open rule, in the last five elections (54.6% [12/22] of these offering perfectly equal splits under the closed rule; 23.3% [7/30] under the open rule).

Conclusion 3. *Proposers' take starts out nearly the same under both amendment rules. However, proposers' take grows substantially under the closed amendment rule, averaging between \$9 and \$10 in the last five elections. This growth under the closed rule results from the increased frequency of minimal winning coalitions. In contrast, there is an immediate decline in proposers' take under the open rule, with allocations quickly converging on the \$6–\$7 level and staying there.*

Figure 3 shows the share that proposers allocated to themselves in round 1. Notice that both the open and the closed rules start with virtually the same share for the proposer in elections 1 and 2. There is substantial and continuous growth in the average share proposers give themselves under the closed rule. But there is an immediate decline in average proposers' share under the open rule, with shares stabilizing at the \$6–\$7 level after the second election. The null hypothesis that proposers allocate the same amount to themselves under open and closed rules is soundly rejected in the last five elections ($p < .01$, Mann–Whitney test).



The growth in the average share proposers take for themselves under the closed rule results directly from

the increased frequency with which they follow the DZ strategy, which grows more or less continuously, averaging 11.1% (4/36) in the first two elections and 73.3% (22/30) in the last two elections. In contrast, the share proposers take for themselves, conditional on playing the DZ strategy, remains essentially the same, around \$10, from election five on (see Figure 4). This results in the steady growth in the share proposers take for themselves, reported in Figure 3.

Conclusion 4. *Proposers receive a uniformly larger share of the benefits than coalition members under both closed and open amendment rules so that we can reject a null hypothesis of an equal proportionate distribution between proposers and other coalition members under both amendment rules. Nevertheless, proposers take well below the SSPE prediction in both cases.*

Looking at accepted offers, under the closed rule the proposer takes on average \$8.30 for him- or herself, while the *next highest* average share is \$6.62. Under the open rule the average take by the proposer is \$6.21, while the *next highest* average share is \$5.47. In both cases, using a sign test (Snedecor and Cochran 1980), the null hypothesis that the median of the differences between the proposer's share and the share offered to anyone else is zero can be rejected at the 1% level.

Conclusion 5. *Voting patterns show a clear bifurcation, with round 1 shares below \$4 always rejected under both rules and shares at or above \$5 almost always*

FIGURE 3. Average Amount the Proposer Takes for Him- or Herself in Round 1 (20 Observations per Election Up to Election 10 and 15 from Then On)**FIGURE 4. Closed Rule: Proportion of Subjects Playing the DZ Strategy (Panel 1) and Share They Take for Themselves (Panel 2) (20 Observations per Election Up to Election 10 and 15 from Then On)**

accepted. Regressions show that subjects vote primarily on the basis of their own share of the benefits, with minimal concern for the shares of the least well-off and for their share compared to the proposer's take.

Figure 5 shows votes, by shares offered, in round 1, excluding the votes of proposers themselves. Under the closed rule shares of less than \$4 are always voted against (66/66). Votes change rather dramatically for offers of \$4–\$4.99, with 69.4% (25/36) of these offers accepted and virtually all offers greater than or equal to \$5 accepted (113/118). There is a similar pattern under the open rule, with all offers less than \$4 rejected (17/17), 91.3% (42/46) of all \$4–\$4.99 offers accepted, and all offers greater than or equal to \$5 accepted (101/101).

Table 2 reports estimates of the following voting equation:

$$vote_{it} = 1\{\beta_0 + \beta_1 s_{it} + \beta_2 PS_{it} + \beta_3 DZ_{it} + \alpha_i + v_{it} \geq 0\}, \quad (1)$$

where $1\{\cdot\}$ is an indicator function that takes the value


one if the left-hand side of the inequality inside the braces is greater than or equal to zero and the value zero otherwise. Explanatory variables include own share (s_{it}); DZ, an indicator variable taking value one if the DZ strategy is on the floor; and the share the proposer takes (PS). (Since the DZ strategy did not take the floor in the open rule, an indicator variable for SZ is included.) The equation is estimated using a random effects probit, with a one-way subject error component for all rounds. The sign of the coefficient (presented in Table 2) for own share is positive, large in value relative to the other coefficients, and statistically significant in both treatments. The coefficients for both the DZ and the SZ strategies, and for proposer's share (PS), do not achieve statistical significance. The implication is that subjects are voting primarily out of concern for their own share of the benefits, with limited concern for the shares of the least well-off and for the proposer's share.⁶

⁶ Limiting the analysis to round 1 votes, PS is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in the closed rule. (In round 1 of the open

TABLE 2. Random Effect Probit Estimates of the Voting Equation (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Independent Variable	Experiment 1		Experiment 2, Computer (Closed)
	Closed	Open	
Share	91.398** (37.525)	23.488*** (5.789)	21.442*** (3.013)
PS (proposer's share)	-19.618 (13.659)	-5.693 (5.078)	-3.126* (1.623)
DZ (DZ strategy on floor)	2.228 (5.688)		-0.287 (0.432)
SZ (SZ strategy on floor)		-0.688 (0.679)	
Constant	-7.948** (3.235)	-0.640 (1.447)	-1.998** (0.837)
Observations	228	220	284
Number of subjects	20	20	14

Note: Statistically significant at the *1%, **5%, and ***10% level

FIGURE 5. Accepted and Rejected Offers in Round 1

rule there exists a perfect fit with all shares greater than 0.16 accepted, so that the normality assumption underlying the probit regression is not satisfied.) The results are robust to alternative specifications such as replacing DZ (or SZ) and PS with a summary measure of inequality such as the effective number of parties (enpv); i.e., whenever PS or DZ is statistically significant, so is enpv, and if neither is significant, neither is enpv. The disaggregated measures of inequality help to pinpoint the precise inequality factors at work.

Conclusion 6. *Seconding and amending patterns in the open rule sessions followed the voting pattern reported in Figure 5. Further, when proposing amendments, the two worst-off voters typically receive increased shares.*

Any time a voter was allocated a share of less than \$4, he or she chose to amend the round 1 proposal (35/35 cases). In contrast, in 45.0% (9/20) of the cases where a voter was allocated \$4, he or she voted to second the motion, and offers greater than \$4 and less than \$5 were almost always seconded (94.3% of all cases; 33/35), as were offers of more than \$5 (seconded 98% of the time; 100/102).⁷ Further, when proposing amendments, in all but one instance, amenders offered the two worst-off subjects improved shares (typically, themselves and one other subject). Subjects were not immediately successful in creating amendments that would win a runoff election: In the first five elections, only 53.3% offered improved shares to at least two other voters beside themselves. However, they learned to create more successful amendments, with improved shares offered to at least two other voters 84.2% of the time in the last five elections.

Discussion

The results of Expt 1 provide clear qualitative support for the BF model, as (1) proposals pass without delay under closed amendment rules, but there are delays under the open rule, as voters left out of the coalition amend the standing proposal, (2) there is a more equal distribution of benefits among coalition members under the open compared to the closed amendment rule, and (3) proposers get a significantly larger share of the benefits than coalition members (and substantially larger shares than the average "legislator") under both amendment rules.⁸ Further,

⁷ Voting patterns closely follow amendment patterns, with all those who seconded a proposal voting in favor of it and 95.1% of amenders voting against a proposal if it was seconded.

⁸ Diermeier and Morton (2000) examine allocations under a closed amendment rule in a finitely lived legislature, with members having

there is convergence toward minimal winning coalitions under the closed amendment rule, as the SSPE predicts.

There are, however, major quantitative deviations from the SSPE. These are twofold. First, for our parameter values, under the open rule the SSPE predicts a minimal winning coalition. This did not occur. Rather, play converged on supermajority coalitions. As a result, round 1 proposals were seconded and passed at a frequency higher than predicted in open rule sessions. Second, within the closed rule sessions, there was a much more equal distribution of shares among coalition members than the theory predicts, even conditioning on DZ allocations.⁹

These quantitative deviations from the SSPE are entirely consistent with deviations from subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes observed in bilateral bargaining game experiments. The main insight from this literature is that responders in bilateral bargaining games have some minimal threshold for the share of the pie that they are willing to accept, which is typically well above the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, and that they consistently reject offers below this threshold. For example, in the ultimatum game responders consistently reject offers below 30%–40% of the pie, even though the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction calls for accepting any allocation short of zero.¹⁰ In anticipation of such responses proposers offer a substantial share of the pie, with median returns to responders of about 40% of the pie (see Roth 1995 for a review of this literature).¹¹

Similar results occur in our game: Responders typically reject offers below \$5, and proposers, anticipating this, typically fail to ask for anything approaching the SSPE. As a result, under the open amendment rule it actually pays (in an expected value sense) to play the ES and the SZ strategies as opposed to the DZ strategy, *conditional on what proposers were actually asking for*. The average return for proposers under the ES and SZ

strategies was \$6.14 and \$6.12, respectively. This compares to an expected return from the DZ strategy of \$5.03 using the average share that DZ proposers asked for under the open rule (\$8.48) or \$6.03 using the average share that DZ proposers asked for in the last five elections under the closed rule (\$10.37).¹² Thus, conditional on what proposers felt comfortable asking for, there was little chance for the DZ strategy to emerge naturally under the open rule.¹³

These more equal shares between coalition members (relative to the SSPE predicted outcome) are also consistent with the deviations from subgame perfection reported in bilateral bargaining game experiments. However, minimal winning coalitions still tend to emerge under closed amendment rules as proposers learn to give zero and have impunity from the two voters excluded from the coalition. Further, coalition members have few compulsions about voting against such proposals as long as their share of the pie is sufficiently large. This last result is information about tastes for “fairness,” which obviously cannot be discovered from bilateral bargaining game experiments.¹⁴

One question that Expt 1 leaves open is why proposer shares do not converge closer to the SSPE in the closed rule sessions. Looking at voting records it is clear that (i) zero shares to noncoalition members do not significantly jeopardize the chances for a proposal passing and (ii) based on votes for \$5 shares, the expected payoff (in round 1) for a \$15, \$5, \$5 proposal is \$13.38. The latter is reasonably close to the SSPE and is considerably higher than the mean proposer share of \$10.37 for DZ proposals in the last five elections. Yet there are virtually no proposals of \$15, \$5, \$5 in the last five elections.¹⁵

Given the large adjustments in behavior under the closed rule, it may well be that, with more elections, play would move closer to the SSPE. Further, it is clear that it is a lot easier, and less risky, for a proposer to recognize that he or she can give zero shares to a minority of voters under the closed rule than to fine-tune shares within a minimal winning coalition. Experiment 2 explores these possibilities.

unequal recognition probabilities and unequal vote shares. They report finding no evidence of proposer power, including one treatment with very equal vote shares (34/99; 33/99, 32/99). We have substantially more observations than they do to identify proposer power, and the experimental designs are very different. This makes reconciling their results with ours problematic without further experimentation.

⁹ McKelvey (1991) also finds a more equal distribution of benefits between coalition partners than the BF model predicts under closed amendment rule procedures. In his experiment there are three voters choosing between three or four predetermined allocations, resulting in a mixed strategy equilibrium.

¹⁰ In the ultimatum game a proposer has a fixed sum of money to allocate between him- or herself and the responder. If the proposed allocation is accepted, it is binding. If it is rejected, both players receive nothing. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction for this game (under the assumption that bargainers seek only to maximize own income) is that the proposers will receive all the money (or almost all of it if payoffs are discrete). These experiments typically employ stakes similar to those used here. However, the results extend to much higher-stakes experiments as well (see, e.g., Slonim and Roth 1999).

¹¹ Dictator game experiments, in which player 2 has no opportunity to reject player 1's offer, result in a wholesale reduction in offers to player 2 (Forsythe et al. 1994), ruling out altruism to explain these results.

¹² These counterfactual computations assume that (i) an amendment, once it is proposed, always beats the proposal on the floor, (ii) any proposal, once it is seconded, will be passed, (iii) a DZ amendment always completely excludes the previous proposer (which is what amenders did), and (iv) only a DZ amendment can beat a DZ proposal. This last assumption is the most restrictive, but it helps make the computations manageable and is based on the assumption that the amender must provide at least one member of the original coalition a superior payoff to win his or her vote.

¹³ For the open rule it is also probably much more salient that there is a 50% chance of one's proposal failing under the DZ strategy and getting zero, compared to a 25% chance under the SZ strategy and 0% chance under the ES strategy.

¹⁴ This lack of concern for players receiving minimal or zero shares, provided own share is large enough, has been reported for three-person ultimatum games (Güth and van Damme 1998).

¹⁵ These proposals are reasonably secure as well, with an 87% probability of passing. In contrast, the expected (round 1) payoff to a proposer under the SSPE is \$7.76, as \$4 shares are much more likely to be rejected.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experimental Design

Two basic changes were made in the procedures for Expt 2 in an effort to see if play would converge closer to the SSPE under the closed rule. First, the number of elections was increased from 15 to 25 to give play more time to evolve. Second, we attempted to speed up the learning/adjustment process as follows: Each experimental session employed six subjects, five student "legislators," as before, and a sixth legislator, an economics graduate student, who, it was announced, "has been instructed to make proposals and to vote according to a computer algorithm." The computer algorithm called for maximizing the proposer's share from the following two alternatives: (i) a proposal of \$10, \$8, \$7, \$0, \$0, with the proposer's amount listed first¹⁶ or (ii) take the highest proposal passed to date, add \$2 to the proposer's share, and give equal shares to two coalition members and zero shares to the two non-coalition members.¹⁷ As a voter, the graduate student approved any proposal that gave her a share at least as large as the SSPE (0.16) and voted against any smaller share. The nature of the computer's strategy, and who the graduate student was, were *not* announced.¹⁸ With the "computer" in the mix we stood a good chance of having proposals reach the floor that came closer to the SSPE than any proposal in Expt 1. The fate of such proposals, whether they were accepted or rejected and, if accepted, whether other voters would make similar or more extreme proposals, should provide insight into the likelihood of play ever converging, on its own, to the shares predicted within minimal winning coalitions under the SSPE.

Payments were made for six elections, selected at random at the end of the session. As before an additional subject was recruited to act as dice roller for all random decisions. Three sessions were conducted using inexperienced subjects drawn from the same subject population as for Expt 1.

Results

The main results from Expt 2 can be summarized as follows.

1. After the first five elections, 85% (51/60) of all proposals were passed in round 1 in Expt 2, compared to 100% (35/35) in Expt 1. These rejections were largely the result of "computer"-generated proposals at (or close to) the SSPE (three such cases with DZ allocations and \$4 or \$4.50 allocations to coalition members) and a number of cases (four) where subjects' own proposals gave more to the proposer than had typically been observed in Expt 1.

2. The growth in the proportion of DZ proposals closely matches the pattern reported in Expt 1, with no significant differences between the two experiments in any consecutive set of three elections.¹⁹ However, the proportion of DZ strategies continued to grow after election 15, averaging 78.4% (29/37) in the last three elections, compared to 71.1% (32/45) in the last three elections in Expt 1. Although this difference is not statistically significant, there was a large increase in the percentage of strict DZ allocations (giving \$0 to two voters), from 42.2% (19/45) in the last three elections in Expt 1 to 75.7% (28/37) in Expt 2 ($Z = -3.05, p < .01$). The ES strategy declines continuously in Expt 2 and has essentially vanished by election 13. In contrast, the ES strategy never dropped below 20% in Expt 1 and is significantly higher in elections 13–15 compared to the same elections in Expt 2 (26.7% [12/45] vs 0% [0/37]; $Z = 3.44, p < .01$).

3. The amount the proposer takes grows steadily in Expt 2, with virtually the same growth pattern as in Expt 1.²⁰ However, share proposed to self continues to grow in Expt 2 so that in round 1 of the last three elections it averaged \$12.05, compared to \$9.22 in Expt 1 ($p < .01$, Mann–Whitney test).

4. Voting patterns are quite similar to those reported in Expt 1, with all shares less than \$4 rejected in both cases and almost all shares of \$5 or more accepted (95.8% [113/118] in Expt 1 vs 93.6% [117/125] in Expt 2). Estimates from the voting equation (1) for Expt 2 reported in the last column in Table 2 show that own share is the dominant factor influencing voting for or against a proposal (accounting for 92% of the variance explained in the data), with proposers' share having a negative, and statistically significant, impact on the probability of voting for a proposal ($p < .10$).²¹ Pooling the closed rule data from Expt 1 with the data from Expt 2, and adding a dummy variable to the voting equation (1) to distinguish between the two data sets, indicates that we *cannot* reject a null hypothesis that voting patterns are the same at anything approaching conventional significance levels.²² We do note, however, that

¹⁶ Alternative (i) was chosen from the more extreme, but common set of values observed in Expt 1, in order not to give the "computer's" strategy away and to avoid possible demand induced effects. Postexperiment questioning of subjects indicated that they were unable to identify the computer's proposals successfully. The introduction of the "computer's" strategy formally eliminates the SSPE. However, given that behavior is subject to a strong trial-and-error adjustment process, we have introduced changes that should push behavior closer to the SSPE, which is what Expt 2 is designed to achieve.

¹⁷ If the computer's proposal was rejected once, it was repeated. If it was rejected twice, the proposer added \$1 (instead of \$2) to the highest proposal passed to date.

¹⁸ The graduate student was paid a flat fee for helping, was a classmate of the experimenters who would not stand out from other participants, and was willing and able to help out. No one inquired regarding who was following the computer algorithm, what they were paid, or what the algorithm was.

¹⁹ Mann–Whitney tests where the unit of observation is subject value data for three consecutive elections (i.e., elections 1–3 and 4–6).

²⁰ Outside of elections 4–6, when proposers ask for a higher share in Expt 2, there are no significant differences between the two in any consecutive set of three elections.

²¹ In contrast, looking at round 1 votes, DZ is negative and statistically significant ($p < .10$) and PS is negative but becomes statistically insignificant. These two variables are highly colinear. These results are computed excluding one outlier subject. Including that subject affects the result by leaving only own share and the constant as statistically significant regressors.

²² This holds for round 1 data and is robust to all the specifications employed.

in the three elections in Expt 2 in which the computer proposed the SSPE allocation or close to it, none of the coalition members voted in favor of the proposed allocations.

Conclusion 7. *Experiment 2 shows somewhat closer conformity to the SSPE than Expt 1 in that proposers take larger shares and there is increased frequency of DZ (and strict DZ) allocations and virtual elimination of ES allocations. However, proposed allocations are still substantially more equal than the SSPE predicts, and in the three elections closest to the SSPE allocation, coalition members all rejected the small shares provided.*

Discussion

The rejections of \$4–\$4.50 shares in Expt 2 associated with the SSPE (or near-SSPE) allocations imply that play has little if any chance of converging to the SSPE on its own, as these proposals have essentially no chance of receiving a majority vote. As such it is highly unlikely that they would be proposed often enough to get voters to accept such small shares (see, e.g., Roth and Erev 1995). This still leaves the possibility of convergence close to the SSPE, e.g., a \$15, \$5, \$5 allocation. This proposal was offered three times by the computer and passed in all cases. Further, based on votes for \$5 shares observed in Expt 2, this proposal has an expected return to the proposer (in round 1) of \$14.63, with about a 98% chance of passing. But here too we observed no spontaneous proposals of this sort so that it remains an open question if even more experience would result in such proposals emerging.

What is left unexplained from Expt 2 is the relative role of more elections versus the “computer” proposals in pushing play closer to the SSPE. Over the first 15 elections there are minimal differences in the frequency of DZ play and in the shares proposers take for themselves between the two experiments, so the existence of the computer proposals appears to have had no effect on these dimensions. Where the computer proposals may have had an effect is in the near-complete elimination of ES (equal split) proposals by election 13 in Expt 2, compared to a sizable remanent (26.7%) in Expt 1.²³ What, if any role, the near-complete elimination of ES proposals played in the adjustments over the last 10 elections in Expt 2 is unknown. But it may have sped up these adjustments.

²³ One question raised by Expt 2 is that perhaps subjects’ awareness of the computer’s presence fundamentally altered their behavior. Although we have no direct evidence on this point, Winter and Zamir (1999) report results from an ultimatum game experiment in which a significant proportion of the subject population was played by computers making relatively unequal offers as well as accepting such offers. They report minimal differences between treatments where subjects were told of the computers and their strategy versus when they were not told. The minimal differences in proposer behavior over the first 15 elections in Expts 1 and 2, and the similarities in voting patterns between the two experiments, suggest no systematic effect on behavior here as well.

CONCLUSIONS

The question underlying our experiment is whether the amendment process—open versus closed amendment rules—can, of and by itself, have the impact on legislative outcomes that the literature suggests? That is, does a closed amendment rule favor minimum winning coalitions with proposers obtaining greater benefits than under an open amendment rule? Do open amendment rules facilitate a more widespread and egalitarian distribution of benefits and lead to greater delays in the legislative bargaining process?

Results from Expt 1 show that the amendment rules have the impact the literature suggests, as proposals under a closed amendment rule are more likely to pass immediately than under an open rule, and the share of benefits the proposer takes is substantially greater under the closed rule. Further, under both amendment rules proposers obtain a larger share of the benefits than do others’ allocated benefits, resulting in decisive rejection of a model where benefits are proportional to relative vote shares within the winning coalition (Gamson 1961).²⁴ Proposer power is a central implication of distributive models of the legislative bargaining process, such as the Baron–Ferejohn model, that underlies our experimental design.

There are, however, important quantitative differences between our results and the Baron–Ferejohn model underlying the experiment. For our parameter values the theory predicts minimal winning coalitions under open amendment rules. Instead we observe supermajorities which, at least as a proximate cause, can be attributed to proposers’ reluctance to ask for a large enough share that it pays to brave the 50% probability that their proposals will be amended. Instead proposers achieve higher expected returns from the more egalitarian distributions offered. In closed rule elections we observe a more egalitarian distribution of benefits among coalition members than the SSPE predicts. However, under the closed rule proposers have impunity from voting behavior of noncoalition members, and the additional resources that such impunity provides can be used both to increase the proposer’s share and to provide greater shares for coalition members. The latter increases the chances of the proposal being accepted. As a result proposers receive a much larger share in the closed rule elections, as the Baron–Ferejohn model predicts, with the institutional forces postulated as being responsible for these differences playing a major role. Only the details of how these institutional forces play themselves out differ from the theory’s characterization under the SSPE refinement.

Experiment 2 was designed to understand better the reasons why the distribution of benefits within winning coalitions was consistently more egalitarian than predicted under the closed amendment rule. To do this

²⁴ This simple proportionality rule—Gamson’s law—has some empirical support in field data (Browne and Fendreis 1980; Browne and Franklin 1973; Gamson 1961; Laver and Schofield 1990; Schofield and Laver 1985). Proportionality in field data is readily explained by an underlying game structure different from Baron–Ferejohn or, perhaps, by repeated play elements.

we increased the number of elections and introduced a “computer” player designed eventually to propose the SSPE. There is continued learning/adjustments in proposals in the extra elections, with behavior at the end of the experiment closer to the SSPE (i.e., increased frequency of minimal winning coalitions and larger benefits to proposers) than in Expt 1. However, the results also indicate that there are fundamental barriers to achieving the SSPE, as coalition members consistently reject the small share of benefits the theory predicts.

There are obvious connections between our results and the large experimental literature on shrinking-pie bilateral bargaining games (including the ultimatum game; Roth 1995 surveys the experimental literature). In the latter, play consistently deviates from the subgame perfect equilibrium in favor of a more equal distribution of benefits between bargainers. This in turn has led to the development of a literature designed to explain these deviations in terms of arguments other than own income in agents’ utility function, something commonly referred to as “fairness” considerations (see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt 1999, to cite a few of the more prominent attempts to organize the experimental data).²⁵

Fairness considerations appear to play an important role in our game as well, with subjects concerned primarily about receiving their “fair” share of any given allocation. One prominent focal point for the minimum acceptable share in our game would be $1/n$, or \$5 in round 1 (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In contrast, calculating the continuation value of the game as required under the SSPE is no doubt beyond the abilities of most of our subjects. Indeed, subjects appear to rely on this minimal “fair” allocation, as shares much below \$5 are routinely rejected in round 1, while shares at or above \$5 are usually accepted under both closed and open amendment rules. As such, under the closed rule subjects frequently reject offers at or slightly above the continuation value (\$4), while under the open rule subjects always accept \$5 offers even though these are below the continuation value (\$6).²⁶ Thus, a fundamental barrier to achieving the SSPE under the closed rule is that the rule of thumb voters rely on for their minimal “fair” share is greater than the SSPE for coalition partners. By the same token, one explanation for why play comes as close as it does to the SSPE in Experiment 2 is that the rule of thumb underlying votes is reasonably close to the continuation value of the SSPE. As a result, we would predict that factors that reduce the continuation value of the game relative to the $1/n$ focal point (for example, increasing the discount rate), or that complicate the game so that a simple focal point

no longer exists (such as unequal recognition probabilities or unequal voting shares), will result in greater deviations from the SSPE.

One prominent feature of our results related to the fairness literature in economics is the frequency of the DZ allocations in the closed amendment rule elections and the acceptance of these allocations. Clearly there is a strategic component to these DZ allocations, as, provided that coalition members get *their* “fair” share, they can be implemented with impunity, while simultaneously increasing the proposer’s share. With these DZ allocations, both proposers and coalition members largely ignore the shares of the two worst-off voters, contrary to the conclusions others have reached (see, e.g., Charness and Rabin 2000).

Although experiments provide the investigator with the opportunity to conduct direct qualitative and quantitative tests of theories where, unlike with field data, the institutional assumptions of the model are satisfied by construction, they too suffer from well-known limitations. Central among these is the use of undergraduate students in the role of decision makers, subjects who are unlikely to be as sophisticated as experienced politicians, the target population for applications of the theory. In addition, the amount of money at stake in laboratory experiments is trivial compared to the money at stake in real legislative bargaining situations, so that choices may not be taken as seriously, and subjects act absent the advice of expert staff consultants that real politicians have at their disposal. These issues threaten the external validity, or generalizability, of experimental results. Further, while the best experiments faithfully implement the theory, real political situations are typically much more complicated, with multiple, oftentimes competing, forces at work that are typically abstracted away from in modeling choices. To the extent that the model in question fails to capture certain essential institutional elements of the target situation, the experimental implementation of the model is incapable of uncovering or accounting for these missing institutional forces.

Although there is no guaranteed solution to the first of these limitations (the problem of external validity), to the extent that a given model works well in the laboratory or fails there, it shifts the burden of proof for those who would dispute the results to show that distinctly different forces are likely to be at work outside the laboratory. Further, once one has made such a case, it often points the way to further experiments designed to follow up on the hypothesized explanation. With respect to the second limitation, failure to account for institutional forces at work in the target institutional setting, the solution is to model the factors in question and to bring the revised model into the laboratory to conduct further tests.

In terms of external validity we do note one striking parallel between our results and apparent deviations from the Baron–Ferejohn model identified in field data. The general consensus from studies of coalition governments using cross-country data is that the distribution of ministerial positions between coalition partners is more evenly distributed, relative to the number of votes

²⁵ There is also a learning literature designed to explain these outcomes (see, e.g., Roth and Erev 1995).

²⁶ The latter cannot be explained by the large number of equal share proposals offered since, if anything, this should result in a higher continuation value. Similarly, risk aversion cannot explain these differences, as under the open amendment rule voters act as if they are risk-averse, accepting smaller shares than the continuation value, and under the closed amendment rule they act as if they are risk-loving, often rejecting shares at the continuation value.

each coalition member contributes, than the Baron–Ferejohn model implies, as in the latter the prime minister's party (the proposer) should have a disproportionate share of cabinet positions (Warwick and Druckman 2001). While there are many alternative explanations for this deviation from the predicted outcome in field data (e.g., repeated play game elements and the fact that the formateur is likely to be constrained with respect to the ideological positions of coalition partners), the tendency for ex post allocations to be more evenly distributed than predicted is consistent with the results of the present experiment and a host of bilateral bargaining game experiments as well.

Further probes of the external validity of the results reported here could involve employing different subject populations, particularly those with more experience and expertise with budget allocation problems of the sort studied here. For example, one might anticipate that with political science undergraduates, or at least graduate students, minimal winning coalitions would develop more rapidly under closed amendment rule procedures, as this option may be more transparent to them as a consequence of their studies. However, it is not clear that allocations within winning coalitions, or the size of winning coalitions under the open rule, would differ substantially, as there is abundant evidence from bilateral bargaining games in modern industrialized societies that subjects are reluctant to accept any share much below the $1/n$ threshold (see Roth et al. 1991). Similarly, it would be interesting to see how professional politicians would behave in an experiment of this sort. Here it is not at all clear what would be observed. On the one hand, professionals should be well attuned to the strategic possibilities inherent in the different amendment rules. On the other hand, professionals too are likely to be subject, at least to some extent, to the same behavioral forces that underlie bilateral bargaining games and the multilateral bargaining game reported on here. Answers to these and other questions form the agenda for future research.

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Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

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The reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.

New forms of governance and dispersion of decision making away from central states have gained the attention of a growing number of scholars across political science. Centralized authority—command and control—has few advocates. Modern governance is—and, according to many, should be—dispersed across multiple centers of authority. But how should multi-level governance be organized?¹ What are the basic alternatives?

The question has long been debated between “consolidationists” and “fragmentationists” in American local government. There is general agreement that decisions on a variety of services, such as fire protection, policing, schooling, commuter transport, and planning, are better taken locally. But how should authority over such services be organized—and for whom? Should the number of jurisdictions for each urban area be limited, perhaps reduced to a single unit, to produce economies in local service delivery and to focus political responsibility? Or should urban areas have numerous, overlapping, special-purpose local jurisdictions to increase

citizen choice and flexibility (Keating 1995; Lowery 2000; Ostrom 1972)? The organization of public transit in the San Francisco Bay Area is a vivid example of the latter. As Donald Chisholm (1989) described the situation in the late 1970s, public rail and bus service was fragmented into seven overlapping jurisdictions. Four of these, the Alameda Contra Costa County Transit District, the Santa Clara County Transit District, the San Mateo County Transit District, and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, are special-purpose jurisdictions created by California State legislation. All except the last were activated by voters, and all except the San Mateo County Transit District have directly elected Boards of Directors. A fifth jurisdiction was incorporated under California legislation to operate the Golden Gate Bridge and its approaches, with a 19-member board appointed by six surrounding counties. A sixth, the Muni, is a division of the Public Utilities Commission of San Francisco. Finally, a Metropolitan Transportation Commission encompasses the entire Bay Area, and more, and is empowered by the state legislature to review budgets, coordinate long-term planning, and vet applications for financial assistance. Chisholm contends that this complex arrangement not only works, but works well, and he charts in detail the complex patterns of interdependence, formal institutions, and informal networks that characterize the system.

Similar issues arise in the context of European integration. How should authority be organized in a European Union (EU) composed (after 2004) of 25 member states? Centralizing national authority in a European superstate is not on the agenda, but sharply different jurisdictional designs are on offer (Börzel and Risse 2000; Joerges, Mény, and Weiler 2000). Federalists support a coherent system of nested governments, stretching up to a unified and encompassing European level. The same decision-making procedures and laws—the *acquis communautaire*—would apply to Poles and Slovenes as they do to Portuguese and Swedes. National governments—and, nested within them, regional and local governments—would be (co)responsible for policies at lower territorial scales. This vision is contested by those who argue that Europeans would be better served by overlapping and even competing jurisdictions—the European term is “variable geometry.” Instead of

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For comments and advice we are grateful to Christopher Ansell, Ian Bache, Richard Balme, Arthur Benz, Tanja Börzel, Renaud Dehousse, Burkard Eberlein, Peter Hall, Edgar Grande, Richard Haesly, Bob Jessop, Beate Kohler-Koch, David Lake, Patrick Le Galès, Christiane Lemke, David Lowery, Michae McGinnis, Andrew Moravcsik, Elinor Ostrom, Franz U. Pappi, Thomas Risse, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Philippe Schmitter, Ulf Sverdrup, Christian Tusschoff, Bernhard Wessels, the political science discussion group at the University of North Carolina, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of *APSR*. We received institutional support from the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung in Berlin. Earlier versions were presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, the ECPR pan-European Conference in Bordeaux, and Hannover Universität, Harvard University, Humboldt Universität, Indiana University at Bloomington, Mannheim Universität, Sheffield University, Sciences Po (Paris), Technische Universität München, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors' names appear in alphabetical order.

¹ We define governance as binding decision making in the public sphere.

a single continent-wide jurisdiction, authority would be spliced into multiple, functionally-specific, policy regimes with overlapping national memberships. Each country would choose the jurisdictions to which it would belong (Eichenberger and Frey 2001). The same principle can be applied to citizens who would be members of one or more of a variety of publicly-empowered organizations that would represent them on subsets of issues (Schmitter 2000).

We propose that issues of jurisdictional design are fractal. Similar choices arise at widely differing territorial scales. The diffusion of decision making away from the central state raises fundamental issues of design that, we argue, can be conceptualized as two contrasting types of governance. We claim that these types are logically coherent and that they represent alternative responses to fundamental problems of coordination. We conclude by arguing that these types of governance reflect distinct conceptions of community.

ISLANDS OF THEORIZING

How have scholars in political science responded to the unraveling of central state control? One intellectual response to the diffusion of authority has been to stretch established concepts over the new phenomena. Scholars of federalism have applied their approach to power sharing among as well as within states. International relations scholars are extending theories of international regimes to include diffusion of authority within states. Another response has been to create entirely new concepts, such as multi-level governance, polycentric governance, multiperspectival governance, condominium, and fragmentation. Table 1 lists five literatures and the terms they have generated for diffusion of authority. We describe them as islands because the density of communication within each of them is much higher than that among them.

One such island is European Union studies, where the label multi-level (or multitiered) governance is common currency among scholars and decision makers.² Multi-level governance initially described a "system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local" that was distinctive of European Union structural policy (Marks 1993, 392; Hooghe 1996), but the term is now applied to the European Union more generally (e.g., Bache and Flinders n.d.; Grande 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001). Europeanists have also analyzed the diffusion of decision making to informal and overlapping

policy networks (e.g., Ansell 2000; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Peterson 2001). Philippe Schmitter (1996) has developed Latinized terms, *consortio* and *condominio*, to describe novel possibilities for a non-state order in Europe. While some conceive multi-level governance as an *alternative* to hierarchical government, others view policy networks as nested in formal government institutions (Peters and Pierre 2000; Rhodes 2000).

Reconfiguring authority has been a major topic for international relations scholars. Literature on multi-lateral cooperation and global governance has sought to specify the conditions under which national governments create international regimes. A classic point of departure is Robert Keohane's 1982 article in *International Organization*, which analyzes demand and supply for international regimes to reduce transaction costs and limit asymmetrical uncertainty. More recently, scholars have begun to examine how globalization facilitates the diffusion of political authority to subnational and international institutions (Kahler and Lake 2003; Nye and Donahue 2000). Others focus on the proliferation of nongovernmental actors in international governance (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995).

This literature asks whether and how these developments challenge Westphalian statehood (Caporaso 2000; Keohane and Nye 2000; for a skeptical view, see Krasner 1999). Some international relations (IR) scholars claim that they unbundle territoriality by breaking the umbilical cord between territory and authority. John Ruggie (1993, 149) compares the outcome to medieval rule with its patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights. James Rosenau (1997) argues that national governments are losing ground to networks of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, professional societies, and advocacy groups, alongside governments. These "spheres of authority" ensure compliance but they are nonhierarchical, fluid, mostly nongovernmental, and often nonterritorial.

An extensive literature on federalism examines the optimal allocation of authority across multiple tiers of government and how governments at different levels interact. An appreciation of the benefits of decentralization—summarized by Wallace Oates' (1999, 1122) decentralization theorem—underlies much of this literature. These scholars speak of multi-level governance or government (Benz 2000; Simeon and Cameron 2000; Wright 1987, 2001), multicentered governance (Kincaid 2001; Nicolaidis 2001), multiple jurisdictions (Oates 1972; Tullock 1969), and matrix of decision making (Elazar 1987). In recent years, this literature has been extended in several directions. Several writers employ concepts drawn from federalism to shed light on supranational regimes, in particular, the European Union (e.g., Inman and Rubinfeld 1992; Sbragia 1993; Scharpf 1988). There has also been a major effort to measure regional and local decentralization across developed and developing countries (e.g., Garman, Haggard, and Willis 2001; Rodden 2002, n.d.; Treisman 1999). Finally, deductive theorists

² European Commission president Romano Prodi (2001) has called for "more effective multi-level governance in Europe. . . . The way to achieve real dynamism, creativity and democratic legitimacy in the European Union is to free the potential that exists in multi-layered levels of governance." In its 2001 *White Paper on Governance*, the European Commission (2001, 34–35) characterizes the European Union as one "based on multi-level governance in which each actor contributes in line with his or her capabilities or knowledge to the success of the overall exercise. In a multi-level system the real challenge is establishing clear rules for how competence is shared—not separated; only that non-exclusive vision can secure the best interests of all the Member States and all the Union's citizens."

TABLE 1. Against Unitary Government—Concepts

<i>European Union studies</i>	Multitiered, multi-level governance; network governance; consortio and condominio
<i>International relations</i>	Multilateral cooperation; global governance; fragementation; multiperspectival governance
<i>Federalism</i>	Multiple jurisdictions; multi-level government or governance; multicentered governance; matrix of authority; decentralization; competing jurisdictions; market-preserving federalism; FOCJ
<i>Local government</i>	Multiple local jurisdictions; fragmentation vs. consolidation; polycentric governance
<i>Public policy</i>	Polycentric governance; governance by networks; multi-level governance

analyze multi-level governance in terms of supply and demand for jurisdictions. They challenge the efficiency of monopolistic, territorially fixed, and nested governments and propose instead flexible jurisdictions conceived as “voluntary coalitions for financing, choosing, and enjoying excludable public goods” (Casella and Weingast 1995, 15). Interjurisdictional competition informs Alessandra Casella’s work on clubs (Casella and Frey 1992), Barry Weingast’s (1995) market-preserving federalism, Bruno Frey’s FOCJ (functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions) (Frey and Eichenberger 1999), and recent analyses of the number and size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Hiscox and Lake 2002).

The study of local government in the United States and Western Europe bears directly on multi-level, polycentric governance. For over four decades, opposing views on the appropriate size and division of functions have structured debate on local and metropolitan governance (e.g., Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994; Foster 1997; Lowery 2000). An influential starting point is Tiebout’s 1956 article, which establishes the claim that competition among multiple local jurisdictions leads to more efficient provision of local public services. Flexible governance arrangements and overlapping, polycentric, jurisdictions have constituted the central research agenda of the Indiana Workshop for several decades (McGinnis 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988). The benefits of “the competitive city” (Schneider 1989) are challenged by consolidationists who argue that efficiency and redistribution are better served by amalgamating numerous, overlapping, jurisdictions into a limited number of municipal governments (Downs 1994; Frug 1999; Lyons and Lowery 1989).

The debate between “two traditions” (Ostrom 1972) of diffusing authority has spilled into public policy. The question of how common goods can be created under multi-level governance is well established (Héritier 2002). Some public policy analysts explore how market principles, participation on the part of societal actors, and deregulation create flexible, self-organizing, loosely coupled, “governance by networks” (Marin and Mayntz 1991). Such networks are hypothesized to reach into the international arena (Blatter 2001; Pappi and Henning 1999; Ronit and Schneider 1999). The generalizability of network governance is questioned by writers who emphasize that central government continues to steer decision making, albeit in cooperation with societal interests and subnational governments

(Jeffery 1996). Peters and Pierre (n.d., 2–3) stress that the “‘shift’ towards multi-level governance should . . . be conceived of as a gradual incremental development in which institutions still play a defining role in governing. . . . Multi-level governance [should not be] seen as an alternative but rather as a complement to intergovernmental relations defined in a regulatory framework.”

FLEXIBLE GOVERNANCE

These literatures share a basic postulate: dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is *more flexible* than concentration of governance in one jurisdiction. Efficient governance adjusts jurisdictions to the trade-off between the virtues and the vices of centralization (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Marks and Hooghe 2000).³ Large (i.e., territorially extensive) jurisdictions have the virtue of exploiting economies of scale in the provision of public goods, internalizing policy externalities, allowing for more efficient taxation, facilitating more efficient redistribution, and enlarging the territorial scope of security and market exchange. Large jurisdictions are bad when they impose a single policy on diverse ecological systems or territorially heterogeneous populations.

One criticism of centralized government is that it is insensitive to varying scale efficiencies from policy to policy. Economies of scale are more likely to characterize the production of capital-intensive public goods than of labor-intensive services because economies accrue from spreading costs over larger outputs (Oakerson 1999). So economies of scale in military defense and physical infrastructure are far greater than in education. Large-scale jurisdictions make sense for the former; small-scale jurisdictions for the latter.

Efficiency requires that a policy’s full effects—positive and negative—be internalized in decision making. Externalities arising from a policy to impede global warming encompass the entire planet, but those involving waste management, water quality control, nature preservation, or urban planning, for example, are local or regional. Under multi-level governance,

³ To say that multi-level governance is more efficient than centralized government is not to say that efficiency determines multi-level governance. Causal explanation of multi-level governance must come to grips with political factors, including party-political or distributional coalitions, legal constraints, path dependence, and identity (Marks and Hooghe 2000).

TABLE 2. Types of Multi-level Governance

Type I	Type II
<i>General-purpose</i> jurisdictions	<i>Task-specific</i> jurisdictions
<i>Nonintersecting</i> memberships	<i>Intersecting</i> memberships
Jurisdictions at a <i>limited number of levels</i>	<i>No limit</i> to the number of jurisdictional levels
<i>Systemwide architecture</i>	<i>Flexible design</i>

jurisdictions can be custom designed with such variation in mind.

Centralized government is not well suited to accommodate diversity. Ecological conditions may vary from area to area. Controlling smog in a low-lying flat area surrounded by hills (such as Los Angeles) poses a very different policy problem than smog control in a high plateau such as Denver. Preferences of citizens may also vary sharply across regions within a state, and if one takes such heterogeneity into account, the optimal level of authority may be lower than economies of scale dictate. In short, multi-level governance allows decision makers to adjust the scale of governance to reflect heterogeneity.⁴

TWO TYPES

Beyond the bedrock agreement that flexible governance must be multi-level, there is no consensus about how multi-level governance should be structured.

- Should jurisdictions be designed around particular *communities*, or should they be designed around particular *policy problems*?
- Should jurisdictions *bundle* competencies, or should they be functionally *specific*?
- Should jurisdictions be *limited* in number, or should they *proliferate*?
- Should jurisdictions be designed to *last*, or should they be *fluid*?

Do answers to these questions hang together? Can one conceptualize logically coherent types that capture alternative jurisdictional arrangements?

We attempt to do this in the remainder of this article. Table 2 sets out types of multi-level governance drawn from the literatures described above. We label them simply Type I and Type II.⁵ The first two attributes in the table concern variation among individual jurisdictions; the final two describe systemic properties.

Type I multi-level governance describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions—international, national, regional, meso, local—are

general-purpose. That is, they bundle together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities and, in many cases, a court system and representative institutions. The membership boundaries of such jurisdictions do not intersect. This is the case for jurisdictions at any one level, and it is the case for jurisdictions across levels. In Type I governance, every citizen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale. Territorial jurisdictions are intended to be, and usually are, stable for periods of several decades or more, though the allocation of policy competencies across jurisdictional levels is flexible.

Type II multi-level governance is distinctly different. It is composed of specialized jurisdictions. Type II governance is fragmented into functionally specific pieces—say, providing a particular local service, solving a particular common resource problem, selecting a particular software standard, monitoring the water quality of a particular river, and adjudicating international trade disputes. The number of such jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely. There is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and flexible—they come and go as demands for governance change.

In the following section we set out a functional argument explaining why these types coexist. But first, we describe them in more detail and ground them in their respective literatures.

Type I Governance

The intellectual foundation for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels. Federalism is concerned chiefly with the relationship between central government and a tier of nonintersecting subnational governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government, rather than the individual policy. In the words of Wallace Oates (1999, 1121), dean of fiscal federalism, “The traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions.” The framework is systemwide, the functions are bundled, and the levels of government are multiple but limited in number. Type I governance shares these basic characteristics, but does not necessarily exist only within individual states. We discuss these characteristics in turn.

General-Purpose Jurisdictions. Decision-making powers are dispersed across jurisdictions but bundled

⁴ Other hypothesized benefits of multi-level governance are that it provides more complete information of constituents’ preferences, is more adaptive in response to changing preferences, is more open to experimentation and innovation, and facilitates credible commitments (Majone 1998; Weingast 1995). Costs of multi-level governance are seen to arise from incomplete information, interjurisdictional coordination, interest-group capture, and corruption (Foster 1997; Gray 1973; Lowery et al. 1995; Cai and Treisman 2001).

⁵ We resist the urge to give proper names to these types and so add terminological complexity to an already jargon-laden subject. For those who prefer substantive labels, we suggest “general-purpose jurisdictions” and “task-specific jurisdictions.”

in a small number of packages. Federalists and students of intergovernmental relations tend to emphasize the costs of decomposing authority into disparate packages. This idea is especially strong in Europe, where local government usually exercises “a wide spread of functions, reflecting the concept of general-purpose local authorities exercising comprehensive care for their communities” (Norton 1991, 22).

Nonintersecting Memberships. Type I jurisdictions are characterized by nonintersecting memberships.⁶ Membership is usually territorial, as in national states, regional, and local governments, but it can also be communal, as in consociational polities.⁷ Such jurisdictions are defined by durable boundaries that are nonintersecting at any particular level. Moreover, the memberships of jurisdictions at higher and lower tiers do not intersect. This extends the Westphalian principle of exclusivity into the domestic arena (Caporaso 2000). The same principle is present in the international arena, where the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union encompass national states.⁸

The key systemic characteristics of Type I governance are as follows.

Limited Number of Jurisdictional Levels. Type I governance organizes jurisdictions at just a few levels. Among students of intergovernmental relations, it is common to distinguish a local, an intermediate, and a central level (John 2001).

Systemwide, Durable Architecture. One does not arrive at general-purpose, nonintersecting, and nested jurisdictions by accident. Systemic institutional choice is written all over Type I governance. In modern democracies, Type I jurisdictions usually adopt the *trias politica* structure of an elected legislature, an executive (with a professional civil service), and a court system. As one moves from smaller to larger jurisdictions, the institutions become more elaborate but the basic structure is similar. Though the institutions of the U.S. federal government are far more complex than those of a French town, they resemble each other more than they do the Type II arrangements described below.

Type I jurisdictions are durable. Jurisdictional reform—that is, creating, abolishing, or radically adjusting new jurisdictions—is costly and unusual. Such change normally consists of reallocating policy functions across existing levels of governance. The institutions responsible for governance are sticky, and they tend to outlive the conditions that brought them into being.

Type II Governance

An alternative form of multi-level governance is one in which the number of jurisdictions is potentially vast rather than limited, in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few levels but operate at numerous territorial scales, in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general-purpose, and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political economists and public choice theorists, but it also summarizes the ideas of several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and European studies.

Task-Specific Jurisdictions. In Type II governance, multiple, independent jurisdictions fulfill distinct functions. This leads to a governance system where “each citizen . . . is served not by ‘the’ government, but by a variety of different public service industries. . . . We can then think of the public sector as being composed of many public service industries including the police industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, and so on” (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999, 88–89). In Switzerland, where Type II governance is quite common at the local level, these jurisdictions are aptly called *Zweckverbände*—goal-oriented/functional associations (Frey and Eichenberger 1999).

Type II governance is widespread at the local level. There are fairly detailed data on Switzerland, where Frey and Eichenberger identify six types of functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions that complement or compete with general-purpose local governments. These communes, of which there are about 5,000, perform specialized tasks, such as providing local schooling, electricity, gas, water, or street lighting. In addition, hundreds of intercommunal associations provide specialized public goods on a larger scale, including, for example, hospitals, nursing homes, or garbage collection. According to the authors’ calculations, there were 178 such associations in the canton of Zurich alone in 1994 (Frey and Eichenberger 1999, 49–53). The closest functional equivalent in the United States consists of “special districts,” which, as in Switzerland, have intersecting territorial boundaries and perform specific tasks. Special district governance is particularly dense in metropolitan areas: in 1992, the metropolitan area of Houston had 665 special districts; Denver, 358; and Chicago, 357 (Foster 1997, 122). Overall, the number of special districts has seen a threefold rise, from 12,340 in 1952 to 35,356 in 2002. Ninety-one percent of these are single-function districts, dealing with one of the following: natural resources, fire protection, water supply, housing, sewerage, cemeteries, libraries, parks and recreation, highways, hospitals, airports, electric power or gas supply, or public transit. These figures do not include several interstate special districts, such as the Delaware River and Bay Authority (operating the Delaware Memorial Bridge and the Cape May–Lewes Ferry connecting Delaware and New Jersey), the Chicago Gary Regional Airport Authority (involving

⁶ While membership of Type I jurisdictions is nonintersecting, competencies are often shared or overlapping. There has, for example, been a secular trend away from compartmentalization in federal polities.

⁷ Other examples of nonterritorial Type I governance are the clan system in Somalia, communal self-governance in the Ottoman empire, and religious self-governance in India.

⁸ There are a few exceptions. For example, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, self-governing parts of Denmark, are not members of the European Union.

Chicago, Illinois, and Gary, Indiana), and the Port Authority between New York and New Jersey; nor do they include independent school districts, of which there were more than 13,500 in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999, 2002).

Intersecting Memberships. “There is generally no reason why the smaller jurisdictions should be neatly contained within the borders of the larger ones. On the contrary, borders will be crossed, and jurisdictions will partly overlap. The ‘nested,’ hierarchical structure of the nation-state has no obvious economic rationale and is opposed by economic forces” (Casella and Weingast 1995, 13).

Frey and Eichenberger (1999) coin the acronym FOCJ (functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions) for this form of governance. “Polycentricity” was initially used to describe metropolitan governance in the United States, which has historically been considerably more fragmented than in Europe. It is now applied by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom as a generic term for the coexistence of “many centers of decision-making that are formally independent of each other” (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 831). In the context of the European Union, Philippe Schmitter (1996, 136) uses the term *condominio* to describe “dispersed overlapping domains” having “incongruent memberships” that “act autonomously to solve common problems and produce different public goods.”

Type II governance has the following systemic characteristics.

Many Jurisdictional Levels. Type II governance is organized across a large number of levels. Instead of conceiving authority in neatly defined local, regional, national, and international layers, public-choice students argue that each public good or service should be provided by the jurisdiction that effectively internalizes its benefits and costs. The result is jurisdictions on diverse scales—something akin to a marble cake. Students of Type II governance generally speak of multi- or polycentered governance, which, they feel, has less a ring of hierarchy to it than the term multi-level or multitiered governance.

One area where one finds a multiplicity of Type II jurisdictions is in densely populated frontier regions in North America and Western Europe. *Ad hoc*, problem-driven jurisdictions in the form of interregional commissions, task forces, and intercity agencies have mushroomed over the past three decades. In the Upper Rhine Valley, for example, the Swiss cantons of Basel-Land and Basel-Stadt, the French department Haut Rhin, and the German region Baden have developed a wide range of transnational jurisdictions, involving meetings of regional government leaders, a regional council of parliamentary representatives, a conference of city mayors, boards of regional planners, associations of local authorities, agricultural associations, chambers of commerce, cooperation projects among universities, joint research projects on regional climate change and biotechnology, teacher exchange programs, and school partnerships (Perkmann 1999;

Weyand 1999). Dense cross-border cooperation has also emerged along the Californian/Mexican border and the U.S./Canadian border (Blatter 2001).

Type II governance has also proliferated in the international arena. A critic of the traditional statist view of governance describes this process as “framgregation”—a neologism combining fragmentation and integration (Rosenau 1997). In his conception, there is no up or under, no lower or higher, no dominant class of actor but, rather, a wide range of public and private actors who collaborate and compete in shifting coalitions. The outcome is akin to Escher’s famous lithograph of incongruously descending and ascending steps.

Flexible Design. Type II jurisdictions are intended to respond flexibly to changing citizen preferences and functional requirements. The idea is rooted in Tiebout’s (1956) argument that mobility of citizens among multiple competing jurisdictions provides a functional equivalent to market competition. In a subsequent article, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) put the burden of mobility and change on jurisdictions rather than on citizens. According to Frey and Eichenberger 1999, 18, 41) “FOCJ . . . are flexible units which are established when needed. . . . [And] FOCJ are discontinued when their services are no longer demanded as more citizens and communities exit and the tax base shrinks. . . . FOCJ are an institutional way to vary the size of public jurisdictions in order to minimize spillovers. A change in size is, therefore, a normal occurrence.”

Type II governance is generally embedded in Type I governance, but the way this works varies. There is no general blueprint. The legal context is decisive for the density of special districts in the United States. A tally of district-enabling laws in California in the early 1980s counted 206 state statutes enabling 55 varieties of special districts for 30 government functions (Foster 1997, 11). No fewer than 200 pages of the most recent U.S. Census of Government were devoted to “a summary description” of local government variation across U.S. states (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999, 73–277). Some districts are created by state legislatures, others are set up by one or more counties or municipalities, while others are initiated by a citizen petition. Special districts may be governed by appointed or elected boards; for some elected boards, only property owners rather than residents can vote. Some special districts levy taxes or fees, while others do not. The geographical scope varies from interstate to regional and submunicipal, but the majority of special districts (a) are smaller than the county and (b) overlap with other local governments (Foster 1997, 9–15). In Switzerland, some local Type II jurisdictions have the power to tax, while others do not, and some, but not all, governing boards are directly elected. The territorial boundaries and conditions for membership vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). The result is a baroque patchwork of Type II jurisdictions overlaying a nested pattern of Type I jurisdictions.

Task-specificity and impermanence are common features of international regimes. Type II governance

is ubiquitous in efforts to internalize transnational spillovers in the absence of authoritative coordination. For example, more than 150 environmental treaties have been agreed among states, half of them since 1970 (Clark 2000). The territorial scale of these regimes varies from global to regional. Most target functionally specific policy problems ranging from aircraft engine emissions, climate change, ozone layer protection, and shipment of hazardous waste to whaling, migratory species, tropical timber, etc. However, few are neatly insulated. Their functions often overlap, as has been demonstrated in the case of the international Convention on Biological Diversity and the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights under the World Trade Organization (Rosendal 2001).

A recent count of international governmental organizations shows steep growth over the past 50 years, from 70 in 1940 to more than one thousand in the 1980s. However, of 1,063 organizations existing in 1981, only 723 survived a decade later, while an additional 400 or so came into being (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996, 143). This fluidity stands in stark contrast to Type I jurisdictions. A study of American federal bureaucracies found that two-thirds of federal agencies in existence in 1923 were still active 50 years later. The mortality rate for Type I domestic bureaucracies is estimated to be five times lower than for international governmental organizations (Kaufman 1976; cited in Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996, 143).

THE COORDINATION DILEMMA

The chief benefit of multi-level governance lies in its scale flexibility. Its chief cost lies in the transaction costs of coordinating multiple jurisdictions. The coordination dilemma confronting multi-level governance can be simply stated: To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers (i.e., negative or positive externalities) for other jurisdictions, so coordination is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes. We conceive this as a *second-order* coordination problem because it involves coordination among institutions whose primary function is to coordinate human activity.

Second-order coordination costs increase exponentially as the number of relevant jurisdictions increases. Fritz Scharpf has probed the conditions of interjurisdictional coordination, and it seems to us fitting to describe this basic dilemma as Scharpf's (1997, 70) law: "As the number of affected parties increases . . . negotiated solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs."

The simplest way to understand this is to think through the impact of increasing numbers of players in an iterated prisoners' dilemma. A two-player iterated game provides certainty of repeated interaction, and this permits strategies based on tit for tat to punish defection effectively. As the number of actors rises, it becomes harder to punish defectors. Free riding is the dominant strategy for large groups in the absence of a leviathan or of countervailing norms that can induce actors to monitor and punish defection. This is,

in a nutshell, the coordination dilemma of multi-level governance.

How can multi-level governance deal with the coordination dilemma? One strategy is to *limit the number of autonomous actors* who have to be coordinated by limiting the number of autonomous jurisdictions. The second is to *limit interaction among actors* by splicing competencies into functionally distinct units.

The first strategy underpins Type I governance. Type I governance describes a limited number of multi-task, general-purpose jurisdictions with nonintersecting borders. By bundling competencies together, Type I governance gains the benefits of varying territorial scale while minimizing the number of jurisdictions that have to be coordinated. Type I governance is bundled multi-level governance.

Type I governance constrains the number of jurisdictions according to the following design principles.

- *Nonintersecting memberships.* Jurisdictional memberships at the same territorial level do not overlap. Nonintersecting membership limits the need for jurisdictional coordination horizontally at any level and, vertically, across levels.
- *Cascading jurisdictional scale.* The territorial scale of jurisdiction decreases sharply across levels. European Union countries have between two and five subnational levels, described by the European Commission in terms of a common rubric, the *Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques* (NUTS) (Eurostat 1999, 27). The median population represented in the first level, NUTS 1 jurisdictions, is 3.89 million; that in the second level, NUTS 2 jurisdictions, is 1.42 million; NUTS 3 jurisdictions have a median population of 369,000; the median population in NUTS 4 is 48,000; and at the lowest level, NUTS 5, it is 5,100. In the United States, the corresponding median population is 3.76 million for states, 69,600 for counties, and 8,800 for subcounties. A cascading jurisdictional scale spreads governance across vastly different scales but limits the total number of subnational levels to three, four, or, at most, five tiers.⁹
- *General-purpose jurisdictions.* A logical corollary is that authoritative competencies are bundled into a small number of extensive packages at each level. Type I governance disperses authority across widely different levels and constrains the number of levels by making the jurisdictions at each level multi-purpose.
- *Systemwide architecture.* The pyramidal structure of Type I governance lends itself to hierarchical direction. Most Type I governance systems are bound together by a single court system with ultimate authority to adjudicate among contending jurisdictions.

The alternative approach is to limit coordination costs by constraining interaction across jurisdictions. Type II governance sets no ceiling on the number of

⁹ These are intercountry or interstate medians. We first calculate country (or state) average populations at each jurisdictional level and then take the figure for the median country (or state).

jurisdictions but spawns new ones along functionally differentiated lines. As a result, externalities across jurisdictions are minimized. This is an exact corollary to Herbert Simon's (1996, 178) notion of "nearly decomposable" structures. Simon argues that tasks within an organization should be distributed so that the share of internal interactions within constituent units is maximized and the share of external interactions minimized. The idea, applied to jurisdictional design, is to distribute tasks so that the short-run behavior of actors across different jurisdictions is more or less independent from that of others, while their long-run behavior is connected only in the aggregate.¹⁰

How can decomposability be attained in policy provision? How, in other words, can one break up policy-making into discrete pieces with minimal external spillover? The following design principles characterize Type II governance.

- *Functional specificity.* Specific, functionally distinct competencies are hived off and insulated. In this way, externalities—and therefore interdependence—among jurisdictions are minimized. The assumption that all significant costs and benefits are internalized within the jurisdiction is a foundation of Type II governance theory, including Tiebout's (1956) theory of jurisdictional competition, Buchanan's (1965) theory of clubs, and Oates' analysis of metropolitan competition (Oates and Schwab 1988).
- *Flexible, policy-specific, architecture.* Type II governance is designed with respect to particular policy problems—not particular communities or constituencies. Institutional design—the scope of a jurisdiction, its mode of decision making, adjudication, and implementation—can thus be adapted to particular policy problems.

The gist of this line of thinking is that Type I and Type II governance are good at different things and coexist because they are complementary. The result is a fluctuating number of relatively self-contained, functionally differentiated Type II jurisdictions alongside a more stable population of general-purpose, nested Type I jurisdictions.

INTRINSIC VS. EXTRINSIC COMMUNITY

Yet Type I and Type II governance are not merely different means to the same end. They embody contrasting conceptions of community. Type I jurisdictions are usually based on encompassing communities. Such communities are often territorial, but they may also be based on membership of a particular religious or ethnic group. In either case, the jurisdiction satisfies a preference for collective self-government, a good that is inde-

pendent of citizens' preferences for efficiency or for any particular policy output. Disputes about Type I jurisdictional boundaries usually cannot be settled by comparative evaluations of the efficiency of competing jurisdictional arrangements in providing public goods but involve contending conceptions of community as well.

Type I jurisdictions are often rooted in communal identity. Historically, the development of national states has gone hand in hand with nationalism. The strongest pressures for multi-level governance within such states have come from regionally based national minorities. Recent research indicates that support among European citizens for European integration is closely associated with the extent to which they identify with Europe. The most trenchant opposition to European integration comes from populist right parties defending national community and national sovereignty against foreign influences (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).

Correspondingly, Type I governance is oriented to voice, rather than to exit. Type I jurisdictions have extensive institutional mechanisms to deal with conflict, including zero-sum conflict about basic values. Because they bundle policies together, Type I jurisdictions are able to benefit from scale economies in the provision of democratic institutions. Issue bundling facilitates distributional bargaining, logrolling, and side payments.

Exit, on the other hand, is difficult and is not conceived as a feasible option for those who disagree with the government. Exit in a Type I world usually means moving from one locality, region, or country to another. Where jurisdictions are designed around religion or group membership, exit demands that one change one's identity.

Type II jurisdictions are more pliable. They are set up to solve particular policy problems, such as managing a common pool resource, setting a technical standard, managing an urban service, or shipping hazardous waste. The constituencies of Type II jurisdictions are individuals who share some geographical or functional space and who have a common need for collective decision making—e.g. as irrigation farmers, public service users, parents, exporters, homeowners, or software producers. These are not communities of fate; membership is voluntary, and one can be a member of several such groups. They are akin to the optimal jurisdictions described by Martin McGuire (1974, 132) generated by "common advantages people may find in producing, exchanging, or consuming some good which they value." Membership in such functional communities is extrinsic; it encompasses merely one aspect of an individual's identity.

Many Type II jurisdictions facilitate entry and exit to create a market for the production and consumption of a public good. Most do not seek to resolve fundamental disagreements by deliberation but, instead, avoid them altogether by allowing individuals to choose among competing jurisdictions.¹¹ Proponents of

¹⁰ The extent to which one can achieve this is contested. Chisholm (1989, 63) is sanguine that "in general most systems are decomposable," but others argue that coordination is a problem (e.g., Peters [1996] and Rosendal [2001]). There is general agreement, however, that policies are self-sufficient. Type II jurisdictions are designed to minimize interactions, but they must still face the difficulty of producing interjurisdictional cooperation.

¹¹ Not always, though. In *Governing the Commons* Elinor Ostrom (1990) describes several common pool resource arrangements with deliberative-democratic decision making. As Ostrom observes, such

competing arrangements like to say that Type I jurisdictions choose citizens, while citizens choose Type II jurisdictions.

CONCLUSION

Political science has had far more to say about *how* collective decisions can and should be made than about *for whom* they can and should be made. Answers to the “how” question have narrowed because there is no legitimate alternative to liberal democracy. Debate centers on the merits of alternative democratic designs. But there is little consensus about jurisdictional design—the “for whom” question. Central states are shedding authority to supranational and subnational authorities, but what kinds of jurisdictional architecture might emerge?

We make no claim to originality. The types we describe are distilled from research in local government, federalism, European integration, international relations, and public policy. Type I and Type II governance arise—under different guises and with different labels—as fundamental alternatives in each of these fields. Specialists will surely wish to make finer distinctions than the ones we draw. There is an extensive literature on variation within each type. Our belief is that a logically consistent schema setting out basic institutional options can help situate one’s work in a larger intellectual enterprise. In the process, we hope that we raise in the reader’s mind many more questions than we can possibly answer. How do these types coexist? What are their dynamic properties? How is democracy limited or enabled in each institutional setup?

The types of governance that we conceive share one vital feature: They are radical departures from the centralized state. However, they diffuse authority in contrasting ways. The first type of governance—we label this Type I—bundles competencies in jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions form part of a systemwide plan: They are mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested within those at the next higher level. Jurisdictional design generally corresponds to communal identities: Each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group or territorial community. These jurisdictions are oriented to voice rather than to exit. Type I governance reflects a simple design principle: Maximize the fit between the scale of a jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good provision while minimizing interjurisdictional coordination by (a) creating inclusive jurisdictions that internalize most relevant externalities and (b) limiting the number of jurisdictional levels.

Type II governance also limits the transaction costs of interjurisdictional coordination, but it does so in a

fundamentally different way, by splicing public good provision into a large number of functionally discrete jurisdictions. But these jurisdictions do not conform to an overarching blueprint. Rather, each is designed to address a limited set of related problems. Type II jurisdictions are task-driven. Hence, the same individual may be part of several overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions. Membership in Type II jurisdictions tends to be conditional and extrinsic. Type II jurisdictions are often designed to have low barriers to entry and exit so as to engender competition among them.

As we conceptualize them here, these forms of governance represent very different ways of organizing political life. Type I governance is nonintersecting from the standpoint of membership; Type II governance is nonintersecting from the standpoint of tasks. The former is designed around human (usually territorial) community; the latter is designed around particular tasks or policy problems. The development of multi-level governance is commonly understood to be a general phenomenon in western democracies. We argue that fundamentally contrasting outcomes are at stake.

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jurisdictions tend to become magnets for solving a wide range of community problems. Once such institutions are in place, it may be more efficient to add governance functions to an existing jurisdiction than to create a new one. Democratic accountability of task-specific regimes is also discussed in IR (e.g., Nye and Donahue 2000 and Skogstad 2001).

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Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States

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In this paper, we contend that party realignments occur due to the interaction of candidates and activists. We examine independent party candidates who are motivated primarily to win elections but who use activist contributions to increase vote shares. In a two-dimensional policy space, such candidates will on occasion engage in "flanking" moves so as to enlist coalitions of disaffected voters, at the risk of alienating some of their traditional activist supporters. We argue that a result of such "flanking" moves, in the early part of the century, has been a shift in emphasis from an underlying social dimension to the economic dimension. In recent decades, electoral salience has shifted back to the social dimension. The net result is that the party cleavage line is much as it was a century ago—but the parties have switched sides.

It is commonly assumed that politics is inherently one-dimensional. In such a world, theory suggests that political candidates would be drawn into the electoral center to maximize votes. Against such a tendency would be the motivation of ideological political activists to pull their preferred candidate away from the center. The balance of electoral incentives and activist pull creates the "political equilibrium" at any election.

But is politics inherently one-dimensional? And what if it is not? We propose an extension of the conventional framework, by offering historical evidence that politics is fundamentally two-dimensional. Politics may appear to be characterized by a single cleavage, but this is because the two parties themselves "organize" politics along the dimension that separates them. Party disagreement on one dimension of politics makes that dimension more salient, while the other dimension is obscured by tacit party agreement.

The existence of a submerged or passive dimension of politics transforms the calculus of activist support and electoral preferences. Activists who are most concerned about the dimension of politics on which parties passively agree constitute a pool of disaffected voters who see no perceptible difference between the two main parties on the issues that matter most to them. These disaffected activists often offer a temptation to vote-maximizing candidates who may see them as the potential margin of victory in a close election. Such a development would be resented and resisted by party activists who are most concerned about the active dimension that differentiates the two parties and would rather see their party go down to defeat than reorient itself to a new set of policy issues and a new agenda.

Party realignments have long fascinated scholars of American politics, but no simple model has apparently

been sufficient to capture the phenomena. These transformations have been conceived as due to exogenous change in the economic or international environment. We view such transformations as the direct consequence of the unrecognized two-dimensionality of the political space. The premise of this paper is that "partisan realignment" cannot be understood without understanding the tension existing between vote-maximizing candidates and policy-specialized party activists, operating in a two-dimensional strategy space. Although each election outcome may be the result of an equilibrium in the context of the contemporary party alignment, over a longer time span we see a kind of "dynamic stability." Each temporary political balance results from candidates' efforts to reform the optimal coalition of party activists. These forces destroy the old equilibrium and create a new one.

Taking the long view, American politics can be seen as a prolonged, slow manifestation of the inherent instability of multidimensional politics long posited by rational choice theory. For example, the period in American politics between 1896 and 2000 can be visualized as manifesting two full reorientations of party politics along distinct ideological dimensions.

The Transformation in Party Positions from 1896 to 2000

Knowing whether a state went for Kennedy or Nixon in 1960 does not allow one to predict whether that state's electoral votes went to Bush or Gore in 2000. Party voting in 1960 was still primarily driven by the economic cleavage of the New Deal. Income and class variables were strong predictors of individual voting behavior, with middle-class and professional homeowners voting Republican and working-class union members voting Democratic. Democratic candidates since the New Deal had tried to suppress racial voting to appeal simultaneously to Northern liberals and Southern segregationists; as a result, the Republican Party, while lukewarm on civil rights, was still arguably more liberal than the Democratic Party.

By 2000, however, the New Deal party alignment no longer captured patterns of partisan voting. In the intervening 40 years, the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts had triggered an increasingly race-driven distinction between the parties. Carmines and Stimson (1989)

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This paper is based on research supported by NSF Grants SBR 98 18582 and SES 02 41732. The authors would also like to thank James Adams and members of the Washington University Department of Political Science for their suggestions and encouragement, especially Randy Calvert, John Carey, Andrew Martin, Scott McClurg, Jeff Smith, and Steve Smith. Larry Handlin and Alexandra Shankster helped with data analysis and technical support.

TABLE 1. Reversal of Partisan Presidential Coalitions, 1896 to 2000

	Democratic 1896		Republican 1896	
Democratic 2000	<i>Washington</i>		Connecticut	<i>California</i>
			Delaware	<i>Iowa</i>
			Illinois	<i>Maine</i>
			Maryland	<i>Oregon</i>
			Massachusetts	<i>Vermont</i>
			Michigan	<i>Wisconsin</i>
			Minnesota	
			New Jersey	
			New York	
			Pennsylvania	
			Rhode Island	
Republican 2000	<i>Colorado</i>	Alabama	W. Virginia	<i>Indiana</i>
	<i>Florida</i>	Arkansas		<i>New Hampshire</i>
	<i>Idaho</i>	Georgia		<i>N. Dakota</i>
	<i>Kansas</i>	Louisiana		<i>Ohio</i>
	<i>Kentucky</i>	Mississippi^a		
	<i>Montana</i>	Missouri		
	<i>Nebraska</i>	Nevada		
	<i>S. Dakota</i>	N. Carolina		
	<i>Tennessee</i>	S. Carolina		
	<i>Utah</i>	Texas		
	<i>Virginia</i>			
	<i>Wyoming</i>			
		23		22

Note: Italicized states are those that were Republican in 1960. Boldfaced states are those that were Democratic in 1960. $\chi^2 = 24.91$ with 3 df ($p < .005$); $r^2 = .55$.

^a Although Kennedy outpolled Nixon in Mississippi (31% to 25%), a plurality voted for electors who cast their electoral votes for segregationist Harry Byrd.

argue that racial issues had become the dominant cleavage in American politics. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) claim, regretfully, that race-based voting had driven out class-based voting. Racial polarities had come to subsume a variety of other social issues as well, including abortion, womens' rights, and prayer in schools. Among whites, church attendance was a primary predictor of Republican voting (Smith 2002).

As a result, it is no surprise that a state that went for Kennedy in 1960 was not particularly likely to vote for Gore in 2000. In fact, virtually half of the states (Nevada and 10 Southern states) that had voted for Kennedy voted for Bush in 2000. Similarly, eight New England and upper Midwest states went from the Republican column in 1960 to the Democrats in 2000. A redefinition of party cleavages had happened in the intervening 40 years.

Similarly, it is not possible to predict which states went for Nixon in 1960 based on the state's choice between Bryan and McKinley in 1896. Once again, the basis of party voting had changed too much. The Republican Party's view of the parties was still largely a relic of the Civil War trauma. The Democrats were a rural, conservative party, whose candidate was a product of rural, Protestant America with no affinity for the growing population of urban immigrants in the cities of the Northeast. The New Deal coalition of Southern agrarian states with Northern liberal states was not even a remote possibility in 1896. As a result, only 10 of the 22 states that voted for McKinley in 1896 voted for Nixon in 1960 (Table 1).

Despite the fact that the partisan status of the states in 1896 does not predict their partisan status in 1960, and that partisan status in 1960 does not predict that in 2000, the partisan status of the states in 1896 *does* predict the electoral behavior of the states in 2000 remarkably well. If one were to predict that a Republican state in 1896 would be Democratic in 2000, and vice versa, one would get all but five states correct. Between 1896 and 1960, 11 Republican upper Atlantic and upper Midwest states joined the Democratic coalition, while 12 primarily Plains and border states left the Democratic coalition and joined the Republicans. Beginning with 1964,¹ California, Oregon, and most of the rest of the Northeast have become reliably Democratic, while the South has become reliably Republican. The composition of these two unpredictable transformations is a nearly perfect reversal of the partisan alignment of 1896. Urban, cosmopolitan states supported the Republican McKinley in 1896 and the Democrat Gore in 2000. Virtually all of the rural and Southern states that supported Bryan's brand of traditional (not to mention fundamentalist) values in 1896 supported Bush in 2000.

Furthermore, a state that is *more strongly Democratic* in 1896 is predictably *more strongly Republican* in 2000. A simple regression of percentage Democratic

¹ Burnham noted that with the 1964 election, the pendulum had begun to swing back toward the 1896 cleavage. Examining the 1964 election, Burnham (1968, 6) noted both a sharp shift from the 1960 and preceding elections and a "similarity with such sectionally polarized elections as the Bryan-McKinley contest of 1896."

TABLE 2. Simple Regression Results by State

DV	% Democratic 1960	% Democratic 2000	% Democratic 2000
IV	% Democratic 1896	% Democratic 1960	% Democratic 1896
Coeff. (SE)	-.049 (.046)	.762 (.198)	-.266 (.053)
<i>t</i>	-1.06	3.84	-4.98
R^2	.02	.23	.37

vote in 2000 on percentage Democratic vote in 1896 gives a strongly significant negative coefficient. Indeed, one can get a more accurate prediction with this negative relationship ($R^2 = .37$) than by predicting the 2000 election outcome from the much more recent 1960 election ($R^2 = .23$) (Table 2).

This fact does not make sense from the perspective of the traditional literature on realignment. In that literature, new "shocks" to the political system occasionally come along, and sometimes such a shock results in a partisan realignment. If this were an accurate model, then each new partisan realignment should result in cumulatively "noisy" transformations of the partisan alignment. There is no reason to believe that a series of such realignments would result in the parties effectively "trading places" (Smith 2002).

This paper has several purposes. The first is to argue that the striking "mirror image" of the 1896 election in 2000 is understandable through a two-dimensional spatial model. We believe that the two underlying dimensions have remained remarkably similar for a century and a half, even while the maneuverings of party leaders (candidates and activists) have resulted in quite different party positions in that underlying two-dimensional space.

The second purpose is to produce a formal argument that explains the spatial positions of the parties through time as a result of both activists and candidates. The literature on the internal organization of parties (Schlesinger 1994) emphasizes the differences in goals of party candidates and party activists—but the traditional spatial modeling literature regards parties as monolithic rational actors, with a single coherent goal of winning elections. We argue that this spatial modeling literature cannot account for the peculiar pattern by which parties have transformed themselves in their search for electoral victory.


In particular, we examine party candidates who are motivated primarily to win elections but who use activist contributions to increase vote shares. Such candidates will on occasion engage in "flanking" moves so as to enlist coalitions of disaffected voters, at the risk of alienating some of their traditional activist supporters. We argue that a result of such "flanking" moves, in the early part of this century, was a shift in emphasis from an underlying social dimension to the economic dimension. In the last four decades, elections have seen salience shift from economics to social policy. The net result of a series of such flanking moves, over more than a century, has been to reproduce the partisan alignment of the end of the nineteenth century, but with the parties in reversed positions in two-dimensional space.

The third purpose of the paper is to use the distinction between activists and candidates to introduce a concept of "dynamic equilibrium." We take this to mean that, in a given election, candidates seek to win elections against a constraint given by the location of the current cadre of party activists and their preferences; this may or may not involve an attempt to relocate the center of party gravity by building a coalition with disaffected activists. Between elections, current and potential party activists reconsider the impact of party leaders in the recent election on their own decisions to join or leave the party activists. The net result of those decisions is, quite possibly, a new configuration of party activists constraining the next party candidates. What we observe as "flanking" maneuvers over short-term horizons give rise, over the long run, to the historically documented partisan realignments of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

PARTY COMPETITION IN TWO POLICY DIMENSIONS

Let us assume that American voters have preferences that can be represented in a policy space of as few as two dimensions. The two dimensions underlying partisan competition since the Civil War may be thought of as an economic and a social dimension. (See Figure 1.) The economic dimension is one in which the left side represents a pro-redistribution position articulated by rural, populist, consumerist, and environmentalist interests. The right side represents a policy position in opposition to the use of the state to support redistributive policies from the rich to the poor. This ideological stance is associated with large businesses and professionals who oppose redistributive taxes, strict regulation of business, and large expenditures on welfare and other social policies in aid of low-income groups. Throughout the era since the Civil War, this axis has distinguished pro- and antibusiness segments of the population.

The vertical dimension is a social dimension. The issue most consistently loading on this dimension has been racial, where "liberalism" has been identified with policies favorable to blacks and other minorities. "Social" conservatives oppose the use of government, especially the national government, to provide additional benefits or opportunities to Afro-American minorities, for example. This distinction between racial liberals and conservatives has had much the same content since Reconstruction. The debate has involved one side which consistently oppose greater political, economic, or legal concessions for racial minorities, as advocated by the other side (although, of course, the status quo has

FIGURE 1. Democratic and Republican "Economic" Policy Positions in a Two-Dimensional Factor Space

changed over this time). This social policy dimension has also been correlated with other policy issues; racial conservatives from Bryan through Strom Thurmond have been associated with Protestant fundamentalism and traditional family values. At different times, the issues of women's rights, crime, abortion, prayer in schools, the military draft, and anticommunism have been indicators of this underlying social preference dimension.

While many policy dimensions are correlated with one ideological dimension or the other, the two dimensions are relatively independent. There are leaders and voters who are both economically and socially conservative (Region B); these include figures from Grover Cleveland, through the Taft family, up to and including Robert Dole. There are also politicians who are both economically and socially liberal (Region D). These include Bob LaFollette, Hubert Humphrey, George McGovern, and Ralph Nader.

But there are also a large number of voters who mix one form of conservatism with another form of liberalism. The group in Region A are what we would call "populists"—social conservatives with a marked antipathy for big business, who favor policies that benefit "the little guy." These include notable Southern populists from Huey Long and Wright Patman to George Wallace. Outside of the South, there are other socially conservative blue-collar workers who are opposed to big government (Jarvis of the tax revolt) or hostile both to affirmative action and to big business (the Northern

blue-collar followers of Patrick Buchanan). Aside from their antipathy to big business, however, this group shares a conservative position on race, religion, and patriotism issues.

The mirror image of the populists is the group that may be thought of as "cosmopolitans"—a term that is meant to imply a linkage with national economic interests and an appreciation of social diversity. These have included Nelson Rockefeller, William Weld of Massachusetts, and Pete Wilson of California, but also many other urban professional and business interests who are likely to be in favor of abortion rights, opposed to prayer in schools, and supportive of some form of affirmative action for minorities. Most recently, this includes moderate Republicans who have identified with James Jeffords's exit from the Republican Party.

In a European-style proportional representation system, such a two-dimensional diversity of opinion would no doubt be represented by a diversity of parties (Laver and Schofield 1990). As suggested by Duverger's (1954) work, however, the American system of first-past-the-post, single-member legislative districts, along with the presidential system, is generally prohibitive of a multi-party system. The pressures to negotiate majority coalitions out of minority positions are strong. While third parties may play an important role in realignment, they do not do so by winning a significant number of seats in Congress, but by serving as catalysts for change in the main parties' coalitional structures. (We discuss third parties more fully below.)

Because the U.S. system is essentially a two-party system in two dimensions, American political parties have to encompass a broad diversity of policy opinion to win a presidential election. A winning electoral coalition will have to combine voters who have quite different preferences on at least one dimension. In Figure 1, the traditional position of the Democratic and Republican parties during the New Deal alignment is approximated. The parties are sharply differentiated on the economic policy dimension but largely undifferentiated on social policy. (As Carmines and Stimson [1989] note, the Republican party was, if anything, slightly more liberal on racial policy up until 1964.) Members of the Democratic Party, in particular, while sharing many elements of an economic ideology, held sharply different positions on race.

In other words, successful American parties must be coalitions of enemies. A party gets to be a majority party by forming fragile ties across wide and deep differences in one dimension or the other. Maintaining such diverse majority coalitions is necessarily an enormous struggle against strong centrifugal forces. Consequently, there will always be an electoral incentive for the losing party to split the majority party by means of the suppressed policy dimension and then woo away some pivotal voters from the winning party. A partisan realignment, we argue, takes place when shifting public perceptions of the partisan positions of the two parties lead some subset of the population to switch voting patterns, creating a new winning partisan coalition.

When two parties differentiate themselves on the basis of one given dimension, we call that an *active* dimension. The very fact that the New Deal parties differed on economic policy guaranteed that legislative debate, electoral conflict, and media attention were focused on that dimension.² At the same time, the New Deal coalition required strict suppression of racial policy, because Southern Democrats and Northern liberals were so opposed on that dimension. Franklin Roosevelt's famous explanation for why he could not openly support a federal antilynching bill (it would alienate key Southern Democrats in Congress) is a striking example of the threat that activation of the social policy posed to the fragile Democratic coalition. Race was a potential fault line within the Democratic Party, which the Republican opposition tried to exploit. Every party alignment must create for the minority party a similar opportunity to divide the majority coalition.

It is the position of this paper that the reversal of party positions between 1896 and 2000 can only be understood in at least two such ideological dimensions. At times (i.e., the New Deal), the party cleavage line has divided economic liberals from economic conserva-

tives. At other times (i.e., the Reconstruction and the 2000 election), the party cleavage line has more consistently divided social liberals from social conservatives. A party candidate, especially a candidate in a party that has lost recent elections, may try to emphasize a previously suppressed policy dimension. This may have the effect of both splitting the opposing party's coalition and bringing disaffected voters who have intense preferences about that suppressed policy into their own party. Success by activating a previously suppressed dimension of policy may result in pivoting of the party cleavage line between the two parties. Two 90-degree movements (over whatever time period) of a party cleavage line result in a complete reversal of the ideological positions of the two parties. This paper provides both a model of how this may occur and an historical interpretation of the two such movements that have occurred between 1896 and 2000. The model will take as an illustration the transformation of the New Deal alignment by means of the activation of the social policy dimension since 1960.

Candidate Competition: Equilibrium or Disequilibrium

The literature on party realignment often represents party alignments as lines of cleavage in a two-dimensional space such as in Figure 1. See Sundquist 1983, for example. This is consistent with the rational choice literature on spatial modeling, where cleavage lines can be derived from a "deterministic" model of rational choice by voters. The most important theoretical result from the spatial modeling literature is that no party may take a position that cannot be beaten by a challenging party taking some other policy position in the space (McKelvey 1979; McKelvey and Schofield 1986; Schofield 1978, 1983). Given any party position such as D_a in Figure 1, there will in general exist a set of alternatives, called the win set, each of which can defeat D_a . The opposition party, by taking position R_c in the win set of D_a should be able to shift its coalition of support to defeat an incumbent.

Candidates, according to the literature on political parties, are interested in winning elections (Schlesinger 1994). An unconstrained challenging candidate trying to defeat an incumbent identified at location D_a would move the party position from R_a to location R_c . The standard spatial modeling assumption is that the party's position is unilaterally chosen by the candidate. That assumption, together with the assumption that the candidate always wants to win elections, leads to the conclusion that two-party competition should be a chaotic series of ever-shifting party coalitions.

Although the recent literature on realignment (Brady 1988; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989) acknowledges the possibility of shifting party positions, it has not considered the likelihood of permanently chaotic party configurations. This paper regards party realignments as being a rather controlled manifestation of underlying two-dimensional electoral instability.

² At any time, politics will appear largely one-dimensional because the existing party activist equilibrium will define party differences along the dimension that distinguishes them. Unidimensional models will successfully predict most of the variation in legislative voting patterns (Koford 1989). Over time, shifts in the composition of the party activist coalition will change the policy "meaning" of the partisan cleavage (Karol 1999). An attempt to estimate the two dimensions underlying party cleavages over time is found in Schofield, Miller, and Martin 2003.

The “instability theorem” alluded to above assumes that voters choose “deterministically” (by, for example, voting for the candidate nearest the voter “bliss” point). An alternative theory “smooths” voter preferences by assuming that each voter is “stochastic.” That is, each voter is described by a probability vector; the nearer the candidate is to the voter, the higher the probability that the voter will choose that candidate. Under the assumption that candidates choose positions to maximize expected vote shares, and accepting a number of reasonable conditions, it can be shown that candidates converge to the mean of the distribution of the voter ideal points. The existence of such pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) is discussed in Banks and Duggan 1999, Coughlin 1992, Enelow and Hinich 1984, and Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999. This convergence parallels the equilibrium result of Downs (1957) in one dimension.³ However, neither the “instability” nor the convergence results of these classes of models is supported by empirical evidence (Merrill and Grofman 1999; Schofield et al. 1998).

In contrast to the assumption of these models that candidates are unconstrained, it is evident that candidates in U.S. presidential elections are, to some degree, constrained by the necessity of winning primaries, raising funds, and mobilizing volunteers. These constraints are associated with party activists, who have different goals from candidates. The next section describes the Aldrich model, in which party “location” in policy space is determined by the decisions of party activists.

Party Activist Equilibrium

As noted by Schlesinger (1994) and Aldrich (1983a, 1983b, 1995), activists are less concerned with winning elections than with maintaining the ideological stance of the party. “The political role [of party activists] is to attempt to constrain the actual leaders of the party, its ambitious office seekers, as they try to become the party-in-government by appealing to the electorate” (Aldrich 1995, 183).

Aldrich (1983a, 1983b, 1995) argues that party activists, not candidates, play the primary role in creating the public’s perception of the “location” of the party in ideological space. Voters take the location of the “average” Democratic and Republican activists as their cues; those voters who find that the location of one party’s activists is much closer to their own preferences than that of the other party may decide to become activists themselves. For example, if a voter finds that the average Democratic activist has policy preferences very like her own, she is more likely to enlist as an activist. In

doing so, she may “move” the location of the average Democratic activist slightly in the direction of her ideal point—which may include a strong prochoice position, for example. In that way, a pro-life activist may find himself at too much of a distance from the gradually moving typical Democratic activist position and resign. Both the enlistment of the pro-choice activist and the deactivation of the pro-life activist have the effect of moving the public’s identification of the Democratic Party. At the same time, as the Democratic Party becomes more pro-choice, the strongly pro-life voter may decide to become a Republican activist, initiating a similar adjustment of the Republican party.

Aldrich’s contribution is to show that the aggregation of such decisions to join or exit the cadre of party activists may constitute stable, activist equilibrium in which parties maintain a certain distance in the ideological space, as illustrated in Figure 1 with D_a and R_a . Activists preserve their ideological distance and, at the same time, create stability in partisan alignments. In Figure 1, the domains N_D and N_R are used to denote the support of ideal points of those voters who choose, in Aldrich’s model, to become activists for the Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Note that the radii of N_D and N_R are determined by parameters of the model, in particular, by the cost, c , that each activist chooses to pay in support of the chosen party. In Aldrich’s model, D_a and R_a are, respectively, the average policy positions taken over the preferred (bliss) points of Democratic and Republican activists. Aldrich’s model has the great theoretical virtue of predicting neither chaos nor convergent equilibrium.

The constraint implicit in this model can be illustrated in Figure 1. While a move from R_a to R_c might be favored by the challenging candidate as a winning move, it is one that would be viewed by economic conservatives as “selling out.” The economic conservatives will inevitably play a key role in a party alignment (such as the New Deal alignment), in which parties are differentiated primarily on economic policy. They will feel that a great deal is at stake in the difference between the parties and will be most likely to vote in primaries, donate money, and engage in canvassing. During the forties and fifties, for instance, Republican activists were professional and small business entrepreneurs who were activated by the classic party conflicts over unionization, nationalized medicine, and taxation. Democratic activists in that period were much more likely to be active union members and farmers, with an equal stake in an economically liberal stance by their party.

What control do party activists have over the public perception of the party? First, they will play a major role in selecting the party candidate. Time and again since 1964, we have seen a majority of party activists throw their support for more extreme over more centrist candidates in primary elections. In 1964, it was Barry Goldwater who defeated William Scranton of Pennsylvania. In 1972, George McGovern won the nomination in the primaries with a liberal position that proved disastrous at the polls. In 2000, centrist John McCain’s popularity with Independents and moderate

³ A third model assumes deterministic voters (with “Euclidean” preferences, for example) and candidate “mixed strategy Nash equilibria” in a two-candidate symmetric voting game. An earlier result of McKelvey (1986), demonstrated more formally in Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton 2002, shows that the support of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria lies within the so-called “uncovered set.” However, with a large electorate this set will be small, and centrally located. Consequently, those results also effectively imply that candidates will “converge” to the center (typically, the multidimensional median) of the voter ideal points.

Republicans proved insufficient to defeat George W. Bush when traditional conservatives rallied to the latter's side. Furthermore, candidates, once selected, must act to keep party activists happy enough to continue to make contributions of money, time, and effort.

It appears that there is a great deal of evidence for Aldrich's argument. First, there is the empirical observation that in the United States (and other political systems), parties do not converge to the center (Adams and Merrill 1999 or Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Furthermore, party activists in the United States tend to be more ideologically extreme than the average Democratic or Republican voter. Finally, political parties do not constantly shift and realign as would be predicted by a model of candidate vote maximization in two-dimensional space. In fact, the "disciplining" force of party activists can be seen in virtually every election.

However, while Aldrich's model rationalizes non-convergent activist equilibrium, it fails to do two things. First, it does not contain party candidates—who *do* want to win elections first and foremost. Second, it does not explain how party activist equilibria are themselves disrupted. For it is clear that occasionally party positions do change, in ways that often dismay traditional party activists and disrupt existing party activist equilibria. In 1964, traditional Republican activists were upset by the nomination of Goldwater; in 1972, many traditional Democratic activists dropped from the rolls of party activists rather than support a more socially liberal Democratic candidate. Evidently, there are destabilizing forces that occasionally disrupt party activist equilibria as described by Aldrich. The purpose of the next section is to provide a formal model, building on Aldrich (1983a, 1983b) and Aldrich and McGinnis (1989), to examine the forces that party candidates may exploit to try to win elections.

A Joint Model of Activists and Candidates

Essentially, the model is a dynamic one based on the willingness of voters to provide support to a candidate. Given current candidate strategies (z), let $C(z) = [C_1(z), \dots, C_p(z)]$ be the current level of support to the various candidates. This support is important to candidates, we assume, because it allows them to have an impact on the *nonpolicy* level of support of voters—which has been called *valence* (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Schofield 2003). We suggest, in contrast to the usual assumptions, that valences consist of two components. For each candidate, j , there is an "innate" valence. We suggest that this is best characterized by a stochastic error term, ε_j . The second component, λ_j , is affected by the money and time that activists make available to candidate j . Essentially, this means that the valence component, λ_j , is a function of the policy choices of all candidates. This implies that we model voter utility by the equation

$$u_{ij}(z) = \lambda_j(z) - A_{ij}(x_i, z_j) + \varepsilon_j, \quad (1)$$

where x_i is voter's i 's preferred policy and z_j is candidate j 's strategy, both in a policy space, X . We make an

important modification of the spatial model in that the salience of different policy dimensions varies among the electorate. More precisely, we assume that

$$A_{ij}(x_i, z_j) = \|x_i - z_j\|_i^2, \quad (2)$$

Here $\|\cdot\|_i$ is an "ellipsoidal" norm giving a metric whose coefficients depend on x_i , as specified further below. The spatial term, A_{ij} , we call the nonvalence or policy component of voter utility.

Candidates deploy their resources, via television and other media, and this has an effect on the vector $\lambda = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_p)$ of candidate-dependent valences. We assume that the nonstochastic valence component, λ_j , is a function of $C(z)$ and thus z .

At this point, a voter, i , may choose to be an activist by adding her own contribution $c_{ij} > 0$ to candidate j subject to the condition

$$c_{ij} < \lambda_j(z) - A_{ij}(x_i, z_j) + \varepsilon_j. \quad (3)$$

Aldrich (1983a) considered an equilibrium of this dynamic process between two candidates, 1 and 2, where the candidate's position, z_j , was defined to be the mean of the ideal points of all activists who supported this candidate.


Consider now a group of Republican "economic" activists. The Republican candidate, j , is situated at the position $\mathbf{R}_a = (x, y)$, while the activist has a utility function given by

$$u_{ij}(x, y) = \lambda_j - [(x - s_i)^2/a^2] - [(y - t_i)^2/b^2] + \varepsilon_j. \quad (4)$$

The activist contributes some amount, $c_{ij} < u_{ij}(x, y)$. For activists who are more concerned about economic issues, it is natural to assume that $a < b$. If the activist actually had "bliss point" $(s_1, t_1) = \mathbf{R}_a$, then his indifference curve would be given by the "ellipsoid" centered at \mathbf{R}_a , as in Figure 2. Depending on various parameters, there will exist a domain, N_R , say, in X , with the property that every voter whose bliss point (s_i, t_i) belongs to N_R is a contributor to the Republican candidate. It is natural to assume that there is an opposing Democratic candidate, whose position is at \mathbf{D}_a , say, and an opposing set, N_D , of Democratic activists.

Aldrich showed, essentially, that these conditions could be satisfied, such that \mathbf{R}_a was given by the mean of the bliss points of the set N_R , while \mathbf{D}_a was the "mean" of the set N_D . It is obvious that for such an activist equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that λ_j , regarded as a function of campaign contributions, is concave (or as has diminishing returns) in contributions to candidate j .

Because candidates can transform activist contributions into non-policy related votes, they cannot be indifferent to the policy preferences of those who are motivated to be activists in a given existing activist equilibrium. On the other hand, as vote maximizers, they may be willing to trade off current activist support for the support of other potential activists—hence the much-documented tension between party activists and candidates. How might candidates (who are passive in the Aldrich model) go about finding a policy position that induces an optimal corps of activists?

FIGURE 2. Illustration of Flanking Moves by Republican and Democratic Candidates circa 1964–92, in a Two-Dimensional Policy Space

As Figure 2 indicates, a typical socially motivated voter would regard Democratic and Republican candidates during the New Deal as equally unattractive, and tend to be indifferent. Civil rights supporters, for example, were frustrated by FDR's refusal to support an antilynching law and, occasionally, threatened to "sit out" elections. Similarly, Dixiecrats walked out of the only New Deal-era Democratic convention (1948) that took a strong pro-civil rights position.

Let us now suppose that such a socially conservative voter, g , has bliss point (s_2, t_2) , say, near the position I_a , with utility function

$$u_{gj}(x, y) = \lambda_j - [(x - s_2)^2/e^2] - [(y - t_2)^2/f^2]. \quad (5)$$

Let N_C be the set of such "disaffected" social conservatives who would be willing to contribute to a candidate as long as this candidate adopted a policy position close to his bliss point—especially if the social policy position was close to t_2 . We suggest that such social conservatives regard social policy to be of greater significance and so $e > f$ in Eq. (5).

Unlike Aldrich, we now suppose that the Republican candidate adopts a position, not at the mean R_a , but at some compromise position between R_a and I_a . It is easy to demonstrate that the "contract curve" between the point (s_1, t_1) and the point (s_2, t_2) is given by the

equation

$$(y - t_1)/(x - s_1) = S(y - t_2)/(x - s_2), \quad (6)$$

where $S = [b^2/a^2][e^2/f^2]$. We use the term "catenary" to describe this curve.

If the Republican candidate moves on this locus, then the resulting number of activists will be of the order $\mu N_R + (1 - \mu)N_C$, where μ is some constant (less than one) dependent on the position taken by the candidate. Because of the asymmetry involved, the total number of activists may increase, thus increasing overall contributions to the Republican candidate. Clearly, there are plausible conditions under which λ_j increases as a result of such a move by a Republican candidate, thus increasing the effective vote share of the Republican candidate. That is, the Republican candidate's desire to win elections can cause him to make a move that will transform the existing party activist equilibrium.

Determination of the existence of a candidate PSNE depends on continuity and quasi-concavity (or concavity) of the candidate utility functions $\{U_j\}$. While each U_j will be a function of z , its dependence on z will be more complex than the simple relationship implicit in the standard spatial model. It is important to note that this proposed model involves differing voter utility functions. To preserve continuity of voter response, it is necessary that the coefficients of voter policy loss

vary continuously with the voter-preferred policy. This can be accommodated by requiring that the function $A_j(z_j): X \rightarrow R$ given by

$$A_j(z_j)(x_i) = \|x_i - z_i\|_i^2 \quad (7)$$

is continuous. This means that the salience parameters change continuously with the bliss point of the voter.

With these assumptions, candidate vote share functions $\{V_j\}$ will be continuous in (the vector of) candidate strategies. Candidate utility functions are generally derived from the vote share functions, and so quasi-concavity or concavity of the candidate utility functions and thus the existence of PSNE can then be shown (see Schofield [2002, 2003] for the technical argument). It is worth emphasizing that the greater the relative salience (b/a) and (e/f), the greater will be S , and thus, the more significant will be the attraction of building a coalition with dissident activist groups to enhance electoral support.

The mixed activist-voter model suggests why a transformation in activist-generated equilibria can occur. In contrast to Aldrich, we suggest that the policy positions of the two parties are chosen by “expected” vote-maximizing candidates. The voter model itself is of the standard probabilistic variety (Enelow and Hinich 1985; Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999). However, the novel feature is that the voter calculus involves a non-policy, valence variable, associated with each candidate. This nonpolicy variable is a monotone increasing, concave function of the respective party activist total contributions. It is an immediate and obvious feature of this model that candidates do not converge in Downsian fashion to the center of the electoral distribution. Instead, a “rational” candidate will choose a policy position so as to “balance” activist contributions and voter responses. (For an empirical analysis based on this formal model, see Schofield, Miller, and Martin 2003) In this variant, potential activists who place high valuation on policy shifts can offer significant contributions and, thus, “affect” rather than “control” candidate locations.

Note, also, that if one of the presidential candidates initiates a flanking move of the kind described, then the opponent should move even farther round the opposing catenary. We can illustrate the existence of the PSNE using Figure 2 as a guide. Let \mathbf{R}'_a and \mathbf{D}'_a be the positions of the Republican and Democratic candidates that maximize their total contributions from activists. These positions will be on the respective catenaries and will be independent of each other (because activist contributions will be determined solely by the respective candidate positions). At these positions the “valence” effects, now labeled λ_R and λ_D , will be maximized. Draw the arc between the position \mathbf{R}'_a and the position \mathbf{D}'_a . If the Republican candidate moves on this arc, toward the origin, λ_R will fall, but the overall policy or spatial component of the vote share may rise. Concavity of the vote share function means that there will be a unique point on the arc where the Republican candidate’s vote share is maximized. Indeed, by the implicit assumptions of continuity and concavity, the Republican candidate will have a continuous

best response to the Democratic candidate’s position. Mutual best response defines the PSNE. This PSNE can also be characterized by the partisan cleavage line, which separates those voters with a higher probability of voting Republican than Democrat. Note that if liberal social activists attract the democratic candidate to move toward them on the liberal catenary, then the best response of the Republican will be to move farther toward the conservative social activists. (More details on the existence of PSNE can be found in Schofield, Miller, and Martin 2003)

The catenary or contract curve (and thus the best response position) depends on the ratio of the intensities of relative preferences on the two axes associated with the activist groups. For example, if economic activists care relatively very strongly about the economy, and social activists care greatly about social policy, then the optimum position will be extreme on both axes. In a very intuitive fashion, the model allows for response to the relative numbers of the activist groups, their intensity of preferences, and their “willingness” to contribute. A party’s candidate should be more willing to seek to move farther down the catenary in an attempt to enlist the social activists when the social activists are larger in numbers and when the intensity of their preferences induces a greater willingness to contribute.

Third Parties

Third parties play a particularly interesting role in this model. They represent voters who are particularly concerned about issue dimensions that are suppressed by the existing party alignment. For example, in 1968, Wallace represented those who were alienated from the Democratic Party by its sponsorship of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In 1935, Franklin Roosevelt was moved to consolidate the economic liberal position of the New Deal to avert a third-party threat from the economic Left. In 1980, Anderson ran a campaign appealing to upper-income, college-educated liberal Republicans on the coasts who were upset about the socially conservative course that Reagan was setting for the GOP. In 2000, Ralph Nader insisted that both major parties were in thrall to corporate elites and represented economic liberals who felt that the “culture wars” competition between Democrats and Republicans had left New Deal liberalism behind.

Once organized, such third parties demonstrate to party elites the electoral advantage of the “flanking maneuver” described in the model above. In the runup to 1972, the attraction of the millions of socially conservative Wallace voters rationalized Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” and exerted a powerful tug on Nixon toward point \mathbf{I}_a in Figure 2. Anderson’s third-party run in 1980 offered the prospect of disaffected socially liberal Republicans whose votes were up for grabs; many of these became Clinton Democrats in the nineties.

The Wallace candidacy of 1968 and the Anderson candidacy of 1980 represented two distinct groups of activists who had quite distinct perspectives about a

reorientation of the Republican Party. The Wallace candidacy illustrated what we call a *leading third party* for the Republicans in the seventies, since it served to attract Nixon and other Republican elites toward a new party position that emphasized conservative social policy rather than the historic economic conservatism. In contrast, the Anderson candidacy represented traditional New Deal Republicans who were dismayed to see the Republican party moving away from their position; consequently, we can call the Anderson candidacy a *dragging third party*. More recently, the Nader candidacy was quite consciously a *dragging third party* for the Democrats, as Nader objected that the Democratic Party had in the nineties abandoned the traditional economic liberalism of the New Deal and was, in the opinion of his supporters, indistinguishable from the Republican party in its support of big business.

Summary of the Model

The elements of the model are as follows.

Some voters are motivated by the policy proximity of one set of party activists (and the distance from the other party activists) to join the cadre of activists. Each decision to exit or enter the cadre of activists changes the mean location of the activist core and, thus, the public perception of the locations of the parties. Stable divergence in the parties' public image is the result of what Aldrich calls "activist equilibrium."

Candidates, unlike party activists, are primarily interested in winning elections; consequently, each candidate has an incentive to try to move the public's perception of his party to a position that maximizes the expected vote.

At any point in time, a candidate is likely to find that current party activists are intensely concerned with one dimension, while a "disaffected" group is more intensely concerned with a different dimension of ideology. Consequently, the candidate may reasonably hope to make a "flanking" move that appeals to one group of disaffected voters without losing too many party activists. When successful, this initiates a shift in partisan activists and, therefore, a redefinition of the public's image of the "relocation" of the parties.

For any given party alignment, "disaffecteds" may try to hasten a realignment by means of a leading third-party attempt. The success of a leading third party is often the excuse that a vote-maximizing party candidate is looking for, to destabilize an existing party activist equilibrium. Party activists who are disgruntled with the previous activist equilibrium may form the core of a dragging third-party attempt.

From this perspective, the partisan realignments of the past century have been fundamentally linked to the multidimensionality of the potential policy space. They have been initiated by "flanking movements" rather than by frontal assaults. Rather than fighting toe-to-toe for the moderates in the exact center of the space, candidates have tried to appeal to disaffected voters in the dimension that has recently not distinguished the two parties.

Of course, an outward thrust on a party's left flank leaves its own right flank exposed and vulnerable, at least in the long run. If this is the case, then each attempt to build a new majority party sows the seeds of the next party realignment.

It is important to note that we hypothesize a voter-activist equilibrium at each election, conditional on the various parameters of the model. However, this does not necessarily imply that the sequence of equilibria will vary smoothly over time. Each equilibrium is determined by candidate calculations over the relative "value" of "activist" and "disaffected" coalitions (and thus by the configurations of the utility functions of such actors). These parameters may shift dramatically as the result of exogenous social and economic shocks.

In the rest of this paper, the implications of this model are used to provide an interpretation of the past century of partisan shifts in ideology.

PARTISAN STRATEGIES

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the dynamics implied by the model in the first half of this paper can explain the switching of party positions in the United States between 1896 and 2000. Between 1960 and 2000, party differences along the economic cleavage line were replaced by a social cleavage between the two parties. And between 1896 and 1960, the Reconstruction social cleavage was ultimately replaced by the New Deal economic cleavage. The net result of both transformations was the flipping of party positions described in the introduction.

The Decline of Race and the Rise of Class: 1896–1960

While the period of 1960 to 2000 saw the undoing of the New Deal partisan cleavage, the period from 1896 to 1960 saw the creation of that economic cleavage from a system that had been primarily divided over the issue of race, civil war, and reconstruction. After the Civil War, the Republicans were most clearly associated with the successful emancipation of slaves and the less successful Reconstruction of the South on an integrated basis. The Republican coalition was united on a social policy dimension. Some Republicans, like Lincoln, were already pro-business advocates, but some Republicans were emancipationists who had joined the party for social liberal reasons only. After the Civil War, the Republican Party continued to include liberal supporters of Reconstruction, new black voters, and what historian Eric Goldman calls "patrician dissidents," also known as "goo-goos" and "mugwumps," who resisted the increasing influence of industrialists in the Republican Party (Goldman 1956, 16).

The two wings of the Republican Party had no strong differences of opinion on social policy: They did have markedly different positions on economic policy. They were kept in alliance by frequent electoral "waving of the bloody flag"—references to the losses of the Civil War that served to reaffirm the Civil War issue party

alignment. As a result, the Reconstruction Republican position was socially liberal but relatively neutral on the economic dimension.

The Democrats had to bear the burden of the Civil War legacy; they also took the racially conservative position that allowed the gradual reimposition of white supremacy in the South. They represented largely rural interests and opposed the tariff, but Democrats, like Republicans, included both pro-business and anti-business forces. Cleveland was a Democrat who gave aid and comfort to business forces. He supported the gold standard, kept tax burdens low for corporations, and fought to keep the government out of economic life, especially where it might benefit low-income groups. He used federal troops to help the Pullman Company put down its desperate workers during their famous strike, which made fellow Democrat William Jennings Bryan charge, "Cleveland might be honest, but so were the mothers who threw their children in the Ganges." (Goldman 1956, 33) Since each party combined economic liberals and conservatives, the cleavage line between the parties was best thought of as a horizontal line separating the party of Reconstruction from its socially conservative opponent.

Who were the "disaffected" voters in the Reconstruction Era? Both economic liberals and economic conservatives had reason to feel inadequately represented in the Reconstruction party alignment. Economic liberals were necessarily agrarian interests, who formed various agrarian interest groups, culminating in the Populist Party, to fight what they saw as the stranglehold of Eastern banks and railroads on the pocketbook of the small farmers.

The creation of the Republican majority after 1896 carried with it a long-term opportunity for the Democratic Party. After 1896, Republicans were increasingly identified with a pro-business economic position. As that issue became more salient, the Bull Moose Progressives under Theodore Roosevelt were in an increasingly disaffected position. Because the Republicans had made the pro-business position the defining position for the Republicans, the Progressives' advocacy of economic regulation and socially liberal positions (social welfare agencies, public health, pure food and drug) made them the obvious target for Democratic cooptation.

Up until the 1920s, the Democrats had been primarily a rural party and, therefore, an unacceptable alternative for the largely urban Progressives. But during the twenties, Al Smith began to push the Democratic Party to take positions that appealed to Catholics, Jews, immigrants, and the new urban working class. Al Smith and, in particular, FDR were more persuasive wooers of urban liberal Republicans than Bryan had ever been. The 1928 Democratic convention marked the beginning of a new Democratic coalition that combined the Bryan populists (Region A) with urban liberals (Region D).

Although Roosevelt was elected in 1932 as a moderate, and tried for two years to maintain a centrist position, the potential for third-party candidates drove him to finish the economic radicalization of the Democratic Party after 1934. Roosevelt viewed the principal threat

to his reelection as being a leftist candidate such as Huey Long. In the Second New Deal, in the two years before his reelection in 1936, Roosevelt moved decisively leftward to forestall such a third-party attempt. In the process, he consolidated the economic orientation of the New Deal coalition, bringing the liberals from region D into alliance with the rural Southern Populists of Bryan. The New Deal pulled such old Bull Moosers as Harold Ickes out of the Republican Party and into the administration (Fine 1976, 392), where they were perfectly comfortable. In addition, they pulled black voters, urban ethnic minorities, and other Republican constituencies, making the Democrats the majority party for the middle third of the twentieth century.

The cleavage line between the two parties became, for the first time since before the Civil War, a vertical, class-defined boundary (as in Figure 1). Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) document that during the New Deal, class was a good predictor of partisan voting in a way that it was not before or after the New Deal. The difference between the proportion of working-class whites voting Democratic and that voting Republican peaked in 1948 at about 44 percentage points. By maintaining the New Deal coalition, Democrats were able to win every presidential race from 1932 to 1964, with the exception of those won by Eisenhower, the World War II hero.

However, the price of being a majority coalition in a two-dimensional world is having to deal with the huge policy differences within different elements of the party. Just as the Republicans of 1912 had faced a split between the Progressive Republicans and the conservatives, the class solidarity of the Democrats did not eliminate the social policy differences between Southern segregationists and Northern liberals. The contradictions were already apparent in 1948, when Hubert Humphrey's riveting call for racial justice divided the Democratic Party. These contradictions presented the inevitable opportunity for Republicans to put together a countercoalition by further pivoting the cleavage line between the parties.

"The Decline of Class and the Rise of Race": 1960 to 2000

The New Deal coalition put together by Franklin Roosevelt necessitated the suppression of the social policy differences between the racial conservatives in the Solid South and the racial liberals of the North. This coalition had faltered in 1948, when the Democratic Party split over a civil rights plank and the Dixiecrats ran as a third-party. But in 1960, the coalition had been patched up, and the parties were still primarily differentiated by economic ideology and class-based voting. As late as 1962, most of the public (55.9%) saw no difference between the two parties on civil rights, and the rest were evenly split (Petrocik 1981, 135-38). In April 1963, it was still only 4% of the population that felt that civil rights was the most important issue (Gallup 1972). It is no wonder that Kennedy felt he might be reelected

the next year by the old New Deal coalition, including the Solid South.

However, after 1962, civil rights leaders succeeded in their policy of destabilization—breaking up the New Deal coalition by forcing the Kennedy administration to choose the side of federal law or state segregation in schools, interstate travel, and voter registration. After the success of the Birmingham protest in May 1963, Kennedy became the first Democratic president to ask Congress for a strong civil rights bill. By October of the same year, after the Birmingham bombings, Wallace's standing in the doorway at Tuscaloosa, and the March on Washington, the Gallup Poll revealed that 52% of the public felt that civil rights was the most important issue facing the country (Gallup 1972). Lyndon Johnson was convinced that he had to have a civil rights success to lead the Democrats to victory in 1964; by his actions in 1964 and 1965, he reached out to civil rights activists and brought them definitively into the Democratic Party. The New Deal coalition was shattered.

In Figure 2, Johnson's move is shown as an upward move from D_a to D'_a , not a move toward the center. Notice the logic of this flanking move. A move toward the center would have alienated the traditional New Deal Democratic activists—the economic liberals of labor and the consumer movement. However, an upward move gave no sign of alienating the party activists most concerned about economic policy. The Democrats' labor allies were solidly behind the Civil Rights Act. The upward move consequently succeeded in keeping economic liberals who were inclined toward social liberalism. At the same time, an upward shift earned the loyalty of the previously disaffected civil rights workers, who were to become a principal component of the post-1964 Democratic activist cadre, in a new, postrealignment activist equilibrium. In terms of the model, Johnson was able to earn the valence benefits of both economic and social liberal activists.

The shift in the public's perception of the Democratic Party created a huge landslide in 1964. Not only did Johnson win the White House by a margin of 16 million votes, but the Democrats added two seats to their majority in the Senate and 48 seats in the House. No member of the House who had voted for the 1964 Civil Rights Act was defeated in either party. Half the Northern members who had voted against the bill were defeated (Branch 1998, 522). Civil rights activists had succeeded in their goal of forcing the Democratic Party off its New Deal equilibrium.

The success of the civil rights activists in forcing the Democratic Party to take a stronger civil rights position had the kind of disequilibrating effect that Aldrich (1995) hypothesized on the New Deal party activist equilibrium: As more civil rights activists became involved in politics, it encouraged more social liberals to become activists and drove social conservatives out of the Democratic Party. It moved the center of gravity of the Democratic activists upward. These social activists had other social concerns as well as civil rights, which became an agenda for the Democratic Party: women's rights, civil liberties, consumerism, environmentalism.

As Aldrich hypothesized, this also had implications for Republican activists. Let us consider the kind of person who had been a New Deal-era Republican activist. Presumably, her ideal point is near R_a (in Figure 2). In addition, however, she is probably more intensely concerned with economic policy than social policy, since for decades it had been only the economic dimension that differentiated the two parties. The party differential on social policy had been zero. This is indicated in Figure 2 by the ellipsoidal indifference curve for the Republican activists.


From Goldwater through Reagan, the strategy of Republican candidates was to build a coalition along the contract curve between economic and social conservatives. Barry Goldwater clearly served to destabilize the party activist equilibrium in 1964. In July of 1964, Goldwater was one of only eight non-Southern senators to vote against the Civil Rights Act. A few weeks later, the Republican National Convention refused to seat the traditionally black Southern delegates to the the Republican convention and nominated Goldwater to be the Republican candidate. It was a disruptive shock to the GOP and to the public's perception of what the GOP stood for (Branch 1998, 403; Carmines and Stimson 1989).

Goldwater won the electoral votes of five states of the Deep South in 1964, four of them states that had voted Democratic for 84 years (Califano 1991, 55). He forged a new identification of the Republican party with racial conservatism, reversing a century-long association of the GOP with racial liberalism. This in turn opened the door for Nixon's "Southern strategy" and the Reagan victories of the eighties.

A small initial success with social conservatives could lead to a positive response by some social conservative activists; their arrival in the party could alienate some of the social liberals within the Republican Party, who would become less active; this in turn would lead to a closer identification with social conservatism, which would encourage more still social conservatives to become involved (Aldrich 1995, 184–85). At the same time, social liberals might be increasingly tempted to become activists for the Democratic Party. As Carmines and Stimson (1989, 188) argue, the "Goldwater gamble" worked for the Republican party: "It did break the tie of southern whites to the Democratic party."

The success of Goldwater in 1964 induced Wallace to run as an independent in 1968. Wallace attempted to mobilize voters on the newly salient social policy dimension. Wallace's campaign earned votes not only from Southern whites but from Northern social conservatives who were concerned about riots, court-ordered busing, the sexual freedom of the sixties, protests against the Vietnam War, and the breakdown of traditional values. Many of the same Milwaukee Polish Catholics who had voted for Kennedy over Humphrey in the 1960 Wisconsin primary voted for Wallace over Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.

In a biography of George Wallace, Carter (1995) argues that Wallace and the voters he represented were a continuing obsession with Nixon during his first term,

FIGURE 3. Possible Candidate Positions, 1976–2000

1968–72. During this time, Nixon engineered various rapprochements with Wallace individually while appealing to potential Wallace voters with a strong “law and order” position and, especially, an anti-busing policy stance. The result was a smashing triumph of Nixon and the “Southern Strategy” over McGovern in 1972.

By the decade of the seventies, class had been largely displaced as the organizing principle of two-party competition in the United States, and “race conflict [was] the major new element in the party-system agenda [T]he most visible difference between the party coalitions that entered the turbulent 1960s and those that exited in the middle 1970s is to be found in their newfound distinctiveness on race-related policy issues” (Petrocik 1981, 148–49).

While Reagan was successful in keeping the coalition of economic and social conservative activists in the Republican camp, the tensions between the two were increasingly apparent during the eighties. Hostility between Southern populists and Eastern business interests is an ancient tradition in the United States. In a GOP that attempted to keep these two warring camps in the same party coalition, economic issues are as divisive as racial issues were for the New Deal Democrats. The old Rockefeller Republicans, especially the social liberals, felt increasingly alienated within their own party. *Fortune* magazine, the vehicle for big business, ran a front cover suggesting what they heard as the message from the Republican party: “GOP to Business: Drop Dead?” The article inside said, “In a political arena dominated by small-business populists,

anti-government conservatives, and the religious right, corporate America’s the odd man out—mistrusted, resented, impotent” (Kirkland 1995, 50). In this article, big business announced that they increasingly felt themselves the “disaffected” voter in a party alignment based more and more on social policy.

It was this fault line in the Republican Party that Clinton was able to take advantage of in the nineties. Many cosmopolitans, while historically loyal to the Republican Party, were frightened of a GOP that was hostile to affirmative action and abortion rights and aggressively pushed traditional social values over economic conservatism. Clinton’s actions in the midnineties—especially welfare reform, a major crime bill, support for NAFTA, a balanced budget—upset many of his liberal supporters but made many upper-income social liberals comfortable voting for him in 1996. Clinton was acknowledged to have moved right on the economic dimension, while preserving the Democrat’s position of social liberalism (see Figure 3). Clinton made it legitimate for a professional suburban homeowner with a six-figure income, concerned about taxes, crime, and welfare fraud, to vote Democratic.

The special prosecutor’s investigations into the Clinton sex scandals had the perverse (for the Republicans) effect of further helping to drive group C cosmopolitans into the Democratic fold. While much of the new Republican party was convinced that the public would be as outraged as they were by the Clinton scandal, it became apparent that the Moral Majority was in fact a minority. Social liberal Republicans and

TABLE 3. Percentage of Cosmopolitans and Populists Voting for Democratic Congressional Candidates

	Populists ^a	Cosmopolitans ^b
1972–80	63%	46%
1982–90	55%	55%
1992–2000	29%	65%

Source: Smith (2002, Tables 10, 11).

^a Populists are operationalized as individuals in the sixteenth percentile or below on annual income who oppose abortion regardless of circumstances.

^b Cosmopolitans are operationalized as individuals in the sixty-eighth percentile or above on annual income who support reproductive freedom.

independents did not want to be a part of Starr's sexual inquisition. The impeachment issue became a defining moment for the Republican party in much the same way that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a defining moment for the Democrats: It identified clearly which voters were now vulnerable to the opposition party.

The extent of the realignment is shown by the shift in voting behavior on the part of cosmopolitans and populists. As shown in Table 3, cosmopolitans voting for Democratic congressional candidates rose from 46% in the seventies to 65% in the decade of the nineties. The percentage of low-income moral traditionalists, whom we would identify as populists, voting for Democratic congressional candidates dropped from 63% in the seventies to 29% in the nineties. The fact that this statistic is for congressional voting rather than presidential voting, and over five elections in each decade, suggests that the trend is broader, deeper, and more lasting than simply a feeling based on Clinton or other particular presidential candidates. Low-income social conservatives have left the New Deal coalition for the Republican Party, and high-income social liberals are increasingly comfortable voting in the Democratic Party (Smith 2002).

A number of political scientists have documented how partisan voting has evolved since 1960. According to Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1982, 2), party voting has been characterized since the New Deal by "the decline of class and the rise of race." They point out that the difference between the proportion of blacks and that of whites voting Democratic rose sharply, from less than 25% in 1960 to more than 50% in 1968 (3). This trend has continued: Democratic presidential candidates have never won more than 47% of the white vote, or less than 83% of the black vote, since 1976 (Connelly 2000, 4). Even a winning candidate like Clinton in 1996 won only 43% of the white vote but 84% of the black vote. Social liberals are now the core of any winning Democratic coalition, and in 2000, social conservatives were the core of the winning Republican coalition.

Choices, Credible Commitment, and Path Dependence

In considering Figure 2, we might wonder whether a Republican candidate has a choice about appealing to

disaffected social activists of either the liberal or the conservative persuasion. Could Nixon, for example, have appealed to civil rights activists rather than to Wallace supporters in 1972? Was there an equally viable "Northern Strategy" that would have substituted for his "Southern Strategy" in that year? After all, in 1957–58, Nixon had hoped to earn support from black voters by positioning the Republican Party as a backer of a civil rights bill (Mann 1996).

We argue that candidates are constrained by recent historical events that introduce an asymmetry in the calculations of party candidates. In 1972, for example, Nixon could not credibly make a claim for pro-civil rights activists. That option had already been ruled out by the public's awareness of the early changes in the cadre of Republican activists in the 1964 national convention and their selection of Goldwater as the candidate in that year. As recently as 1962, the public felt that Republicans were equally as likely to see that African Americans got fair treatment in jobs and housing (21.3% for Republicans, 22.7% for Democrats, 55.9% seeing no difference in the two parties). But by late 1964, the Democrats had already earned the civil rights advocacy reputation by 56% to 7%, with 37% seeing no difference (Petrocik 1981, 135–38). A determined Republican could at best have neutralized the civil rights issue, without constructing a coalition. But by 1972, Nixon was able to show the way for two decades of Republican victories by giving the civil rights advocacy honors to the Democrats, while earning the support of social conservative activists.

Similarly, in the midnineties, Clinton was under a great deal of pressure from liberals in his party to restore the Democratic Party to the economic liberalism of the New Deal. However, in the midnineties, the Democratic Party had irrevocably lost a vital component of the successful New Deal coalitions: the South. As a result, Clinton had only one choice; he could keep the Democratic Party as a minority party, isolated in the upper left-hand quadrant in Figure 3, or he could reach out to the cosmopolitans in the upper right-hand corner. Appealing to Southern and other social conservatives was no longer credible for the party that had supported civil rights and affirmative action for 30 years—but reaching out to cosmopolitans via a more moderate economic policy was viable. Figure 3 suggests the location of the various presidential candidates over the last 25 years.

CONCLUSION

The "position" of the parties in the minds of voters is largely influenced by the policy preferences of party activists, who are not vote-maximizers but policy-driven. Party activists can, as Aldrich argued, achieve equilibrium positions vis-à-vis each other and, from that position, act as a significant constraint on the ability of candidates to locate themselves in winning positions.

Nevertheless, candidates sometimes seize on forces outside their activist cadres to enhance their short-term prospects for winning elections. Disaffecteds,

especially disaffecteds organized in leading third parties, are destabilizing features that give party candidates the opportunity to disrupt activist equilibria, as they maneuver to win against the opposing party's position. Striving to put together a coalition that adds a group of mobilized disaffecteds to the cadre of current party activists, candidates create what appears in two-dimensional ideological space as a "flanking" move. Roosevelt's consolidation of an economically liberal New Deal coalition, Nixon's Southern strategy to woo social conservatives, and Clinton's move to the center in economic policy while appealing to social liberals all constitute such flanking coalition-building efforts.

The net effect of these periodic flanking movements, over the course of the last half-century, has been to move from primarily a social, to an economic, to, once again, a social cleavage between the two parties. By 2000, however, the positions of the two parties are reversed from where they were in 1896. The Democratic Party of 2000, like the post-Reconstruction Republicans, was a party advocating racial equality and urban tolerance, and the greater use of the national government to protect those ends. The Republican Party of 2000, like the post-Reconstruction Democrats, advocated states' rights, allied with traditional Protestant values.

We have argued that, to understand the pace and mechanisms of party realignment, it is important to recognize that parties are not unitary actors—they are coalitions of party activists and candidates, with differing goals. Party activists are a force for stability; they have chosen to be party activists because of the existing party alignment, and they discourage by the possibility of their exit any substantial changes in party ideology. The desire of candidates to construct winning coalitions is, on the other hand, a dynamic force. When disaffected activists have enough to offer, party candidates may seek to establish coalitions on the contract curve between existing and disaffected voters.

This implies a kind of dynamic in which, in a given election, candidates are partially (but not wholly) constrained by the preferences of existing party activists. In a given election, they may seek to reposition themselves so as to bring in disaffected voters and activists; this causes a reconfiguration of the party activist equilibrium in response to the strategic coalition formation of both parties.

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A Behavioral Model of Turnout

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The so-called "paradox of voting" is a major anomaly for rational choice theories of elections. If voting is costly and citizens are rational, then in large electorates the expected turnout would be small, for if many people voted the chance of anyone being pivotal would be too small to make the act worthwhile. Yet many people do vote, even in large national elections. To address this puzzle we construct a model of adaptive rationality: Citizens learn by simple trial and error, repeating satisfactory actions and avoiding unsatisfactory ones. (Their aspiration levels, which code current payoffs as satisfactory or unsatisfactory, are also endogenous, themselves adjusting to experience.) Our main result is that agents who adapt in this manner turn out in substantial numbers even in large electorates and even if voting is costly for everyone.

Standard conceptions of rational behavior do not explain why anyone bothers to vote in a mass election . . . [Turnout is] the paradox that ate rational choice theory.

Fiorina (1990, 334)

Perhaps Fiorina's remark is too gloomy, but it does seem apparent that the phenomenon of substantial turnout in large-scale electorates is anomalous for rational choice theory, in either its decision-theoretic or its game-theoretic guises. In a rough-and-ready sense, the problem is straightforward: In large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be pivotal is very small. Consequently, if voting imposes strictly positive costs, these will outweigh the expected gains from voting. Accordingly, rational citizens will not vote—contrary to the evidence. Hence, an anomaly.

This is the classical version of the turnout problem as formulated by Downs (1957). Downs's formulation, however, is decision-theoretic. In strategic models of turnout, if the cost of participating is not too high, then

it will not be an equilibrium for everyone to stay home, for then a single voter could decide the election. The key insight of strategic models is that the probability of being pivotal is endogenous. That is, if citizens are rational, the voting decisions and pivot probabilities are determined simultaneously.

Strategic theories usually model turnout as a large team game (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985). There are typically two alternatives (e.g., candidates) and two types of citizens (call them Democrats and Republicans), where each type or team has identical preferences. Preferences of each team are diametrically opposed. Each person can either vote, for either candidate, or stay home (shirk). Elections are decided by a simple plurality with some tie-breaking rule, usually a coin toss. All members of the winning faction earn a payoff for winning (whether or not they voted); losers get nothing. Independent of the outcome, citizens bear an additive and private cost of voting.

Strategic theories then solve for the equilibria of such team games. Because voting for the nonpreferred candidate is dominated for each voter, the relevant problem reduces to a participation game that simply involves the binary decision of whether to vote or stay home. The results of game theoretic models can be summarized as follows (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985; Myerson 1998).

1. No pure strategy equilibria exist, except in degenerate cases. For example, "Everybody votes" is an equilibrium only if voting costs are zero or if the teams are of exactly the same size.
2. Many equilibria with positive turnout exist. Except in degenerate cases, these equilibria involve the use of mixed strategies by at least some voters.
3. Equilibria with nontrivial turnout are asymmetric. That is, voters of the same type are required to use different strategies.
4. High turnout equilibria are not robust to the introduction of uncertainty over either preferences and costs (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985) or the number of players (Myerson 1998). The robust equilibria have vanishing turnout.

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We would like to thank Stephen Ansolabehere, Sorin Antohi, Glenn Ellison, Dedre Gentner, Sunil Kumar, David Laitin, Tze Lai, Arthur Lupia, Elijah Millgram, Lincoln Moses, Scott Page, Tom Palfrey, John Patty, Paul Pfeiderer, Adam Simon, Joel Sobel, Carole Uhlaner, three anonymous referees, and the participants in the Political Economics seminar at the GSB, the Stanford-CalTech workshop, the UNC American Politics Research Group, the UCLA conference on Cognition, Emotion, and Rational Choice, panels at the Annual Meetings of the MPSA and the APSA, the Agent 2000 Workshop, the Seventh Annual Wallis Conference, the CMU-Pitt Colloquium Series, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences seminar series for their helpful comments. This paper was written while Ting was at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and he thanks UNC's Department of Political Science for its support. It was revised while Bendor was a Fellow at the CASBS, and he is grateful for the Center's financial and intellectual support.

Thus, as Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985, 64) point out, "We have come full circle and are once again beset by the paradox of not voting." The initial rough-and-ready intuition is still close to the mark: As long as all voters have strictly positive costs of voting, the expected turnout will be vanishingly small relative to the size of the electorate.

The term "paradox" here does not refer to a logical inconsistency or incompleteness. Rather, it indicates a puzzling implication of the rational choice theory of voting that is at odds with the facts.¹ More precisely, the implication of vanishingly small turnout follows by *jointly* assuming a certain behavioral model, such as expected utility maximization or Nash equilibrium, and making certain payoff assumptions as expressed, for example, in a normal form game: that voters care about outcomes and not, e.g., the act of voting per se, that voting is costly, and the like. Thus, a solution to the anomaly must modify either the behavioral model or the payoff assumptions or both.

The most prevalent response to this anomaly has been to modify the payoff assumptions. For example, citizens may have a sense of duty to vote that outweighs the cost of participation (Riker and Ordeshook 1968).² Empirically this may well be true, and we suspect that it does explain at least some turnout. But completely dispelling an anomaly in this manner raises obvious methodological concerns. To answer the question, "Why do people do x ?" by saying that people have a taste for x seems theoretically shallow.

In this paper we take a different approach. We leave the game structure, and hence payoffs, alone, i.e., we assume that voting is costly, as in the classical models, and that voters are motivated by outcomes. Instead, we modify the rationality assumptions. Voters are not assumed to optimize. Rather, we assume that voters are *adaptively* rational: They learn to vote or to stay home. Their learning is a simple form of trial-and-error behavior that is consistent with basic axioms of reinforcement learning (Bush and Mosteller 1955): Actions that are successful today are more likely to be produced tomorrow; unsuccessful actions are less likely. This reinforcement learning is married to an aspiration level (Simon 1955), a threshold that partitions all possible current payoffs into satisfactory and unsatisfactory ones, hence indicating which actions are coded as successes (and so worthy of reinforcement) and which as failures (and so inhibited). A voter's aspiration level itself adjusts to experience, reflecting prior payoffs.

Our model thus proposes to use a synthesis of two of the most important competing research programs in political science: behavioralism and rational choice theory. As in the former, our model posits that decision makers are boundedly rational (Simon 1990): They

adapt to a confusing, complex world by using (possibly suboptimal) heuristics such as trial and error. But as in the latter, our agents are embedded in a strategic environment—the interdependent world of elections—and we explicitly model some of the relevant connections by specifying a game form.³

Supporting this synthesis entails taking a specific position on the intense controversies about paradigms that are so prominent in the discipline (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1994, Friedman 1996). Advocating a marriage may be foolish—partisans on both sides may dislike the offspring—but we are convinced that both of the older research programs have too much to offer political science to warrant rejecting either one. Game theory's substantive emphasis on strategic interdependence is a natural fit with most political contexts, and its methodological thrust (formal modeling) speeds the accumulation of knowledge by making it easy to criticize and revise our theories. On the other hand, behavioralism's emphasis on a psychologically accurate portrayal of how real political decision makers think, evaluate, and choose is too significant, empirically and theoretically, to be set aside.⁴

Indeed, we view the solution of the paradox of voting—important as it is in its own right—as primarily a vehicle for demonstrating the power of this new research program. We wish to demonstrate that political scientists need not be forced to choose between the substantively reasonable (behavioralism) and the analytically powerful (full-rationality game theory). And to make the case, what better arena than one that involves a core democratic process—elections—and that has exhibited an anomaly that has long plagued one of the parent programs? In short, much more is at stake than solving the paradox of voting.

The present paper is also synthetic regarding methods. Rational choice theorists usually work with mathematical models, deducing results "by hand" from axioms. Behavioralists in the Simonian tradition usually prefer computational models (e.g., Cyert and March 1963). We use both—for completely pragmatic reasons. As will be clear shortly, certain problems are best addressed analytically. But because of the model's complexity, we have turned to simulation to obtain many of our main results.⁵ The simulation results indicate that even if all the voters experience strictly positive costs of voting, turnout is substantial. Perhaps most strikingly, *turnout remains nonnegligible even when we increase the size of the electorate to 1 million voters*. Moreover, the model implies some of the regularities from the empirical turnout literature, e.g., turnout is negatively correlated with participation costs or with differences

¹ It is thus more appropriate to call it an "anomaly" in the sense of Kuhn (1962).

² For a model where voters have altruistic preferences see Feddersen and Sandroni 2003. For a model of group voting see Morton 1991. Schuessler (2000) has suggested models of "expressive voting." In a decision-theoretic formulation, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) assume that voters are regret minimizers.

³ This synthesis, which recently has made headway in economics, is sometimes called *behavioral game theory*. For an overview of this approach in economics, see Camerer 2003.

⁴ On these topics in the context of voting, see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991 and Lodge and McGraw 1995. For an overview of these topics in politics more generally, see Kinder 1998.

⁵ The simulation model bears a family resemblance to an analytical model of aspiration-based learning (Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray 2001a).

in the relative sizes of factions. This is important because our approach not only proposes a solution to a hitherto unresolved puzzle, but also preserves the insights of existing models.⁶ (As Lakatos [1970] argued, a new research program demonstrates strong problem-solving power when one of its models solves a long-standing anomaly *and* simultaneously continues to answer questions that the older research programs had successfully addressed.) Finally, we derive some new implications, such as a prediction of declining turnout in new democracies.

THE MODEL

Each agent has two choices, to vote or stay home ("shirk").⁷ We assume that the electorate is of finite size N and is divided into two blocs or factions, of n_D Democrats and n_R Republicans, with $n_D > 0$ and $n_R > 0$, and $n_D + n_R = N$. (Candidates and their behavior are suppressed in the model.) Voters are denoted i . Players interact at discrete time periods t according to the same (one-shot) game.

Payoffs

As is typical of turnout games, the payoff to each player depends on the action taken by the voter, i.e., whether the voter participated or stayed home, and on the outcome of the election (and hence on the actions taken all by players, i.e., the action profile). Whichever side turns out more voters wins the election. Ties are decided by a (not necessarily fair) coin toss.

In addition to this conventional deterministic component, in our model payoffs have a random component. Let $I \in \{V, S\}$ denote the actions of voting and shirking, respectively, and let $J \in \{W, L\}$ denote the outcomes of winning and losing, respectively. We use $\pi_{i,t}(I, J)$ to denote agent i 's realized payoffs at time t conditional on I and J , with corresponding random variables $\Pi_{I,J}$. Where convenient, we also use $\pi_{i,t}$ to denote agent i 's unconditional payoff at time t .

To make our model as comparable as possible to earlier, game theoretic analyses, for the deterministic component we use the payoffs from the Palfrey–Rosenthal (1985) model. Thus $\pi_{i,t}(I, J)$ equals that game's normal form payoff plus a random shock $\theta_{i,t}$, where $\theta_{i,t}$ is drawn from a mean-zero nondegenerate random variable that takes on finitely many values, and is i.i.d. across players and periods. As in the Palfrey–Rosenthal game, if player i is part of the winning faction, then she/he earns a deterministic payoff of $b_i > 0$, whether or not she/he voted; all losers get zero. Player i 's deterministic cost of voting is c_i , where $b_i > c_i > 0$. Payoffs are additive in the benefits and costs. Thus for the deterministic component (and ignoring individual subscripts), winning voters get $b - c$; winning shirkers get b . Losing voters

get $-c$; losing shirkers get 0. (Of course, the turnout paradox can be directly avoided by assuming that voters have a duty to vote or, equivalently, a "negative cost" of voting [Riker and Ordershook 1968]. In our model this corresponds to assuming that $c_i < 0$. This will be investigated as a special case, below. Unless otherwise stated, however, we use the conventional assumption that voting is costly: $c_i > 0$ for all i .)

Propensities and Adjustments

The heart of the model is the learning behavior of each agent. As stated above, adaptation combines reinforcement learning and endogenous aspirations. Thus in every period t , every actor i is endowed with a propensity (probability) to vote; call this $p_{i,t}(V) \in [0, 1]$. That citizen's propensity to shirk is thus $p_{i,t}(S) = 1 - p_{i,t}(V)$. For convenience, we often abbreviate the vote propensity to $p_{i,t}$. Each citizen is also endowed with an aspiration level, denoted $a_{i,t}$. Depending on $p_{i,t}$, an action is realized for each i . This determines whether i 's faction won or lost and whether i voted. Realized payoffs are then compared to aspiration levels, which may lead to the adjustment of propensities or aspirations for the next period.

In our model we wish to capture agents that learn by trial and error, i.e., propensities and aspirations may adjust to payoff experience. However, because an actor's attention may be on other matters, these codings do not invariably lead to adjustments in propensities. Consistent with the spirit of bounded rationality, we allow for the possibility that humans are sometimes inertial: They do not invariably adapt or learn. Thus with probability ε_p an agent does not adjust his/her propensity in a current period. Similarly, with probability ε_a an agent does not adjust his/her aspiration level. For simplicity we assume that ε_p and ε_a are mutually independent and i.i.d. across both agents and periods. We call any noninertial agent *alert*.

Propensities and aspirations may adjust randomly or deterministically. We assume that each agent has finitely many propensity levels; each agent's set of levels is fixed over time but agents' sets may differ. Agent i 's propensities are denoted $p_i^1, \dots, p_i^{l(i)}$, with $l(i) > 1$. So $p_i^1 = p_i^{\min}$ and $p_i^{l(i)} = p_i^{\max}$. To represent random propensity adjustment we define for each i a family of random variables $\{P_{i,t}\}_{t \in N}$ with values drawn from $p_i^1, \dots, p_i^{l(i)}$. Propensity adjustment then corresponds to a (stochastic) dynamic process. In deterministic adjustments (e.g., the Bush–Mosteller rule), one of the possible propensity values occurs with certainty; hence, such processes are a special case of this general stochastic approach.

As in the case of propensities we assume that each agent has finitely many aspiration levels; again, these are constant over time but may differ across individuals. Agent i 's feasible aspirations are denoted $a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{m(i)}$ with $m(i) > 1$. Again, we allow for random adjustment, with deterministic rules as a special case. Thus for each i , $\{A_{i,t}\}_{t \in N}$ is a family of (possibly degenerate) random variables with values drawn from $a_i^1, \dots, a_i^{m(i)}$. We

⁶ Preference-based solutions frequently fail this second criterion. See, e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985 for a critique of regret minimization (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974).

⁷ For an application to general finite normal form games see Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting n.d.

assume that $\{P_{i,t}\}_{t \in N}$ and $\{A_{i,t}\}_{t \in N}$ are mutually independent stationary processes.

When they adjust (i.e., when agents are not inertial), propensities as well as aspiration levels respond to experience, i.e., the payoffs received in previous rounds. We consider a very general class of adjustment rules for both propensities and adjustments. These assumptions on propensity and aspiration adjustment formally define our concept of an *aspiration-based adjustment rule* (ABAR).

Propensities

(P1) (positive feedback). For all i, t , and action $I \in \{S, V\}$ chosen by i in t :

- if $\pi_{i,t} \geq a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(p_{i,t+1}(I) \geq p_{i,t}(I)) = 1$;
- if $\pi_{i,t} > a_{i,t}$ and $p_{i,t}(I) < p_i^{\max}$, then $\Pr(p_{i,t+1}(I) > p_{i,t}(I)) = 1$.

(P2) (negative feedback). For all i, t , and action I chosen by i in t :

- if $\pi_{i,t} < a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(p_{i,t+1}(I) \leq p_{i,t}(I)) = 1$;
- if $\pi_{i,t} < a_{i,t}$ and $p_{i,t}(I) > p_i^{\min}$, then also $\Pr(p_{i,t+1}(I) < p_{i,t}(I)) = 1$.

Aspirations

(A1) For all i, t :

- if $\pi_{i,t} > a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(\pi_{i,t} \geq a_{i,t+1} > a_{i,t}) = 1$.

(A2) For all i, t :

- if $\pi_{i,t} = a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(a_{i,t+1} = a_{i,t}) = 1$.


(A3) For all i, t :

- if $\pi_{i,t} < a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(\pi_{i,t} \leq a_{i,t+1} < a_{i,t}) = 1$.

These assumptions formally capture the two central concepts of aspiration-based learning. The first key feature is feedback: (P1) says that if the payoff associated with an action taken exceeds the aspiration level (i.e., if it is coded as a success), its propensity will increase (if the agent is not inertial and the current propensity is not already maximal); (P2) says that if it is coded a failure, the agent's propensity to choose it in the future will decrease (if the agent is alert and the current propensity is not already minimal). The key second feature is the assumption of endogenous aspirations: Over time aspirations adjust to payoffs received (A1 and A3). (Note that because aspirations can adjust to experience, everyone's aspirations will be drawn toward the set of feasible payoffs.)

We can now describe a full cycle of learning. In each period t an agent is endowed with a vector of propensity levels $p_{i,t}$ and an aspiration level $a_{i,t}$. Initially (i.e., for $t = 1$) these levels are assigned arbitrarily. Given the realized action of each agent, each agent receives a randomly drawn payoff conditional on the outcome of the election and the agent's own action. This leads to a propensity adjustment with probability $1 - \varepsilon_p$ and to an adjustment of the agent's aspira-

FIGURE 1. Basic Learning Cycle



tion level with probability $1 - \varepsilon_a$. So, with probability $\varepsilon_a \varepsilon_p$ the agent is completely inertial. (An agent may be inertial regarding either propensities or aspirations or both.) Propensity adjustment occurs according to some adjustment process consistent with axioms (P1) and (P2). For aspiration adjustment, axioms (A1)–(A3) must be satisfied. This cycle is depicted in Figure 1.

The cycle of learning described by Figure 1 makes evident the differences between decision making in this model and the classical, full-rationality version. In the latter agents are relentlessly forward-looking and maximize expected utility, either in the decision-theoretic sense or in the strategic (Nash) sense. They understand every nuance of strategic interdependence—the Nash hypothesis—even in the presence of thousands of other decision makers (as in, e.g., large electorates). In our model decision making is driven by a process of backward-looking adaptation: If something worked in the past, become more inclined to use it today. This is a thoroughly psychological theory: Although agents respond to incentives, they do so myopically and crudely, without trying to optimize any function or deploy best responses to other people's strategies. Moreover, although they respond to experience (feedback), they are *not Bayesians*: e.g., they do not use Bayes's rule for computing posterior probabilities. Rather, their propensities merely obey the *law of effect* (Thorndike 1898), the foundation of psychological learning theory. Further, our model makes use of a cognitive concept—*aspirations*—that is foreign to the conceptual apparatus of rational choice theory. In the latter, agents care only about baskets of consequences and how these baskets compare to one another (i.e., their preference ordering). In contrast, in many psychological theories of choice (including ours), agents have internal standards or reference points by which they judge whether outcomes are good or bad, satisfactory or not. It is thus possible, for example, for a decision maker in a psychological theory to regard *all* outcomes in a choice situation as unsatisfactory. This has no meaning in expected utility theory; in our model it is not only a coherent idea, it can also lead to interesting predictions (see proposition 7, below).

Our model is naturally formalized as a discrete-time, finite-state Markov process. In any period, each agent has a vote propensity and an aspiration level. Hence, a state in this process is described by N

pairs of propensities and aspirations—one pair for each of the N agents. Transitions between states are governed by a combination of the propensity- and aspiration-adjustment axioms and the payoff environment of the turnout game. Because these transitions are stationary—they do not depend on the date—we have a stationary Markov process.⁸ Our goal is to study the long-run behavior of this process. Using our definition of ABARs, we are able to derive the following important result about this process. (Note that Proposition 1 does not require agents to use the same ABAR; it assumes only that they use *some* stationary ABAR.)⁹

Proposition 1 (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2002). *Suppose that players adjust by any arbitrary set of stationary ABARs. There are finitely many propensity values and aspiration levels. All payoff distributions are nondegenerate and finitely valued. Then the process is ergodic: It converges to a unique limiting distribution from any initial set of propensities and aspirations.*

Ergodicity—reaching a unique limiting distribution, regardless of the initial values of the state variables—ensures the model's rich empirical content: Its prediction consists in a *unique* probability distribution. Moreover, many different variations of the adjustment process also ensure ergodicity (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2002). That is, ergodicity is a robust property of our general model: It holds for many different specifications of randomness. In turn, some kind of randomness is vital for ergodicity. To understand both points, consider the following simple example. Suppose that initially all Democrats are fully disposed to vote and all Republicans are completely inclined to shirk. Then in the first period all Democrats vote while no Republicans do. Now suppose further that everyone's aspirations are low enough so that everyone is satisfied with their actions. Consequently they will start period 2 with exactly the same propensities they started with, and the whole process will repeat itself. In a deterministic model it follows that the Democrats' aspirations will stay low enough so that everyone will always get positive feedback for repeating their initial actions. So Democrats will always vote and Republicans never

will. (Note that this holds even if there is only a single Democrat and millions of Republicans.) In general, in a deterministic model, if we rig the initial values of the state variables in the "right" way, we can get any extreme pattern of participation we desire. (In short, it would have a great many limiting distributions.) Thus the model would have too little empirical content: With the right auxiliary assumptions, it might be consistent with any observed pattern of turnout.¹⁰

The Computational Model

In most games of interest (including the turnout game) it is difficult or impossible to derive quantitative properties of the limiting distribution analytically. We therefore use simulation techniques, which enable us to examine the limiting distribution's important quantitative features, such as the average level of turnout. To use simulation we specify a particular computational model as a special case of the general model defined above. (The simulation program is described in the Appendix.)

Regarding payoffs, we simplify the general model in two ways. First, unless otherwise stated we assume homogeneous costs and benefits of voting: $c_i = c > 0$ and $b_i = b > c$, for all i . (Unless stated otherwise we normalize b to 1 in the simulation.) We also consider special cases in which members of one faction experience different costs or benefits than members of the other. In these, however, everyone in the same faction gets the same costs or benefits. Second, we assume that the random component, $\theta_{i,t}$, is distributed uniformly over $[-\omega/2, \omega/2]$. The parameter ω therefore represents the size of the support of the shock.

For our specific ABAR we use the well-known Bush–Mosteller reinforcement rule, which is defined as follows. If an actor who takes action I and happens to be noninertial in a given period codes the outcome as successful (i.e., if $\pi_{i,t} \geq a_{i,t}$), then

$$p_{i,t+1}(I) = p_{i,t}(I) + \alpha(1 - p_{i,t}(I)),$$

⁸ More precisely, we have a family of random variables $\{X^t : t \in N\}$, where X^t assumes values on the state space $S = \times_{i=1, \dots, N} S_i$ and S_i consists of elements of the form $(p_i, a_i) =: s_i$. Generic states are thus of the form $(p_i, a_i)_{i=1, \dots, N}$, denoted s . Note that given the independence assumptions on $\{P_{i,t}\}_{i \in N}$ and $\{A_{i,t}\}_{i \in N}$, $\Pr(X^t = s' | s) = \prod_{i=1, \dots, N} \Pr(X_i^t = s'_i | s)$, where $\{X_i^t\}$ is the (decomposed) family of random variables assuming values on S_i .

⁹ Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2002) show that Proposition 1 extends to general normal-form games with finitely many agents and actions and heterogeneously distributed payoff shocks, provided the model satisfies two more properties. The first property describes the indirect effect of negative feedback when an agent has more than two feasible actions: (P3) For all i, t , and distinct actions I' and I'' , if i chose I' in t and $\pi_{i,t}(I', \cdot) < a_{i,t}$, then $\Pr(p_{i,t+1}(I'') > 0) > 0$.

Intuitively, if an action receives negative feedback, the propensity to play the other actions must increase. Note that (P2) implies (P3) if (as in the turnout game) each agent has only two actions.

The second property stipulates that if one action receives agent i 's maximal propensity at any date t , then all of i 's other actions must get i 's minimal propensity in t . This is automatically satisfied in stage games with only two actions or if i 's maximal propensity equals one.

¹⁰ This problem of impoverished empirical content can afflict *any* deterministic model of aspiration-based adaptation, as the following general result establishes. Because the result has negative implications for the predictive content of a class of models, it is similar to the folk theorems of repeated game theory.

Theorem (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2002). Consider any repeated game with deterministic payoffs and $N \geq 1$ players. Suppose that the players adjust their action propensities by any arbitrary mix of rules that satisfy (P1) and adjust their aspiration levels by any arbitrary mix of rules that satisfy (A2). If each player's maximal propensity equals 1.0 and each player's feasible stage-game payoffs are a subset of his feasible aspiration levels, then *any* outcome of the stage game is a steady state, supported by some limiting distribution of the repeated game's underlying stochastic process.

The result holds for any number of players, any number of actions, and asymmetric stage games. Moreover, agents can adapt by different rules, and can switch to different ways of adjusting propensities, provided only that new rules satisfy (P1). An analogous result holds for models with exogenously fixed aspirations. Indeed, many existing agent-based models fall under Theorem 1 and thus have little empirical content. See, e.g., Macy 1990, 1991, 1993 or Macy and Flache 2002.

where $\alpha \in (0, 1]$ represents the speed of learning or adaptation, given a successful outcome. Similarly, if the outcome was coded as a failure, then

$$p_{i,t+1}(I) = p_{i,t}(I) - \beta p_{i,t}(I),$$

where $\beta \in (0, 1]$. Finally, aspiration adjustment is implemented by stipulating that tomorrow's aspirations are a weighted average of today's aspiration level and today's payoff (Cyert and March 1963):

$$a_{i,t+1} = \lambda a_{i,t} + (1 - \lambda)\pi_{i,t},$$

where $\lambda \in (0, 1)$.

Because we assume a finite state space—and hence finitely many propensity and aspiration values—these transition rules are approximate; we assume that actual values of $p_{i,t}$ and $a_{i,t}$ are rounded to three digits for all i and t .¹¹ Thus this combination of adjustment rules is indeed a special case of an ABAR. For example, it specifies linear adjustment rules where ABARs in general are not restricted to a particular functional form. Moreover, Bush–Mosteller adjustments are deterministic, while the class of ABARs also includes probabilistic adjustment rules.

It is important to note that because the computational model satisfies all of the premises of the general model, Proposition 1 continues to hold: The simulation must indeed converge to a unique limiting distribution. Proposition 1 provides theoretical foundations for our simulations in two ways. First, because we know irrespective of the starting state the process will converge to the same limiting distribution, our simulation results do not depend on the initial state (provided, of course, the program is run “long enough”). Second, an alternative interpretation of the limiting distribution is that it also gives the long-run mean fraction of time that the process occupies a given state. Therefore, by considering a single run (for each parameter configuration) we can capture the limiting behavior of our process as if it were run for many different initial states.

However, the simulation approach is limiting in two ways. First, all simulation results depend on the specific functional form given by the Bush–Mosteller model and the specific payoff distribution. Second, any conclusion drawn from a simulation holds, strictly speaking, only for the chosen parameter configuration. To address both problems we derive analytical results for different classes of general ABARs and payoff distributions to capture the general properties that drive the simulation runs.

MAIN RESULTS

Simulation Results

The main question obviously is, Will these adaptively rational agents learn to vote in significant numbers?

¹¹ The rounding rule works as follows. To satisfy (P1)–(P3) and (A1)–(A3), we round up for all upward adjustment and round down for downward adjustment (when feasible). For example, if shirking did not satisfy in period t and $p_{i,t}(S) - \beta p_{i,t}(S) = 0.306$, then $p_{i,t+1}(S) = 0.300$.

The answer is “yes.” Run 1 (Figure 2) considers the case of 500,000 Republicans and 500,000 Democrats. Even in such a large electorate (well above that for congressional races), our model implies turnout of about 50%! As our finding of substantial turnout is perhaps the paper's central result, and one that may puzzle some readers, it is worthwhile to pause at this point to try to understand it. In an electorate of 1 million people, the chance that any one person will cast a pivotal vote is miniscule. Why, then, do so many people learn to vote? To see why, it is useful to study this “breakout of participation” in detail. Consider run 2 (Figure 3), in which citizens are initially very apathetic.¹² Nevertheless, participation quickly reaches about 50% and stabilizes at this level. The speed of this breakout of participation depends on the parameters. For example, when the adjustment parameter α is raised to 0.4, almost 50% of citizens vote in period 6.¹³

The astute reader may have noticed that in the equal-faction size case, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists—with full turnout. So, perhaps the simulation simply captures voters coordinating on a high turnout state?¹⁴ A slight modification in our run shows that this is not the case. In run 3 (Figure 4) factions are of almost-equal size ($n_D = 5,000$, $n_R = 5,001$).

Now a pure strategy equilibrium no longer exists. Nevertheless, turnout again stabilizes at about 50%.¹⁵ From now on we thus focus on the equal-faction case as a natural baseline and discuss the effect of relative faction size in a separate section below.

What causes this breakout of participation? Why do agents learn to participate? To understand what is going on it is very helpful to focus on the dynamics of a single hypothetical simulation. Suppose that $n_D = n_R = 5,000$, $b = 1$, $c = 0.25$, initial propensities are $p_{i,0} = 0.01$, initial aspirations are $a_{i,0} = 0.5$, and the size of the payoff support is 0.2. Suppose that Democrats win in period 1:50 D's vote and only 49 R's. The key question is, What happens to people's dispositions to vote after this election? Because everyone starts with *intermediate* aspirations, all the winning Democrats find winning and voting to be satisfactory. (Even with a bad random shock to payoffs, the worst payoff a winning voter can get is 0.65.) Hence these 50 Democrats are mobilized: Their vote propensities rise after the election.


¹² By Theorem 1, our results are independent of the endogenous variables' starting values. However, examining low initial vote propensities provides valuable insight into the dynamics of the process. Also, henceforth we will study intermediate-sized electorates, of about 10,000 voters. As we discuss below, little is gained by considering much larger electorates, which take much longer to compute.

¹³ Elsewhere (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2001) we have shown that for symmetric and action-invariant Bush–Mosteller rules (these properties are defined below), the speed of convergence is increasing in α , the rate at which agents adjust their vote propensities. Thus, by choosing α appropriately, turnout can reach empirically reasonable levels after only a few elections.

¹⁴ Of course, if this interpretation were correct, one would need to explain why turnout levels do not converge to 100%.

¹⁵ So ABARs do not necessarily converge to distributions that put a high probability on Nash equilibrium states. This insight generalizes to other games (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting n.d.). For example, in the two-person prisoners' dilemma, agents using ABARs cooperate much of the time.

FIGURE 2. Run 1: Large Populations



Starting Values: 1,000 Periods
1,000 Simulations

Faction	D	R
Population	500,000	500,000
<i>b</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>c</i>	0.25	0.25
Aspirations	0.5	0.5
Vote Propensities	0.5	0.5


However, the slothful behavior of their comrades, who enjoyed a free-riding payoff of between 0.9 and 1.1, is *also* reinforced. So this is not the place to look for the explanation of a major breakout of participation. The place to look is the effect that the Democratic victory had on their *shirking opponents*. The best payoff that a shirking Republican could get in period one was 0.1 (zero plus a maximally good shock). Because this is less than their initial aspiration level, *all shirking losers are dissatisfied with staying home*. Hence in the next period all such Republicans—the overwhelming majority of their team (4,951)—will increase their probability of voting. We call this *loser-driven mobilization*.

The story is not over. In period 2 the Republicans, having been mobilized by their loss in the previous election, will almost certainly win. The effect on their propensity to vote is complicated. All Republicans who actually voted will be reinforced for doing so, but all of their free-riding comrades will have that action sup-

ported as well. Thus, once again, focusing on the winners does not explain why the system eventually winds up at a much higher turnout level; once again, we must look at the losers—in this period, the Democrats. In period 2 almost all Democrats stay home and get a payoff of zero, on average. With aspirations adjusting slowly, and hence still close to one-half, the players will code payoffs that are about zero as failures. So now the Democrats' shirking is inhibited. Hence more of them turn out in period 3, and loser-driven mobilization continues. The mobilization of one side begets countermobilization, in a typically pluralist fashion.¹⁶

Finally, we can understand why participation breaks out in run 2 even though everyone begins with an aspiration level of -0.2 . Even in the worst case a shirker

¹⁶ The mobilization and countermobilization amounts to an escalating arms race of effort that is collectively inefficient. The Pareto-optimal symmetric outcome is for everyone to stay home.

FIGURE 3. Run 2: Breakout of Participation Time Series

Starting Values: 100 Periods
1,000 Simulations

<u>Faction</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>R</u>
<i>Population</i>	5,000	5,000
<i>b</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>c</i>	0.25	0.25
<i>Aspirations</i>	-0.2	-0.2
<i>Vote Propensities</i>	0.01	0.01


cannot fall below a payoff of -0.1 , hence all shirkers are satisfied with staying home in period 1. While one might think that this should stop the main cause of the breakout of participation, loser-driven mobilization, dead in its tracks, happy slothfulness does not—*cannot*—endure because aspirations adjust to experience. Thus, although either side is content to lose the election in period 1, that is only because we set their initial aspirations so low as to ensure this outcome. But aspirations are endogenous in this model, so they will not stay at this artificially low level. They will rise even if one's side loses—the expected payoff to a shirking loser is zero—and they will rise even more if one's party wins the coin toss and the election (for an expected payoff of one). And once a citizen's aspiration equals zero (as it does for many Republicans by period 4), shirking and losing will be dissatisfying over half the time. Thus, while shirking and winning continues to be fine, shirking and losing quickly becomes unsatisfac-

tory. Once again, a process of loser-driven mobilization is triggered, as dissatisfied losing shirkers become more inclined to vote.

Explaining the “Breakout of Participation”: Analytical Results

Using our general model we now show in a step-by-step fashion why the mobilization observed in run 2 occurs. Indeed, we also show why much of it does not depend on the specific form of adaptation, the Bush–Mosteller mechanism, used in the simulation but is instead driven by much more general properties of trial-and-error learning. (For simplicity all of the following analytical results use the computational model's assumption of homogeneous costs and benefits of voting, except in those special cases where differences across factions are examined.)

FIGURE 4. Run 3: Robustness



Starting Values: 1,000 Periods
1,000 Simulations

Faction	D	R
Population	5,000	5,001
<i>b</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>c</i>	0.25	0.25
Aspirations	0.5	0.5
Vote Propensities	0.5	0.5


The first result is exceedingly simple but it supplies the basis for what follows. Observation 1 reports a simple property about aspirations and electoral payoffs. We call a player's aspirations "not too high" if they are less than $\pi_{V,W}^{\min}$ and "not too low" if they exceed $\pi_{S,L}^{\max}$, where the former denotes the minimal possible payoff from voting and winning and the latter is the maximal payoff obtained from shirking and losing. We also say that an actor is "satisfied" if the corresponding action is coded a success and "dissatisfied" if it is coded a failure.

Observation 1. If in t the aspirations of people in the winning faction are not too high and the aspirations of people on the losing side are not too low, then all winners are satisfied by the outcome in t while all losers are dissatisfied.

This makes intuitive sense. Winners get payoffs of either $\pi_{i,t}(V, W)$ or $\pi_{i,t}(S, W)$, depending on whether

they voted or stayed home. So if all winners have aspirations below $\pi_{V,W}^{\min}$, then they are all content with the outcome. Similarly, losers get payoffs of either $\pi_{i,t}(V, L)$ or $\pi_{i,t}(S, L)$, depending on their individual choices. So if the aspirations of all losers exceed $\pi_{S,L}^{\max}$, then losing is unacceptable.

Though simple, this condition is very important both substantively and analytically. Substantively, it identifies situations in which everyone's satisfaction is determined exclusively by the collective outcome: If your side wins, you are happy; if it loses, you are unhappy (Figure 5). An important special case of this condition is when all citizens have intermediate aspirations, in the interval $(\pi_{S,L}^{\max}, \pi_{V,W}^{\min})$. (In that case the conclusion of observation 1 holds if either party wins.) A natural interpretation of this special case is that people identify with the well-being of their factions: Personal satisfaction is driven completely by collective outcomes.

FIGURE 5. Aspiration Characteristics

Note: Recall that $\pi_{V,W}^{\min}$ is the minimum payoff from voting and winning, and $\pi_{S,L}^{\max}$ is the maximum payoff from shirking and losing.

Now given the conditions described by observation 1 (which are satisfied by the initial conditions of run 3b), which citizens will mobilize after the election in period 1? That is, if observation 1 applies to period 1, which citizens will increase their propensity to vote in period 2? To answer that question one must make some assumptions about how propensities are adjusted. Of course, we could use the Bush–Mosteller mechanism employed in the simulation. Happily, however, the next result depends only on general qualitative properties of ABARs, and not on the specifics of the Bush–Mosteller rule. The next observation characterizes which citizens become more inclined to vote and which become less inclined.

Observation 2. Suppose in t the aspirations of people in the winning faction are not too high and the aspirations of people on the losing side are not too low. If adjustment is by any arbitrary mix of ABARs, then all alert winning voters and all alert losing shirkers become more disposed to vote after the election in t (or remain fully disposed to vote). The other alert citizens become less inclined to vote (or remain fully inclined to shirk).

It is obvious that winning voters increase their propensity to participate: They voted and were pleased with the outcome. A bit less obviously, so will losing shirkers, as all losers were displeased with the outcome.¹⁷

¹⁷ We focus on these two sets of citizens because they typically determine whether mobilization will occur. Given realistic aspirations, winning shirkers and losing voters rarely become more likely to turn out: The former's apathy tends to be reinforced; the latter's participation, inhibited.

The next piece of the story involves political demography: How many citizens are either winning voters or losing shirkers? We say a win is "conclusive" if it did not result from a favorable coin toss in the event of a tie.

Observation 3. If in t the Democrats win (conclusively) and $n_D \leq n_R + 1$ or the Republicans win (conclusively) and $n_R \leq n_D + 1$, then the number of winning voters plus losing shirkers is a majority of the electorate in t .

To see why, suppose that the Republicans win. Hence we have more Republican (winning) voters than Democratic (losing) voters. But given that $n_R \leq n_D + 1$, there must be at least as many Democratic shirkers as Republican ones.

Now let us combine observations 1, 2, and 3 to see how much of the electorate will, at the end of a given election, become more mobilized (increase their propensity to vote). It is important to note that the following result does not assume that everyone in the electorate uses the same type of adaptive rule. People may adapt in different ways and at different speeds, per observation 2. All that is required is that voters use some kind of ABAR.

Proposition 2. Suppose that the following conditions hold: (i) In t the aspirations of people in the winning faction are not too high and the aspirations of people on the losing side are not too low; (ii) the election is conclusive and the winning party is not larger than the losing party by more than one voter; and (iii) everyone in t has a vote propensity of less than one. Then the expected number of citizens who become more disposed to vote exceeds the expected number who become less inclined.

Beyond the conditions of the three observations, the further requirement of proposition 2—before the election nobody is completely disposed to vote—is very mild. It is obviously satisfied by run 2, which presumes that initially everyone is almost completely inclined to shirk. Thus proposition 2 makes clear that outbreaks of participation are to be expected, if citizens learn via this large class of adaptive rules.¹⁸ Further, it is important to note that this result does not depend in any way on the size of the electorate. (Nor do any of our other analytical results, as we will see shortly.) In particular, proposition 2 does not require that the electorate be small. This gives us confidence that the results of run 1—stable, substantial amounts of turnout in a district with 1 million citizens—will generalize to even larger jurisdictions.

The notion of “loser-driven mobilization” that we discussed earlier falls naturally out of special cases of proposition 2. For example, consider circumstances in which initially everyone is fully disposed to shirk, as in run 2. Because aspirations are endogenous, they typically will increase rapidly into the intermediate region of $(\pi_{S,L}^{\max}, \pi_{V,W}^{\min})$. Once this happens, the run will satisfy all of the conditions of proposition 2, say in period t . Hence we know (analytically, now) that, on average, after the election in period t at least half of the noninertial citizens will become more inclined to vote. (As ties are very rare, typically more than half become more inclined.)

However, because no one initially has any inclination to vote and the speed of learning is relatively low ($\alpha = 0.1$), relatively few people actually turn out in period $t + 2$. Given that winning voters and losing shirkers are over half the community, this implies that most of the newly mobilized are losing shirkers. Thus, in the early goings mobilization is loser-driven.

Proposition 2 establishes mobilization in a demographic or head-counting sense: When its assumptions are satisfied, more citizens will on average increase their propensity to participate than will decrease that tendency. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the electorate’s average propensity to turn out rises. Whether that follows depends on how much those increasing their vote propensity boost their participation tendencies versus how much those decreasing reduce theirs. To flesh out this point, consider the following numerical example.

Let us reconsider run 2, in which all citizens started out with a vote propensity of only 0.01. Suppose that the Democrats won in the first period. Compare a

Democrat (denoted D1) who voted and won with one who shirked (denoted D2). Because initial aspirations are low (-0.2), both of these Democrats are satisfied with their actions. Hence D1 will become more disposed to vote, while D2 will become more disposed to shirk. But now consider the magnitudes of their adjustments (given the Bush–Mosteller rule). Because D1’s vote propensity was initially so low, D1’s tendency to vote can rise substantially: The ceiling of 1.0 is a long way off. Quantitatively, with the speed of adjustment (α) set at 0.1, D1 will increase from 0.01 to $0.01 + 0.1(0.99) = 0.109$: i.e., D1 will jump from almost-complete apathy to an approximately 10% chance of voting. But because D2 started with a shirk propensity of 0.99, the ceiling—the maximum feasible propensity—of 1.0 is very close. Hence D2 cannot become much more inclined to shirk. (Specifically, D2’s shirk propensity increases from 0.99 to just $0.99 + 0.1(0.01) = 0.991$.) Hence, although qualitatively D2’s movement opposes D1’s, with the former becoming more apathetic and the latter more mobilized, quantitatively D1’s heightened mobilization swamps D2’s increased lethargy. Indeed, in this example the district-wide average vote propensity would rise if more than 1% of the district became more mobilized.

In general, then, the ceiling effect is very powerful. Under symmetric Bush–Mosteller and many other adaptive rules, very high rates of shirking tend to be self-limiting: In these circumstances the satisfied shirkers cannot increase their shirk propensities much, while the propensities of satisfied voters have lots of room in which to rise.

Hence, once demographic mobilization is assured, e.g., via proposition 2, then the above per capita quantities constitute a sufficient condition for the electorate’s average participation propensity to rise. To see which features of the Bush–Mosteller rule are crucial for the result to hold, we isolate and identify three properties of ABARs. For this purpose, the following notation will be useful. Let $\delta_{i,t}^+(I, p_{i,t}(I)) := E[p_{i,t+1}(I) | I \text{ succeeds}] - p_{i,t}(I)$, and $\delta_{i,t}^-(I, p_{i,t}(I)) := p_{i,t}(I) - E[p_{i,t+1}(I) | I \text{ fails}]$ represent the expected increment and decrement in propensities for success and failure, respectively. Now we can define the first property.

Definition. Suppose that $p'_{i,t}(I) > p_{i,t}(I)$. The ABAR is *weakly monotonic (with respect to action I)* if $\delta_{i,t}^+(I, p'_{i,t}(I)) \leq \delta_{i,t}^+(I, p_{i,t}(I))$ and $\delta_{i,t}^-(I, p'_{i,t}(I)) \geq \delta_{i,t}^-(I, p_{i,t}(I))$.

Thus, for example, the expected increase in the propensity to vote, if it was tried and succeeded, is weakly decreasing in the current propensity to vote. (Henceforth we usually say just “monotonic” instead of “weakly monotonic.”)

Regarding the second property, note that with $\alpha = \beta$ in the Bush–Mosteller rule the degree of propensity adjustment is the same in the face of failure and of success. We can capture this “symmetry” feature in the following general property.

¹⁸ Proposition 2 holds even if shirking by all citizens forms a Nash equilibrium. (In our game, universal pure shirking is Nash if $c > b/2$.) But Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray (2001a) argue that the critical solution concept for stability in adaptive models is *protected* Nash equilibrium, where a unilateral deviation does not hurt other players. (For example, mutual defection in the two-person prisoner’s dilemma is protected Nash.) Thus protected Nash equilibria are stable against random shocks: If player A trembles, B’s propensity to play his Nash action is undisturbed. (See propositions 10 and 11 in Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray 2001a.) This general idea applies directly to the present paper: Even when universal pure shirking is Nash, it is never protected Nash. (If a Democrat deviates from “all shirk,” then many other players—the Republicans—are hurt.)

Definition. Suppose that $p'_{i,t}(I) = 1 - p_{i,t}(I)$. The ABAR is *symmetric* (with respect to action I) if $\delta^+_{i,t}(I, p_{i,t}(I)) = \delta^-_{i,t}(I, p'_{i,t}(I))$.

Thus, given the same amount of adjustment room, symmetric ABARs adjust identically in response to failure and to success. It can be easily verified that Bush–Mosteller rules satisfy monotonicity and, with $\alpha = \beta$, symmetry also. Their distinctive feature is linearity; i.e., their adjustment magnitudes are linear in the status quo propensity.

An ABAR that is both (strictly) monotonic and symmetric must display ceiling effects. Thus, if citizens use a monotonic and symmetric ABAR, then when citizens' participation propensities are already low the tendency to shirk cannot rise much more, whereas feedback that is favorable to voting can lead to big changes. And so the next result shows that the breakout of participation illustrated by run 2 holds for a rather large class of adaptive rules, under a broad range of parameter values. In particular, this generalization of Bush–Mosteller rules shows that their linearity plays no essential role in the outcome of the preceding example.¹⁹ Let \bar{p}_t denote the district-wide average propensity to vote in t ; $E[\bar{p}_t]$ denotes its expected value.

Proposition 3. Suppose that the following conditions hold: (i) In t the aspirations of people in the winning faction are not too high and the aspirations of people on the losing side are not too low; (ii) the election is conclusive and the winning party is not larger than the losing party by more than one voter; and (iii) everyone uses the same ABAR, which is monotonic and symmetric. If $p_{i,t}(V) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for all i , then $E[\bar{p}_{t+1}] > \bar{p}_t$.

Proposition 3 gives only a partial explanation of the outbreak of participation, because the antecedent specifies that all voters have a propensity of at most one-half. Of course, proposition 3 describes a sufficient condition for increasing average propensity to participate, not a necessary one. So it is consistent with run 2; i.e., it is consistent with the fact that mobilization continues in that run even after some $p_{i,t}(V)$'s exceed one-half.

Because propensities (probabilistically) affect behavior, proposition 3 immediately implies that when its assumptions hold, *expected turnout will rise*. Because this conclusion is the payoff to the sequence of analytical mini-results that began with observation 1, it is worth recapitulating the sequence to get a clear overview of the logic that yields this conclusion. When observation 1 holds, aspirations are such that winners are happy and losers are sad. By observation 2, if everyone adjusts via some form of ABAR, then the noninertial winning voters and losing shirkers will become more disposed to vote (whenever that is possible). By observation 3, winning voters and losing shirkers groups are a majority of the electorate if (say) $n_D = n_R$. Hence it follows that if no citizen is fully disposed to

vote in t and the conditions in observations 1–3 hold, then on average more people become more mobilized than become less mobilized, at the end of period t (proposition 2). If the district's current distribution of propensities is not so high as to evoke ceiling effects, then the demographic mobilization of proposition 2 in turn implies that the expected value of an electorate's average propensity to vote rises (proposition 3). Finally, because propensities are (probabilistically) related to behavior, expected turnout must also rise.

In sum, we see that run 2 does not depend on the details of the simulation program. Our results show that even at a starting point of nearly complete apathy, participation will break out eventually. The results of run 2 thus are the consequence of a few simple mechanisms that are instantiated by the parametric setting of this run. In this sense the analytical results also serve as a sweeping sensitivity test for that run. Instead of laboriously investigating a huge number of other parametric configurations, we can invoke the "if" part of a result and know that a finding stands up for all parameter values swept up by that clause. Deduction complements simulation.

WHY DOES MOBILIZATION STOP?

We know from the simulations reported thus far that mobilization does not continue indefinitely: It appears to level out at about 50% turnout. Why?

Given that behavior in our model is mediated by aspiration levels, the distribution of citizens' aspirations is very important. It is therefore no accident that the cornerstone of our analytical results, observation 1, pertains to aspirations. The hypothesis of observation 1 is that winners' aspirations are low enough so that winning is gratifying even if one paid the costs of participating, and losers' aspirations are high enough so that losing is dissatisfying even if one avoided those costs. Let us take up the hint inherent in observation 1 by examining what happens when we go to the opposite extreme: The aspirations of winning citizens are high, while those of the losers are low.

Proposition 4. Suppose that $p_{i,t}(V) > 0$ for all i . People adjust by any arbitrary mix of ABARs. If in t the winners' aspirations are in $(\pi_{V,W}^{\max}, \pi_{S,W}^{\min})$ and the losers' aspirations are in $(\pi_{V,L}^{\max}, \pi_{S,L}^{\min})$, then after the election all (noninertial) citizens will become less inclined to vote.²⁰

Obviously, given that everyone's propensity to vote decreases (or, due to inertia, remains unchanged), proposition 4 immediately implies that the expected value of the electorate's average propensity to vote falls.

Clearly, a situation in which all alert players are becoming more likely to stay home is unstable. Hence this one-sided domination cannot be a long-run probabilistic equilibrium. Something must give. What will give, we

¹⁹ We have extended Proposition 3 (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2001) to cover asymmetric rules, which respond more to negative than to positive feedback. For evidence of this "negativity bias" see Baumeister et al. 2001.

²⁰ If $(\pi_{V,W}^{\max}, \pi_{S,W}^{\min})$ and $(\pi_{V,L}^{\max}, \pi_{S,L}^{\min})$ are empty, then Proposition 4 holds vacuously.

believe, is that the dominating faction will become too complacent: Too many will learn to free ride on their comrades' efforts. This will make the race competitive again.

Note that proposition 4 and its implications rest on very weak assumptions about the nature of trial-and-error learning: Only the qualitative properties of ABARs were assumed. Thus, citizens may differ substantially in how they learn.

What will produce aspirations of the type assumed by proposition 4? The proximate cause is that recently one faction has been winning by wide margins. Winning produces payoffs of either $\pi_{i,t}(V, W)$ or $\pi_{i,t}(S, W)$, and thus a sufficiently long string of victories will drive the winners' aspirations above $\pi_{V,W}^{\max}$. Meanwhile, the corresponding long run of defeats will end the losers' aspirations below $\pi_{S,L}^{\min}$.

What produces such one-sided strings? There are two main possibilities. If one side is much larger than the other, it will win many elections by virtue of size. (As we will see in the next section [below], changing the relative sizes of the factions in the simulation does affect turnout as this reasoning indicates.) Alternatively, if factions are relatively balanced one side might reel off a string of victories by chance. Thus, because aspirations adjust to experience and one side has been winning while the other has been losing, people in the dominant faction currently have high aspirations while members of the weaker party have low aspirations.²¹

The following result parallels proposition 3 by reversing some of its key assumptions and invoking the following property.

Definition. Suppose that $p_{i,t}(V) = p'_{i,t}(S)$. The ABAR is *action-invariant* if $\delta_{i,t}^-(V, p_{i,t}(V)) = \delta_{i,t}^-(S, p'_{i,t}(S))$ and $\delta_{i,t}^+(V, p_{i,t}(V)) = \delta_{i,t}^+(S, p'_{i,t}(S))$.

Intuitively, an ABAR is action-invariant if the propensities to vote and to shirk are adjusted identically, given the same feedback (and thus independently of the action taken).

Proposition 5. Suppose that everyone adapts via the same monotonic, symmetric, and action-invariant ABAR. Together, winners with aspirations in $(\pi_{V,W}^{\max}, \pi_{S,W}^{\min})$ and losers whose aspirations are in $(\pi_{V,L}^{\max}, \pi_{S,L}^{\min})$ are a majority in t . If $p_{i,t}(V) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ for all i , then $E[\bar{p}_{t+1}] < \bar{p}_t$.

Naturally, proposition 5 implies that the expected turnout in $t+1$ is less than that in period t . Thus, together propositions 3 and 5 give us a clear understanding of the dynamics of turnout in the simulation, given (for example) a start of nearly complete apathy. Initially, demographic mobilization and the ceiling effect—per capita amounts of propensity change—reinforce each other, as explained by observations

1–3: More people increase their propensity to vote than decrease it, and because they began with little inclination to participate, increasers have plenty of adjustment room, while decreasers have little. Eventually, however, mobilization is self-limiting because one or both of the underlying factors will reverse themselves. First, once the community's average propensity to vote exceeds one-half, the ceiling effect favors shirking: There is now more room to decrease than to increase. Second, one side may run off a string of victories, which will send some of the winners' aspirations above $b - c$ and some of the losers below zero. If this happens to enough people, the demography of mobilization will turn around: Now a majority of people will become less inclined to vote. And so turnout will start to fall.

VARIATIONS IN PARTICIPATION

The main result of this paper is the emergence of substantial turnout in large electorates. That is, we propose a solution to rational choice theory's anomalous prediction of negligible turnout. However, rational choice models are successful in explaining *variation* in turnout (Hansen, Palfrey, and Rosenthal 1987; Nalebuff and Shachar 1999). Thus, we also need to consider whether the price of resolving the turnout anomaly is to lose the successful comparative static predictions of rational choice theory.

In comparative static analysis one analyzes how changes in the model's exogenous parameters (e.g., cost of participation) affect its endogenous variables (e.g., participation levels). In a probabilistic framework, on the other hand, we need to study how the properties of the (unique) limiting distribution (e.g., *expected* turnout) change as an exogenous parameter varies.

Variations in the Costs of Voting


Our model is consistent with a well-known empirical regularity: higher costs, lower turnout. (See runs 4a–4c, summarized in Table 1.) However, a substantial change in cost leads only to fairly moderate decrease in turnout. This perhaps surprising finding is an instance of a more general phenomenon in models of aspiration-based learning: The effects of changing payoffs on behavior are muted by aspirational mechanisms (March 1994). The reason is that aspirations adjust to experience—here, payoffs. Hence an increase in the cost of voting is partly absorbed by lower aspirations in the steady state.

When one faction has systematically higher costs of voting (due either to harassment by the other faction, as in the old South, or to more innocuous factors), one

TABLE 1. Varying Costs

Run	c	Average turnout ($t = 1,000$)	
		Democrats	Republicans
4a	0.8	0.416	0.415
4b	0.05	0.498	0.498

²¹ Proposition 4 makes the restrictive assumption that all winners have high aspirations and all losers have low ones. This allows us to use the weak premise that people adjust via any arbitrary mix of ABARs. Stronger assumptions about adjustment rules would let us weaken the assumption about the distribution of aspirations.

FIGURE 6. Run 5: Asymmetric Costs

Starting Values: 1,000 Periods
1,000 Simulations

Faction	D	R
Population	5,000	5,000
<i>b</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>c</i>	0.4	0.1
Aspirations	0.5	0.5
Vote Propensities	0.5	0.5


would expect that bloc to participate less in elections. That seems to be the case here (run 5; Figure 6). Run 5 spreads the factions' costs of voting apart from the common default value of 0.25. With the Democrats' cost of voting equal to 0.4, while the Republicans incur a cost of only 0.1, we see that by about period 1,000 only 10–13% of all Democrats are voting. It is more interesting to observe that Republican turnout is also falling below the values we saw in the benchmark cases of runs 1 and 2, even though their costs in run 5 are lower than in runs 1 and 2. Evidently this reflects an indirect influence of the higher Democrat costs: As Democratic participation is reduced, Republicans learn that they can stay home and still win. Generally in runs such as this the disadvantaged group will experience a rebound after their opponents stop voting. However, this recovery is brief as the advantaged group will quickly reassert

itself, thus again producing the pattern observed in run 5.

Variations in Population and Faction Size

In game-theoretic models of turnout, participation quickly approaches zero as the population size increases. We already know from run 1 that this is not the case in our model. Nevertheless, participation is affected to some degree by N . Figure 7 presents the average participation levels for electorates of various sizes, at $t = 1,000$. Consistent with the data of Hansen, Palfrey, and Rosenthal (1985), our computational model predicts that turnout decreases in N .

Notice that the decline in turnout is nonlinear, dropping precipitously as N increases for N below 100.

FIGURE 7. Turnout and Population

Starting Values: 1,000 Periods
 1,000 Simulations for populations above 1,000.
 5,000 Simulations for all other populations.
 Equal faction sizes.

<u>Faction</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>R</u>
<i>b</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>c</i>	0.25	0.25
<i>Aspirations</i>	0.5	0.5
<i>Vote Propensities</i>	0.5	0.5

Turnout is significantly higher in small, committee-sized forums than in large legislative districts. The principal intuition behind this result is that pivot probabilities still matter (albeit experientially rather than prospectively): When N is small, each agent's likelihood of swinging the election is nontrivial. Thus, given realistic aspirations, voting is more likely to satisfy in an election with low N .

We have already noted (run 2) that very slight variations in the factions' relative sizes yield virtually the same patterns as the perfectly symmetric runs. However, if one faction becomes substantially larger than the other, then turnout in the steady state is noticeably lower (runs 6a, 6b, and 6c, summarized in Table 2). Further, over an empirically relevant range of proportions, the bigger the size asymmetry, the more participation falls. It is also intriguing to note that in runs 6a–6c the

minority faction turns out at higher rates than does the majority faction.

Significantly, this decrease in turnout is accompanied by a polarization of aspirations: The majority faction's aspirations soar, while those of the minority plummet. Obviously, majority factions are winning most of the

TABLE 2. Asymmetric Faction Sizes

Run	n_D	n_R	Average turnout ($t = 1,000$)	
			Democrats	Republicans
6a	5,500	4,500	0.414	0.494
6b	6,000	4,000	0.325	0.470
6c	7,000	3,000	0.210	0.444

contests. This drives their aspirations up and the unfortunate minority's aspirations down.

Indeed, we claim that it is precisely this movement of aspirations out of the intermediate zone that causes vote propensities to fall. The explanation is the same as that put forward in the preceding section, where we explain why mobilization stops. A string of victories makes the majority complacent: Their aspirations go so high that only the highest payoff, winning and shirking, satisfies for many of them. (This holds probabilistically, because payoffs are stochastic.) Hence voting is inhibited, regardless of the electoral outcome, and the majority faction's average vote propensity falls. Meanwhile, the series of losses have reduced the minority's aspirations so much that for many of them losing and shirking has become acceptable. Thus shirking is reinforced, regardless of the electoral outcome, reducing the smaller group's average vote propensity.

This explanation is corroborated by two points, one computational and one analytical, relating the distribution of aspirations to participation rates. First, inspection of the simulation's dynamics reveals that as long as the aspirations remain intermediate (in the usual sense), average participation rates hold steady. *They start to fall only when the aspirations of a substantial number of people in a faction begin to leave the intermediate zone.*

Second, the following analytical result shows that this pattern holds more generally for Bush–Mosteller adjustments. In particular, proposition 6 implies that if aspirations remain intermediate, one-sided electoral competition does not systematically degrade participation propensities.

Proposition 6. *Suppose that either party can win conclusively in t . Citizen i uses an action-invariant Bush–Mosteller, and $a_{i,t}$ is intermediate.*

- (i) *If $p_{i,t} \leq \frac{1}{2}$, then $E[p_{i,t+1}] > p_{i,t}$.*
- (ii) *If $p_{i,t} > \frac{1}{2}$ and the probability that i is pivotal in t is sufficiently low, then $E[p_{i,t+1}] < p_{i,t}$.*

To see the intuition for proposition 6, consider an extremely lopsided district that has only one Republican (denoted R1) and many Democrats. Because everyone has intermediate aspirations, losing is unsatisfactory. Hence, because the Republican is virtually certain to lose, R1 is in what learning theorists call a *malign environment*: No matter what action R1 takes, the feedback is virtually sure to be negative. Thus if R1 is inclined to vote in t defeat will probably induce shirking, but if R1 is initially disposed to shirk defeat will probably induce mobilization. These probabilistic tendencies are amplified by the Bush–Mosteller's ceiling effects: If R1 is already inclined to vote, then not only is voting likely to be the action that is selected and then (probably) inhibited, but also an initially high vote propensity can be reduced greatly. Exactly the same quantitative effect holds for a minority citizen who is initially disposed to stay home. Consequently, Bush–Mosteller adaptation pushes a soon-to-be-defeated minority citizen with intermediate aspirations to dampen both

initially apathetic and initially mobilized tendencies. Being outnumbered does not by itself systematically degrade participation; being outnumbered by a lot does.

Meanwhile, members of the majority faction in this lopsided district are in what learning theorists call a *benign* environment: No matter what action a Democrat takes, it is likely to be reinforced. Thus prior dispositions get strengthened: A Democrat who is already likely to vote at the start of period t will probably become still more mobilized, while one who is initially apathetic will probably become still more so. Hence no systematic degradation in the participation tendencies of majority faction citizens emerges either—as long as aspirations remain intermediate.

Decreasing Turnout in New Democracies

Thus far we have focused mainly on determinants of turnout that can be captured by game-theoretic models. The purpose was to demonstrate that our approach preserves the broad qualitative implications of rational choice models that are consistent with established empirical regularities. Already, however, we have seen that a behavioral model can lead to additional quantitative insights. For instance, the highly nonlinear nature of aspiration-based learning may either partially absorb exogenous changes (as in the case of changing costs of participation) or reinforce them (as in the case of large differences in faction size).

However, our model also yields qualitatively new inferences, by exploiting its somewhat richer psychological framework. Consider realistic versus unrealistic aspirations. The former are likely to prevail in stable democracies, in which citizens have learned which payoffs are feasible and which are utopian. But in a new or unstable democracy voters may have unrealistic aspirations; they may expect a new regime to transform society overnight.

Having unrealistically high aspirations—those exceeding the game's maximal payoff—can only produce disappointment. And if, in the excitement of building a new society, these unreasonable aspirations are initially coupled to high rates of participation, then disappointment leads to disillusionment with politics, i.e., to decreased political participation, as the next result shows.

Proposition 7. *Suppose that everyone uses the same monotonic and action-invariant ABAR. If $a_{i,t} > \pi_{S,W}^{\max}$ and $p_{i,t} > \frac{1}{2}$ for all i , then $\bar{p}_t > E[\bar{p}_{t+1}]$.*

Of course, with unrealistically high aspirations, every action will be dissatisfying. But voting will tend to be inhibited more than shirking because of ceiling effects and the frequency of voting relative to shirking. Hence disillusionment with the results of a fledgling democracy can lower the average propensity to participate, and the expected turnout as well.²²

²² We would like to thank Carole Uhlaner for suggesting this point.

TABLE 3. Varying Benefits with Negative Costs

Run	<i>c</i>	<i>b</i>	Average Turnout (<i>t</i> = 1,000)	
			Democrats	Republicans
4b	0.05	1	0.498	0.415
7a	-0.25	1	0.753	0.738
7b	-0.25	0.2	0.784	0.786
7c	-0.25	0	0.798	0.798

The Duty to Vote

One response to the turnout anomaly was to change the payoff assumptions. The most influential of these attempts was Riker and Ordeshook's famous "D"-term, intended to capture a "duty to vote." Formally, assuming a large enough D-term is equivalent to assuming negative costs of participation—whence participating is a strictly dominant strategy. Rational choice theory predicts that people would then always vote, but what happens in our model is surprising. Consider runs 7a–7c (Table 3), with run 4b included as a benchmark.

Comparing run 4b with run 7a we see that turnout does increase with negative costs. Yet it does not climb nearly as high as predicted by rational choice theory. That is, our aspiration-based model *does not necessarily select strictly dominant actions*. (As mentioned earlier this finding is not unique to the turnout game [see Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting n.d.].) This seems strange—until we recall the mediating effects of aspirations. In run 7a aspirations end up much higher than they were in 4b. Hence losing while voting is still usually dissatisfying. Consequently losing voters often become less inclined to participate, so full turnout cannot be a stable outcome even when participation costs are negative.

Aspiration-based models can imply even more surprising results. Consider run 7b, which is just like run 6a except that in this latest run the benefits of winning have been sharply reduced. Surprisingly, *participation is higher when the benefits of winning are lower*. Indeed, when we reduce *b* still further, to the point where people do not care about winning at all (run 7b), then citizens become almost fully disposed to vote!

What is going on here? Are runs 7a and 7b bizarre? Do they indicate that our simulation model is fundamentally flawed?

Not so: Far from being pathological, these runs illustrate a rather general effect. The counterintuitive effect that mobilization increases when the value of winning falls to zero is not peculiar either to the particular configuration of parameter values in runs 7a and 7b or to the functional forms of the simulation model. The next result will show analytically that patterns similar to those of the above runs can be derived under more general assumptions.²³ Note, in particular, that proposition 8 holds for *any* $b > -c$. Hence it does not matter

how valuable winning is; the pure intrinsic motivation of civic duty leads to greater expected mobilization.

Proposition 8. Consider two districts, *A* and *B*, with $c < 0$, such that in *A*, $b = 0$ (thus $\pi_S^{\max} = \pi_{S,W}^{\max} = \pi_{S,L}^{\max}$ and $\pi_V^{\min} = \pi_{V,W}^{\min} = \pi_{V,L}^{\min}$), while in *B*, $b > 0$. Assume that $p_i^1 < p_{i,t} < p_i^{l(i)}$ for all *i*. Then for any arbitrary collection of ABARs:

- (i) If in district *A* $a_{i,t} \in (\pi_S^{\max}, \pi_V^{\min})$, then $p_{i,t+1} > p_{i,t}$ with probability one for all alert citizens in *A*.
- (ii) If $\pi_{S,W}^{\min} \geq \pi_{V,L}^{\min}$, then the conclusion of (i) cannot hold for district *B*: For arbitrary faction sizes, $p_{j,t+1} < p_{j,t}$ with positive probability for any *j* in *B*.
- (iii) If, in addition to the conditions of (i) and (ii), everyone in both districts uses the same symmetric and action-invariant Bush–Mosteller and $\bar{p}_t^A \geq \bar{p}_t^B$, then $E[\bar{p}_{t+1}^A] > E[\bar{p}_{t+1}^B]$.

Proposition 8 implies that if initially the districts start out with the same average vote propensity, then after period 1 the expected vote propensity in district *A* will exceed the expected propensity in *B*, at every date. The result is driven precisely by the fact that people in district *A* are motivated *only* by their sense of civic duty. As they do not care about the collective outcome, they have only two expected payoffs: $-c > 0$ for voting and zero for shirking. Because everyone's aspirations are realistic, in district *A* they will tend to be in $(0, -c)$. Hence for people in this district participating is always gratifying, while shirking never is. Consequently voting is always reinforced and shirking is always inhibited, regardless of the electoral outcome. Thus, in the case of degenerate payoff distributions, in district *A* everyone's propensity to turn out rises in every period until they reach 1, where they will stay. In contrast, in district *B* people care about winning. This implies that losing while voting can be disappointing. If this occurs—and such an outcome is always possible—then the losing voters will become less inclined to vote.²⁴

Note that proposition 8 holds for an extreme comparison, between a district where winning is worthless and one where winning is worth more than the private satisfaction of doing one's civic duty—yet, despite this, the district where winning is worthless has a higher expected turnout than the one where winning not only is worth something, but is the more important payoff.

EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This work attempts to construct a mathematical model of adaptively rational electoral participation. Specifically, the model

²³ For a more detailed analysis of the counterintuitive effects of aspiration-mediated change, see Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting n.d.

²⁴ Our result is consistent with the intriguing finding by psychologists that adding extrinsic rewards can impair the performance of actions for which people are already intrinsically motivated. For a review see Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999.

- (a) implies substantial turnout even in very large electorates and even when voting is costly for all citizens;
- (b) is consistent with most of the empirical regularities that determine levels of turnout; and
- (c) provides new predictions, e.g., when voters feel a duty to vote or when their aspirations (in, for instance, new democracies) are unrealistic.

The results reported here are quite encouraging. Reinforcement learning, mediated by endogenous aspirations, seems to lead naturally to substantial turnout under a wide array of parametric configurations. Indeed, it has been hard to *suppress* participation in the computational model. Thus, we look forward to seeing the model subjected to systematic empirical testing (e.g., Kanazawa 1998, 2000).

Because adaptive learning models offer a behaviorally plausible assumption for voters in mass elections, applying them to contexts of multicandidate competition is a natural next step. Next on the agenda would be to introduce active (though still adaptive) parties or candidates (as in, e.g., Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992 or Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray 2001b).²⁵ Payoffs to voters would then no longer be exogenously fixed; instead, they would depend on the platform adopted by the winning party. The present model and one of adaptive candidates would complement each other: The former depicts active voters while parties are passive; in the latter, candidates adjust their behavior while citizens do not (they always turn out and always vote sincerely). The logical next step is to combine both models into an integrated model of elections in which *both* candidates and voters adaptively adjust their behavior. We propose (and have begun working on) a unified model of elections that synthesizes behavioralism and game theory. All agents in this model will be intendedly rational but not completely so; all will be tied together by the strategic interdependence created by electoral processes. We hope that this synthesis, by fusing the empirical insights of behavioralism to the analytical power of game theory, proves to be a fruitful way to study not only turnout but electoral processes in general.

APPENDIX

Simulation Program

Because of the serious tractability issues involved, we have written a program in ANSI C to simulate the described adaptively rational behavior. The program is compatible with the GNU C compiler and most UNIX operating system configurations. A version of this program is maintained at <http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/formal-behavioralism>.

We adopt the following terminology in describing the simulation results. A period is a one-shot play of the turnout game. A simulation is a sequence of periods, for a specific set of voters. Finally, a run is a collection of simulations.

When started, the program allows the user to set the following parameters before each run: (i) the number of simulations;

(ii) the number of periods per simulation; (iii) the faction sizes, n_D and n_R ; (iv) the payoff parameters, b and c ; (v) the inertia probabilities, ε_a and ε_p ; (vi) the reinforcement and inhibition rates, α and β ; (vii) the aspiration updating rate, λ ; (viii) the size of the payoff support ω ; (ix) each faction's vote propensity at $t = 0$ ($p_{i,0}$); and (x) each faction's aspiration level at $t = 0$ ($a_{i,0}$).

When a run begins, the program initializes a pseudorandom number generator with an integer representing the current time. This standard procedure effectively ensures that each run's random parameters are independent of those of other runs. The program then initializes a custom data structure that keeps track of state variables (i.e., propensities and aspirations, which may change over the course of a run) and statistics related to the history of play.

In each period, moves are realized, given the underlying corresponding propensities. After payoffs are revealed, the data structure is updated to reflect the changed propensities and aspirations. These variables revert to their original values for each new simulation.

The data structure associated with each run can be used to recover statistics at different levels of a run. To reduce run times, only those statistics that are requested by the user are collected. In particular, the user may opt to view or save to disk any of the following: (i) the moves, payoffs, and adjusted propensities and aspirations after each period; (ii) the average and cumulative propensities and aspirations for each simulation, and a histogram of propensities for each voter for each simulation; (iii) the average propensities and aspirations across simulations for certain periods; and (iv) a histogram of final-period turnout and aspiration levels across simulations.

For the runs investigated in this paper, the final two items proved to be most useful. All of the run reports are composed of either time series of average turnout or histograms of final-period turnouts across simulations. While the program does not generate graphics on its own, the output files it creates are easily read into other programs for further processing.

The program is able to generate large samples of game play quickly, although naturally large electorates will slow run times considerably. Typical run times for most of the runs reported here (10,000 voters, 1,000 periods, and 1,000 simulations) ranged between 5 and 30 hours depending on hardware configurations.

Proofs

Before we prove the results described in the text, it is convenient first to state some facts about ABARs. (The proofs are available on request and are also given in Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2001.)

Fact 1. If all agents use the same ABAR, which is monotonic and action-invariant, and $p_{i,t} \leq (\geq) \frac{1}{2} \forall i$, then for all i and j (where i may or may not equal j): (a) $\delta_i^+(V; p) \geq (\leq) \delta_j^+(S; 1 - p)$; and (b) $\delta_i^-(V; p) \leq (\geq) \delta_j^-(S; 1 - p)$.

Fact 2. If all agents i use the same ABAR, which is monotonic and symmetric, and $p \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for all i , then for all i and j (where i may or may not equal j) and $q \leq \frac{1}{2}$: (a) $\delta_i^+(V; p) \geq \delta_j^-(V; q)$; and (b) $\delta_i^-(S; 1 - p) \geq \delta_j^+(S; 1 - q)$.

Fact 3. If all agents use the same ABAR, which is monotonic, action-invariant and symmetric, and $p_{i,t} \leq (\geq) \frac{1}{2}$, then $\delta_{i,t}^-(S; 1 - p) = \delta_{j,t}^+(V; p) \geq (\leq) \delta_{j,t}^-(V; p) = \delta_{i,t}^+(S; 1 - p)$.

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that the Republicans win. Given the assumed aspirations, a Republican victory

²⁵ Such a model would correspond to an adaptive version of Ledyard 1984.

produces satisfied Republicans and dissatisfied Democrats. Hence, because everyone adjusts by some kind of ABAR, noninertial Republican voters and alert Democratic shirkers will increase their propensity to vote. Given that observation 3 applies, Republican voters plus Democratic shirkers must exceed Republican shirkers plus Democratic voters. And because the probability of inertia is i.i.d. across voters, the expected number of noninertial Republican voters and Democratic shirkers exceeds the expected number of alert Republican shirkers and Democratic voters. Exactly the same logic holds for the other case. QED

Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first winning noninertial voters, who increase their participation propensities, versus losing alert voters, who decrease theirs. We know that there are more of the former, in expectation. Fact 2 shows that none of these per capita expected increases can be less than any of the expected decreases. Hence the net expected effect of the changes of these two groups must be to increase the expected value of the district-wide average propensity to vote.

Now compare the losing noninertial shirkers, who decrease their propensity to shirk, with the winning alert shirkers, who increase theirs. The expected number of the former exceeds the expected number of the latter, given the assumptions of the proposition. Hence we need only check that the losing alert shirkers' per capita expected decreases are at least as big as the per capita expected increases of the winning alert shirkers. This is also ensured by Fact 2. QED

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the Democrats win. Given the realized payoffs and the assumed aspiration levels, Democratic shirkers are satisfied but Democratic voters are not. Similarly, Republican shirkers are content but Republican voters are not. By the definition of ABARs, all satisfied (alert) shirkers will increase their propensity to shirk and all dissatisfied (alert) voters will decrease their propensity to vote. QED

Proof of Proposition 5. Any shirking winner whose aspiration is "realistically high"—i.e., in $(\pi_{V,W}^{\max}, \pi_{S,W}^{\min})$ —must be content with shirking, while any voting winner with aspirations in the same interval must be dissatisfied with voting. Similarly, any shirking loser whose aspiration is "realistically low"—i.e., in $(\pi_{V,L}^{\max}, \pi_{S,L}^{\min})$ —must be content with shirking, while any voting loser with aspirations in the same interval must be dissatisfied with voting. Hence, given the demographic assumption of proposition 6, the expected number of people who will become more apathetic (or remain completely apathetic) exceeds the expected number who will become more mobilized (or remain completely mobilized).

It suffices to show that the expected increase in shirk propensity of all those becoming more apathetic must exceed the expected increase in the vote propensity of all those becoming more mobilized. This is established by Fact 3. QED

Proof of Proposition 6. This proof is quite long and is therefore omitted. It can be obtained from the authors on request and can also be found in Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2001.

Proof of Proposition 7. Because

$$E[p_{i,t+1}] = \varepsilon_p p_{i,t} + (1 - \varepsilon_p)[p_{i,t}(p_{i,t} - \delta_{i,t}^-(V)) + (1 - p_{i,t})(p_{i,t} + \delta_{i,t}^-(S))],$$

to show that $E[p_{i,t+1}] < p_{i,t}$ it suffices to show that $p_{i,t}(p_{i,t} - \delta_{i,t}^-(V)) + (1 - p_{i,t})(p_{i,t} + \delta_{i,t}^-(S)) < p_{i,t}$, which (after rearranging terms) holds if and only if $\delta_{i,t}^-(S) < p_{i,t}[\delta_{i,t}^-(V) + \delta_{i,t}^-(S)]$. But given $p_{i,t} > \frac{1}{2}$ and Fact 1 we have $\delta_{i,t}^-(V) > \delta_{i,t}^-(S)$; hence $E[p_{i,t+1}] < p_{i,t}$ for every i . QED

Proof of Proposition 8. (i) Because $b = 0$, the electoral outcome has no effect. Hence the sign of feedback depends only on individual behavior. And if $a_{i,t} \in (\pi_{S,W}^{\max}, \pi_{V,W}^{\min})$ for all i , then shirking is dissatisfying while voting is satisfying. Given that every agent i is using some kind of ABAR and $p_{i,t} < p_i^{(i)}$, if i is alert, i will become more inclined to vote.

(ii) Because $p_{i,t} \in (0, 1)$ for all i , every kind of outcome can occur: i can vote or shirk and either win or lose. If $a_{i,t} \leq \pi_{S,W}^{\min}$, then consider the event (which occurs with positive probability) in which i shirks and wins, and $\pi_{i,t} > \pi_{S,W}^{\min}$. Then i 's propensity to shirk rises, if i is alert. If $a_{i,t} > \pi_{S,W}^{\min}$, then consider the event (which also occurs with positive probability) in which i votes, loses, and gets $\pi_{V,L}^{\min}$. Since $\pi_{V,L}^{\min} \leq \pi_{S,W}^{\min} < a_{i,t}$, this is dissatisfying; so if i is alert, his/her vote propensity falls.

(iii) Because everyone in district A is either inertial or becomes more inclined to vote, and everyone uses the same symmetric and action-invariant Bush–Mosteller rule,

$$\begin{aligned} E[\bar{p}_{t+1}^A] &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \{(1 - \varepsilon_p)[p_{i,t} + \alpha(1 - p_{i,t})] + \varepsilon_p p_{i,t}\}, \\ &= \bar{p}_t^A + \frac{(1 - \varepsilon_p)\alpha}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - p_{i,t}). \end{aligned}$$

Suppose, counterfactually, that all alert citizens in B would increase their vote propensity with probability one. Because they use the same symmetric, action-invariant Bush–Mosteller rule, then (given the counterfactual) $E[\bar{p}_{t+1}^B] = \bar{p}_t^B + \frac{(1 - \varepsilon_p)\alpha}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (1 - p_{j,t})$. Now it is given that $\bar{p}_t^A \geq \bar{p}_t^B$, and hence, $\bar{p}_t^A + \frac{(1 - \varepsilon_p)\alpha}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - p_{i,t}) \geq \bar{p}_t^B + [(1 - \varepsilon_p)\alpha]/N \sum_{j=1}^N (1 - p_{j,t})$. And given (ii), any j in B becomes, with positive probability, less disposed to vote. Hence, it follows that $E[\bar{p}_t^A] > E[\bar{p}_t^B]$. QED

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The Construction of Rights

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This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approaches to the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights. Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights—social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic, and Steiner's approach—we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rights—which we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions—where compossibility is not important and rights cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be exercised are hardly worth the name.

In what sense, if any, do rights exist? If rights are instantiated in law but difficult to exercise in practice, do people really have those rights? Can we compare across countries to see what rights people have both materially and formally? In this paper we map out the senses in which rights can be said to have existence. We suggest a framework for analyzing how rights might be measured and compared. The framework is supposed to be relatively neutral between competing conceptions of rights, though we do argue that rights cannot form the basis of morality or a system of justice. They are not foundational since no system of rights worth the name can be “co-possible” (Nozick 1974) or, more precisely, “compossible” (Steiner 1994). A system of rights is compossible to the extent that all persons can exercise their right and there will be no conflicting duties. In other words, we suggest that there are no principles of justice that can deliver a set of rights that do not contain contradictory judgments about the permissibility of actions. There will always be occasions when people cannot exercise their rights simultaneously.

Contrary to what some have argued, it does not follow that at least one person does not have a right to do x simply because two people cannot exercise a right to do x simultaneously. Having a right does not entail being able to exercise it. Nevertheless, if rights cannot be exercised, then they hardly seem worth the name. Did Zimbabweans really have the right to vote in the Presidential elections of March 9 and 10, 2002? That election demonstrated how easy it is to disenfranchise voters simply by taking so long to check names against the list of registered voters, while voters are just as effectively

disenfranchised by intimidation, whether organized by the state, by political parties, or by wandering thugs. U.S. citizens have the right to vote, but first they must register and there must be polling stations that recognize that registration and are open long enough for registered voters to cast their ballot. Some voters claimed that they were disenfranchised at the U.S. Presidential election in 2000, as polling officers would not accept their registration details. The ease of registration differs across U.S. states and more so across the world, while the costs of voting also differ. At what level of difficulty and cost can we say that citizens effectively lose the right to vote? At what level of health care or educational opportunity do people have rights to education or health care? Can we expect poor nations to provide the same level of rights as rich nations? How might we weight and compare rights across countries? These are not easy questions to answer but we try to provide a framework through which such questions may be addressed.

This paper is concerned with judging in what sense people have rights. It provides a framework by which we can judge to what extent rights exist and to what extent they can be exercised. While no framework could be normatively neutral, our framework can encompass different substantive rights theories. We begin by examining the noncompossibility of rights, demonstrating formally that rights are not compossible or, to the extent that they are, they are not the rights about which we ordinarily write and speak. According to Steiner (1994, 2–3), the compossibility of a set of rights is a necessary condition for the plausibility of any theory of justice that yields that set. Nevertheless, rights and liberty are fundamental to liberalism, and clashes of rights are (part of) what politics is all about (see Primus 1999 for an historical account of such clashes and changing rights talk in American history; see also Wellman 1998). The fact that rights clash, and that at times my right to free speech may need to be curtailed by your right to privacy, or my right of free speech is curtailed by your right of free speech, does not mean that we do not have such rights. But in what sense do we have them?

Rawls (1971, 1982) argues that as long as our rights in these regards are approximately equal, then we have

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We would like to thank Cecile Fabre, Ruth Kinna, Matt Kramer, Anna Pilatova, three anonymous referees, and participants at the Analysis of Measurement of Freedom conference in Palermo, Italy, September 2001, the 2002 meeting of the Dutch Political Science Association, and the Economic Decisions Conference in Pamplona, Spain, June 2002, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

a just liberal system. He says that as long as the “central range of application” of basic liberties is provided for, the principles of justice are fulfilled. The basic liberties for Rawls are specified by institutional rules and duties that form a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities. As he recognizes, of course, differential material or educational means entail that not everyone may exercise their rights equally. Rawls introduces the idea of the “worth” of liberty to suggest how useful to people these rights are given the probability that they can exercise them. For many, however, if someone has no chance of exercising a right, then the right is barely worth the name. We do not try to adjudicate this particular issue here. Rather we provide a framework for defining rights of different sorts—what we call the existence conditions of rights—and then suggest a way of handling whether or not we should judge that those rights can be said to exist in the forms we define for a given individual, a group, or society as whole. Such judgments are made relative to the expectations we may have for exercising rights given the social and economic circumstances of different societies. We specify the sense in which someone can be said to have a right (the senses in which a right can exist) and then the probability that someone can exercise the right. In doing so we specify in a fashion broadly compatible with Rawls’s (1982) discussion how to identify worthwhile rights and do so relative to different circumstances. Although rights can and should play an important role in the theory of justice, they cannot form the basis of a theory of justice. Rights are essentially constructed.

The extent to which rights exist is not all-or-nothing when it comes to respecting or exercising those rights. People have rights even when they cannot exercise them. First, they may have them formally, when they do not have them materially. Second, people may have rights materially even though they cannot always exercise them. Having a right entails some expectation that it might be realized, but it does not ensure it. We believe that this way of representing rights both makes sense formally and is more in tune with everyday moral language than other formal accounts of rights discussed here. First, however, we argue that the allure of rights compossibility should be avoided.

THE NONCOMPOSSIBILITY OF SEN RIGHTS

Rights may seem obviously noncompossible. The most striking examples are entitlements, though rights in any form are not manifestly compossible. For example, if I claim a right to free speech and you claim a right not to be subject to abuse, something must give way if I want to abuse you verbally. Of course, we may need to sort out whether my right to free speech includes the right to say the precise words I intend, and whether your right not to be abused is covered by those words. However, typically rights do conflict in these sorts of ways.

We can trivially make rights compossible by creating a dictator who can assign rights as she sees fit to ensure that no rights ever conflict. (In Steiner [1994] such a dictator is called the Adjudicator.) She could be careful

and assign type rights so that no conflict occurs—the easiest way would be to assign all rights to herself and none to others. Or she could decide the assignation of a right *after* a conflict between two sets of the putative rights has been claimed.¹ Juridical decisions do decide which rights are to be restricted or which given greatest weight in any conflict, and they might be said to be part of a construction toward a formally compossible rights set. However, any formally specified rights set worth the name is not able to deliver a compossible set of rights without such an “external” adjudication: external, that is, to the rights set as understood to be in conflict (Steiner 1998, 265ff). Furthermore, in practice any external adjudication is likely to involve considerations that are not strictly rights-based (as the discussion of cases in Wellman 1995, chap. 7 shows). To overcome the triviality of such a set of compossible rights, formal theorists normally assign a set of reasonable conditions and then see whether conflicts emerge. For example, we can see a simple proof of the noncompossibility of rights in terms of Amartya Sen’s account of minimal liberalism.²

One way of representing Sen is to view society as a social decision function, that is, as a function F that defines possible combinations of individual preference orderings R_1, \dots, R_n to a “social preference” $R = F(R_1, \dots, R_n)$.³ Whatever the feasibility constraints on the alternatives open to society, F provides the answer to the question of what is best for society by generating the social preference relation R . For any situation the best social state relative to R is chosen from the set of feasible social states. Obviously, it is thereby assumed that the social preference relation always contains a best element.⁴

Sen defines a condition of minimal liberalism (*ML*), suggesting that it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for rights holding. *ML* states that there are at least two individuals such that for each of them there is at least one pair of alternatives over which each is *decisive*. An individual is decisive over a pair of social states (x, y) if it is always the case that if the person strictly

¹ We say more about this issue below.

² The term “right” is used in the broadest sense in this essay. We examine the compossibility and existence of rights as they are discussed in both philosophical and everyday moral discourse. Thus the “right to free speech” here may be seen as a liberty to speak on various topics, an immunity against being divested of that liberty, and rights against certain types of interference with that liberty. Similarly, the Sen rights specified in his example of the right to read a book seemingly require, at least, a liberty- and a property-right. The compossible rights Nozick (1974, 166) refers to must be both. We do not attempt to sort out these issues conceptually in this paper; rather we deliberately use the term “right” somewhat loosely but claim that our analysis can be applied easily to a more technical Hohfeldian analysis of rights, entitlements, privileges, liberties, and so on. In places we suggest how that application to other Hohfeldian categories may be accomplished. Especially clear statements of a Hohfeldian position are given in Kramer (1998, 2001).

³ R describes the weak preference relation (“at least as good as”). From R the strict preference relation P (“better than”) and the indifference relation I (“equally as good as”) are derived in the usual way.

⁴ This implies that the social preference relation needs to be acyclic and complete.

prefers x to y , then society should strictly prefer x to y , and conversely, if that person strictly prefers y to x , then society should strictly prefer y to x . The condition of minimal liberalism, ML , thus states, there are individuals i and j and distinct pairs of alternatives (x, y) and (z, v) such that: $[yP_i x \rightarrow yPx \text{ and } xP_i y \rightarrow xPy]$ and $[zP_j v \rightarrow zPv \text{ and } vP_j z \rightarrow vPz]$.

Sen's liberal paradox states that condition ML cannot be satisfied simultaneously with the (weak) Pareto condition (PAR) and the condition of universal domain (UD). According to the Pareto condition a strict preference that is shared by all individuals should also be represented in the social preference relation: If all individuals strictly prefer some alternative x to some other alternative y , then society should also strictly prefer x to y . The condition of universal domain demands that a social preference relation is generated for any logically possible configuration of individual orderings: No individual preference orderings are excluded *a priori*.

The incompatibility of the three conditions is easy to demonstrate. Take the simple case in which there are only three alternatives, x , y , and z , and two individuals. Assume that the two individuals, i and j , have rights over x and y and over y and z , respectively. Given UD , suppose that individual i strictly prefers y to x and x to z , while j strictly prefers x to z and z to y . We then see that i 's rights over x and y imply yPx and that j 's rights over y and z imply zPy . The Pareto principle yields xPz , which means that we have $xPzPyPx$: The social preference relation is cyclic and hence does not contain a best alternative.

Sen's results show that, under the conditions UD and PAR , a person's decisiveness over one pair of alternatives is incompatible with other persons having any rights at all. To see rights in terms of decisiveness over pairs of alternatives means that, in a very strong sense, individual rights are incompatible. However, the incompatibility of Sen rights follows only if the social decision function satisfies UD and PAR . It can easily be shown that if one of these conditions is dropped, compossibility remains possible. Indeed, much of the early literature directly following Sen's theorem consisted of the derivation of such possibility results arising from relaxing the conditions (see Wriglesworth 1985 for an overview). To what extent can such relaxations be seen as showing the compossibility of rights?

A relaxation of UD , that is, a restriction of the domain of the social decision function, can be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be used normatively. It has, for instance, been shown that the liberal paradox arises in cases in which individuals are "meddlesome," and it has been argued that rights should not protect "meddlesomeness" (Blau 1975). We could ban "deviant preference profiles" from the social decision mechanism (Goodin 1986). Alternatively, rather than abandoning UD , a weaker notion of decisiveness could be used—a person's strict preference regarding a pair of alternatives over which he/she has a right should be reflected in the social preference relation only if the person is nonmeddlesome. It is not the place here to assess the normative appeal of abandoning UD or of using domain information to weaken the definition of rights.

However, such approaches are rather *ad hoc*. Defining meddlesome preferences is not straightforward. To call them "meddlesome" already labels them as "wrong," but we might call some of them "caring preferences" or, more neutrally, "other-regarding." Most of us want our loved ones to care about us, even if this means that they have preferences regarding our well-being that differ from our own. Abandoning UD may be one route out of Sen's paradox, but it is a route with almost as many problems as the theorem itself.

Second, a relaxing of UD can be justified ontologically. In this view, the domain can be restricted because the situations in which conflicts between rights occur do not "really" belong to the realm of the possible. The restricted domain is thought to describe more correctly the set of possible worlds: Some configurations of individual preference orderings may, for instance, be psychologically impossible and may therefore never be realized, and conflicts in those psychologically impossible worlds need not bother us. Such an approach ensures rights compossibility by adopting an alternative interpretation of the notion of possible worlds; it does not deny that under a *logical* interpretation of that notion, Sen's liberal paradox establishes the noncompossibility of rights. More importantly, however, the claim that the preference profiles that lead to problems may be logically possible but may be impossible by some other criterion simply cannot be sustained. There is, for instance, nothing odd about Sen's original illustration of the paradox—the Prude and the Lewd having to decide whether to read or not to read a copy of *Lady Chatterly's Lover*. Whatever one's metaphysical opinions regarding the notion of "possibility" are, that situation certainly seems possible.

What about relaxing the Pareto condition? Can that secure the compossibility of Sen rights? Such a relaxation is Sen's (1982) suggestion. In his view, ML is more important than PAR and the latter therefore has to yield. However, the Pareto condition itself describes certain rights, to wit, the rights of society. After all, the Pareto condition states that the group of all individuals is decisive for any pair of alternatives. Hence, we cannot really say, as we did above, that Sen's result only established the noncompossibility of rights *given* a social decision mechanism satisfying UD and PAR . Instead, we should say that, given UD , the result establishes the noncompossibility of individual and certain *group rights* (see in this respect Steven and Foster's [1978] extension to conflicts between group rights; see also Gekker 1985).

It could be argued that a theory of justice need not attach much importance to the group rights exemplified by PAR , and so the result merely shows that *some* allocations of rights are noncompossible. And, indeed, Sen's arguments for a relaxation of the Pareto condition could be interpreted as a powerful defense of such a position. However, even without group rights, there is a serious compossibility problem with Sen rights. Alan Gibbard (1974) posed the problem, in what is known as Gibbard's liberal paradox. He showed that with a slight formal strengthening of ML , compatible with the spirit of Sen's defense of ML , impossibility results arise

even when the Pareto condition is dropped altogether. The condition *ML* does not specify over which pairs of alternatives an individual is decisive—it states only that at least two individuals are decisive over some pairs. In his various examples, however, Sen assumes that individuals are decisive over those pairs of alternatives that differ only with respect to some aspect pertaining to that individual's life. Gibbard's strengthening of *ML* essentially comes down to this same assumption. Assume that each alternative can be described as a vector of features or characteristics and let, for instance, some feature—say, component *a* of the vector—stand for person *i* reading or not reading a particular book (say, *Lady's Chatterly's Lover*), whereas another feature—component *b*—describes whether *j* reads a copy of that same book. Gibbard's condition would be satisfied if *i* is decisive for any pair of alternatives that differ only with respect to *i* reading the book or not (that is, that differ only with respect to their *a*th component) and if *j* is decisive for all pairs of alternatives that differ only with respect to *j* reading the book or not (that is, that differ only with respect to their *b*th component). Gibbard subsequently shows that there is no social decision function that satisfies such a strengthened version of *ML* and also satisfies *UD*. In other words, given *UD*, any allocation of individual rights turns out to be noncompossible.

Many authors have suggested that the Sen approach is basically flawed. As Gibbard (1982, 597–98) himself later formulated it,

These liberal paradoxes carry with them, then, an air of sophistry: they must in some way be creating problems that do not really exist. . . . To talk about the paradoxes, then, is to explore the role of one kind of mathematics in thought about social norms and organization. What is it about the mathematical apparatus of social choice theory that apparently so misapplies to questions of liberty?

In our opinion, there are at least two problems with the social choice-theoretic account of rights. First, a Sen right is defined as a form of power: Having a right means being able to determine a part of the social preference relation.⁵ However, we often think of people having rights without having power. Consider a right to buy tickets for some concert. Obviously, one can have such a right even though one cannot ensure that one will indeed get a ticket, say, because there are more people who want to attend the concert than there are available tickets. Indeed, to say that people lack a certain power does not necessarily imply that people lack certain rights or liberties or that the rights of individuals are noncompossible. The latter conclusion follows only if the notion of noncompossible rights is considerably stretched: It now refers to the impossibility of mutually compatible powers. And this is precisely what happens in the Sen approach—if each person's preference for

attending the concert leads to a veto of the outcomes in which he/she does not have a ticket, a cycle of the social preference relation emerges.

Second, even if all rights were powers, defining rights in terms of decisiveness makes it difficult to distinguish between *having* rights and *exercising* them. If a person strictly prefers *x* to *y* and is decisive over (*x*, *y*), then, by Sen's account of rights, *x* is socially preferred to *y*. The fact that a person has a strict preference and is decisive *entails* that the social preference relation is partly fixed, that is, that having rights is equivalent to exercising them. But we normally make a distinction between having a right and exercising it. If I have a right to read a book, I have that right whether or not I ever read the book.

One way of avoiding the conclusion that, in the social choice approach, one cannot distinguish between having and exercising a right is to say that the preferences of an individual can be interpreted as choices made by that individual (see, e.g., Sen 1992, 148). The rights that individuals have are described by the sets for which they are decisive, and the preferences of the individuals describe the ways in which they decide to exercise them. Suppose that I strictly prefer *x* to *y*, that is, suppose that I choose *x* when faced with a choice between *x* and *y*. This choice is hypothetical since I am confronted not only with *x* and *y*, but also with many other alternatives. In this approach, people exercise rights by making certain hypothetical choices. Two observations are in order. First, the noncompossibility of Sen rights does not disappear. The impossibility result still remains valid but can now be understood as the impossibility of translating all relevant hypothetical choices into one coherent social preference relation: Individuals cannot always exercise their rights simultaneously. Second, both the exercise and the possible violation of rights are about the choices we actually make, not about hypothetical ones.

Thus, the social choice definition of rights leads to counterintuitive conclusions since all rights are assumed to be powers, and the distinction between having rights and exercising them evaporates. Dissatisfaction with these counterintuitive consequences has led to a different way of formalizing rights, *viz.*, through the use of game-theoretic tools. In the next section we briefly sketch the outlines of the game-theoretic approach.

GAME FORMS AND EFFECTIVITY FUNCTIONS

Recently, social choice writers have developed game-theoretic approaches to the study of rights and freedoms (Fleurbaey and Van Hees 2000; Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura 1992; Gärdenfors 1981; Hammond 1996; Pattanaik 1996). The basic idea underlying game-theoretic approaches is that rights do not depend on individuals' preferences, as is the case with a definition in terms of decisiveness, but on the things individuals are and are not allowed to do, that is, on their admissible strategies. The approaches were designed to characterize rights formally in a manner

⁵ Note that here, and in the rest of the paper, we do not use the term "power" in the Hohfeld sense in which it forms a type of right, that is, the one that describes the permissibility of bringing about changes in normative (legal or moral) relations. For a game-theoretic description of the various Hohfeld types of rights, see Van Hees 1995.

preferable to the *ML* condition but were not designed to overcome the “impossibility” result (though see Van Hees 1999, 2000b).

Two types of game-theoretic approaches can be distinguished. The first, based on work originally by Gärdenfors (1981), suggests that rights may be represented by effectivity functions. In this approach rights are described in terms of sets of outcomes of which a person can secure elements. The right to wear a black shirt means that a person is effective for a set of outcomes that are all characterized by that person wearing a black shirt. If the right is exercised, one of those outcomes is realized. The second approach represents rights directly in terms of a normal game form. A game form is a game where the utility function of each player remains unassigned. So it includes a list of the players, a list of alternative strategies for each player, and an outcome from every combination of strategies that may be chosen. Taking the notion of “admissibility” as a primitive term, that is, as a term that is not further explicated, some of the strategies of the individuals are labelled admissible while others are not. The rights of individuals are subsequently specified by the freedom each has to choose any of their admissible strategies and/or by the obligation not to choose a nonadmissible strategy (Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura 1992, p. 173; Suzumura 1991, p. 229).

The two approaches are not independent of each other. One way of viewing the effectivity approach is to say that it specifies how to distill the exact specification of rights from a given normal game form. Of course, we then need to make clear in what circumstances a person can be said to be effective for a set of outcomes, that is, what it means to say that a person can “secure” a certain outcome. Two types of effectivity have been used: α -effectivity and β -effectivity. The first is defined as an individual’s *power* to force an outcome from any set: Given a normal game form, a person is α -effective for a set of outcomes under any strategy that, regardless of whatever admissible strategies the others adopt, leads to an outcome belonging to that set. The notion of β -effectivity is much weaker since it does not guarantee that a person can secure some outcome no matter what anyone else does—rather it is defined by the absence of a *blocking power* by the others: A person is β -effective for a set *A* if the group consisting of all others is not α -effective for a set disjoint from *A*.

There is a potential problem, however, with inducing “rights as effectivity” from a normal game form if it is assumed that the normal game form contains only feasible strategies (some of which are admissible while others are nonadmissible). In that case effectivity functions may be too strong for an account of rights. Take, for example, my right to wear a blue shirt. Presumably, I have such a right even though I am unable to choose one—say, because I messed up the colors of my clothes while doing my laundry. That is, even though everyone else has adopted admissible strategies, I may not be effective (whether in the α - or β -sense) for a set of outcomes in which I wear a blue shirt. This sort of problem can be accommodated if it is assumed that the game form from which effectivity functions are derived can differ

across individuals (Van Hees 1995). We then assign to each individual a normal game form that describes that individual’s “deontic realm.” To see whether a person has a certain right, we examine whether the person is effective for the relevant set of outcomes in the game form that has been specifically assigned to that person, that is, whether someone is effective for that set in that person’s own deontic realm. Since individuals may have been assigned different game forms, that is, may have different deontic realms, the described problems need not arise. It is, for instance, perfectly possible that I have the power to see to it that a certain outcome is realized in my deontic realm, whereas you have in your deontic realm the power to see to the realization of the contrary state of affairs.⁶ Although the notion of a deontic realm can be interpreted in different ways, it is clear that insofar as the deontic realms of individuals differ, they denote different “worlds” (whether possible or not). But that means that the problems are not solved by showing that rights are compossible after all, that is, that they can exist in one and the same possible world, but by implicitly abandoning the notion of noncompossibility of rights.

Furthermore, there is a problem that underlies all of the game-theoretic approaches to rights that have been developed so far and that consists of their neglect of the intentions of individuals. For instance, contrary to what the effectivity approach suggests, rights can exist even where I am not effective (however defined) in bringing about some outcome. What matters also is whether someone has *deliberately* stopped me from being effective in an illegal manner. Imagine that I am on my way to the polls but am held up in heavy traffic and they are closed by the time I arrive. My right to vote has not been infringed, even though my strategy of voting—driving to the polls—was not effective—certainly not in the α -sense but perhaps also not in the β -sense. My right to vote has not even been infringed if the heavy traffic was caused by an accident due to someone doing something illegal—driving faster than the legal limit. My right to vote would be infringed only if someone did something illegal *in order* to stop me from voting, such as a refusal to recognize my registration card as legitimate. To accommodate these problems, a game-theoretic account of rights should also refer to the intentions that individuals have, and thus far this has not been done.

STEINER’S RIGHTS COMPOSSIBILITY

In both Sen’s and the effectivity approach, rights are conceived in terms of ways of realizing certain outcomes. Sen defends his account on the grounds that actions and their consequences are closely related. Steiner, too, though he sees rights as pertaining to actions, understands rights compossibility as concerning

⁶ Note, incidentally, that an approach in which each person is assigned their own game form generalizes the one in which there is only one game form from which all effectivity functions are derived. The latter then simply forms a special case, to wit, the one in which all individuals have been assigned the same game form.

the object-temporal or spatiotemporal coincidence of the extensional specification of actions. In that sense actions and their outcomes are closely linked. Furthermore, both the social choice and the effectivity approach define rights in terms of powers. Steiner's account of rights, though not formalized in the same way, also sees rights much in terms of powers, and so similar compossibility problems arise.⁷

In terms of the Hohfeldian classification, Steiner views rights as claims or immunities such that the right-holder possesses the powers to enforce or waive the constraints that are logically implied by it. For instance, if A has a claim that B performs *x*, then B has the duty to perform *x* unless A waives this duty. In our discussion of Steiner's theory we do not focus on these claims or immunities as such, but on the liberties that are implied by them. Steiner makes clear that the exercise of rights that form part of a compossible set of rights should issue in the performance of actions that are compossible. We argue that this requirement cannot be satisfied in a meaningful way, which entails that the compossibility of rights as conceived by Steiner forms a problem.⁸

An act-type is a class of acts for which each act-token is an instantiation of that act-type. "Freedom of expression" is an act-type, for which my saying "Down with the government" on the pavement at Whitehall on Thursday, March 8, 2001, at precisely 2:15 PM is an act-token. But my statement at that time is also an act-token of the class of acts of saying "Down with the government." We normally think of rights and liberties as act-types, or rather more carefully we think of them as claims for act-types. The right to free speech is a liberty, immunity against the removal of the liberty, and rights against certain types of interference with the exercise of that liberty. Thus the right to be able to express oneself freely on controversial political, social, and scientific matters without hindrance from the state, indeed protection from the state against others who may illegitimately try to stop me, is a complex set of interrelated rights, liberties, and immunities.⁹ Whether or not I want to express myself, or ever do express myself,

on social and political matters does not affect whether or not my right to do so is protected. (This means both the protection of my liberty-to-speak by my immunity and the protection of my ability-to-exercise-my-liberty by my rights.) Similarly a right to be educated or for decent health care is the right that the state will facilitate provision of education and health care. This is so whether or not I play truant from school or never feel the need to go to the doctor. In that sense we ordinarily think of rights as being about act-types. But if rights are about act-types, then rights cannot be compossible. Or at least, to the extent that rights are about act-types, then we cannot guarantee that the exercise of those rights on any occasion is compossible. We cannot all give our conflicting views about the government at the same place and time, since my occupying this place at this time entails that you cannot occupy the same place at the same time. To the extent that resources are limited, one person's health care may need to be sacrificed for another's, while the amount devoted to the special educational needs of some may be more limited than many would wish.

For these reasons Steiner develops an account of rights compossibility specifically generated in terms of act-tokens. Immediately, we can see that Steiner's account of rights is not the language of ordinary rights talk. The justification of such a move has to be that it is the only way to make rights talk coherent, and the basis of a system of justice. However, if the cost of that coherence is to divorce it entirely from our moral world, the cost is too high. Our argument against Steiner is that his account of rights is so divorced that the cost is indeed too high.

Steiner identifies an act-token by its *extensional* description indicating its physical components. There can only be one act-token (or a particular act-type) answering to the same extensional description that has the same set of physical components. So he defines action compossibility:

Two actions, A and B, are impossible if there is partial (either object-temporal or spatio-temporal) coincidence between the extensional description of A and either (i) B's extensional description or (ii) C's extensional description if C is a prerequisite of B. (Steiner 1994, 37, italics removed)

From this Steiner argues that a person, *i*, is unfree to do an action if *i*'s control of at least one of its physical components is actually or subjunctively denied by another person *j*. This implies, according to Steiner, that *j* must actually or subjunctively possess at least one of the physical components denied to *i*. The subjunctive element is important to Steiner but its nature may not be immediately clear.

The subjunctive exclusion refers to an actual exclusion inoperative only because the individual did not attempt the action. Thus if *i* cannot leave a room because the door is locked, *i* is unfree to leave the room even if *i* does not attempt to do so (and has no desire to do so). It does, presumably, include the case where the door is not locked, but had *i* attempted to leave the room, it *would have been* locked. Say, the bolt is drawn quickly as *i*'s hand touches the handle. Does it include the case

⁷ We have chosen to discuss Steiner in some detail, despite his taking a choice-based approach to rights as opposed to the more popular interest-based approach, since his work most carefully and thoroughly examines the issue of compossibility.

⁸ Some people, for example, Jeremy Waldron (1989, 506), maintain that "when we say rights conflict, what we really mean is that the duties they imply are not compossible." But this is too restrictive. Wellman (1995, 201) points out, using a much-cited example from Feinberg (1980), that "this is too limited a conception of rights conflict. . . . Feinberg's example reminds us that rights involve a variety of Hohfeldian positions. Any of these could conflict logically with its opposite. Just as the liberty of doing some act is the logical contradictory of a duty not to do this act, so one's power of effecting some legal or moral consequence is logically incompatible with one's disability to effect this consequence."

⁹ The nature of what the right of free speech defends is important. The fact that people can go to shops and verbally inquire about the price of goods, or talk about personal matters with friends, relatives, or their doctor, is not enough for there to be free speech. The content of what one is allowed to speak is what counts. Of course, a defense of the right of freedom of speech need not be based on the importance for the speaker, but may also be in terms of what listeners gain from it (Mill 1848).

where the door could have been locked had *i* chosen to leave the room, but would not have been, since *j*, the person who could have locked the door, would not have done so? We may assume that *j* had no desire to lock *i* in the room. Steiner is not absolutely clear on this. One would think, from his discussion on pages 37–38 of *An Essay on Rights* (1994), that in such a case, *i* would be free. We would think so because *i* has the subjunctive freedom to leave the room since, had the attempt been made, *i* would have succeeded. Person *i* would have left the room even though *j* could have prevented it had *j* so chosen. Control over actions, or the actual or subjunctive possession of the physical components of *i*'s freedom, is thus existent only given that others with preventive powers *happen* not to use them. The freedom *i* has in the actual world does not extend to other possible worlds where others' intentions and actions are different. A person's control therefore is a control only of sorts: It is a control given that the person faces no (effective) resistance; it is not the control the person would have if there were resistance from others that is not there. This might be termed "outcome power" (Dowding 1991, 48).

However, things are not so simple. The problem arises not when we consider *i*'s liberty, but when we consider *i*'s liberty together with *j*'s. Steiner insists that any subjunctive freedoms a person has, only that person can have. No two people can both have the same subjunctive freedoms. Thus *i* may be subjunctively free to post a letter in the mailbox down the road in two minutes' time, but only if there is no one else who is *subjunctively* free to post a letter in the same mailbox in exactly two minutes' time. He says, "Like actual possession, subjunctive possession cannot be ascribed to more than one person for any one time" (Steiner 1994, 41). The fact that I am able to go and post a letter two minutes from now might suggest that I have the freedom to perform that particular act-token. After all, just as in the example of leaving the room, the freedom would be absent only if there were resistance from others. However, in Steiner's view, a freedom is always a possession, and in this case—even in the absence of any potential resistance—it cannot be the case that I (subjunctively or actually) possess the same physical components of that act: There may be a host of others who *could* arrive at the mailbox just ahead of me. The fact that they do not, since none of them wants to post a letter at that precise moment, is thereby irrelevant. Steiner, in a discussion of an objection raised by Taylor (1982, 142–144) to an earlier account of his theory of freedom (Steiner 1975), acknowledges that it need not be the case that everything is always in the possession of one person or another (Steiner 1994, 40). However, what his account of subjunctive freedoms implies is that *almost nothing* can be in the possession of one person or another: It would seem that no one has any subjunctive freedoms beyond what others *could* physically stop them from doing.

This means that a person's subjunctive freedoms do not extend very far since, beyond the next few seconds, a lot of people could do actions that would stop one from doing much (some people could start a nuclear

war, killing us within the next hour or two). To put the point more bluntly, the account of subjunctive freedom must be wrong. Subjunctives rule every possible act we do and do not do but could do. It means that we are never free, except in the very limited sense that what we actually do we are free to do, plus a few acts in the very near-future that no one could possibly stop us from doing in the actual world. This simply is not what we mean when we talk about human freedom. The fact that *i*'s attempt to post a letter is thwarted by a queue of people at the letterbox does not mean that *i* is not free to post a letter. It means that *i* cannot always post a letter precisely when and where *i* wants. Or, stated differently, *i* does not have the freedom to perform this particular act-token. Steiner's account of rights builds on this account of freedom and thus encounters similar problems. His choice account of rights is based upon each person's freedom being constrained only by the legitimate (or admissible) actions of others. Where *j* illegitimately locks the door on *i*, then *i*'s rights have not been not been recognized; where *j* legitimately locks the door on *i*, then *i*'s rights have not been broken. In both cases, however, *i* is not free to leave the room. However, *i*'s rights cover only the cases where freedom to do some action *x* is not overwhelmed by some other person *j*'s legitimate actions. Thus *i* does not have the right to post a letter in two minutes' time, given that others subjunctively may also be queuing to post a letter at that exact time. (To the extent that a set of people may legitimately set in motion nuclear war at any given moment, nobody has any rights beyond the next couple of hours.)¹⁰

Steiner (1994, 86–101) tries to accommodate these problems, by drawing on Bentham's familiar distinction between *vested* and *naked liberties*. A liberty (or permission) refers to the absence of a duty, and should not be confused with Steiner's descriptive notion of a freedom as discussed thus far. A vested liberty is a liberty that is protected by the duties that others have, whereas a naked liberty lacks such protection. The problem discussed so far can be formulated in terms of vested liberties: We have argued that what we commonly perceive as freedoms can never be seen as "completely vested." Since, by definition, a naked liberty lacks "protection," it cannot constitute possession of part of the world and, hence, cannot form a freedom in Steiner's sense. Steiner (1994, 87) does not disagree with this: "The salience of nakedness in the creation of impossibilities is clear enough." It is for this reason that he argues that rights should consist of vested liberties (Steiner 1994, 89), that is, they should consist of liberties surrounded by "an impenetrable perimeter." However, the resulting rights catalog becomes rather peculiar if all rights are

¹⁰ As explained in the previous section, this conclusion holds only if the deontic realms of the individuals coincide. However, it is clear that the notion of possession as used by Steiner refers to possession of a part of the world that is the same for all individuals. For instance, he argues that Becker and McEnroe, when competing for the 1990 Wimbledon Tennis Championship, cannot both be said to be free to win the championship, because "there's no possible world in which two (or more) such attempters can be both unprevented" (Steiner 1994, 41). In other words, the set of possible worlds (the deontic realm) is assumed to be identical for Becker and McEnroe.

completely vested, that is, if there is indeed an *impenetrable* perimeter. If we want to say that I have the right to post a letter, we would have to stipulate that my vested liberty exists only between, say, 3:00 and 3:05 AM—during other time slots others have the right to post a letter. Indeed, most activities (to demonstrate, to practice a religion, to go to a concert, to surf the web, and so on) that would normally be thought of as the exercising of rights (a possible instantiation of an act-type right) should be made permissible to an individual or small group of individuals only during some particular slots in time or space. In fact, not even all individuals can be guaranteed such rights. Should we, for instance, say that at least some individuals lack the right to practice a particular religion if it is physically impossible that all individuals attend a Sunday service?

THE EXISTENCE OF RIGHTS

Much of the discussion thus far has concerned itself with the *sense* in which a right exists, though this question has not been addressed directly. Before we go farther it is perhaps a good idea that we do address this question directly. The conditions of rights' existence are not straightforward. Rights do not exist in the sense in which the *Economist* famously defined economic "goods" (as opposed to "services"), *viz.*, something that can be thrown through a window. But they do not exist even in the sense of an economic service. To the extent that we can empirically establish (and economists do empirically measure more or less successfully) the size of the service economy, the rights existent in a community cannot be so (easily) established empirically. The problem may seem even more difficult once we distinguish legal from moral rights. To illustrate, consider a claim that certain legal rights are respected in one nation but not in another. To confirm this, we might examine which rights are respected in nation X, compare this with rights in nation Y, and conclude that there are indeed more legal rights in X than Y. We may empirically quantify this by showing that more activities falling under some right *R* occur in X than in Y. Yet if we say that there are moral rights in Y that are not respected, then we are saying that the rights *exist* in both X and Y but that the respective states do not recognize or respect those rights equally.

We make a distinction between a "material" existence and a "formal" existence of a right. We say that a right exists materially if it is being respected, which means that the material existence of a right depends on the efforts of the state to protect those rights and on the ability of its population to exercise them. Formal existence, on the other hand, depends "only" on some theory, *T*, that specifies the rights in question: Rights formally exist insofar as they are recognized or proclaimed to exist. The theory that specifies these rights may be a moral one. It may also be one that refers to a "general recognition" of such rights, that is, rights may be seen as constituting some sort of maxim underlying the equilibrium of a game. Another possibility would be to say that the theory stipulates that

rights exist in terms of some general recognition backed by the force of a law—it stipulates legal rights. We do not provide a separate analysis here of these various approaches. Rather we fold them into one kind of existence that may take each or all of these interpretations. However, further specification along these lines may be desirable under future more detailed analysis.

To some extent the problem of existence does not have to be a problem. Quine (1953, 15) famously remarked that "to be is to be the value of a variable" (see also Quine 1939). This famous dictum points out the importance of a prior doctrine or ontological standard. This serves well for the existence of rights. Our rights can be given only by the prior doctrine or standard and we need consider their existence only with regard to that doctrine, demanding only that the existence claims are coherent with regard to the logical formulation adopted. We can trivially define the existence of anything by stating the truth-conditions of the formulae in which it occurs. Less trivially, however, we may wish to consider how we can represent different kinds of existence. We present four ways in which rights can exist (*cf.* Rescher 1978).

When we speak about the existence of individual human beings, we speak of the existence of particulars as contingent members of the world.¹¹ This existence can, of course, be described in terms of a first-order predicate logic that contains the existence predicate *E*. We then write *Ek*, where *k* is an individual constant.¹² The first way in which rights can be seen to exist is in terms of the existence of properties of individuals. To say that an individual right exists is then to say that certain first-order predicates apply to certain individuals. Existence is seen as a second-order predicate that is applied to first-order predicates *in combination* with the particulars to which those first-order predicates applies. At this point, if a first-order predicate *R* denotes a certain right, we do not discuss the existence of such a right but the existence of this right for a particular individual *k*. In a way, the right of *k* can be seen as a particular, where the right "as such" is a universal. To indicate that we talk here about rights that are being proclaimed by some moral or legal theory without necessarily being respected, we call this type of existence formal.

- (i) The formal existence of a right as a particular:
 $\Sigma(Rk)$.

What can we say about the truth-conditions of such a formula in a world *w*? One might claim that $\Sigma(Rk)$ holds only if $(Ek \ \& \ Rk)$. Thus an individual's right to breathe fresh air exists if, and only if, the individual exists and if he/she indeed has this right. This implies that future generations cannot now have the right to

¹¹ We restrict the analysis to the existence of rights in the actual world at a certain point in time, that is, we ignore modal aspects.

¹² As Hintikka (1969) has shown, if we have a semantic model in which not every individual term necessarily has a bearer, the formula "*Ek*" can be seen to be equivalent to the formula " $\exists i (k = i)$ " thereby also giving the formal rendition of Quine's famous saying. See also, for example, Quine 1970, chap. 5.

breathe fresh air in the future. While this may be acceptable to some (it does not imply, for example, that we do not have obligations to future generations so that they can, in the future, have such rights), we may not want to exclude the existence of such rights on logical grounds only. We might therefore be inclined to infer that $\Sigma(Rk)$ presupposes only Rk rather than $(Ek \& Rk)$. But then we are still making a particular ontological presupposition, to wit, the existence of the universal R . If we say that some individual possesses a right R , we assume that R is a right that exists that individuals may or may not possess. Now let Σ again be the second-order predicate describing the existence of first-order predicates. Hence, we now also distinguish

(ii) the formal existence of a right as a universal: ΣR

and we claim that $\Sigma(Rk)$ should be defined partly in terms of ΣR . That is, we believe that to say that an individual formally possesses a particular right presupposes that the right formally exists as a universal. For instance, a bill of rights stipulates which rights exist formally as universals, and this *in turn* determines which rights formally exist as particulars. With respect to formal existence, the universals thus have ontological priority. The question of the formal existence of a right as a particular shifts to the formal existence of the corresponding universal, that is, the formal existence of the freedom or right *as such*. It is here that a prior theory T is needed that recognizes this existence.¹³

Such recognition makes clear which rights there are formally and, also, which individuals possess those rights. It does not, however, establish the more “definite” or “concrete” existence of rights when they are respected or exercised. To capture the “material” existence of rights, we introduce a different existence predicate, ε .

(iii) The material existence of a right as a particular: $\varepsilon(Rk)$.

What can we say about the truth-conditions of formulas of type iii? In this case we again take recourse to the prior theory T , that is, the theory also needs to stipulate the conditions that should be fulfilled before we can say that the rights a person formally possesses are respected or exercised. Assume that the fulfillment of these conditions can be described in terms of a formula δ of the formal language at hand and that the formal existence of a right is a necessary requirement for its material existence. We might then hold that $\varepsilon(Rk) \Leftrightarrow (Rk) \& \delta$. Thus an individual right exists materially if it exists formally *and* if the right is respected or exercised.

The distinction between formal and material existence can in turn be applied to rights *sui generis*. We can say, for instance, that although some society for-

mally acknowledges some right, it is being violated—without our thereby referring to the violation of rights of specific individuals.

(iv) The material existence of a right as a universal: εR .

Whereas the formal existence of rights as universals can be established without reference to the rights as particulars that individuals possess formally, the ontological priority is reversed with respect to the material existence of rights as universals: A society can formally acknowledge a right *sui generis*, but to say that those rights also exist materially, we first have to examine which rights materially exist as particulars.

To summarize, we have argued that to begin to analyze rights by their exercise is mistaken, but it is surely correct that rights “exist” in the most “definite” or “concrete” sense when they are exercised or respected by others’ actions. In some important sense, rights essentially “exist” in terms of i and ii: Otherwise we would not be able to claim that rights are not being respected by the laws of some state or through actions of members of society. However, rights also have a more concrete existence when they are respected or exercised. This is captured by iii and iv. Thus the *analysis* of rights should begin at the level of the formal existence of rights *sui generis* (level ii), proceed to the formal existence of rights as particulars (level i), and *then* proceed to the level of material existence of rights as particulars (level iii) and rights *sui generis* (level iv), respectively. Of course, the nature of the existence of rights under i and ii is a form of “bootstrapping.” Rights exist in the sense that they are thought to exist (whether through moral theory, through beliefs underlying behavior, or by law) but thinking that they exist leads to a more concrete existence through behavior itself or state action.

Rights can thus be seen in terms of expectations. Through our recognition of others’ rights we behave differently toward them. In other words, rights are part of our social institutions that may be defined in terms of equilibrium strategies. There is a large and growing literature that examines social institutions in terms of equilibrium arrangements (see, for example, Calvert 1995, Ostrom 1991, and Schotter 1981). Specific applications of institutional theory to the analysis of rights can be found in Sened (1997) and Van Hees (2000a). Our rights theories both track such equilibrium strategies and criticize or try to modify such behavior. Often groups may try to construct new rights by extending previous claims to new domains. If such rights can form new social institutions, then these groups may be successful. In other words, moral systems and ways of representing them grow through both argument and behavior, the latter (as Rawls importantly noted) putting constraints upon the successes of the former.

This section merely forms a sketch of the nature of the existence conditions of rights. As said, the crucial parts of those conditions—the conditions δ and the theory of which they form a part—have not been specified yet. Leaving aside the issue of the material existence of rights as universals, we analyze in the next section

¹³ We do not attempt here to specify the exact way of deriving the particulars from the universals. Note, however, that the existence of a right *sui generis* does not necessarily imply that *every* individual possesses the right in question.

how the condition δ may be cashed in, that is, what it means to say that an individual right exists materially. Below we examine what that analysis entails for the other parts of the theory T.

MEASURING RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

These considerations lead us to examining the expectations that one may have about exercising one's rights. We briefly outline the possibilities of an approach to rights that circumvents some of the problems discussed pertaining to noncompossibility. In two important aspects we deviate from the three approaches to rights discussed above. First, we focus on the freedom to perform act-types rather than act-tokens, thus coming closer to ordinary rights vocabulary. Second, we reverse the relation between judgments about which specific freedoms an individual has and judgments about the *extent* (or degree) of a person's (overall) freedom. Rather than examining which freedoms an individual has and, on the basis of that information, examining the extent of a person's freedom, we derive a judgment about what freedoms a person (materially) has from judgments about the extent of that person's freedom. Although we limit the analysis to showing how a measurement of (overall) *freedom* can help to establish the existence of (particular) *freedoms*, we also claim that the approach can be used to establish the existence of other types of rights.

We want to ascertain whether a person (materially) possesses a certain act-type right R and we assume that the individual possesses the right in the formal sense. Let r_1, \dots, r_k denote act-tokens instantiating the right. R may stand, for instance, for freedom of speech, and r_1 may stand for shouting "Down with the government" at Whitehall at a given time and date, r_2 may stand for shouting the same thing at Piccadilly Circus, and so on. Now we want to derive a "freedom function" Γ that assigns a value between 0 and 1 to each R—the value $\Gamma(R)$ describing the extent to which a person is free to do R. Suppose that for each act-token r_i , we can define the probability $p(r_i)$ that the act-token will, in the relevant manner, not be prevented. Assuming that these probabilities determine to what extent a person is free to perform R, we have $\Gamma(R) = \Gamma(p(r_1), \dots, p(r_k))$. That is, the extent to which a person is free to do R depends on the probabilities with which each of the relevant act-tokens will not be prevented.

It might be objected by those taking an all-or-nothing view to the existence of freedom that what we are specifying here is "the probability of a person's being free to perform R" rather than the extent to which he/she is free to do R.¹⁴ To the extent that our analysis is consistent with the "all-or-nothing" view of liberty or freedom, there is perhaps nothing wrong with interpreting freedom in this manner. We take it that our analysis teases out what most people mean when they talk about freedom. However, the fact that everything

can be translated from everyday language to a clumsier formulation is not a reason for preferring the latter: especially so when one considers that the implication of the clumsy formulation is that what people value in a free society is not the extent of their freedom, but "the probability of being free to do R, S, . . ." We claim that the extent of people's freedom is specified by their probability of being free to do R, S, . . ., but see no point in declaring that people are wrong about what they claim they value. In other words, analyzing these claims in terms of a formal language (a translation) is preferable to attempting to change the claims into a language most people would not recognize.

For Steiner, rights pertain to act-tokens, not to act-types. If one, nevertheless, wants to make claims about the existence of act-type rights, it seems that there is only one way of carrying out such an analysis that is compatible with Steiner's approach. As we saw, for Steiner, having a right means possessing a part of the world. If a person has the act-type "freedom of speech," then there should be at least one act-token instantiating it that the person can be sure to realize. The main non-compossibility problem described thus far—the impossibility of *ensuring* that a person can perform some act-token—can now be taken to mean that the probability that some particular act-token will not be prevented will usually not be one. If δ indeed stipulates that the value of at least one of the relevant probabilities should be one, then rights are noncompossible. But this is too strong. We cannot be said not to possess the right of free speech, the right to attend a church service, the right to post a letter, and so on, simply because in some circumstances we are not able to exercise them.

We cannot say that the material existence of a right depends on at least one of the relevant act-token probabilities having a value of one. It seems much more natural to suppose that the existence will depend on the value that the function Γ assigns, and this value may be positive even if all of the relevant act-token probabilities are lower than one. Indeed, as the extensive recent literature on measuring freedom suggests, there are many ways in which the function Γ can be defined (see, for example, Arrow 1995, Carter 1999, Dowding 1992, Pattanaik and Xu 1990, 1998, Rosenbaum 2000, Sen 1991, Sugden 1998, and Van Hees 2000a). One possibility is for the value to be determined by the act-token with the highest probability of not being prevented. Thus, if at Piccadilly Circus, I have the highest probability of not being prevented from protesting, then that probability describes the extent of my freedom of speech. Another possibility might be to take the average values of the various probabilities. For instance, one could argue that the extent of freedom is severely limited if one is only permitted to protest at a particular place – the other probabilities should therefore also be taken into account. Deciding between these and the many other possibilities may be a very difficult task, and this is not the place to explore this issue further.¹⁵ Let us simply suppose that we have

¹⁴ Kramer (2002) argues for such a view. In a personal communication Kramer points out that, apart from this quibble, his approach is perfectly consistent with the rest of the analysis.

¹⁵ One could also argue that the value of Γ should depend on the probabilities that various *sets* of compossible act-tokens will be

a particular Γ with which we can establish the extent to which a person is free to perform various act-types. This information is used subsequently to define which act-types a person is free to perform. Again, an all-or-nothing approach is counterintuitive: We do not say that a person lacks the freedom to perform a particular act-type if, and only if, the extent of that person's freedom to perform that act-type is one. It may be more plausible to claim that for each act-type right, a specific threshold value exists: If the relevant Γ value exceeds that value, the person has the right; otherwise he/she does not. Although there is no particular point in time or public place at which I can be absolutely sure to have the opportunity to protest against the government, the value of Γ will be sufficiently high to say that my right is unaffected.¹⁶ The proposition δ , which is used to determine whether an individual right exists materially, thus is true indeed.

Such a method departs from the usual approaches to the measurement of freedom. Rather than starting with the freedoms an individual has and subsequently building a judgment about the extent of the person's freedom, the order is reversed. First, we examine the extent to which a person is free to perform certain act-types. That extent, which is specified by Γ , and a specification of the various threshold values, subsequently determines which (material) freedoms and rights an individual is said to have. In other words, first we measure how free individuals are and then we determine which freedoms and rights they have.¹⁷ Although we have only illustrated the approach with respect to the establishment of freedoms, the framework is general enough to derive judgments about the existence of other types of rights.

This is just a brief outline of an alternative approach. Many questions still need to be addressed. Particularly relevant is the question of how the various Hohfeld types of rights can be distinguished within our framework. Although the probabilities pertain to the freedom to perform an act and thus to liberty-rights only, the other Hohfeld types can be described in terms of these liberty-rights. For instance, to say that A has a claim-right that B performs x means that B has the liberty to perform x and does not have the liberty not to perform x, and it also entails that A has the liberty to perform an action (i.e., to waive the duty) such that the resulting state of affairs is one in which B does have the liberty to abstain from performing x. Moreover, many questions need to be addressed with respect to

the nature of Γ and the various threshold values. We do not go into these questions here, but we mention various advantages of the approach that may help to motivate further exploration. First, the use of threshold values enables us to make clear that for some rights act-token impossibilities matter more heavily than for others. At the same time, the costs of raising the probabilities of rights being exercised also matter. For example, having access to medical care may be thought to be more important than being able to post a letter at a nearby mailbox. But ensuring that one may have one's health problems sorted out, no matter what they are, is far more costly than ensuring good access to mailboxes. Both importance and cost need to be considered when considering threshold values.

Second, the approach may enable us to incorporate the earlier-mentioned relation between intentions and rights. After all, others' intentions affect the probabilities. If others intend to prevent me from going to the voting booth, and they have the means to carry out—or at least try to carry out—these intentions, then the probability that I will be able to vote will affect the relevant Γ value. My right is violated only when the relevant Γ value falls below the threshold value. The threshold value may be much lower when nonintentional acts stop me from voting. For example, if the journey to the voting booth is very long and hazardous, with a high probability of failure, even though no one is trying to stop me, we may feel that one does not have the right to vote. (Or imagine that there are so few voting booths open, for such a short period of time, that it is not possible for all those registered to vote at that booth to do so in the time it is open. As recent events have shown, this example is not fantastic.) In this case, the low probability of my being able to exercise my right should be obvious, and one may legitimately expect the state to increase that probability—by increasing the number of voting booths, allowing postal votes, and so on. This approach allows us to recognize, however, that my right to vote is not always violated when someone does something to stop me, as in the traffic accident example discussed above. What matters is the *probability* of being able to exercise the right and the *reasons* why that probability holds.

Third, the approach enables us to make clearer the distinction between rights and freedoms. Freedom is a generic term that refers to all possible acts, whereas rights refer to acts the probabilities of which are affected by legal or moral considerations. My right to vote implies that I am protected against others' acting against me in certain ways and for which provisions are made such that I have a given minimum probability (the threshold value) of being able to exercise the right. Without that legal protection, the relevant probability would be lower.

Fourth, we may note that it enables us to handle positive rights and negative rights in much the same manner. In both cases we are looking at the probabilities of our rights being, in the first case, respected and, in the second, exercised. It thereby also enables us to take due consideration of the moral value of rights and of the costs of protecting them. One may expect any

unprevented, rather than on the probabilities that singular act-tokens will be unprevented. For an elaborate defense of such an approach, see Carter 1999.

¹⁶ There may be places where no absolute right is important. One would hardly claim that we have the right to free speech if it is allowed only where no one else can hear. There is a difference between protesting down Whitehall or Piccadilly Circus and being allowed to march only on Dartmoor.

¹⁷ Note that our analysis suggests that how δ is specified is a choice that is made given judgments about the world in which freedoms are being considered. It is an *a posteriori* judgment that cannot be made independent of our experience of the world and our expectations of what is practically possible.

society to value the same negative and positive rights equally, but not expect a poor society to be able to protect negative rights as strongly or provide as many positive rights as a rich one.

CONCLUSION

Rights are noncompossible in an important sense. Rights as defined in both the social choice-theoretic and the game-theoretic approaches are noncompossible. Steiner's sophisticated attempt to specify a form of rights as act-tokens also fails to deliver rights compossibility in any interesting sense. If one is free to do some action only if one is subjunctively free to do it and others are not as subjunctively free, then the rights one has over such actions are nonexistent or vanishingly small. While Steiner's account is not strictly logically contradictory, when examined it looks more like a *reductio ad absurdum* of rights theory than a defense. Certainly it is far from the nature of rights as recognized in traditional political theory and in everyday moral talk.

The noncompossibility of rights is an embarrassment especially to those who want to argue that rights form the *foundation* or *basis* of justice. Those who see rights as an important component of our moral and political thought can view their noncompossibility with equanimity. We can still attempt to measure and quantify individual rights by the extent of individual freedoms to carry out actions, and to not be subject to the domination of others, within the scope of the rights presupposed by moral theory. The extent of these freedom judgments does not require that individuals *necessarily* are able to carry out everything they wish under the terms of the rights. That is what is meant by rights noncompossibility. We cannot all exercise all of our rights simultaneously, but it does not follow from that that we do not have those rights. Where rights clash, we examine the grounds of the rights and other moral considerations to see which rights claim should prevail, in each circumstance. Moral theories are not complete, they develop over time, but our moral theory does guide such decisions.

If rights are noncompossible but form an important part of moral and political theory, it is natural to question the nature of their existence. Quantifying their existence conditions is not a trivial matter. Rights exist in many senses. They exist as presupposed by a moral or political theory. They exist as claims under such a theory. They exist in the sense that individuals recognize their existence and act accordingly. They exist as set out in legal documents subject to defense by the state and private litigation. We have begun to tease out some of these existences and place them in the context of their exercise and recognition.

While rights do not guarantee their own exercise, they have only a weak existence (a theoretical existence) if there is no chance of their being respected by others or of their being exercised. This suggests that we need to examine the probability that individuals' rights will be respected and that they may be able to exercise their rights. These judgments will depend upon

prior moral considerations—which include what types of actions and constraints need to be taken into account in the probability judgments, what kind of freedom function we understand, and so on. There is no reason to think that every right should have the same probability of being successfully exercised. Many considerations, both pragmatic and moral, enter into the consideration of what threshold value—or probability—each exercise should take. Different threshold values may exist for different sorts of rights, and such threshold values may have to be traded one for another in different societies. “Overall” comparison of rights or freedoms across societies may be extremely difficult or even impossible. However, it does not rule out comparisons with respect to certain categories of rights and freedoms for partial comparability.

Can the notion of compossibility of rights also be applied to our alternative conception of rights? Theoretically, it can. However, it is doubtful whether it is possible to give a proof of compossibility or noncompossibility to a reasonable set of rights within our framework. Given the logical relations between various right types, and the interdependence of the various probability distributions, constructing a (nontrivial) set of rights that can be shown to be compossible (or noncompossible) would be complex.¹⁸ Yet it can be safely inferred that since our probabilistic account of rights is weaker than the other accounts of rights we have described, compossibility results are more likely to occur. More importantly, however, is that the issue of compossibility has lost its urgency in our framework. Compossibility may be one consideration relevant in the construction of rights, and hence in establishing, for instance, the various threshold values, but in our framework there is no reason for giving it *a priori* overriding importance.

Our formal approach to the nature and measurement of rights and freedom is more in tune with everyday intuitions and standard accounts of rights in political philosophy than extant formal accounts. It provides a framework to start an assessment of the extent of rights in different nations understood in different senses and allows us to measure rights and freedoms both through the statutory and institutional forms in which they may be identified in different countries and through their exercise. The number of people who exercise rights in one country relative to the number in another, taking into account other relevant features, gives us an indication of the probability that such rights can be exercised. The distribution of such exercise across different social groups also gives us an indication of the bias in any system of rights.

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¹⁸ Here a game-theoretic approach may be helpful. It would differ from existing game-theoretic approaches in that it would use information about the probability that certain (equilibrium) outcomes will emerge to derive a specification of which strategies are admissible and which are not.

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Identity and Liberal Nationalism

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A number of liberal defenders of nationalism argue that cultural-national membership is a vital component of individual identity. Notable among these liberal "identity nationalists" is Will Kymlicka, who defends minority national and cultural rights on the basis of the importance of such membership for persons' sense of identity. Kymlicka's conception of the liberal autonomous self, however, is radically at odds with his views concerning the importance of cultural-national membership. It also privileges national identity in such a way as to lend support to an extreme and illiberal form of nationalism, one that bases the priority of national obligations on the priority of national identity. By prioritizing national identity as Kymlicka does, other nonnational sites of identity formation, such as religious communities, may receive inadequate protection in a pluralistic nation-state.

In his opinion in *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940), which upheld the expulsion of the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from public school for refusing to say the pledge of allegiance on religious grounds, Justice Frankfurter wrote,

The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create the continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. (596)

This passage and the context in which it was made pose something of a dilemma for liberal defenders of nationalism. Liberal nationalists tend to define nations—as opposed to states—in terms of a common culture and common language, a real or imagined heritage, a connection, real or imagined, with an historical homeland, and a populace that exhibits "nationalist sentiments"—affective ties to one's conationals and a belief in the value of the nation as an enduring community extending into the past and continuing into the future (e.g., McCormick 1982; Miller 1995; Tamir 1993).

The liberal nationalist's dilemma is this: What happens when the claims of nationalism and of national unity conflict with the claims of religion in a religiously pluralistic nation-state? Should the religious liberty of the Jehovah's Witnesses be sacrificed for the sake of promoting national unity? What, then, of liberalism's commitment to religious liberty and individual liberty of conscience? This question will be especially acute for those liberal nationalists who, rejecting proceduralist or *modus vivendi* conceptions of liberalism, argue that the inculcation of nationalist sentiments is necessary to generate the trust, "transparency," and concern for the common good they believe necessary for a well-functioning liberal democracy (Barry 1991, chap. 6; Miller 1995, 1998; Schnapper, 1994).

There will be equal challenges, however, for liberal defenses of nationalism that emphasize not necessarily

nationalism's instrumental value in enabling and maintaining liberal-democratic norms and institutions, but the importance of membership in a secure national community for persons' sense of identity and self-worth. For example, according to Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990, 447–49),

The fact that these are groups [i.e., cultural-national groups] membership of which is a matter of belonging and not of accomplishment, makes them suitable for their role as primary foci of identification Secure identification at that level is particularly important to one's well-being [P]eople's sense of their own identity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups

Similarly, in *Liberal Nationalism*, Yael Tamir (1993, 73) emphasizes the extent to which individuals' sense of identity can be constituted by their national membership and that the self-image of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national communities:

Membership in a nation is a constitutive factor of personal identity. The self-image of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national community. . . . A safe, dignified, and flourishing national existence thus significantly contributes to their well-being.

Equally strong cultural and national identity claims are made by Will Kymlicka in his defense of minority cultural and national rights:

Cultural membership provides us with an intelligible context of choice and a secure sense of identity and belonging, that we call upon in confronting questions about personal values and projects If state institutions fail to recognize people's culture and identity, the result can be serious damage to people's self-respect and sense of agency. (1995, 89, 2001, 33)

The difficulties raised by Frankfurter's opinion for what might be termed liberal "identity-nationalism" are twofold. First, there is the question as to which community in a pluralistic and multicultural society is properly considered to be *the* relevant cultural-national community, the loss of which it is assumed will result in serious damage to people's self-respect and sense of identity and agency. The problem here is that people may have overlapping and cross-cutting memberships in more than one cultural community, all of which may contribute in significant ways to their sense of identity (Levy 2000, 69–97). Second, even if the relevant

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The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers and the editor of the *American Political Science Review* for their many helpful comments and suggestions.

cultural-national community could unproblematically be identified—let us say that in the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses the relevant *national* community is the United States—there remains the question as to the standing or importance of persons' national identity in contrast to their religious identity, or familial identity, or any other source of identity. Should we infer, on the basis of an assumption that the national community is the *primary* focus of identity and identification (Kymlicka 1995, 89; Margolit and Raz, 1990, 447–49), that in a religiously pluralistic nation (or nation-state) religious identity is somehow of less importance and therefore might justifiably be made to yield to the demands of national identity?

My argument in this paper is that we should not infer this, and we should not infer this because any assumptions concerning the primacy of national identity both are empirically questionable and, if intended as a normative ideal, lend themselves to a prioritizing of identities that is profoundly illiberal. My argument is concerned specifically with the claims associated with what I have called liberal identity nationalism, and although I believe that this critique has relevance for liberal nationalisms that view nationalism as instrumental for the generation of liberal-democratic norms, this is not my primary focus.

IDENTITY AND CONSTITUTIVE ATTACHMENTS

Will Kymlicka was arguably the first contemporary liberal theorist to defend the right to cultural-national preservation on the basis of an assumption concerning the relation between identity formation and cultural-national communities, and his work has had a significant influence on debates concerning liberal nationalism. Kymlicka's assumptions concerning identity formation are problematic for two primary reasons. First, Kymlicka's assumption concerning the nature of so-called "constitutive" attachments supports a counter-intuitive and unappealing conception of the liberal autonomous self, one that plays into the hands of critics of liberalism who contend that liberalism presupposes just such a flawed conception. Second, Kymlicka's conception of the liberal autonomous self is radically at odds with his views concerning the importance of cultural-national identity and membership, which presupposes precisely the kind of constitutive attachments he denies.

A key component of Kymlicka's defense of cultural-national rights rests upon his conception of personal autonomy¹ and his conviction that autonomy is the core liberal value. The fundamental freedoms liberalism grants to each individual are important because liberal freedom "grants people a very wide freedom of

choice in terms of how they lead their lives. . . . It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and then adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life" (Kymlicka 1995, 80). The importance of culture, specifically what Kymlicka (2001, 53) calls a "societal culture"—"a set of institutions, covering both public and private life, with a common language, which has historically developed over time on a given territory"—is that it "provides people with a wide range of choices as to how to lead their lives." Thus societal cultures are characterized as "contexts of choice" (1995, 89). The idea is that (for most persons at any rate) societal culture forms a kind of "authoritative horizon" of shared meanings such that ends can, for the most part, meaningfully be chosen intraculturally but not interculturally.

What Kymlicka (1995, 81) identifies as the fundamental importance of our being able rationally to choose and revise our conceptions of the good, to choose from an array of culturally determined ends in exercising our personal autonomy, depends on the view that

as Rawls [1980, 544] puts it, individuals "do not necessarily view themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good that they espouse at any given time," they can 'stand back' from their current ends to survey and assess their worthiness.

To assess Kymlicka's view of identity, it is necessary to consider briefly why Rawls held this view in relation to particular conceptions of the good and why he abandoned it.²

Rawls's assertion that persons are not inevitably tied to a particular conception of the good relates to his conception of moral personality as presented in *A Theory of Justice* (1971). There, moral personality is characterized by two capacities: one, the capacity rationally to choose and revise a conception of the good—a version of personal autonomy; the other, the capacity for a sense of justice—a version of Kantian autonomy (505).³ When realized, the former is expressed by a "rational plan of life"; the latter, by a "regulative desire to act upon certain principles of right" (561). Throughout *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls assumed that as part of a rational plan of life individuals choose their dominant ends: "[A] moral person is a subject with ends he has chosen. . . . [T]he self is prior to the ends that are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities" (569). According to critics, this appeared to commit Rawls to a view of a "temporally prior" fully formed and fixed self that then chooses its dominant ends, and what this seemed to imply was that the identity of the self was in some way fixed or determined apart from all of its ends (Sandel 1982).

¹ I borrow the term "personal autonomy" from Joseph Raz (1986, 370) and employ it, as does Raz, to mark a contrast with Kant's (and Kantian) conceptions of moral autonomy. Personal autonomy involves the ability "to formulate, evaluate, and revise ideals of life and character [and] to bring these evaluations to bear on actual choices and on the formulation of projects and commitments" (Macedo 1990, 79). See Kymlicka 1989, 9–20, 47–73, 1990, 207–15, 1995, 80–93, 152–72, 2001, 209–11.

² The emphasis here upon conceptions of the good is important, for in *A Theory of Justice* (1971), Rawls maintains, as part of his Kantian account of moral motivation, that persons do have a "constitutive relationship" to their moral motivations, i.e., their interest in acting justly, in contrast to their conceptions of the good (251–57, 567–77). For more on this, see discussion below.

³ For these two conceptions of autonomy see above, footnote 1, and discussion below.

The first to raise this sort of critique with regard to Rawls's theory was Bernard Williams (1976), in his discussion of "ground projects": "A man may have, for a lot of his life or even for just some part of it, a *ground* project or set of projects which are closely related to his existence and which to a significant degree give a meaning to his life" (208–9). Williams commented,

I do not mean that they [ground projects] provide him with a life plan, in Rawls' sense. On the contrary, Rawls's conception, and the conception of practical rationality, shared by Nagel [1970], which goes with it, seems to me rather to imply an external view of one's life, as something like a given triangle that has optimally to be filled in. This perspective omits the vital consideration that the continuation and the size of this triangle are up to me. (209)

In "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" (1980), Rawls attempted to respond explicitly to the criticism raised by Williams. In elaborating on the capacity of persons to have a conception of the good, Rawls writes,

Given their moral power to form, to revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good, [citizens'] public identity as a moral person . . . is not affected by changes in their conceptions of the good. . . . By contrast, citizens in their personal affairs, or within the internal life of associations, may regard their ends and aspirations differently. They may have attachments and loves that they believe they would not or could not, stand apart from; and they might regard it as unthinkable for them to view themselves without certain religious and philosophical convictions and commitments. (1980, 544–45; cf. 1985, 241, 1993, 31)⁴

Kymlicka is critical of the notion of people's self-understandings being tied to certain ends or conceptions of the good and criticizes Rawls for having modified his views concerning the relation between the self and its ends. Kymlicka argues (1989, 58) that Rawls "gives no real examples of people whose self-understandings are bound to a particular complex of ends" and endorses instead Rawls's (1974, 61) earlier view that persons "do not think of themselves as inevitably bound to, or as identical with, the pursuit of any particular complex of fundamental interests that they may have at any given time."

In describing what he takes to be central to the "liberal" view of the self and to one's sense of identity, as opposed to the "communitarian" view of the self, which he attributes to Michael Sandel, Kymlicka

demonstrates why he rejects Rawls's revised conception of the possible relationship between persons' self-understandings and their "complex of ends," and it is a view that he has consistently reaffirmed:

What is central to the liberal view is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior to our ends, *in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination*. . . . My self is, in this sense, perceived prior to its ends, i.e., I can always envisage myself without its present ends There must always be some ends given with the self when we engage in such reasoning, but it doesn't follow that any *particular* ends must always be taken as given with the self. . . . [W]hat is given with the self can, and sometimes does change over the course of a lifetime. Thus there is a further claim that Sandel must establish: he must show not only that we can't perceive a totally unencumbered self, but that we can't perceive ourselves without some specific end or motivation. (Kymlicka 1989, 52, original emphasis; cf. 1990, 207–15, 1995, 90–92, 2001, 329)

Although it may not be easy or enjoyable to revise one's deepest ends, "[n]o end is immune from such potential revision" (Kymlicka 1995, 91). What does it mean to assert that people's self-understandings, their *sense of identity*,⁵ is not bound to a particular complex of ends, when this complex of ends includes what Rawls (1980, 544–45, 1985, 241, 1993, 31) identifies as religious, philosophical, and moral convictions, as well as enduring attachments, loves, and loyalties?

In stating what is central to the liberal view of the self, Kymlicka amalgamates two distinct claims. One is that "no end is immune from potential revision," that one's deepest ends can and sometimes do change over the course of a lifetime. This is an empirical generalization and from the third person or "external" perspective: It is the claim that experience shows us that in the course of time, persons may come to abandon ends, even those that perhaps, at some given time in the past, they could not have conceived of themselves as being without, or adopt ends that they could not have conceived of themselves as having. It is undeniable that persons' dominant ends can and do change in this way, but in and of itself this tells us nothing about people's self-understandings or sense of identity as it relates to their dominant ends at any given point in time: for it is perfectly compatible with this that after a sufficiently profound change in ends, persons' sense of self will be radically altered; they will view themselves as, in effect, different persons; e.g., on the road to Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle.

The second distinct claim Kymlicka advances here is a claim about person's self-understandings or sense of identity from the first-person perspective at any given point in time. It can be stated succinctly as follows:

⁴ This does not mean, as Michael Sandel interprets it in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1982), that persons' sense of identity can be intimately tied to or "constituted" by private commitments and attachments but not by public ones: "There [in public life] no loyalty or allegiance could be similarly essential to our sense of who we are. Unlike our ties to family and friends, no devotion to city or nation, to party or cause, could possibly run deep enough to be defining" (182). By "public identity" Rawls simply means one's status as a citizen. Changes in one's conception of the good do not change one's legal status as a citizen, whether one's good is identified, for example, with a particular religion or a particular political party. One who converts has the same liberties and obligations, the same public identity, as one who changes political parties, regardless of the potential transformative effect of their respective "conversion experiences" on their sense of personal identity. See Rawls 1985 and 1993, 29–35.

⁵ In what follows I use the expressions "sense of identity" and "self-understanding" to mark a contrast with metaphysical questions concerning personal identity as traditionally understood. One's sense of identity or sense of self is intended to denote the individual's own reflexive representation of who or what the individual is. Similarly, when talking of "constitutive ends," I refer to those ends that form an integral part of a person's sense of identity. For this distinction see Baillie 1993, 4–6.

No particular ends or attachments contribute to, or are a part of, a person's sense of identity, inasmuch as we can always envision ourselves without our present ends. As Kymlicka points out, we can never conceive of ourselves as devoid of *all* ends or as "unencumbered" by them, for we must always choose on the basis of something (i.e., some end) and groundless choice is no choice at all. Therefore, "the process of ethical reasoning is always one of comparing one 'encumbered' potential self with another 'encumbered' potential self" (Kymlicka 1989, 53). Hence for the envisioned potential self in such reasoning to be recognizably *me*, it must be encumbered with *some* of the ends I currently have. According to Kymlicka—and this is the crucial point—this does not require that the envisioned self be encumbered with any *particular* ends: It is not the case that "we can't perceive our self without some *specific* end or motivation" (Kymlicka 1989, 53, original emphasis).

It follows that if in our ethical reasoning no specific end or attachment must be given with the self to make any imagined "potential self" recognizably *me* (i.e., to preserve its identity), then *no* specific end or attachment from amongst all the ends a person might have can be essential to one's sense of identity. To repeat: What is required to preserve one's sense of identity in ethical reasoning according to Kymlicka is that some one end or attachment or motivation be "given with the self," but no *particular* end or attachment or motivation. This nonprivileging of any end or conception of the good or any attachment or loyalty or motivations is, I want to argue, at odds with our own deepest self-understandings as well as Kymlicka's own defense of rights of cultural-national membership.

All individuals have plural ends, using the term "ends" in the broadest possible sense to include projects, plans, relationships, commitments, motivations, and the like. It is also the case that for most individuals (or for all normal individuals) some ends are more important than others. Some may involve mere "preferences," while others may rise to the level of Williams's (1976, 208–9) ground projects or be what Charles Taylor (1989, 50) calls "constitutive concerns," concerns that enter into the "full definition of someone's identity, and include an individual's stand on moral and spiritual matters and some reference to a 'defining community.'" For many people, religious, philosophical, and moral convictions and commitments perform such a role, and in any moral individual, one would expect the relation between these convictions and sense of identity to be particularly strong. Such convictions may form what John Kekes (1983) has called "identity-conferring" commitments. To have such a commitment, moral or otherwise, means that from the first person perspective it is immune from potential revision precisely because the individual cannot conceive of him or herself as being the same person without it. Consider the common expression "I could never do that," e.g., betray my friends and family or commit murder for money. By using such language one is making a statement about one's future self, claiming, in effect,

that if one could do such things at some point in the future, one would *no longer be oneself*.⁶

Of course, perhaps the individual in question will come to do such things. Misfortune or despair can turn saints into sinners and sinners into saints, and reflection and experience can change one's beliefs as to what is a valuable form of life—perhaps for the better, but by no means necessarily so. Sometimes, failure to adhere to an ideal or principle, to be faithful to it, is seen as an instance of self-betrayal. The concept of self-betrayal makes sense only if one assumes an identity relationship between one's sense of self and certain convictions and attachments, for what one betrays in the process of self-betrayal is not an ideal or set of principles in the abstract, but *oneself*. Consider in this regard Harry Frankfurt's (1999, 139; cf. Royce 1969). characterization of the betrayal of an object of love:

Someone who loves justice... necessarily regards serving its interests not only as contributing to the realization of a desirable social condition, but also as integral to the realization of his ideal for himself. ... A person who fails to act in the way that caring about his beloved requires necessarily fails to live in accordance with his ideal for himself. In betraying the object of his love, he therefore betrays himself as well. Now the fact that a person betrays himself entails, of course, a rupture in his inner cohesion or unity.

A rupture to inner cohesion as Frankfurt characterizes it means a loss of integrity. As Christine Korsgaard (1996, 102) points out, etymologically, integrity is "oneness" and integration is what makes a person one:

We use this term ["integrity"] for someone who lives up to his standards. And that is because we think that living up to them is what makes him one, and so makes him a person at all. It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be who you are.

On a view in which there can be no identity-defining or identity-conferring relationships or commitments or attachments, there can be neither self-betrayal nor integrity.

Since Kymlicka is critical of Rawls for revising his view of the relation between the self and its ends, it is worth noting in this regard what Rawls says in *A Theory of Justice* concerning our *moral* ends and motivations. When Rawls (1974, 641) comments that "persons do not regard themselves as inevitably bound to, or identical with, the pursuit of any particular complex of fundamental interests that they may have at any given moment"—which Kymlicka (1995, 81) quotes with approval—he is referring specifically to interests associated with a person's autonomous selection of a "plan of life." Regarding *moral* autonomy and persons' moral interests or moral motivations, however, things

⁶ According to Derick Parfit (1984, sec. III), changes of sufficient magnitude in the attitudes, beliefs, and values of an individual entail that for all intents and purposes one is a different person. For opposing views, see MacIntyre, 1981, 216–17; Taylor 1989, 49–50; and Williams 1976.

stand otherwise. According to Kymlicka (1989, 53, 58) persons' sense of self is not tied to any particular "motivation," and he maintains that this was Rawls's view in *A Theory of Justice*. In his account of moral motivation in that work, Rawls explicitly links certain moral motives—our interest in acting justly—to the identity of the self:

Properly understood, then, the desire to act justly derives in part from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely free and equal rational beings with a liberty to choose. It is for this reason, I believe that Kant speaks of the failure to act on the moral law as giving rise to shame and not to feelings of guilt. . . . What we cannot do is express our nature by following a plan that views the sense of justice as but one desire to be weighed against others. *For this sentiment reveals who the person is . . .* (1971, 256, 575, emphasis added)

As Rawls (1971, 443) points out, shame "implies an especially intimate connection with our person"; it "springs from a feeling of diminishment of the self." What Rawls came to acknowledge then, in his writings after *A Theory of Justice*, was not the existence of identity-defining motivations—which he already assumed in relation to our motive for acting justly—but that persons may have a constitutive relationship to their conceptions of the good, or a host of other religious or moral ends or motivations.⁷ One need not accept Rawls's earlier Kantian account of moral motivation to acknowledge the intimate connection between who a person is, or takes himself/herself to be, and his/her moral motivations.⁸

⁷ It might be argued that Kymlicka is critical of Rawls solely for extending the kind of identity-defining relationship he assumed between persons and their moral motivations to include their conceptions of the good as well. Such an interpretation, however, would wed Kymlicka to an (early) Rawlsian-Kantian account of the specific nature of our motives for acting justly that he nowhere avows. Kymlicka (1995, 213, n. 7) is clear that what he endorses is a version of personal, not Kantian, autonomy, and he characterizes his conception of autonomy, following Allen Buchanan (1975), as one of "rational revisability." Furthermore, Kymlicka draws no such distinction between moral (specifically, Kantian or neo-Kantian) and nonmoral ends and motivations but asserts simply that it is "not the case that we can't perceive our self without some *specific* end or motivation (1987, 53, original emphasis; cf. 1990, 212–13). Rawls (1985, 241) writes that persons "may regard it as simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical and moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments and loyalties." As the context makes clear, the phrase "moral convictions" refers to *any* moral convictions (including, conceivably, Kantian ones), just as "attachments and loyalties" refer to any attachments and loyalties. If, as Kymlicka insists, Rawls is wrong about this, then we can always conceive of ourselves without our present moral convictions of any kind whatsoever.

⁸ Kant often emphasizes the potential opposition between one's inclinations (*Neigungen*) and the moral motive (or "incentive") of acting out of respect (*Achtung*) for the moral law, i.e., duty (e.g., 1981 [1785], 9–13, and 1996 [1788], 201–6). Kantian moral autonomy is intended to be a principle of morality in what Raz (1986, 213; cf. Gibbard 1990, 6) calls the "narrow" sense of the term: "Morality in the narrow sense is meant to include only all those principles which restrict the individual's pursuit of his personal goals and his advancement of his self-interest." Clearly, Kant's moral theory is not the only moral theory in the narrow sense of the term, nor is it the only moral theory that supposes that acting morally may require on occasion sacrificing one's personal goals or self-interest or pleasure

Kymlicka defends his autonomy-based conception of liberalism on the basis of an untenable conception of the self. It is a conception that in the name of personal autonomy requires an impossible "distance" between one's sense of self and one's ends and motivations, and it is a view that plays into the hands of those critics of liberalism (in particular, communitarian critics) who contend that liberalism is an untenable political conception precisely because it depends upon such an implausible and unattractive conception of the self (MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982, 1996; Taylor 1979).

IDENTITY AND NATIONAL CULTURE

Kymlicka's insistence that ends, motivations, convictions, loves, loyalties and attachments are not constitutive of our sense of identity is particularly perplexing given that he argues vigorously for the constitutive nature of our cultural-national communities and posits a strong identity relationship between individuals and such communities. Kymlicka argues for minority group-based rights to preserve minority societal cultures within liberal societies on the basis of the constitutive dimension of cultural heritage. Some argue against any special rights to preserve minority cultures on the grounds that through assimilation, minority cultures will be able to enjoy the cultural membership of the larger liberal society into which they are assimilated. Against such views, Kymlicka (1989, 175, 1995, 105) argues that it is extremely difficult for persons to integrate into another culture because of the role of cultural membership in defining persons' identities:

[W]e can't just transplant people from one culture into another even if we provide the opportunity to learn the language and culture. . . . Someone's upbringing isn't something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity. The connection between personal identity and cultural membership is suggested by a number of considerations. . . . Why cannot members of a decaying culture simply integrate into another culture? . . . [B]ecause of the role of cultural membership in people's self-identity. . . . [N]ational identity . . . provides a secure foundation of individual autonomy and self-identity.

In support of this view of the constitutive nature of cultural and national identity, Kymlicka (1989, 175–77) cites such factors as the reluctance of persons to give up cultural-national associations even when faced with negative costs of membership and the well-documented sense of despair, purposelessness, and loss of identity that ensues when persons are forcibly deprived of their cultural membership. Cultural-national membership, as Kymlicka characterizes it, is an attachment that shapes our very identity, that defines who the person is, and it is also a constitutive attachment that for the most

for the sake of doing the right thing. The pursuit of "ground projects" as well may involve all sorts of sacrifice undertaken because of the intimate connection between the individual's sense of self and his/her particular project. (For example, the idea that great artists sacrifice a good deal of happiness for the sake of their art is a commonplace).

part (or for most individuals) is both *unchosen* and *cannot be changed*: “[I]t is, and will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is” (Kymlicka 1989, 175).

According to Kymlicka, cultural-national membership is an attachment of the sort that, in Rawls’s (1980, 544–45, 1985, 241, 1993, 31) words, persons “cannot stand apart from” and “regard it as unthinkable to view themselves without.” Yet as noted, Kymlicka criticizes Rawls for making precisely this assumption about the relationship between persons and their ends, attachments, and loves. If, as Kymlicka argues, Rawls is wrong in suggesting that certain attachments and loyalties can be an integral part of an individual’s self-conception, inasmuch as all ends are open to rational revision and we can always conceive of ourselves without our present (and particular) ends, then why can we not always conceive of ourselves without the attachment of our particular cultural-national membership? Why is not cultural-national membership always potentially revisable in the same way that Kymlicka insists all of a person’s other ends and attachments are?

The only way to resolve this contradiction is to assume the following: Kymlicka should not have said that Rawls was wrong to assume a constitutive or identity-defining relationship between persons and their attachments such that they cannot conceive of themselves without them but, rather, that Rawls was wrong with regard to every possible attachment *except one*. Cultural or national membership is the *only* attachment or loyalty or end that can be constitutive of, or an integral part of, a person’s sense of identity. And in effect, this is what Kymlicka (1995, 89) says: Cultural-national identity is particularly suited to serving as the *primary focus* of identification. If this is Kymlicka’s claim, however, it faces a serious difficulty.

Any argument that can be used to demonstrate the so-called constitutive dimension of culture vis-à-vis the individual can be applied equally to argue for the constitutive dimension of ends vis-à-vis the individual. If, as Kymlicka (1989, 175) expresses it, upbringing cannot be erased but remains a constitutive part of the individual, then an individual whose primary ends and ground projects are connected in some way to his or her upbringing within a particular cultural-national community—as is often the case—will equally be constituted by those ends. And if the cultural-national community is a form of traditional society in which individuals are generally assigned certain ends, primary projects, or roles as a part of their normal upbringing and socialization, then the two perspectives, community-self and ends-self, cannot always be clearly distinguished.

In certain kinds of traditional cultures, the cultural life of the community is organized around one overarching conception of the good, often a religious conception. Part of the normal process of upbringing in such cultures that, according to Kymlicka (1989, 175), “is and will remain a constitutive part of who that person is” and that “affects our very sense of personal identity” will be the holding and pursuit of certain religious ends, so that such ends, by Kymlicka’s own logic, can be equally constitutive of the self. It is beside the point

to object that traditional cultural communities are illiberal because they do not promote personal autonomy, for what is at issue is the question of whether or not persons can have constitutive attachments to any particular ends or complex of ends *at all*, regardless of whether or not the culture in question is liberal or illiberal.

Clearly not all cultures are autonomy-promoting contexts of choice, a fact that Kymlicka (e.g., 1995, 163–72) himself recognizes. So perhaps in denying that persons can ever be constituted by their ends in the same way that they are constituted by their cultural-national communities, Kymlicka is referring to *liberal* persons rather than persons in any absolute sense of the term, that is, persons who embrace the ideal of personal autonomy Kymlicka espouses. The assumption might be that in traditional societies that do not enable autonomy, persons *can* have a constitutive bond to certain ends associated with the community, its specific religious norms or values, for example. Perhaps Kymlicka intends that in social environments such as these, what he identifies as the communitarian conception of the self as bound to or identified with a given complex of ends does apply. In support of such an interpretation, one finds assertions such as the following:

A *Sittlichkeit* rooted in, and content with, its own particularity is impossible for us, since there is no conscious route back from reflectiveness. This may have been what Marx had in mind when he said that we can’t return to the conditions of ancient Greece because of their naïveté. We’ve lost the naïve faith necessary to consciously let the community set goals for us. (Kymlicka, 1989, 55)

The relevant “we” in this passage would be autonomy-embracing liberals, to be contrasted with the “naïveté” of once existing—or still extant—traditional cultures. In communities that encourage personal autonomy, persons will not be constituted by the culturally determined array of ends both because they will be viewed as potential objects of choice rather than predetermined or culturally ascribed, and because persons will be encouraged to “stand back” from whatever ends they choose, to maintain a critical distance as it were, and continually assess and reassess the value of these ends before the court of individual reason.

On this reading, the distinction between liberal and communitarian conceptions of the self would be a sociological rather than theoretical one. It is worth noting that liberal advocates of a conception of personal autonomy such as Joseph Raz have emphasized the extent to which the capacity for the exercise of autonomy is a culturally dependent variable. In particular, Raz (1986, 369–70) associates autonomy with the social conditions of industrial and postindustrial society:

It [personal autonomy] is an ideal particularly suited to the industrial age and its aftermath with their fast changing technologies and free movement of labor. They call for an ability to cope with changing technological, economic, and social conditions, for an ability to adjust, to acquire new skills, to move from one subculture to another, to come to terms with new scientific and moral views.

The assumption that persons can be constituted by their cultural-national communities but not by any of the ends available within their cultures is both supported by, and parallel to, the manner in which Kymlicka defines culture itself. For just as the (sense of) identity of the self “exists” independently of any of the ends a person might have at any given time, ends that one might normally associate with the *character* of an individual, Kymlicka (1989, 168; cf. 1995, 84–93; 2001, 25–26) maintains that a culture can be said to exist distinct from its character at any given time:

In one common usage, culture refers to the character of a historical community. On this view, changes in the norms, values, and their attendant institutions in one's community (e.g. membership in churches, political parties, etc.) would amount to a loss of one's culture. However, I use culture in a different sense, to refer to the cultural community, or cultural structure, itself.⁹

Kymlicka employs this distinction to argue that while the norms of a culture may be illiberal to the extent that they are not egalitarian and/or diminish the opportunities for personal autonomy, what the liberal is committed to preserving is not the culture's “character” (which includes its norms) but, rather, its “structure” or “existence.”

This is a problematic distinction. It is not clear in what sense people can be said to share a common culture if they need not share, in at least some minimal sense, a culture's norms, values, and attendant institutions, all of the things one would associate with a common cultural “way of life.”⁹ At times, Kymlicka seems to associate the structure or existence of a culture with its history and language, but to talk of the history of a cultural-national community presupposes the antecedent existence of such a community: It begs the question what it means for a culture or nation to be said to exist (and to have a history) apart from its values, norms and attendant institutions. If the cultural structure is to be associated solely with language, we are faced with the problem that groups may in fact share the same language, but because of significant cultural differences (i.e., differences in their values, norms, and attendant institutions) be held to be (or consider themselves to be) members of distinct national cultures. It is not my intent here to concentrate on the difficulties associated with Kymlicka's distinction between the existence of a culture and its character (see Tomasi 1995) but, rather, to note the additional difficulties this makes for Kymlicka's insistence that while persons' sense of identity can be constituted by their cultures, they cannot be constituted by any of the norms, values, and attendant institutions associated with their cultures. By

what, then, are they constituted? What features of the culture determine persons' identities?

IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

Kymlicka's view concerning cultural-national communities as our only constitutive attachments leads to an illiberal privileging of identities. Specifically, it prioritizes nationalist identity over and above all of the other “identities” that an individual might have and the nation over and above all other possible cites of identity formation. Such prioritizing represents the advancement of a substantive conception of the good in violation of Kymlicka's own principle of liberal neutrality concerning conceptions of the good. Kymlicka (1995, 88) associates what he identifies as the liberalization of a culture with a thinner and less distinctive cultural identity:

Despite the fact that as cultures liberalize persons become less and less like their fellow citizens and more and more like the members of other nations in terms of sharing a common culture, nonetheless, the evidence is overwhelming that the members of liberal cultures do value their cultural membership. Far from displacing national identity, liberalization has gone hand in hand with an increased sense of nationhood. . . . The same combination of liberalization and a strengthened national identity can be found in many other countries.

Since Kymlicka equates cultural identity explicitly with national identity, let us turn to the concept of national identity to discover precisely the kind of identification Kymlicka has in mind.

Recalling all that Kymlicka says about the absolutely privileged status of cultural-national identity, we are faced with the following troubling conclusion: In those cases where the cultural community is conceived as a nation (presumably by its members), *nationalist identity* is the *only* attachment or loyalty or love or end that individuals cannot conceive of themselves as ever lacking, that can be constitutive of their sense of self, and that can define who or what they enduringly and unchangeably are. Nationalistic identity means that individuals are “essentially” part of a greater whole—nationalist identity must always be communal—and if individuals' well-being is so fundamentally connected to the well-being of their nation (as the source of their sense of self), it is a short step to assume that persons find their own highest good in and through the flourishing of the nation. A view such as this is a view of the *highest good* or the *ends of life*: It is a “thick” or “substantive” or “comprehensive” conception of the good derived from a view as to what our “true nature” is and what ultimately fulfills that nature.

According to those versions of liberalism that take, or strive to take, value pluralism seriously, such a substantive conception of the good neither can be the locus of liberal politics or a liberal “way of life” nor can serve as a justification for liberal principles. What Rawls (1993, xix) calls the “fact of pluralism”—that a free society will result in a plurality of radically diverse religious and comprehensive conceptions of the

⁹ I am not arguing for a “reification” of the concept of culture, or assuming that the values and institutions of any culture form a seamless and harmonious whole, or that cultures possess “primordial” values or primordial social institutions by which they can always be differentiated from other cultures (see, e.g., Wedeen 2002). Cultures are porous and values are contested. Yet for all this porousness and contestation, it is still meaningful to talk of *different* cultures and to differentiate them, in part, by their different (contested, porous) values and institutions.

good over time—precludes liberal society from being based on one comprehensive conception of the good, something that could be achieved only through the coercive and repressive use of state power. Not justifying liberal principles on one such conception is part of the liberal aspiration that all aspects of the social world—in particular, the coercive use of state power—be justified, as far as possible, to all members of society (e.g., Ackerman 1980; Larmore 1987, 1990; Rawls, 1993).

Kymlicka (2001, 331–36) is at pains to deny that the value of national identity as he presents it amounts to a particular conception of the good or that the promotion of such identity by the state would amount to a violation of the liberal principle of neutrality concerning conceptions of the good, which he endorses.¹⁰ He characterizes national identity as a “thin” good and maintains that if the state promotes such a thin good and a thin communal identity it is not violating principles of liberal neutrality (Kymlicka 2001, 334).¹¹ This is in contrast to communitarians, who seek to promote a “thicker” conception of the common good, “even if this limits the ability of individual members to revise their ends” (Kymlicka 1995, 92). The question of how the state goes about promoting the common good, however, is entirely distinct from the question of the nature of the good that is being promoted. Presumably even the “nonrestrictive” promotion of a substantive or “thick” conception of the common good would violate Kymlicka’s principle of liberal neutrality.

In what sense can the common good of national identification be characterized as a “thin” good or a “thin” identity in Kymlicka’s theory? The good of one’s “sense of nationhood” (Kymlicka 1995, 88) is the only good for Kymlicka that is identity-defining; it is our only constitutive attachment, the only identity that cannot (for most persons) be changed, the only identity loss of which results in loss of identity and agency, the only attachment beyond rational revision, and the primary focus of identification. In support of his argument concerning both the constitutive and the “transcendent” nature of our national identifications, Kymlicka (1995, 90) refers to Tamir’s (1993, 72) assertion that through national membership our individual accomplishments take on an “additional meaning” by becoming “part of a continuous creative effort;” and he refers to Benedict Anderson’s (1983, 11) view that “national identity enables us to transcend our mortality, by linking us to something whose existence seems to extend back into time immemorial, and forward into the indefinite future.”

According to Anderson (1983, 11), the idea of the nation-state arose historically with the “ebbing of religious belief,” the “disintegration of paradise,” and the “absurdity of salvation,” when what was needed was “a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning.” Anderson’s view of the quasi-religious function of national identification is a view

that finds expression in writings such as Fichte’s (1922 [1806]) *Address to the German Nation*, where the nation is unambiguously characterized as the secular transformation of fatality into immortality: “He who regards his invisible life as eternal, but not his visible life as similarly eternal, may perhaps have a heaven and therein a fatherland, but here below he has no fatherland, for this, too, is regarded only in the image of eternity.” The nation, as a secular substitute for religion, is as “thick” a conception of the good as religion itself.

Let me forestall the following objection: I am fundamentally misunderstanding what Kymlicka means by the constitutive nature of our cultural–national attachments. These attachments are unique because it is only by having such attachments in the first place, by being members of one or another cultural or national community, that we can have a sense of self at all. To be a self, to be a person, is to engage in practices of one sort or another; but all practices can have meaning only if they are in some sense culturally defined or given meaning within a cultural “background” or “horizon”:

Different ways of life are not simply different physical movements. The physical movements have meaning for us only because identified as having significance by our culture, because they fit into some pattern of activities which is culturally recognized as a way of leading one’s life. (Kymlicka 1989, 165)

All of these assumptions are, I believe, relatively unproblematic as a matter of sociology or anthropology or of a “phenomenological” account of the self (e.g., Geertz 1973; Mead 1967; Taylor 1989), but if this is all that Kymlicka is in fact claiming, very little follows from it.

First, it does not follow from the fact that ends have culturally defined meanings that there must exist one single cultural framework in which each end is assigned a meaning or that ends can meaningfully be chosen only intraculturally and not interculturally. As a “cosmopolitan” liberal such as Jeremy Waldron (1992, 783) notes, “Meaningful options may come to us as fragments from a variety of cultural sources.” Second, even if we were to assume that there must exist one cultural framework for each complex of culturally defined ends, this tells us nothing as to how people understand themselves vis-à-vis their cultures. Kymlicka’s point is not simply, or primarily, that practices must have culturally defined meanings—a proposition that a cosmopolitan liberal such as Jeremy Waldron readily accepts; nor is his point simply a causal one, i.e., that one’s cultural surroundings, the societal culture of one’s upbringing, determine to a greater or lesser extent what ends or options can be meaningful or viable for a given individual. In talking about persons’ *sense* of identity and in making a claim that cultural–national identification is a defining component of person’s self-understandings, Kymlicka is discussing a strong *feeling* or *attachment* that people have to their national heritage, of which they are aware, and of their intense *desire* to preserve their national identities, i.e., their *nationalistic sentiments*.

Such sentiments are exactly what one would expect when talking about nationalism; thus Weber’s (1948,

¹⁰ For liberal neutrality, see, e.g., R. Dworkin 1978, Larmore 1987; and Waldron 1989.

¹¹ For “thin goods” see Rawls 1971, 395–99.

179) referral to a nation as a “community of sentiment” or Renan’s (1992 [1882], 17) definition of a nation as “a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again.” By talking of sentiment I am not endorsing the view that nationalism necessarily “appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice” (Popper 1962, 49). Rather, the point is that to conceive of one’s national identity—one’s “sense of nationhood” as Kymlicka (1995, 88) phrases it—as a central part—the “primary focus”—of one’s identity, entails holding a subjective belief about the overriding value of one’s nation and the centrality of one’s national identity for his or her self-understanding.

To clarify this point, consider a distinction between identity and *identification*. Peoples’ identities are doubtless shaped by innumerable factors, including the specific linguistic, socioeconomic, normative, and institutional features of their national communities. But this causal fact concerning formative influences does not necessarily mean that persons necessarily *identify* with their national communities in any significant way: They may be completely alienated from them; the survival of the community may be a matter of complete indifference or they may wish its demise or assimilation *even though* their identities may have been shaped in certain ways by membership in the nation in question. The point is that one cannot assume the existence of nationalistic sentiments, of strong *identification* with the national culture, from the bare fact that certain features of the nation—its language or social customs, for example—have exerted a formative influence upon the individual. To talk, as Kymlicka does, about the overriding value of an individual’s sense of nationhood is to talk not about formative influences, but about something the individual *identifies* with and values, i.e., it is to talk about an individual’s *conception of the good*. Hence in assuming the existence of, as well as advocating the promotion of, the common good of a sense of nationhood characterized as such a profound and overriding value, Kymlicka advocates a shared conception of the good in violation of his own principles of liberal neutrality.

Kymlicka (1989, 165, 175, 1995, 83, 2001, 209–10) places a good deal of emphasis upon language as constitutive of identity and links language with national culture (even though he acknowledges [1995, 218, n. 29] that language cannot be, in and of itself, that which differentiates cultures or nations). The emphasis on language illustrates well how assumptions concerning identity formation can easily slide into assumptions concerning what I have termed identification. Kymlicka (1989, 175) is surely correct to argue that persons’ identities are constituted in some very important way by their native languages. Language is the very medium through which persons form a conception of themselves and represent, to themselves and others, who and what they take themselves, and the world around them, to be. Language is not a neutral medium of communication or self-representation; it is a “marker of the societal goals, the large-scale valueladen arenas of interaction that typify every speech-community” (Fishman

1972, 4; quoted in Kymlicka 1989, 175). This does not mean, however, that persons thereby consciously *identify* with or embrace their languages as a source of pride or consciously value them as a central part of their identity. Some do, but for others, language has no such connotations—it is simply something they know and use, largely unreflectively, like any other valuable and familiar tool. To be sure, language is, and always has been, an important part of nationalism and nationalist movements (e.g., Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983, and Hobsbawm 1990), but it is *nationalists*, not native speakers, simply by virtue of being native speakers, who view their language as a source of pride and distinctiveness and as what binds them, in some important way, to their cultural or national community.

IDENTITY AND LOYALTY

A nationalist prioritizing of identity may be used to support a parallel prioritizing of claims of loyalty. Such a prioritizing of loyalty claims, however, is problematic for liberalism. It also rests on an assumption that identity can give rise to loyalty claims. Neither identity nor “identification,” however, can, in and of itself, give rise to claims of loyalty or any obligations whatsoever.

If claims of loyalty are related in some way to an individual’s identity (e.g., it is my duty to act thus because I am an American, a Christian, a parent, a rational being), such that disloyalty is also a form of self-betrayal, and if there can be only one, unchanging form of identity—one’s nationalist identity—then it is possible to develop on that basis an absolute hierarchy of loyalty claims: Claims made on behalf of the nation must override all other possible claims made on the individual, whether of religious commitment, family, friendship, or personal conscience, because it is only in betraying the nation that one can betray oneself. Commentators have often defined nationalism precisely in terms of the priority of claims made on behalf of the nation to all other claims (e.g., Berlin 1979, 345; Connor 1993, 156; and Smith 1991, 74).¹² According to Brian Barry (1987, 352–54), nationalism is a doctrine that “claims that all people should give their highest loyalty to their nation” and that “in politics . . . the pursuit of national interest should subordinate all other interests.” A theory of liberal nationalism, however, cannot maintain—and still be liberal—that people should always give their highest loyalty to their nation, that it is their supreme loyalty.

To clarify this point, consider Michael Sandel’s account of the birth of what he terms the liberal (American) “procedural republic.” According to Sandel (1996, 12), underlying the procedural republic is a commitment to a form of liberal Kantianism that opposes any moral view that

regards us as obligated to fulfill ends we have not chosen—ends given by nature or God for example, or by our identities as members of families, peoples, cultures, or

¹² For opposing views, see MacCormick 1982, 247–64; Nielsen 1996; and Tamir 1993, 87–94.

tradition. Encumbered identities are at odds with the liberal conception of the person as free and independent selves, unbound by prior moral ties, capable of choosing our ends for ourselves.

Sandel (1996, 17) argues that the contractualist vision of society that flows from such a conception of the self can never be “a community with which I identify, but rather the claims of an arbitrarily defined collectivity whose aims I may or may not share”: “[T]hose whose fate I am required to share really are, morally speaking, *others*, rather than fellow participants in a way of life with which my identity is bound.” Sandel (1996, 53–54) discusses the case of *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940) and quotes with approval Justice Frankfurter’s opinion, which supported compulsory flag salutes in public schools as a legitimate way of cultivating the communal national identity of citizens.¹³ *Gobitis* was overturned three years later in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* (1943), which Sandel (1996, 54) decries as the “birth” of the procedural republic. The problem with Sandel’s story is that he ignores the fact that the Jehovah’s Witnesses were also “encumbered selves,” bound by their identities as members of a church, and were obligated to fulfill ends that they believed were given by God.¹⁴ Is it the case that in a clash between the claims of religion (or religious communities) and the claims of national unity (or national communities), the claims of nationalism must always take precedence?¹⁵

Kymlicka would, perhaps, reject Sandel’s argument concerning *Gobitis* and *Barnette* on the basis of what he terms “polyethnic” rights, rights “intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without hampering their success in economic and political institutions of the dominant society” (Kymlicka 1995, 31). Yet he is by no means opposed to policies that promote national identity: “For liberal nationalists . . . it is a legitimate and essential task of government to protect the ongoing viability of national cultures, and, more generally, to

express people’s national identities” (Kymlicka 2001, 42). In his defense of polyethnic rights, Kymlicka stresses the extent to which such rights foster the integration of ethnic/religious groups into the mainstream national culture: The policy of allowing Sikhs to wear turbans in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police “is intended, not to allow Sikhs to withdraw from the larger society, but precisely to modify the institutions of mainstream society so that Sikhs can integrate into them as fully as possible” (Kymlicka 1995, 177); and he stresses that religious groups that seek to withdraw from the larger society—“Christian and Jewish groups such as the Amish, Hutterites, Quakers, and Hasidim”—hence subverting the apparent culturally integrative purpose of polyethnic rights by having “been granted exemption from the usual requirements regarding integration”—are “an exception” and “atypical” (Kymlicka 1995, 177–78). If the exemptions sought by the Jehovah’s Witnesses are seen as not fostering their integration into the national culture, then perhaps Kymlicka would not support them, but however Kymlicka would decide this case, as I have argued, his arguments concerning the nature of national identity provide a good justification for overriding the claims of religious identity should the two conflict.

If we assume that persons’ sense of identity can be constituted by a wide range of ends and commitments, what follows from this? Let me begin by considering what does not follow. What follows is neither a specifically communitarian conception of the self nor a communitarian politics. Kymlicka, however, believes that this does follow. In criticizing Sandel’s communitarian conception of the self, he argues that if some of our ends are constitutive of our sense of identity, then “there is no reason why the state should not reinforce people’s allegiances to those ends, and limit their ability to question and revise these ends” (Kymlicka 1995, 91). By the same logic that Kymlicka (91) attributes to Sandel, however, Kymlicka’s view of national culture as a constitutive attachment would allow the state to reinforce *that* allegiance and limit persons’ ability to question and revise, if not the nation’s norms (i.e., its “character”), then its *existence as a nation*. Yet what if people question or reject their nation as a whole?

This entire logic, however, is faulty. It does not follow from the fact that people have such attachments that this confers upon the state a right of this sort. Without rehearsing a familiar story about the rise of liberalism from the advent of religious pluralism and the wars of religion, it was, arguably, a recognition that people do in fact have constitutive (religious) attachments of such a sort that they could not envision themselves without them, and would give their lives rather than betray them (as well as slaughter those of other faiths in their name), that led to the liberal view that it was precisely *not* the role of the state to enforce peoples’ allegiances to their (religious) ends. The acknowledgment of such constitutive attachments combined with the advent of religious pluralism led to the liberal view that the state was not entitled to enforce one comprehensive (religious) conception of the good—hence Locke’s

¹³ See above.

¹⁴ The Witnesses based their objection to the flag salute on their reading of Exodus 20: 4–5, which forbids “making” or “bowing down” to any “graven image” (*Gobitis*, 1943, 589–90).

¹⁵ One might suppose that this is Sandel’s ultimate point, except that in his account of First Amendment Religion Clause jurisprudence, he appears to argue for exactly the opposite. Sandel criticizes the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Goldman v. Weinberger* (1986) upholding the decision of the United States Air Force not to allow an Orthodox Jew the right to wear a yarmulke while serving in a health clinic, on the grounds that “the essence of military service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service” (507). Sandel (1996, 69) criticizes the Court’s decision for failing to appreciate the nature of religious obligations. Whether or not this is true of the Court, what has become of the overriding importance of the inculcation of a unifying national sentiment that Sandel supported in *Gobitis* even at the expense of the religious obligations of the Jehovah’s Witnesses? Sandel’s inconsistency on this matter indicates how identity claims can conflict precisely because persons’ identities are comprised of a variety of affiliations. It is also characteristic of the difficulties communitarians, as well as nationalists, face when confronted with the conflict of duties that may arise from membership in a plurality of communities.

(1983 [1689]) principle of the separation of Church and State.

If constitutive attachments do not give the state the right to reinforce them, can they give rise to duties on the part of individuals? For example, does the fact that an individual's nationality is an important part of one's sense of self give rise to an obligation to be loyal to the nation? That someone views something as an integral part of one's sense of self does not give rise to any claims of loyalty or obligations whatsoever. This is not to deny that there exist special obligations or "associative duties" based on ascriptive membership in families and clans, nations and states, races and religion, cultures, communities, and classes (e.g., R. Dworkin 1986, 195–216; Gewirth 1988; and Scheffler 2001)—parents have special obligations to their child, not to all children—as opposed to general obligations, grounded on impartiality, that are owed by anyone to anyone. Associative obligations are linked to identity in the sense that it is one's identity as a mother, or an American, or a Jew that gives rise to special obligations to one's children, or country, or coreligionists. As Samuel Scheffler (2001, 48–65) argues, any relationship we have *reason to value* can give rise to obligations whether or not it is voluntarily incurred.

The reason why identity alone cannot give rise to obligations or claims of loyalty is that persons can and do struggle against their own identities, and sometimes for good reasons: "A person can be alienated from his values, too; and he can be alienated from them even as they continue to grip him and to influence his behavior—as for instance, when someone recoils from his own materialism or his own sense of sin" (Wellman 2000, 134). Persons may reject a feature of themselves that they come to view as worthless or evil, and the need to reject it may be all the more imperative out of a recognition that what they now reject is indeed a part of who they are.¹⁶ In this regard, consider the following comment of Charles Taylor (1985, 34) concerning one's national heritage: "[M]y lineage is a part of my identity because it is so bound up with certain qualities I value, or because I believe that I must value these qualities since they are so integrally part of me that to disvalue them would be to reject myself." The first alternative here certainly has normative force: Individuals' lineage is a part of their identity *and* it is linked with qualities they value (and, presumably, have reasons to value). And it is also relatively unproblematic to assume that the reason why they especially value their particular heritage—as opposed to any other heritage—is because their heritage is in some sense a part of their identity. The second alternative, however, reads more like a description of a psychological defense mechanism than anything giving rise to a normative claim. Perhaps there are cases in which morality does require that I reject myself, or a part of myself; but does fear of this act of rejecting mean that I must value those qualities (what is the normative force of "must" here?) and perhaps pretend to value what I really reject—or what I should

reject—out of a desire to avoid psychic pain or "cognitive dissonance" or an "identity crisis"?¹⁷

The case of Alfred Dreyfus is instructive here. According to Bernard Yack (1996, 34), "Dreyfus was so intent on demonstrating his loyalty to the French nation because that community was an important part of his personal identity." This may be true, but as Judith Shklar (1993, 191) has argued, such loyalty to a nation that completely rejected his Jewish identity and betrayed him in the name of an anti-Semitic French nationalism was hardly to be praised as an instance of one being "true to oneself":

Dreyfus's obligations to the state clearly were terminated when it exiled him and betrayed him. He however defended only his own conduct, remained loyal to France and to his army, and thus sustained his sense of obligation. I think he was crazy, but many people admire him because they think that loyalty to one's nation is the highest political virtue.

Was Dreyfus a hero or was he "crazy" for having clung to his identity as a French nationalist and remained loyal to the French nation when it became apparent that French nationalism included a heavy dose of anti-Semitism?

There are, admittedly, complex questions concerning the nature of associative obligations. According to Dworkin (1986, 202–6), for example, associative obligations are owed only to *moral* associations. Against this view, Tamir (1993, 101) argues that since associative obligations flow from "relatedness and identity," "they are independent of the normative nature of the association." She goes on to argue,

[E]ven members of a group who feel that they themselves have been wronged, such as members of deprived classes, or women, may still feel that they have a reason to support the state that has mistreated them. As long as despite their victimization, they retain a feeling of belonging they will feel obliged. This sheds light on the true essence of associative obligations: they are not grounded on consent, or reciprocity, or gratitude, but rather on a feeling of belonging and connectedness.

This formulation appears to make a feeling of belonging and "connectedness" the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of associative obligations, which means that when one no longer has a feeling of belonging or no longer identifies with the community in question, then one no longer has any associative obligations. Yet if, for example, a parent no longer identifies with the role of parenthood, do the associative obligations of parenthood thereby end? Furthermore, by resting associative obligations on a feeling of belonging, then no matter how horrendously an individual is treated by a community—any community—as long as one identifies with or feels "connected" to it, one is obligated to it. In certain circumstances, however, such identification can verge on being pathological, and it

¹⁶ See the distinction between identity and identification above.

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that leading such a life—pretending to value what one does not—would be a paradigmatic case of "inauthenticity" according to Taylor (1989, 35).

is hard to see how moral obligations could be derived from identifications of such a sort.

BEYOND DICHOTOMOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF

It might appear that what has been argued thus far is a somewhat uncomfortable mix of communitarian and liberal conceptions. On the one hand, I have argued for the reality of constitutive attachments and that a large range of communities, ends, and motivations may be involved in identity formation. On the other hand, I have argued against any supposition that solely because something is a part of one's sense of self that it *eo ipso* gives rise to obligations either to oneself or to the nation. In fact, the stylized and stereotyped distinction between liberal and communitarian conceptions of the self with which Kymlicka works needs to be abandoned. Kymlicka is working with a false dichotomy that associates what he identifies as the liberal autonomous conception of the self with the lack of constitutive attachments (all, that is, except one) and the communitarian, "nonautonomous" conception of the self with the existence of such attachments.¹⁸ Liberal theory must move beyond a number of limiting and artificial dichotomies: that which places liberalism, autonomy, and the nonexistence of constitutive attachments on one side and communitarianism, the lack of autonomy, and the existence constitutive attachment on the other.

The assumed opposition between the liberal autonomous self and constitutive attachments is false because so-called constitutive attachments can equally be the result of autonomous choice. As Tamir (1993, 33) argues,

The claim that, if given to choice, identity features cannot be constitutive, seems unreasonable. We readily accept that life-plans, religious belief, and social roles are objects of reflection and choice, yet constitutive of our identity. Cultural and national affiliations fall under the same category, of being both chosen and constitutive.

Tamir's point is not that we choose our cultural-national identities from an Archimedian point outside of culture, but rather, for all that our sense of self may be shaped by our upbringing in a particular national community, we can still choose to embrace this community and identify with it or reject it and adopt a new national identity (Tamir 1993, 20–34). Kymlicka appears to deny this and to assume that our national identities are largely fixed and that most people will strongly embrace and identify with their native national communities. The problem with Kymlicka's account is that it seems unable to account for the experience of immigrants, whom Kymlicka (1995, 14–15, 76–80, 2001, 275–89) expects to be able largely to integrate into the national culture to which they have emigrated, i.e., change, at least partially, their national identities. This is so despite his insistence that it is "rare" and "difficult"

for persons to move between cultures (Kymlicka 1995, 85).

The claim here is not, however, that Tamir's approach is superior to Kymlicka's because she views national identity as the result of autonomous choice. Both Tamir's and Kymlicka's descriptions may accurately describe the way in which individuals identify with a given national culture. The mode of identification may itself be related to the presence or lack of the conditions of autonomy, i.e., in a more traditional culture that does not necessarily value individuality and personal autonomy, one would expect people to have a much harder time, if not the complete inability, autonomously to chose their ultimate nationality, or their religion, or a host of other things. In more cosmopolitan, pluralistic environments, such choices may be more feasible; but this is doubtless an oversimplification. People may lead "traditional" lives in the midst of cosmopolitan environments (consider the Lubavitcher Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn New York); relatively secluded Amish children can and do decide to leave their faith and their traditional ways of life; and one and the same "cosmopolitan" individual may be "autonomous" in relation to some important aspects of life, e.g., career and marriage, but not others, e.g., religion.

That people can identify with their cultural-national communities both autonomously and nonautonomously, however, misses the point, for what both Kymlicka and Tamir are advancing is a moral ideal of the person to complement their conceptions of liberal nationalism. Both are "autonomy-based" liberals.¹⁹ Kymlicka (1995, 81) defends the value of autonomy in part on the assumption that it is by leading an autonomous life that individuals can satisfy what Ronald Dworkin (1989, 486) calls the "endorsement constraint": "No component contributes to the value of a life without endorsement. . . . [I]t is impossible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them" (Dworkin 1989, 486). As Kymlicka (1995, 81, 1990, 203–4) phrases it, a necessary precondition for leading a good life is that "we lead our lives from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life," and he equates endorsement with autonomous choice—that is, one endorses what one chooses (and vice versa).

Liberal proponents of an ideal of autonomy often argue as if endorsement is equivalent to autonomous choice or can be exhibited only through such choice,²⁰ but such need not be the case: People can endorse what they do not choose. As one proponent of the ideal of autonomy acknowledges,

¹⁹ See Tamir (1993, 21), "Liberals view the ability to choose as the most essential characteristic of the human agent," and Kymlicka (1989, 9–20, 47–73, 1990, 207–15, 1995, 80–93, 152–72, 2001, 209–11). For other autonomy-based conceptions see, e.g., Ackerman 1980, Raz 1989, and Wall 1998. For "toleration-based" conceptions see, e.g., Galston 1995, 2002; Larmore 1987, 1990; and Moon 1991.

²⁰ See, e.g., Wall 1998. Wall (1998, 189) assumes that the endorsement thesis, if true, leads to the conclusion that "autonomous engagement is a necessary condition for any pursuit to contribute to the value of a person's life."

¹⁸ Thus, according to Kymlicka (1995, 160), "Rawls's [new] account of our non-public identity is of course very close to the 'communitarian' conception of the self defended by Michael Sandel."

[N]ot everything we willingly embrace is something we have freely or deliberately chosen from among various alternatives open to us. The relationship between parents and their children is an obvious example. Notwithstanding the fact that it can, and sometimes does, go badly wrong, it is a relationship most people willingly embrace but do not freely choose. (Raz 1985, 369)

An individual whose identity is constituted by membership in a given community—national, religious, familial—that has never been viewed as an object of choice and that he/she has never contemplated leaving—and hence never “chosen” to remain affiliated with—can still be an individual freely leading life on the basis of his/her beliefs concerning value. Kymlicka’s own characterization of the value of societal cultures can be seen as at least a partial affirmation of this position, in opposition to Tamir. For while societal cultures, according to Kymlicka’s characterization, are not something that persons autonomously choose from a range of options, they are something that people for the most part value and willingly embrace.

According to Tamir (1993, 21), Kymlicka confuses choice with change when he asserts that it is not the case that the more choice we exercise the better: “We do not suppose that someone who has made twenty marriage choices is in any way leading a life more valuable than someone who has no reason to question or revise their original choice” (Kymlicka 1990, 209). Tamir (1993, 21) argues that Kymlicka overlooks the fact that staying in a marriage also reflects a choice: “How do we know that we have no reason to question and revise our original choices unless we reflect on them and decide them anew?” The occasion for choosing to stay in a marriage—or any other union or association—is precisely when one is contemplating *leaving* it, so that a marriage one was continually choosing to remain in would be a marriage totally lacking in *commitment* (contrast choosing to remain married, a Christian, an American, with affirming one’s love, faith, patriotism).

The advocate of autonomy-based liberalism might respond that it is obvious that persons can endorse, and be committed to, all sorts of things, but the fact of endorsement alone is insufficient to establish the value of a mode of life—consider the unsettling possibility of a “happy slave” (Herzog 1989, 215–47). It certainly is not sufficient to establish its value, but neither is the fact that a mode of life is the result of autonomous choice sufficient to establish its value, inasmuch as advocates of personal autonomy acknowledge that—in contradistinction to the exercise of Kantian moral autonomy—persons may autonomously choose all manner of immoral, or degraded, or worthless forms of life.²¹ As

Thomas Spragens (1999, 125; cf., e.g., Raz 1989, 380, or Feinberg, 1986, 45) writes in a *defense* of personal autonomy:

We can easily think of a myriad of human actors and actions that were autonomous but clearly evil. Adolf Hitler, Jeffrey Dahmer, and Benedict Arnold all were arguably autonomous agents. They had reflectively conceived purposes that animated their plans of life, and they pursued these freely and, in the narrow technical sense, “rationally.” But these were not good purposes and not good lives.

That autonomy can be used in the pursuit of worthless or immoral ends, however, is not a refutation of the claim that personal autonomy still adds something of value to life. Mill (1975, 55) thought the exercise of personal autonomy necessary for the development of certain distinctive capacities: “The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preferences are exercised only in making a choice,” by which Mill meant a choice of a mode of life. Yet it seems unreasonable to assume that all such faculties cannot be employed in leading a more traditional or customary mode of life. Surely the Calvinite, whom Mill (1975, 58–59) decries as an exemplar of the evils of a nonindividualistic, customary mode of life, uses all of the distinctive capacities Mill lists in leading the life he/she does (and perhaps moral preference to a greater degree than many).

It might be argued that endorsement cannot be “authentic” if made under conditions that distort or pervert both preference formation and the individual’s will: Desires can be “authentic” only if formed under conditions of freedom. Conditions of freedom, yes; but a key question for liberals is whether freedom should be equated with personal autonomy. The implication of equating freedom with personal autonomy is that a life lived in a culture that does not value individuality and personal autonomy is thereby unfree. Assuming, with Locke (1983 [1689]) that faith—or any other belief—cannot be coerced, I am also assuming that one who embraces a traditional form of life and *believes in its*

ing to Raz (1989, 406)—and Gutmann (1995, 559, n. 4) cites Raz’s theory as a contemporary example of the kind of “comprehensive” autonomy-based liberalism she supports—the exercise of Millian-Razian personal autonomy tends to lead not to mutual respect, but to *intolerance*: “The moral virtues associated with the diverse forms of life allowed by a morality which enables all normal persons to attain autonomy by moral means are very likely to depend upon character traits many of which lead to intolerance of other acceptable forms of life. . . . Therefore respect for autonomy by requiring competitive value pluralism also establishes the necessity for toleration” (Raz 1989, 406). For Raz, toleration is not generated by personal autonomy, but must enter in as an exogenous principle to restrain its exercise. Of course, Mill (1972, 362–64, 1975, 58–59, 67) himself did not respect (traditional, customary) forms of life that he saw as being at variance with the ideal of individuality, e.g., the “cramped and dwarfed” Calvinite, the “stationary” Chinese, the Scottish Highlander, and Basque “half salvage relics” of past times. Gutmann, like many others who advocate autonomy and individuality as necessary components of an education in liberal democratic virtues, ignores the “flip side” of the Millian ideal. Mill’s theory concerning individuality and autonomy is not simply a theory about pluralism and social diversity; it is a theory about putatively superior and inferior forms of life.

²¹ Much confusion has been generated in liberal political theory by a failure to distinguish adequately between personal autonomy and Kantian moral autonomy or variations thereof. For example, according to Amy Gutmann (1995), “Millian liberalism” advocates living an autonomous life, which entails exercising the liberal virtue of mutual respect. Such an assumed connection between autonomy and mutual respect would be true of a Kantian conception of autonomy which includes, as part of the moral law, treating persons with respect, i.e., as ends in themselves (Kant 1981 [1785], 36). Such a connection is not true of a Millian conception of personal autonomy. Accord-

value—even if not aware of alternatives—is not being “compelled” to do so.

Sometimes it is argued that the coercion or compulsion in customary societies is the process of socialization itself. For example, according to George Kateb (1984, 343; cf. Spragens 1999, 121–32), “One’s dignity resides in being, to some important degree, a person of one’s own creating, making choosing, rather than in being merely a creature or a socially manufactured, conditioned, manipulated thing: half animal and half mechanical and therefore wholly socialized.” The assumption here is that those who lead customary modes of life are not really *leading* their lives at all: The relevant causal agent is something external to the individual, his/her culture or “socialization,” and the individual is, as it were, the passive receptacle of what is transmitted to him/her. In contrast, the particular type of choice associated with personal autonomy appears to locate agency squarely in the individual. The choice of ends and forms of life reflect the agent’s own determination about value and what are to count as valid reasons; the validity of reasons is not determined for him/her by his/her cultural environment.

This is an assumption concerning the relationship between autonomy and human agency. An assumption such as this, however, rests upon contestable assumptions as to what is necessary for a belief, or mode of life lived on the basis of a given belief or system of beliefs, to be “one’s own.” For a belief to be one’s own, it need not be unique; all that is required is that one be able to give a reason for it. “Traditional” reasons, such as believing in something on the basis of a belief in the authority or knowledge of one’s ancestors, or elders, or priest, or community, or the authority of a divine text, or God, do not make what one believes any less one’s own or a life lived on that basis any less an expression of one’s beliefs concerning value, i.e., any less an expression of human agency (see, e.g., G. Dworkin 1988, 38). Beliefs held in common by members of a community are still the individual beliefs of every single member of that community.

Of course, any individual may be wrong about the value of the way of life he/she is leading. It is in acknowledging that one can be wrong about a way of life—that our beliefs about the good life are fallible—that assumptions about the importance of autonomy as “rational revisability” (Buchanan 1975) enter the debate. For Kymlicka (1989, 18), rational revisability is important “precisely because our goals can be wrong, and because we can revise and improve them.” Yet just as personal autonomy may be one path to error about the value of particular form of life (see quote from Spragens, above)—and nothing precludes that it be a road to error after error—so it may be a path to a valuable form of life. Liberals generally assume, on the basis of a belief in value pluralism, that there can be a plurality of valuable forms of life (e.g., Berlin 1998; Raz 1986, 395–97). Why assume, then, that the road to valuable forms of life must be unitary? Or, put another way, why assume that only autonomous forms of life can be truly valuable? To view value pluralism as a principle concerning the variety of ends and forms of life that

may be *autonomously chosen* is to restrict the concept to such an extent as to call into question the use of the term “pluralism” in the phrase “value pluralism.”

CONCLUSION

Kymlicka’s theory of liberal nationalism, which limits the sites of identity formation to the national or cultural community itself, as opposed to any of the norms, or practices, or institutions, or subcommunities, or ends, or ways of life associated with a given national culture or other cultures, is untrue to the complexity of human experience. Devotion to the nation may be one important source of identity or one kind of “constitutive attachment,” but it is one among others. In a view that privileges the nation as *the* source of identity and identification, nationalism becomes relatively easy to defend. It also becomes easy to defend a form of nationalism that claims that fidelity to the nation must take precedence over all other forms of commitment. But such a form of nationalism cannot be liberal. The liberal commitment to an acceptance of value pluralism precludes any assumptions as to what constitutes, or what should constitute, persons’ “true selves” or their deepest identities, commitments, and attachments.²² People may be ardent liberal nationalists but no liberal state or liberal theory can assume that all persons are such—or should be made such—and ground this assumption in a nationalistic conception of identity.

According to Kymlicka (2001, 25), the United States has nurtured a national identity among its citizens as part of its project of “nation building,” a process of which Kymlicka wholly approves. What he rejects is nations attempting to force their national cultures upon minority national cultures within their borders when those nations reject assimilation and seek to preserve their own distinctive national identities. This constitutes a violation of the cultural-national rights Kymlicka seeks to defend. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, however, are not a nation, nor are they a societal culture in Kymlicka’s sense of the term, as is the case with most other religions geographically dispersed throughout the United States. In a view that so privileges national identity, the rights of nonmajority religions can easily receive inadequate protection.

In important ways, the development of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and the free exercise accommodation of religion—exempting religious groups and individuals from otherwise valid laws seen as burdening their religious beliefs and practices—has presented a challenge to any vision of American nationalism, for it constituted a recognition of the supreme importance of religion in the lives of many citizens and allowed, at times, the claims of religious identity to take precedence over those of national identity.²³ In a series of cases over the past 15 years the Supreme Court appears to have largely done away with the special status that

²² For the dangers inherent in talking about persons’ “true selves” in the history of political thought, see Berlin 1969.

²³ For the doctrine of free exercise accommodation, see *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963) and *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972).

religion once enjoyed among constitutional liberties.²⁴ These developments might be justified by an appeal to national unity, inasmuch as such accommodations, rather than integrating persons into the larger "national culture," at times allowed them to distance themselves from it and to continue in ways of life that did not necessarily exemplify individuality and personal autonomy (see, e.g., *Wisconsin v. Yoder* 1972; cf. Kymlicka 1995, 162, 231–32). For liberals sensitive to the nature of religious identity—as well as other forms of identity—such developments are a cause for serious concern.

The reason for this concern has been succinctly stated by Kymlicka (2001, 33): "If state institutions fail to respect people's culture and identity, the result can be serious damage to people's self respect and sense of agency." The problem with Kymlicka's theory, I have argued, is his apparent equation between national culture and identity, as if identity simply *is* national identity. None of what has been argued, however, is intended as a denial of the importance of nationalist claims. What must be kept in mind is that national identity is but one form of identity among others, and liberalism must eschew any theory of nationalism that would deny this.

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²⁴ See *Bowen v. Roy* (1986), *City of Boerne v. Flores* (1997), *Employment Division v. Smith* (1990), *Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association* (1998), *Marin* 1991, *McConnell*, 1993, *United States v. Lee* (1982), and *Whitehead* 1997.

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Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data

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We present a new way of extracting policy positions from political texts that treats texts not as discourses to be understood and interpreted but rather, as data in the form of words. We compare this approach to previous methods of text analysis and use it to replicate published estimates of the policy positions of political parties in Britain and Ireland, on both economic and social policy dimensions. We “export” the method to a non-English-language environment, analyzing the policy positions of German parties, including the PDS as it entered the former West German party system. Finally, we extend its application beyond the analysis of party manifestos, to the estimation of political positions from legislative speeches. Our “language-blind” word scoring technique successfully replicates published policy estimates without the substantial costs of time and labor that these require. Furthermore, unlike in any previous method for extracting policy positions from political texts, we provide uncertainty measures for our estimates, allowing analysts to make informed judgments of the extent to which differences between two estimated policy positions can be viewed as significant or merely as products of measurement error.

Analyses of many forms of political competition, from a wide range of theoretical perspectives, require systematic information on the policy positions of the key political actors. This information can be derived from a number of sources, including mass, elite, and expert surveys either of the actors themselves or of others who observe them, as well as analyses of behavior in strategic settings, such as legislative roll-call voting. (For reviews of alternative sources of data on party positions, see Laver and Garry 2000 and Laver and Schofield 1998). All of these methods present serious methodological and practical problems. Methodological problems with roll-call analysis and expert surveys concern the direction of causality—“data” on policy positions collected using these techniques are arguably more a product of the political processes under investigation than causally prior to them. Meanwhile, even avid devotees of survey techniques cannot rewind history to conduct new surveys in the past. This vastly restricts the range of cases for which survey methods can be used to estimate the policy positions of key political actors.

An alternative way to locate the policy positions of political actors is to analyze the texts they generate. Political texts are the concrete by-product of strategic political activity and have a widely recognized potential to reveal important information about the policy positions of their authors. Moreover, they can be analyzed, reanalyzed, and reanalyzed again without becoming jaded or uncooperative. Once a text and an

analysis technique are placed in the public domain, furthermore, others can replicate, modify, and improve the estimates involved or can produce completely new analyses using the same tools. Above all, in a world where vast volumes of text are easily, cheaply, and almost instantly available, the systematic analysis of political text has the potential to be immensely liberating for the researcher. Anyone who cares to do so can analyze political texts for a wide range of purposes, using historical texts as well as analyzing material generated earlier in the same day. The texts analyzed can relate to collectivities such as governments or political parties or to individuals such as activists, commentators, candidates, judges, legislators, or cabinet ministers. The data generated from these texts can be used in empirical elaborations of any of the huge number of models that deal with the policies or motivations of political actors. The big obstacle to this process of liberation, however, is that current techniques of systematic text analysis are very resource intensive, typically involving large amounts of highly skilled labor.

One current approach to text analysis is the “hand-coding” of texts using traditional—and highly labor-intensive—techniques of content analysis. For example, an important text-based data resource for political science was generated by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)¹ (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Laver and Budge 1992). This project has been in operation since 1979 and, by the turn of the millennium, had used trained human coders to code 2,347 party manifestos issued by 632 different parties in 52 countries over the postwar era (Volken 2001, 35). These data have been used by many authors writing on a wide range of subjects in the world’s most prestigious journals.² Given the immense sunk costs of

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We thank Raj Chari, Gary King, Michael McDonald, Gail McElroy, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on drafts of this paper.

¹ Formerly the Manifesto Research Group (MRG).

² For a sample of such publications, see Adams 2001; Baron 1991, 1993; Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993; Gabel and Huber 2000; Kim and Fording 1998; Schofield and Parks 2000; and Warwick 1994, 2001, 2002.

generating this mammoth data set by hand over a period of more than 20 years, it is easy to see why no other research team has been willing to go behind the very distinctive theoretical assumptions that structure the CMP coding scheme or to take on the task of checking or replicating any of the data.

A second approach to text analysis replaces the hand-coding of texts with computerized coding schemes. Traditional computer-coded content analysis, however, is simply a direct attempt to reproduce the hand-coding of texts, using computer algorithms to match texts to coding dictionaries. With proper dictionaries linking specific words or phrases to predetermined policy positions, traditional techniques for the computer-coding of texts can produce estimates of policy positions that have a high cross-validity when measured against hand-coded content analyses of the same texts, as well as against completely independent data sources (Bara 2001; de Vries, Giannetti, and Mansergh 2001; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Laver and Garry 2000). Paradoxically, however, this approach does not dispense with the need for heavy human input, given the extensive effort needed to develop and test coding dictionaries that are sensitive to the strategic context—both substantive and temporal—of the texts analyzed. Since the generation of a well-crafted coding dictionary appropriate for a particular application is so costly in time and effort, the temptation is to go for large general-purpose dictionaries, which can be quite insensitive to context. Furthermore, heavy human involvement in the generation of coding dictionaries imports some of the methodological disadvantages of traditional techniques based on potentially biased human coders.

Our technique breaks radically from “traditional” techniques of textual content analysis by treating texts not as discourses to be read, understood, and interpreted for meaning—either by a human coder or by a computer program applying a dictionary—but as collections of word data containing information about the position of the texts’ authors on predefined policy dimensions. Given a set of texts about which something is known, our technique extracts data from these in the form of word frequencies and uses this information to estimate the policy positions of texts about which nothing is known. Because it treats words unequivocally as data, our technique not only allows us to estimate policy positions from political texts written in any language but also, uniquely among the methods currently available, allows us to calculate confidence intervals around these point estimates. This in turn allows us to make judgments about whether estimated differences between texts have substantive significance or are merely the result of measurement error. Our method of using words as data also removes the necessity for heavy human intervention and can be implemented quickly and easily using simple computer software that we have made publicly available.

Having described the technique we propose, we set out to cross-validate the policy estimates it generates against existing published results. To do this we reanalyze the text data set used by Laver and Garry

(2000) in their dictionary-based computer-coded content analysis of the manifestos of British and Irish political parties at the times of the 1992 and 1997 elections in each country. We do this to compare our results with published estimates of the policy positions of the authors of these texts generated by dictionary-based computer-coding, hand-coded content analyses, and completely independent expert surveys. Having gained some reassurance from this cross-validation, we go on to apply the technique to additional texts not written in English. Indeed estimating policy positions from documents written in languages unknown to the analyst is a core objective of our approach, which uses computers to minimize human intervention by analyzing text as data, while making no human judgement call about word meanings. Finally, we go on to extend the application of our technique beyond the analysis of party manifestos, to the estimation of legislator positions from parliamentary speeches. If our method can be demonstrated to work well in these various contexts, then we would regard it as an important methodological advance for studies requiring estimates of the policy positions of political actors.

A MODEL FOR LOCATING POLITICAL TEXTS ON A *PRIORI* POLICY DIMENSIONS

A Priori or Inductive Analyses of Policy Positions?

Two contrasting approaches can be used to estimate the policy positions of political actors. The first sets out to estimate positions on policy dimensions that are defined *a priori*. A familiar example of this approach can be found in expert surveys, which offer policy scales with predetermined meanings to country experts who are asked to locate parties on them (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1989). Most national election and social surveys also ask respondents to locate both themselves and political parties on predefined scales. Within the realm of text analysis, this approach codes the texts under investigation in a way that allows the estimation of their positions on *a priori* policy dimensions. A recent example of this way of doing things can be seen in the dictionary-based computer-coding technique applied by Laver and Garry (2000), which applies a predefined dictionary to each word in a political text, yielding estimated positions on predefined policy dimensions.

An alternative approach is fundamentally *inductive*. Using content analysis, for example, observed patterns in texts can be used to generate a matrix of similarities and dissimilarities between the texts under investigation. This matrix is then used in some form of dimensional analysis to provide a spatial representation of the texts. The analyst then provides substantive meanings for the underlying policy dimensions of this derived space, and these *a posteriori* dimensions form the basis of subsequent interpretations of policy positions. This is the approach used by the CMP in its hand-coded content analysis of postwar European party manifestos (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987), in which data

analysis is designed to allow inferences to be made about the dimensionality of policy spaces and the substantive meaning of policy dimensions. A forthright recent use of this approach for a single left–right dimension can be found in Gabel and Huber 2000. Warwick (2002) reports a multidimensional inductive analysis of both content analysis and expert survey data.

It should be noted that a *purely* inductive spatial analysis of the policy positions of political texts is impossible. The analyst has no way of interpreting the derived spaces without imposing at least some *a priori* assumptions about their dimensionality and the substantive meaning of the underlying policy dimensions, whether doing this explicitly or implicitly. In this sense, all spatial analyses boil down to the estimation of policy positions on *a priori* policy dimensions. The crucial distinction between the two approaches concerns the point at which the analyst makes the substantive assumptions that allow policy spaces to be interpreted in terms of the real world of politics. What we have called the *a priori* approach makes these assumptions at the outset since the analyst does not regard either the dimensionality of the policy space or the substantive meaning of key policy dimensions as the essential research questions. Using prior knowledge or assumptions about these reduces the problem to an epistemologically straightforward matter of estimating unknown positions on known scales. What we have called the inductive approach does not make prior assumptions about the dimensionality of the space and the meaning of its underlying policy dimensions. This leaves too many degrees of freedom to bring closure to the analysis without making *a posteriori* assumptions that enable the estimated space and its dimensions to be interpreted.

The ultimate methodological price to be paid for the benefits of *a posteriori* interpretation is the lack of any objective criterion for deciding between rival spatial interpretations, in situations in which the precise choice of interpretation can be critical to the purpose at hand. The price for taking the *a priori* route, on the other hand, is the need to accept take-it-or-leave-it propositions about the number and substantive meaning of the policy dimensions under investigation. Using the *a priori* method we introduce here, however, this price can be drastically reduced. This is because, once texts have been processed, it is very easy to reestimate their positions on a new *a priori* dimension in which the analyst might be interested. For this reason we concentrate here on estimating positions on *a priori* policy dimensions. The approach we propose can be adapted for inductive analysis with *a posteriori* interpretation, however, and we intend to return to this in future work.

The Essence of Our *A Priori* Approach


Our approach can be summarized in nontechnical terms as a way of estimating policy positions by comparing two sets of political texts. On one hand is a set of texts whose policy positions on well-defined

a priori dimensions are “known” to the analyst, in the sense that these can be either estimated with confidence from independent sources or assumed uncontroversially. We call these “reference” texts. On the other hand is a set of texts whose policy positions we do not know but want to find out. We call these “virgin” texts. All we do know about the virgin texts is the words we find in them, which we compare to the words we have observed in reference texts with “known” policy positions.

More specifically, we use the relative frequencies we observe for each of the different words in each of the reference texts to calculate the probability that we are reading a particular reference text, given that we are reading a particular word. For a particular *a priori* policy dimension, this allows us to generate a numerical “score” for each word. This score is the expected policy position of any text, given only that we are reading the single word in question. Scoring words in this way replaces the predefined deterministic coding dictionary of traditional computer-coding techniques. It gives words policy scores, not having determined or even considered their meanings in advance but, instead, by treating words purely as data associated with a set of reference texts whose policy positions can be confidently estimated or assumed. In this sense the set of real-world reference texts replaces the “artificial” coding dictionary used by traditional computer-coding techniques.

The value of the set of word scores we generate in this way is not that they tell us anything new about the reference texts with which we are already familiar—indeed they are no more than a particular type of summary of the word data in these texts. Our main research interest is in the virgin texts about which we have no information at all other than the words they contain. We use the word scores we generate from the reference texts to estimate the positions of virgin texts on the policy dimensions in which we are interested. Essentially, each word scored in a virgin text gives us a small amount of information about which of the reference texts the virgin text most closely resembles. This produces a conditional expectation of the virgin text’s policy position, and each scored word in a virgin text adds to this information. Our procedure can thus be thought of as a type of Bayesian reading of the virgin texts, with our estimate of the policy position of any given virgin text being updated each time we read a word that is also found in one of the reference texts. The more scored words we read, the more confident we become in our estimate.

Figure 1 illustrates our procedure, highlighting the key steps involved. The illustration is taken from the data analysis we report below. The reference texts are the 1992 manifestos of the British Labour, Liberal Democrat (LD), and Conservative parties. The research task is to estimate the unknown policy positions revealed by the 1997 manifestos of the same parties, which are thus treated as virgin texts. When performed by computer, this procedure is entirely automatic, following two key decisions by the analyst: the choice of a particular set of reference texts and the identification

FIGURE 1. The Wordscore procedure, using the British 1992–1997 manifesto scoring as an illustration

- Step 1:** Obtain reference texts with a priori known positions (setref)
Step 2: Generate word scores from reference texts (wordscore)
Step 3: Score each virgin text using word scores (textscore)
Step 4: (optional) Transform virgin text scores to original metric

Note: Scores for 1997 virgin texts are transformed estimated scores; parenthetical values are standard errors. The scored word list is a sample of the 5,299 total words scored from the three reference texts.

of an estimated or assumed position for each reference text on each policy dimension of interest.

Selection of Reference Texts

The selection of an appropriate set of reference texts is clearly a crucial aspect of the research design of the type of *a priori* analysis we propose. If inappropriate reference texts are selected, for example, if cookery books are used as reference texts to generate word scores that are then applied to speeches in a legislature, then the estimated positions of these speeches will be invalid. Selecting reference texts thus involves crucial substantive and qualitative decisions by the researcher, equivalent to the decisions made in the design or choice of either a substantive coding scheme for hand-coded content analysis or a coding dictionary for traditional computer-coding. While there are no mechanical procedures for choosing the reference texts for any analysis, we suggest here a number of guidelines as well as one hard-and-fast rule.

The hard-and-fast rule when selecting reference texts is that we must have access to confident estimates of, or assumptions about, their positions on the policy dimensions under investigation. Sometimes such estimates will be easy to come by. In the data analyses that follow, for example, we seek to compare our own estimates of party policy positions with previously published estimates. Thus we replicate other published content analyses of party manifestos, using “reference” party manifestos from one election to estimate the po-

sitions of “virgin” party manifestos in the next election. Our reference scores are taken from published expert surveys of the policy positions of the reference text authors, although this is only one of a number of easily available sources that we could have used with reasonable confidence. While a number of flaws can certainly be identified with expert surveys—some of which we have already mentioned—our purpose here is to compare the word scoring results with a well-known and widely used benchmark. In using these particular reference texts, we are in effect assuming that party manifestos in country *c* at election *t* are valid points of reference for the analysis of party manifestos at election *t* + 1 in the same country. Now this assumption is unlikely to be 100% correct, since the meaning and usage of words in party manifestos change over time, even over the time period between two elections in one country. But we argue not only that it is likely to be substantially correct, in the sense that word usage does not change very much over this period, but also that there is no better context for interpreting the policy positions of a set of party manifestos at election *t* + 1 than the equivalent set of party manifestos at election *t*. Note, furthermore, that any attempt to estimate the policy position of any political text, using any technique whatsoever, must relate this to some external context if the result is to be interpreted in a meaningful way, so that some equivalent assumption must always be made. As two people facing each other quickly discover, any attempt to describe one point as being to the “left” or the “right” of some other point must always have recourse to some external point of reference.

There may be times, however, when it is not easy to obtain simultaneously an authoritative set of reference texts and good estimates of the policy positions of these on all *a priori* dimensions in which the analyst is interested. In such instances it is possible to assume specific values for reference texts representing quintessential expressions of a view or policy whose position is known with a high degree of *a priori* confidence. Later in this paper, we apply our technique to legislative speeches made during a no-confidence debate, *assuming* that the speech of the leader of the government is quintessentially progovernment and that the speech of the leader of the opposition is quintessentially antigovernment.

In other words, what we require for our set of reference texts is a set of estimates of, or assumptions about, policy positions that we are prepared to stand over and use as appropriate points of reference when analyzing the virgin texts in which we are ultimately interested. Explicit decisions of substantive importance have to be made about these, but these are equivalent to the implicit decisions that must always be made when using other techniques for estimating policy positions. We do essentially the same thing when we choose a particular hand-coding scheme or a computer-coding dictionary, for example, both of which can always be deconstructed to reveal an enormous amount of (often hidden) substantive content. The need to choose external points of reference is a universal feature of any attempt to estimate the policy positions of political actors. In our application, the external points of reference are the reference texts.

We offer three further general guidelines in the selection of reference texts. The first is that the reference texts should use the same lexicon, in the same context, as the virgin texts being analyzed. For example, our investigations have (unsurprisingly) revealed very different English-language lexicons for formal written political texts, such as party manifestos, and formal spoken texts, such as speeches in a legislature. This implies that we should resist the temptation to regard party manifestos as appropriate reference texts for analyzing legislative speeches. In what follows, we use party manifestos as reference texts for analyzing other party manifestos and legislative speeches as reference texts for other legislative speeches. The point is that our technique works best when we have a number of "virgin" texts about which we know nothing and want to relate these to a small number of lexically equivalent (or very similar) "reference" texts about which we know, or are prepared to assume, something.

The second guideline is that policy positions of the reference texts should "span" the dimensions in which we are interested. Trivially, if all reference texts have the same policy position on some dimension under investigation, then their content contains no information that can be used to distinguish between other texts on the same policy dimension. An ideal selection of reference texts will contain texts that occupy extreme positions, as well as positions at the center, of the dimensions under investigation. This allows differences in the content of the reference texts to form the basis of inferences about differences in the content of virgin texts.

The third general guideline is that the set of reference texts should contain as many different words as possible. The content of the virgin texts is analyzed in the context of the word universe of the reference texts. The more comprehensive this word universe, and thus the less often we find words in virgin texts that do not appear in any reference text, the better. The party manifestos that we analyze below are relatively long documents. The British manifestos, for example, are between 10,000 and 30,000 words in length, each using between about 2,000 and 4,000 unique words. Most words observed in the virgin texts can be found in the word universe of the reference texts, while those that cannot tend to be used only very occasionally.³ If the texts in which we are interested are much shorter than this—for example, legislative speeches are typically shorter than party manifestos—then this will tend to restrict the word universe of the reference texts and may reduce our ability to make confident inferences about the policy positions of virgin texts. As we show below when analyzing legislative speeches, the uncertainty of our estimates does increase when texts are short, although it is worth noting that, when other methods of content analysis use short texts, they typically report no estimate at all of the associated increase in uncertainty.⁴ The problem of short texts is thus a problem with any form of quantitative content analysis and is not in any way restricted to the technique we propose here. And if the texts in which we are genuinely interested are short, then they are short and we just have to make the best of the situation in which we find ourselves. But the principle remains that it is always better to select longer suitable texts when these are available.

Generating Word Scores from Reference Texts

We begin with set R of reference texts, each having a policy position on dimension d that can be estimated or assumed with confidence. We can think of the estimated or assumed position of reference text r on dimension d as being its *a priori* position on this dimension, A_{rd} . We observe the relative frequency, as a proportion of the total number of words in the text, of each different word w used in reference text r .⁵ Let this be F_{wr} . Once

³ We are more specific about this when discussing particular results below.

⁴ We note that in the widely used content analysis data set of the CMP, many of the texts analyzed are very short. Using the CD-ROM distributed with Budge et al. 2001, we find that about one-third of all texts in the data set comprise fewer than 100 quasi-sentences. Generously estimating each quasi-sentence to be about 20 words, this implies that one-third of the CMP texts are about 2,000 words or fewer, while well over half of all texts analyzed are probably fewer than 4,000 words each.

⁵ In the analyses reported here, we use the relative frequencies of every single different word in each reference text, even very common words such as prepositions and indefinite articles. We do this for two reasons. First, to do otherwise would require knowledge of the language in which the text under analysis was written, violating our principle of treating words as data and undermining our fundamental objective of being able to analyze texts written in languages we do not understand. Second, where such common words are systematically

we have observed F_{wr} for each of the reference texts, we have a matrix of relative word frequencies that allows us to calculate an interesting matrix of conditional probabilities. Each element in the latter matrix tells us the probability that we are reading reference text r , given that we are reading word w . This quantity is the key to our *a priori* approach. Given a set of reference texts, the probability that an occurrence of word w implies that we are reading text r is

$$P_{wr} = \frac{F_{wr}}{\sum_r F_{wr}}. \quad (1)$$

As an example consider two reference texts, A and B. We observe that the word “choice” is used 10 times per 10,000 words in Text A and 30 times per 10,000 words in Text B. If we know simply that we are reading the word “choice” in one of the two reference texts, then there is a 0.25 probability that we are reading Text A and a 0.75 probability that we are reading Text B.

We can then use this matrix P_{wr} to produce a score for each word w on dimension d . This is the expected position on dimension d of any text we are reading, given only that we are reading word w , and is defined as

$$S_{wd} = \sum_r (P_{wr} \cdot A_{rd}). \quad (2)$$

In other words, S_{wd} is an average of the *a priori* reference text scores A_{rd} , weighted by the probabilities P_{wr} . Everything on the right-hand side of this expression may be either observed or (in the case of A_{rd}) assumed *a priori*. Note that if reference text r contains occurrences of word w and no other text contains word w , then $P_{wr} = 1$. If we are reading word w , then we conclude from this that we are certainly reading text r . In this event the score of word w on dimension d is the position of reference text r on dimension d : thus $S_{wd} = A_{rd}$. If all reference texts contain occurrences of word w at precisely equal frequencies, then reading word w leaves us none the wiser about which text we are reading and S_{wd} is the mean position of all reference texts.

To continue with our simple example, imagine that Reference Text A is assumed from independent sources to have a position of -1.0 on dimension d , and Reference Text B is assumed to have a position of $+1.0$. The score of the word “choice” is then

$$0.25(-1.0) + 0.75(1.0) = -0.25 + 0.75 = +0.5.$$

Given the pattern of word usage in the reference texts, if we knew only that the word “choice” occurs in some text, then this implies that the text’s expected position on the dimension under investigation is $+0.5$. Of course we will update this expectation as we gather more information about the text under investigation by reading more words.

used with equal relative frequencies in all reference texts, they convey no useful information, but they do not systematically bias our results. Where such words are systematically used with unequal relative frequencies in reference texts, we assume that this is because they are conveying information about differences between texts.

Scoring Virgin Texts

Having calculated scores for all words in the word universe of the reference texts, the analysis of any set of virgin texts V of any size is very straightforward. First, we must compute the relative frequency of each virgin text word, as a proportion of the total number of words in the virgin text. We call this frequency F_{wv} . The score of any virgin text v on dimension d , S_{vd} , is then the mean dimension score of all of the scored words that it contains, weighted by the frequency of the scored words:

$$S_{vd} = \sum_w (F_{wv} \cdot S_{wd}). \quad (3)$$

This single numerical score represents the expected position of the virgin text on the *a priori* dimension under investigation. This inference is based on the assumption that the relative frequencies of word usage in the virgin texts are linked to policy positions in the same way as the relative frequencies of word usage in the reference texts. This is why the selection of appropriate reference texts—discussed at some length above—is such an important matter.

Interpreting Virgin Text Scores

Once raw estimates have been calculated for each virgin text, we need to interpret these in substantive terms, a matter that is not as straightforward as might seem at first sight. Because different texts draw upon the same word universe, relative word frequencies and hence word scores can never distinguish perfectly between texts. Words found in common to all or most of the reference texts hence tend to take as their scores the mean overall scores of the reference texts. The result is that, for any set of virgin texts containing the same set of nondiscriminating words found in the reference texts, the raw virgin text scores tend to be much more clustered together than the reference text scores. While the mean of the virgin scores will have a readily interpretable meaning (relative to the policy positions of the reference texts), the dispersion of the virgin text scores will be on a different scale—one that is much smaller. To compare the virgin scores directly with the reference scores, therefore, we need to transform the scores of the virgin texts so that they have same dispersion metric as the reference texts. For each virgin text v on a dimension d (where the total number of virgin texts $V > 1$), this is done as follows:

$$S_{vd}^* = (S_{vd} - \bar{S}_{vd}) \left(\frac{SD_{rd}}{SD_{vd}} \right) + \bar{S}_{vd}, \quad (4)$$

where \bar{S}_{vd} is the average score of the virgin texts, and the SD_{rd} and SD_{vd} are the sample standard deviations of the reference and virgin text scores, respectively. This preserves the mean and relative positions of the virgin scores but sets their variance equal to that of the reference texts. It is very important to note that this particular approach to rescaling is not fundamental to our word-scoring technique but, rather, is a matter of

substantive research design unrelated to the validity of the raw virgin text scores. In our case we wish to express the estimated positions of the virgin texts on the same metric as the policy positions of the reference texts because we wish to compare the two sets of numbers to validate our technique. Further development to interpret raw virgin scores can and should be done, yet the simple transformation (Eq. 4) provides excellent results, as we demonstrate below. Other transformations are of course possible, for example, by analysts who wish to compare estimates derived from text analysis with policy positions estimated by other sources but expressed in some quite different metric. For these reasons we recommend that raw scores always be reported, in addition to any transformed values of virgin scores.

Estimating the Uncertainty of Text Scores

Our method for scoring a virgin text on some policy dimension generates a precise point estimate, but we have yet to consider any *uncertainty* associated with this estimate. No previous political science work estimating policy positions using quantitative content analysis deals systematically with the uncertainty of any estimate generated. The seminal and widely used CMP content analysis data, for example, are offered as point estimates with no associated measures of uncertainty. There is no way, when comparing the estimated positions of two manifestos using the CMP data, to determine how much the difference between estimates can be attributed to “real” differences and how much to coding unreliability.⁶ Notwithstanding this, the time series of party policy positions generated by the CMP data has been seen in the profession as one of its great virtues, and “movements” of parties over time have typically been interpreted as real policy movements rather than as manifestations of coding unreliability.

Here we present a simple method for obtaining uncertainty estimates for our estimates of the policy positions of virgin texts. This allows us for the first time to make systematic judgments about the extent to which differences between the estimated policy positions of two texts are in fact significant.⁷ Recall that each virgin text score S_{vd} is the weighted mean score of the words in

text v on dimension d . If we can compute a mean for any set of quantities, then we can also compute a variance. In this context our interest is in how, for a given text, the scores S_{wd} of the words in the text vary around this mean. The variance of S_{wd} for a given text measures how dispersed the individual word scores are around the text’s mean score. The less this variance, the more the words in the text all correspond to the final score and hence the lower our uncertainty about that score. Because the text’s score S_{vd} is a weighted average, the variance we compute also needs to be weighted. We therefore compute V_{vd} , the variance of each word’s score around the text’s total score, weighted by the frequency of the scored word in the virgin text:

$$V_{vd} = \sum_w F_{vw} (S_{wd} - S_{vd})^2. \quad (5)$$

This measure produces a familiar quantity directly analogous to the unweighted variance, summarizing the “consensus” of the scores of each word in the virgin text.⁸ Intuitively, we can think of each scored word in a virgin text as generating an independent prediction of the text’s overall policy position. When these predictions are tightly clustered, we are more confident in their consensus than when they are scattered more widely.

As with any variance, we can use the square root of V_{vd} to produce a standard deviation. This standard deviation can be used in turn, along with the total number of scored virgin words N^v , to generate a standard error $\sqrt{V_{vd}}/\sqrt{N^v}$ for each virgin text’s score S_{vd} .⁹ As we will see below, this standard error can then be used to perform standard statistical tests, such as the difference between means, to evaluate the significance of any difference in the estimated positions of two texts.¹⁰

factors, since we regard the generation of texts by political actors to be a stochastic process.

⁸ Note that while we have employed the weighted formula here because our representation of words thus far has been as frequency distributions, this formula is equivalent to computing a population variance of the score of every (nonunique) word in the text. Each word hence contributes once for each time it occurs.

⁹ This standard error applies to the raw virgin scores but not directly to the transformed scores. In the tables that follow (Tables 2–7), we also computed a standard error for the transformed scores along with 95% confidence intervals for the transformed scores, to make more straightforward the task of interpreting the uncertainty of the transformed scores on the original policy metric. The procedure for obtaining the upper and lower bounds of the transformed score confidence interval was straightforward. First, we computed the untransformed 95% confidence interval, calculated as the untransformed score S_{vd} plus and minus two standard errors (computed as explained in the text). These upper and lower confidence intervals, in the metric of the raw scores, were then transformed using exactly the same rescaling procedure as applied to the raw scores S_{vd} . The transformed standard error was then taken to be half of the distance between the transformed score and the bounds.

¹⁰ We note that this measure is only one of a number of possible approaches to representing the uncertainty of our estimates of the positions of virgin texts and that numerous alternative measures can be developed to gauge the accuracy and robustness of final scores. In this introductory treatment of the word scoring method, we have deliberately chosen a form that will be familiar to most readers as well as being simple to compute. Diagnostic analysis of the word scoring technique is something to which we will return in future work.

⁶ In large part this is because most manifestos in the data set were coded once only by a single coder, making it impossible to provide specific indications of inter- or intracoder reliability. The CMP has not yet published any test of intracoder reliability (Volkens 2001, 39). Inter-coder reliability checks have been performed by correlating the frequency distribution of an “official” coding of a single standard text with the codings of hired researchers. The average correlation found for 39 “thoroughly trained” hired coders was 0.72, with correlations running as low as 0.34 (Volkens 2001, 39). Thus we can be certain that there is inter-coder unreliability in the CMP data but have no precise way of knowing whether or not the difference between the estimated positions of two texts is statistically significant.

⁷ Previous approaches to content analysis typically refer to *reliability*, but that is different from the notion of uncertainty we use here. Reliability refers to the stability of measures across repeated codings, as with the inter-coder reliability of hand-coded content analysis. *Uncertainty* in our usage is consistent with the statistical notion of uncertainty, representing confidence that an estimate reflects the true position rather than variation due to chance or other uncontrollable

TABLE 1. Word Scoring Example Applied to Artificial Texts

Word w	Word Count						Probability of Reading Text r , Given Reading Word w					Score S_{wd}	Virgin Score		
	Reference Text					Virgin Text	P_{w1}	P_{w2}	P_{w3}	P_{w4}	P_{w5}		F_{wv}	$F_{wv} * S_{wd}$	$F_{wv}(S_{wd} - S_{vd})^2$
	r_1	r_2	r_3	r_4	r_5										
A	2	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
B	3	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
C	10	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
D	22	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
E	45	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
F	78	2	0	0	0	0	0.98	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.48	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
G	115	3	0	0	0	0	0.97	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.48	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
H	146	10	0	0	0	2	0.94	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.45	0.0020	-0.0029	0.0020
I	158	22	0	0	0	3	0.88	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.41	0.0030	-0.0042	0.0028
J	146	45	0	0	0	10	0.76	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.32	0.0100	-0.0132	0.0077
K	115	78	2	0	0	22	0.59	0.40	0.01	0.00	0.00	-1.18	0.0220	-0.0261	0.0119
L	78	115	3	0	0	45	0.40	0.59	0.02	0.00	0.00	-1.04	0.0450	-0.0467	0.0156
M	45	146	10	0	0	78	0.22	0.73	0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.88	0.0780	-0.0687	0.0146
N	22	158	22	0	0	115	0.11	0.78	0.11	0.00	0.00	-0.75	0.1150	-0.0863	0.0105
O	10	146	45	0	0	146	0.05	0.73	0.22	0.00	0.00	-0.62	0.1460	-0.0904	0.0043
P	3	115	78	2	0	158	0.02	0.58	0.39	0.01	0.00	-0.45	0.1580	-0.0712	0.0000
Q	2	78	115	3	0	146	0.01	0.39	0.58	0.02	0.00	-0.30	0.1460	-0.0437	0.0032
R	0	45	146	10	0	115	0.00	0.22	0.73	0.05	0.00	-0.13	0.1150	-0.0150	0.0116
S	0	22	158	22	0	78	0.00	0.11	0.78	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.0780	0.0000	0.0157
T	0	10	146	45	0	45	0.00	0.05	0.73	0.22	0.00	0.13	0.0450	0.0059	0.0151
U	0	3	115	78	2	22	0.00	0.02	0.58	0.39	0.01	0.30	0.0220	0.0066	0.0123
V	0	2	78	115	3	10	0.00	0.01	0.39	0.58	0.02	0.45	0.0100	0.0045	0.0081
W	0	0	45	146	10	3	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.73	0.05	0.62	0.0030	0.0019	0.0034
X	0	0	22	158	22	2	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.78	0.11	0.75	0.0020	0.0015	0.0029
Y	0	0	10	146	45	0	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.73	0.22	0.88	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Z	0	0	3	115	78	0	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.59	0.40	1.04	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
AA	0	0	2	78	115	0	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.40	0.59	1.18	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
BB	0	0	0	45	146	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.76	1.32	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
CC	0	0	0	22	158	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.88	1.41	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
DD	0	0	0	10	146	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.94	1.45	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
EE	0	0	0	3	115	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.97	1.48	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
FF	0	0	0	2	78	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.98	1.48	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
GG	0	0	0	0	45	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
HH	0	0	0	0	22	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
II	0	0	0	0	10	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
JJ	0	0	0	0	3	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
KK	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Total	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000							1.00	-0.45	0.14
	-1.50	-0.75	0.00	0.75	1.50	-0.45									
<i>A priori</i> positions of reference texts															
Estimated score for virgin text S_{vd}														-0.45	
Estimated weighted variance V_{vd}														0.14	
Estimated SD $\sqrt{V_{vd}}$														0.38	
Estimated SE $\sqrt{V_{vd}}/\sqrt{1000}$														0.018	

Illustration Using a Sample Text

The method we have outlined can be illustrated by working through the calculation of word scores on an artificial text. Table 1 shows the results of analyzing a very simple hypothetical data set, shown in columns 2–7 in the table (in bold face), containing word counts for 37 different words observed in five reference texts, $r_1 - r_5$, as well as counts for the same set of words in a hypothetical “virgin” text whose position we wish to

estimate. The policy positions of the reference texts on the dimension under investigation are estimated or assumed *a priori* and are shown at the bottom of the table as ranging between -1.50 and +1.50. Table 1 shows that, in this hypothetical data set, nearly all words can be ranked from left to right in terms of the extent to which they are associated with left- or right-wing parties. Within each individual text, the observed pattern of word frequencies fits a normal distribution. We also indicate the “real” position of the virgin text, which

is unknown to the hypothetical analyst but which we know to be -0.45 . This is the essential quantity to be estimated by comparing the distribution of the word frequencies in the virgin texts with that in the reference texts.

The columns headed $P_{w1}-P_{w5}$ show the conditional probabilities (Eq. 1) necessary for computing word scores from the reference texts—this is the matrix of probabilities that we are reading reference text r given that we are reading word w . Combined with the *a priori* positions of the reference texts, these allow us to calculate scores, S_w , for each word in the word universe of the reference texts (Eq. 2). These scores are then used to score the virgin text by summing the scores of words used in the virgin text, weighting each score by the relative frequency of the word in question (Eq. 3). The resulting estimate, and its associated uncertainty measure, is provided at the bottom right of Table 1, together with its associated standard error. From this we can see that, in this perfectly behaved data set, our technique perfectly retrieves the position of the virgin text under investigation.

While this simple example illustrates the calculations associated with our technique, it of course in no way shows its efficacy with real-world data, in which there will be much more heavily overlapping patterns of word usage in reference texts, large numbers of very infrequently used words, volumes of words found in virgin texts that do not appear in reference texts and therefore cannot be scored, and so on. The true test of the technique we propose lies in applying it to texts produced by real-world political actors, to see if we can reproduce estimates of their policy positions that have been generated by more traditional means.

ESTIMATING ECONOMIC POLICY POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND IRISH PARTIES

We now test our technique using real-world texts, by attempting to replicate previously published findings on the policy positions of political parties in Britain and Ireland. We compare our own findings with three sets of independent estimates of the economic policy positions of British and Irish political parties at the time of the 1997 general elections in each country. These are the results of 1997 expert surveys of party policy positions (Laver 1998 a, b) and of the hand-coding and deterministic computer-coding of 1997 party manifestos (Laver and Garry 2000).

British Party Positions on Economic Policy

The first task is to calculate word scores on the economic policy dimensions for British party manifestos in the 1990s. We selected the 1992 British Labour, Conservative, and LD party manifestos as reference texts. For independent estimates of the economic policy positions of these manifestos, we use the results of an expert survey of the policy positions of the parties that wrote them, on the scale “increase public services vs.

cut taxes,” reported in Laver and Hunt 1992.¹¹ The first stages in the analysis are to observe frequency counts for all words used in these reference texts¹² and to calculate relative word frequencies from these.¹³ Using these relative frequencies and the reference text policy positions, we then calculated a word score on the economic policy dimension for every word used in the reference texts, using the procedures outlined above (Eqs. 1 and 2).

Having calculated word scores on the economic policy dimension for each of the 5,299 words used in the 1992 reference texts, we use these to estimate the positions of three “virgin” texts. These are the Labour, LD, and Conservative manifestos of 1997. Note that this is a tough substantive test for our technique. Most commentators, backed up by a range of independent estimates, suggest that the ordering of the economic policy positions of the British parties changed between the 1992 and the 1997 elections, with Labour and the LDs exchanging places, leaving Labour in the center and the LDs on the left in 1997. This can be seen in 1997 expert survey findings (Laver 1998a) that we set out to replicate using computer word scoring, reported in the third row of the top panel in Table 2. We are particularly interested to see whether our technique can pick up this unusual and significant movement.

We can only score virgin texts on the words that they share with the universe of reference texts. The 1997 British manifestos used a total of 1,573 words that did not appear in the 1992 texts and these could not be scored.¹⁴ We thus applied the word scores derived from

¹¹ It is very important to note that such expert survey estimates are convenient to use as reference scores in this context but are not in any way intrinsic to our technique. What we require are independent estimates of, or assumptions about, the positions of the reference texts in which we can feel confident. The expert survey scores we use are reported in the first row in the lower half in Table 2. Both in terms of their face validity and because these scores report the mean judgments of a large number of British political scientists, we consider these estimated positions of the reference texts to represent a widely accepted view of the of the British policy space in 1992.

¹² While, for reasons discussed above, we included every single word used in the 1992 manifestos, even common words without substantive political meaning such as “a” and “the,” we did exclude all “non-words,” which we took to be character strings not beginning with letters.

¹³ Any computer-coded content analysis software (for example, Textpack) can perform simple word counting. To process large numbers of texts simultaneously and quickly perform all subsequent calculations on the output, however, we wrote our own software. Easy-to-use software—entitled WORDSCORES—for implementing the methods described in this paper is freely available from <http://www.politics.tcd.ie/wordscores/>. A full replication data set for this paper, using the WORDSCORES software, is also available at that web site. Installation or updating of WORDSCORES can be accomplished by any computer connected to the Internet by executing a single command from within the Stata statistical package: `net install http://www.politics.tcd.ie/wordscores/wordscores`. Version information prior to installation can be obtained by executing the Stata command `net describe http://www.politics.tcd.ie/wordscores/wordscores`.

¹⁴ Most of the 1997 words not used in 1992 were used very infrequently, with a median occurrence of 1 and a mean occurrence of between 1.2 and 1.9 (see Table 2). For this reason they would have contributed very little weight to the virgin text scores. Overall for

TABLE 2. Raw and Standardized Estimated Economic Policy Positions of 1997 British Party Manifestos

Party	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conservative	Mean Absolute Difference
Estimates				
1997 transformed virgin text scores	5.00	9.17	17.18	
SE	0.363	0.351	0.325	
1997 expert survey	5.77	10.30	15.05	
SE ($n = 117$)	0.234	0.229	0.227	
1997 standardized comparison scores				
Word scores	-0.88	-0.21	1.09	0.13
Expert survey	-0.99	-0.02	1.01	—
Hand-coded content analysis	-0.83	-0.28	1.11	0.17
Dictionary-based computer-coding	-1.08	0.18	0.90	0.13
Raw data				
1992 reference texts				
<i>A priori</i> positions	8.21	5.35	17.21	
SE ($n = 34$)	0.425	0.377	0.396	
Length in words	17,077	11,208	28,391	
No. of unique words	2,911	2,292	3,786	
1997 virgin texts				
Raw mean word scores (S_{vd})	10.2181	10.3954	10.7361	
SE	0.015	0.015	0.014	
Length in words	13,709	17,237	20,442	
Unique words scored	1,915	2,211	2,279	
% words scored	94.9	96.2	95.5	
Unique unscorable words	423	697	714	
Mean frequency of unscorable words	1.23	1.26	1.29	

Sources: *A priori* positions 1992 (Laver and Hunt 1992); expert survey scores 1997 (Laver 1998a); hand-coded content analysis and deterministic computer-coding (Laver and Garry 2000).

Note: Standardized scores are reported raw scores for 1997 standardized within each data source. For hand- and deterministic computer-codings, these have been recalculated to facilitate comparison from data presented by Laver and Garry (2000), who standardized their raw score across all observations for Britain and Ireland. The mean absolute difference reports the mean of the absolute differences for the three parties between the standardized party scores for each text-based estimate and the standardized expert survey party score. Standard errors are computed as described in the text.

the 1992 reference texts to the 1997 manifestos, calculating a "raw" score for each of the three manifestos (Eq. 3) and transforming (Eq. 4) it in the way described above. Finally, we calculate the standard errors of our estimates (Eq. 5 and associated discussion).

The key results of this analysis are presented in the top panel in Table 2. The first row reports our estimated positions of the 1997 party manifestos, transformed to the same metric as the 1992 expert survey scores that were used as points of reference. Our first point of comparison is with a set of 1997 expert survey scores, expressed in the same metric, highlighting the shift of the Labour Party to the center of this policy dimension (Laver 1998a). These scores are reported in the third row in Table 2. The comparison is very gratifying. Our word-scored estimates clearly pick up the switch in Labour and LD economic policy positions and are remarkably close, considering that they derive from an utterly independent source, to the expert survey estimates for 1997. Note particularly that the word scores we used were calculated from 1992 reference positions that locate the LDs between Labour and the Conservatives on economic policy, so that it was simply the

changing relative frequencies of word use between the 1992 and the 1997 manifestos that caused the estimated positions of these two parties to reverse, in line with independent estimates.

Table 2 also reports the standard errors associated with our raw estimates, from which we can conclude that differences among the estimated economic policy positions of the three manifestos are statistically significant. Note that this availability of standard errors, allowing such judgments to be made, is unique among published estimates of policy positions based on the content analysis of political texts.

To compare our results with those generated by other content analysis techniques, the last four rows in the top panel in Table 2 report, in addition to our own estimates and those of the 1997 expert survey, two other text-based estimates of the 1997 economic policy positions of the British parties. One of these derives from hand-coded content analysis, and the other from dictionary-based computer-coding, of the 1997 manifestos that we have treated here as virgin texts (both reported in Laver and Garry 2000). Since different published sets of scores had different metrics, all scores have been standardized to facilitate comparison.¹⁵ The main

the 1997 virgin texts, the bottom panel in Table 2 shows that the percentages of virgin words scoreable were 96.2%, 94.9%, and 95.5% for the LDs, Labour, and the Conservatives, respectively.

¹⁵ All sets of standardized estimates in Table 2 have been standardized within country and time period in the tables that follow, to

substantive difference between different estimates of British party positions in 1997 concerns the placement of the Labour Party. All scales locate Labour between the LDs and the Conservatives. The dictionary-based scale places Labour closer to the Conservatives, and the other text-based scales place Labour closer to the LDs, while the independent expert survey locates Labour midway between the two other parties.

As a summary of the fit between the various text-based estimates of party positions and the expert survey, the final column in the top panel in Table 2 reports the mean absolute difference between the estimated positions of the parties on each standardized scale and the positions of the same parties in the expert survey. This confirms our *prima facie* impression that our word-scored estimates are somewhat closer than the hand-coded content analysis to the expert survey estimates (representing the consensus among British political scientists about British party positions in 1997) and are about as close to these as the more traditional dictionary-based computer-coded scale. This is a remarkable achievement considering that, in stark contrast to all other methods, our word scoring technique treats words as data without reading or understanding them in any way, uses no knowledge of English, and does not require a predetermined computer-coding dictionary when analyzing the texts.

Irish Party Positions on Economic Policy

We now report a similar analysis for the Irish party system. As our reference texts for Irish politics in the 1990s, we take the manifestos of the five main parties contesting the 1992 election—Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, the Progressive Democrats (PDs), and the Democratic Left (DL). For our independent estimate of the positions of these reference texts, we use an expert survey taken at the time of the 1992 Irish election (Laver 1994). Having used these data in a preliminary analysis to calculate word scores for the economic policy dimension in Ireland in the 1990s, we then analyze 1997 Irish party manifestos as virgin texts. Our aim is once more to replicate independent published estimates of Irish party policy positions in 1997—the results of an expert survey conducted at the time of the 1997 election (Laver 1998b), as well as estimates based on hand-coded content analysis and dictionary-based computer-coding (Laver and Garry 2000). The results of this analysis are listed in Table 3, which has the same format as Table 2.

facilitate comparison of estimates originally reported using different units of analysis. (Thus the 1997 British estimates, for example, are standardized against themselves.) This differs from the practice adopted by Laver and Garry (2000), who standardized across both countries and time periods. This was because they were evaluating the application of a single expert coding scheme and computer-coding dictionary to all observations. In contrast, we use the 1992 manifestos to generate separate sets of words scores for Britain and Ireland and apply these separately to virgin texts taken from subsequent time periods in each country. The standardized figures in Tables 2–5 thus differ from those reported by Laver and Garry (2000) but are calculated directly from them.

Substantively, while nothing as dramatic happened in Ireland between 1992 and 1997 as the vaunted dash to the center by the British Labour Party under Tony Blair, there was a major coalition realignment that we expect to show up in the economic policy positions of the parties. The government that formed immediately after the 1992 election was the first-ever coalition between Fianna Fáil and the Labour Party. As the bottom panel in Table 3 shows, these parties were judged by expert survey respondents in 1992 to be adjacent, though by no means close, on the economic policy dimension. This government fell in 1994 and was replaced without an intervening election by a “rainbow” coalition of Fine Gael, Labour, and DL—so called because of major policy differences among what was essentially a coalition of Fianna Fáil’s opponents. By the time of the 1997 election, the three parties of the Rainbow Coalition presented a common front to the electorate and sought reelection. While promoting independent policy positions, they were nonetheless careful to ensure that their respective party manifestos did not contain major policy differences that would embarrass them on the campaign trail. Confronting the Rainbow Coalition at the election, Fianna Fáil and the PDs formed a pact of their own, promising to go into government together if they received enough support and, also, taking care to clean up any major policy incompatibilities in their respective manifestos that would have been exploited by opponents during the campaign. The 1997 election was thus fought between two rival coalitions—the Fine Gael, Labour, and DL rainbow, on one side, and Fianna Fáil and the PDs, on the other—who published independent but coordinated policy programs.

The top panel in Table 3 shows that the main manifestation of these changes in expert survey data is a collective judgment that Fine Gael Shifted to the left in 1997 as a result of its membership in the Rainbow Coalition with Labour and DL. The experts did not consider Fianna Fáil to have shifted right, despite the fact that the 1997 Fianna Fáil manifesto was designed not to conflict with that of the PDs and that immediately after the election Fianna Fáil agreed to a joint program of government with the right-wing PDs, subsequently governing harmoniously with them for the first full-term coalition government in the history of the Irish state. This is intriguing because, as the last four lines in the top panel in Table 3 show, both expert survey and hand-coded content analyses continue to show Fine Gael to the right of Fianna Fáil in 1997, while both dictionary-based computer-coding and our own word scoring techniques, which proceeded without expert intervention, find Fine Gael to the left of Fianna Fáil. Both sets of computer-coded results reflect the pattern of actual coalitions in the legislature, so we may speculate here that we are seeing signs of experts—whether survey respondents or human text coders—reading between the lines of the published texts and inferring that, in a coalition environment such as this, stated policy positions are not entirely sincere.

Be that as it may, the results in Table 3 show that our approach, while generating results with good face

TABLE 3. Raw and Standardized Estimated Economic Policy Positions of 1997 Irish Party Manifestos

	DL	Labour	Fianna Fáil	Fine Gael	PD	Mean Absolute Difference
Estimates						
1997 transformed virgin text scores	3.79	6.78	15.32	13.18	16.44	
SE	1.908	0.503	0.461	0.593	0.797	
1997 expert survey	5.47	7.77	12.07	12.30	17.27	
SE ($n=30$)	0.325	0.330	0.398	0.363	0.310	
1997 standardized comparison scores						
Word scores	-1.32	-0.78	0.79	0.37	0.94	0.27
Expert survey	-1.21	-0.70	0.24	0.29	1.38	
Hand-coded content analysis	-1.10	-0.72	-0.02	0.38	1.46	0.11
Deterministic computer-coding	-1.22	-0.52	0.36	-0.06	1.45	0.15
Raw data						
1992 reference texts						
<i>A priori</i> positions	4.50	6.88	13.13	15.00	17.63	
SE ($n=28$)	0.40	0.37	0.57	0.47	0.30	
Length in words	6,437	16,373	3,782	3,679	3,523	
No. of unique words	1,763	2,768	1,186	1,019	1,136	
1997 virgin texts						
Raw mean word scores (S_{vd})	10.9205	10.9954	11.2087	11.1552	11.2367	
SE	0.048	0.013	0.012	0.015	0.020	
Length in words	2,549	32,171	38,659	24,026	13,922	
Unique words scored	748	2,348	2,609	2,098	1,721	
% words scored	92.4	92.4	89.7	92.1	92.9	
Unique unscorable words	172	1,492	2,203	1,902	991	
Mean frequency of unscorable words	1.13	1.64	1.82	1.59	1.13	

Sources: *A priori* positions 1992 (Laver 1994); expert survey 1997 (Laver 1998b); expert-coded content analysis and deterministic compute coding (Laver and Garry 2000).

Note: See Note to Table 2.

validity in terms of subsequent coalition alignments, does not correspond as well as the other text-based techniques with expert survey. The key difference between our scale and the others is the convergence of Fianna Fáil and the PDs indicated by our technique, followed as we have seen by a coalition between the two parties. While this convergence is substantively plausible, an alternative possibility is that our estimates are less accurate than the others in this case.

One possible source of such a problem is that the 1997 Irish manifestos were on average considerably longer than their short 1992 progenitors, using many words that were not used in 1992. The Fianna Fáil manifesto, in particular, burgeoned dramatically in length. We scored the 4,279 different words in the 1992 manifestos, but a total of 4,188 new words appeared in 1997, albeit many of them only once.¹⁶ There was thus much less overlap than in Britain between the word pools used in 1992 and 1997, leaving more of the 1997 Irish manifestos necessarily unscored. This is reflected in noticeably higher standard errors for our Irish estimates than for the British ones. The short DL manifesto in 1997, for example, generates a word-scored estimated economic policy position of 3.79 on the 1–20 metric of the expert survey with which it is being compared, but

the very high associated standard error tells us that this position might be anything from 0.0 to 7.6 on this scale (its 95% confidence interval). The PD manifesto has a standard error that implies that we cannot statistically distinguish its economic policy position from that of Fianna Fáil. In other words, the standard errors generated by the word scoring technique are telling us that we should not feel as confident with its estimates for Ireland as we feel with those for Britain. We consider this to be an interesting and important result in itself—bearing in mind that all previous content analysis policy estimates of which we are aware report point estimates with no estimate whatsoever of associated error and, thus, are effectively blind to the potential problems arising from short texts we have diagnosed in the Irish case.

ESTIMATING THE POLICY POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND IRISH PARTIES ON THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL POLICY DIMENSION

A range of techniques has been used to estimate economic policy positions in Britain and Ireland and has been found to have good face validity. When setting out to cross-validate economic policy estimates produced by our word scoring method, therefore, we are working in well-explored territory. We turn now to a more difficult and interesting problem. This is the estimation of policy positions on the “liberal-conservative” dimension of social policy, taken as the second most important

¹⁶ The Fianna Fáil manifesto in 1997 contained more than 10 times as many total words as the 1992 manifesto. Because the pool of reference texts included manifestos from four other parties, however, we were able to score 89.7% of the words in the 1997 manifesto (see Table 3). Results for the other virgin texts were all above 92% words scored.

TABLE 4. Raw and Standardized Estimated Social Policy Positions of 1997 British Party Manifestos

	Liberal Democrat	Labour	Conservative	Mean Absolute Difference
Estimates				
1997 transformed virgin text scores	5.17	8.96	15.06	
SE	0.285	0.272	0.254	
1997 expert survey	6.75	8.28	13.26	
SE ($n = 116$)	0.240	0.228	0.253	
1997 standardized comparison scores				
Word scores	-0.91	-0.15	1.07	0.12
Expert survey	-0.79	-0.34	1.13	
Hand-coded content analysis	-1.07	-0.15	0.91	0.33
Deterministic computer-coding	-1.06	-0.12	0.93	0.31
Raw data				
1992 reference texts				
<i>A priori</i> positions	6.87	6.53	15.34	
SE ($n = 34$)	0.410	0.358	0.451	
1997 virgin texts				
Raw mean word scores (S_{vd})	9.5285	9.6956	9.9649	
SE	0.013	0.012	0.011	

Note: Sources as in Table 2. All statistics for the word counts and frequencies of reference and virgin texts are the same as in Table 2.

dimension of competition in many European party systems, a general perception for which Warwick (2002) found support when extracting common policy spaces from party manifesto and expert survey data.

Traditional techniques of content analysis have been very much less effective at providing reliable and stable estimates of policy positions on this dimension, a conclusion confirmed in a careful study by McDonald and Mendes (2001). Having found a number of economic policy scales to be highly reliable, they found the reliability of content analysis-based social policy scales to be "not so filled with noise as to be completely unreliable" but "below a . . . reliability that we would take as minimally acceptable" (McDonald and Mendes 2001, 111).

In applying our word scoring approach to a new policy dimension, we also reveal one of its chief advantages of flexibility, ease of use, and susceptibility to tests using different *a priori* conditions. Once the reference texts have been converted into the matrix of word probabilities P_{wr} , it is straightforward to compute word scores for a new dimension d' simply by changing the *a priori* set of reference scores to $A_{r,d'}$. We can then very easily apply these new word scores to the virgin texts and thereby estimate their positions on d' , which in most cases takes under one second of computing time. In contrast to other computer-coding techniques, there is no need for the labor-intensive development and testing of a new coding dictionary for each new policy dimension considered. We demonstrate this by rerunning the analysis for the social policy dimension in Britain and Ireland in a manner identical to that for economic policy, except that the reference scores were taken from expert survey estimates of the social policy positions of the authors of these reference texts (Laver 1994; Laver and Hunt 1992). The social policy positions we estimate are defined *a priori* in terms of promoting liberal policies on matters such as abortion and homosexuality, at one end, and opposing such policies, at the other.

British Party Positions on Social Policy

The results of rescoring of the 1997 virgin texts for Britain are reported in Table 4, which has the same format as Table 2 without repeating raw data unnecessarily. As before, we begin by comparing our estimates with those generated by the completely independent expert survey conducted at the time of the 1997 election. Substantively, the main party movement reported by the expert surveys is a shift from estimates in 1992 that found the social policy positions of Labour and the LDs to be statistically indistinguishable, to one in 1997 in which Labour occupied a statistically distinct position on the conservative side of the LDs. This finding is clearly replicated by our word-scored estimates.

As before, the last four rows in the top panel in Table 4 compare standardized estimates from our word scoring method with those derived from the 1997 expert survey, as well as both hand- and dictionary-based computer-coded content analyses of the 1997 manifestos. These results, summarized by the mean absolute differences, show that computer word scoring performs extraordinarily well in this previously troublesome area, far better than any other content analysis technique. Substantively this is because, according to the expert survey that summarizes the judgments of British political scientists on this matter, the situation in 1997 was one in which Labour and the LDs were relatively close to each other in the more liberal half of the social policy dimension, with the Conservatives firmly on the right. This configuration is retrieved from the 1997 manifestos by our language-blind word scoring technique—it can be seen in the negative standard scores for the Labour Party. The more traditional techniques of content analysis, whether hand- or computer-coded, place Labour much closer to the Conservatives on social policy than to the LDs, a finding that does not seem to have good face validity.

The mean absolute differences between the results of the various content analyses and those of the expert survey show that our word scoring technique did as well on the liberal-conservative dimension in Britain as it did for economic policy. What is striking, however, is that it did distinctly better than more traditional text analysis techniques in what has previously been a very problematic area for content analysis.

Irish Party Positions on Social Policy

We reran the analysis in the same way to estimate the social policy positions of the 1997 Irish party manifestos, treating these as virgin texts. The results are reported in Table 5. The most important substantive pattern to watch for in the Irish case is the relative position of Fianna Fáil and the PDs. Since the PDs are regarded by many as a classical liberal party, their right-wing economic policy position is widely perceived to be combined with a relatively leftist position on social issues. As Table 5 shows, this received wisdom is reflected in expert survey estimates. Fianna Fáil, in contrast, is typically seen as the guardian of traditional Catholic social values in Ireland. This pattern can be seen clearly in the expert surveys, which place Fianna Fáil very firmly on the right of the liberal-conservative dimension of social policy.

In contrast to the situation in Britain, therefore, the relative positions of parties on the liberal-conservative social policy dimension in Ireland differ in important substantive ways from those on the economic policy dimension. The top row in Table 5 shows that our language-blind word scoring techniques picks this difference up very well, coming close to the 1997 expert survey results in its analysis of the 1997 manifestos as virgin texts. As the last four rows in the top panel in Table 5 show, the more traditional content analysis techniques cannot replicate independent estimates of

the social policy position of the PDs, (mis)placing the PDs, with high positive standard scores, on the conservative side of the social policy dimension at a position much more conservative than that of Fianna Fáil. This neither corresponds to the consensus of political scientists reflected in the expert judgments nor has good face validity.

The mean absolute differences again summarize the relative performance of the three content analysis techniques. These show that our word scoring technique, despite the fact that it uses no knowledge of the English language, performs strikingly better than the other content analysis techniques, performing remarkably well on a dimension that has previously presented content analysts with considerable problems.

Overall Fit with Expert Surveys


Figure 2 summarizes the fit between independent expert survey findings and our rescaled estimates of the policy positions of virgin texts, using computer word scoring. The X axis gives the word-scored estimates for 1997 virgin texts; the Y axis, expert survey estimates for 1997 of the positions of the authors of those texts. The vertical bars on each point represent a single standard deviation among the expert survey results. These bars may be interpreted as the range within which a single standard deviation of experts ranked the party on each scale. Where this bar crosses the vertical line of perfect correspondence, it indicates that approximately the middle 65% of the experts surveyed could easily have chosen the policy position estimated by the word scoring procedure. Of all of the texts we analyzed, on two policy dimensions, the only text for which word-scored estimates were more than a single standard deviation away from expert survey results was the Fianna Fáil manifesto in Ireland. And this difference, as we have argued, could possibly have been the result of

TABLE 5. Raw and Standardized Estimated Social Policy Positions of 1997 Irish Party Manifestos

	DL	Labour	Fianna Fáil	Fine Gael	PD	Mean Absolute Deviation
Estimates						
1997 transformed virgin text scores	4.23	6.96	19.07	10.37	8.01	
SE	1.178	0.319	0.339	0.378	0.474	
1997 expert survey	4.97	6.57	13.55	10.82	6.93	
SE ($n=30$)	0.495	0.405	0.491	0.467	0.577	
1997 standardized comparison scores						
Word scores	-0.97	-0.49	1.65	0.12	-0.31	0.21
Expert survey	-1.02	-0.57	1.42	0.64	-0.47	
Hand-coded content analysis	-1.31	-0.62	0.09	1.23	0.62	0.67
Deterministic computer-coding	-1.07	-1.02	0.75	0.25	1.09	0.62
Raw data						
1992 reference texts						
<i>A priori</i> positions	3.50	6.00	17.50	13.71	9.43	
SE ($n=28$)	0.416	0.404	0.391	0.554	0.809	
1997 virgin texts						
Raw mean word scores (S_{vd})	9.4960	9.6098	10.1157	9.7523	9.6537	
SE	0.049	0.013	0.014	0.016	0.020	

Note: Sources as in Table 3. Word statistics and counts as in Table 3.

FIGURE 2. Agreement Between Word Score Estimates and Expert Survey Results, Ireland and United Kingdom, 1997, for (a) Economic and (b) Social Scales



contextual judgments made by experts about the “real” position of Fianna Fáil, rather than of error in the computer analysis of the actual text of the party manifesto. Put in a slightly different way, the technique we propose performed, in just about every case, equivalently to a typical expert—which we take to be a clear confirmation of the external validity of our technique’s ability to extract meaningful estimates of policy positions from political texts.

CODING NON-ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXTS

Thus far we have been coding English-language texts, but since our approach is language-blind it should work equally well in other languages. We now apply it to German-language texts, analyzing these using no knowledge of German. Our research design is essentially similar to that we used for Britain and Ireland. As reference texts for Germany in the 1990s, we take the 1990 manifestos of four German political parties—the Greens, Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU), and Free Democrats (FDP). Our estimates of the *a priori* positions of these texts on economic and social policy dimensions derive from an expert survey conducted in 1989 by Laver and Hunt (1992). Having calculated German word scores for both economic and social policy dimensions in precisely the same way as before, we move on to analyze six virgin texts. These are the manifestos of the same four parties in 1994, as well as manifestos for the former Communists (PDS) in both 1990 and 1994. Since no expert survey scores were collected for the PDS in 1990, or for any German party in 1994, we are forced to rely in our evaluation upon the face validity of our estimated policy positions for the virgin texts. However, the corpus of virgin texts presents us with an interesting and taxing new challenge. This is to locate the PDS on both economic and social policy dimensions, even though no PDS reference text was used to calculate the German word scores. We are thus using German word scores, calculated using no knowledge of German, to locate the policy positions of the PDS, using no information whatsoever about the PDS other than the words in its manifestos, which we did not and indeed could not read ourselves. The top panel in Table 6 summarizes the results of our analysis.

The first row in Table 6 reports our rescaled computer estimates of the economic policy positions of the six virgin texts. The main substantive pattern for the economic policy dimension is a drift of all established parties to the right, with a sharp rightward shift by the SPD. Though this party remains between the position of the Greens and that of the CDU, it has moved to a position significantly closer to the CDU. The face validity of this seems very plausible. Our estimated economic policy positions of the 1990 and 1994 PDS manifestos locate these firmly on the left of the manifestos of the other four parties, which has excellent face validity. The rescaled standard errors show that the PDS is indeed significantly to the left of the other parties but that there is no statistically significant difference between the 1990 and the 1994 PDS manifestos. In other words, using only word scores derived from the other four party manifestos in 1990 and no knowledge of German, the manifestos of the former Communists were estimated in both 1990 and 1994 to be on the far left of the German party system. We consider this to be an extraordinarily good result for our technique.

The third row in Table 6 reports our estimates of the social policy positions of the virgin texts. As in the

TABLE 6. Estimated Economic and Social Policy Positions of German Party Manifestos, 1990–94

Party	1990 PDS	1994 PDS	1994 Green	1994 SDP	1994 CDU	1994 FDP
Estimates						
1994 transformed economic policy virgin text scores	4.19	3.98	7.47	10.70	13.67	17.15
SE	0.436	0.511	0.259	0.365	0.391	0.220
1994 transformed social policy virgin text scores	1.16	1.93	4.09	11.07	13.65	8.12
SE	0.306	0.421	0.221	0.325	0.368	0.182
Raw data						
1990 reference texts						
Economic policy						
<i>A priori</i> positions	—	—	5.21	6.53	13.53	15.68
SE (<i>n</i> = 19)	—	—	0.652	0.436	0.544	0.613
Social policy						
<i>A priori</i> positions	—	—	2.90	6.68	14.42	6.84
SE (<i>n</i> = 19)	—	—	0.908	0.856	0.537	0.603
Length in words	—	—	6,345	9,768	7,322	42,446
No. of unique words	—	—	1,838	2,517	1,987	6,594
1994 virgin texts						
Economic policy						
Raw mean word scores (<i>S_{vd}</i>)	10.3048	10.2802	10.4459	10.5997	10.7407	10.9059
SE	0.020	0.024	0.012	0.017	0.019	0.010
Social policy						
Raw mean word scores (<i>S_{vd}</i>)	7.4136	7.5096	7.6076	7.9257	8.0420	7.7909
SE	0.016	0.019	0.010	0.015	0.017	0.008
Length in words	15,296	10,078	36,419	16,341	14,562	50,452
Unique words scored (<i>N_v</i>)	2,031	1,674	3,455	2,466	2,281	4,168
% words scored	86.7	86.8	86.1	89.8	90.2	87.0
Unique unscorable words	1,294	945	5,064	1,669	1,236	4,707
Mean frequency of unscorable words	1.57	1.41	1.40	1.18	1.16	1.39

Sources: As in previous tables. The rescaled values for PDS 1990 are in the context of the virgin scores for the non-PDS 1994 parties, using the four 1990 texts as references. This procedure has no effect on the value of the raw scores.

Irish case, an important matter to watch for is whether the word scoring technique can pick up what is widely perceived as the classical liberal position of the FDP—on the right of the economic policy dimension and on the liberal side of the social policy dimension—a perception confirmed by the expert survey results reported in the bottom panel in Table 6. The results again suggest a general conservative shift among the establishment parties, most marked with the SDP. Language-blind word scoring also picks up the liberal positions of the FDP, putting this party on the liberal side of the social policy dimension and the right-wing side of the economic policy dimension. Again providing strong face validity for our general approach, the word-scored estimates place the PDS very firmly at the liberal end of the liberal-conservative dimension of social policy. Again, the standard errors imply that, while the position of the PDS is significantly to the left of the other parties, there is no statistically significant difference between the PDS manifesto of 1990 and that of 1994.

Overall, we take these results to show that our word scoring technique can migrate effectively into a non-English-language environment. They illustrate the enormous payoffs available from using language-blind text coding, since our technique allowed us to analyze very quickly and effectively texts written in a language that we do not speak!

USING THE WORD SCORING TECHNIQUE TO ANALYZE LEGISLATIVE SPEECHES

Our demonstration of the word scoring technique thus far has been limited to estimating party policy positions from party manifestos. However, computer word scoring also offers the important prospect of moving into completely new areas of text analysis for which the effort involved has previously been prohibitive. Our technique removes this effort, making it possible to analyze the speeches of all members of a given legislature, for example, opening up the prospect of generating policy spaces that locate politicians in a time series and, thereby, the possibility of much more sophisticated analyses of intra- and interparty politics. Moving beyond party politics, there is no reason the technique should not be used to score texts generated by participants in any policy debate of interest, whether these are bureaucratic policy documents, the transcripts of speeches, court opinions, or international treaties and agreements.

To demonstrate the applicability of our computer word scoring technique to texts other than party manifestos, we now use word scoring to analyze legislative speeches. Although most legislatures have long preserved such speeches as part of the written parliamentary record, these speeches have become

TABLE 7. Mean Raw and Standardized Scores of Speakers in 1991 Confidence Debate on "Pro- versus Antigovernment" Dimension, by Category of TD

Group	N	Median		Raw		Standardized	
		Total Words	Unique Words	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Reference texts							
FF Prime Minister Haughey	1	6,711	1,617	1.0000	—	—	—
FG opposition leader Bruton	1	4,375	1,181	−1.0000	—	—	—
DL leader de Rossa	1	6,226	1,536	−1.0000	—	—	—
Virgin texts							
FF ministers	12	3,851	727	−0.2571	0.0383	1.15	0.66
PD minister	1	2,818	593	−0.2947	—	0.50	—
FF	10	1,553	397	−0.2999	0.0721	0.41	1.24
Independent	1	3,314	582	−0.3360	—	−0.21	—
Greens	1	1,445	415	−0.3488	—	−0.43	—
WP	2	2,001	455	−0.3501	0.0423	−0.46	0.73
FG	21	1,611	394	−0.3580	0.0306	−0.59	0.53
Labour	7	2,224	475	−0.3599	0.0220	−0.62	0.38


highly amenable to computerized analysis as they are increasingly published electronically. While the analysis of speeches holds considerable promise, it also raises new challenges for content analysis—whether computerized or traditional—because such speeches differ substantially from party manifestos in several key respects. First, manifestos are typically comprehensive documents addressing a wide range of policy issues, while speeches tend to be much more restricted in focus. Second, manifestos are published in a political context that is fairly well defined. Greater care must be taken in establishing the political context of speeches if we are to justify the comparison of different speeches in the same analysis. Third, because manifestos and speeches use different language registers and lexicons, the analysis of speeches requires types of reference text different from those used in the analysis of manifestos. Finally, political speeches tend to be much shorter than manifestos. With fewer words to analyze, statistical confidence in the results is likely to be reduced. In these respects, the analysis of legislative speeches will be more problematic than the analysis of party manifestos, and therefore we expect this final test of the word scoring technique to be particularly difficult. If successful, however, we would consider it a major confirmation of the ability of our technique to extract political positions from texts using word frequencies as data.

Laver and Benoit (2002) analyzed the acrimonious confidence debate in the Irish Dáil that took place in October 1991 over the future of the incumbent Fianna Fáil-PD coalition government. The matter of interest is the extent to which each individual legislator speaking in this debate was pro- or antigovernment. The texts analyzed were the set of 58 set-piece speeches, extracted from the verbatim transcript of the debate published on the web site of the Irish legislature (<http://www.irlgov.ie/oireachtas>). The tightly structured debate gave each member of the 166-member Dáil a single opportunity to speak. Including speeches by each party leader, the 58 speeches generated a written record of just over 167,000 words.

For reference positions in the debate, we postulated *a priori* the location of certain party leaders on the "pro-versus antigovernment" dimension. The speech of the *Taoiseach* (prime minister) was assumed axiomatically to be progovernment and assigned a reference position of +1.0. The speech of the Fine Gael leader of the day and leader of the opposition, John Bruton, was assumed axiomatically to be antigovernment and assigned a reference position of -1.0, as was the speech of Prionias de Rossa, then leader of the opposition Workers' Party. This allowed the calculation of word scores for all different words used in the debate in at least one of the reference texts—a total of 2,856 different words in all. Having calculated word scores from the reference texts, it was then possible to estimate the positions of 55 other speakers on the pro- versus antigovernment dimension, scoring their speeches as virgin texts.

Table 7 presents the results of this analysis, along with descriptive statistics about each text or group of texts from the same party. The three reference speeches were relatively long, as indicated by the median numbers of total and unique words. The virgin texts were typically short, however, with medians of 2,224 total and 508 unique words—much shorter than the typical manifesto analyzed in previous examples, which ranged in length from about 3,000 to 28,000 total words. The bottom half of Table 7 groups legislators by party and, in the case of governing Fianna Fáil and PD parties, by whether or not the legislator was a government minister. Taking the standardized scores as the most interpretable results, our expectation is that members of the coalition parties should be relatively progovernment, that government ministers should be more strongly progovernment than backbenchers, and that opposition legislators should be relatively antigovernment.

The results give us strong encouragement about the possibility of extending the use of our word scoring technique to the analysis of political speeches. Figure 3 shows these results graphically, generating a scale of "support versus opposition" to the government that is readily recognizable by any observer of Irish politics.

FIGURE 3. Box Plot of Standardized Scores of Speakers in 1991 Confidence Debate on "Pro- versus Antigovernment" Dimension, by Category of Legislator

Note: Values at the right indicate the number of legislators in each category.

Fianna Fáil ministers were overwhelmingly the most progovernment speakers in the debate, with Fianna Fáil TDs (members of parliament) on average less progovernment in their speeches. At the other end of the scale, Labour, Fine Gael, and Workers' Party TDs were the most systematically antigovernment in their speeches, closely followed by the sole Green TD.

Not only does the word scoring plausibly locate the party groupings, but also it yields interesting information about individual legislators, whose scores may be compared to those of the various groupings. The position of government minister and PD leader Des O'Malley, for instance (the sole PD minister in Table 7), was less staunchly progovernment than that of his typical Fianna Fáil ministerial colleagues. This may be evidence of the impending rift in the coalition, since in 1991 the PDs were shortly to leave the coalition with Fianna Fáil.

We already noted that the word scoring of relatively short speeches may generate estimates of a higher uncertainty than those for relatively longer party manifestos. This is because our approach treats words as data and reflects the greater uncertainty that arises from having fewer data. In the point estimates of the 55 individual speeches we coded as virgin texts (not shown), greater uncertainty about the scoring of a virgin text was directly represented by its associated standard error. For the raw scores (with a minimum of -0.41 and a maximum of -0.25), the standard errors of the estimates derived from speeches ranged from 0.020 , for the shortest speech of 625 words, to 0.006 , for the longest speech of 6,396 words, delivered by the Labour Party leader Dick Spring. These errors are indeed larger than those arising in our manifesto analy-

ses. However, substantively interesting distinctions between speakers are nonetheless possible on the basis of the resulting confidence intervals. Considering policy differences within Fine Gael, for example, the raw estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) of the positions of former FG *Taoiseach* Garrett FitzGerald were -0.283 ($-0.294, -0.272$), while those of future party leader Enda Kenny were -0.344 ($-0.361, -0.327$). This allows us to conclude with some confidence that Kenny was setting out a more robustly antigovernment position in the debate than party colleague FitzGerald. Thus even when speeches are short, our method can detect strong variations in underlying positions and permit discrimination between texts, allowing us to infer how much of the difference between two estimates is due to chance and how much to underlying patterns in the data.

Overall we consider the use of word scoring beyond the analysis of party manifestos to be a considerable success, reproducing party positions in a no-confidence debate using no more than the relative word frequencies in speeches. This also demonstrates three important features of the word scoring technique. First, in a context where independent estimates of reference scores are not available, *assuming* reference text positions using substantive local knowledge may yield promising and sensible results. Second, we demonstrate that our method quickly and effortlessly handles a large number of texts that would have presented a daunting task using traditional methods. Third, we see that the method works even when texts are relatively short and provides estimates of the increased uncertainty arising from having less data.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Our word scoring approach to placing political texts on policy dimensions has been demonstrated to be effective at replicating the results of content analysis techniques based on human- or computer-coding. The scores produced by our technique are both substantively plausible and congruent with independent estimates—even when parties made dramatic moves on policy positions, as with the British Labour party in 1997. Furthermore, it avoids many of the problems of traditional techniques of content analysis. First, it produces policy estimates for texts whose positions are unknown, at a low cost and terrific speed—typically completing the analysis in a matter of seconds. In an analysis reported elsewhere, we were able to estimate the policy positions of the Irish political parties during the 2002 Irish general election, updating the analysis the same day each party released its election manifesto on-line (Benoit and Laver Nd.). Second, unlike traditional methods of content analysis, our technique provides quantitative measures of uncertainty for text-based estimates of policy positions. These allow analysts to make informed judgments, when comparing two estimated policy positions, about whether differences between them can be viewed as significant or merely as products of chance or measurement error—something that has not been possible before. Finally, because it treats words simply as data rather than requiring any knowledge of their meaning as used in the text, our word scoring method works irrespective of the language in which the texts are written. In other words, while our method is designed to analyze the content of a text, it is not necessary for an analyst using the technique to understand, or even read, the texts to which the technique is applied. The primary advantage of this feature is that the technique can be applied to texts in any language.

Given these advantages, the computer word scoring approach to text analysis opens up exciting possibilities for the rapid analysis and reanalysis of large and complex text data sets. As political texts become ever more easily available electronically, for example, it is now possible to analyze party manifestos and other election addresses before the election concerned has even taken place. It is worth reiterating that the great leap forward in efficiency made possible by our computational text analysis approach is made possible by a no less dramatic shift from previous applications of content analysis in political science. Our crucial move is to abandon the notion, which runs throughout most political science content analysis, that the objective of an analyst coding a text is to identify its meaning. Indeed, this notion has been so much taken for granted that it is seldom even recognized as an assumption. It is also why many early attempts to computerize content analysis within political science have in effect attempted to automate tasks otherwise performed by human experts, rather than cashing in on the things computers do really well. The results have been rather like the early robots designed in the 1960s—remarkable more because they could do anything at all than because they

actually did anything better or faster than real people. As with dictionary-based computer-coding applications, these early robots required frequent human intervention, close monitoring, and occasional direct control to make their behavior realistic. Furthermore, neither robots nor computer algorithms to analyze texts can understand meaning “in context,” something easily, if unreliably, performed by humans.¹⁷ Consider an attempt to computer-code the following text: “Some say that I am not averse to the argument that it would be dangerous not to raise taxes. They have every right to say this and nobody would deny them this right, but in this case it is impossible not to conclude they are wrong.” While everyone agrees that this would be a wonderful thing to do, no published work has yet reported success at coding large volumes of political text in context, in this sense. Our approach avoids these pitfalls by circumventing them entirely, by treating individual words simply as data rather than attempting to use computerized algorithms to ascribe meaning to these words in an emulation of a human reader.

Nonetheless, sensitive to the issue of analyzing words in context while retaining our insistence on an essentially statistical method, we intend in future work to extend our approach to allow us to analyze word pairs, triples, and indeed n -tuples, as a way of taking one step toward a probabilistic analysis of the context in which individual words are located. Two comments are in order here, however. The first is the purely arithmetical point that, in a text with a total of m words, we must find $m - 1$ word pairs, $m - 2$ word triples, and $m - n$ word n -tuples. In other words, the number of short word strings in a text is effectively the same as the number of words. But, if there are d different words in a given text, then there are d^2 different possible word pairs and d^n different possible n -tuples. In short, the number of different possible word n -tuples increases exponentially with n , meaning that the relative frequencies of even short word strings in a text are likely to be very, very much lower than the relative frequencies of individual words. Much lower relative frequencies will combine with a much higher probability of unscorable word strings in virgin texts, meaning that our estimates of the policy positions of the virgin texts will be more uncertain when we move from scoring individual words to scoring word n -tuples. But this will nonetheless be an interesting and important matter to explore.

The second comment on scoring short word strings concerns why our technique appears to work so well without doing this at present. As Laver and Garry (2000) point out when discussing the dictionary-based computer-coding of individual words, this almost certainly has to do with the way that words are used in

¹⁷ Recall the first published reliability tests of the expert coders used by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), Volkens 2001, in which a significant number of coders produced codings that correlated with an “official” coding in the 30–60% range. This is almost certainly the most professionally run and prestigious content analysis project in political science to date. We have seen no other published tests of intercoder reliability in relation to political science content analysis, but we know informally from our own experiences with this that it is a major unspoken problem.

practice in the advocacy of particular policy positions. With regard to our own technique, take the individual word used in our earlier example—"choice." Of course the word "choice" has several meanings, while each meaning can also be qualified with a negative or even a double negative. Someone coming to computational text analysis for the first time might reasonably feel for these reasons that the relative frequency of the word "choice" in a given text does not convey substantive information. This might well be true if our frame of reference were all possible texts written in the English language, read in all possible contexts, but this is very precisely not the frame of reference we propose here. For a given virgin text dealing with a given policy debate in a given political context at a given time—all of these things crucially defined by our selection of a set of reference texts—our approach works because particular words do, empirically, tend to have policy-laden content. Thus, in post-Thatcher Britain, those using the word "choice" in relation to education or health policy, for example, tended to be advocating greater choice of schools or health providers and correspondingly less central control. Those opposing such policies tended, as a matter of empirical observation, not to argue for "no choice" or "less choice" but rather to talk about the benefits of central planning and coordination. This is why the use of the word "choice" in this precise context conveyed substantive information about policy positions. Of course, if the political context changes, the information content of words may well change too—perhaps "citizens now face a stark choice and must sweep out this corrupt administration." If the context changes, however, so must the set of reference texts and hence all word scores—highlighting once more the role of the expert analyst in ensuring that the reference texts reflect in a valid way the political context of the virgin texts to be analyzed. It is patterns in the relative word frequencies observed in the reference texts that define the information content of the words to be analyzed.

In short, our technique works as well as we have shown it to work because, in practice and in a precisely defined context, individual words convey information about policy positions, information revealed in the preliminary analysis of the reference texts. Of course we will almost certainly not always be right when we apply a given word score to a given virgin text. However, provided that we are right more often than we are wrong, a function of choosing good reference texts, and provided that we analyze a large enough number of words, the slender pieces of information we extract by scoring individual words compound to allow us to make what we have shown to be valid estimates.¹⁸

Computerized word scoring offers the potential for a huge increase in the scope and power of text analysis within political science, but there is still no such thing as a methodological free lunch. While the word scoring technique automates much of the dreary and time-consuming mechanical tasks associated with traditional

text analysis, it in no way dispenses with the need for careful research design by an analyst who is an expert in the field under investigation. The key to our *a priori* approach is the identification of an appropriate set of reference texts for a given research context and the estimation or assumption of policy positions for these reference texts with which everyone can feel comfortable. This is by no means a trivial matter, since the word scores for each policy dimension, and hence all subsequent estimates relating to virgin texts, are conditioned on the selection of reference texts and their *a priori* positions on key policy dimensions. This is thus something to which a considerable amount of careful and well-informed thought must be given before any analysis gets under way. In this, our method shares the "garbage in—garbage out" characteristic of any effective method of data analysis; potential users should, indeed, be comforted by this.¹⁹ The casual or ill-informed choice of reference texts or *a priori* policy positions will result in findings that are unreliable—in the same way as will the choice of inappropriate or poorly worded survey questions or an inappropriate or ambiguously defined content analysis coding scheme. Given a valid set of reference texts, however, and good estimates or assumptions of the policy positions of these, computer word scoring offers the potential to crunch huge volumes of virgin text very rapidly indeed, with an enormous range of intriguing political science applications.

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¹⁸ Statistically, there is an analogy with the Condorcet Jury Theorem—if we treat individual words as jurors deciding on the policy content of texts.

¹⁹ If they are not, they should consider what they would feel about a method offering "garbage in, gold out."

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Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

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*P*eceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) find that interstate dyads containing a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are more likely than other types of dyads to experience militarized disputes. They argue that this is because democracies are especially likely to challenge personalist dictatorships. Unfortunately, they do not identify which state in a conflictual dyad initiated the dispute and so cannot present data to support their claim. We improve on their research design by using "directed dyads" to identify potential initiators. We confirm their finding that democracy–personalist dictatorship dyads are particularly conflict-prone, but we also disprove their argument that democracies attack dictators, as we find that personalist dictatorships are more likely to challenge democracies, but not vice versa. We also find that other kinds of autocracies, namely, military regimes and single-party regimes, are more likely to challenge democracies than vice versa. Our findings have important implications for understanding the relationships between regime type and international conflict.

Mark Peceny, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry (2002; hereafter PBS; see also Werner 2000) find that for the years 1946–92 pairs of states that include a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are significantly more likely to experience militarized disputes than are other pairs of states. They (25) attribute this finding to an ability and willingness on the part of "strong and capable democracies [to] pick weak personalist regimes as targets" and take this to be "evidence that it is the greater war-fighting effectiveness of democracies that helps account for that [democratic] peace." This is a potentially important finding for the ongoing debate about the connections between domestic and international politics in general and the tendency of democracies not to fight each other (the democratic peace) in particular. If true, it would provide support for a war-fighting explanation of why democracies' foreign policy is different from other types of states. It would also provide evidence against explanations of the democratic peace that focus on the importance of institutional constraints or liberal norms of behavior.

We consider this finding problematic because of limitations in the PBS research design. Specifically, their unit of analysis is the occurrence of conflict within a pair, or dyad, of states in a particular year. While PBS do not identify who initiated the disputes in their data set, they nevertheless draw conclusions based on important assumptions about which side initiated. When they observe conflict between a democracy and a dictatorship, they assume that the democracy initiated the conflict against the dictatorship. We build a research design that enables us to test their claims by examining which side initiated any conflict. This improved research design

reverses the PBS findings, as we discover that dictatorships are significantly more likely to initiate against democracies, rather than vice versa, as PBS assert.

REPLICATING AND RECONSIDERING THE PBS FINDINGS

PBS hypothesize that because democracies have superior war-fighting capabilities, conflicts between personalist dictatorships and democracies ought to be especially frequent. They argue that democracies, confident in their abilities to win, challenge personalist dictatorships, the least politically constrained and militarily weakest of the three types of authoritarian regimes (the other two being single-party regimes and military regimes). PBS (19) argue that "(i)f war-fighting capabilities are key, personalist regimes may be precisely the kids of easy targets that democracies are most likely to attack."

To test this and other hypotheses, PBS examine annual data from 1946 to 1992 for all pairs of states in the international system.¹ The dependent variable is whether a militarized interstate dispute (MID) occurred during the dyad-year in question. Using data from Polity (Jagers and Gurr 1995) and Geddes (1999), they classified all states as being either democratic, a personalist dictatorship, a military regime, or a single-party regime. Their independent variables included a set of dummy variables marking whether a pair of states was two democracies, two military regimes, two single-party states dictatorships, two dictatorships, or one democracy and one personalist dictatorship.² They also included control variables for geographic contiguity, whether the dyad included at least one major power, whether the states were allies, whether there

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The authors thank Caroline Beer very much for assistance with data.

¹ Though PBS (22) claim to use data from 1945 to 1994, their data actually run from 1946 to 1992, as the Geddes data start in 1946 and the MID data end in 1992.

² We focus on the PBS finding that personalist–democratic dyads are significantly more prone to conflict (Model 4 in Table 5 of PBS, 24), but other analyses were conducted. PBS provide more details about their research design and findings.

was power preponderance between the two states, and economic development. To control for potential bias resulting from autocorrelation they included four controls for temporal dependence, a variable measuring the time since the last dispute, and three cubic spline variables. They used logit regression to estimate their statistical models.

We replicate their results in Model 1 in Table 1 (Model 4 in Table 3 in PBS 24). PBS found that the dyads with a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are significantly more likely to have a dispute than other dyads. PBS (25) interpret this as evidence that "strong and capable democracies pick weak personalist regimes as targets." There is a gap, however, between this conclusion and the nature of their dependent variable. Their dependent variable is the occurrence, not the deliberate initiation, of a dispute between two states. They do not identify which side initiated the dispute. In the PBS data set, an observed dispute between a personalist dictatorship and a democracy may be an instance of the dictatorship challenging the democracy or the democracy challenging the dictatorship. While PBS contend that their results indicate the latter rather than the former, their research design does not allow them to test this claim.

Fortunately, we can test PBS' claim, as the MID data set codes which states are initiators and which are targets (Bennett and Stam 2000; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). We use these initiator data to test the PBS argument. We create a new "directed dyad year" data set, in which a dyad-year between state A and state B appears twice, first as dyad A-B, in which state A is the potential dispute initiator and country B is the potential dispute target, and then as dyad B-A, in which state B is the potential initiator and state A is the potential target. We use a dichotomous dependent variable coded 1 if the potential initiator (the first listed state) in the directed dyad initiates a dispute and 0 otherwise. We used the EUGene program to build the data set (Bennett and Stam 2000).³ The directed dyad-year design allows us to track which state initiated a particular dispute ongoing during the year in question. Doing so allows us to determine if the increased probability of personalist dictatorship-democracy dyads experiencing disputes is due to democracies being more likely to initiate against personalist dictators or vice versa.⁴

³ We code a state as having initiated a dispute if it is on "side A" of a MID, the conventional approach to coding initiation. This means that the state was on the side that took the first action in the dispute, whether that action was the threat, display, or use of force. We code joiners as initiators or targets, though the results do not change if we do not code joiners as initiators or targets. Unfortunately, the MID data do not permit us to determine which side escalated the dispute once it has begun. Though coding initiation will always be difficult, the "side A" variable has been widely used in past conflict scholarship. For a more detailed discussion of MIDs, initiators, and joiners, see Bennett and Stam 2000. EUGene is available at <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/>.

⁴ This approach doubles the size of the PBS data set. The risk of such doubling is that standard errors may be artificially low because of the "false" inflation of the data set. We address this potential problem by using robust standard errors, specifically using the "cluster" function in STATA 7.0, clustering on the dyad during the year in question.

Table 1 has the new results. In Model 2, we use our data set of directed dyad years with the PBS nondirected dependent variable. The results are similar to those in Model 1 (the PBS results). Next, we use our new dependent variable, coded 1 if state A in the dyad initiated a dispute and 0 otherwise. We also replace the Personalist Dictatorship-Democracy variable with two dummy variables. The first (Democ/Pers) is coded 1 if state A is a democracy and state B is a personalist dictatorship and 0 otherwise. The second (Pers/Democ) is coded 1 if state A is a personalist dictatorship and state B is a democracy and 0 otherwise. If democracies target personalist dictatorships with a greater likelihood than the baseline probability, then the first new variable should be positive and significant; if dictatorships are more likely to target democracies, then the second new variable should be positive and significant. Note that with the inclusion of the Personalist, Military, Single Party, and Democracy dummy variables, we exclude the category of mixed state pairs other than Personalist Dictatorship-Democracy pairs.

The results in Model 3 overturn the PBS claim about the bellicose nature of democratic states toward personalist dictatorships. Pairs of states in which state A (the potential initiator) is democratic and state B (the potential target) is a personalist dictatorship are *not* more likely to experience conflict than the reference group, other mixed pairs of states. Conversely, pairs of states in which state A is a personalist dictatorship and state B is a democracy are significantly more likely to experience conflict than the baseline. In short, personalist dictatorships are significantly more likely to initiate disputes against democracies than vice versa. Democracies are not especially likely to initiate disputes against personalist dictatorships. These results do not change if we instead use rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001; Tomz et al. 1999) to account for the dependent variable's highly skewed distribution of being 99.79% zeros and 0.21% ones (results not shown) or if we exclude all dyads that include Iraq.

There is, however, some evidence for the PBS argument that personalist dictatorships fight wars poorly. From 1946 to 1992, 19 personalist dictatorships fought wars.⁵ Not counting the 1977 Ethiopia-Somalia War, in which two hybrid personalist dictatorships fought one pure personalist dictatorship (as we are interested in comparing mixed dyads only), none of the 19 belligerents won, 12 lost, and four drew.⁶

⁵ Personalist dictatorships in World War II had a mixed record, as Germany conquered Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Yugoslavia, and France, but ultimately lost the war, though in part to the Soviet Union, which is either a single-party regime or a personalist dictatorship. Italy also lost the war.

⁶ This includes states that Geddes coded as hybrids, those regimes containing aspects of personalist dictatorships, though note that PBS coded only "pure" types as personalist dictatorships. In our quantitative analysis, we follow PBS by coding only "pure" types rather than hybrids. The list of personalist dictatorships fighting wars during this period includes the following: North Korea (hybrid), Korean War, draw; Egypt (hybrid), 1956 Suez War, loss; Pakistan (pure), 1965 Second Kashmir War, loss; Egypt (hybrid), Six Day War, loss; Syria

TABLE 1. Analysis of the Causes of Militarized Disputes among Interstate Dyads, 1946–92

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Rare events logit
Dependent variable	Undirected dyads	Directed dyads	Directed dyads	Directed dyads	Directed dyads
Personalist	.234 (.234)	.281 (.265)	.281 (.265)	.296 (.265)	.315 (.265)
Military	-.300 (.593)	-.322 (.574)	-.323 (.574)	-.307 (.574)	-.145 (.574)
Single Party	-.691*** (.126)	-.676*** (.144)	-.677*** (.144)	-.651*** (.151)	-.645*** (.151)
Pers/Democ					
Undirected dyad	.654*** (.0990)	.653*** (.129)	—	—	—
Directed dyad	—	—	1.03*** (.140)	1.05*** (.140)	1.05*** (.140)
Democ/Pers, directed dyad	—	—	.0831 (.191)	.105 (.190)	.117 (.190)
Mil/Democ, directed dyad	—	—	—	.642** (.244)	.655** (.244)
Democ/Mil, directed dyad	—	—	—	-.455* (.276)	-.415 (.276)
Single/Democ, directed dyad	—	—	—	.179 (.114)	.181 (.114)
Democ/Single, directed dyad	—	—	—	-.0814 (.142)	-.0784 (.142)
Democracy	-1.14*** (.133)	-1.07*** (.194)	-1.07*** (.194)	-1.05*** (.210)	-1.04*** (.210)
Contiguous	2.99*** (.0628)	2.91*** (.0902)	2.91*** (.0902)	2.91*** (.0903)	2.91*** (.0903)
Major Power	2.33*** (.0720)	2.17*** (.101)	2.17*** (.101)	2.16*** (.104)	2.16*** (.104)
Ally	.0400 (.0712)	.0777 (.0861)	.0781 (.0862)	.0848 (.0870)	.0856 (.0870)
Higher/Lower Power Ratio	-.325*** (.0217)	-.316*** (.0268)	-.316*** (.0268)	-.316*** (.0267)	-.315*** (.0237)
Economically Advanced	-.244*** (.0983)	-.175 (.131)	-.175 (.131)	-.187 (.142)	-.186 (.142)
Time Since Last Dispute	-.388*** (.0201)	-.381*** (.0226)	-.381*** (.0227)	-.381*** (.0227)	-.380*** (.0227)
Cubic Spline 1	-.00358*** (.000404)	-.00350*** (.000438)	-.00350*** (.000424)	-.0035*** (.000424)	-.00351*** (.000424)
Cubic Spline 2	.00231*** (.000346)	.00227*** (.000356)	.00227*** (.000356)	.00228*** (.00356)	.00228*** (.000356)
Cubic Spline 3	-.000632*** (.0000632)	-.000634*** (.000141)	-.00063*** (.000141)	-.000641*** (.000141)	-.000643*** (.000141)
Constant	-4.10*** (.0758)	-4.78*** (.0971)	-4.78*** (.0971)	-4.81*** (.0989)	-4.80*** (.0989)
log likelihood	-6,756.8298	-7,976.1954	-7,960.6312	-7,950.9217	—
N	376,728	753,456	753,456	753,456	753,456

Note: Model 1 replicates Model 4 in Table 3 of PBS (24). Models 2 and 3 include robust standard errors. For the directed dyad dependent variables, country A (e.g., Democ in Democ/Mil) is the potential initiator. ***Significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test.

Are the relationships within other types of democracy–autocracy dyads similar? That is, are military and single-party regimes also more likely to challenge democracies? We look at this possibility in Table 1. We include four dummy variables. The first (Democ/Mil) is coded 1 if state A, the potential initiator, is a democracy and state B, the potential target, is a military regime; the second (Mil/Democ) is coded 1 if state A is a military regime and state B is a

(hybrid), Six Day War, loss; Egypt (hybrid), 1969 War of Attrition, draw; Pakistan (pure), 1971 Bangladesh War, loss; Iraq (hybrid), Yom Kippur War, loss; Egypt (hybrid), Yom Kippur War, loss; Syria (hybrid), 1973 Yom Kippur War, loss; Cambodia (pure), 1975 Vietnam–Cambodian War, draw; Uganda (pure), Tanzania–Uganda War, loss; Libya (pure), Tanzania–Uganda War, loss; Iraq (pure), Iraq–Iran War, draw; Syria (hybrid), 1982 Lebanon War, loss; and Iraq (pure), Gulf War, loss.

democracy; the third (Single/Democ) is coded 1 if state A is a single-party regime and state B is a democracy; and the fourth (Democ/Single) is coded 1 if state A is a democracy and state B is a single-party regime.

The results of this analysis are in Model 4 in Table 1. The Model 3 results do not change. Like personalist dictatorships, military regimes are significantly more likely to challenge democracies. Interestingly, democracies are significantly less likely to challenge military regimes, but democracies are not more likely to challenge single-party regimes. Single-party regimes are more likely to challenge democracies, but the result is of only limited statistical significance ($p < .10$; one-tailed test). If we instead use rare events logit (Model 5), the results are mostly unchanged, with the exception that Democracies are not significantly less likely to challenge military regimes. Notably, if we drop the statistically insignificant variable of Democ/Single (democracy as potential initiator and single party as potential target), as justified by a log-likelihood ratio test, then the Single/Democ variable (single party as potential initiator and democracy as potential target) becomes positive and statistically significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test. These results hold up whether one uses conventional or rare events logit (result not shown). The general picture is remarkably consistent: Democracies are no more likely than other kinds of states to challenge any of the three types of autocracy, and generally, each type of autocracy is more likely to challenge democracies than they are to challenge other types of nondemocratic regimes. This is quite the opposite of what PBS argue.

IMPLICATIONS

PBS (25) argue that "the increased possibilities for conflict found between personalist dictatorships and democracies provides evidence suggesting that it is the war-fighting capabilities of democracies that best explains the distinctive conflict behavior of democracies," based on the inference that conflict between democracies and personalist dictatorships means democracies are attacking dictatorships (see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). While we agree with the core assumption that democracies are better war-fighters than personalist dictatorships, we have shown that the inference PBS draw is incorrect. Specifically, with a dependent variable containing more information we have demonstrated the exact opposite of the PBS inference: Democracies are *not* significantly more likely to target dictatorships than vice versa, but dictatorships *are* significantly more likely to target democracies. Our finding that dictators target democracies but not vice versa is consistent with several analyses of different data sets (Bennett and Stam 2000; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Leeds and Davis 1999; Rousseau et al. 1996).

What theoretical inferences should one draw from these results? First, although different kinds of regimes display varying degrees of warfighting effectiveness, this is probably insufficient to explain how regime

type affects the likelihood of violent interstate conflict. While domestic political institutions do affect military efficiency (Reiter and Stam 2002), they are not the most important determinants of victory in war (Stam 1996), but they are among the most powerful predictors of conflict initiation (Bennett and Stam n.d.). The unwillingness of democracies to challenge militarily ineffective personal dictatorships demonstrates this point. This is not to say that democracies do not pay attention to the likelihood of victory when picking their fights. On the contrary, democracies pay close attention to the military power of potential opponents. Indeed, democracies become increasingly likely to initiate disputes as their military advantages over potential opponents increases, though this fact does not completely explain the democratic propensity for victory (Reiter and Stam 2002, 48–51). They may pick on very small states or they may be better able to ascertain which large states have inefficient military organizations and target them.

Second, the evidence presented here strongly supports explanations of the democratic peace based on institutional constraints rather than mutual deterrence. Elected leaders know that to remain in power they must avoid costly or unsuccessful policies, which in turn steers them away from launching risky military ventures. Dictators, however, know that they are unlikely to lose power if they launch an unsuccessful diplomatic challenge or even a losing war short of catastrophic defeat (Goemans 1999). This explains why unconstrained dictators challenge democracies more often than vice versa. Dictators more than other state types use military force short of war as a means to try to push democracies into making substantial concessions over some issue. If war does come, dictators hope to win by simply outlasting their cost-averse democratic opponents (Filson and Werner 2002; Reiter and Stam 2002).

More generally, these results are consistent with a wide array of findings stressing the importance of domestic institutional constraints in the causes and outcomes of international conflict. Specifically, democracies start wars only when they are confident of victory (Reiter and Stam 2002); the greater the fraction of society that votes, the less likely are democracies to initiate MIDs (Reiter and Tillman 2002); democracies fight short wars (Bennett and Stam 1996); democracies seek low-casualty wars (Siverson 1995); democracies are likely to initiate only those international challenges that they are likely to win (Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001); and democracies choose military strategies that promise quick, low-cost victory (Reiter and Meek 1999).

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Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists

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Reiter and Stam advance the study of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes in two ways. First, they clearly demonstrate the importance of using directed dyad data sets for studying mixed pairs of political regimes. Second, they have refocused our attention on the question of decisional constraints and international conflict. This response examines the dispute patterns of a specific mixed pair of authoritarian regimes, single-party regimes, and personalist dictatorships. We find that single-party regimes are significantly less likely to start militarized disputes against personalist dictatorships than is true of other types of regime dyads. In contrast, personalist regimes are somewhat more likely to initiate militarized disputes against single-party regimes than is the norm for other regime dyads. These findings indicate that the relationships among specific types of authoritarian regimes may be as consequential as the relationships between democracies and authoritarian regimes of any type. They also indicate that we need to examine further the role that institutional constraints play in shaping the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.

The main purpose of "Dictatorial Peace?" was to identify potential sources of peace among authoritarian regimes. Because we were primarily interested in homogeneous dyads, we were not concerned with which country initiated each conflict. We did not use a directed dyad data set because such a data set was unnecessary for this task. The next step for research on authoritarian regimes and conflict is to examine mixed dyads. We began this examination by looking at one mixed dyad, democracies and personalist dictators. Reiter and Stam (2003; preceding article) are correct that we should have used a directed dyad data set to analyze the conflict behavior of this heterogeneous dyad. In "Identifying the Culprit," they ably rerun our results using such a data set. As expected, the directed dyads do not add much to the analysis of the homogeneous dyads, but they do shed new light on the relationship between democracies and each type of authoritarian regime.

Reiter and Stam show that democracies are no more likely to initiate disputes against authoritarian regimes than any mixed dyad. Instead, authoritarian regimes are often significantly more likely to initiate disputes against democracies than the norm. Reiter and Stam argue that decisional constraints explain both why democracies would be unlikely to initiate militarized disputes and why all types of authoritarian regimes might wish to target democracies. Among the specific types of authoritarian regimes, they find that personalist dictatorships are the most likely to initiate disputes against democracies, while single-party regimes are the least likely. This final finding provides the starting point for our response.

We did not emphasize decisional constraints in "Dictatorial Peace?" because we anticipated that such

constraints were unlikely to account for peaceful relationships among specific types of authoritarian regimes (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002 [PBS], 17). The differences in the likelihood of dispute initiation against democracies suggest that decisional constraints may play a more important role in shaping the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes than we had anticipated. If single-party regimes are less likely than other types of authoritarian regimes to initiate disputes, this may call for a reevaluation of the importance of institutional constraints in shaping their behavior. If personalist regimes initiate disputes against regimes most likely to defeat them in war, this suggests that the lack of decisional constraints permits them to engage in risky foreign policy endeavors.

An examination of mixed dyads composed of personalist dictatorships and single-party regimes allows us to probe these issues in greater depth. In this response, we present a logistic regression that adds two variables to the directed dyad data set used by Reiter and Stam, to capture the dynamics of the relationship between single-party and personalist regimes. We find that single-party regimes are significantly less likely to start militarized disputes against personalist dictatorships than is true of other types of regime dyads. In contrast, personalist regimes are more likely to initiate disputes against single-party regimes than is the norm for other regime dyads, although this relationship is weak. These findings indicate that we need to examine further the role that institutional constraints play in shaping the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, DECISIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE INITIATION OF DISPUTES

The concept of decisional constraints invokes images of elections, public opinion polls, public demonstrations, and powerful legislatures. Democratically elected leaders are cautious about going to war because they do not want to lose the next election, suffer from plummeting public support in the polls, have to respond to

We thank Chris Butler for his comments and Dan Reiter for sharing his data.

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widespread public demonstrations, and/or answer hostile questions in congressional hearings due to costly and unsuccessful wars (Gaubatz 1999; Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993). Increasingly, the institutional literature on the democratic peace emphasizes the efficiency of democratic institutions in mobilizing resources for war, the transparency of the political process, which makes democratic threats more credible; the ability of democratic armies to seize the initiative on the battlefield; and the vigorous debate within democracies, which makes it more likely that they will avoid foolish or risky policies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Fearon 1994; Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Schultz 2001).

None of the three types of authoritarian regimes experiences the type of decisional constraints emphasized by the first wave of literature on political institutions and the democratic peace. Autocratic leaders usually need not worry about reelection. They can repress demonstrations, ignore public opinion, and abolish uncooperative legislatures. It was the lack of these types of decisional constraints that led us to deemphasize such constraints as a potential source of peace among specific types of authoritarian regimes. Among the three types we have examined, however, single-party regimes are the ones that make the most consistent claims to represent the majority of the population and they incorporate large numbers of people into the regime through recruitment into the party (Geddes 1999). Can this rhetorical commitment to the will of the majority and inclusion of large numbers of people into the governing party compensate for the lack of competitive politics and autonomous representative institutions? The need to respond to the concerns of members of the party led us, in "Dictatorial Peace?" to classify single-party regimes as somewhat constrained in contrast to personalist regimes, which we considered the least constrained (PBS, 18). The lack of meaningful elections, political space for protest, a free press, and independent legislatures, however, led us to suggest that decisional constraints would have only a medium-low chance of generating a peace among single-party regimes.

Single-party regimes, however, may be closer to democracies than to personalist regimes on some of the dimensions emphasized by the more recent institutional literature on the democratic peace. Most importantly, single-party regimes have demonstrated substantial war-fighting capabilities. Only one pure single-party regime has lost a war since 1945, and that was at the hands of another single-party regime, when the Soviet Union crushed Hungary in 1956. Pure single-party regimes have won five wars and fought to eight draws, with many of the draws involving two single-party regimes (Reiter and Stam 2002, 56–57). The war-fighting effectiveness of single-party regimes could reduce conflict through effective deterrence. It could also encourage these regimes to initiate disputes against states with weak and vulnerable regimes, a temptation that we also suggested might afflict democracies. As long as chief executives must gain the approval of the other leaders of the party and important decisions are vetted in a politburo or similar institution,

it is possible that single-party regimes may exhibit some of the same caution and restraint as democracies.

Personalist dictatorships share none of these characteristics with single-party regimes or democracies. In "Dictatorial Peace?" we focused on a different kind of institutional constraint, one imposed by the poor war-fighting effectiveness of the armed forces in personalist regimes (PBS, 17–19). As Reiter and Stam note, personalist regimes have not won a single war in the post-WWII era, with the exception of the Ogaden War, in which two hybrid regimes with some personalist characteristics defeated a pure personalist regime. In contrast, democracies have won most of their wars. One would expect, as we suggested in "Dictatorial Peace?" that the leaders of personalist regimes would think twice before initiating any disputes, given their vulnerability. Yet we did not find strong evidence in "Dictatorial Peace?" that personalist regimes avoided participation in militarized disputes (PBS, 24). Pairs of personalist dictatorships were no less likely to engage in disputes than were mixed dyads. The different types of constraints experienced by democracies and personalist regimes did not produce an avoidance of disputes among democracy–personalist dyads. Indeed, as Reiter and Stam have shown, personalist regimes have picked numerous fights with democracies.

This finding leaves us with an interesting puzzle. Why do personalist regimes start fights they are likely to lose? Reiter and Stam suggest that personalist dictatorships pick on democracies because they see them as unwilling to pay high costs in war. Dictators expect democracies to back down in the face of a threat to use force or give up the fight once the costs become too high. "Dictators hope to win by simply outlasting their cost-averse democratic opponents" (Reiter and Stam 2003, 333–37). Thus, democratic constraints encourage personalist regimes to target democracies. But do personalist regimes also start fights with regimes that do not experience the same kind of decisional constraints that democracies do? If not, the unique political constraints found in democracies may be the key factor in accounting for the behavior of personalist regimes. If personalist regimes initiate disputes against regimes other than democracies, however, this may reflect the general importance of the lack of decisional constraints in such dictatorships. The lack of decisional constraints in personalist regimes allows dictators to engage in aggressive policies for several reasons. First, opponents of war have no institutionalized mechanisms for influencing policy. Second, dictators can lose in war and remain in power because there are no institutionalized mechanisms for punishing leaders for policy failure (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Finally, dictators tend to be surrounded by sycophants who tell the leader what he wants to hear, which suggests that personalist regimes may be among the least likely to calculate accurately the consequences of a belligerent foreign policy.

Examining the conflict behavior of dyads containing personalist dictators and single-party regimes will help us to deepen our understanding of institutional constraints and international conflict and address the

principal themes of Reiter and Stam's contribution. If single-party regimes start more militarized interstate disputes against personalist dictatorships, this could indicate that we have found the relationship we had expected to find among democracy–personalist dyads, with capable single-party regimes selecting vulnerable personalist regimes as their targets. If personalist dictators start more conflicts against single-party regimes, it may mean that the limited institutional constraints found in single-party regimes make them more peaceful in general than other types of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the lack of even limited constraints may lead personalist regimes to pick fights against regimes that are likely to defeat them in war.

ANALYZING SINGLE PARTY–PERSONALIST DICTATORSHIP DYADS

To address these issues, we added two dummy variables to the directed dyad data set constructed by Reiter and Stam. The first, *Single Party/Personalist*, is coded 1 if state A, the potential initiator, is a single-party regime and state B, the potential target, is a personalist dictatorship. The second, *Personalist/Single Party*, is coded 1 if state A is a personalist regime and state B is a single-party regime. As indicated by the logistic regression presented in Table 1, single-party regimes are significantly less likely to target personalist regimes than the norm. Personalist regimes were more likely to challenge single-party regimes than the norm but this result is of only limited statistical significance ($p < .10$, one tailed test). As with the analyses in "Dictatorial Peace?" and "Identifying the Culprit," these results are included in models that control for contiguity, major power status, relative power, alliance, economic development, and temporal dependence.

The finding for single party–personalist dyads is especially interesting compared to the findings for democracies. Democracies are significantly less likely to initiate disputes against a particular authoritarian regime only in the case of military regimes, and that finding, as noted by Reiter and Stam (Table 1) (2003, 333–37), is not statistically significant when rare events logit is used to estimate the model. The finding that single-party regimes are unlikely to initiate disputes against personalist regimes is significant at the .01 level. Single-party regimes have started only 16 disputes with personalist regimes, while personalist dictators have started 43 disputes with single-party regimes. This finding suggests that single-party regimes may be less likely to initiate disputes in general than are other types of authoritarian regimes, a possibility that should be explored in future research. The positive, weakly significant finding for personalist initiators deepens the puzzle surrounding such regimes. Perhaps personalist regimes target both democracies and single-party regimes because they perceive them to be institutionally constrained and reluctant to go to war. Or perhaps the lack of institutional constraints in personalist regimes allows them to pick fights without making careful calculations about the likely outcomes. Further research will be needed to untangle this puzzle.

TABLE 1. Political Regimes and the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Variable	Model 1
Single Party–Personalist	–.707** (.263)
Personalist–Single Party	.256 (.175)
Personalist	.288 (.265)
Military	–.314 (.574)
Single Party	–.645*** (.151)
Personalist–Democracy	1.025*** (.140)
Democracy–Personalist	.123 (.191)
Military–Democracy	.635** (.245)
Democracy–Military	–.459* (.276)
Single Party–Democracy	.177 (.115)
Democracy–Single Party	–.089 (.142)
Democracy	–1.049*** (.210)
Contiguous	2.915*** (.090)
Major Power	2.164*** (.104)
Ally	.085 (.087)
Higher/Lower Power Ratio	–.316*** (.027)
Economically Advanced	–.191 (.141)
Time Since Last Dispute	–.381*** (.023)
Cubic Spline 1	–.004*** (.000)
Cubic Spline 2	.002*** (.000)
Cubic Spline 3	–.001*** (.000)
Constant	–4.799*** (.099)
log likelihood	–7,945.3577
Number	753,455

Note: * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level. One tailed tests.

CONCLUSION

Reiter and Stam follow most scholarship on the relationship between political regimes and international conflict in arguing that the gap between democracy and dictatorship of any kind should be the focus of attention in the field. Their results do show broad similarities in the relationship between democracies and each type of authoritarian regime. Indeed, in our own work, we concluded that the democratic peace was more robust than any separate peace among authoritarian regimes (PBS, 25).

Our main purpose, however, has been to distinguish among single-party, military, and personalist types of authoritarian regimes and to explore the relationships among these different types of authoritarian regimes. Although Reiter and Stam focus on the behavior of democracies, their contribution advances the study of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes in two ways. First, they clearly demonstrate the importance of using directed dyad data sets to examine the relationships among mixed pairs of political regimes. Second, they have refocused our attention on the importance of decisional constraints, which may prove to be as important for distinguishing among authoritarian regimes as between dictatorship and democracy. The presence of limited decisional constraints in single-party regimes may make them more peaceful in general than we had anticipated. The absence of even the most limited decisional constraints in personalist regimes may make them more reckless in general than we had expected.

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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

ARTICLES

- The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism 34
Robert Pape
- Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security 36
Brian Frederking
- Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies 37
Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt and Glen Galajch
- Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation 39
Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgård and Tarik Yousef
- The Limits of Delegation: Veto-Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy 40
Philip Keefer & David Stasavage
- New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975-1995 42
Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme
- Freedom and Normalization: Poststructuralism and the Liberalism of Michael Oakeshott 44
Jacob Segal
- Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and Majority Rule 45
Ethan Putterman
- Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter? 47
Stephen D. Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. and Michael Ting
- Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-1985 48
Paul Frymer

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Subscription Information: *American Political Science Review* (ISSN 0003-0554) is published quarterly in February, May, August, and November by Cambridge University Press for the American Political Science Association. Annual institutional electronic-only subscription rate (2003) in US\$392 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK £253 elsewhere. Annual institutional print-and-electronic subscription rate (2003) is US\$435 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, UK £280 elsewhere. Periodicals postage rate paid at New York, NY and additional mailing offices. Institutional subscription orders and address changes should be sent to: *American Political Science Review*, Cambridge University Press, 110 Midland Avenue, Port Chester, NY 10573, USA.

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American Political Science Review

Volume 97, Number 3, August 2003

Table of Contents

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR iii

ARTICLES

The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
Robert A. Pape 343-361

Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security
Brian Frederking 363-378

Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party
Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies
Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich 379-390

Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation
Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef 391-406

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank
Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
Philip Keefer and David Stasavage 407-423

New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and
Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries,
1975-95
Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme 425-446

Freedom and Normalization: Poststructuralism and the
Liberalism of Michael Oakeshott
Jacob Segal 447-458

Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and Majority Rule
Ethan Putterman 459-469

Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does
Malapportionment Matter?
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michael M. Ting 471-481

Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and
Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-85
Paul Frymer 483-499

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Notes from the Editor

Scarcely a day has passed in the last decade without reports appearing of yet another act of suicide terrorism (the subject matter of this issue's cover graphic) in the world's established and emerging hotspots. In "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," Robert Pape posits that "Even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not." Rather, such attacks are intended to achieve specific political purposes. To examine these acts, Pape has assembled a database of suicide attacks worldwide, 1980–2001. His findings – among other things, that suicide terrorism often "pays" from the perspective of group leaders because it leads governments to make concessions – will enable scholars to achieve a new understanding of this complex phenomenon. Nor does Pape shy away from considering the policy implications of his findings. Consequently, this important article is destined to inform not only scholarship but also policy-making for years to come.

The September 11 attacks "changed everything." That, at least, is the contention of many students of national and international security, and of high-level policymakers as well. As Brian Frederking puts it in "Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security," the assumption is that "New threats from terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction have transformed the international system" so thoroughly that, for example, President Bush's campaign pledges not to engage in nation-building or to become involved in military hostilities without a clear exit strategy are no longer operative. However, employing the tools of dialogical analysis to consider the debate over intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s, Frederking uncovers themes that he deems "stunningly similar to the post-September 11 debates about the use of military force in Iraq." His analysis thus poses a fundamental challenge to the notion that September 11 "changed everything."

The authors of the third article in this issue consider a very different mode of dealing with political conflict, interparty competition. In "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich probe the impacts of the size of legislative districts, the proximity of legislative and presidential elections, and the fragmentation of ethnopolitical groups on the structure of African party systems, as observed in 62 legislative elections. Consistent with their expectations, these authors uncover a set of contingent effects. That is, rather than determining that party systems are shaped either by the institutions governing electoral contestation or by underlying ethnopolitical cleavages, Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich find that the impact of either set of forces depends upon the other set of forces. This complex pattern, they conclude, makes them cautiously optimistic about the future course of democracy in Africa.

In "Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation," Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef pose a deceptively simple question: Do democracies suffer higher inflation than non-democracies? Analyzing data from 140 countries over the last four decades of the twentieth century, Desai, Olofsgård, and Yousef find (much as Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich do about the structure of African party systems) that the best general answer is "It depends." Only when a nation's level of income inequality is taken into account, they show, can the impact of democracy on inflation be understood, for the relationship between democracy and inflation actually reverses from countries where incomes are more equally distributed to those where they are less equally distributed. This finding sheds new light on question of why inflation has had such different political impacts in different parts of the world.

Economic policy is also the focus of Philip Keefer and David Stasavage's "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." The emergence of independent central banks around the world has occasioned concern about the potential politicization of these powerful institutions and the resulting likelihood that the credibility of monetary policy could thereby be undermined. Keefer and Stasavage identify conditions under which credibility can be bolstered by a system of institutional checks and balances. They argue that a system in which the actions of one group can be "vetoed" by another semi-adversarial group can positively affect consumer confidence and thereby provide one basis for a stable currency. Methodologically, this is one of a growing number of articles that combine formal and statistical modes of analysis; theoretically, it advances the "veto player" perspective by specifying contextual elements that shape and constrain a government's ability to override the decisions of its semi-autonomous agencies.

In "New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries 1975–1995," Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme sustain this focus on the interplay between politics and social forces – this time in the context of the impact of class-related parties on social welfare programs. If politics is, in the Lasswellian formulation, a matter of "who gets what, when, and how," then Korpi and Palme's focus is crucial. Taking issue with a prominent interpretation, Korpi and Palme contend that class-based political forces have remained important during an era of welfare state regress; a decline in the extension of welfare state policies does not reflect a decline in class-based politics, which continues to play a key role in the era of retrenchment.

The next two articles in this issue present text-based analyses of the thought of two very different political theorists. The first of these centers on the liberal ideal of freedom of choice, which is supposed to promote

individuality. Poststructuralists criticize liberals for assuming that choice can be truly free; because being “normal” itself acquires value and guides behavior, choice is always constrained. In “Freedom and Normalization: Poststructuralism and the Liberalism of Michael Oakeshott,” Jacob Segal analyzes the confrontation between liberalism and normalization through the lens of the thought of Oakeshott. One of Segal’s contributions is to show that the problem of normalization arises from the perspective of radical critics of liberalism but also from that of Oakeshott – hardly a radical critic of liberalism! Another is to show how Oakeshott reformulates liberalism in the course of grappling with the challenges to it that normalization poses.

A long-recognized dilemma of democratic politics involves the simultaneous needs for widespread participation in decision-making, on the one hand, and for expertise, on the other. This dilemma seems to arise in an especially acute form in the writings of Rousseau, the “theorist *par excellence* of participation” whose arguments for both majority rule and *commissaires* to set the legislative agenda have often been seen as irreconcilable. In “Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and Majority Rule,” Ethan Putterman refutes such criticism by returning to Rousseau’s writings on the role of representatives. Rousseau’s thinking about representatives, Putterman argues, was consistent with his thinking about majority rule, and if proper checks on representatives are in place, the dual advantages of democratic participation and learned leadership can be simultaneously achieved.

A merger of Korpi and Palme’s emphasis on distribution and Putterman’s on representation occurs in Steven Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michael M. Ting’s “Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?” The starting point for this analysis is the oft-documented finding that the greater a jurisdiction’s representation in a legislature, the greater its share of public expenditures. It follows that malapportionment can produce inequities in resource allocation – a possibility that underlies much criticism of the U.S. Senate in particular. Strikingly, though, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting contend that unequal representation, or “malapportionment,” is not itself the cause of uneven distributions of resources; when a bicameral legislature distributes resources, the share of every jurisdiction’s resources should be equal as long as, as is the case in the U.S. Congress, one chamber is not malapportioned and possesses authority to initiate spending legislation. The root causes of the uneven distribution of resources lie elsewhere, e.g., in supermajoritarian rules like cloture. Buttressed by empirical results that these authors have reported elsewhere, these analytical results have undeniable implications for what reforms should be pursued if the goal is to attain a more equitable distribution of resources.

Finally, in “Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions,” Paul Frymer provides a well-developed analysis that may well lead many Americanists to re-

think the importance of the judicial system in the United States. Drawing on archival and other historical sources from the middle of the twentieth century, Frymer builds a deep understanding of the circumstances surrounding the impact of U.S. courts on the racial integration of labor unions. Frymer contends that the courts alone forced unions to cease discriminatory practices. It was the courts that ruled discrimination illegal, that rewrote civil rights statutes, and forced unions to comply with these statutes – not Congress or the executive branch.

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The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

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Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but the most common explanations do not help us understand why. Religious fanaticism does not explain why the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a group that adheres to a Marxist/Leninist ideology, while existing psychological explanations have been contradicted by the widening range of socio-economic backgrounds of suicide terrorists. To advance our understanding of this growing phenomenon, this study collects the universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, 188 in all. In contrast to the existing explanations, this study shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Moreover, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. In all but the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Thus, Western democracies should pursue policies that teach terrorists that the lesson of the 1980s and 1990s no longer holds, policies which in practice may have more to do with improving homeland security than with offensive military action.

Terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on suicide attacks to achieve major political objectives. For example, spectacular suicide terrorist attacks have recently been employed by Palestinian groups in attempts to force Israel to abandon the West Bank and Gaza, by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to compel the Sri Lankan government to accept an independent Tamil homeland, and by Al Qaeda to pressure the United States to withdraw from the Saudi Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, such attacks are increasing both in tempo and location. Before the early 1980s, suicide terrorism was rare but not unknown (Lewis 1968; O'Neill 1981; Rapoport 1984). However, since the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, there have been at least 188 separate suicide terrorist attacks worldwide, in Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Russia and the United States. The rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, to 53 in 2000–2001 alone (Pape 2002). The rise of suicide terrorism is especially remarkable, given that the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide fell during the period, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to a low of 274 in 1998, with 348 in 2001 (Department of State 2001).

What accounts for the rise in suicide terrorism, especially, the sharp escalation from the 1990s onward?

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I thank Robert Art, Mia Bloom, Steven Cicala, Alex Downs, Daniel Drezner, Adria Lawrence, Sean Lynn-Jones, John Mearsheimer, Michael O'Connor, Sebastian Rosato, Lisa Weeden, the anonymous reviewers, and the members of the program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago for their superb comments. I especially thank James K. Feldman and Chaim D. Kaufmann for their excellent comments on multiple drafts. I would also like to acknowledge encouragement from the committee for the Combating Political Violence paper competition sponsored by the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, which selected an earlier version as a winning paper.

Although terrorism has long been part of international politics, we do not have good explanations for the growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Traditional studies of terrorism tend to treat suicide attack as one of many tactics that terrorists use and so do not shed much light on the recent rise of this type of attack (e.g., Hoffman 1998; Jenkins 1985; Laqueur 1987). The small number of studies addressed explicitly to suicide terrorism tend to focus on the irrationality of the act of suicide from the perspective of the individual attacker. As a result, they focus on individual motives—either religious indoctrination (especially Islamic Fundamentalism) or psychological predispositions that might drive individual suicide bombers (Kramer 1990; Merari 1990; Post 1990).

The first-wave explanations of suicide terrorism were developed during the 1980s and were consistent with the data from that period. However, as suicide attacks mounted from the 1990s onward, it has become increasingly evident that these initial explanations are insufficient to account for which individuals become suicide terrorists and, more importantly, why terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on this form of attack (Institute for Counter-Terrorism 2001). First, although religious motives may matter, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic Fundamentalism. Islamic groups receive the most attention in Western media, but the world's leader in suicide terrorism is actually the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group who recruits from the predominantly Hindu Tamil population in northern and eastern Sri Lanka and whose ideology has Marxist/Leninist elements. The LTTE alone accounts for 75 of the 186 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001. Even among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account for about a third of these attacks (Merari 1990; Sprinzak 2000).

Second, although study of the personal characteristics of suicide attackers may someday help identify

individuals terrorist organizations are likely to recruit for this purpose, the vast spread of suicide terrorism over the last two decades suggests that there may not be a single profile. Until recently, the leading experts in psychological profiles of suicide terrorists characterized them as uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, single men in their late teens and early 20s (Merari 1990; Post 1990). Now we know that suicide terrorists can be college educated or uneducated, married or single, men or women, socially isolated or integrated, from age 13 to age 47 (Sprinzak 2000). In other words, although only a tiny number of people become suicide terrorists, they come from a broad cross section of lifestyles, and it may be impossible to pick them out in advance.

In contrast to the first-wave explanations, this article shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic. Even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not. Viewed from the perspective of the terrorist organization, suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support, or both. Crenshaw (1981) has shown that terrorism is best understood in terms of its strategic function; the same is true for suicide terrorism. In essence, suicide terrorism is an extreme form of what Thomas Schelling (1966) calls "the rationality of irrationality," in which an act that is irrational for individual attackers is meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater attacks are sure to come. As such, modern suicide terrorism is analogous to instances of international coercion. For states, air power and economic sanctions are often the preferred coercive tools (George et al. 1972; Pape 1996, 1997). For terrorist groups, suicide attacks are becoming the coercive instrument of choice.

To examine the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, this article collects the universe suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, explains how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of these attacks, and evaluates the limits on their coercive utility.

Five principal findings follow. First, suicide terrorism is strategic. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual fanatics but, rather, occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal. Groups using suicide terrorism consistently announce specific political goals and stop suicide attacks when those goals have been fully or partially achieved.

Second, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination. In general, suicide terrorist campaigns seek to achieve specific territorial goals, most often the withdrawal of the target state's military forces from what the terrorists see as national homeland. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide terrorist campaign from 1980 to 2001 has been waged by terrorist groups whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-determination for their community's homeland by

compelling an enemy to withdraw. Further, every suicide terrorist campaign since 1980 has been targeted against a state that had a democratic form of government.

Third, during the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. Terrorist groups did not achieve their full objectives in all these cases. However, in all but the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Leaders of terrorist groups have consistently credited suicide operations with contributing to these gains. These assessments are hardly unreasonable given the timing and circumstances of many of the concessions and given that other observers within the terrorists' national community, neutral analysts, and target government leaders themselves often agreed that suicide operations accelerated or caused the concession. This pattern of making concessions to suicide terrorist organizations over the past two decades has probably encouraged terrorist groups to pursue even more ambitious suicide campaigns.

Fourth, although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may well fail completely. In general, suicide terrorism relies on the threat to inflict low to medium levels of punishment on civilians. In other circumstances, this level of punishment has rarely caused modern nation states to surrender significant political goals, partly because modern nation states are often willing to countenance high costs for high interests and partly because modern nation states are often able to mitigate civilian costs by making economic and other adjustments. Suicide terrorism does not change a nation's willingness to trade high interests for high costs, but suicide attacks can overcome a country's efforts to mitigate civilian costs. Accordingly, suicide terrorism may marginally increase the punishment that is inflicted and so make target nations somewhat more likely to surrender modest goals, but it is unlikely to compel states to abandon important interests related to the physical security or national wealth of the state. National governments have in fact responded aggressively to ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns in recent years, events which confirm these expectations.

Finally, the most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists' confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target society. States that face persistent suicide terrorism should recognize that neither offensive military action nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should invest significant resources in border defenses and other means of homeland security.

THE LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Most suicide terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward achieving particular political goals; it is not simply the product of irrational individuals or an expression of fanatical hatreds. The main purpose of suicide terrorism is to use the threat of punishment to coerce a target government to change policy, especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from territory terrorists view as their homeland. The record of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 exhibits tendencies in the timing, goals, and targets of attack that are consistent with this strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior.

Defining Suicide Terrorism

Terrorism involves the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience (Department of State 1983–2001; Reich 1990; Schmid and Jongman 1988). Although one could broaden the definition of terrorism so as to include the actions of a national government to cause terror among an opposing population, adopting such a broad definition would distract attention from what policy makers would most like to know: how to combat the threat posed by subnational groups to state security. Further, it could also create analytic confusion. Terrorist organizations and state governments have different levels of resources, face different kinds of incentives, and are susceptible to different types of pressures. Accordingly, the determinants of their behavior are not likely to be the same and, thus, require separate theoretical investigations.

In general, terrorism has two purposes—to gain supporters and to coerce opponents. Most terrorism seeks both goals to some extent, often aiming to affect enemy calculations while simultaneously mobilizing support or the terrorists cause and, in some cases, even gaining an edge over rival groups in the same social movement (Bloom 2002). However, there are trade-offs between these objectives and terrorists can strike various balances between them. These choices represent different forms of terrorism, the most important of which are demonstrative, destructive, and suicide terrorism.

Demonstrative terrorism is directed mainly at gaining publicity, for any or all of three reasons: to recruit more activists, to gain attention to grievances from soft-liners on the other side, and to gain attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side. Groups that emphasize ordinary, demonstrative terrorism include the Orange Volunteers (Northern Ireland), National Liberation Army (Columbia), and Red Brigades (Italy) (Clutterbuck 1975; Edler Baumann 1973; St. John 1991). Hostage taking, airline hijacking, and explosions announced in advance are generally intended to use the possibility of harm to bring issues to the attention of the target audience. In these cases, terrorists often avoid doing serious harm so as not to undermine sympathy for the political cause. Brian

Jenkins (1975, 4) captures the essence of demonstrative terrorism with his well-known remark, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."

Destructive terrorism is more aggressive, seeking to coerce opponents as well as mobilize support for the cause. Destructive terrorists seek to inflict real harm on members of the target audience at the risk of losing sympathy for their cause. Exactly how groups strike the balance between harm and sympathy depends on the nature of the political goal. For instance, the Baader-Meinhof group selectively assassinated rich German industrialists, which alienated certain segments of German society but not others. Palestinian terrorists in the 1970s often sought to kill as many Israelis as possible, fully alienating Jewish society but still evoking sympathy from Muslim communities. Other groups that emphasize destructive terrorism include the Irish Republican Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the nineteenth-century Anarchists (Elliott 1998; Rapoport 1971; Tuchman 1966).

Suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of losing support among the terrorists' own community. What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is that the attacker does not expect to survive a mission and often employs a method of attack that requires the attacker's death in order to succeed (such as planting a car bomb, wearing a suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building). In essence, a suicide terrorist kills others at the same time that he kills himself.¹ In principle, suicide terrorists could be used for demonstrative purposes or could be limited to targeted assassinations.² In practice, however, suicide terrorists often seek simply to kill the largest number of people. Although this maximizes the coercive leverage that can be gained from terrorism, it does so at the greatest cost to the basis of support for the terrorist cause. Maximizing the number of enemy killed alienates those in the target audience who might be sympathetic to the terrorists cause, while the act of suicide creates a debate and often loss of support among moderate segments of the terrorists' community, even if also attracting support among radical elements. Thus, while coercion is an element in all terrorism, coercion is the paramount objective of suicide terrorism.

¹ A suicide attack can be defined in two ways, a narrow definition limited to situations in which an attacker kills himself and a broad definition that includes any instance when an attacker fully expects to be killed by others during an attack. An example that fits the broad definition is Baruch Goldstein, who continued killing Palestinians at the February 1994 Hebron Massacre until he himself was killed, who had no plan for escape, and who left a note for his family indicating that he did not expect to return. My research relies on the narrow definition, partly because this is the common practice in the literature and partly because there are so few instances in which it is clear that an attacker expected to be killed by others that adding this category of events would not change my findings.

² Hunger strikes and self-immolation are not ordinarily considered acts of terrorism, because their main purpose is to evoke understanding and sympathy from the target audience, and not to cause terror (Niebuhr 1960).

The Coercive Logic of Suicide Terrorism

At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy. The central logic of this strategy is simple: Suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm their interest in resisting the terrorists demands and, so, to cause either the government to concede or the population to revolt against the government. The common feature of all suicide terrorist campaigns is that they inflict punishment on the opposing society, either directly by killing civilians or indirectly by killing military personnel in circumstances that cannot lead to meaningful battlefield victory. As we shall see, suicide terrorism is rarely a one time event but often occurs in a series of suicide attacks. As such, suicide terrorism generates coercive leverage both from the immediate panic associated with each attack and from the risk of civilian punishment in the future.

Suicide terrorism does not occur in the same circumstances as military coercion used by states, and these structural differences help to explain the logic of the strategy. In virtually all instances of international military coercion, the coercer is the stronger state and the target is the weaker state; otherwise, the coercer would likely be deterred or simply unable to execute the threatened military operations (Pape 1996). In these circumstances, coercers have a choice between two main coercive strategies, punishment and denial. Punishment seeks to coerce by raising the costs or risks to the target society to a level that overwhelms the value of the interests in dispute. Denial seeks to coerce by demonstrating to the target state that it simply cannot win the dispute regardless of its level of effort, and therefore fighting to a finish is pointless—for example, because the coercer has the ability to conquer the disputed territory. Hence, although coercers may initially rely on punishment, they often have the resources to create a formidable threat to deny the opponent victory in battle and, if necessary, to achieve a brute force military victory if the target government refuses to change its behavior. The Allied bombing of Germany in World War II, American bombing of North Vietnam in 1972, and Coalition attacks against Iraq in 1991 all fit this pattern.

Suicide terrorism (and terrorism in general) occurs under the reverse structural conditions. In suicide terrorism, the coercer is the weaker actor and the target is the stronger. Although some elements of the situation remain the same, flipping the stronger and weaker sides in a coercive dispute has a dramatic change on the relative feasibility of punishment and denial. In these circumstances, denial is impossible, because military conquest is ruled out by relative weakness. Even though some groups using suicide terrorism have received important support from states and some have been strong enough to wage guerrilla military campaigns as well as terrorism, none have been strong enough to have serious prospects of achieving their political goals by conquest. The suicide terrorist group with the most significant military capacity has been the LTTE, but

it has not had a real prospect of controlling the whole of the homeland that it claims, including Eastern and Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka.

As a result, the only coercive strategy available to suicide terrorists is punishment. Although the element of “suicide” is novel and the pain inflicted on civilians is often spectacular and gruesome, the heart of the strategy of suicide terrorism is the same as the coercive logic used by states when they employ air power or economic sanctions to punish an adversary: to cause mounting civilian costs to overwhelm the target state’s interest in the issue in dispute and so to cause it to concede the terrorists’ political demands. What creates the coercive leverage is not so much actual damage as the expectation of future damage. Targets may be economic or political, military or civilian, but in all cases the main task is less to destroy the specific targets than to convince the opposing society that they are vulnerable to more attacks in the future. These features also make suicide terrorism convenient for retaliation, a tit-for-tat interaction that generally occurs between terrorists and the defending government (Crenshaw 1981).

The rhetoric of major suicide terrorist groups reflects the logic of coercive punishment. Abdel Karim, a leader of Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a militant group linked to Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement, said the goal of his group was “to increase losses in Israel to a point at which the Israeli public would demand a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Greenberg 2002). The infamous fatwa signed by Osama Bin Laden and others against the United States reads, “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim” (World Islamic Front 1998).

Suicide terrorists’ willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks. An attacker who is willing to die is much more likely to accomplish the mission and to cause maximum damage to the target. Suicide attackers can conceal weapons on their own bodies and make last-minute adjustments more easily than ordinary terrorists. They are also better able to infiltrate heavily guarded targets because they do not need escape plans or rescue teams. Suicide attackers are also able to use certain especially destructive tactics such as wearing “suicide vests” and ramming vehicles into targets. The 188 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001 killed an average of 13 people each, not counting the unusually large number of fatalities on September 11 and also not counting the attackers themselves. During the same period, there were about 4,155 total terrorist incidents worldwide, which killed 3,207 people (also excluding September 11), or less than one person per incident. Overall, from 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks amount to 3% of all terrorist attacks but account for 48% of total

deaths due to terrorism, again excluding September 11 (Department of State 1983–2001).

Second, suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come, because suicide itself is a costly signal, one that suggests that the attackers could not have been deterred by a threat of costly retaliation. Organizations that sponsor suicide attacks can also deliberately orchestrate the circumstances around the death of a suicide attacker to increase further expectations of future attacks. This can be called the “art of martyrdom” (Schalk 1997). The more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of religious or ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national community, the more the status of terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the more plausible it becomes that others will follow in their footsteps. Suicide terrorist organizations commonly cultivate “sacrificial myths” that include elaborate sets of symbols and rituals to mark an individual attacker’s death as a contribution to the nation. Suicide attackers’ families also often receive material rewards both from the terrorist organizations and from other supporters. As a result, the art of martyrdom elicits popular support from the terrorists’ community, reducing the moral backlash that suicide attacks might otherwise produce, and so establishes the foundation for credible signals of more attacks to come.

Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorists to increase expectations about escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence. They can do this by crossing thresholds of damage, by breaching taboos concerning legitimate targets, and by broadening recruitment to confound expectations about limits on the number of possible terrorists. The element of suicide itself helps increase the credibility of future attacks, because it suggests that attackers cannot be deterred. Although the capture and conviction of Timothy McVeigh gave reason for some confidence that others with similar political views might be deterred, the deaths of the September 11 hijackers did not, because Americans would have to expect that future Al Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.

The Record of Suicide Terrorism, 1980 to 2001

To characterize the nature of suicide terrorism, this study identified every suicide terrorist attack from 1980 to 2001 that could be found in Lexis Nexis’s on-line database of world news media (Pape 2002).³ Exam-

ination of the universe shows that suicide terrorism has three properties that are consistent with the above strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior: (1) *timing*—nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated or randomly timed incidents; (2) *nationalist goals*—suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of what the terrorists see as their national homeland territory, specifically at ejecting foreign forces from that territory; and (3) *target selection*—all suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been aimed at democracies, which make more suitable targets from the terrorists’ point of view. Nationalist movements that face nondemocratic opponents have not resorted to suicide attack as a means of coercion.

Timing. As Table 1 indicates, there have been 188 separate suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001. Of these, 179, or 95%, were parts of organized, coherent campaigns, while only nine were isolated or random events. Seven separate disputes have led to suicide terrorist campaigns: the presence of American and French forces in Lebanon, Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza, the independence of the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka, the independence of the Kurdish region of Turkey, Russian occupation of Chechnya, Indian occupation of Kashmir, and the presence of American forces on the Saudi Arabian Peninsula. Overall, however, there have been 16 distinct campaigns, because in certain disputes the terrorists elected to suspend operations one or more times either in response to concessions or for other reasons. Eleven of the campaigns have ended and five were ongoing as of the end of 2001. The attacks comprising each campaign were organized by the same terrorist group (or, sometimes, a set of cooperating groups as in the ongoing “second *intifada*” in Israel/Palestine), clustered in time, publically justified in terms of a specified political goal, and directed against targets related to that goal.

The most important indicator of the strategic orientation of suicide terrorists is the timing of the suspension of campaigns, which most often occurs based on a strategic decision by leaders of the terrorist organizations that further attacks would be counterproductive to their coercive purposes—for instance, in response to full or partial concessions by the target state to the terrorists’ political goals. Such suspensions are often accompanied by public explanations that justify the decision to opt for a “cease-fire.” Further, the terrorist organizations’ discipline is usually fairly good; although there are exceptions, such announced cease-fires usually do stick for a period of months at least, normally until the terrorist leaders take a new strategic decision to resume in pursuit of goals not achieved in

³ This survey sought to include every instance of a suicide attack in which the attacker killed himself except those explicitly authorized by a state and carried out by the state government apparatus (e.g., Iranian human wave attacks in the Iran–Iraq war were not counted). The survey is probably quite reliable, because a majority of the incidents were openly claimed by the sponsoring terrorist organizations. Even those that were not were, in nearly all cases, reported multiple times in regional news media, even if not always in the U.S. media. To probe for additional cases, I interviewed experts and officials involved in what some might consider conflicts especially prone to suicide attacks, such as Afghanistan in the 1980s, but this did not yield more

incidents. According to the CIA station chief for Pakistan from 1986 to 1988 (Bearden 2002), “I cannot recall a single incident where an Afghan launched himself against a Soviet target with the intention of dying in the process. I don’t think these things ever happened, though some of their attacks were a little hare-brained and could have been considered suicidal. I think it’s important that Afghans never even took their war outside their borders—for example they never tried to blow up the Soviet Embassy in Pakistan.”

TABLE 1. Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2001

Date	Terrorist Group	Terrorists' Goal	No. of Attacks	No. Killed	Target Behavior
Completed Campaigns					
1. Apr–Dec 1983	Hezbollah	U.S./France out of Lebanon	6	384	Complete withdrawal
2. Nov 1983–Apr 1985	Hezbollah	Israel out of Lebanon	6	96	Partial withdrawal
3. June 1985–June 1986	Hezbollah	Israel out of Lebanon security zone	16	179	No change
4. July 1990–Nov 1994	LTTE	Sri Lanka accept Tamil state	14	164	Negotiations
5. Apr 1995–Oct 2000	LTTE	Sri Lanka accept Tamil state	54	629	No change
6. Apr 1994	Hamas	Israel out of Palestine	2	15	Partial withdrawal from Gaza
7. Oct 1994–Aug 1995	Hamas	Israel out of Palestine	7	65	Partial withdrawal from West Bank
8. Feb–Mar 1996	Hamas	Retaliation for Israeli assassination	4	58	No change
9. Mar–Sept 1997	Hamas	Israel out of Palestine	3	24	Hamas leader released
10. June–Oct 1996	PKK	Turkey accept Kurd autonomy	3	17	No change
11. Mar–Aug 1999	PKK	Turkey release jailed leader	6	0	No change
Ongoing Campaigns, as of December 2001					
12. 1996–	Al Qaeda	U.S. out of Saudi Peninsula	6	3,329	TBD ^a
13. 2000–	Chechen Rebels	Russia out of Chechnya	4	53	TBD
14. 2000–	Kashmir Rebels	India out of Kashmir	3	45	TBD
15. 2001–	LTTE	Sri Lanka accept Tamil state	6	51	TBD
16. 2000–	Several	Israel out of Palestine	39	177	TBD
Total incidents	188				
No. in campaigns	179				
No. isolated	9				

Source: Pape (2002).

^aTo be determined.

the earlier campaign. This pattern indicates that both terrorist leaders and their recruits are sensitive to the coercive value of the attacks.

As an example of a suicide campaign, consider Hamas's suicide attacks in 1995 to compel Israel to withdraw from towns in the West Bank. Hamas leaders deliberately withheld attacking during the spring and early summer in order to give PLO negotiations with Israel an opportunity to finalize a withdrawal. However, when in early July, Hamas leaders came to believe that Israel was backsliding and delaying withdrawal, Hamas launched a series of suicide attacks. Israel accelerated the pace of its withdrawal, after which Hamas ended the campaign. Mahmud al-Zahar, a Hamas leader in Gaza, announced, following the cessation of suicide attacks in October 1995:

We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means, not a goal. Hamas's decision to adopt self-restraint does not contradict our aims, which include the establishment of an Islamic state instead of Israel. . . . We will never recognize Israel, but it is possible that a truce could prevail between us for days, months, or years. (Mishal and Sela 2000, 71)

If suicide terrorism were mainly irrational or even disorganized, we would expect a much different pattern in which either political goals were not articulated (e.g., references in news reports to "rogue" attacks)

or the stated goals varied considerably even within the same conflict. We would also expect the timing to be either random or, perhaps, event-driven, in response to particularly provocative or infuriating actions by the other side, but little if at all related to the progress of negotiations over issues in dispute that the terrorists want to influence.

Nationalist Goals. Suicide terrorism is a high-cost strategy, one that would only make strategic sense for a group when high interests are at stake and, even then, as a last resort. The reason is that suicide terrorism maximizes coercive leverage at the expense of support among the terrorists' own community and so can be sustained over time only when there already exists a high degree of commitment among the potential pool of recruits. The most important goal that a community can have is the independence of its homeland (population, property, and way of life) from foreign influence or control. As a result, a strategy of suicide terrorism is most likely to be used to achieve nationalist goals, such as gaining control of what the terrorists see as their national homeland territory and expelling foreign military forces from that territory.

In fact, every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2001 has had as a major objective—or as its central objective—coercing a foreign government that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out. Table 2 summarizes the disputes that have

TABLE 2. Motivation and Targets of Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2001

Region Dispute	Homeland Status	Terrorist Goal	Target a Democracy?
Lebanon, 1983–86	US/F/IDF military presence	US/F/IDF withdrawal	Yes
West Bank/Gaza, 1994–	IDF military presence	IDF withdrawal	Yes
Tamils in Sri Lanka, 1990–	SL military presence	SL withdrawal	Yes (1950) ^a
Kurds in Turkey, 1990s	Turkey military presence	Turkey withdrawal	Yes (1953) ^a
Chechnya, 2000–	Russia military presence	Russian withdrawal	Yes (1953) ^a
Kashmir, 2000–	Indian military presence	Indian withdrawal	Yes
Saudi Peninsula, 1996–	US military presence	US withdrawal	Yes

Sources: Pape (2002). Przeworski et al. 2000 identifies four simple rules for determining regime type: (1) The chief executive must be elected, (2) the legislature must be elected, (3) there must be more than one party, and (4) there must be at least one peaceful transfer of power. By these criteria all the targets of suicide terrorism were and are democracies. Przeworski et al. codes only from 1950 to 1990 and is updated to 1999 by Boix and Rosato 2001. Freedom House also rates countries as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free,” using criteria for degree of political rights and civil liberties. According to Freedom House’s measures, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia were all partly free when they were the targets of suicide terrorism, which puts them approximately in the middle of all countries, a score that is actually biased against this study since terrorism itself lowers a country’s civil liberties rating (freedomhouse.org).

^aDate established as a democracy (if not always a democracy).

engendered suicide terrorist campaigns. Since 1980, there has not been a suicide terrorist campaign directed mainly against domestic opponents or against foreign opponents who did not have military forces in the terrorists’ homeland. Although attacks against civilians are often the most salient to Western observers, actually every suicide terrorist campaign in the past two decades has included attacks directly against the foreign military forces in the country, and most have been waged by guerrilla organizations that also use more conventional methods of attack against those forces.

Even Al Qaeda fits this pattern. Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation *per se* and the terrorists have political objectives against the Saudi regime and others, one major objective of Al Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Saudi Peninsula and there have been attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama Bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabia. To be sure, there is a major debate among Islamists over the morality of suicide attacks, but within Saudi Arabia there is little debate over Al Qaeda’s objection to American forces in the region and over 95% of Saudi society reportedly agrees with Bin Laden on this matter (Scolino 2002).

Still, even if suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, could some suicide terrorist campaigns be irrational in the sense that they are being waged for unrealistic goals? The answer is that some suicide terrorist groups have not been realistic in expecting the full concessions demanded of the target, but this is normal for disputes involving overlapping nationalist claims and even for coercive attempts in general. Rather, the ambitions of terrorist leaders are realistic in two other senses. First, suicide terrorists’ political aims, if not their methods, are often more mainstream than observers realize; they generally reflect quite common, straightforward nationalist self-determination claims of their community. Second, these groups often have significant support for their policy goals versus the target state, goals that are typically much the same as those of other nationalists within their community. Differences between the terrorists and more “moderate” leaders usually concern the usefulness of a certain level of vi-

olence and—sometimes—the legitimacy of attacking additional targets besides foreign troops in the country, such as attacks in other countries or against third parties and civilians. Thus, it is not that the terrorists pursue radical goals and then seek others’ support. Rather, the terrorists are simply the members of their societies who are the most optimistic about the usefulness of violence for achieving goals that many, and often most, support.

The behavior of Hamas illustrates the point. Hamas terrorism has provoked Israeli retaliation that has been costly for Palestinians, while pursuing the—apparently unrealistic—goal of abolishing the state of Israel. Although prospects of establishing an Arab state in all of “historic Palestine” may be poor, most Palestinians agree that it would be desirable if possible. Hamas’s terrorist violence was in fact carefully calculated and controlled. In April 1994, as its first suicide campaign was beginning, Hamas leaders explained that “martyrdom operations” would be used to achieve intermediate objectives, such as Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, while the final objective of creating an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean may require other forms of armed resistance (Shiqaqi 2002; Hroub 2000; Nusse 1998).

Democracies as the Targets. Suicide terrorism is more likely to be employed against states with democratic political systems than authoritarian governments for several reasons. First, democracies are often thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive punishment. Domestic critics and international rivals, as well as terrorists, often view democracies as “soft,” usually on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy. Even if there is little evidence that democracies are easier to coerce than other regime types (Horowitz and Reiter 2001), this image of democracy matters. Since terrorists can inflict only moderate damage in comparison to even small interstate wars, terrorism can be expected to coerce only if the target state is viewed as especially vulnerable to punishment. Second, suicide terrorism is a tool of the weak, which means that, regardless of how much punishment the terrorists inflict,

the target state almost always has the capacity to retaliate with far more extreme punishment or even by exterminating the terrorists' community. Accordingly, suicide terrorists must not only have high interests at stake, they must also be confident that their opponent will be at least somewhat restrained. While there are infamous exceptions, democracies have generally been more restrained in their use of force against civilians, at least since World War II. Finally, suicide attacks may also be harder to organize or publicize in authoritarian police states, although these possibilities are weakened by the fact that weak authoritarian states are also not targets.

In fact, the target state of every modern suicide campaign has been a democracy. The United States, France, Israel, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia were all democracies when they were attacked by suicide terrorist campaigns, even though the last three became democracies more recently than the others. To be sure, these states vary in the degree to which they share "liberal" norms that respect minority rights; Freedom House rates Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia as "partly free" (3.5–4.5 on a seven-point scale) rather than "free" during the relevant years, partly for this reason and partly because terrorism and civil violence themselves lowers the freedom rating of these states. Still, all these states elect their chief executives and legislatures in multiparty elections and have seen at least one peaceful transfer of power, making them solidly democratic by standard criteria (Boix and Rosato 2001; Huntington 1991; Przeworski et al. 2000).

The Kurds, which straddle Turkey and Iraq, illustrate the point that suicide terrorist campaigns are more likely to be targeted against democracies than authoritarian regimes. Although Iraq has been far more brutal toward its Kurdish population than has Turkey, violent Kurdish groups have used suicide attacks exclusively against democratic Turkey and not against the authoritarian regime in Iraq. There are plenty of national groups living under authoritarian regimes with grievances that could possibly inspire suicide terrorism, but none have. Thus, the fact that rebels have resorted to this strategy only when they face the more suitable type of target counts against arguments that suicide terrorism is a nonstrategic response, motivated mainly by fanaticism or irrational hatreds.

TERRORISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that terrorists have learned from the experience of 1980s and 1990s are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reasonable assessments of the outcomes of suicide terrorist campaigns during this period.

To understand how terrorists groups have assessed the effectiveness of suicide terrorism requires three tasks: (1) explanation of appropriate standards for eval-

uating the effectiveness of coercion from the standpoint of coercers; (2) analysis of the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns that have ended as of 2001 to determine how frequently target states made concessions that were, or at least could have been, interpreted as due to suicide attack; and (3) close analysis of terrorists' learning from particular campaigns. Because some analysts see suicide terrorism as fundamentally irrational (Kramer 1990; Merari 1990; Post 1990), it is important to assess whether the lessons that the terrorists drew were reasonable conclusions from the record. The crucial cases are the Hamas and Islamic Jihad campaigns against Israel during the 1990s, because they are most frequently cited as aimed at unrealistic goals and therefore as basically irrational.

Standards of Assessment

Terrorists, like other people, learn from experience. Since the main purpose of suicide terrorism is coercion, the learning that is likely to have the greatest impact on terrorists' future behavior is the lessons that they have drawn from past campaigns about the coercive effectiveness of suicide attack.

Most analyses of coercion focus on the decision making of target states, largely to determine their vulnerability to various coercive pressures (George 1972; Pape 1996). The analysis here, however, seeks to determine why terrorist coercers are increasingly attracted to a specific coercive strategy. For this purpose, we must develop a new set of standards, because assessing the value of coercive pressure for the coercer is not the same problem as assessing its impact on the target.

From the perspective of a target state, the key question is whether the value of the concession that the coercer is demanding is greater than the costs imposed by the coercive pressure, regardless of whether that pressure is in the form of lives at risk, economic hardship, or other types of costs. However, from the perspective of the coercer, the key question is whether a particular coercive strategy promises to be more effective than alternative methods of influence and, so, warrants continued (or increased) effort. This is especially true for terrorists who are highly committed to a particular goal and so willing to exhaust virtually any alternative rather than abandoning it. In this search for an effective strategy, coercers' assessments are likely to be largely a function of estimates of the success of past efforts; for suicide terrorists, this means assessments of whether past suicide campaigns produced significant concessions.

A glance at the behavior of suicide terrorists reveals that such trade-offs between alternative methods are important in their calculations. All of the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism began their coercive efforts with more conventional guerrilla operations, nonsuicide terrorism, or both. Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PKK, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda all used demonstrative and destructive means of violence long before resorting to suicide attack. Indeed, looking at the trajectory of terrorist groups over time, there

is a distinct element of experimentation in the techniques and strategies used by these groups and distinct movement toward those techniques and strategies that produce the most effect. Al Qaeda actually prides itself for a commitment to even tactical learning over time—the infamous “terrorist manual” stresses at numerous points the importance of writing “lessons learned” memoranda that can be shared with other members to improve the effectiveness of future attacks.

The most important analytical difficulty in assessing outcomes of coercive efforts is that successes are more ambiguous than failures. Whenever a suicide terrorist campaign, or any coercive effort, ends without obtaining significant concessions, presumably the coercers must judge the effort as a failure. If, however, the target state does make policy changes in the direction of the terrorists’ political goals, this may or may not represent a coercive success for suicide attack in the calculations of the terrorists. The target government’s decision could have been mainly or partly a response to the punishment inflicted by the suicide attacks, but it also could be a response to another type of pressure (such as an ongoing guerrilla campaign), or to pressure from a different actor (such as one of the target state’s allies) or a different country, or the target’s policy decision may not even have been intended as a concession but could have been made for other reasons that only coincidentally moved in a direction desired by the terrorists. Different judgments among these alternatives yield different lessons for future usefulness of suicide attack.

Standard principles from social psychology suggest how terrorists are likely to resolve these ambiguities. Under normal conditions, most people tend to interpret ambiguous information in ways that are consistent with their prior beliefs, as well as in ways that justify their past actions (Jervis 1976; Lebow 1981). Suicide terrorists, of course, are likely to have at least some initial confidence in the efficacy of suicide attack or else they would not resort to it, and of course, the fact of having carried out such attacks gives them an interest in justifying that choice. Thus, whenever targets of suicide terrorism make a real or apparent concession and it is a plausible interpretation that it was due to the coercive pressure of the suicide campaign, we would expect terrorists to favor that interpretation even if other interpretations are also plausible.

This does not mean that we should simply expect terrorists to interpret virtually all outcomes, regardless of evidence, as encouraging further terrorism; that would not constitute learning and would make sense only if the terrorists were deeply irrational. To control for this possibility, it is crucial to consider the assessments of the same events by other well-informed people. If we find that when suicide terrorist leaders claim credit for coercing potential concessions, their claims are unique (or nearly so), then it would be appropriate to dismiss them as irrational. If, on the other hand, we find that their interpretations are shared by a significant portion of other observers, across a range of circumstances and interests—from target state leaders, to others in the terrorists’ community, to neutral analysts—then we should

assume that their assessments are as rational as anyone else’s and should take the lessons they draw seriously. In making these judgments, the testimony of target state leaders is often especially telling; although states like the United States and Israel virtually never officially admit making concessions to terrorism, leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Yitzhak Rabin have at times been quite open about the impact of suicide terrorism on their own policy decisions, as we see below.

Finally, understanding how terrorists’ assess the effectiveness of suicide terrorism should also be influenced by our prior understanding of the fanatical nature of the specific terrorists at issue. If the most fanatical groups also make what appear to be reasonable assessments, then this would increase our confidence in the finding that most terrorists would make similar calculations. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are the most crucial case, because these groups have been considered to be fanatical extremists even among terrorists (Kramer 1996). Thus, detailed examination of how Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders assessed the coercive value of suicide attacks during the 1990s is especially important.

The Apparent Success of Suicide Terrorism

Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause about half the time. As Table 1 shows, of the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 1980–2001, six closely correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals. In one case, the terrorists’ territorial goals were fully achieved (Hezbollah v. US/F, 1983); in three cases, the terrorists’ territorial aims were partly achieved (Hezbollah v. Israel, 1983–85; Hamas v. Israel, 1994; and Hamas v. Israel, 1994–95); in one case, the target government to entered into sovereignty negotiations with the terrorists (LTTE v. Sri Lanka, 1993–94); and in one case, the terrorist organization’s top leader was released from prison (Hamas v. Israel, 1997). Five campaigns did not lead to noticeable concessions (Hezbollah’s second effort against Israel in Lebanon, 1985–86; a Hamas campaign in 1996 retaliating for an Israeli assassination; the LTTE v. Sri Lanka, 1995–2002; and both PKK campaigns). Coercive success is so rare that even a 50% success rate is significant, because international military and economic coercion, using the same standards as above, generally works less than a third of the time (Art and Cronin 2003).

There were limits to what suicide terrorism appeared to gain in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the gains for the terrorists’ cause were modest, not involving interests central to the target countries’ security or wealth, and most were potential revocable. For the United States and France, Lebanon was a relatively minor foreign policy interest. Israel’s apparent concessions to the Palestinians from 1994 to 1997 were more modest than they might appear. Although Israel withdrew its forces from parts of Gaza and the West Bank and released

Sheikh Yassin, during the same period Israeli settlement in the occupied territories almost doubled, and recent events have shown that the Israel is not deterred from sending force back in when necessary. In two disputes, the terrorists achieved initial success but failed to reach greater goals. Although Israel withdrew from much of Lebanon in June 1985, it retained a six-mile security buffer zone along the southern edge of the country for another 15 years from which a second Hezbollah suicide terrorist campaign failed to dislodge it. The Sri Lankan government did conduct apparently serious negotiations with the LTTE from November 1994 to April 1995, but did not concede the Tamil's main demand, for independence, and since 1995, the government has preferred to prosecute the war rather than consider permitting Tamil secession.

Still, these six concessions, or at least apparent concessions, help to explain why suicide terrorism is on the rise. In three of the cases, the target government policy changes are clearly due to coercive pressure from the terrorist group. The American and French withdrawal was perhaps the most clear-cut coercive success for suicide terrorism. In his memoirs, President Ronald Reagan (1990, 465) explained the U.S. decision to withdraw from Lebanon:

The price we had to pay in Beirut was so great, the tragedy at the barracks was so enormous. . . . We had to pull out. . . . We couldn't stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines.

The IDF withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon in 1985 and the Sri Lankan government decision to hold negotiations with the LTTE were also widely understood to be a direct result of the coercive punishment imposed by Hezbollah and LTTE respectively. In both cases, the concessions followed periods in which the terrorists had turned more and more to suicide attacks, but since Hezbollah and the LTTE employed a combination of suicide attack and conventional attack on their opponents, one can question the relative weight of suicide attack in coercing these target states. However, there is little question in either case that punishment pressures inflicted by these terrorist organizations were decisive in the outcomes. For instance, as a candidate in the November 9, 1994, presidential election of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga explicitly asked for a mandate to redraw boundaries so as to appease the Tamils in their demand for a separate homeland in the island's northeast provinces, often saying, "We definitely hope to begin discussions with the Tamil people, with their representatives—including the Tigers—and offer them political solutions to end the war . . . [involving] extensive devolution." This would, Kumaratunga said, "create an environment in which people could live without fear." (Sauvagnargues 1994; "Sri Lanka" 1994).

The other three concessions, or arguable concessions, are less clear-cut. All three involve Hamas campaigns against Israel. Not counting the ongoing second intifada, Hamas waged four separate suicide attack campaigns against Israel, in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. One, in 1996, did not correspond with Israeli concessions.

This campaign was announced as retaliation for Israel's assassination of a Hamas leader; no particular coercive goal was announced, and it was suspended by Hamas after four attacks in two weeks. The other three all do correspond with Israeli concessions. In April 1994, Hamas began a series of suicide bombings in relation for the Hebron Massacre. After two attacks, Israel decided to accelerate its withdrawal from Gaza, which was required under the Oslo Agreement but which had been delayed. Hamas then suspended attacks for five months. From October 1994 to August 1995, Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) carried out a total of seven suicide attacks against Israel. In September 1995, Israel agreed to withdraw from certain West Bank towns that December, which it earlier had claimed could not be done before April 1996 at the soonest. Hamas then suspended attacks until its retaliation campaign during the last week of February and first week of March 1996. Finally, in March 1997, Hamas began a suicide attack campaign that included an attack about every two months until September 1997. In response Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu authorized the assassination of a Hamas leader. The attempt, in Amman, Jordan, failed and the Israeli agents were captured. To get them back Israel agreed to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, spiritual leader of Hamas. While this was not a concession to the terrorists' territorial goals, there is no evidence that Hamas interpreted this in anyway different from the standard view that this release was the product of American and Jordanian pressure. Accordingly the key Hamas campaigns that might have encouraged the view that suicide terrorism pays were the 1994 and 1995 campaigns that were associated with Israel's military withdrawals from Gaza and the West Banks. Terrorists' assessments of these events are evaluated in detail.

The Crucial Case of Hamas

The Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide campaigns against Israel in 1994 and 1995 are crucial tests of the reasonableness of terrorists' assessments. In each case, Israel made significant concessions in the direction of the terrorists' cause and terrorist leaders report that these Israeli concessions increased their confidence in the coercive effectiveness of suicide attack. However, there is an important alternative explanation for Israel's concessions in these cases—the Israeli government's obligations under the Oslo Accords. Accordingly, evaluating the reasonableness of the terrorists' assessments of these cases is crucial because many observers characterize Hamas and Islamic Jihad as fanatical, irrational groups, extreme both within Palestinian society and among terrorists groups in general (Kramer 1996). Further, these campaigns are also of special interest because they helped to encourage the most intense ongoing campaign, the second *intifada* against Israel, and may also have helped to encourage Al Qaeda's campaign against the United States.

Examination of these crucial cases demonstrates that the terrorist groups came to the conclusion that suicide attack accelerated Israeli's withdrawal in both cases.

Although the Oslo Accords formally committed to withdrawing the IDF from Gaza and the West Bank, Israel routinely missed key deadlines, often by many months, and the terrorists came to believe that Israel would not have withdrawn when it did, and perhaps not at all, had it not been for the coercive leverage of suicide attack. Moreover, this interpretation of events was hardly unique. Numerous other observers and key Israeli government leaders themselves came to the same conclusion. To be clear, Hamas may well have had motives other than coercion for launching particular attacks, such as retaliation (De Figueredo and Weingast 1998), gaining local support (Bloom 2002), or disrupting negotiated outcomes it considered insufficient (Kydd and Walter 2002). However, the experience of observing how the target reacted to the suicide campaigns appears to have convinced terrorist leaders of the coercive effectiveness of this strategy.

To evaluate these cases, we need to know (1) the facts of each case, (2) how others interpreted the events, and (3) how the terrorists interpreted these events. Each campaign is discussed in turn.

Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, May 1994.

The Facts. Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993. These obligated Israel to withdraw its military forces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank town of Jericho beginning on December 13 and ending on April 13, 1994. In fact, Israel missed both deadlines. The major sticking points during the implementation negotiations in Fall and Winter of 1993–94 were the size of the Palestinian police force (Israel proposed a limit of 1,800, while the Palestinians demanded 9,000) and jurisdiction for certain criminal prosecutions, especially whether Israel could retain a right of hot pursuit to prosecute Palestinian attackers who might flee into Palestinian ruled zones. As of April 5, 1994, these issues were unresolved. Hamas then launched two suicide attacks, one on April 6 and another on April 13, killing 15 Israeli civilians. On April 18, the Israeli Knesset voted to withdraw, effectively accepting the Palestinian positions on both disputed issues. The suicide attacks then stopped and the withdrawal was actually conducted in a few weeks starting on May 4, 1994.⁴

These two suicide attacks may not originally have been intended as coercive, since Hamas leaders had announced them in March 1994 as part of a planned series of five attacks in retaliation for the February 24th Hebron massacre in which an Israeli settler killed 29 Palestinians and had strong reservations about negotiating a compromise settlement with Israel (Kydd and Walter 2002). However, when Israel agreed to withdraw more promptly than expected, Hamas decided to forgo the remaining three planned attacks. There is thus a circumstantial case that these attacks had the effect of coercing the Israelis into being more forthcoming in the withdrawal negotiations and both Israeli government leaders and Hamas leaders publically drew this conclusion.

Israeli and Other Assessments. There are two main reasons to doubt that terrorist pressure accelerated Israel's decision to withdraw. First, one might think that Israel would have withdrawn in any case, as it had promised to do in the Oslo Accords of September 1993. Second, one might argue that Hamas was opposed to a negotiated settlement with Israel. Taking both points together, therefore, Hamas' attacks could not have contributed to Israel's withdrawal.

The first of these arguments, however, ignores the facts that Israel had already missed the originally agreed deadline and, as of early April 1994, did not appear ready to withdraw at all if that meant surrendering on the size of the Palestinian police force and legal jurisdiction over terrorists. The second argument is simply illogical. Although Hamas objected to surrendering claims to all of historic Palestine, it did value the West Bank and Gaza as an intermediate goal, and certainly had no objection to obtaining this goal sooner rather than later.

Most important, other observers took explanations based on terrorist pressure far more seriously, including the person whose testimony must count most, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. On April 13, 1994, Rabin said,

I can't recall in the past any suicidal terror acts by the PLO. We have seen by now at least six acts of this type by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. . . . The only response to them and to the enemies of peace on the part of Israel is to accelerate the negotiations. (Makovsky and Pinkas 1994).

On April 18, 1994, Rabin went further, giving a major speech in the Knesset explaining why the withdrawal was necessary:

Members of the Knesset: I want to tell the truth. For 27 years we have been dominating another people against its will. For 27 years Palestinians in the territories . . . get up in the morning harboring a fierce hatred for us, as Israelis and Jews. Each morning they get up to a hard life, for which we are also, but not solely responsible. We cannot deny that our continuing control over a foreign people who do not want us exacts a painful price. . . . For two or three years we have been facing a phenomenon of extremist Islamic terrorism, which recalls Hezbollah, which surfaced in Lebanon and perpetrated attacks, including suicide missions. . . . There is no end to the targets Hamas and other terrorist organizations have among us. Each Israeli, in the territories and inside sovereign Israel, including united Jerusalem, each bus, each home, is a target for their murderous plans. Since there is no separation between the two populations, the current situation creates endless possibilities for Hamas and the other organizations.

Independent Israeli observers also credited suicide terrorism with considerable coercive effectiveness. The most detailed assessment is by Efraim Inbar (1999, 141–42):

A significant change occurred in Rabin's assessment of the importance of terrorist activities. . . . Reacting to the April 1994 suicide attack in Afula, Rabin recognized that terrorists activities by Hamas and other Islamic radicals were "a form of terrorism different from what we once knew from the PLO terrorist organizations. . . . "Rabin admitted

⁴ There were no suicide attacks from April to October 1994.

that there was no "hermitic" solution available to protect Israeli citizens against such terrorist attacks. . . . He also understood that such incidents intensified the domestic pressure to freeze the Palestinian track of the peace process. Islamic terrorism thus initially contributed to the pressure for accelerating the negotiations on his part.

Arab writers also attributed Israeli accommodation to the suicide attacks. Mazin Hammad wrote in an editorial in a Jordanian newspaper:

It is unprecedented for an Israeli official like Y. Rabin to clearly state that there is no future for the settlements in the occupied territories. . . . He would not have said this [yesterday] if it was not for the collapse of the security Israel. . . . The martyrdom operation in Hadera shook the faith of the settlers in the possibility of staying in the West Bank and Gaza and increased their motivation to pack their belongings and dismantle their settlements. (" Hamas Operations" 1994)

Terrorists' Assessments. Even though the favorable result was apparently unexpected by Hamas leaders, given the circumstances and the assessments voiced by Rabin and others, it certainly would have been reasonable for them to conclude that suicide terrorism had helped accelerate Israeli withdrawal, and they did.

Hamas leader Ahmed Bakr (1995) said that "what forced the Israelis to withdraw from Gaza was the intifada and not the Oslo agreement," while Imad al-Faluji judged that

all that has been achieved so far is the consequence of our military actions. Without the so-called peace process, we would have gotten even more. . . . We would have got Gaza and the West Bank without this agreement. . . . Israel can beat all Arab Armies. However, it can do nothing against a youth with a knife or an explosive charge on his body. Since it was unable to guarantee security within its borders, Israel entered into negotiations with the PLO. . . . If the Israelis want security, they will have to abandon their settlements . . . in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. (" Hamas Leader" 1995)

Further, these events appear to have persuaded terrorists that future suicide attacks could eventually produce still greater concessions. Fathi al-Shaqqi (1995), leader of Islamic Jihad, said,

Our jihad action has exposed the enemy weakness, confusion, and hysteria. It has become clear that the enemy can be defeated, for if a small faithful group was able to instill all this horror and panic in the enemy through confronting it in Palestine and southern Lebanon, what will happen when the nation confronts it with all its potential. . . . Martyrdom actions will escalate in the face of all pressures . . . [they] are a realistic option in confronting the unequal balance of power. If we are unable to effect a balance of power now, we can achieve a balance of horror.

Israel's Withdrawal from West Bank Towns, December 1995. The second Hamas case, in 1995, tells essentially the same story as the first. Again, a series of suicide attacks was associated with Israeli territorial concessions to the Palestinians, and again, a significant

fraction of outside observers attributed the concessions to the coercive pressure of suicide terrorism, as did the terrorist leaders themselves.

The Facts. The original Oslo Accords scheduled Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian populated areas of the West Bank by July 13, 1994, but after the delays over Gaza and Jericho all sides recognized that this could not be met. From October 1994 to April 1995, Hamas, along with Islamic Jihad, carried out a series of seven suicide terrorist attacks that were intended to compel Israel to make further withdrawals and suspended attacks temporarily at the request of the Palestinian Authority after Israel agreed on March 29, 1995 to begin withdrawals by July 1. Later, however, the Israelis announced that withdrawals could not begin before April 1996 because bypass roads needed for the security of Israeli settlements were not ready. Hamas and Islamic Jihad then mounted new suicide attacks on July 24 and August 21, 1995, killing 11 Israeli civilians. In September, Israel agreed to withdraw from the West Bank towns in December (Oslo II) even though the roads were not finished. The suicide attacks then stopped and the withdrawal was actually carried out in a few weeks starting on December 12, 1995.⁵

Israeli and Other Assessments. Although Israeli government spokesmen frequently claimed that suicide terrorism was delaying withdrawal, this claim was contradicted by, among others, Prime Minister Rabin. Rabin (1995) explained that the decision for the second withdrawal was, like the first in 1994, motivated in part by the goal of reducing suicide terrorism:

Interviewer: Mr Rabin, what is the logic of withdrawing from towns and villages when you know that terror might continue to strike at us from there?

Rabin: What is the alternative, to have double the amount of terror? As for the issue of terror, take the suicide bombings. Some 119 Israelis . . . have been killed or murdered since 1st January 1994, 77 of them in suicide bombings perpetrated by Islamic radical fanatics. . . . All the bombers were Palestinians who came from areas under our control.

Similarly, an editorial in the Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot* ("Bus Attack" 1995) explained,

If the planners of yesterday's attack intended to get Israel to back away from the Oslo accord, they apparently failed. In fact, Prime Minister Y. Rabin is leaning toward expediting the talks with the Palestinians. . . . The immediate conclusion from this line of thinking on Rabin's part—whose results we will witness in the coming days—will be to instruct the negotiators to expedite the talks with the Palestinians with the aim of completing them in the very near future.

Terrorists' Assessments. As in 1994, Hamas and Islamic Jihad came to the conclusion that suicide terrorism was working. Hamas's spokesman in Jordan explained that new attacks were necessary to change Israel's behavior:

⁵ There were no suicide attacks from August 1995 to February 1996. There were four suicide attacks in response to an Israeli assassination from February 25 to March 4, 1996, and then none until March 1997.

Hamas, leader Muhammad Nazzal said, needed military muscle in order to negotiate with Israel from a position of strength. Arafat started from a position of weakness, he said, which is how the Israelis managed to push on him the solution and get recognition of their state and settlements without getting anything in return. (Theodoulou 1995)

After the agreement was signed, Hamas leaders also argued that suicide operations contributed to the Israeli withdrawal. Mahmud al-Zahhar (1996), a spokesman for Hamas, said,

The Authority told us that military action embarrasses the PA because it obstructs the redeployment of the Israeli's forces and implementation of the agreement. . . . We offered many martyrs to attain freedom. . . . Any fair person knows that the military action was useful for the Authority during negotiations.

Moreover, the terrorists also stressed that stopping the attacks only discouraged Israel from withdrawing. An early August Hamas communique (No. 125, 1995) read,

They said that the strugglers' operations have been the cause of the delay in widening the autonomous rule in the West Bank, and that they have been the reason for the deterioration of the living and economic conditions of our people. Now the days have come to debunk their false claims . . . and to affirm that July 1 [a promised date for IDF withdrawal] was no more than yet another of the "unholy" Zionist dates. . . . Hamas has shown an utmost degree of self-restraint throughout the past period. . . . but matters have gone far enough and the criminals will reap what their hands have sown.

Recent Impact of Lessons Learned. In addition to the 1994 and 1995 campaigns, Palestinian terrorist leaders have also cited Hezbollah experience in Lebanon as a source of the lesson that suicide terrorism is an effective way of coercing Israel. Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shallah (2001) argued that:

The shameful defeat that Israel suffered in southern Lebanon and which caused its army to flee it in terror was not made on the negotiations table but on the battlefield and through jihad and martyrdom, which achieved a great victory for the Islamic resistance and Lebanese People. . . . We would not exaggerate if we said that the chances of achieving victory in Palestine are greater than in Lebanon. . . . If the enemy could not bear the losses of the war on the border strip with Lebanon, will it be able to withstand a long war of attrition in the heart of its security dimension and major cities?

Palestinian terrorists are now applying the lessons they have learned. In November 2000, Khalid Mish'al explained Hamas's strategy for the second *intifada*, which was then in its early stages:

Like the *intifada* in 1987, the current *intifada* has taught us that we should move forward normally from popular confrontation to the rifle to suicide operations. This is the normal development. . . . We always have the Lebanese experiment before our eyes. It was a great model of which we are proud.

Even before the second *intifada* began, other Hamas statements similarly expressed,

The Zionist enemy . . . only understands the language of Jihad, resistance and martyrdom, that was the language that led to its blatant defeat in South Lebanon and it will be the language that will defeat it on the land of Palestine. (Hamas Statement 2000)

The bottom line is that the ferocious escalation of the pace of suicide terrorism that we have witnessed in the past several years cannot be considered irrational or even surprising. Rather, it is simply the result of the lesson that terrorists have quite reasonably learned from their experience of the previous two decades: Suicide terrorism pays.

THE LIMITS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Despite suicide terrorists' reasons for confidence in the coercive effectiveness of this strategy, there are sharp limits to what suicide terrorism is likely to accomplish in the future. During the 1980s and 1990s, terrorist leaders learned that moderate punishment often leads to moderate concessions and so concluded that more ambitious suicide campaigns would lead to greater political gains. However, today's more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are likely to fail. Although suicide terrorism is somewhat more effective than ordinary coercive punishment using air power or economic sanctions, it is not drastically so.

Suicide Terrorism Is Unlikely to Achieve Ambitious Goals

In international military coercion, threats to inflict military defeat often generate more coercive leverage than punishment. Punishment, using anything short of nuclear weapons, is a relatively weak coercive strategy because modern nation states generally will accept high costs rather than abandon important national goals, while modern administrative techniques and economic adjustments over time often allow states to minimize civilian costs. The most punishing air attacks with conventional munitions in history were the American B-29 raids against Japan's 62 largest cities from March to August 1945. Although these raids killed nearly 800,000 Japanese civilians—almost 10% died on the first day, the March 9, 1945, firebombing of Tokyo, which killed over 85,000—the conventional bombing did not compel the Japanese to surrender.

Suicide terrorism makes adjustment to reduce damage more difficult than for states faced with military coercion or economic sanctions. However, it does not affect the target state's interests in the issues at stake. As a result, suicide terrorism can coerce states to abandon limited or modest goals, such as withdrawal from territory of low strategic importance or, as in Israel's case in 1994 and 1995, a temporary and partial withdrawal from a more important area. However, suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to their wealth or security, such as a loss of territory that would weaken the economic prospects of the state or strengthen the rivals of the state.

Suicide terrorism makes punishment more effective than in international military coercion. Targets remain willing to countenance high costs for important goals, but administrative, economic, or military adjustments to prevent suicide attack are harder, while suicide attackers themselves are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of retaliation. Accordingly, suicide attack is likely to present a threat of continuing limited civilian punishment that the target government cannot completely eliminate, and the upper bound on what punishment can gain for coercers is recognizably higher in suicidal terrorism than in international military coercion.

The data on suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 support this conclusion. While suicide terrorism has achieved modest or very limited goals, it has so far failed to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security. When the United States withdrew from Lebanon in 1984, it had no important security, economic, or even ideological interests at stake. Lebanon was largely a humanitarian mission and not viewed as central to the national welfare of the United States. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon in June 1985 but remained in a security buffer on the edge of southern Lebanon for more than a decade afterward, despite the fact that 17 of 22 suicide attacks occurred in 1985 and 1986. Israel's withdrawals from Gaza and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995 occurred at the same time that settlements increased and did little to hinder the IDF's return, and so these concessions were more modest than they may appear. Sri Lanka has suffered more casualties from suicide attack than Israel but has not acceded to demands that it surrender part of its national territory. Thus, the logic of punishment and the record of suicide terrorism suggests that, unless suicide terrorists acquire far more destructive technologies, suicide attacks for more ambitious goals are likely to fail and will continue to provoke more aggressive military responses.

Policy Implications for Containing Suicide Terrorism

While the rise in suicide terrorism and the reasons behind it seem daunting, there are important policy lessons to learn. The current policy debate is misguided. Offensive military action or concessions alone rarely work for long. For over 20 years, the governments of Israel and other states targeted by suicide terrorism have engaged in extensive military efforts to kill, isolate, and jail suicide terrorist leaders and operatives, sometimes with the help of quite good surveillance of the terrorists' communities. Thus far, they have met with meager success. Although decapitation of suicide terrorist organizations can disrupt their operations temporarily, it rarely yields long-term gains. Of the 11 major suicide terrorist campaigns that had ended as of 2001, only one—the PKK versus Turkey—did so as a result of leadership decapitation, when the leader, in Turkish custody, asked his followers to stop. So far, leadership decapitation has also not ended Al Qaeda's

campaign. Although the United States successfully toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan in December 2001, Al Qaeda launched seven successful suicide terrorist attacks from April to December 2002, killing some 250 Western civilians, more than in the three years before September 11, 2001, combined.

Concessions are also not a simple answer. Concessions to nationalist grievances that are widely held in the terrorists' community can reduce popular support for further terrorism, making it more difficult to recruit new suicide attackers and improving the standing of more moderate nationalist elites who are in competition with the terrorists. Such benefits can be realized, however, only if the concessions really do substantially satisfy the nationalist or self-determination aspirations of a large fraction of the community.

Partial, incremental, or deliberately staggered concessions that are dragged out over a substantial period of time are likely to become the worst of both worlds. Incremental compromise may appear—or easily be portrayed—to the terrorists' community as simply delaying tactics and, thus, may fail to reduce, or actually increase, their distrust that their main concerns will ever be met. Further, incrementalism provides time and opportunity for the terrorists to intentionally provoke the target state in hopes of derailing the smooth progress of negotiated compromise in the short term, so that they can reradicalize their own community and actually escalate their efforts toward even greater gains in the long term.⁶ Thus, states that are willing to make concessions should do so in a single step if at all possible.

Advocates of concessions should also recognize that, even if they are successful in undermining the terrorist leaders' base of support, almost any concession at all will tend to encourage the terrorist leaders further about their own coercive effectiveness. Thus, even in the aftermath of a real settlement with the opposing community, some terrorists will remain motivated to continue attacks and, for the medium term, may be able to do so, which in turn would put a premium on combining concessions with other solutions.

Given the limits of offense and of concessions, homeland security and defensive efforts generally must be a core part of any solution. Undermining the feasibility of suicide terrorism is a difficult task. After all, a major advantage of suicide attack is that it is more difficult to prevent than other types of attack. However, the difficulty of achieving perfect security should not keep us from taking serious measures to prevent would-be terrorists from easily entering their target society. As Chaim Kaufmann (1996) has shown, even intense

⁶ The Bush administration's decision in May 2003 to withdraw most U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia is the kind of partial concession likely to backfire. Al Qaeda may well view this as evidence that the United States is vulnerable to coercive pressure, but the concession does not satisfy Al Qaeda's core demand to reduce American military control over the holy areas on the Arab peninsula. With the conquest and long term military occupation of Iraq, American military capabilities to control Saudi Arabia have substantially increased even if there are no American troops on Saudi soil itself.

ethnic civil wars can often be stopped by demographic separation because it greatly reduces both means and incentives for the sides to attack each other. This logic may apply with even more force to the related problem of suicide terrorism, since, for suicide attackers, gaining physical access to the general area of the target is the only genuinely demanding part of an operation, and as we have seen, resentment of foreign occupation of their national homeland is a key part of the motive for suicide terrorism.

The requirements for demographic separation depend on geographic and other circumstances that may not be attainable in all cases. For example, much of Israel's difficulty in containing suicide terrorism derives from the deeply intermixed settlement patterns of the West Bank and Gaza, which make the effective length of the border between Palestinian and Jewish settled areas practically infinite and have rendered even very intensive Israeli border control efforts ineffective (Kaufmann 1998). As a result, territorial concessions could well encourage terrorists leaders to strive for still greater gains while greater repression may only exacerbate the conditions of occupation that cultivate more recruits for terrorist organizations. Instead, the best course to improve Israel's security may well be a combined strategy: abandoning territory on the West

Bank along with an actual wall that physically separates the populations.

Similarly, if Al Qaeda proves able to continue suicide attacks against the American homeland, the United States should emphasize improving its domestic security. In the short term, the United States should adopt stronger border controls to make it more difficult for suicide attackers to enter the United States. In the long term, the United States should work toward energy independence and, thus, reduce the need for American troops in the Persian Gulf countries where their presence has helped recruit suicide terrorists to attack America. These measures will not provide a perfect solution, but they may make it far more difficult for Al Qaeda to continue attacks in the United States, especially spectacular attacks that require elaborate coordination.

Perhaps most important, the close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should give pause to those who favor solutions that involve conquering countries in order to transform their political systems. Conquering countries may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but it is important to recognize that occupation of more countries may well increase the number of terrorists coming at us.

Appendix: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2001

Date	Weapon	Target	Killed*
Completed Campaigns			
Campaign #1: Hezbollah vs. US, France			
1. April 18, 1983	car bomb	US embassy, Beirut	63
2. Oct 23, 1983	car bomb	US Marine barracks, Beirut	241
3. Oct 23, 1983	car bomb	French barracks, Beirut	58
4. Dec 12, 1983	grenades	US embassy, Kuwait	7
5. Dec 21, 1983	car bomb	French HQ, Beirut	1
6. Sept 12, 1984	truck bomb	US embassy, Beirut	14
Campaign #2: Hezbollah vs. Israel			
1. Nov 4, 1983	car bomb	IDF post, Tyre, Lebanon	50
2. Jun 16, 1984	car bomb	IDF post, south Lebanon	5
3. Mar 8, 1985:	truck bomb	IDF post	12
4. Apr 9, 1985:	car bomb	IDF post	4
5. May 9, 1985:	suitcase bomb	Southern Lebanese Army checkpoint	2
6. June 15, 1985:	car bomb	IDF post, Beirut	23
Campaign #3: Hezbollah vs. Israel and South Lebanon Army			
1. July 9, 1985	car bombs	2 SLA outposts	22
2. July 15, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	10
3. July 31, 1985	car bomb	IDF patrol, south Lebanon	2
4. Aug 6, 1985	mule bomb	SLA outpost	0
5. Aug 29, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	15
6. Sept 3, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	37
7. Sept 12, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	21
8. Sept 17, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	30
9. Sept 18, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	0
10. Oct 17, 1985	grenades	SLA radio station	6
11. Nov 4, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	0
12. Nov 12, 1985	car bomb	Christ. militia leaders, Beirut	5**
13. Nov 26, 1985	car bomb	SLA outpost	20
14. April 7, 1986	car bomb	SLA outpost	1
15. July 17, 1986	car bomb	Jezzine, south Lebanon	7
16. Nov 20, 1986:	car bomb	SLA outpost	3

Appendix—Continued

Date	Weapon	Target	Killed*
Campaign #4: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam vs. Sri Lanka			
1. Jul 12, 1990	boat bomb	naval vessel, Trincomalee	6
2. Nov 23, 1990	mines	army camp, Manakulam	0
3. Mar 2, 1991	car bomb	defense minister, Colombo	18**
4. Mar 19, 1991	truck bomb	army camp, Silavathurai	5
5. May 5, 1991	boat bomb	naval vessel	5
6. May 21, 1991	belt bomb	Rajiv Gandhi, Madras, India	1**
7. June 22, 1991	car bomb	defense ministry, Colombo	27
8. Nov 16, 1992	motorcycle bomb	navy commander, Colombo	1**
9. May 1, 1993	belt bomb	president of Sri Lanka, Colombo	23**
10. Nov 11, 1993	boat bomb	naval base, Jaffna Lagoon	0
11. Aug 2, 1994	grenades	air force helicopter, Palali	0
12. Sept 19, 1994	mines	naval vessel, Sagarawardene	25
13. Oct 24, 1994	belt bomb	Presidential candidate, Colombo	53**
14. Nov 8, 1994	mines	naval vessel, Vettalaikerny	0
Campaign #5: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka			
1. Apr 18, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Trincomalee	11
2. Jul 16, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Jaffna peninsula	0
3. Aug 7, 1995	belt bomb	government bldg, Colombo	22
4. Sep 3, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Trincomalee	0
5. Sep 10, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Kankesanthurai	0
6. Sep 20, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Kankesanthurai	0
7. Oct 2, 1995	scuba divers	Naval vessel, Kankesanthurai	0
8. Oct 17, 1995	scuba divers	naval vessel, Trincomalee	9
9. Oct 20, 1995	mines	2 oil depots, Colombo	23
10. Nov 11, 1995	belt bombs	army HQ, crowd, Colombo	23
11. Dec 5, 1995	truck bomb	police camp, Batticaloa	23
12. Jan 8, 1996	belt bomb	market, Batticaloa	0
13. Jan 31, 1996	truck bomb	bank, Colombo	91
14. Apr 1, 1996	boat bomb	navy vessel, Vettalaikerni	10
15. Apr 12, 1996	scuba divers	port building, Colombo	0
16. Jul 3, 1996	belt bomb	government motorcade, Jaffna	37
17. Jul 18, 1996	mines	naval gunboat, Mullaitivu	35
18. Aug 6, 1996	boat bomb	naval ship, north coast	0
19. Aug 14, 1996	bicycle bomb	public rally, Kalmunai	0
20. Oct 25, 1996	boat bomb	gunboat, Trincomalee	12
21. Nov 25, 1996	belt bomb	police chief vehicle, Trincomalee	0***
22. Dec 17, 1996	motorcycle bomb	police unit jeep, Ampara	1
23. Mar 6, 1997	grenades	air base, China Bay	0
24. Oct 15, 1997	truck bomb	World Trade Centre, Colombo	18
25. Oct 19, 1997	boat bomb	naval gunboat, northeastern coast	7
26. Dec 28, 1997	truck bomb	political leader, south Sri Lanka	0***
27. Jan 25, 1998	truck bomb	Buddhist shrine, Kandy	11
28. Feb 5, 1998	belt bomb	Air Force headquarters, Colombo	8
29. Feb 23, 1998	boat bombs	2 landing ships off Point Pedru	47
30. Mar 5, 1998	bus bomb	train station, Colombo	38
31. May 15, 1998	belt bomb	army brigadier, Jaffna peninsula	1
32. Sep 11, 1998	belt bomb	mayor of Jaffna	20**
33. Mar 15, 1999	belt bomb	police station, Colombo	5
34. May 29, 1999	belt bomb	Tamil rival leader, Batticaloa	2
35. Jul 25, 1999	belt bomb	passenger ferry, Trincomalee	1
36. Jul 29, 1999	belt bomb	Tamil politician, Colombo	1**
37. Aug 4, 1999	bicycle bomb	police vehicle, Vavuniya	12
38. Aug 9, 1999	belt bomb	military commander, Vakarai	1
39. Sep 2, 1999	belt bomb	Tamil rival, Vavuniya	3**
40. Dec 18, 1999	2 belt bombs	president of Sri Lanka, Colombo	38***
41. Jan 5, 2000	belt bomb	prime minister of Sri Lanka, Colombo	11***
42. Feb 4, 2000	sea diver	naval vessel, Trincomalee	0
43. Mar 2, 2000	belt bomb	military commander, Trincomalee	1***
44. Mar 10, 2000	belt bomb	government motorcade Colombo	23
45. Jun 5, 2000	scuba diver	ammunition ship, northeast coast	5
46. Jun 7, 2000	belt bomb	Industries Minister, Colombo	26**
47. Jun 14, 2000	bicycle bomb	air force bus, Wattala Town	2

Appendix—Continued

Date	Group	Weapon	Target	Killed
48. Jun 26, 2000		boat bomb	merchant vessel, north coast	7
49. Aug 16, 2000		belt bomb	military vehicle, Vavuniya	1
50. Sep 15, 2000		belt bomb	hospital, Colombo	7
51. Oct 2, 2000		belt bomb	political leader, Trincomalee	22**
52. Oct 5, 2000		belt bomb	political rally, Medawachchiya	12
53. Oct 19, 2000		belt bomb	Cabinet ceremony, Colombo	0
54. Oct 23, 2000		boat bombs	gunboat/troop carrier, Trincomalee	2
Campaign #6: Hamas vs. Israel				
1. Apr 6, 1994	Hamas	car bomb	Afula	9
2. Apr 13, 1994	Hamas	belt bomb	Hadera	6
Campaign #7: Hamas/Islamic Jihad vs. Israel				
1. Oct 19, 1994	Hamas	belt bomb	Tel Aviv	22
2. Nov 11, 1994	Islamic Jihad	bike bomb	Netzarim, Gaza	3
3. Dec 25, 1994	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	0
4. Jan 22, 1995	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Beit Lid Junction	21
5. Apr 9, 1995	IJ & H	2 car bombs	Netzarim, Gaza	8
6. July 24, 1995	Hamas	belt bomb	Tel Aviv	6
7. Aug 21, 1995	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	5
Campaign #8: Hamas vs. Israel				
1. Feb 25, 1996	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	25
2. Feb 25, 1996	Hamas	belt bomb	Ashkelon	1
3. Mar 3, 1996	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	19
4. Mar 4, 1996	Hamas	belt bomb	Tel Aviv	13
Campaign #9: Hamas vs. Israel				
1. Mar 21, 1997	Hamas	belt bomb	café, Tel Aviv	3
2. Jul 30, 1997	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	14
3. Sept 4, 1997	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	7
Campaign #10: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) vs. Turkey				
1. Jun 30, 1996		belt bomb	Tunceli	9
2. Oct 25, 1996		belt bomb	Adana	4
3. Oct 29, 1996		belt bombs	Sivas	4
Campaign #11: PKK vs. Turkey				
1. Mar 4, 1999		belt bomb	Batman	0
2. Mar 27, 1999		grenade	Istanbul	0
3. Apr 5, 1999		belt bomb	governor, Bingöl	0
4. Jul 5, 1999		belt bomb	Adana	0
5. Jul 7, 1999		grenades	İlüh	0
6. Aug 28, 1999		bomb	Tunceli	0
Ongoing Campaigns				
Campaign #12: Al Qaeda vs. United States				
1. Nov 13, 1995		car bomb	US military base, Riyadh, SA	5
2. Jun 25, 1996		truck bomb	US military base, Dhahran SA	19
3. Aug 7, 1998		truck bombs	US embassies, Kenya/Tanzania	250
4. Oct 12, 2000		boat bomb	USS Cole, Yemen	17
5. Sep 9, 2001		camera bomb	Ahmed Shah Massoud, Afghanistan	1**
6. Sep 11, 2001		hijacked airplanes	WTC/Pentagon	3037
Campaign #13: Chechen Separatists vs. Russia				
1. Jun 7, 2000		truck bomb	Russian police station, Chechnya	2
2. Jul 3, 2000		truck bomb	Argun, Russia	30
3. Mar 24, 2001		car bomb	Chechnya	20
4. Nov 29, 2001		belt bomb	military commander, Chechnya	1
Campaign #14: Kashmir Separatists vs. India				
1. Dec 25, 2000		car bomb	Srinagar, Kashmir	8
2. Oct 1, 2001		car bomb	Legislative assembly, Kashmir	30
3. Dec 13, 2001		gunmen	Parliament, New Delhi	7

Appendix—Continued

Date	Group	Weapon	Target	Killed
Campaign #15: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka				
1. Jul 24, 2001		belt bomb	international airport, Colombo	12
2. Sep 16, 2001		boat bomb	naval vessel, north	29
3. Oct 29, 2001		belt bomb	PM of Sri Lanka, Colombo	3***
4. Oct 30, 2001		boat bomb	oil tanker, northern coast	4
5. Nov 9, 2001		belt bomb	police jeep, Batticaloa	0
6. Nov 15, 2001		belt bomb	crowd, Batticaloa	3
Campaign #16: Hamas/Islamic Jihad vs. Israel				
1. Oct 26, 2000	Islamic Jihad	bike bomb	Gaza	0
2. Oct 30, 2000	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	15
3. Nov 2, 2000	Al Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	2
4. Nov 22, 2000	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	Hadera	2
5. Dec 22, 2000	Al Aqsa	belt bomb	Jordan valley	3
6. Jan 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya	10
7. Feb 14, 2001	Hamas	bus driver	Tel Aviv	8
8. Mar 1, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Mei Ami	1
9. Mar 4, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya	3
10. Mar 27, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	1
11. Mar 27, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem (2nd attack)	0
12. Mar 28, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Kfar Saba	3
13. Apr 22, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Kfar Saba	3
14. Apr 23, 2001	PFLP	car bomb	Yehuda	8
15. Apr 29, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	West Bank	0
16. May 18, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Netanya	5
17. May 25, 2001	Islamic Jihad	truck bomb	Netzarim, Gaza	2
18. May 27, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Netanya	1
19. May 30, 2001	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	Netanya	8
20. Jun 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	nightclub, Tel Aviv	22
21. Jun 22, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Gaza	2
22. Jul 2, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	IDF checkpt, Gaza	0
23. Jul 9, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Gaza	0
24. Jul 16, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Jerusalem	5
25. Aug 8, 2001	Al Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	8
26. Aug 9, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Haifa	15
27. Aug 12, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Haifa	0
28. Aug 21, 2001	Al Aqsa	car bomb	Jerusalem	0
29. Sept 4, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	0
30. Sept 9, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Nahariya	3
31. Oct 1, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Afula	1
32. Oct 7, 2001	Islamic Jihad	car bomb	North Israel	2
33. Nov 26, 2001	Hamas	car bomb	Gaza	0
34. Nov 29, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Gaza	3
35. Dec 1, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Haifa	11
36. Dec 2, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Jerusalem	15
37. Dec 5, 2001	Islamic Jihad	belt bomb	Jerusalem	0
38. Dec 9, 2001	???	belt bomb	Haifa	0
39. Dec 12, 2001	Hamas	belt bomb	Gaza	4
Isolated Attacks				
1. Dec 15, 1981	???	car bomb	Iraqi embassy, Beirut	30
2. May 25, 1985	Hezbollah	car bomb	Emir, Kuwait	0***
3. Jul 5, 1987	LTTE	truck bomb	army camp, Jaffna Peninsula	18
4. Aug 15, 1993	???	motorcycle bomb	Interior Minister, Egypt	3***
5. Jan 30, 1995	Armed Islamic Group	truck bomb	crowd, Algiers	42
6. Nov 19, 1995	Islamic Group	truck bomb	Egyptian embassy, Pakistan	16
7. Oct 29, 1998	Hamas	belt bomb	Gaza	1
8. Nov 17, 1998	???	belt bomb	Yuksekova, Turkey	0
9. Dec 29, 1999	Hezbollah	car bomb	South Lebanon	1

Note: Several reports of PKK suicide in May and June 1997 during fighting between PKK and Kurdish militias in Iraq, but coverage insufficient to distinguish suicide attack from suicide to avoid capture.

* Not including attacker(s).

** Assassination target killed.

*** Assassination target survived.

??? = unclaimed.

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Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security

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September 11 did not fundamentally change world politics. Instead, it exacerbated already existing tensions about how to implement post-cold war collective security rules. Using a rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security, I argue that the dominant post-cold war global security trend is the gradual construction of collective security rules, including rules punishing human rights abuses, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Using an interpretive method called dialogical analysis, I analyze the debate about intervention in Kosovo and argue that the recent conflict over intervention in Iraq revolves around similar claims about how to implement collective security rules. This analysis challenges arguments that September 11 ushered in a new era of world politics that necessarily justifies more aggressive, preemptive U.S. policies.

Did September 11 fundamentally change world politics?¹ The global rift over the United States invasion of Iraq hinges on this question. The United States' "war on terrorism" presumes that new threats from terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction have transformed the international system. Advocates of military intervention in Iraq argue that this fundamentally changed world justifies more aggressive, even preemptive policies. Critics of the United States invasion of Iraq, however, argue that existing collective security rules are still applicable even after the events of September 11. They prefer an international system where the use of force is justified only by explicit Security Council authorization or traditional standards of self-defense, neither of which applies to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Healing this rift within the international community will require eventual agreement about the extent to which September 11 changed the rules of global security.

I argue that September 11 did not fundamentally change world politics. Using a rule-oriented constructivist approach, I argue that the dominant trend of the post-cold war world is the gradual institutionalization of global collective security rules. As in earlier struggles to punish states violating human rights rules, the international community is now struggling to punish both states and ruthless nonstate actors that violate terrorism and weapons proliferation rules. The pre-September 11 debate about intervening in Yugoslavia over human rights abuses in Kosovo is stunningly similar to the post-September 11 debates about the use of military force in Iraq. This analysis suggests that September 11 did not fundamentally change the rules governing global security; instead, it exacerbated already existing tensions about the appropriate implementation of fledgling collective security rules.

To analyze the Kosovo debate I use an interpretive method called *dialogical analysis* (Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker 1998; Frederking 2000). Dialogical analysis builds on approaches that take the constitutive nature of language seriously, including Wittgenstein's (1968) latter philosophy of language, Habermas' (1984, 1987) notion of communicative rationality, and the speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). Dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments. It assumes the existence of constitutive social rules and communicatively rational agents constructing those social rules through the performance of speech acts. The development of interpretive methods like dialogical analysis is important if we are to move beyond epistemological debates between advocates of Science and advocates of Anti-Science. Interpretive methods capable of yielding theoretical and practical insights can show both the positivist defenders of Science and the postmodern defenders of Anti-Science that one can accept the philosophical critiques of positivism and still engage in rigorous, replicable empirical research in the pursuit of knowledge.

I build on Onuf's rule-oriented constructivism to offer a tentative rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security. Onuf (1989) argues that agents are embedded in "social arrangements" of intersubjective rules. I posit four social arrangements constituting the security structures of world politics: war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities. The dominant post-cold war trend is movement away from cold war rivalry rules and (slowly) toward collective security rules. This trend is complicated because some rules in these social arrangements overlap. For example, the use of force is acceptable in war, rivalry, and collective security arrangements. How others interpret the use of force will depend on a dialogic consensus about which social arrangement governs the interaction. If others interpret force to invoke rules of war, then they will dismiss claims that collective security rules apply. I argue that a rule-oriented constructivist emphasis on language and rules shows the debates over Kosovo and Iraq to have tremendous similarities, casting doubt on arguments that September 11 fundamentally changed world politics.

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I would like to thank Karin Fierke, Yale Ferguson, Gavan Duffy, and David Ahola for comments on earlier drafts, as well as Maximo Sanchez Pagano for research assistance. Any errors are my own.

¹ The final draft of this paper was written in April during the beginning of the war in Iraq.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism² emerged in the 1990s as international relations scholars realized that the dominant approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism could not explain transformative events like the end of the cold war. Constructivism asserts the existence of social structures—including norms, beliefs, and identities—constituting world politics. All constructivists in some way assert the importance of what Searle calls “social facts”: facts that exist because all the relevant actors agree they exist. Social facts like sovereignty, property, human rights, and collective security are for constructivists the stuff of world politics, and human agency constructs those social facts (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Searle 1995).

Within international relations, constructivism resembles English school arguments that the state system is embedded in a larger society in which states agree to certain rules and institutions (e.g., Bull 1977). However, leading constructivists cite many influences. Wendt (1999) cites Mead’s symbolic interactionism and Bhaskar’s scientific realism. Onuf (1989) cites Wittgenstein’s latter philosophy of language, Giddens’s structurationism, Habermas’ theory of communicative action, and Searle’s speech act theory. Campbell (1992) cites the postmodern arguments of Foucault and Derrida. Ruggie (1998) cites Durkheim’s studies of the collective conscience and Weber’s methods of *verstehen*. All emphasize the constitutive nature of language. Language not only represents the world but in many ways creates the world by making action possible. Language is not a neutral medium through which we study the world; language is itself action. Constructivism is thus part of the postpositivist “sociological turn” (Guzzini 2000) or “linguistic turn” (Palan 2000) in the social sciences.

Constructivists assert three common ontological positions (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Kubalkova 2001; Wendt 1999). First, social factors primarily influence human interaction. Constructivism opposes materialist ontology asserting material structures, like the balance of power in neorealism or markets in neoliberalism. Constructivists argue that material structures have meaning for human agents only within the context of social rules. For example, a state’s military capability has different meanings depending on whether it belongs to an ally or an enemy. Second, social structures help constitute the interests and identities of purposive actors. Constructivism opposes individualist ontologies that explain social outcomes as the aggregate result of individual decisions. Human agency is enmeshed in a web of social rules that both constitute and regulate agency. Third, agents and structures construct each other. Rules make agents and agents make rules. The (social) world is made by people, who in turn are made by that (social) world.

Most categorizations of constructivist arguments are epistemological. For example, Hopf (1998) distin-

guishes between conventional and critical constructivists. Conventional constructivists adhere to standard positivist causal theorizing, using norms and ideas as independent variables that cause action (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Critical constructivists, however, reject positivist epistemology and methods and the possibility of objective knowledge (Campbell 1992). Their goal is to demystify the discursive practices that constitute social rules in order to foster change.

Many constructivists do not consider themselves in either of these camps. Adler (1997) and Ruggie (1998) argue that constructivism offers an important middle ground between positivism and postmodernism. Indeed, Onuf (2002, 126) introduced constructivism to international relations to stake out such a middle ground:

This third way holds that *ontology* is the key. . . . Constructivism challenges the positivist view that language serves *only* to represent the world as it is. Language also serves a constitutive function. By speaking, we make the world what it is. . . . Nevertheless, constructivism is not postmodern because it accepts, as a practical matter, the Enlightenment belief in the possibility of shared knowledge about the world we live in.

Many constructivists work within this middle ground, using a wide variety of methods to analyze the social world (Fierke 2001). Crawford (2002) uses linguistic methods similar to the dialogical analysis presented here to analyze the ethical arguments challenging colonialism. Hopf (2002) uses a phenomenological approach of inductively analyzing texts to recover identities influencing Soviet and Russian foreign policy. Mattern (2001) analyzes “friendship” narrative strategies in the Western security community. Fierke (2000) conceptualizes social interaction as a dialogue to analyze the interaction between Iraq and the United Nations (UN) in the 1990s. Doty (1993) uses a “discursive practices” approach to analyze U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines. Others not explicitly within constructivism also build such methods, including conversation analysis (Fetzer 2000) and event data analysis (Duffy 1994). Dialogical analysis, the method used in this article, is also intended to be within this middle ground.

Another way to categorize constructivism is to focus on ontology, emphasizing the type of social rule—beliefs, norms, or identities—constructivists argue influences world politics. Beliefs, norms, and identities are all types of rules that constitute the social structure of world politics. This categorization is consistent with Habermas’ arguments (discussed in more detail below) for the existence of three fundamental validity claims: truth, appropriateness, and sincerity. Each type of constructivist argument emphasizes one of those fundamental validity claims. Beliefs are social rules that primarily make truth claims about the world. To criticize a belief is to say that it is untrue. Norms are social rules that primarily make appropriateness claims about relationships. To criticize a norm is to say that it is inappropriate. Identities are social rules that primarily make sincerity claims about agents. To criticize a conveyed identity is to say that it is insincere.

² For more comprehensive surveys see Checkel 1998, Farrell 2002, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, and Hopf 1998.

One type of constructivist argument emphasizes truth validity claims by studying the importance of beliefs, or ideas, in world politics. *Beliefs* are shared understandings of the world. For example, Adler (1992) argues that “epistemic communities” create shared interpretations that frame and structure human practices. Bukovansky (2001) analyzes how the ideas championed by the American and French revolutions influence world politics. Other examples include how economic ideas influence economic policy making (Jacobsen 1995) and Third World development policies (Sikkink 1991).

A second type of constructivist argument emphasizes the appropriateness validity claim by studying the importance of norms in world politics. *Norms* are shared understandings of appropriate action. Norms guide action and make action possible, enabling agents to criticize assertions and justify actions. Finnemore (1996) argues that states often follow a “logic of appropriateness” and adhere to existing norms. Kratochwil (1989) demonstrated how norms arise in rationalist environments to enable and guide action. Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) show the conditions under which “transnational advocacy networks” diffuse human rights and environmental norms and influence domestic institutional changes. Other examples include the role of norms in the collapse of the cold war (Kratochwil and Koslowski 1994) and sanctions against South Africa (Klotz 1995).

A third type of constructivist argument emphasizes the sincerity validity claim by studying the importance of identity in world politics. *Identities* tell agents who they are and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and others intelligible. Constructivists argue that interests stem from a particular, constructed representation of the relationship between self and other. Wendt (1995) argues that 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than five North Korean nuclear weapons. A social concept of structure explains this, but a material concept of structure cannot. Other examples include the role of a liberal democratic identity in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Risse-Kappen 1997), the role of Arab nationalism in Middle East alliances (Barnett 1995), and the role of a friendship identity during the Suez Canal Crisis (Mattern 2001).

Many constructivists focus on the interconnections among ideas, norms, and/or identities. For example, Price and Tannewald (1996) argue that the reproduction of norms is inseparable from the construction of identity: “Civilized” states adhere to chemical and nuclear weapons norms because only “barbaric” states violate those norms. Crawford (2002) explicitly analyzes all three validity claims in her analysis of how ethical argumentation influenced decolonization. Weldes (1999) also analyzes all three validity claims and how they influenced U.S. national interests in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Viewed through Habermas, constructivists illustrate how agents conveying validity claims of truth, appropriateness, and sincerity construct the rules governing world politics.

The rule-oriented constructivist approach presented here also includes all three constructivist arguments. Social arrangements include all three types of rules: beliefs, norms, and identities. Global security arrangements include beliefs about the world (e.g., the nature of security), norms about social relationships (e.g., the appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and other (e.g., enemy, rival, citizen, or friend). Finally, dialogical analysis illustrates these three arguments by analyzing the validity claims and counterclaims of the speech acts performed by communicatively rational agents.

RULE-ORIENTED CONSTRUCTIVISM

Rule-oriented constructivists make two fundamental claims (Kubalkova 2001; Onuf 1989, 1998). First, social arrangements, or stable patterns of rules, make up the structures of world politics. Social arrangements are constitutive (they tell us what is possible) and regulative (they tell us what to do). World politics is a complex set of interdependent and overlapping social arrangements. Rules constitute and regulate all aspects of world politics—even “anarchy” is a constitutive social arrangement. Rules make it possible for agents to act: They tell us how the world works, They tell us who we are and who others are, they tell us which social goals are appropriate, and they tell us what we should do. Rules, like language, are not reducible to the meanings that individuals attach to them; they exist in the shared meanings of their users and are reproduced through their practices (Guzzini 2000). And, as Onuf (1989) argues, rules create rule by inherently providing more benefits and privileges to some more than others.

Beliefs, norms, and identities are types of social rules that constitute and regulate world politics. For example, beliefs about whether security is based on military capability or political relationships help constitute the range of possible arms control practices and influence particular arms control negotiations (Frederking 2000). Norms about the appropriateness of weapons of mass destruction help constitute the range of possible war-fighting and deterrence practices and influence particular war and deterrence policies (Price and Tannewald 1996). Identities about racial superiority help constitute the range of possible colonial practices and influence particular decolonization policies and even humanitarian interventions (Crawford 2002). For rule-oriented constructivists these rules explain world politics.

Onuf’s concept of rules is based on Wittgenstein’s (1968) critique of the mirror theory of language, which holds that language is meaningful to the extent that it accurately represents the real world. Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a term is connected to its use in speech, not whether it corresponds exactly to things in the real world. Meaning resides in the everyday use of language as a “form of life”; that is, by context and/or convention. Shared background knowledge is necessary to interpret language. Wittgenstein argues that learning a language is like learning the rules of a game; they help you “go on” by acting in ways that make sense

given the rules of the game. For example, the rules of chess enable one to participate in or to interpret a chess game. This also applies to the rules of global security. Hollis and Smith (1991, 179) put Wittgenstein's position this way: "*Social action can occur only when there is a rule followed, thus identifying what is going on*" (my emphasis). The task for rule-oriented constructivists, then, is to explicate a range of social arrangements and show how the rules within these social arrangements make action intelligible.

The second rule-oriented constructivist claim is that communicatively rational agents use speech acts to construct social rules. This claim builds on both speech act theory and Habermas' notion of communicative rationality. Speech act theory begins with Austin's (1962) demonstration that many verbal statements constitute social action. For example, saying "I do" in a marriage ceremony is a meaningful social act because it invokes social rules of the institution of marriage. Speech act theory argues that language is action; speech acts (promising, declaring, apologizing, etc.) are both plentiful and central to social life. Searle (1995) argues that a touchdown creates six points and a promise creates an obligation because both are "social facts" based on the constitutive rules of football and promising. Onuf uses speech act theory to build his rule-oriented constructivism. Kubalkova (2001, 64) argues,

Onuf's most important contribution to constructivism is his systematic effort to show that rules derive from, work like, and depend on speech acts, and that language and rules together (they can never be separated) are the medium through which agents and structures may be said to constitute each other. . . . To study international relations, or any other aspect of human existence, *is to study language and rules.* (my emphasis)

Onuf uses three types of speech acts to analyze world politics: assertions, directives, and commitments. These speech acts invoke and/or challenge social rules that have the form of speech acts. For example, *assertion rules* convey knowledge about the world. Liberalism, neoclassical economics, and neorealism, for example, all include assertions about world politics. Repeated and unchallenged assertions like "democratic governments do not go to war with one another," "free trade maximizes economic efficiency," and "unipolar systems are less stable than bipolar systems" both enable and justify democratization policies, trade agreements, and arms shipments. *Directive rules* tell us what we must or should do and often include consequences for disregarding them. Examples of speech acts invoking directive rules include the use of force, trade sanctions, and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs. *Commitment rules* are promises to act in a particular way. Examples of speech acts invoking commitment rules are treaties, contracts, and international trade.

Habermas' notion of communicative rationality builds on speech act theory. Habermas argues that communicatively rational agents perform speech acts, convey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claims of others, and act on the basis of mutually recognized

validity claims. Rationality refers to linguistic competence; a rational act effectively conveys validity claims and invokes social rules so that others correctly interpret the speech act. This dialogic process of agents conveying and evaluating the validity claims of each other's speech acts constructs and reconstructs social rules. Rule-oriented constructivists rely on Habermas because only communicatively rational actors can achieve the interpretive accomplishments ascribed to them by constructivist arguments.

Habermas argues that communicatively rational speech acts convey implicit validity claims of truth, appropriateness, and sincerity.³ Consider the three types of speech acts emphasized by Onuf. An assertion (X) conveys a truth claim (X is true), an appropriateness claim (It is right that I assert X), and a sincerity claim (I believe X is true). A directive (You must do X) conveys a truth claim (You can do X), an appropriateness claim (It is right that I direct you to do X), and a sincerity claim (I want you to do X). And a commitment (I promise to do X) conveys a truth claim (I can do X), an appropriateness claim (It is right that I promise to do X), and a sincerity claim (I want to do X). Others may accept or challenge the validity claims on the basis of reasons, requiring a "moment of insight" to justify the claim that goes beyond strategic rationality. All competent speakers intuitively know how to test claims and judge whether certain claims are warranted. The binding force of language comes from others' ability to say "yes" or "no" to the validity claims. When actors agree to the validity claims of a speech act, the binding effect of language motivates them to coordinate subsequent actions with the speaker.⁴

Focusing on the validity claims of speech acts enables constructivists to analyze the process through which speech acts construct and/or challenge social rules. When one performs a speech act and conveys the three validity claims, another can either accept all three claims or challenge one (or all) of the claims. For example, suppose that a teacher asserts the following to her class: "The United States Civil War occurred in the 1900s." The class may not challenge the speech act and add it to their notes(!). Or the class could challenge the sincerity claim: The teacher wanted to see if they were paying attention. Or the class could challenge the truth claim: The Civil War was not fought in the 1900s. Or the class could challenge the appropriateness claim:

³ A fourth validity claim of speech acts studied by linguists, but less useful for dialogic analysis, is "grammaticality."

⁴ Rule-oriented constructivism does not assume that Habermas' notion of communicative action within an ideal speech situation characterizes world politics. For Habermas, communicative action is action oriented toward mutual understanding and coordinated by a consensus on all validity claims. Risse (2000) analyzes whether Habermas' conditions for communicative action (lack of power relations, non-coerced consensus, etc.) resemble interactions in world politics. I do not assert the existence of communicative action in this sense. The Kosovo debate does not illustrate communicative action; the claims about whether intervention is consistent with existing security rules are constantly disputed. What is important, though, is that the agents invoke collective security rules to justify their acts. Their action is meaningful only within the context of (albeit disputed) collective security rules.

Teachers should not lie to their students. In each case the students construct and/or challenge the rules of the student–teacher social arrangement.

The same possibilities structure political interaction. Suppose that one country directs another to destroy its weapons of mass destruction within six months. The other country could accept the validity claims and comply, challenge the sincerity claim (you want a pretext to invade), challenge the normative rightness claim (it is not appropriate for you to determine our military capabilities), or challenge the truth claim (we cannot completely disarm within six months). This view of agency puts language at the heart of social life by emphasizing argumentation, a search for reasoned consensus, and the constitutive effects of an argumentative consensus on agents.

Using speech act theory and communicative rationality to inform a conception of social interaction enables analysts to treat physical, nonverbal acts as if they were speech acts. Of course, something unspoken is not literally a speech act. However, nonverbal acts are often communicatively rational—they make validity claims and invoke and/or challenge social rules—and are thus analyzable as speech acts. The use of force is an extremely important example of such a nonverbal, yet communicatively rational, act. How communicatively rational agents justify and interpret the use of force is central to the ongoing construction of global security rules. As the analysis below shows, how the world interpreted the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo is central to that interaction, as is how the world interprets the use of force in Iraq. Treating nonverbal but communicative acts as speech acts makes a wide variety of social interaction amenable to dialogical analysis.

For example, during the cold war the superpowers understood each other's missile deployments to invoke the deterrence rules constituting the cold war rivalry (Frederking 2000). Missile deployments are intelligible only if they operated as speech acts within a particular social arrangement. Missile deployments do not necessarily invoke deterrence rules; they could, for example, alter the strategic balance or expand a sphere of influence. Indeed, the superpowers criticized all missile deployments interpreted to invoke these latter rules. A missile deployment is understood as a deterrent only when all agree that a certain set of linguistically constructed rules govern their interaction. In this way speech acts, both verbal and nonverbal, are constitutive elements of social reality, and linguistically constructed rules provide meaning to both verbal and nonverbal speech acts.

Rule-oriented constructivism takes the constitutive nature of language and communicative agency seriously. Rule-oriented constructivists analyze the shared context that makes social action possible and meaningful. We make sense of action when there is coherence between the actions of agents (speech acts) and the meaning of their situation (existing social rules). Interpretive approaches like dialogical analysis explain in terms of intelligibility, not “expectability” (Dessler 1999). *To explain an act is to specify the rule(s) an agent*

is following. Rule-oriented constructivism does not assume, as positivist causal arguments do, that language is a mirror and we compare our statements about the world with the world to see whether they correspond. As Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) argue, in constructivist ontology language constitutes social interactions, while in positivist epistemology language is independent of social interactions. Constructivists who espouse positivism ignore the epistemological implications of their ontological arguments (Kratochwil 2000).

A RULE-ORIENTED CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Constructivism is an ontology asserting the existence of social rules; it cannot tell us the content of those rules. This is an empirical question, and constructivists must demonstrate that their theoretical assertions about social rules cohere with the speech acts of real-world agents. This section is a first cut at a rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security. Many important social arrangements also constituting world politics—capitalism, globalization, postcolonialism, international law, and so on—fall outside the scope of this theory but are amenable to a rule-oriented constructivist analysis. The influence of other social arrangements (e.g., the position of Russia in the international economy, domestic politics) in the dispute over Kosovo also falls outside the scope of this analysis.

Wars, rivalries, collective security, and security communities are the “form of life” (Wittgenstein) or “life-world” (Habermas) or “social facts” (Searle) of global security. These social arrangements constitute global security in the way that the rules of chess constitute chess; participants use them to “go on” and act in intelligible ways. Sometimes one social arrangement is more institutionalized than the others; sometimes the social arrangements are contested and fluid; and sometimes social arrangements are more institutionalized in different geographic areas (e.g., war in the Middle East, rivalry in South Asia, security community in Europe). The operation of overlapping social arrangements constituting global security is similar to Fierke's (n.d.) argument that opposing “logics” may coexist within a historical context. What constitutes rational action depends on which logic is governing the particular interaction.

A first cut at stating ideal-typical rules in these social arrangements is in Table 1. Each social arrangement has six fundamental rules that constitute and regulate action: (1) identity, (2) autonomy, (3) the nature of security, (4) deterrence, (5) enforcement, and (6) the use of force. The identity rule establishes agent identities as enemies, rivals, citizens, or friends. The autonomy rule establishes the extent to which the autonomy of both state and nonstate agents is either threatened by others or limited by mutual obligations. The security rule establishes the belief that security is acquired by either relative military capability or friendly political relationships. The deterrence rule establishes a dominant normative expectation either to recognize the autonomy

TABLE 1. Global Security Social Arrangements

	War	Rivalry	Collective Security	Security Community
Rule 1—Identity	We are enemies	We are rivals	We are fellow citizens	We are friends
Rule 2—Autonomy	We do not recognize the autonomy of others	We recognize the autonomy of others	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the community's rules	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow the community's rules
Rule 3—Security	Survival is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability	Security is based on political relationships
Rule 4—Deterrence	You must surrender	Do not attack me	Do not break the rules of our community	Do not break the rules of our community
Rule 5—Enforcement	We will attack until you surrender	We will retaliate if you violate our sovereignty	We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community	We will resolve conflicts peacefully
Rule 6—Use of force	The use of force is always necessary to resolve conflicts	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is not acceptable

of others or to follow the rules of the community. The enforcement rule establishes the ultimate method of resolving conflict. The use of force rule establishes the extent to which force is required to resolve conflict. Variations of these rules constitute the ideal-typical social arrangements of war, rivalry, collective security and security communities.

These rules are not intended to be a priori assertions of social reality. They comprise a tentative rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security. They may not cohere with future empirical research and have to be abandoned. But they are a recognizable, plausible place to start. The contents of the rules are culled from major scholars of international politics, including Alker's (1996, 370) work on security systems, Onuf's (1989) "mutual insecurity system," Schelling's (1960) theories of deterrence and arms agreements, and Deutsch's (1957) work on security communities. Wendt's (1999) three cultures of world politics—Hobbesian war, Lockean rivalry, and Kantian security communities—heavily influence these rules. Wendt's characterization of Kantian culture, however, includes both collective security (in which the use of force is acceptable) and security communities (in which the use of force is not acceptable). I argue that this distinction warrants separate social arrangements; moreover, as I argue below, this distinction is essential to understand the construction of post-cold war collective security.

In war, agents identify each other as enemies (rule 1), perhaps even an enemy that threatens their existence. Agents do not recognize the autonomy of others or perhaps even the right of others to exist (rule 2). Survival demands a military capability greater than one's immediate enemies (rule 3) because the military capabilities of others are interpreted as a threat to one's existence. The directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), supported by the commitment to attack until the other does surrender (rule 5). Because others are enemies with the military capability to threaten one's existence, the use of force is considered inevitable, necessary, and appropriate (rule 6). War orients agents to act with

great mistrust and hostility towards others, including interactions like traditional nation-state warfare, Israeli-Palestinian relations, imperialism, and (perhaps) the ongoing "war" on terrorism.

In rivalries, agents identify each other as rivals (rule 1). They attempt to increase their security through joining alliances (rule 3) and performing classic deterrence threats (rules 4 and 5). Agents do recognize the autonomy of others (rule 2), but the rivalry constituting the system sometimes leads to violence to settle disputes (rule 6). War is thus an accepted but limited practice to end an attempt by any state to dominate world politics. Rivalry orients agents to act with mistrust and caution toward others, including interactions like power balancing, alliance systems, security dilemmas, arms races, and spheres of influence regimes. The cold war was a prototypical rivalry social arrangement.

In collective security arrangements, agents identify each other as citizens (rule 1) who are obliged to uphold agreed-upon rules of behavior (rule 2) and act collectively to punish those who do not uphold those rules (rule 3). There is no presumption that actors will universally agree to the directive rules (rule 4); an enforcement mechanism that includes military force is thus needed to punish any transgressors of the rules (rule 5). A collective security arrangement may enforce only the rule of state sovereignty, or it could enforce rules regarding weapons proliferation, terrorism, human rights, and so on. The use of force is considered to be sometimes necessary and acceptable to enforce community rules (rule 6). Collective security orients agents to act with a sense of duty to generate rules of peaceful behavior and punish those who break the rules. Through the explosion of multilateral treaties, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping missions, and nongovernmental organizations, agents have been slowly institutionalizing a global collective security arrangement in the post-cold war world.

In security communities, agents identify each other as friends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict (rule 1). Agents in security communities have a strong

consensus about the obligation to follow the rules of their community (rule 2), and they engage in peaceful, multilateral decision making to ensure security through political relationships (rule 3). The directive rule to follow the rules of community does exist in security communities (rule 4), but enforcement does not include the possibility of force (rules 5 and 6). Given the lower level of threat in these social arrangements, security often refers to alternative security issues like the environment and the economy (Adler and Barnett 1998, Deutsch 1957). Security communities orient agents to act with great trust and “we-ness” toward others, as in the relations between members of the European Union.

The first three rules—regarding the nature of identity, autonomy, and security in the world—are distinct across social arrangements. These rules constitute the core differences among the social arrangements. Agents establish which social arrangement is governing their interaction through speech acts implicitly conveying the validity of these rules. In war, agents are enemies that do not recognize the autonomy of others and must survive by acquiring greater relative military capability. In rivalries, agents are rivals that recognize autonomy but act to ensure security by acquiring, unilaterally or through alliances, greater relative military capability. In collective security arrangements, agents are citizens whose sovereignty is limited by obligations to follow community rules and to use multilateral military force to ensure compliance with those rules. In security communities, agents are friends whose sovereignty is limited by obligations to peacefully follow the rules of the community.

However, rules 4–6—regarding deterrence, enforcement, and the use of force—overlap across social arrangements, and this overlap can lead to conflict between agents over the applicable social arrangement. For example, rule 4 is identical in collective security arrangements and security communities (“Do not break the rules of our community”). Rule 5 is similar—though not identical—in collective security arrangements and rivalries. In rivalries, the only agreed-upon rule of the community is state sovereignty, and alliance mechanisms enforce that rule. Collective security arrangements represent an alternative mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules that often extend beyond state sovereignty to include human rights, etc. Most importantly, rule 6 justifies the use of force in war, collective security arrangements, and rivalries. The use of force in and of itself does not tell agents whether war, rivalry, or collective security rules govern their interaction; agents must justify and interpret which rules the use of force invokes at any particular time. Conflicts may develop if agents dispute which rules the use of force invokes. I argue that this overlap in the use of force rule helps explain the disputes over Kosovo and Iraq.

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS

Dialogical analysis posits the existence of social rules, communicatively rational agents, and the argumenta-

tion of validity claims. It is one method to illustrate constructivist arguments about the role of norms, beliefs, and identity in world politics. Dialogical analysis is an interpretive approach, explaining action by specifying the rules agents follow; that is, by showing the coherence between speech acts and rules within a particular social arrangement. Dialogical analysis proceeds in four steps (Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker 1998; Frederking 2000). First, one specifies the background knowledge necessary to understand the interaction. Second, one accumulates explicit speech acts that conveyed meaning during the interaction. Third, one conducts a pragmatic analysis of the speech acts, deriving the implicitly conveyed propositions during the interaction. Fourth, one constructs a formal argument analysis from the inventory of pragmatic propositions to isolate consensual and disputed claims during the interaction.

The analyst first specifies background knowledge, most importantly a set of rules governing the interaction. These rules are the theory asserted by the analyst; dialogical analysis is a methodological tool to provide empirical evidence for the existence of these rules. The social arrangements of war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities asserted in the section above are the background knowledge for the dialogic analysis of the veto power dispute over Kosovo. Other background knowledge used to support interpretive inferences is also in the narrative below.

The analyst next accumulates explicit speech acts during the interaction, including nonverbal acts that convey meaning, justifying the speech acts chosen with defensible selection criteria. The speech acts in the analysis are not, in the statistical sense, a random sample of all possible speech acts during the interaction. This step often requires a reconstruction of the dialogue from public sources. No algorithmic coding rules exist to transform textual data into analyzable speech acts. Perhaps such rules are even impossible to develop. The analyst simply generates the most relevant speech acts with the same interpretive ability of all communicatively rational agents.

The bulk of dialogical analysis is the pragmatic analysis. Pragmatics is the field of linguistics that relates the meaning of language to the context of its use. In the pragmatic analysis, one specifies the implicit propositions conveyed by speech acts given the context of the interaction.⁵ Speakers convey and hearers infer more than uttered sentences; they make pragmatic inferences that enable them to understand one another and coordinate action. For example, Grice (1957) argues that speakers use rational principles of conversation in all exchanges, including the following maxims.⁶

⁵ Pragmatically conveyed propositions include reflexive intentions, implicatures, presuppositions, and logical entailments. For reasons of space, the analysis presented here includes only implicatures. See Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker (1998) and Frederking (2000) for a discussion of how to generate a full-fledged pragmatic analysis.

⁶ Future work on this method will explore whether these maxims apply to all political rhetoric. More generally constructivists must deal with rationalist critics who emphasize “cheap talk” and realist critics who emphasize “uncertainty” as reasons not to rely on a linguistic conception of social interaction.

(1) *The maxim of quality*—Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence. (2) *The maxim of quantity*—Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange. (3) *The maxim of relevance*—Make your contributions relevant. (4) *The maxim of manner*—Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. Actors infer *conversational implicatures*, or the implicit contents of speech acts, by assuming that speakers adhere to these maxims.

The propositions generated by the pragmatic analysis convey validity claims of truth, appropriateness, and sincerity. When one agrees to a speech act, one concedes all three validity claims. When one disputes a speech act, one disputes (at least) one of these claims. As the interaction continues, the pragmatic analysis specifies all validity claims and counterclaims. For example, consider the following exchange between the United States and Afghanistan.

United States: Extradite the responsible parties immediately.

Afghanistan: We will try them under Islamic law.

The pragmatic analysis specifies truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims conveyed by the speech acts. The United States directive toward Afghanistan conveys implicit claims of sincerity (The United States sincerely directs Afghanistan to extradite the responsible parties), normative rightness (It is appropriate that the United States direct Afghanistan to extradite the responsible parties), and truth (It is true that Afghanistan can extradite the responsible parties). The directive is coherent with collective security rules: The United States is directing Afghanistan to follow the community's rules against terrorism.

When Afghanistan refuses the directive, it disputes the United States' appropriateness claim and thus rejects the applicability of collective security rules. Instead, its claims of sincerity (Afghanistan sincerely intends to try them under Islamic law), appropriateness (It is appropriate that Afghanistan try them under Islamic law), and truth (It is true that Afghanistan can try them under Islamic law) are most coherent within a rivalry social arrangement. Afghanistan invokes the stronger sovereignty norms coherent in rivalries rather than the more limited sovereignty coherent with obligations to enforce collective security rules. Different understandings about which social arrangement is relevant generate the competing propositions in this dispute. Dialogical analysis is particularly appropriate to illustrate conflicts such as this in which agents invoke different social arrangements to justify their action.

The final step is an argument analysis that isolates and formalizes the disputed propositions and thus disputed social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis. The argument analysis extends Alker's (1988) approach in his dialectical analysis of the Melian Dialogue, which in turn builds on Rescher's (1977) model of argumentation. In Rescher's model, a proponent defends and an opponent challenges the truth of a thesis, and the argumentative stance is oriented toward winning the debate. In the argument analysis, agents

instead negotiate the truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims of speech acts, and the communicative stance is oriented toward constructing a valid social arrangement. Each claim in the argument analysis specifies (at least) one proposition in the pragmatic analysis. When one challenges the validity claim of another, the pragmatic analysis shows the dispute as contradictory propositions. When and if one "cancels" an earlier claim and ends a pragmatic dispute, the analyst updates the set of contested validity claims. Dialogical analysis can thus account for the changing construction of social rules both within and across social arrangements.

Constructivists can use dialogical analysis to illustrate their arguments about the importance of beliefs, norms, and identities in world politics. In the above example, constructivists interested in beliefs would focus on disputed truth claims about whether security is based on military capability or political commitments. Constructivists interested in norms would focus on the disputed appropriateness claims about whether Afghanistan is obligated to follow the rules of the international community. Constructivists interested in identity would focus on the disputed sincerity claims about whether the United States and Afghanistan are citizens or rivals. Dialogical analysis illustrates constructivist ontology by showing how communicatively rational agents convey validity claims that construct and/or challenge social rules.

Dialogical analysis takes the linguistic turn seriously. It is based on linguistics, and language (like the world) is ambiguous. Other analysts could use this method to analyze the Kosovo debate and assert different global security rules, select different speech acts, infer different pragmatic propositions, and reach contradictory conclusions. But dialogical analysis is rigorous enough that such disputes are transparent and explicit: We can then argue about the greater coherence of competing theory (background knowledge) and evidence (speech acts and pragmatic propositions). Dialogical analysis is deductive, is capable of replication, and relies on logic and empirical evidence for its conclusions. It is consistent with the notion that a community of interpreters can agree to the most coherent explanation and that those explanations can help us "go on" in that world and act in intelligible ways.

INTERPRETING KOSOVO: A DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VETO POWER DISPUTE

Background Knowledge

The background knowledge for this analysis is the four ideal-typical global security social arrangements discussed above and more particularly a slow transition from a cold war rivalry arrangement to a post-cold war collective security arrangement. Many indicators of "global governance"—such as multilateral treaties, international organizations, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping operations, nongovernmental organizations, and diffusion of human rights norms—have dramatically increased in number since the end of the cold war. Within this context, the international

community has struggled to agree on the appropriate implementation of the fledgling collective security rules: Under what conditions should the international community use force to punish those who violate the rules?

When widespread evidence arose of human rights abuses by Serbs against Albanian Muslims in the Serbian province of Kosovo, many in the West advocated the punishment of Milosevic and the Serbs for violating the human rights rules of the international community. Russia and China, however, promised to veto any Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force. The dispute between the veto powers was whether the collective security rules emerging since the end of the cold war, together with emerging rules obligating states to limit human rights abuses, were sufficient to authorize NATO action. Critics of the use of force on the right (Waller, Drezov, and Gokay 2001), critics on the left (Chomsky 1999), and supporters (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000) all recognized the precedent-setting implications of Kosovo on the post-cold war construction of global security rules.

Speech Acts

The six speech acts in the analysis, as well as the narrative information in this section, are reconstructed from accounts of the dispute in the *New York Times*. The speech acts below were included because they represent official positions (all were conveyed by either the president or the top diplomat in each country) and focus on the relevant issue of how to implement collective security rules appropriately.

1. *United States*: If Yugoslavia continues to violate the human rights of the Kosovo Albanians, NATO will use military force against Yugoslavia.⁷
2. *Russia/China*: The Security Council has not authorized the use of force.⁸
3. *United States*: Humanitarian concerns justify NATO use of force.⁹
4. *Russia/China*: Any NATO use of force would threaten international order.¹⁰
5. *United States*: NATO initiates a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia.
6. *Russia/China*: NATO is engaging in unprovoked aggression against a sovereign state.¹¹

The United States asserted speech act 1 when violence between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians escalated

in early 1998. In September the Security Council demanded that Yugoslavia withdraw security forces from Kosovo, enable monitors to return to Kosovo, facilitate the return of refugees, and begin political negotiations with the Albanian Muslims. Russia voted for both resolutions but argued that there was no explicit authorization of the use of force and that further Security Council action was needed to authorize the use of force. China abstained on both resolutions, arguing that Kosovo was an internal matter and Yugoslavia was acting within its legitimate rights. Russia and China abstained on a third resolution in October 1998 endorsing the Holbrooke cease-fire agreement, arguing that they did not consider Resolution 1203 sufficient to authorize the use of force (speech act 2).

When Serb abuses in Kosovo increased in March 1999, the United States (speech act 3) argued that the overwhelming humanitarian crisis justified intervention even without explicit Security Council authorization. Clinton (1999) asserted a "moral imperative" for NATO to end the atrocities, arguing that "if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing." Albright (1999) argued that human rights violations are not domestic matters but legitimate concerns of the international community; NATO has the right to defend the stability of Europe. State sovereignty in the post-cold war world is limited because "legitimate" states ensure basic human rights. States that perpetrate ethnic cleansing, thus, forfeit their right to territorial integrity.

Russia and China continued to criticize NATO policy (speech act 4). Yeltsin argued that NATO action would "destabilize the situation in the Balkans with unforeseeable consequences for all of Europe." Both argued that invoking a humanitarian crisis to justify unilateral armed intervention violated the UN charter. Nevertheless, NATO commenced the bombing campaign (speech act 5), which Russia and China denounced (speech act 6). Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivan said, "Russia is deeply outraged by NATO's military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, an action that is nothing short of undisguised aggression. . . . Only the UN Security Council has the right to decide (if) the use of force should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. . . . The true aims are obvious. To impose on the world the political, military, and economic dictate of the United States."

Pragmatic Analysis

The pragmatic analysis generates all implicitly conveyed propositions during the interaction. These contextual propositions convey truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims that invoke and/or challenge existing social rules. The pragmatic analysis specifies how each speech act conveyed validity claims and invoked social rules. Communicatively rational actors convey many implicit propositions during an interaction, and many are consensual and/or irrelevant to the specific issue of how to implement collective security rules. For

⁷ Myers, Steven Lee, and Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Is Stepping Up Military Threats Against the Serbs," *New York Times*, 7 October 1998, sec. A1.

⁸ Bohlen, Celestine, "Russia Vows to Block the UN from Backing Attack on Serbs," *New York Times*, 7 October 1998, sec. A10.

⁹ See Clinton 1999.

¹⁰ Gordon, Michael, "Conflict in the Balkans: Russian Anger Tempered by the Need for Cash," *New York Times*, 25 March 1999, sec. A1.

¹¹ Eckholm, Eric, "Conflict in the Balkans: Bombing May Have Hardened China's Line," *New York Times*, 18 May 1999, sec. A11.

TABLE 2. Pragmatic Analysis of the Great Power Interaction over Kosovo

	Speech Act
1	<p><i>U.S.:</i> If Yugoslavia continues to violate the human rights of the Kosovar Albanians, NATO will use military force against Yugoslavia.</p> <p><i>Speech act:</i> Directive</p> <p><i>Implicature:</i></p> <p>1a. Do not break the rules of our community. (CS4)</p> <p>1b. The NATO directive to Yugoslavia not to break the rules of our community is appropriate. (CS4N)</p> <p>1c. We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community. (CS5)</p> <p>1d. The NATO threat to retaliate against Yugoslavia is appropriate. (CS5N)</p> <p>1e. The use of force is acceptable to resolve the conflict. (CS6)</p>
2	<p><i>Russia/China:</i> The Security Council has not authorized the use of force.</p> <p><i>Speech act:</i> Assertion</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i></p> <p>2a. The NATO directive to Yugoslavia not to break the rules of the international community is not appropriate. (~CS4N)</p> <p>2b. The NATO threat to retaliate against Yugoslavia is not appropriate. (~CS5N)</p> <p>2c. The use of force is not acceptable to resolve this conflict. (~CS6N)</p>
3	<p><i>U.S.:</i> Humanitarian concerns justify NATO use of force.</p> <p><i>Speech act:</i> Assertion</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i></p> <p>3a. NATO countries are acting as citizens in our community. (CS1)</p> <p>3b. NATO is obligated to enforce the rules of our community. (CS2)</p> <p>3c. NATO is establishing security through a multilateral alliance commitment. (CS3)</p>
4	<p><i>Russia/China:</i> Any NATO use of force would threaten international security.</p> <p><i>Speech act:</i> Assertion</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i></p> <p>4a. NATO countries are not acting as a citizen in our community. (~CS1T)</p> <p>4b. NATO is not obligated to enforce the rules of our community. (~CS2T)</p> <p>4c. NATO is not establishing security through an alliance commitment. (~CS3T)</p>
5	<p><i>U.S.:</i> NATO initiates a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia.</p> <p><i>Speech act:</i> Punishment (directive)</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i></p> <p>5a. NATO is sincerely acting as a citizen in our community. (CS1S)</p> <p>5b. NATO is sincerely enforcing the rules of our community. (CS2S)</p> <p>5c. NATO is sincerely establishing security through an alliance commitment. (CS3)</p>
6	<p><i>Russia/China:</i> NATO is engaged in unprovoked aggression against a sovereign state.</p> <p><i>Speech Act:</i> Assertion</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i></p> <p>6a. NATO is a political rival (enemy?). (R1 or W1?)</p> <p>6b. NATO does not recognize Yugoslavia's sovereign rights to territorial integrity. (W2)</p> <p>6c. NATO is trying to increase its relative alliance military capability. (R3)</p>

Note: The notation in parentheses after each proposition signifies the social rule and or validity claim invoked by that proposition: CS = collective security, R = rivalry, W = war; 1 = identity rule, 2 = autonomy rule, 3 = nature of security rule, 4 = deterrence rule, 5 = enforcement rule, 6 = use of force rule; T = truth claim, S = sincerity claim, N = normative rightness or appropriateness claim. For example, (CS5) means that the preceding proposition invokes the collective security enforcement rule, and (CS5N) means that the preceding proposition claims that the collective security enforcement rule is normatively appropriate.

reasons of space, then, the pragmatic analysis in Table 2 includes only the disputed propositions conveyed during the interaction.¹² Readers should refer to Table 2 throughout the discussion in this section.

¹² A more complete analysis, including reflexive intentions, implicatures, and presuppositions, as well as explanations for each reference, is at http://faculty.mckendree.edu/brian_frederking/kosovo.htm.

The pragmatic analysis shows that throughout the interaction the United States invoked collective security rules, and Russia and China disputed the validity of those collective security rules. Within this overall pattern, however, each exchange in the interaction generated a set of escalated disputes. In speech acts 1 and 2, Russia and China disputed the appropriateness of United States-invoked collective security deterrence, enforcement, and use of force rules. Here all veto

powers justified their speech acts with collective security rules, arguing that the other is inappropriately interpreting those rules. In speech acts 3 and 4, Russia and China disputed the truth of United States-invoked collective security identity, autonomy, and the nature of security rules. Here Russia and China began to dispute whether the United States would be actually invoking collective security rules with a use of force. And in speech acts 5 and 6, Russia and China disputed the sincerity of United States-invoked collective security identity, autonomy, and the nature of security rules. Here Russia and China argued that the United States indeed invoked war and/or rivalry rules with its use of force. By the end of the interaction, the veto powers had different understandings of which social arrangement governed their interaction. I discuss each exchange in turn.

In speech acts 1 and 2 the veto powers disagreed about whether the U.S. directive to Yugoslavia appropriately invoked collective security rules. With its directive to Yugoslavia in speech act 1, the United States invoked the collective security deterrence rule with proposition 1a; it invoked the collective security enforcement rule with proposition 1c; and it invoked the collective security use of force rule with proposition 1e. With their assertion that the Security Council did not authorize the use of force in speech act 2, Russia and China disputed the appropriateness of the United States invoking collective security rules to justify its directive to Yugoslavia. They disputed the appropriateness of the United States invoking the collective security deterrence rule with proposition 2a; they disputed the appropriateness of the United States invoking the collective security enforcement rule with proposition 2b; and they disputed the appropriateness of the United States invoking the collective security use of force rule with proposition 2c.

In this first exchange, the veto powers understood collective security rules to govern their interaction; all invoked collective security rules to justify their acts. However, Russia and China argued that the United States and NATO were not following those rules properly. One could interpret the Russian and Chinese criticism as intended to thwart the development of an emerging human rights norm that would justify humanitarian intervention given internal problems with Chechnya and Tibet (Carpenter 2000). While China did have these concerns, Russia had previously supported Security Council action regarding human rights. Of the 32 Security Council resolutions regarding Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor, Russia voted yes 31 times and abstained only once (Heinze and Borer 2002). Given this context, I interpret the criticism to stem from Russia's insistence that the collective security rules required a legal process based on Security Council action. Russia was preserving its role in world politics by asserting the primacy of the Security Council, not challenging the validity of an emerging human rights norm.

In speech acts 3 and 4 the veto powers deepened their dispute about whether NATO policy appropriately implements collective security rules. The U.S. assertion in speech act 3 conveyed a substantive, moral concep-

tion of collective security. NATO intervention was both legally and morally justified because it intended to avert humanitarian disaster and was consistent with Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203. Within the context of collective security, it argued for a rule enabling regional enforcement without explicit Security Council authorization. With these arguments, the United States invoked the collective security identity rule with proposition 3a; it invokes the collective security autonomy rule with proposition 3b; and it invokes the collective security nature of security rule with proposition 3c.

Russia and China countered the United States' moral and substantive conception of collective security with a procedural conception of collective security in speech act 4. Any use of force without Security Council authorization, they argued, threatened international peace and security. With this assertion, they challenged U.S. truth claims that NATO was acting as a citizen in the international community (proposition 4a), that NATO was enforcing the rules of the international community (proposition 4b), and that NATO was attempting to establish security through a multilateral commitment to use military capability (proposition 4c). Here the veto powers disputed truth claims about collective security rules 1–3; note that rules 1–3 are the core rules that differentiate the four global security social arrangements. With this exchange, then, Russia and China disputed that NATO policy invoked collective security rules. They began to suggest that perhaps the NATO use of force invoked a different social arrangement.

In speech acts 5 and 6 the conflict between the veto powers escalated dramatically. I treat the NATO bombing campaign as speech act 5. Within the context of the earlier interaction, the use of force defended the United States truth claims conveyed in speech act 3: NATO was indeed a citizen in our community (proposition 5a); NATO was indeed enforcing the rules of the community (proposition 5b); and NATO was indeed establishing security through an alliance commitment (proposition 5c). With speech act 6, Russia and China disputed the sincerity of U.S. claims that the NATO use of force invoked collective security rules. Instead they argued that NATO use of force is actually unprovoked aggression, invoking the rivalry (and perhaps war?) identity rule in proposition 6a, the war autonomy rule that NATO was violating Yugoslav sovereignty in proposition 6b, and the rivalry nature of security rule that NATO was trying to increase its relative alliance military capability.

With this exchange the veto powers completely disagreed about which social arrangement governed their interaction. While the United States continued to invoke collective security rules, Russia and China argued that it was trying to create a "NATO-centered Europe." They were no longer criticizing NATO for inappropriately implementing collective security rules; they now charged NATO with blatantly invoking rivalry and perhaps even war rules. For example, Russia charged the United States with violating the UN Charter, and China claimed that the United States was using pretexts like human rights to begin a new form of colonialism as part of a global strategy for world hegemony.

Consistent with rivalry rules, Russia and China responded to the NATO use of force in Kosovo by attempting to increase their relative military capability. Russia sent a reconnaissance ship into the Mediterranean, revised its military doctrine to reinvigorate nuclear weapons capability, signed joint defense initiatives with Belarus and others, held war games in the Balkans, expelled NATO representatives from Moscow, suspended cooperation in the Partnership for Peace program, withdrew its mission and students from Brussels and NATO countries, and weakened communication between Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia. The Duma postponed ratification of the START II agreement (the December 1998 bombing in Iraq also caused a postponement of that vote). Although Russia never violated UN sanctions and sent direct military aid to Yugoslavia, the Duma voted 279 to 30 to send military aid and advisers. China suspended military ties with the United States and all negotiations with the United States over human rights issues. In June 1999, Russia and China announced that they would foster a "strategic partnership" to offset the global dominance of the United States. All of these responses invoked rivalry rules, particularly the rule that security is based on relative alliance military capability.

Argument Analysis

The argument analysis in Table 3 isolates and formalizes the disputes generated by the pragmatic analysis. It lists three sets of interconnected disputes discussed in the above section: disputed social rules, disputed validity claims, and disputed propositions. In speech acts 1 and 2, Russia and China contested the appropriateness of NATO's directive to Yugoslavia. Here the veto powers disagreed about how to implement the collective security rules regarding deterrence, enforcement, and the use of force. In speech acts 3 and 4, Russia and China disputed the truth of U.S. claims that NATO was enforcing collective security rules. Here the veto powers disagreed about the core rules of each social arrangement: the identity, sovereignty, and nature of

security rules. In speech acts 5 and 6, Russia and China disputed NATO's sincerity that it was enforcing collective security. Here the agents disputed which social arrangement governed the interaction, with the United States citing collective security rules and Russia/China claiming that the United States is actually invoking rivalry and perhaps even war rules.

The overlap in rules between the social arrangements fueled this conflict. Specifically, the use of force rule—"the use of force is often necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts"—holds in collective security arrangements, rivalry, and war. NATO's use of force was consistent with both U.S. justifications that NATO was invoking collective security rules and Russian and Chinese criticisms that NATO was invoking rivalry and/or rules. For the United States, NATO use of force was the appropriate way to enforce community rules regarding human rights. For Russia and China, NATO use of force was at least an attempt to dominate a global rivalry and at most an act of war consistent with imperialism. Both were rational interpretations from within the social arrangements each claimed were operative.

If interpretive methods explain action by specifying the rule(s) agents follow, then the dialogical analysis of the veto power conflict over Kosovo enables one to explain U.S. acts by specifying the collective security rules its speech acts invoked. Similarly, one can explain Russian and Chinese acts by specifying the rivalry and war rules their speech acts invoked. Finally, one can explain the entire conflict by specifying the difference and the overlap between the social arrangements.

Kosovo and Iraq

The debates about the use of force in Kosovo and Iraq do not seem similar on the surface. Kosovo was about human rights abuses and Iraq was about nonproliferation. But at the pragmatic level of the rules constituting global security, there are many stunning similarities. The three-stage Kosovo interaction occurred again regarding intervention in Iraq. First, there was a dispute about how to implement collective security given non-compliance with community rules: The United States

TABLE 3. Argument Analysis

Speech Act	U.S.	Russia/China
1. If Yugoslavia... , NATO will...	I1	
2. No SC authorization...		~N1/2 & I2
3. Humanitarian concerns...	N1/3 & I3	
4. Force would threaten order...		~T3/4 & I4
5. NATO bombing campaign	T3/I5 & I5	
6. NATO bombing threatens...		~S5/6 & I6
Disputed Social Rules	Disputed Validity Claim	Disputed Propositions
CS4, CS5, CS6	N1	1b-2a, 1d-2b, 1e-2c
CS1, CS2, CS3	T3	3a-4a, 3b-4b, 3c-4c
R1(W1?)/CS1, W2/CS2, W3/CS3	S5	5a-6a, 5b-6b, 5c-6c

Note: The notation in the argument analysis should be read as follows: An exclamation point signifies the performance of a speech act, S signifies the conveyance of a sincerity claim, N signifies the conveyance of a normative rightness or appropriateness claim, T signifies the conveyance of a truth claim, ~ signifies a negation, and/signifies a ceteris paribus argument, "All things being equal, this is normally the case..."

(and Britain) advocated the use of force, and Russia and China (and France) advocated continued weapons inspections. Second, there was further debate about whether the use of force would actually invoke collective security rules: The United States and Britain argued that they would enforce the Security Council resolutions and disarm Iraq if the UN was unwilling to do so, with Russia, China, and France arguing that any use of force without Security Council authorization would violate international law and undermine international peace and security. Finally, there was a more fundamental disagreement about which social arrangement governed the interaction: The United States began the war in Iraq, and Russia, China, and France contended that the use of force deliberately invoked war rules because the United States never sincerely wanted a UN-centered enforcement of community rules.

The similarities between the two interactions also extend to the more detailed disputes. Table 4 lists both the disputed propositions generated by the pragmatic analysis of the Kosovo dispute and the restated proposi-

tions replacing "NATO" with "U.S." and "Yugoslavia" with "Iraq." The latter disputes reasonably characterize not only the global debate about the war in Iraq, but also the argumentative tasks facing the United States if it continues to widen its war on terrorism. The overall coherence of these disputed propositions regarding war in Iraq strongly suggests that the events of September 11 did not fundamentally change world politics. Instead, September 11 exacerbated already existing tensions prominently illustrated in the Kosovo interaction.

The reason for the similarities is the overlapping nature of the social arrangements constituting global security rules, particularly the use of force rule that exists in war, rivalry, and collective security arrangements. The United States was (again) trying to convince the international community that its use of force invokes collective security rules. Many in the international community were (again) interpreting the use of force to invoke war rules. Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a term is defined by its use, by how speakers understand

TABLE 4. Disputed Claims Over the Use of Force in Kosovo and Iraq

Security Rule	Kosovo		Iraq	
	United States	Russia/China	United States	Critics of War in Iraq
Identity	NATO countries are acting as citizens in our community	NATO countries are not acting as a citizen in our community	The U.S. is acting as a citizen in our community	The U.S. is not acting as a citizen in our community
Identity	NATO is sincerely acting as a citizen in our community	NATO is a rival (enemy?)	The U.S. is sincerely acting as a citizen in our community	The U.S. is a rival (enemy?)
Autonomy	NATO is obligated to enforce the rules of our community	NATO is not obligated to enforce the rules of our community	The U.S. is obligated to enforce the rules of our community	The U.S. is not obligated to enforce the rules of our community
Autonomy	NATO is sincerely enforcing the rules of our community	NATO does not recognize Yugoslav autonomy	The U.S. is sincerely enforcing the rules of our community	The U.S. does not recognize Iraqi autonomy
Nature of security	NATO is establishing security through an alliance commitment	NATO is not establishing security through an alliance commitment	The U.S. is establishing security through an alliance commitment	The U.S. is not establishing security through an alliance commitment
Nature of security	NATO is sincerely establishing security through an alliance commitment	NATO is trying to increase its relative alliance military capability	The U.S. is sincerely establishing security through an alliance commitment	The U.S. is trying to increase its relative alliance military capability
Deterrence	The NATO directive to Yugoslavia not to break the rules of our community is appropriate	The NATO directive to Yugoslavia not to break the rules of our community is not appropriate	The U.S. directive to Iraq not to break the rules of our community is appropriate	The U.S. directive to Iraq not to break the rules of our community is not appropriate
Enforcement	The NATO threat to retaliate against Yugoslavia is appropriate	The NATO threat to retaliate against Yugoslavia is not appropriate	The U.S. threat to retaliate against Iraq is appropriate	The U.S. threat to retaliate against Iraq is not appropriate
Use of force	The use of force is acceptable to resolve this conflict	The use of force is not acceptable to resolve this conflict	The use of force against Iraq is acceptable to resolve this conflict	The use of force against Iraq is not acceptable to resolve this conflict

and use the term. In the post-cold war construction of collective security, the meaning of the use of force is defined by how agents understand the act. How will the international community interpret the use of force? Does it invoke collective security rules or war rules? In both the Kosovo and the Iraq debates, both sides asserted the validity of collective security rules but differed on whether U.S. use of force actually invoked those rules.

CONCLUSION

This paper makes three main contributions. First, it contributes to the constructivist research program by offering a tentative rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security asserting the existence of war, rivalry, collective security, and security community social arrangements. Second, it adds dialogical analysis to the growing toolkit of interpretive methods, using it to study the veto power debate over Kosovo. Third, it contributes to the policy debates about U.S. foreign policy after September 11, suggesting that preemption policies are premised on a flawed assumption that the events of September 11 fundamentally changed world politics. These three contributions are consistent with the tasks of rule-oriented constructivism: (1) assert the existence of social arrangements, (2) show how these rules make action intelligible, and (3) help agents "go on" in the world.

Within the context of constructivism, the rule-oriented theory of global security offered here modifies Wendt's argument for "three cultures" of world politics. Conceptualizing global security as constituted by four overlapping sets of social arrangements is necessary to understand the dominant security trends since the end of the cold war: movement away from the cold war rivalry and the gradual institutionalization of collective security rules. Wendt's Kantian culture includes both collective security and security communities, which are differentiated by (among other rules) the necessity and acceptability of the use of force. As the analysis above shows, however, the crux of the debates over Kosovo and Iraq is how the international community interprets the use of force in the post-cold war world. While the use of force is central to collective security, it is not conceivable in security communities. Wendt's Kantian culture hides this important distinction and thus cannot account for the argument presented here. Wendt's suggestions that world politics may be slowly moving toward a Kantian culture ignore the autonomy of collective security arrangements as an intermediate step in that process.

Dialogical analysis helps make the speech acts constructing post-cold war security intelligible by showing those acts to be logically consistent with the social rules—beliefs, norms, and identities—constituting global security structures. Dialogical analysis is one interpretive method capable of illustrating constructivist arguments because it adequately captures the social ontology of constructivism. It analyzes social interaction as a dialogue between communicatively rational

actors who assert validity claims and evaluate others' validity claims. Through this interaction, linguistically competent agents challenge and/or perpetuate the rules constituting world politics. It does not assert causal explanations; instead, it explains action by specifying the (both regulative and constitutive) rule(s) that agents follow. It attempts to offer constructivists a nonrationalist, nonpositivist approach to analyze social interaction.

Finally, rule-oriented constructivism and dialogical analysis help provide practical insight into issues of global security. The analysis presented here casts doubt on justifications that a new post-9/11 world necessitates more aggressive, unilateral, and even preemptive U.S. policies. Instead, the war on terrorism is embedded within a larger post-cold war construction of global security rules. Tensions about the appropriate implementation of collective security rules to punish the global criminals who violate international rules existed before and after September 11. That the United States is now a direct victim of criminal acts does not change this larger context; instead it exacerbates already existing tensions because the United States is now that much more determined to enforce community rules against terrorism and nonproliferation.

This analysis suggests two broad trajectories for future global security rules. One possibility is that the international community will minimize these tensions, strengthen the post-cold war construction of collective security rules, and continue the "war" on terrorism through cooperative multilateral action. The other possibility is that U.S. use of force in Iraq, together with other likely uses of force in its "war" on terrorism, will break down the post-cold war construction of collective security rules and institutionalize some form of a war social arrangement.

The Bush administration is split about which direction it prefers. Of course, many in the administration are critical of "global governance" and prefer to weaken collective security rules because those rules limit the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the Bush administration challenged emerging collective security rules in many ways prior to September 11 (e.g., rejection of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court). Constantly declaring a "war" on terrorism and using force in Iraq without Security Council authorization, at least on the surface, also weaken collective security rules and invoke a war social arrangement. Many in the administration continue to assert that September 11 fundamentally changed world politics, that the normal rules of collective security are no longer applicable, that a war social arrangement now governs global security, and that this new social arrangement justifies preemptive U.S. policies.

However, a terrorist event, even a horrific one, cannot automatically change the rules of global security. Even U.S. foreign policy, although tremendously important, cannot unilaterally construct a war social arrangement through declarations of a "war on terrorism" or even by invading Iraq. Social rules are constantly negotiated and mediated through the actions of many

agents. Whether future global security rules are constituted by collective security rules or by war rules is always being negotiated and renegotiated. The analysis presented here suggests that the post-cold war rules governing global security remain strikingly similar after September 11. As in Kosovo, the United States sought Security Council authorization prior to intervention in Iraq. And as in Kosovo, the veto powers struggled with which rule violations should trigger multilateral intervention and how to appropriately implement collective security rules. The international community clearly prefers collective security rules over a unilateral U.S. war on terrorism.

The United States must consider this underlying context in which it is fighting its war on terrorism and how others will interpret its use of force. Continuing to claim that September 11 fundamentally changed world politics and advocating unilateralism may eventually convince others that global security is indeed constituted by rules of war. Such a world would only discourage many from cooperating with the United States in other areas of the war on terrorism. The United States is more likely to be successful in its war on terrorism by embracing rather than ignoring the emerging collective security norms and institutions.

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Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies

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Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems separately or jointly? We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the number of electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables (district magnitude and proximity of presidential and legislative elections), one intervening variable (effective number of presidential candidates), and two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups (fragmentation and concentration). Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However, the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties. These results emphasize the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems, with important implications for the stability of Africa's emerging democracies in which parties are weak and multiethnic coalitions are fluid.

Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure (the fragmentation or concentration) of party systems separately or jointly? If they shape the structure of party systems jointly, how can this joint effect be theoretically specified and empirically tested? If ethnopolitical groups and associated ethnopolitical cleavages are not primordially fixed but constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions, as the accumulated findings of over three decades of comparative research on ethnopolitics attest, how can constructed ethnopolitical groups be specified and associated eth-

nopolitical cleavages measured? Do measures of ethnopolitical cleavages premised on constructivist logic and processes offer better explanations of variations in the structure of party systems, independently and in combination with electoral institutions, than measures based on primordialist logic? What are the implications of how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems for the stability of Africa's unconsolidated democracies in which political parties are weak and multiethnic coalitions fluid?

To answer these questions systematically, we utilize two new data sets on African countries—one on elections and electoral institutions and the other on ethnopolitical groups and cleavages. While empirically focused on Africa, our analysis and data sets are designed to address three substantive theoretical issues in comparative scholarship that are reflected in the preceding list of questions. The first issue concerns the competing emphases on electoral institutions and social cleavages as mutually exclusive determinants of the structure of party systems and recent attempts to bridge this theoretical divide. Arguing for their joint impact, we employ the notion of embedded institution to clarify how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages structure the strategic coordination of voters and candidates over votes and seats, and we systematically test for their independent, additive, and interactive effects on the fragmentation or concentration of party systems as measured by the number of electoral and legislative parties. The second issue concerns the accumulated findings in comparative scholarship that ethnic groups, identities, and cleavages are not primordially fixed, but are constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions, and the analytical implications of this constructivist approach for specifying ethnopolitical groups, measuring the cleavages among them, and incorporating these measures in explaining variations in the structure of party systems. We reject primordialism and draw on the insights of the constructivist approach to specify ethnopolitical groups (constructed

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The National Science Foundation provided financial support (Grant SBER-9515439; Shaheen Mozaffar, Principal Investigator) for the larger project from which this article is drawn. Scarritt supervised the data collection on ethnopolitical groups and Mozaffar supervised the data collection on elections, electoral systems, and party systems. Adrian Prentice Hull of Jackson State University and Michelle Camou and Eitan Schiffman of the University of Colorado at Boulder provided invaluable assistance in the coding of ethnopolitical groups. For many helpful comments on early drafts, the authors thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers, as well as Fabian Camacho, Gary Cox, Ted Gurr, Richard Katz, David Leblang, Arend Lijphart, Tom Mayer, Susan McMillan, Kathleen O'Doherty, Dan Posner, Donald Rothchild, and members of the Globalization and Democratization colloquium at the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder. Mozaffar thanks the Boston University African Studies Center for continued research support. The data set for the article is available at <http://webhost.bridgew.edu/smozaffar/>. Final responsibility for the article rests with the authors.

and politicized ethnic groups, as discussed below) and measure the cleavages among and within them. Our data analysis shows that these specifications and measures provide improved accounts of variations in the number of electoral and legislative parties. The third issue concerns the prospects for stability of unconsolidated emerging democracies. We proceed by clarifying the first two issues, followed by a description of our research design and the presentation of data analysis. In the conclusion, we speculate on how our analysis helps to clarify the third issue.

INSTITUTIONS, CLEAVAGES, AND PARTY SYSTEMS

An important debate in the comparative literature on parties and party systems involves the competing emphasis on electoral institutions (Duverger 1962) and social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) as mutually exclusive determinants of the structure of party systems. But scholars also recognize that social cleavages condition institutional effects. Thus, plurality formulas that typically produce two-party systems also tend to foster multiparty systems if voters are regionally concentrated and vote as a block, as, for example, in India and Canada (Rae 1971). And proportional formulas predictably tend to increase the number of parties but only in ethnically heterogeneous societies and not in ethnically homogeneous ones (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). These emendations suggest the possibility of a joint impact of electoral institutions and social cleavages on the structure of party system. In particular, they underscore the importance of two dimensions of ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the direct effects of electoral institutions: ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration. We present quantitative measures of both dimensions and test their independent as well as additive and interactive effects with each other and with electoral institutions on the number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa's emerging democracies.

Embedded Institutions

Systematically sorting out the independent and joint effects of institutions and cleavages on party systems requires a theoretical specification of these relationships that denies *a priori* privilege to either institutions or cleavages. The notion of "embedded institutions" provides this specification. It conceptualizes electoral institutions as embedded in wider social contexts, raising the possibility that similar institutions may not produce similar outcomes in different contexts and leaving the validation or rejection of that possibility to empirical investigation (Grofman et al. 1999).

The notion of embedded institution highlights *how* electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems. Electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems as sources of information that structure the mutual expectations of voters and candidates about winning and losing, thus

facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and seats. However, the information that the two variables contain and convey may not necessarily be consistent; indeed, they may be at odds with each other. This may explain why electoral institutions do not always produce their expected results in many new democracies (Moser 2001; Mozaffar 1997). That expected institutional outcomes do not obtain, however, is often interpreted as an indication of the failure of electoral institutions to perform in expected ways. An alternative, but related, explanation is that contextual variables provide more relevant information for voters and candidates that modifies the impact of electoral institutions. It is a useful research strategy, therefore, to sort out this relationship of structured tension between electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages by specifying and examining their independent, additive, and interactive effects on the structure of party systems.

Strategic Coordination

The strategic coordination role of electoral institutions is now well established (see, e.g., Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Cox's (1997) definitive work clarifies the central logic: (a) candidates wish to get elected and voters wish to gain the benefits of voting for winners, and (b) candidates' and voters' expectations of winning and losing tend to be mutually reinforcing. Electoral institutions structure these two micro-level processes, which, in turn, affect the number of electoral and legislative parties. The role of electoral institutions in strategic coordination is premised on political actors' knowledge and understanding of the information embodied in these institutions. In emerging democracies, however, electoral institutions are new and their incentives and outcomes not well known or understood by political actors, who compensate for the resulting information deficit by relying on alternative sources of information and coordination. In Africa, ethnopolitical groups and cleavages are these alternative sources.

Ethnopolitical groups facilitate strategic coordination because the identities that define them are strategic resources that are contingently (not reflexively) activated to define group interests and that help to reduce the cost of collective political action in response to the institutional incentives that structure the competition for power and resources. In Africa, colonial institutions established the initial institutional incentives for constructing and politicizing ethnic groups and identities, while varied postcolonial regimes reinforced the incentives for sustaining and occasionally redefining these groups and identities, as discussed in the next section (Laitin 1986; Rothchild 1997).

How ethnopolitical cleavages facilitate strategic coordination among voters and candidates to shape the structure of party systems depends largely on patterns of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration. Analysts generally posit an isomorphic relationship between ethnopolitical cleavages and party systems on the assumption that each ethnopolitical group involved in a cleavage is totally separate from others and is also

sufficiently large and internally cohesive to support a party by itself. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, large numbers of cleavages (high ethnopolitical fragmentation) increase and small numbers of cleavages (low ethnopolitical fragmentation) reduce the number of parties. However, the nature of constructed ethnopolitical groups in Africa and the resulting cleavages that we describe below reveal a complex group morphology that seriously militates against such a reflexive relationship between ethnopolitical cleavages and party system structure. Specifically, African ethnopolitical demography features politically salient differences within as well as among groups. The resulting high ethnopolitical fragmentation, *ceteris paribus*, either produces such a high degree of vote dispersion among large numbers of small parties that most are unlikely to secure enough votes to win seats or produces small numbers of large multiethnic parties by encouraging them to campaign for votes across both intergroup and intragroup cleavages. Either way, high ethnopolitical fragmentation is likely to reduce the number of parties.

African ethnopolitical groups, however, also exhibit the highest levels of geographic concentration in the world (Gurr 1993). Such concentrations, especially when they exist "in above-plurality proportions in particular constituencies and geographical pockets" (Sartori 1994, 40), help to counteract the reductive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation on the number of parties. Geographic concentration by itself, however, is unlikely to overcome the reductive effect of high fragmentation due to the presence of large numbers of small ethnopolitical groups. Countries with low fragmentation, moreover, feature a small number of large ethnopolitical groups that are also likely to have dispersed populations and, therefore, do not need concentrated voters to sustain a small number of parties. These variations in the configurations of ethnopolitical cleavages suggest the likelihood of an interactive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration on the structure of party systems.

The magnitude of this effect will depend on the district magnitude, that is, the number of seats in each electoral district. District magnitude shapes party systems by setting a minimum threshold of votes required to win one seat (or, conversely, the maximum number of votes a party can secure without winning a seat) and thus influencing the proportionality between votes and seats. *Ceteris paribus*, small districts set high thresholds that increase vote-seat disproportionality and reduce the number of parties, while large districts set low thresholds that reduce vote-seat disproportionality and increase the number of parties.

Presidential elections also play a crucial role in shaping the structure of party systems (Cox 1997, 187–90, 203–21; Jones 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992). This has special resonance in Africa, where all new democracies, except Lesotho and South Africa, have adopted presidential systems. Presidential elections in Africa are important for three reasons. First, with the presidency as the top prize in the political game, presidential elections attract a large number of candidates, few of whom have any realistic chance of winning. Characteristic prob-

lems of postauthoritarian democracies—limited experience with competitive elections, information deficit about the extent of electoral support, plus personal ambition—prevent opposition candidates from coordinating on a single candidate to oppose incumbents armed with the standard advantages of incumbency. Second, an important strategic reason for the entry of large numbers of contenders in presidential elections is that African presidents possess substantial resources for patronage. Presidential contenders with weak winning potential often expect to demonstrate sufficient electoral support to bargain entry into post-election coalitions and secure state resources for their constituencies in return for political support of the winners. Third, for leading presidential candidates the electoral base and bargaining resources possessed by weaker candidates are also strategically important because of the salience of ethnopolitical groups for electoral support. Just as it constrains legislative candidates, the combination of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration may also constrain leading presidential candidates from securing outright electoral majorities. And since the weaker candidates often control small but cohesive blocks of votes, leading presidential contenders have strong incentives to form minimum-winning coalitions with them to ensure an electoral victory and a governing majority.

The extent to which strong and weak presidential contenders are able to negotiate minimum-winning coalitions will depend, among other things, on the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the number of presidential candidates (Cox 1997, 209–13). Greater proximity of presidential and legislative elections tends to reduce the number of parties due to the coattail effects of winning presidential candidates. Large numbers of presidential candidates have the opposite effect due to the influence of ethnopolitical cleavages.

In addressing these substantive theoretical concerns, our analysis builds on the only two studies, of which we are aware, that also test for the independent, additive, and interactive effects of electoral institutions and ethnic heterogeneity on the number of electoral (Cox 1997, esp. 203–21) and legislative (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994) parties.¹ But our analysis also extends their theoretical insights in two specific ways. First, the two studies measure ethnic heterogeneity by a fractionalization index that is based on primordialist specification of *ethnic* groups and, therefore, can neither distinguish politically relevant ethnic groups from irrelevant ones nor capture politically salient intragroup differences. We focus only on *ethnopolitical* groups, that is, on politically relevant ethnic groups specified by the logic of constructivism. Our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages, therefore, capture multiple levels of politically salient cleavages consistent with the complex morphology of ethnopolitical groups in African countries. Second, the two studies focus only on ethnic fragmentation, while

¹ Powell (1982) also focused on the joint effects of electoral institutions and social heterogeneity but examined only their additive effects on the number of legislative parties.

we focus on ethnopolitical concentration *as well as* ethnopolitical fragmentation.

SPECIFYING CONSTRUCTED ETHNOPOLITICAL GROUPS AND CLEAVAGES²

The logic of constructivism turns on the notion that individuals have multiple ethnic identities that are constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions. This malleability of ethnic identities derives (a) from the multiplicity of objective ethnic markers (language, religion, race, caste, "tribe," territory, etc.) that may be invoked to define and distinguish ethnic groups, (b) from the relative complexity of these markers that may foster intragroup divisions combined with intergroup differences (e.g., sectarian divisions in a religion, "tribal" differences among same language speakers, or subjects of the same kingdom), and (c) from temporal changes in the relevance of these composite markers and their components in defining and distinguishing ethnic groups as well as in the politicization of resulting intergroup and intragroup cleavages (Chandra 2001, 7–8; Laitin and Posner 2001, 13–16).

Intrinsic to the logic of constructivism are three specific processes that motivate our criteria for specifying the ethnopolitical groups and the cleavages among them that we include in our analysis: construction, politicization, and participation. We do not explicate the construction of ethnic groups and cleavages, but we do highlight its salient features because it is a necessary precondition for the politicization of ethnic groups, that is, the construction of ethnic groups into ethnopolitical groups. Like other social cleavages, however, not all ethnic cleavages become politicized, and even fewer become "*particized*," that is, made into important lines of partisan division" (Cox 1997, 26, original emphasis). We describe below how this crucial distinction between participation and other forms of politicization of ethnic cleavages helps to solve the problem of endogeneity that is ostensibly inherent in measuring ethnopolitical cleavages for explaining variations in the number of electoral and legislative parties.

An ethnic group is constructed when individuals in culturally plural societies self-consciously choose one or more objective ethnic markers to distinguish in-groups from out-groups. In Africa, as elsewhere, the individuals' choice of ethnic markers and the consequent size of the constructed ethnic groups are constrained by the variety, complexity, and prior use of such markers, the associated cost of forming new groups and sustaining group solidarity, and the institutional framework of governance defined by the state. Increased variety and complexity of ethnic markers expand opportunities for ethnic group construction but also constrain unfettered construction of especially large and cohesive ethnic groups because of (a) the high start-up cost of group formation associated with the incorporation

of competing groups and interests defined by varied ethnic markers to construct larger and more encompassing ethnic groups and (b) the high cost of sustaining group solidarity in the face of the varied markers serving as competing sources of group definition within the larger constructed agglomerations. These structural and strategic factors thus limit the size and the cohesion of ethnic groups that can be constructed and mobilized for collective political action.

In Africa, colonial rule and postcolonial regimes reinforced these constraints by structuring the variety and complexity of ethnic markers and politicizing some of them. Colonial rulers' reliance on local agents to cope with the dilemma of maintaining control at low cost encouraged these agents to differentiate their groups from those not so privileged by colonial authority either by recombining and redefining existing objective markers of ethnicity or by accentuating previously minor group differences (Vail 1989). Colonial rulers' creation of administrative units to secure additional economies in the cost of governance incorporated culturally separate groups within single administrative units or separated culturally similar groups into separate units. Occasionally, administrative encapsulation enabled the combination and redefinition of different ethnic markers for the construction of larger, territorially concentrated and, hence, also cohesive ethnopolitical groups. In other instances, colonial rulers privileged one ethnic marker (e.g., ancestral village) to foster spatially distributed, hence fragmented, groups over another (e.g., religion) that could foster larger and more encompassing groups (Laitin 1986). In these different ways, colonial rule emphasized the relevance of a wide range of diffuse and heterogeneous criteria of group formation, thereby increasing instead of decreasing the variety and complexity of objective ethnic markers that constrained the construction and politicization of large and cohesive ethnic groups in Africa's culturally plural societies.

At independence, therefore, African countries inherited a distinctive ethnic morphology with three defining features that are reflected in the structure of constructed ethnopolitical groups and that have shaped the pattern of their political interactions: (1) marked differences in group size, such that virtually no major ethnopolitical group comprises an outright majority in a country, although some comprise a large plurality; (2) considerable variety and complexity in ethnic markers, such that, even as they produce politically salient interethnic differences, they also produce politically salient intragroup heterogeneity but limited cultural differences among large agglomerations of such groups; and (3) the territorial concentration of some ethnic groups that facilitates their construction as large and cohesive units for collective political action. These three features have combined with the accommodation by postcolonial regimes of instrumental ("pork-barrel") ethnopolitical demands to foster *communal contention* as the typical pattern of political interactions in which ethnopolitical groups serve as cost-effective strategic resource for organizing political competition for power and resources. Communal contention,

² This section draws on materials and data presented in Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999.

however, underscores the high start-up cost of new group formation and the high maintenance cost of group solidarity, thus discouraging political entrepreneurs from exaggerating cultural differences among groups and encouraging them instead to maintain strong group identities, including some coexisting subgroup identities, that are strategically sustained by their ability to access the state and secure valued goods and services for their followers (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999, 239–42).

The constructivist processes highlighted above motivate five criteria for specifying ethnopolitical groups and cleavages. The first, which derives from the distinction among the construction, politicization, and participation of ethnic groups and helps to avoid the endogeneity problem noted above, involves specifying only those groups that have demonstrated their actual political relevance or high potential political relevance based on past relevance, apart from or prior to participation. We thus employ the decision rule that the incidence of at least one of the following several forms of long-standing politicization other than participation is a necessary and sufficient indicator of the construction of *ethnopolitical* groups: (a) organized group mobilization unrelated to party formation (primarily in ethnic associations or cliques of leaders within the same party, the bureaucracy, or the military); (b) articulation of grievances by leaders claiming to speak for a group rather than a party; (c) participation in collective action or (violent or nonviolent) conflict with other groups or the state and being subjected to state violence; (d) encapsulation within or domination of an officially designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a disproportionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy or the military; and (f) controlling disproportionate socioeconomic resources.

The second criterion involves specifying all ethnopolitical groups, even at the risk of being overly inclusive. Thus our decision rule deliberately defines forms of nonparty politicization broadly. Furthermore, we draw on the extensive secondary Africanist literature in history, anthropology, sociology, and political science to assess the demonstrated and potential political relevance of a wide range of ethnic groups to arrive at the list of ethnopolitical groups included in our data set.³ The third criterion involves specifying ethnopolitical groups at three levels of inclusiveness in order to capture all cleavages that may affect variations in party system structure, including national dichotomous cleavages between top-level groups (which are found in twelve countries), as well as a variety of more complex multiethnic ones usually involving both middle-level groups (within or independent of top level groups) and lower-level groups within them. The fourth criterion involves specifying the geographic concentration of ethnopolitical groups and subgroups. As noted above, territorial concentration facilitates ethnopolitical group

construction by furnishing a critical mass of individuals with similar interests based on common location, thus reducing the start-up cost of group formation and the maintenance cost of group solidarity. The final criterion concerns specifying the time frame for the cleavages that we analyze. Thus, to be included in our data set, ethnic groups at all levels of inclusiveness must have been politicized at least 10 years prior to the first election analyzed in each country, which helps to avoid the problem of endogeneity, and the most recent evidence of their politicization must be no more than 20 years prior to this election, which helps to establish their continued, and potential for future, politicization.⁴

Based on these five criteria, we specified 242 ethnopolitical groups and subgroups at three levels of inclusiveness in 34 countries that held multiparty elections between 1980 and 2000. These countries and elections are the focus of our analysis, and the 242 groups are the basis of our two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration. Ethnic groups that did not meet one or more of the necessary and sufficient conditions for politicization specified above, or are subgroups of our lower-level groups, are excluded from the analysis (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999, 88–91).

MEASURES, METHODS, AND MODELS

Variable Operationalizations

Party Systems. The structure of the party system measured by the number of electoral and the number of legislative parties is the dependent variable in our analysis. We employ the widely used indices developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1989) to operationalize both measures: *Effective Number of Electoral Parties* and *Effective Number of Legislative Parties*.

Electoral Institutions. *District Magnitude* is now widely acknowledged as the decisive institutional variable in shaping the structure of party systems. Because countries with proportional representation formulas for converting votes into seats have multiple districts of varying size, we follow Lijphart (1994) and utilize average district magnitude as the summary measure for district magnitude. Also, because of the potential curvilinear relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 106–7), we utilize the natural log of district magnitude.⁵

³ We acknowledge that in the case of ambiguity in the secondary literature, we relied on our best judgments based on our knowledge and expertise to assess demonstrated political relevance of specified groups.

⁴ We made an exception to the 10-year rule for inclusion in the case of politicization of groups through violence because this is so clearly independent of participation. For example, ethnic associations that were instrumental in politicizing the Yorubas and the Ibos in Nigeria were founded in the 1920s and 1930s and have continued to be active within the last 20 years, while the politicization of the Ogoni and other "oil minorities" in that country occurred only a little more than 10 years prior to the 1999 election and involved considerable violence. This criterion means that politicized groups remain constant for all of the elections analyzed in this article, although their participation may change between elections. The analysis of future elections may require that changes in politicization be taken into account.

⁵ For other measures of district magnitude, see Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 126–41, 264–69.

Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections is also an important institutional variable that shapes the structure of party systems. We utilize Cox's (1997, 209–13) formula to operationalize this variable. Cox extends the insights of the comparative literature on the reductive effects of presidential elections on the number of parties (Shugart and Carey 1992) with a more refined interval measure of the degree of proximity between presidential and legislative elections instead of the standard nominal measure of the two elections as concurrent or separate. Proximity is a matter of degree and ranges from maximal proximity (concurrent elections) to zero proximity when legislative elections are held at the presidential midterm. Between these extremes, as proximity increases presidential elections tend to reduce the number electoral and legislative parties. The magnitude of this effect depends on the degree of fractionalization of presidential elections as measured by the effective number of presidential candidates (Cox 1997, 211–13). We, therefore, also examine the interaction of the proximity of presidential and legislative elections with the effective number of presidential candidates, *Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections* \times *Effective Number of Presidential Candidates*.

Constructed Ethnopolitical Cleavages: Fragmentation and Concentration. We use two indices to operationalize the two dimensions of constructed ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration. The *Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation* index is based on the share of the politicized population that belongs to each ethnopolitical group or subgroup. Most countries have different fragmentation scores derived from these population shares, depending on which of the three levels of inclusiveness is used to calculate the index. For some countries, these differences will range from very low to very high fragmentation. A strict application of constructivist logic might require calculating fragmentation at the level having greatest relevance at the time of a given election, but that would be almost impossible to do and would increase the danger of endogeneity by conflating politicization and participation. Therefore, we use the index of total fragmentation in our analysis. This index *combines all three levels of inclusiveness by including all undivided top and middle-level groups and all lowest-level groups*. In other words, total fragmentation includes all groups that are potentially politically relevant at the national level, while excluding groups that have not been politicized. We thus relate the greatest possible nationally relevant ethnopolitical fragmentation as identified in our data set to variations in the structure of the party system, which makes theoretical sense since parties can appeal to groups at any of the three levels of inclusiveness.

The *Ethnopolitical Group Concentration* index is based on concentration codes adapted from the Minorities at Risk (Phase III) data set: 0 = widely dispersed, 1 = primarily urban or minority in one region, 2 = majority in one region, dispersed in others, and 3 = concentrated in one region (Gurr 1993). The index for each group is calculated by multiplying its concentration code by its share of the ethnopolitically rele-

vant population in the country, with the results for all groups summed to obtain the ethnopolitical group concentration score for the country. Because we wish to examine whether fragmentation and concentration have independent or joint effects on the number of parties, we include an interaction term reflecting their product in the analysis, *Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation* \times *Ethnopolitical Group Concentration*.

Comparison with Other Measures of Ethnic and Ethnopolitical Cleavages

One of our important claims in this article is that our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages offer better accounts of the number of electoral and legislative parties than measures that are not based on our measurement criteria. To test this claim, we examine the effects of two such measures. One is the widely used Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index. Based principally on data from the *Atlas Narodov Mira* (1964), it assumes that ethnic groups are primordially fixed, measures ethnic rather than ethnopolitical cleavages, specifies only one level of cleavage, and does not measure concentration. Our test shows that it has no significant effect on the structure of party systems in Africa's emerging democracies.

The second measure we test is the politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG) index developed by Posner (2000) in response to the flawed application of the ELF index by economists to explain the negative impact of ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth in Africa. Posner started from the *Atlas Narodov Mira* (1964) data to develop a baseline population count (labeled Count C) that includes all ethnic groups listed in the *Atlas*. Then he used secondary sources on political competition to eliminate groups that are not relevant to economic policymaking and, in some countries, to disaggregate ethnic groups that are politically divided or to combine ethnic groups that act together politically. This method produced a second population count (Count B) that specifies ethnopolitical groups at a higher level of aggregation but with less inclusiveness than in Count C. The groups in Count B were further reduced in number or aggregated to develop a new population count (Count A). The PREG index derived from groups specified in Count B comes closest to approximating the fragmentation index that we have developed in the sense of including the most ethnopolitical groups; hence we expected it to be more closely related to the number of electoral and legislative parties than the previously discussed ELF measure. Our test shows, however, that its relationship with these outcomes is weakened by its failure to include all ethnopolitical cleavages or geographic concentration.

Case Selection

Our analysis is based on data from 62 elections to the lower chamber of national legislatures in 34 African countries that underwent democratic transitions in the context of the third wave of democratization. In

focusing on elections as the unit of analysis, we follow Rae (1971) but acknowledge Lijphart's (1994, 7) criticism of Rae that "elections under the same rules are not really independent cases but merely repeated operations of the same electoral system." We also examine 15 countries that have held only one election in conjunction with countries that have held multiple elections, which unduly treats the electoral systems in both groups as temporally stable. The temporal stability of electoral system is a key assumption underlying the hypothesized relationship between electoral institutions and party systems, but there is no "wholly satisfactory methodology . . . to learn the 'true' (stable) number of parties in a regime that encompasses . . . two or three elections" (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 102). Therefore, while cognizant of these problems in case selection, we adopt a pragmatic approach of including the maximum number of cases in our analysis.

Model Specification

We utilize OLS regression to test eight specifications, four each for Effective Number of Electoral Parties and Effective Number of Legislative Parties. Model 1 is an institutional specification that includes variables measuring legislative electoral institutions (District Magnitude) and two aspects of presidential elections, the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections and the interaction between the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections and the Effective Number of Presidential Candidates. Model 2 is a sociological specification that tests for the independent effects of Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation and Ethnopolitical Group Concentration as well as their interactive effects (Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical Group Concentration). Model 3 is an additive specification in which all six variables in the previous two models are entered in the equation. Model 4 is an additive/interactive specification and hence a fully specified model. It includes five variables in Model 3 but replaces the interaction of the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages in that model with an interaction term reflecting the product of district magnitude and the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages (District Magnitudes X Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical Group Concentration).⁶

RESULTS

Tables 1 and 2 display the results of each set of four specifications for the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and the Effective Number of Legislative Parties, respectively. For both dependent variables, all four models are statistically significant and all independent variables correctly signed and statistically significant. The purely institutional specification (Model 1) explains 19% of the variance in the number of electoral parties and 24% of the variance in the number

of legislative parties. The purely sociological model (Model 2), which tests for the independent and interactive effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration, explains 30% of the variance in the number of electoral parties (an increase of 11% over the institutional model) and 40% of the variance in the number of legislative parties (an increase of 16% over the institutional model). In Model 3, the additive effects of electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages account for 40% of the variance in the electoral party system, increasing the explanatory power of the additive model by 21% over the institutional model, and 53% of the variance in the legislative party system, increasing the explanatory power of the additive model by 29% over the institutional model. The fully specified model (Model 4) explains 50% of the variance in the electoral party system and 52% of the variance in the legislative party system.

Overall, these results confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in structuring the strategic coordination among voters and candidates and in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems in Africa's emerging democracies. Examination of the effects of individual clusters of variables provides additional confirmation. Models 2 and 3 confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping the structure of party systems, both independently and interactively. Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of electoral and legislative parties in both models.⁷ This reductive effect, which stems from the distinctive morphology of African ethnopolitical groups that we noted above and that our data set captures, suggests that increased number of group cleavages encourages candidates to forge intergroup alliances to improve on their electoral gains. Such alliances, while improving the prospect of group cooperation, also tend to reduce the number of electoral and legislative parties. Ethnopolitical concentration, however, counteracts this reductive effect of fragmentation. For example, when group concentration is high, at 2.56, group fragmentation tends to *increase* the effective number of electoral parties by .04 and the effective number of legislative parties by .03. Correspondingly, when group concentration is low at .63, group fragmentation tends to *reduce* the effective number of electoral parties by -.04 and the effective number of legislative seats by -.02.⁸ This counteracting influence of ethnopolitical concentration on ethnopolitical fragmentation remains even with the addition of institutional variables in Model 3.

These important results can be explained by the role of group concentration in reducing the transaction costs of forging and sustaining group solidarity. Scholars of social movements (Tarrow 1994) have

⁶ See Jaccard, Turrissi, and Wan, 1990, esp. 40–42, for the motivating logic for the three-way interaction of independent variables.

⁷ We ran a separate equation without the interaction term to confirm the independent effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation. We do not report the results to save space.

⁸ We derived these conditional effects of fragmentation on the number of electoral and legislative parties by calculating the value of one standard deviation of the concentration index above and below the mean value of the index and entering these values into an equation to obtain the additive and multiplicative coefficients.

TABLE 1. Determinants of Effective Number of Electoral Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
District Magnitude (logged)	.10 (.52)		.34 (.53)	-1.62*** (.42)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections	-4.50** (1.41)		-3.25* (1.30)	-2.80** (1.03)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections × Effective Number of Presidential Candidates	1.50** (.48)		.97** (.33)	1.02*** (.28)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation		-.07** (.02)	-.06* (.03)	-.03*** (.01)
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration		.17 (.29)	.03 (.39)	.68** (.27)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × Ethnopolitical Group Concentration		.04** (.02)	.04* (.02)	
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × Ethnopolitical Group Concentration				.03*** (.00)
Constant	3.80*** (.95)	2.48*** (.21)	3.12*** (.74)	3.34*** (.75)
R ²	.19	.30	.40	.50
F	3.81*	4.50**	3.58**	14.47***
N	62	62	62	62

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

TABLE 2. Determinants of Effective Number of Legislative Parties

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
District Magnitude (Logged)	.17 (.20)		.26 (.17)	-.65** (.23)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections	-2.76*** (.62)		-1.98*** (.50)	-1.90*** (.44)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections × Effective Number of Presidential Candidates	.89*** (.20)		.53** (.17)	.58*** (.16)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation		-.03** (.01)	-.03** (.01)	-.01* (.00)
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration		.17 (.16)	.09 (.18)	.49** (.19)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × Ethnopolitical Group Concentration		.02** (.01)	.02** (.01)	
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × Ethnopolitical Group Concentration				.01*** (.00)
Constant	2.66*** (.48)	1.65*** (.15)	2.09*** (.30)	2.12*** (.31)
R ²	.24	.40	.53	.52
F	8.05***	6.69***	8.30***	10.82***
N	62	62	62	62

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

found, for instance, that unmediated communication of ideas, strategies, and resources is crucial for reducing the collective action costs of group cohesion. The effectiveness of such communication derives from the face-to-face interaction in small groups that typically constitute the larger social movements as loosely linked "congeries of social networks" (Tarrow 1994, 22). African ethnopolitical groups are not social movements, but their morphologies are conceptually similar. As described above, the combinations of cleavages among and within groups that typically characterize African ethnopolitical groups diminish the effectiveness of strategic face-to-face interaction in forging

groups that are sufficiently large and cohesive to sustain political parties of their own. Group concentration, however, helps to overcome this constraint. The physical proximity engendered by group concentration facilitates the strategic face-to-face interaction of small groups, which helps to solidify the otherwise loose links among the subgroups. The associated affinity of place, moreover, helps to define the common interests of the emergent, spatially anchored larger group in electoral competition with similarly constructed groups. This process is the key to the interactive effect of ethnopolitical group fragmentation and concentration on increasing the number of electoral and legislative parties in

Africa's emerging democracies. And this effect obtains with or without the effect of electoral institutions.

The variables related to presidential elections consistently demonstrate the substantial effect of the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections in reducing the number of electoral and legislative parties, reproducing in Africa the almost-universal tendency of presidential regimes to constrict the structure of party systems. But, just as consistently, the interaction of proximity and the Effective Number of Presidential Candidates counters this effect, indicating, for the reasons detailed above, the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping strategic entry as well as voter behavior in presidential elections (Cox 1997, 211).

District magnitude, widely acknowledged as the decisive institutional variable in shaping the structure of party systems, has no independent effect (Models 1 and 3). This unexpected result may reflect the workings of weakly institutionalized electoral systems, but it also indicates the effect of context. The two, of course, are not mutually exclusive. District magnitude is a hard constraint to which political actors must strategically adjust. In emerging democracies, however, political actors' limited knowledge and understanding of institutional incentives and the salience of ethnopolitical cleavages as alternative incentive structures vitiate the expected strategic consequences of district magnitude, but without totally removing its mechanical effects. In other words, candidates and voters in emerging democracies rely on familiar cues of ethnopolitical affiliations for cost-effective coordination of electoral strategies, but district magnitude may still mechanically exert a moderating influence. This is why we test for the joint effects of institutional and contextual variables (Models 3 and 4). This test shows that district magnitude does have a significant effect, but only in interactive combination with ethnopolitical cleavages. In the additive Model 3, for instance, district magnitude has no independent effect on the number of electoral and legislative parties. But in the fully specified Model 4, which includes an interaction term measuring the product of district magnitude and the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures, district magnitude substantially reduces the number of electoral and legislative parties.⁹

Large district magnitudes tend to reduce the number of parties if ethnopolitical fragmentation is high and ethnopolitical concentration is low, as exemplified by South Africa, but they tend to increase the number of parties if both fragmentation and concentration are high, as exemplified by Benin. In South Africa, ethnopolitical groups are highly fragmented (fragmentation index = 7.89) due to substantial cleavages among the nine groups that comprise the majority African population as well as among the English-speakers and the Afrikaners that comprise the White population. They are also spatially dispersed (concentration index = 1.6).¹⁰

However, the continued strategic importance of race as a cost-effective basis of electoral mobilization diminishes the political significance of intragroup cleavages among African voters, while White voters typically tend to divide their votes among several smaller parties. As a result, the average effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties in South Africa over two elections are 2.2 and 2.2, respectively, even though the average district magnitude is 40 seats and the allocation rule is the highly proportional Largest-Remainder Droop formula.

In Benin, ethnopolitical groups are only slightly less fragmented than in South Africa (fragmentation index = 7.30), but they are also more geographically concentrated, principally in the administrative provinces that form the electoral districts (concentration index = 3.0). Combined with an average district magnitude of 11 seats and with the highly proportional Largest-Remainder Hare formula as the allocation rule, this concentration has fostered correspondingly fragmented party systems, with the average effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties at 13.0 and 7.0, respectively.

Finally, even moderate levels of geographical concentration of ethnopolitical groups tends to offset the expected constraining effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation and small district magnitudes on the number of parties, as exemplified by Kenya and Malawi. In both countries, seats are allocated by plurality formula in single member districts. But in Kenya, which has a fragmentation index of 9.5 and a concentration index of 2.3, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 4.3 and 3.0, respectively. In Malawi, which has a fragmentation index of 5.8 and a concentration index of 2.8, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 2.8 and 2.8, respectively.

The influence of district magnitude on the structure of party systems in Africa's emerging democracies thus reflects a complex pattern of interaction with ethnopolitical cleavages. Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the reductive effect of highly fragmented and spatially dispersed ethnopolitical groups on the number of parties. Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the expansive effect of spatially concentrated but otherwise fragmented ethnopolitical groups on the number of parties. And small district magnitudes tend to reduce the number of parties when ethnopolitical groups are fragmented but tend to increase them when ethnopolitical groups are spatially concentrated.

Comparing the Effects of ELF and PREG Indices

To test if the two alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity, the ELF and PREG indices, improve on

⁹ We used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayes criterion to determine the superiority of the three-way interaction among district magnitude, ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration over the two-way interaction between district magnitude and each of the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures.

¹⁰ The Asians and the Coloreds, the other two ethnopolitical groups in South Africa, are not internally divided. For comparative reference, the mean, median, and range of the fragmentation indices for the 34 countries in our data set are 4.38, 3.92, and 1.0–5.91, respectively. The corresponding values for the concentration indices are 1.60, 1.84, and 0.0–3.0, respectively.

our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages in explaining variations in the number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa's emerging democracies, we substituted them for our measures in the fully specified Model 4, excluding ethnopolitical concentration because the two indices do not measure it. The results, not reported here to save space, show that the two indices have no significant effect, independently or interactively with district magnitude. The proximity of presidential and legislative elections and its interaction with the effective number of presidential candidates wholly account for the variance in the number of electoral and legislative parties.

The nonsignificance of the ELF index is not surprising. The index measures ethnic heterogeneity by indicators of social cleavages, such as language, but not every objective indicator of social cleavage possesses intrinsic political salience. Indeed, most conventional ethnographic indicators, including, especially, language and religion, have not acquired the political salience in contemporary Africa that they have elsewhere (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999). The PREG index, which is otherwise premised on constructivist logic, was nonsignificant for two possible reasons. First, the PREG index was designed to explain the potential impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the lack of economic growth in Africa, and not on electoral outcomes. Thus the levels of ethnopolitical cleavage captured by its Counts A or B may not necessarily be the most relevant ones in electoral politics. Second, it does not measure ethnopolitical concentration, which in our analysis consistently counteracts the impact of fragmentation.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Our results demonstrate that, in Africa's emerging democracies, both electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems, but not reflexively. They do so contingently and strategically. Our results thus point up the need to replace the misconstrued institutions-or-cleavages debate in the comparative literature on party systems with a more analytically sound theoretical specification that privileges neither institutions nor cleavages but allows for systematically sorting out their independent and joint effects. Our results also demonstrate that ethnopolitical cleavage measures based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups improve on explanations that utilize measures of ethnic heterogeneity based on primordialist specification. Our results thus underscore the importance of systematic incorporation of constructivist insights in comparative research agendas.

Finally, our results demonstrate the significance of both ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration, *the latter heretofore unexamined in comparative scholarship*, in influencing the number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa's emerging democracies. In particular, they clarify the complex ways in which the two cleavage dimensions independently and interactively with each other and with electoral institutions shape the structure of party systems.

By influencing the effective number of presidential candidates, ethnopolitical cleavages moderate the reductive effects of the proximity of presidential and legislative elections on the number of parties, encouraging the formation of electoral alliances between major presidential contenders seeking electoral victory and minor ones controlling critical blocs of votes that can secure it. By counteracting the reductive effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation, moreover, ethnopolitical concentration helps to increase the number of electoral and legislative parties, expanding opportunities for electoral competition and political representation. But district magnitude limits excessive party system fragmentation due to this expansive effect. It reinforces the reductive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation, enabling geographically concentrated voters voting as a bloc to increase the number of electoral and legislative parties. But it interacts with both cleavage dimensions to offset excessive party system fragmentation.

These complex relationships between electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages have fostered in Africa's emerging democracies electoral and legislative party systems that are characterized by relatively low levels of fragmentation. For example, the data in Table 3 show that for all 62 elections in 34 countries that we analyze, the mean values of the effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 3.2 (SD = 2.7) and 2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding median values are 2.4 and 2.0 parties, respectively. For 47 multiple elections in 19 countries, the mean values for effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 3.1 (SD = 2.4) and 2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding median values are 2.4 and 2.0 respectively. And for 15 single elections in 15 countries, the average effective numbers of electoral parties and legislative parties are 3.7 (SD = 3.4) and 2.5 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding median values are 2.5 and 2.2, respectively. This remarkable convergence of Africa's emerging democracies around some semblance of party system stability obtains even in the face of high levels of underlying electoral and legislative volatility. For example, the data in Table 3 also show that for the 47 multiple elections (ranging from 2 to 5 elections), the mean electoral volatility index (based on votes) is 27.87 and the mean legislative volatility index (based on seats) is 22.96.¹¹ These indices are comparatively lower than those reported for new democracies in post-World War II western Europe and in southern Europe in the 1970s but are roughly comparable to those reported for the new democracies in Latin America in the 1980s and in the former communist states in eastern Europe in the 1990s. In all these new democracies, moreover, high electoral volatility coincides with high party system fragmentation (Bielasiak 2002). That high electoral volatility coincides with low party system fragmentation in Africa's emerging democracies is thus a paradox. Our analysis suggests three reasons for this paradox.

¹¹ We use Pedersen's (1983) volatility index, which is calculated by adding the net percentage change in the votes (or seats) won by each party from one election to the next and dividing the sum by two.

TABLE 3. Mean and Median Values of Effective Numbers of Electoral and Legislative Parties and Indices of Electoral and Legislative Volatility

	Effective Number of Electoral Parties	Effective Number of Legislative Parties
Number of elections		
All elections ($N = 62$)		
Mean	3.2	2.3
(SD)	(2.7)	(1.5)
Median	2.4	2.0
Multiple elections ($N = 47$)		
Mean	3.1	2.3
(SD)	(2.4)	(1.5)
Median	2.4	2.0
Single elections ($N = 15$)		
Mean	3.7	2.5
(SD)	(3.4)	(1.5)
Median	2.5	2.2
Volatility indices for 47 multiple elections		
Mean electoral volatility index	27.87	
Mean legislative volatility index	22.96	

First, because of the manifest programmatic and organizational weakness of African political parties, candidates rely principally on ethnopolitical group support to win. But, because of intergroup and intragroup cleavages, few African ethnopolitical groups possess sufficient numerical strength and internal cohesion to propel a candidate to victory on their own. Candidates, therefore, forge ethnopolitical coalitions to secure victory in each election. However, because of the very morphology that encourages them in the first place, these election-specific coalitions tend to shift from election to election, increasing electoral volatility. Second, because characteristic problems of limited information about new electoral institutions and the extent of electoral support in postauthoritarian democracies vitiate the constraints of strategic barriers to entry in electoral competition (Cox 1997, 151–72), excessively large numbers of candidates and parties, most lacking even minimum levels of electoral support, compete in democratic elections in Africa's emerging democracies. This typically results in a highly skewed vote distribution, with a small number of candidates and parties winning by substantial majorities, in high levels of electoral volatility, in the emergence of a small number of electoral and legislative parties, and hence in relatively concentrated party systems. Finally, these two reasons suggest a curvilinear relationship between ethnopolitical fragmentation and the structure of party systems in Africa's emerging democracies. Low fragmentation correlates in a straightforward way with a small number of parties and low party system fragmentation. High fragmentation encourages the formation of intergroup coalitions that also help to reduce the number of parties and party system fragmentation. But moderate levels of fragmentation, combined with the countervailing effect of concentration, increase the number of parties and party system fragmentation, with district magnitude exerting an additional moderating influence to diminish the prospect of excessive increases in both. The complex interaction of electoral institutions and

ethnopolitical cleavages thus structures the conversion of electoral volatility into concentrated party systems in Africa's emerging and unconsolidated democracies.

What are the implications of our analysis for the stability of these democracies? We conclude with three speculative answers. First, both the dominant multiethnic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages captured by our data set and the resulting structures of electoral and legislative party systems revealed by our data analysis are generally conducive for democratic consolidation. The multiethnic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages exerts pressure toward the formation of multiethnic electoral coalitions that, in turn, engender party systems without excessive fragmentation. Such party systems facilitate the formation of multiethnic governing coalitions. Second, to the extent that elections remain the principal legitimate source of forming and changing governments, increasing information on the effects of electoral institutions and the extent of electoral support engenders a learning process for both voters and candidates that is likely to improve the prospect of strategic coordination among competing ethnopolitical groups over a small number of winning candidates.¹² This will also help to lower the current high rate of electoral volatility and the associated cost of forming multiethnic coalitions in each election.

Finally, our analysis suggests that no intrinsic antipathy exists between ethnopolitical diversity and democratic stability in Africa or, for that matter, elsewhere. Claims of such antipathy typically posit a reflexive relationship between ethnicity and democracy that is grossly misconstrued, rests on the fundamentally flawed primordialist conception of ethnicity, and reflects an odious one-dimensional view of ethnic identities. Our data and analysis show, instead, that clarifying the relationship between ethnicity and democracy requires (a) conceiving ethnicity as a strategic

¹² Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) present a systematic analysis of this process in Senegal, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea.

resource that is contingently politicized and (b) paying close attention to variations in the configuration of resulting ethnopolitical cleavages. Democratic stability is typically threatened when ethnopolitical cleavages reflect the configuration of deeply divided societies in which two internally cohesive, sharply polarized, and spatially mixed groups are implacably arrayed against each other, as exemplified most brutally in contemporary Africa by Rwanda and Burundi.¹³ Our data and analysis reveal, however, that ethnopolitical cleavages in the other 38 African countries manifest a predominantly multiethnic configuration engendered by the combination of salient intergroup and intragroup cleavages.¹⁴ Within the dominant multiethnic configurations of African countries, therefore, variations in the incidence and interaction of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration, and in the interaction of these two cleavage dimensions with electoral institutions, offer partial but crucial insights into, as well as reasons for cautious optimism about, the relationship between ethnopolitical diversity and the prospective stability of Africa's emerging democracies.

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¹³ But Comoros and Djibouti, with similar ethnopolitical configurations, have not experienced similar brutality or violence.

¹⁴ Multiethnicity, in fact, is the dominant configuration even in the eight countries in which ethnopolitical cleavages were either previously, or can potentially be, transformed into deeply divided configurations: Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. For a conceptual distinction between, and measurement of, multiethnic and deeply divided societies, see Mozaffar (2001).

Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation

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Do democracies suffer higher inflation than nondemocracies? We identify two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of democracy on inflation. In the “populist” approach, inflation is the result of public demands for transfers financed by the inflation tax, suggesting that electoral competition will increase inflation. In the “state-capture” approach, inflation is a result of pressure from elites who derive private benefits from money creation, suggesting that electoral competition may constrain inflation. We present a simple model that captures both ideas and argue that the impact of democracy is conditioned by the prevailing level of income inequality. This claim is tested with data from more than 100 countries between 1960 and 1999 using different dynamic panel estimation methods to control for unobserved effects and the potential endogeneity of some independent variables. We find robust evidence that democracy is associated with lower inflation in lower-inequality countries but with higher inflation in higher-inequality countries.

Do democracies suffer from higher inflation than non-democracies? One of the long-standing debates in comparative political economy concerns the effect of regime type and regime characteristics on macroeconomic performance. The implications of democracy and dictatorship for price stability, in particular, have retained an important place in these debates at least since the inflationary crises in developing countries in the 1980s. During the transitions in the former socialist countries throughout the 1990s, these issues were revisited with renewed interest. Two decades of theoretical and empirical work, however, have yielded conflicting opinions on how political authority in different regimes determines the choice of economic policy.

Political theories of inflation that address regime effects fall into two contrasting categories: *populist* approaches and *state-capture* approaches. The first approach argues that democratically elected politicians use inflation to generate revenues in response to public demands for redistribution. In the second, incumbent politicians and their elite patrons obtain private benefits from money creation, and are themselves the cause of price instability. These approaches, consequently, lead to diverging conclusions regarding the influence of democratic institutions and procedures on inflation. In populist approaches, the institutional fea-

tures of democracy—electoral competition, separation of powers, partisanship, and political participation—increase pressures on politicians to use the inflation tax; inflation is less likely if governments with consolidated, autonomous—even dictatorial—powers are able to avoid these pressures. In state-capture approaches, in contrast, democratic accountability *promotes* price stability, since use of the inflation tax is eroded once elites face credible challenges to their authority. The populist view has enjoyed something of a consensus among scholars of developing countries for many years. Drawing heavily upon evidence from the post-Communist transitions over the past decade, however, the state-capture view has challenged the argument that authoritarian states are more capable than democracies of maintaining price stability.

These approaches identify different players in the making of monetary policy: in the populist approach, the (relatively poorer) majority demand high inflation; in the state-capture approach, demands for inflation come from the (relatively richer) elite. Thus, populist theories assume that politicians merely respond to the “omnipotence of the majority,” in Tocqueville’s phrase, while state-capture theories assume that politicians are essentially clients of elites. We seek to reconcile these divergent hypotheses, arguing that the distribution of income in a society, together with the differing abilities of the rich and poor to avoid the inflation tax, shapes underlying preferences for inflation. As a result, the influence of political regime-type on inflation is contingent upon these preferences, as well as the extent to which rich and poor have access to and representation in decision making. Our analysis counsels some caution to proponents of both approaches, suggesting instead that certain socioeconomic conditions will inevitably constrain the “marketplace” for economic policies and, thus, proscribe the impact of political institutions.

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The authors thank Michael Bailey, Robert Cumby, Philip Keefer, Torsten Persson, Dennis Quinn, George Shambaugh, David Stasavage, and David Strömberg for comments on early drafts. The central bank turnover data used in this paper were generously provided by Jakob de Haan. Previous versions of this paper were delivered at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association and American Political Science Association. Financial support from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and research assistance from Jorge Ugaz and Mouneer Odeh are gratefully acknowledged.

DEMOCRACY AND INFLATION

Two Views on the Politics of Easy Money

Political explanations of inflation remain closely tied to theories of group conflict. To paraphrase Albert

Hirschman (1985), pressure groups are the political scientist's "monotonous equivalent of the economist's untiring stress on the undue expansion of the money supply" as an explanation of inflation. The implications of democracy for price stability, naturally, derive from the view that the role and significance of interest groups are a function of the effectiveness of their mobilization and, ultimately, the mechanisms by which they are represented.

We consider the main existing political explanations of inflation and group conflict as belonging to one of two categories, depending upon which particular groups are considered salient and the nature of group demands.¹ The first is a "populist" view of inflation that, put simply, considers inflation a result of public demands for government spending, especially in the presence of conflicts over the apportionment of economic gains and losses. In one variant of the populist perspective, inflation is linked to tax-transfer schemes, in which governments maximize the welfare of the representative consumer through money creation (Calvo 1978). This basic idea has appeared in formal models and empirical analyses of the political business cycle, which have suggested that inflation may be a consequence of opportunistic or partisan politicians who manipulate the levers of fiscal and monetary policy in order to appease voters (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997; Clark and Reichert 1998). In another variant, coalitions of organized, special interests—especially labor unions—make two kinds of policy demands. The first is for accommodative monetary policies that allow wages, salaries, rents, and interest payments to be inflation-indexed, which gives these groups initial advantages during inflationary bouts but, in turn, increases the vulnerability of the whole economy to price shocks (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Olson 1982). The second is for greater fiscal laxity, especially increased public spending.² In the end, governments resort to the inflation tax—the main component of seignorage—because of the ease with which inflationary financing can be generated compared to financing from tax revenues and because inflation obviates the need for protracted legislative bargaining typically required for increases in taxation.

Beginning with the participation-crisis theories of the 1960s and 1970s (Huntington 1968; Weiner 1971), the

populist perspective has viewed "raw pluralism" as a detriment to economic performance. The central implication of these theories is that competition and participation simply exacerbate demands for inflation as well as the coordination problems inherent in preventing inflationary spirals. Governments that are characterized by electoral uncertainty, moreover, are more likely to turn to the inflation tax, which is both remunerative and easy to levy. Such explanations of inflation hold little affection for the procedural or structural features of democratic government, namely, electoral competition, pluralism, and divided government. Indeed, in the populist view, there is a simple policy prescription to avoid inflation: insulate policymakers and institutions from public pressures. Thus, arguments have been made that price instability may be avoided by concentrating power in a strong executive (Nelson 1993), that monetary policy needs to be in the hands of independent, professional "technocrats" (Williamson 1994), that centralized authority is needed to overcome partisanship and division (Haggard and Kaufman 1992), and that authoritarian regimes may be more capable of resolving economic crises than pluralistic democracies (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986).

The "state-capture" approach, in contrast, is focused on the power of rent-seeking elites, rather than on the public (see Hellman et al. 2000). This view suggests that the chief source of inflation is not the demand for seignorage revenues, but the *internal opposition* within the ruling class to limiting the inflation tax. Inflation does not arise from voters or consumers pressuring politicians to ease monetary or fiscal constraints but, rather, because elites (and indeed, incumbent politicians) derive two kinds of potential *private* benefits from money and credit creation. First, credits issued by the central bank can be channeled to favored enterprises or sectors directly or through the commercial banks using portfolio requirements, directed credit programs, and other forms of selective financial "repression." Second, resulting inflation lowers real interest rates and erodes the real value of outstanding liabilities that have to be repaid (both the loans held by borrowers and the deposits held by banks). If the power of the elites—in whose hands money creation processes are held—is not credibly challenged, their access to rents under the status quo remains unchanged (Bates and Krueger 1993; Geddes 1995). The state-capture approach leads to conclusions that are sharply opposed to those of the populist view. Indeed, the very elements of political regimes that induce inflationary binges in the populist view—partisanship, separations of powers, and excessive political participation—serve the opposite function in the state-capture view, namely, they constrain the power of incumbents. In short, inflation in the state-capture view occurs in the absence of political contestation. The central challenge of price stability in the state-capture view, then, is not to insulate policymakers from the public but, rather, to force accountability upon incumbents in order to limit their private accumulation of wealth.

¹ A more recent body of theory—partially related to group-based theories—examines the impact of changing the number of veto players on policy choice in unidimensional or multidimensional settings (e.g., Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Cox and McCubbins 2001). The central implication of these models—that expanding the number of veto points leads to a status quo policy bias—has been examined with respect to inflation by Treisman (2000). Our chief interest, in contrast, is in the *level* of inflation, rather than its inertia.

² Treisman (2000) refers to these variants as "commitment" and "collective action" approaches, respectively. In the first, inflation occurs because there is a general preference for inflation (due to its output-expanding properties) that is uniform across the population. In the second, inflation occurs because of coordination failures among groups. Both approaches assume that the demands of the representative consumer or representative interest group for inflationary financing will be acted upon by monetary and fiscal authorities unless those authorities are autonomous and insulated, and for this reason we consider them variants on the "populist" theme.

The Evidence

Recent econometric studies have emphasized the need for an understanding of the political determinants of inflation in both developed and developing countries (e.g., Campillo and Miron 1997; Gasiorowski 2000; Treisman 2000). Similarly, empirical analyses have also examined the role of political-constitutional arrangements in promoting credible commitments to monetary stability (Keefer and Stasavage 2002). Yet fundamental disagreements remain about the impact of democracy and democratization on inflation. What distinguishes both statistical and case-study research is that evidence supporting sharply contrasting claims has been found, depending upon the region or set of countries examined.

The populist conclusion—that democracy has contributed to inflationary crises—draws much of its support from Latin America (and other developing countries) during the debt crisis of the 1980s, when inflation was blamed on economic mismanagement that ensued when democracies became prone to political stalemates during times of economic trouble (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). In particular, the intransigence of left-wing and populist parties in Latin America—supported by militant labor unions—is identified as a key factor in the failures of Bolivia under Siles, Peru—first under Belaúnde and then under García—and Argentina in the second Perón era to maintain price stability (Cantriot 1975; Herrera 1985). Similarly, Alfonsín's Argentina, Brazil under Sarney, and Chile under Ibañez and Allende suffered from fragmented political structures that enabled single constituencies—business, labor, or agriculture—to resist tax reforms and spending cuts and to force governments to embark on radical redistribution programs (French-Davis and Muñoz 1990; Kaufman 1985). In contrast, authoritarian Latin American states appear to have been more successful in forcing workers “unresistingly to absorb all price shocks” (Whitehead 1989). Chile and Mexico, among other cases, are cited as examples of more successful attempts to restrain inflation, accomplished under dictatorship in the case of Chile, and under a dominant-party system that effectively coopted opposition leaders in the case of Mexico (Silva 1993; Velasco 1988).

The state-capture approach, on the other hand, derives much support from the cases of the post-Communist transition countries, most of which experienced very high inflations in the early 1990s as a result of price liberalization and the release of their monetary overhang. By 1993–1994, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary had all brought down inflation to moderate rates, averaging slightly over 20% a year, while in the worst cases (Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), inflation hovered above 2,000%. The group of countries that struggled to bring inflation under control throughout the 1990s—Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—tend to be characterized by single-party systems with quasi-dictatorial heads of state. The countries that liberalized their po-

litical systems rapidly, on the other hand, were able to bring inflation under moderate levels by 1995. The persistence of high inflation in transition countries has been explained as a consequence of the failure of democratic procedures and institutions to take root and the unconstrained behavior of elites who profited personally from rapid money creation in a liberalizing economy (e.g., Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996; Hellman 1998; Mikhailov 1997). In some countries, large commercial banks themselves were inflation's indirect beneficiaries, profiting from commissions, fees, and other rents involved in allocating credits to the industrial and agricultural sectors—casting doubt on the traditional wisdom that strong financial sectors demand price stability (Shleifer and Treisman 2000).

A BASIC MODEL OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE INFLATION TAX

Formal political-economic models of inflation have focused almost exclusively on the time-consistency problem examined by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and by Barro and Gordon (1983). The perception that output can be raised in the short run by expansionist monetary or fiscal policies induces governmental authorities to implement less restrictive policies than would be consistent with low inflation, creating an inflationary “bias.” Our approach is somewhat differently conceived, based on the Meltzer–Richard (1981) model of redistribution but focusing, instead, on the distributional effects of the inflation tax, which we consider a means of both increasing government revenues and reducing outstanding financial liabilities. Upon this, we build a simple view of democracy as the enfranchisement—either directly or indirectly—of the poorer segments of the population. Although this may be considered an unrestrictive definition of democracy (since, surely, the voice of the poor can matter in dictatorships—an issue to which we return later), it fits with the prevailing view found in classic “civic” democratic theories that democracy expands the scope for participation and representation by previously excluded groups in society (e.g., Bryce 1921; Dahl 1956; Eckstein 1984).³

Individuals care linearly about consumption and live for two periods. The utility of a representative individual j , with no discounting, can thus be represented as

$$U^j(\pi) = C_1^j + C_2^j. \quad (1)$$

Individuals differ in their endowments of wealth and there are two types of agents: the rich, whose per-capita wealth is y^r , and the poor, whose per-capita wealth is y^p , with $y^r > y^p$. The total population is normalized to one, and the proportion of poor in the population is $\alpha > 1/2$,

³ Indeed our definition of democracy reflects the views of Bryce (1921, Vol. 2), who, in referring to “the power of wealth,” stated, “Democracy was expected to extinguish this ancient evil, for every citizen is interested in preventing men from using money to secure gains for themselves at the expense of the community.”

indicating that the poor constitute the majority. The rich are assumed to have access to loans intermediated through the public sector, which the poor do not.⁴ Total per-capita money balances m^j are thus given by wealth plus (nominal) liabilities λ , so we can define $m^r = y^r + \lambda$ and $m^p = y^p$.

In period 1, agents will use part of their available money balances (including, for the rich, borrowing) for consumption, while the remainder will be saved. Rich and poor both save a share s of their total available money balances, and these savings are remunerated in period 2, when they become vulnerable to inflation.⁵ For simplicity, all nominal interest rates are set to zero. The real value of money balances depends on the price level, which is controlled by the government through base-money creation. There is an initial price level P_1 , normalized to one, that determines the real value of money in period 1, but the government can tax the proportion of money that is saved through inflation $\pi = (P_2 - P_1)/P_2$.

Finally, we assume that the ability to “hedge” differs across income groups. Recent empirical studies suggest that lower-income groups are more vulnerable to inflation than are upper-income groups for three reasons. First, the poor are less likely to benefit from wage indexation and are more likely to draw incomes in nominal terms. Second, assets that are insulated from price increases—e.g., real assets such as land or other indexed financial assets—are typically beyond the reach of the poor (Agénor n.d.). Third, the poor hold a smaller portion of their money balances in foreign currency accounts, either locally or offshore (Easterly and Fischer 2001). While the rich have access to financial instruments that protect a portion of their savings from inflation, the poor tend to hold mostly cash and local-currency deposits. The share of savings susceptible to inflation is given by the parameter ψ , while $(1 - \psi)$ represents the share of inflation-hedged savings to which only the rich have access.

Our analysis emphasizes the role of inflation as a mechanism of redistribution. Revenues generated by the inflation tax are used for per-capita transfers in period 2, denoted g . To account for the general welfare cost of inflation we also assume that the inflation tax generates a deadweight loss to consumers, simplified as a quadratic function (see Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). Consumption in period 1 is therefore the share $(1 - s)$ of total money balances; consumption

in the second period will be drawn from savings and transfers minus the real value of outstanding liabilities (which must be repaid in period 2). Consumption in each period, for rich and poor, respectively, is therefore given by the following:

$$C_1^r = m^r(1 - s),$$

$$C_2^r = \psi m^r s(1 - \pi) + (1 - \psi)m^r s - \lambda(1 - \pi) + g - \frac{\pi^2}{2},$$

$$C_1^p = m^p(1 - s),$$

$$C_2^p = m^p s(1 - \pi) + g - \frac{\pi^2}{2}.$$

Note that, if we ignore the financial “advantage” of the rich (i.e., their hedging ability as well as their ability to augment money balances with borrowing), then the per-capita transfers generated by inflation clearly benefit the poor. On the other hand, if the financial advantage of the rich is large—if the portion of hedged savings is large enough that the unhedged savings of the rich are less than the total savings of the poor or if the amount borrowed is large enough that the inflation-induced erosion of these liabilities exceeds the inflation tax that must be paid—then it is the rich who will benefit from inflation.

If, in the basic median-voter framework, democracy implies an extension of the franchise to the poor, then policy outcomes in a democracy will be identical to the policies preferred by the (poorer) median voter. Recent extensions of this view, however, have shown that the extent to which the poor can influence any given policy will depend on the “weight” the poor have in the political process (Franzese 2002). We therefore propose a more continuous public-choice mechanism by which government preferences are determined by a convex combination of the utilities of a rich and a poor individual. The weight, or “influence,” of the poor is given by the parameter θ , which indexes the access to, and representation in, decision making by the median voter, and $\theta \in [0, 1]$. State capture is thus interpreted as the ability of a rich minority to have a disproportionate impact on government policy. As θ approaches zero, the government becomes more insulated from the preferences of the poorer majority and a potential target for influence peddling by the rich. One can either think of this influence as taking the form of political pressure and financial contributions or assume that the politician belongs to the rich but that private benefits are also obtained from holding political power.

In contrast, as θ approaches one, the government will put a higher weight on the utility of the poor, since the poor constitute the majority in the population. There is thus an implicit reference to electoral competition in θ , as the incumbents’ desire for reelection translates into a concern for the poorer majority. With greater electoral competition and political representation, the participation of the poor in decision making increases. After some simplification the government’s utility function

⁴ For simplicity, our model does not include a private financial sector, the exclusion of which has no qualitative impact on our results, as long as the rich hold net liabilities (loans) and the poor net assets (deposits), i.e., the richer segment is borrowing from poorer depositors.

⁵ Treating savings as exogenous implicitly assumes, first, that the marginal propensity to save is independent of income level and, second, that there is no shifting between consumption and savings in response to the inflation rate, which basically serves as a tax on savings in the model. The first assumption is empirically supported by Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000), who find no evidence for any impact of income inequality on aggregate savings levels. The second assumption is made for simplicity, and the main result of the model holds true if we assume concave utility and allow for endogenous savings.

can be expressed as

$$U^G(\pi) = \theta \left[m^p(1 - s\pi) + g - \frac{\pi^2}{2} \right] + (1 - \theta) \times \left[m^r(1 - \psi s\pi) - (1 - \pi)\lambda + g - \frac{\pi^2}{2} \right]. \quad (2)$$

The government budget constraint equalizes total transfers (equivalent to per-capita transfers since the population is normalized to one) with total revenues from the inflation tax plus the real value of the loans to the rich. Transfers are therefore fully funded by the inflation tax and are not caused by running deficits:

$$g \leq s\pi(\psi m^r - \alpha(\psi m^r - m^p)) + (1 - \pi)\lambda(1 - \alpha). \quad (3)$$

Inflation, therefore, increases government revenues through the inflation tax on wealth but decreases government revenues by eroding outstanding debt. By substituting the government budget constraint into the government's utility function, the latter can be maximized with respect to inflation, which gives us the implicit per-capita transfer. Solving this yields the following optimal inflation rate:

$$\pi^* = (\theta - \alpha)s(\psi m^r - m^p) - \lambda. \quad (4)$$

The impact of democratization, or of an increase in the political participation and representation of the poor, on the equilibrium inflation rate is

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*}{\partial \theta} = s(\psi m^r - m^p) - \lambda. \quad (5)$$

Equation (5) shows that increasing the involvement of the poorer majority in the political process (increasing θ) raises inflation if per-capita wealth differences are high. Alternatively, increasing θ lowers inflation rates if income inequality is low—specifically, if the skew in per-capita unhedged money balances $s(\psi m^r - m^p)$ is less than outstanding liabilities λ .⁶ The impact of democracy on the optimal inflation level may thus be ambiguous. In particular, a negative relationship between the inflation rate and democracy in a country where income is relatively equally distributed is possible, whereas the relationship tends to be positive in a more unequal society. In sum, the redistributive effect of the inflation tax increases with income inequality: In economies with high income inequality, the poor are likely to demand that governments levy inflation taxes to redistribute from rich to poor, but a poorer individual's optimal inflation rate will decrease as the distribution of income becomes equal.

On the other hand, the rich may demand more inflation than will the poor if the depreciation of the real

value of their outstanding liabilities is larger than their inflation-vulnerable money balances. Hence, while the claim that inequality and inflation are correlated seems justified, it is unclear whether the impetus for inflation comes primarily from the richer (elite) or the poorer (majority) strata in the population. Our model suggests that what matters is a combination of the degree to which the rich and poor are politically represented, and the prevailing income inequality. The remainder of this paper examines whether this model is empirically justified.

DATA, ESTIMATION, AND RESULTS

Our governing hypothesis, then, is that more democratic, politically competitive countries will suffer from higher inflation as the distribution of income in those countries becomes more unequal. In other words, the effect of democracy or political openness on inflation should be *increasing in* income inequality. This interactive relationship forms the crux of our empirical analysis.

Data and Measurement

To investigate systematically the relationship between regime type and inflation, we examine the determinants of inflation using cross-national time-series data from more than 100 countries—including developing, advanced-industrial, and transition countries. Our maximum time-series length is between 1960 and 1999.⁷ Based on the central predictions of the model, our estimations take the following basic form:

$$\text{Inflation} = f(\text{GINI}, \text{POL}, \mathbf{X}), \quad (6)$$

where *GINI* is a measure of income inequality, *POL* a measure of political regime-type, and *X* a vector of other conditioning variables. Because the effect of democracy on inflation should be conditioned by inequality, the inequality and political democracy measures are interacted in our empirical specifications. We transform the inflation rate to reduce the heteroskedasticity of the error that is typically obtained with inflation data. Transformed inflation, *D*, is defined as the annual inflation rate divided by one plus the annual inflation rate:

$$D_t = \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_t + 1}. \quad (7)$$

Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) refer to this variable as the “annual real depreciation” of money.

Two common measures of political democracy cover the range of countries in which we are interested.

⁶ As we are interested primarily in per-capita wealth differences, the share of the population α drops out of our result. The expression $(m^r - m^p)$, however, can be rewritten $(\bar{m} - m^p)/(1 - \alpha)$, where \bar{m} corresponds to the mean money balances in the economy, an expression more directly equivalent to that of Meltzer–Richard (see Persson and Tabellini 2000).

⁷ Cross-national and panel statistical studies that have analyzed the relationship between democratic institutions and inflation have focused on either high-income countries (Crepaz 1996) or developing countries (see, e.g., Gasiorowski [2000], who also reviews the empirical research and Haggard et al. 1990), and, occasionally, both sets of countries (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). These studies—mainly due to the lack of available data—however, have not typically included the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Treisman 2000 is the exception).

The *Gastil* index includes both political rights and civil rights, each of which is scored from one (free) to seven (not free); the *Polity* index is based on separate measures of democracy and autocracy, each of which are scored from zero to 10. Both have been criticized for ideological bias, inappropriate aggregation procedures, and improper conceptualization (Bollen and Paxton 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Given these drawbacks, we use both measures in separate regressions and later test for alternative measures of democracy. We transform the *Gastil* index as $(14 - \text{political rights} - \text{civil rights})/12$, which yields an index between zero (least free) and one (most free), and, for comparability, the *Polity* index as $(10 + \text{democracy} - \text{autocracy})/20$, which similarly rescales the index from zero (nondemocratic) to one (democratic).⁸

Our inequality measure is the *Gini* coefficient of income inequality and is taken from the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality Database as used by Dollar and Kraay (2001). We adjusted the coefficients for differences in income-based vs. consumption-based measures of welfare and for gross vs. net income, as recommended by Denninger and Squire (1996), resulting in 973 country-year observations. Following Boix and Garicano (2001) we then take five-year moving averages of the *Gini* coefficient, producing a maximum sample size of 2,235 observations.⁹

We consider several conditioning variables to be particularly important. We include the general consolidated government fiscal balance as a percentage of the GDP (*Fiscal Balance*), on the assumption that fiscal motives may drive inflation. We include the rate of annual GDP growth (*Growth*) to control for cyclical movements in the price level. We are also interested in controlling for the size of the financial sector, on the assumption that weaker financial sectors will prompt greater inflation.¹⁰ One possible measure of this would be the outstanding claims on the private sector held by commercial banks. Unfortunately, this measure would not include commercial bank lending to the public or parastatal sector—a significant part of total bank credit in the transition economies, particularly during the high-inflation periods of the early 1990s. Another measure would be of total assets of the banking sector.

This measure, however, is not available for most transition countries in our sample. Therefore, we use M2 as a percentage of GDP (*Financial Depth*), which is a measure of outstanding banking-sector liabilities. This is an accepted measure of financial sector size and is widely available. Foreign reserves, as a percentage of imports (*Reserves*), are included to control for currency flight and exchange rate management. We also include imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (*Trade*) to control for trade openness, and the log of per-capita GNP (*Income*) to control for country wealth. An *Instability* dummy is included, coded one if any revolution, coup, or armed conflict occurred within the borders of a country in a given year and zero otherwise. Finally, we include the lagged value of inflation, D_{t-1} , to control for persistence in the dependent variable. All data sources are given in Table A1 (see the Appendix); Table A2 contains descriptive statistics for all variables included in the regressions.

Benchmark Specification and Basic Results

Our first empirical model therefore takes the following autoregressive, interactive form:

$$D_{it} = \alpha + \phi D_{it-1} + \gamma X_{it} + \beta_G GINI_{it} + \beta_P POL_{it-1} + \beta_{GP} (GINI_{it} \times POL_{it-1}) + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (8)$$

where α , ϕ , γ , β_G , β_P , and β_{GP} are parameters to be estimated, and ε is a random disturbance, for $i = 1, \dots, N$ countries, and $t = 1, \dots, T$ years. We initially estimate equation (8) using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE), where OLS estimates are used but where standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation as recommended by Beck and Katz (e.g., 1995, 1996, 2001). All estimations include a lagged dependent variable.¹¹ These basic regression results, excluding the interactive term, are reported in Table 1. Regression (1) tests a basic economic model that considers inflation rates a result of fiscal policy, growth, financial sector depth, income levels, and economic openness. The fiscal, growth, trade, and financial depth terms all have the expected signs—surpluses, growth, greater trade openness, and larger financial sectors tend to be correlated with lower inflation levels.

In regression (2), we add a measure of central bank independence (CBI). Although analyses of OECD countries have generally found evidence supporting this view, empirical studies covering more countries have yielded little conclusive evidence of a robust connection across a range of countries, periods, and inflation rates, and the results have been considered highly sensitive to the sample and specification. Nevertheless, if CBI reduces the scope for discretion in monetary policy, then the inflationary bias induced by time-inconsistent monetary policies may also be limited. Thus we test whether our results are robust to

⁸ For an analysis of the validity of different measures of democracy, see Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), who find that the *Gastil* index contains less measurement error than the alternatives.

⁹ We add 6.6 points to *Gini* coefficients based on expenditure (as opposed to income) and 3 points to those based on net rather than gross earnings. A five-year moving average, in addition to maximizing observations (given the number of gaps in the *Gini* data), also minimizes year-to-year fluctuations.

¹⁰ The use of seignorage revenues where private, voluntary markets for government securities are thin has been well documented in developing countries (Fry 1997). In weaker financial markets, individuals are less likely to have large cash holdings, savings, indexed pensions, and other instruments whose real value is prone to inflation-induced erosion. Thus it is that case that countries characterized by stronger, deeper financial markets are less prone to inflationary episodes due to both the presence of alternative sources of government finance, and equally importantly, because the “demand” for monetary stability is stronger in robust financial markets (Maxfield 1997).

¹¹ We also test for first-order serial correlation, i.e., that the error terms in equation (7) follow an AR(1) process ($\varepsilon_{it} = \rho \varepsilon_{it-1} + \mu_{it}$) and report rho estimates. All estimations were performed using Stata 7.0.

TABLE 1. Basic Inflation Regressions: Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Fiscal Balance	-0.0013*** (0.0003)	-0.0007** (0.0003)	-0.0013** (0.0005)	-0.0013** (0.0006)	-0.0010* (0.0005)	-0.0010* (0.0005)	-0.0013** (0.0006)	-0.0013** (0.0006)
Income	-0.0030 (0.0036)	0.0019 (0.0047)						
Trade	-0.0001* (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)						
Growth	-0.0027*** (0.0005)	-0.0028*** (0.0005)	-0.0032*** (0.0007)	-0.0036*** (0.0007)	-0.0032*** (0.0006)	-0.0035*** (0.0006)	-0.0032*** (0.0007)	-0.0036*** (0.0007)
Financial Depth	-0.0002*** (0.0000)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0001** (0.0000)	-0.0001** (0.0000)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
Reserves	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
CBI		0.0189*** (0.0051)	0.0079 (0.0068)	0.0064 (0.0071)				
Instability			0.0020 (0.0064)	0.0006 (0.0062)	0.0100 (0.0062)	0.0071 (0.0056)	0.0019 (0.0065)	0.0004 (0.0063)
Gini			0.0009** (0.0004)	0.0010** (0.0004)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009** (0.0004)	0.0010** (0.0004)
Gastil _{t-1}			0.0226** (0.0106)		-0.0055 (0.0076)		0.0236** (0.0108)	
Polity _{t-1}				0.0231** (0.0097)		-0.0001 (0.0070)		0.0239** (0.0097)
Inflation _{t-1}	0.7716*** (0.0310)	0.8459*** (0.0311)	0.8469*** (0.0409)	0.8414*** (0.0413)	0.8005*** (0.0345)	0.7956*** (0.0326)	0.8513*** (0.0411)	0.8446*** (0.0415)
Observations	3,096	1,368	595	558	1,150	1,225	595	558
N	153	73	54	50	109	106	54	50
R ²	0.7180	0.7875	0.8030	0.8035	0.8016	0.7934	0.8025	0.8031
Wald χ^2	1264.11	1281.81	1182.46	1179.59	1982.46	2124.09	1168.26	1167.87
(p)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
ρ	0.0977	0.0010	0.0703	0.0556	0.1531	0.1491	0.0767	0.0646

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Rho tests are derived from specifications in which errors are explicitly modeled as AR(1) processes. Intercepts are estimated but not reported. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$.

the inclusion of CBI as a control variable. The familiar Cukierman index of legal independence, however, does not cover a sufficiently large number of countries over a consistent time series.¹² We rely, therefore, upon an expanded database of central bank governor turnover rates as a proxy for CBI taken from a recent study of developing countries (Sturm and de Haan 2001) for two reasons. First, it is the most extensive measure of CBI currently available in panel format. Second, rather than measuring formal independence, it approximates the actual autonomy of the central bank governor—something not necessarily reflected in the legal index. Including *Central Bank Turnover* in regression (2) cuts the sample size by over one-half (since advanced industrial and transition economies are no longer included) and removes the significance of the reserve and trade coefficients. The turnover rate of the central bank governor, however, is positively associated with inflation,

confirming general findings about CBI in high-income countries.¹³

In regressions (3) through (8) we add the instability dummy as well as the Gini coefficient and alternate between our two measures of democracy. The trade and income measures have been removed (they are no longer significant; removing them does not alter the results in any way, and thus they are dropped from all subsequent estimations). Across all specifications, instability carries no significance. Inflation is associated, however, with income inequality, supporting claims in previous empirical work (Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg 1996). In regressions (3) and (4) both democracy measures are positively associated with inflation, also confirming earlier panel-data analyses. Central bank turnover, however, loses significance when these variables are added. Note that the sample size is further reduced, owing to the gaps in the data caused mainly by the unavailability of Gini data for several developing countries over the sample time period. In regressions (5) and (6) we remove central bank turnover, and the sample size doubles in each case. But in the larger

¹² Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) find an inverse relationship between CBI and inflation, but their sample does not include postcommunist transition economies, and the CBI measures are separated by five-year gaps. More recently, comparable measures have been developed for 25 transition economies, and the evidence suggests that CBI is unrelated to inflation in the early stages of transition, i.e., when inflation is highest (Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti 2002).

¹³ We also used the "tenure" (in years) of the central bank governor as an alternative measure of CBI. The results were identical in all respects.

sample, the democracy measures have lost their statistical significance. To ensure that these changes in the significance of the coefficients are not due to changes in the sample size, we reran estimations (5) and (6) with the same sample used in equations (3) and (4). The democracy measures are once again significantly positive—in columns (7) and (8)—suggesting that these results are sensitive to sampling. Rho tests throughout yield low estimates (0.001 to 0.153) and the use of an AR(1) process does not alter any results, suggesting that the lagged dependent variable captures most of the persistence in the dependent variable.

When the multiplicative terms are included in Table 2, the political variables become consistently significant. Regressions (1) and (2) use the full sample of available data. The measures of democracy are now significantly *negative*, while the coefficients on the interactive terms are significantly positive. As predicted, democratic regimes appear less likely to inflate than less competitive, more autocratic systems, but this effect is contingent upon the Gini coefficient: As the level of income inequality rises, the Gastil and Polity indices become *positively associated* with inflation. In regressions (3) and (4) we again add the central bank turnover term, which does not carry any significant sign. More importantly, the effects of the Gastil and Polity terms as well as the interactive terms are unchanged from the previous two estimations, and thus controlling for CBI does not influence our basic results. To ensure, again, that these results are robust to sampling, we rerun estimations (1) and (2) for the smaller sample and report the results in columns (5) and (6). The smaller sample size does not change the signs or the magnitudes of either the Gastil or Polity indices or their interactive terms.

To control for country-specific effects, we rerun all regressions (1) to (6) using OLS with fixed effects. We are also, however, interested in year-specific effects, since global inflation is generally perceived to have peaked in the 1980s. Thus we estimate the error term in equation (8) as $\varepsilon_{it} = \nu_i + \eta_t + \mu_{it}$, including both time-invariant and cross-section invariant effects, in addition to the random disturbance. The results from these two-way fixed effects regressions are reported in columns (7) through (12). The linear and interactive effects of democracy both remain statistically significant, while the magnitudes of the coefficients actually increase by 19% to 67%. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is now negatively associated with inflation, indicating that high-inequality countries have lower inflation when time and country-specific intercepts are included.

These conditional effects are depicted graphically in Figure 1, which plots the expected effect of the Gastil and Polity measures on inflation over a range of all possible Gini coefficients (though not the actual range, which is from 16.6 to 74.3).¹⁴ For illustrative purposes, upper and lower bounds for the 99% confidence interval are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix. In both cases, the conditional effects switch signs

after some critical Gini value—39.6 in the case of the Gastil index, 40.0 in the case of the Polity index—above which the effect of these political measures on inflation becomes positive.

Sensitivity and Robustness

Alternative Measures of Democracy. To test the robustness of our results to different measures of political democracy across different estimation techniques, we replaced the lagged Gastil/Polity terms in regressions (1) and (2) from Table 2 with two different alternatives, and reran these specifications using several different panel-data estimation methods. The first is the *Democracy* component of the Polity index, which ranges from zero to 10. The second is a measure of democracy taken from Banks (1997), using a composite of indicators of the effectiveness of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, the competitiveness of the political nominating process, and freedom of group opposition (each of which are scored from one to three). The Democracy and Banks measures are both rescaled to yield indicators that range from zero to one.

In addition to the OLS-PCSE and two-way fixed effects models used in Table 2, we reran specifications (1) and (2) from Table 2 using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Table 3 shows selected results from these full regressions—specifically, the coefficients of the (linear) political variables and their interactions with the Gini coefficient. Gastil and Polity results are shown for comparison. All results are consistent with our previous findings: The linear coefficients are negative, and the interactive coefficients positive. With one exception, all coefficients are significant at 95% (the exception is significant at 90%). Of the 24 new coefficients generated, 19 are significant at the 99% level.

Endogeneity and Bias. It has been argued that OLS estimates will generate inconsistent results in the presence of serial correlation in dynamic panels (Maddala 1997). The fixed-effects model, in addition, will generate biased estimates when applied to a dynamic panel, particularly in shorter time series.¹⁵ Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed an alternative estimator, using a GMM technique that uses lagged values of the dependent and independent variables as valid instruments in a first-differenced equation, to develop a set of moment conditions that can be used to produce consistent results, even in smaller T panels. An additional advantage of this GMM estimator is that it can remedy problems of reverse causality that


¹⁴ The procedure for calculating conditional effects, and standard errors of the conditional effects, is explained in Franzese, Kam, and Jamal (1999).

¹⁵ If the mean dependent variable and the mean error are correlated, demeaning the variables to eliminate country-specific effects (as the fixed-effects estimator does) introduces correlation between the demeaned, lagged dependent variable and the demeaned error term. Monte Carlo studies based on mean square error criteria generally show that the fixed effect model is better suited as $T \rightarrow 30$ but that GMM estimators are preferable for T between 5 and 30 (Judson and Owen 1999). Average time series for the countries in our sample are generally less than 20 years. On problems of fixed effects models specific to political variables, see Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) and Beck and Katz (2001).

TABLE 2. Inflation Regressions with Interactive Terms

	OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors					OLS with Two-Way Fixed Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Fiscal Balance	-0.0013** (0.0006)	-0.0012** (0.0006)	-0.0015*** (0.0006)	-0.0015*** (0.0006)	-0.0015*** (0.0006)	-0.0015*** (0.0006)	-0.0020*** (0.0006)	-0.0020*** (0.0006)	-0.0021*** (0.0008)	-0.0020*** (0.0008)	-0.0021*** (0.0008)	-0.0021*** (0.0008)
Growth	-0.0032*** (0.0006)	-0.0036*** (0.0006)	-0.0032*** (0.0007)	-0.0037*** (0.0007)	-0.0033*** (0.0007)	-0.0037*** (0.0007)	-0.0040*** (0.0005)	-0.0044*** (0.0005)	-0.0043*** (0.0007)	-0.0048*** (0.0007)	-0.0043*** (0.0007)	-0.0048*** (0.0007)
Financial Depth	-0.0001 (0.0000)	-0.0001* (0.0000)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0008* (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.0004)
Reserves	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0002)
Central Bank Turnover			0.0080 (0.0067)	0.0065 (0.0070)					0.0071 (0.0058)	0.0061 (0.0060)		
Instability	0.0084 (0.0061)	0.0053 (0.0057)	0.0015 (0.0062)	-0.0003 (0.0062)	0.0013 (0.0063)	-0.0005 (0.0063)	0.0143** (0.0059)	0.0113** (0.0055)	0.0030 (0.0075)	0.0036 (0.0077)	0.0028 (0.0075)	0.0035 (0.0077)
Gini	-0.0013 (0.0009)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0012 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0011 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0046*** (0.0012)	-0.0035*** (0.0010)	-0.0037* (0.0019)	-0.0033* (0.0018)	-0.0037* (0.0019)	-0.0033* (0.0018)
Gastil _{t-1}	-0.01489*** (0.0521)		-0.1571** (0.0750)		-0.1555** (0.0753)		-0.1953*** (0.0614)		-0.2338** (0.1145)		-0.2292** (0.1145)	
Polity _{t-1}		-0.0836** (0.0413)		-0.0817* (0.0487)		-0.0803* (0.0487)		-0.0998** (0.0437)		-0.1365* (0.0833)		-0.1325* (0.0832)
Gini × Gastil _{t-1}	0.0038*** (0.0013)		0.0042** (0.0018)		0.0042** (0.0018)		0.0059*** (0.0014)		0.0062*** (0.0025)		0.0062** (0.0025)	
Gini × Polity _{t-1}		0.0021** (0.0010)		0.0024** (0.0011)		0.0024** (0.0011)		0.0041*** (0.0010)		0.0041** (0.0018)		0.0041** (0.0018)
Inflation _{t-1}	0.7954*** (0.0339)	0.7925*** (0.0323)	0.8403*** (0.0411)	0.8357*** (0.0419)	0.8447*** (0.0413)	0.8390*** (0.0421)	0.6168*** (0.0223)	0.5981*** (0.0216)	0.6120*** (0.0316)	0.5961*** (0.0329)	0.6151*** (0.0315)	0.5988*** (0.0328)
Observations	1,150	1,225	595	558	595	558	1,150	1,225	595	558	595	558
N	109	106	54	50	54	50	109	106	54	50	54	50
R ²	0.8046	0.7950	0.8051	0.8049	0.8045	0.8045	0.7823	0.7468	0.7979	0.7853	0.7972	0.7847
Wald χ^2/F test	2186.77	2117.16	1212.18	1082.44	1195.40	1073.76	37.43	38.01	24.19	23.56	24.95	24.34
(p)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
ρ	0.1603	0.1508	0.0617	0.0576	0.0755	0.0655						

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors and standard errors (OLS two-way fixed effects) are in parentheses. Rho tests are derived from panel specifications in which errors are explicitly modeled as AR(1) processes. Two-way fixed effects include both cross-sectional and time dummies. Intercepts are not reported. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$.

FIGURE 1. Conditional Effects of Political Variables on Inflation with Measures of Uncertainty

may apply to several of our independent variables. Neither OLS-PCSE nor OLS with fixed effects deals satisfactorily with the potential problem of endogeneity. There is evidence, for example, that inflation can lead to low economic growth (Barro 1995; Bruno and Easterly 1998), financial disintermediation (Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001; Khan, Senhadji, and Smith 2001), foreign reserve depletion (Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000), political instability (Gasiorowski 1995), and inequality itself (Easterly and Fischer 2001). The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator allows us to relax the assumption that economic growth, financial depth, reserves, instability, and inequality are strictly exogenous and treat these as endogenous variables.

To ensure that our results are not affected by these inconsistencies, we reformulate our empirical specification in accordance with the Arellano-Bond first-differenced GMM estimator.¹⁶ The results are reported in the last row in Table 3. The coefficients confirm our general expectations from previous results. The democracy indices are negatively correlated with inflation, but

¹⁶ In an unrestricted Arellano-Bond estimator, one would use all available lags of the dependent variable lagged two periods or more as instruments. Instruments from earlier periods, however, become weaker in later periods when the sample is finite. A discussion of these techniques and the full set of results are given in the working-paper version of this paper, which is available upon request from the authors.

TABLE 3. Stability of Coefficients across Different Panel Estimation Methods and Different Measures of Democracy

	Gastil	Polity	Democracy	Banks
OLS-PCSE ^a	–0.1489 ^{0.004} 0.0038^{0.004}	–0.0836 ^{0.043} 0.0021^{0.039}	–0.0923 ^{0.007} 0.0023^{0.007}	–0.0954 ^{0.052} 0.0026^{0.034}
OLS (2-way fixed effects) ^b	–0.1953 ^{0.002} 0.0059^{0.000}	–0.0998 ^{0.022} 0.0041^{0.000}	–0.1259 ^{0.002} 0.0043^{0.000}	–0.1261 ^{0.027} 0.0046^{0.000}
FGLS ^c	–0.0715 ^{0.000} 0.0015^{0.002}	–0.0439 ^{0.009} 0.0009^{0.036}	–0.0450 ^{0.001} 0.0009^{0.007}	–0.0626 ^{0.002} 0.0014^{0.006}
Difference-GMM ^d	–0.0166 ^{0.014} 0.0005^{0.018}	–0.0163 ^{0.011} 0.0005^{0.003}	–0.0228 ^{0.002} 0.0007^{0.001}	–0.0244 ^{0.006} 0.0007^{0.011}

Note: Coefficients are selected from full specifications using different measures of democracy in each case, lagged once. The first figure reported is the coefficient from the linear term; the second is from the interactive term (italicized). *p* values are superscripted. Coefficients significant above the 99% level are in boldface.

^a Coefficients are from specifications (1) and (2) in Table 2.

^b Coefficients are from specifications (7) and (8) in Table 2.

^c Coefficients are from specifications (1) and (2) in Table 2 using feasible generalized least squares estimation with cross-sectional weights.

^d Coefficients are generated using a one-step GMM estimator, with asymptotic standard errors robust to cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all equations. All instrumental variables are lagged two or more periods. The instrument set includes up to six lags of the dependent variables, one lag of the Gini coefficient, and three lags of growth. Initially, one lag each of broad money, instability, and reserves were also included in the specification; these variables were not significant and were dropped from the estimations reported here. All variables in estimations are in first differences except the Gastil/Polity indices and their interactive terms, which are in levels.

this relationship is increasing in inequality. Overall, our GMM results support our governing hypothesis, that the relationship between democracy and inflation is contingent on income inequality, even if we control for the possible endogeneity of the independent variables.

Regional Effects. It is possible that the Gini coefficient is actually capturing a particular “regional effect”—for example, due to the possible coincidence of high inequality in Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries and low inequality in Transition economies—and that the effect of democracy on inflation, therefore, varies by particular region. To determine whether there is this sort of regional effect at work, we included three regional dummies and interacted the Gastil index with the regional dummy in separate regressions. Table 4 indicates that only the transition dummy is significant. In no case is the regional interaction term significant, however, indicating that the effect of democracy does not vary by region. Moreover, all of our previous results remain—the signs on the political term are negative, the signs on the political term interacted with Gini positive. The basic results are noted in the top panel of Table 4 for the purposes of comparison.

Income Effects. We are also interested in whether the phenomenon we have described—that democracy increases inflation in high-inequality countries and decreases inflation in low-inequality countries—applies to all countries or whether the results are driven by emerging markets. To test country-income effects, we simply reran the basic regressions as well as the regressions with regional dummies and interactive terms only for non-OECD countries (“emerging” markets). We also reran the basic regressions restricting our sample to 20 high-income OECD countries plus seven

non-OECD high-income countries. These results are in columns (2) and (3) in Table 4. The magnitudes of our basic coefficients increase when we constrain the sample to the emerging markets but decrease when applied to the high-income countries. In addition, the significance of our estimates falls to the 90% level from the 99% level. Finally, less than half of the variance is explained among the high-income observations. In short, it appears that our hypothesis has less explanatory force among the richer nations. This is to be expected—these countries have been consistently democratic for longer periods, and thus the marginal effects of democracy are likely to be smaller.

Populism vs. Democracy. A possible critique of our analysis is that we have not drawn a sufficiently careful distinction between democratic regimes and *populist* regimes. To be sure, dictators are often subject to public pressures—a form of “quasi-participation” by the public. Although this criticism can be leveled at most empirical analyses of the effects of democracy, we take this criticism seriously, given the historical importance of populist systems in Latin America and other regions in which we are interested. It is, however, exceedingly difficult to distinguish a coherent “populist” ideology and, therefore, difficult to identify *ex ante* which political parties are populist and which are not (Dix 1985). We rely on the narrower definition of populism as referring to a set of policies aimed at the “disorganized underclasses,” involving redistributive measures (Stokes 2001). As such, populist programs are considered to overlap frequently those of socialist and left-leaning parties, particularly those that derive support from the urban and rural poor (Conniff 1999). To control for the presence of populist regimes, therefore, we use a *Left* dummy, taken from the *Database of Political Institutions*, coded one if the political party or

TABLE 4. Stability of Coefficients across Regional, Income, and Ideological Effects: Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	Full Sample (1)	Emerging Markets (2)	High Income (3)
Observations	1,150	772	363
<i>N</i>	109	89	27
$Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1489*** (0.0521)	-0.2034*** (0.0755)	-0.0730* (0.0418)
$Gini \times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0038*** (0.0013)	0.0051*** (0.0017)	0.0016* (0.0010)
R^2	0.8046	0.8005	0.4944
$Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1192** (0.0536)	-0.1888** (0.0765)	
$Gini \times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0028** (0.0014)	0.0045** (0.0018)	
Latin America	-0.0059 (0.0296)	-0.0046 (0.0299)	
Latin America $\times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0283 (0.0361)	0.0189 (0.0376)	
R^2	0.8054	0.8007	
$Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1394*** (0.0524)	-0.1910** (0.0763)	
$Gini \times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0034** (0.0014)	0.0046** (0.0018)	
Africa	-0.0163 (0.0144)	-0.0227 (0.0155)	
Africa $\times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0072 (0.0216)	0.0153 (0.0215)	
R^2	0.8052	0.8015	
$Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1013* (0.0531)	-0.1297* (0.0771)	
$Gini \times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0027** (0.0014)	0.0036** (0.0018)	
Transition	0.0876* (0.0490)	0.0887* (0.0482)	
Transition $\times Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1188* (0.0667)	-0.1141* (0.0672)	
R^2	0.8067	0.8027	
$Gastil_{t-1}$	-0.1778*** (0.0499)	-0.2358*** (0.0771)	-0.0525 (0.0404)
$Gini \times Gastil_{t-1}$	0.0045*** (0.0012)	0.0059*** (0.0017)	0.0011 (0.0009)
$Left_{t-1}$	0.0283 (0.0236)	0.0486 (0.0343)	0.0158 (0.0252)
$Left_{t-1} \times Gini$	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0010 (0.0008)	-0.0004 (0.0008)
R^2	0.8258	0.8231	0.4879

Note: Estimations based on specification (1) in Table 2, with selected coefficients reported and with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Emerging market countries are all non-OECD countries plus Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey. High-income countries refer to 20 high-income OECD countries plus seven other countries with annual per-capita income levels above U.S.\$10,000 (in 1996) for which we have data: UAE, Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

faction of the chief executive is "defined as communist, socialist, social-democratic, or left-wing," or if "rural issues [are] a key component of the party's platform, or if farmers are a key party constituency" (Beck et al. 2001). To see if the left dummy (lagged once) performs a similar function as the democracy measures, we interacted the left dummy with the Gini coefficient and reran the basic regressions from columns (1) and (2) in Table 2. The selected coefficients are presented in the bottom panel in Table 4. The inclusion of the left dummy

does not alter our key results, nor is it by itself significant, either in the full sample or among the emerging markets. The inclusion of the left dummy, however, does weaken our results for the high-income countries.

Moderate, High, and Very High Inflation. To test for sign-switching at extreme values of the dependent variable, finally, we constrain the sample to those country-year observations for which average annual inflation was greater than or equal to 25%, 40%, and

TABLE 5. High-Inflation (Constrained-Sample) Regression Results: Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	$\geq 25\%$	$\geq 40\%$	$\geq 100\%$
Fiscal Balance	-0.0042*** (0.0011)	-0.0049*** (0.0018)	-0.0117*** (0.0043)
Growth	-0.0076*** (0.0012)	-0.0105*** (0.0020)	-0.0217*** (0.0018)
Financial Depth	-0.0006* (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0011)	-0.0026* (0.0015)
Reserves	0.0004* (0.0002)	0.0008*** (0.0003)	0.0031*** (0.0009)
Instability	0.0076 (0.0142)	0.0169 (0.0233)	-0.0111 (0.0495)
Gini	-0.0044** (0.0019)	-0.0073** (0.0028)	-0.0077** (0.0038)
Gastil _{t-1}	-0.4256*** (0.1257)	-0.6667*** (0.2141)	-0.8139*** (0.2933)
Gini \times Gastil _{t-1}	0.0106*** (0.0030)	0.0175*** (0.0049)	0.0206*** (0.0073)
Inflation _{t-1}	0.6715*** (0.0434)	0.6146*** (0.0673)	
Observations	323	186	97
N	64	43	26
R ²	0.7383	0.7367	0.6024
Wald χ^2	1237.56	1011.32	305.70
(p)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Intercepts are estimated but not reported. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$.

100%, plus three years after the last year of inflation above these thresholds. Because of the narrowness of the time scale for the $\geq 100\%$ data (for which the average time series is less than four years), we do not include the lagged dependent variable in these specifications (rho tests revealed no substantial autocorrelation for this subsample). The results using OLS-PCSE are reported in Table 5.¹⁷ They show no sign-switching among either the political or the control variables. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients for both the Gastil and the Polity indices and their interactive terms increase as we move from 25% to 40% to 100% thresholds, suggesting that the hypothesized relation applies with even greater force as the sample is constrained among the higher-inflation observations.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to provide the outlines of a possible solution to one of the enduring puzzles in positive political economy, namely, the effect of regime type on inflation levels. In recent years the view that political participation, divided government, electoral competition, and political accountability will complicate matters of macroeconomic stability has been challenged by a view that supports the spread of democratic procedures as a means of challenging elites' private benefits from inflation. These approaches attribute inflationary demands to different key groups. Neither explanation, however, considers how certain prevailing conditions might

shape preferences for inflation and define the political interactions by which monetary policies are made.

In a simple model we show that the effect of political regime on inflation is influenced by income inequality. Using a variety of panel-data estimation techniques, we found remarkably consistent and robust support for the claim that democracy and political competition affect inflation differently depending upon the level of income inequality. In countries with Gini coefficients generally below 40, democracy appears to help restrain inflationary pressures. Above that value, the effect reverses, and democracy and widespread political representation appear to generate inflation.

Our results explain the diverging experiences of Latin America during the debt crisis and of the post-socialist transition economies during the 1990s. In the Latin American cases, it is likely that higher levels of income inequality led to stronger pressures on government officials to use inflationary taxes to finance redistribution. Democratization and the spread of the electoral franchise in these countries, then, would have made price stability a more serious challenge. In the transition countries, in contrast, where 40–70 years of central planning had fashioned extremely equitable societies, governments that democratized did not feel pressures from the voting majority to use the inflation tax for increased redistribution. Indeed, the scenes of Latin American-style protests against stabilization programs did not materialize in the transition countries. In these countries, inflation spiraled not because of public pressures, but because of the private benefits elites obtained from channeling public resources to targeted groups—especially (often insolvent) enterprise

¹⁷ OLS results with two-way fixed effects were similar in all respects.

borrowers—and democratization served as a check on these excesses.

Our analysis has identified some monetary disadvantages of democratic transition in high-inequality countries, perhaps leading to the troubling conclusion that democracy should be restricted in countries with high levels of income inequality in order to control inflation. There are, however, alternative implications of our analysis for institutional and policy design that may enable countries to maintain price stability while retaining the benefits of democratic rule. We mention two such implications here. First, our analysis suggests that redistribution in democratic societies with high levels of income inequality should reduce political pressures for inflation. Noninflationary redistributive programs—such as progressive taxation—that would not place fiscal burdens on governments would also ameliorate demands for inflationary financing by the poor.

Second, we found that, when controlling for regime type, the overall impact of central bank independence on inflation vanishes. While this may be a consequence of measurement difficulties, it nevertheless raises the possibility that insulated, autonomous central banks may not restrain the “passions” of populist politicians in democratic polities with high inequality. It is also likely that, in order to avoid becoming merely the clients of economic elites, central banks need to be insulated not only from popular pressures or from politicians, but also from the financial sector—normally thought of as the stalwart of price stability. We have seen, most prominently in the transition countries, several instances in which commercial banks benefited from central bank weakness, mainly because of the rents obtained from channeling centralized credits to borrowers. In either case, the influence of monetary institutions will be constrained by prevailing socioeconomic conditions and by the characteristics of political competition.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources

Variable Name	Definition and Measurement	Source(s)
Inflation	Annual change in CPI, supplemented by annual GDP deflator where CPI data are unavailable. Transformed as $\pi/(1 + \pi)$	IMF, International Financial Statistics; supplemented by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (various years)
Fiscal Balance	Overall general government budget balance (+ surplus/–deficit) as % of GDP	IMF, International Financial Statistics; supplemented by EBRD (various years)
Income	log of GNP per capita, constant U.S.\$ (Atlas method)	World Bank, World Development Indicators
Trade Growth	Total exports + total imports as % of GDP Annual % change in real GDP	World Bank, World Development Indicators World Bank, World Development Indicators; supplemented by EBRD (various years)
Financial Depth	Broad money (M2), or money in circulation, or plus demand, sight, and time deposits as % of GDP	IMF, International Financial Statistics; supplemented by EBRD (various years)
Reserves	International reserves excluding gold, as % of imports	IMF, International Financial Statistics; supplemented by EBRD (various years)
CBI	Number of times per year the governor of the central bank has changed	Sturm and de Haan (2001)
Instability	1 if revolution, coup, or internal armed struggle taking place within territory, 0 otherwise	Banks (1997)
Gini	Gini coefficient of income inequality adjusted for income- vs. consumption-based data, and net vs. gross income, five-year moving average	Deininger and Squire (1996), supplemented by Dollar and Kraay (2001)
Gastil index	Index of democracy based on measures of political rights P and civil rights C, transformed as $(14 - P - C)/12$	Freedom House (2001)
Polity index	Index of democracy based on democracy D and autocracy A scores, transformed as $(10 + D - A)/20$	Marshall and Jaggers (2001)
Democracy	Democracy component D of the Polity index, transformed as $(D - 1)/9$	Marshall and Jaggers (2001)
Banks index	Index of democracy based on measures of legislative effectiveness (L), party competitiveness (G), and executive selection (E), transformed as $((L + G + E) - 3)/9$	Banks (1997)
Left	Index of ideological character of government, coded 1 if executive's party is “socialist, social-democratic, or left-wing” or rural, 0 otherwise	Beck et al. (2002)

TABLE A2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Regressions

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N	T(ave.)	N × T
Inflation	0.11	0.16	-0.58	1.00	191	31.81	6,075
Fiscal Balance	-3.65	6.52	-61.14	68.67	170	24.21	4,115
Income	3.08	0.65	1.60	4.68	189	26.32	4,975
Trade	70.96	45.90	2.15	439.03	181	29.00	5,249
Growth	3.72	6.69	-50.60	116.18	190	29.84	5,669
Financial Depth	38.51	32.92	0.05	423.21	172	27.59	4,746
Reserves	31.35	27.15	-0.96	277.57	177	27.97	4,950
CBI	0.24	0.48	0.00	4.00	81	23.22	1,881
Instability	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	188	28.44	5,346
Gini	38.91	10.09	16.63	74.33	135	16.56	2,235
Gastil	0.49	0.34	0.00	1.00	188	24.54	4,613
Polity	0.48	0.38	0.00	1.00	162	33.83	5,481
Democracy	0.37	0.42	0.00	1.00	161	32.89	5,295
Banks	0.47	0.32	0.00	1.00	190	28.28	5,373

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The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

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Governments unable to make credible promises hinder economic development and effective policymaking. Scholars have focused considerable attention on checks and balances and the delegation of authority to independent agencies as institutional solutions to this problem. The political conditions under which these institutions enhance credibility, rather than policy stability, are still unclear, however. We show that checks—multiple veto players—enhance credibility, depending on the extent of uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policymaking authority to independent agencies. In the context of monetary policy and independent central banks, we find evidence supporting the following predictions: Delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.

Two circumstances significantly circumscribe the ability of politicians to pursue their private or political objectives: when their promises are not credible and when they must implement their decisions through bureaucratic agents who do not share their preferences. When governments are unable to make credible commitments (e.g., to follow a set of rules tomorrow that they announce today), they cannot stimulate economic growth (and tax collections) by, for example, promising a stable tax and regulatory environment for firms. Scholars have argued that political systems characterized by checks and balances mitigate this credibility problem, but less is known about one of the questions motivating this paper: Under what conditions do checks and balances enhance credibility?

The literature on delegation presents the reverse situation. Scholars have analyzed how politicians face a trade-off between the risks of delegating to unsympathetic bureaucratic agents who could subvert their intentions and the benefits of delegating in order to maximize the contribution of experts to policymaking. They have not considered, however, the political conditions under which delegation improves government credibility, the question examined in this paper.

Taking as our point of departure the credibility of government promises regarding monetary policy, the

analysis below contributes to three lines of scholarly inquiry. The first is the literature on veto players. Veto players are the actors—individual politicians or political parties—who can block proposals to move away from current, or status quo policies. In this paper we also use the term “veto point” to refer to a political institution, the holder of which has the power to block a proposed change in policy. Scholars in this area, particularly Tsebelis (1995, 2002), offer the most thorough analysis of the effects of political checks and balances, emphasizing, for example, that the effects of additional veto players on policy outcomes depend on whether their preferences diverge from those of existing veto players. The concern in the veto player literature, however, is not policy *credibility* but policy *stability*, an important distinction that is explored below. In the analysis that follows, we show that policy credibility varies with the number and polarization of preferences of veto players, but the underlying logic is different. For example, we find that where there is greater uncertainty about which status quo will prevail in the future, additional veto players have less effect on credibility.

We also contribute to a large literature on the role of delegation in policymaking. In much of this literature, the focus is on politicians who need expert agencies to make policy but who must confront the challenge of controlling agency shirking (see, e.g., Bawn 1997, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, Lupia and McCubbins 2000, and McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Our results suggest that politicians might also delegate to increase policy credibility but that delegation has this effect only in the presence of multiple veto players with polarized preferences.

Finally, this paper contributes to a large literature on the role of central banks as sources of credibility in monetary policy. Beginning with Rogoff (1985), scholars have argued that central bank independence can cement the credibility of government policy commitments. With few exceptions, they abstract from the interaction of politicians and central banks and assume that, once delegated, the policy authority of agencies

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We have benefited from the generous advice of many people, including Alberto Alesina, Tim Besley, Georgios Chortareas, Roberta Gatti, Simon Hug, Stephan Haggard, Witold Henisz, Aart Kraay, Francesca Recanatini, and Mary Shirley, and from comments of seminar participants at DELTA (Paris), George Mason, and Oxford. Three anonymous referees and the editor were especially helpful. This paper's findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of The World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.

(central banks) can never be revoked. We relax this assumption in order to ask: What are the political and institutional preconditions necessary for delegation to an independent agency to increase policy credibility?

Monetary policy is an especially convenient target of investigation because the policy attribute we care about, but cannot directly measure—credibility—maps directly onto a policy outcome that we can measure, inflation. To establish an appropriate benchmark for the effects of delegation, we therefore first develop a model of inflation outcomes under a government with two veto players. We then compare outcomes under this model to those under a second model, in which monetary policy has been delegated to an independent central bank. The detailed empirical tests in the second half of the paper strongly support our predictions. These tests use new data both on political institutions and on political polarization and show that multiple veto players can increase credibility (reduce inflation), that legal central bank independence is more likely to reduce inflation in the presence of multiple political veto players, and that all of these effects strengthen when political veto players are more polarized.

A REVIEW OF SOLUTIONS TO THE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM IN MONETARY POLICY

Multiple veto players or checks and balances (we use the terms interchangeably) are the institutional arrangement that has received the greatest attention as a solution to the problem of credible commitment, at least since classic theorists of representative government like Madison and Montesquieu. North and Weingast (1989) argue that constitutional changes increasing the British Parliament's role as a constraint on the monarch following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 encouraged lenders to reduce the risk premium on loans to the British crown. Stasavage (2003) shows that the preferences of the members of Parliament, and the pattern of coalition formation within Parliament, played an equally important role in establishing credibility of debt repayment in the United Kingdom.

These arguments invoke some of the same concepts that are common in the application of veto player analysis to the issue of policy stability, pioneered by Tsebelis (1995). The underlying issues—policy stability and policy credibility—are nevertheless quite distinct. Policy stability is high when the set of policies that politicians prefer to the status quo is small; policy is unstable when this set is large. Credible commitment introduces an explicit dynamic element, however, in which policy choices today influence the payoffs to policy options tomorrow. More to the point, policies can be stable but not credible. Politicians might prefer a particular policy today to all other alternatives, making the policy fully stable, as Tsebelis (1995) defines stability. Stability provides no guarantee, however, that once citizens have relied on the policy in their contractual, investment, or other decisions, the same politicians tomorrow will not take advantage of their reliance and reverse the policy.

This is a pervasive problem and is at the core of the model below of monetary policymaking.

The question of credible commitment (or “time consistency”) has been central to discussions of monetary policy since Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a). These articles have influenced research into government commitment problems in many other policy areas. In the model presented by Barro and Gordon (1983a) governments prefer lower inflation and higher national income. The government is a unitary actor that would be better off if it could commit to a low rate of inflation. Before the government actually sets monetary policy, however, private actors must form inflation expectations and write contracts governing the future sale of goods and services. Once these contracts are signed, governments have an incentive to boost output by pursuing a high inflation policy. In equilibrium, agents anticipate this behavior by the government and build an “inflation bias” into their wage contracts. Inflation is therefore higher when governments are less credible.

Barro and Gordon (1983b) argued that reputation could mitigate this problem. However, the reputational outcome is but one of multiple possible equilibria in their infinitely repeated game. Moreover, for many governments heavy discounting of the future eliminates reputational equilibria. Rogoff (1985) then offered the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank as a solution to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy. The central banker would place a greater weight than society at large on stabilizing prices relative to stabilizing output and, so, would be less tempted than politicians to make surprise increases in the money supply to secure temporary boosts to income. Knowing this, private actors reduce the inflation premium that they build into their long-term contracts.

Most subsequent research investigating different aspects of the Rogoff solution has retained his assumption, that delegation of monetary policy authority to the central bank is irrevocable. However, substantial evidence from the study of American politics suggests that partisan identification of political actors affects the decisions of nominally independent bureaucratic agencies.¹ Recognizing this, Lohmann (1992) and Jensen (1997) explicitly analyze the potential for political reversals of central bank decisions. Jensen (1997), for example, introduces a parameter that represents the costs to political actors of overriding a central bank, essentially capturing in a “black box” formulation the potential institutional limitations of delegation. Our model opens up the institutional black box.

Lohmann (1998) and Moser (1999) also relax the irreversibility assumption in their analyses of central bank independence. As we do, they argue that multiple veto players in government make it more difficult to reverse a decision to delegate, giving independent central banks greater scope to reduce the inflation bias. In our theoretical and empirical analysis we consider

¹ See, for example, Weingast and Moran 1983.

several questions not addressed by their contributions. Under what conditions do multiple veto players, by themselves, mitigate the credibility problem that increases expected inflation? How do changes in agenda control, political polarization, and the level of uncertainty affect the impact of multiple veto players on the expectations of private actors? Given multiple veto players, the assignment of agenda-setting authority, and political polarization, what additional influence does an independent central bank have on expected inflation?

A MODEL OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, AND INFLATION

The model of the time consistency problem in monetary policy that anchors this paper follows Barro and Gordon 1983a. In the traditional model, in which “the government” is a single veto player, the government minimizes

$$L_G = \frac{1}{2}\pi_t^2 + \frac{1}{2}b_G(y_t - y^*)^2 \quad \text{with respect to } \pi, \quad (1)$$

where

$$y_t = \pi_t - \pi_t^e + \varepsilon_t, \quad (2)$$

where π^e is the expected inflation, the price increases that are programmed by the private sector in their contracts prior to the realization of the supply shock (a shock to output given by ε_t) and the policy decisions of the government. The variable y^* is the desired output (with $y^* > 0$ and the trend, or “natural” rate, of output normalized to zero). The parameter b_G characterizes the government’s preferences regarding the trade-off between inflation and output. Private actors first form expectations about future inflation, then write contracts that effectively set prices in the economy. A random supply shock to the economy occurs, and, finally, government sets actual inflation (π_t).

Private actors know that their long-term contractual decisions—and particularly the inflation expectations built into those decisions—will affect government inflation policies subsequently. They know, in particular, that the government will solve for the inflation outcome that minimizes its losses, or, from the minimization of (1),


$$\pi = \frac{b_G(\pi^e - \varepsilon + y^*)}{1 + b_G}. \quad (3a)$$

After taking expectations, solving for expected inflation, and substituting the expression for expected inflation back into (3a), the problem yields the following well-known solution for inflation (suppressing time subscripts here and throughout):

$$\pi = b_G y^* - \frac{b_G}{1 + b_G} \varepsilon. \quad (3b)$$

The inflation bias—the amount of extra inflation generated by the inability of the government to commit credibly to its announced inflation policy—is $b_G y^*$.

FIGURE 1. Delegation with Two Veto Players



Discretionary Monetary Policy Under Checks and Balances

Delegation to a central bank is traditionally analyzed within the context of the single-veto player model outlined above, where the central bank has no informational or other advantages over the government. Given this, there is no obvious reason why a single veto player would not always override any central bank decision that diverged from the veto player’s preferred outcome in any period.² A brief illustration based on Figure 1 is sufficient to show that delegation changes policy only in the presence of multiple veto players. However, this simple illustration is insufficient for understanding the credibility problem at the heart of this paper, which depends upon the existence of exogenous economic shocks and efforts by the private sector to anticipate government action.

There are two veto players, v_1 and v_2 . Figure 1 shows their preferences relative to each other, with v_1 preferring a lower rate of inflation. Some status quo rate of inflation sq is located between the preferred rates of the two veto players. It is well understood, at least since Shepsle and Weingast (1981), that one must specify how the veto players make decisions—that is, what are the agenda-setting powers of each? We assume throughout the paper that there is one player with agenda-setting authority—the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player. For example, in some countries, the executive branch can propose a candidate for central bank governor to the legislature, which must vote the choice up or down.³ In this simple model, the second veto player v_2 has agenda control, the sole authority to propose a change in monetary policy.

In the absence of a central bank, policy does not shift from sq since there is no policy that v_2 could propose that both veto players prefer to sq . The presence of a “conservative” central banker, cb , who prefers a lower rate of inflation than either veto player can therefore reduce inflation. Policy is made as follows: (i) The central bank chooses an inflation rate; (ii) v_2 can propose to override the central bank’s inflation rate; and (iii) v_1 can either accept the override proposal, in which case it is implemented, or v_1 can reject it, in which case the central bank’s rate is maintained. Given this series of

² Governments may refrain from overriding central bank decisions because such action may have adverse reputational effects. However, as Keefer and Stasavage (2002) argue, it is not clear why governments that could build a reputation would need a central bank, since they could also build a reputation even if they retained discretionary control of policy. In any case, if reputational concerns rather than institutions are the important force protecting central bank decisions from override, our empirical results should reject the hypotheses we derive below.

³ While different bargaining assumptions are possible, this seems among the most plausible and substantially increases tractability.

moves and the alignment of preferences in Figure 1, the lowest rate of inflation that the central bank can propose without fear of override is the policy preferred by v_1 , which is lower than the status quo.

What if v_1 or v_2 were the only veto player? Then policy would always be at their preferred outcome, with or without the central bank; any attempt by the central bank to propose a different inflation rate would be immediately overridden by the single veto player. Clearly, then, the presence of a central bank can change policy outcomes only in the presence of multiple veto players.

This model begs two basic questions that are key to analyzing delegation and credibility. The first is where the status quo rate of inflation originates. In this simple illustration the status quo is exogenous and given. Consistent with standard models of monetary policy, the default outcome we employ in the models below—the inflation that prevails in the absence of government action in the second period—is the set of price increases programmed by the private sector into its contracts in the first period.⁴ In contrast to most models of policy choice, therefore, the status quo here is endogenous: The default inflation outcome confronting politicians is the product of private-sector decisions that are made in anticipation of the decisions of politicians. The dependence of the status quo or default outcome on the actions of the players in the game is a pervasive feature of policymaking and not exclusive to monetary policy. It is not captured in the analysis following from Figure 1 but is a key innovation in our model.⁵

The simple model depicted in Figure 1 also provides no reason for v_1 to delegate to a conservative central banker in the first place. This paradox emerges because the model assumes away economic shocks. Again, a simple example confirms this point. Delegation would occur if, in some previous unspecified period of play, v_1 controlled both veto points. Veto player v_1 would then have a choice: to retain future control of monetary policy or to delegate to a conservative central banker. Veto player v_1 would then confront one of three scenarios in the future. This veto player could retain control of both veto points, in which case the presence of a central bank would make no difference, and his/her preferred inflation outcome would prevail. Or v_1 could retain control of one veto point, but again, the presence of a central bank would make no difference, since v_1 could veto any attempt to shift policy away from his/her preferred outcome. Finally, v_1 could lose control of all veto points. In this case, policy would shift to the outcome preferred by v_2 , regardless of whether there was a conservative

central bank. None of the three cases provides a justification for delegation.

The possibility of unpredictable economic shocks can, however, motivate the inflation-averse veto player to delegate authority. These shocks are fundamental to the analysis of political decision making in many policy areas, including Rogoff's (1985) analysis of monetary policy. To see how they would motivate v_1 to delegate, one can imagine an example in which v_1 prefers a 2% rate of inflation and, given that v_1 controls all veto points, simply decides to set inflation at that rate. Then, v_1 loses control of one veto point to a policymaker who prefers a 4% rate of inflation. Inflation does not change, however, since v_1 can still block all attempts to move away from the 2% rate. Finally, however, a shock occurs, such as an increase in oil prices that leads simultaneously to higher inflation and slower economic growth. At that point, both veto players prefer a higher inflation rate, say 4% for v_1 and 6% for v_2 , that they believe would best allow them to minimize the impact of the oil price shock on economic growth.

It is straightforward to see that in this situation v_1 could have done better by delegating to a conservative central bank. Assume that v_1 is indifferent between inflation at 2% and inflation at 6%—both are two percentage points away from her preferred, postshock rate of 4%. Following the shock, and absent a central bank, v_2 therefore proposes a rate just less than 6%, which v_1 would accept. What if v_1 had previously delegated authority to a conservative central bank? The conservative central bank would have responded to the shock by setting inflation at 4%, v_1 's new preferred rate. Delegation in the presence of economic shocks therefore yields inflation outcomes closer to the preferred outcome of v_1 .

This heuristic example demonstrates the importance of integrating two elements into a convincing model of delegation: the emergence of the status quo from the interaction of the private sector and government actors and the presence of economic shocks. The formal models we develop here do precisely this. We first analyze policy outcomes with multiple veto players in the absence of delegation.⁶ We then add an independent central bank to the institutional mix in the next section. The decision-making structure under each model is summarized in Table 1.

Given the decision-making rules and the default outcome, the policy game with two veto players is otherwise the same as in the Barro–Gordon model: Private-sector actors establish their inflation expectations and then write contracts that fix prices; a supply shock ε occurs, distributed uniformly over the range $[-c, c]$; and two political actors decide what inflation policy to pursue after observing expected inflation and the shock. Now there are two political actors, A and N (the

⁴ Walsh (1998, 205–18) presents a detailed model that further supports using private-sector actions as the default outcome. His model includes a money demand equation and a more fully defined economic structure, showing clearly that actual inflation depends on both the rate of money growth chosen by policymakers and the expected rate of inflation in private sector contracts.

⁵ Our model therefore goes beyond Moser (1999), who assumes that the two veto players must *always* make a decision, avoiding the introduction of a status quo entirely. Our approach has the advantage of greater realism and of a closer connection to relevant literature. For example, it is widely accepted, since Romer and Rosenthal (1979), that the decisions veto players make are influenced by the outcome that would prevail should they make no decision.

⁶ There are a number of reasons why multiple political actors might have an influence on monetary policy in the absence of checks and balances. In a parliamentary system, for example, the minister of finance has nominal control of monetary policy, but monetary policy decisions may well be debated in cabinet or among members of the governing coalition. In presidential systems, legislatures may exercise veto power over the borrowing authority of government.

TABLE 1. Setting Monetary Policy in Four Institutional Frameworks^a

	One Veto Player	Two Veto Players
No delegation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public fixes expected inflation. 2. Supply shock occurs. 3. Veto player sets inflation rate. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public fixes expected inflation. 2. Supply shock occurs. 3. Agenda setter proposes rate of inflation. 4. Second veto player accepts or refuses proposal. 5. If second veto player refuses, status quo rate of inflation prevails.
Delegation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public fixes expected inflation. 2. Supply shock occurs. 3. Central bank (CB) sets inflation rate. 4. Veto player can override CB. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public fixes expected inflation. 2. Supply shock occurs. 3. CB sets inflation rate. 4. Both veto players can agree to override the CB. If no override, CB inflation rate prevails. 5. If veto players override, agenda setter proposes rate of inflation. 6. Second veto player accepts or refuses proposal. 7. If second veto player refuses, status quo rate of inflation prevails.

agenda setter and the non-agenda setter), who seek to minimize their respective loss functions:

$$L_i = \frac{1}{2}\pi^2 + \frac{1}{2}b_i(\pi - \pi^e + \varepsilon - y^*)^2, \quad i \in [A, N], \quad (4)$$

which is just equivalent to (1) after substituting in (2).

The more inflation-averse a veto player is, the lower is b_i . In analyzing when an additional veto player will make a difference to policy outcomes, Tsebelis (2002) emphasizes the importance of taking into account the orientation of veto player preferences with respect to the status quo outcome, the outcome that prevails if veto players are unable to make a decision. Where additional veto players have policy preferences identical to those of some current veto players, their presence does not change policy outcomes. The preferred outcomes of the two veto players diverge here because they have different preferences regarding the trade-off between income and inflation, $b_A, b_N > 0$ and b_A/b_N . We examine the cases where the agenda setter is both more and less inflation-averse than the non-agenda setter ($b_A < b_N$ and $b_N < b_A$, respectively).

Since private actors write their contracts anticipating the actions of government, we proceed as usual by backward induction to establish what rate of price increase (expected inflation or status quo inflation) will be built into the private sector's contracts. In the last period, the political actors observe the price increases written into private-sector contracts and the supply shock. If they do nothing, the price increases, which are (once again) the default or status quo outcome confronting the veto players, will constitute final inflation. If the private sector were sure that the government would not act, then it would set expected inflation, or default inflation, equal to zero. However, the private sector does not observe the random supply shock and, therefore, cannot know for sure what decision the veto players will make upon observing the private sector's contracts.

Altogether there are four possible situations that the two veto players might confront, depending on the orientation of the status quo to the preferred inflation

outcomes of the veto players. Assuming for now that the agenda setter is more inflation-averse ($b_A < b_N$), the agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome must always be less than that of the non-agenda setter's.⁷ The four cases therefore follow.

Case I: $\pi_{SQ} < \pi_A < \pi_N$

If the supply shock is large and negative, both veto players seek to stimulate output with an expansionary monetary policy; both therefore prefer a rate of inflation that is higher than the status quo rate established in private-sector contracts. The non-agenda setter prefers the agenda setter's most preferred inflation policy to the default outcome. Therefore, the agenda setter makes an all-or-nothing proposal of his/her most preferred outcome and the non-agenda setter accepts it. Final inflation is therefore π_A .


Case II: $\pi_A < \pi_{SQ} < \pi_N$

In Case II, the supply shock leaves the output short of what the non-agenda setter prefers. His/her preferred policy is therefore a stimulative monetary policy leading to higher inflation than given by the status quo or default outcome. The agenda setter, on the other hand, believes that the output after the supply shock is high enough that some output can be sacrificed to attack inflation more aggressively; he/she prefers a lower inflation outcome than the status quo. Therefore, no inflation outcome is preferred by both the agenda setter and the non-agenda setter to the status quo outcome. The status quo therefore prevails.

Case III: $\pi_A < \pi_N < \pi_{SQ} < 2\pi_N - \pi_A$

If the supply shock is large and positive, both players prefer to sacrifice some output and pursue a more restrictive monetary policy that reduces inflation below

⁷ When $b_N < b_A$, the ordering is $\pi_{SQ} > \pi_A > \pi_N$, $\pi_A > \pi_{SQ} > \pi_N$, and $\pi_A > \pi_N > \pi_{SQ}$.

FIGURE 2. The Effect of Multiple Veto Players and Polarization on Expected Inflation

Note: At polarization = 0, $b_N = b_A = 0.5$. Increasing polarization is mean preserving (e.g., at polarization = 0.4, $b_N = 0.7$ and $b_A = 0.3$). More and less inflation-tolerant refer to whether b_N is less than or greater than b_A . The shock parameter $c = 5$, and desired output $y^* = 1$. Note that the simulation is conducted over those ranges of polarization where all cases have positive probability.

the status quo inflation outcome. If, as in Case III, status quo inflation outcome is closer to the non-agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome than is the agenda setter's preferred outcome (that is, if $\pi_{SQ} < 2\pi_N - \pi_A$), the agenda setter must split the difference and propose an inflation policy that lies between her preferred outcome and the outcome most preferred by the non-agenda setter. Specifically, the agenda setter successfully proposes inflation outcome π such that $\pi_N - \pi = \pi_{SQ} - \pi_N$, or $2\pi_N - \pi_{SQ} = \pi$.⁸

Case IV: $\pi_A < \pi_N < 2\pi_N - \pi_A < \pi_{SQ}$

Under Case IV the supply shock is sufficiently large and positive that the preferred inflation outcomes of both veto players are far to the left of (much lower than) the status quo inflation outcome and the non-agenda setter prefers even the agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome to the status quo. The agenda setter therefore proposes $\pi = \pi_A$ and the non-agenda setter accepts.

The four cases describe the possible government actions in the second period of the game conditional on the decisions of the private sector in the first period. Since the supply shock affects which case will emerge, and since the private sector does not observe the supply shock prior to writing its contracts, the private sector must therefore take into account the possibility that any of the cases can occur. Private actors must therefore assess, for any inflation rate that they factor into their contracts, the probability of each of the four cases emerging. They calculate expected inflation as the solution to (5), where the q_i 's are the probabilities that the government will choose each of the four different inflation outcomes after the shock is realized:

$$\pi^e = q_1(\pi_A) + q_2(\pi^e) + q_3(2\pi_N - \pi_{SQ}) + q_4(\pi_A). \quad (5)$$

⁸ In principle, the agenda setter should propose an inflation policy π such that $L_N(\pi) = L_N(\pi_{SQ})$. The expression for π resulting from this quadratic equation, however, renders subsequent analysis intractable. Nevertheless, since the equation is entirely quadratic, we also know that symmetric deviations up or down from the most preferred π result in symmetric changes to the loss function.

The solution to (5) is complex, since the preferred inflation rates and the q probabilities are all themselves a function of expected inflation. Appendix 2 derives the solution for expected inflation when the agenda setter is less inflation-tolerant than the non-agenda setter, or $b_A < b_N$ (Eq. [A.12]), and when the agenda setter is more inflation-tolerant (Eq. [A.13]). Although the solution is highly nonlinear and closed-form solutions do not exist, numerical simulations using plausible parameter values allow us to make three propositions.

First, the larger is the variance of the supply shock, and therefore the greater the uncertainty surrounding the default or status quo outcome, the less influential is the non-agenda setter in setting policy. Veto players matter less in a more uncertain environment. This is intuitively clear, since the larger is a shock, the more likely the non-agenda setter will prefer the agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome to the status quo.

Second, the addition of a second, non-agenda-setting veto player increases policy credibility, with the effect rising in the magnitude of the preference differences between the two veto players. Of course, if the two veto players have identical preferences ($b_1 = b_2$), the second veto player has no influence at all on outcomes. Multiple veto players therefore can increase policy credibility as well as policy stability.

Third, policy credibility is sensitive to the decision making rules. If the agenda setter is the veto player who has the least incentive to renege on policy commitments (in this case, is most inflation-averse), the addition of a second veto player has little effect on credibility. In the reverse situation, multiple veto players have a significant effect on policy credibility.

The numerical simulations generating the second and third propositions, which are most relevant to the delegation case, are illustrated in Figure 2. Differences in preferred outcomes of the two veto players are modeled as mean-preserving polarization of the preferences, where "mean-preserving" is defined as an increase in $|b_N - b_A|$ holding $(b_N - b_A)/2$ constant. The addition of a second veto player always reduces expected inflation provided that the interests of the two veto players are divergent; as the third result predicts,

this effect is much stronger when the non-agenda setter is *less* inflation tolerant than the agenda setter. This two-veto player outcome is the benchmark against which to compare the effect of an independent central bank subsequently.

The Introduction of an Independent Central Bank

The key attribute of an independent central bank is that it, rather than the private sector, sets the default rate of inflation that political veto players must accept if they choose not to override it. After the private sector has acted and the supply shock has occurred, the central bank determines an inflation policy and it is this inflation policy that prevails if the two veto players do not act. The two veto players determine whether to accept the central bank's policy. If they overturn it and then do nothing, then the private sector's contractual price increases become final inflation. Consequently, the policy that prevails should they revoke the central bank's independence is precisely the policy derived earlier when there is no central bank. This policy is labeled π_{CH} , the inflation policy under checks and balances. The central bank has an effect on policy, therefore, to the extent that it can change the default or status quo rate of inflation relative to what would prevail in its absence.

The central banker's loss function and preferred inflation policy are, respectively,

$$L_{CB} = \frac{1}{2}\pi_t^2 + \frac{1}{2}b_{CB}(\pi_t - \pi_t^e + \varepsilon_t - y^*)^2 \quad (6)$$

and

$$\pi_{CB} = \frac{b_{CB}(\pi^e - \varepsilon + y^*)}{1 + b_{CB}}. \quad (7)$$

Three assumptions make the analysis more compelling. First, the central bank is assumed to be more inflation-averse than either of the political actors ($b_{CB} < b_A, b_N$). Second, for simplicity, the central banker always prefers any inflation outcome lower than the inflation that would prevail were he/she to be overridden, π_{CH} . Third, to avoid trivial cases, the most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker. The third assumption means that central banker's preferred inflation outcome, π^* , is such that $\pi_A - \pi^* \geq \pi_{CH} - \pi_A$ when $b_A < b_N$ and $\pi_N - \pi^* \geq \pi_{CH} - \pi_N$ when $b_N < b_A$.⁹ The lowest inflation that the central banker can propose without fear of override is a rate π that converts these expressions into equalities, $\pi = 2\pi_A - \pi_{CH}$ for $b_N < b_A$ and $\pi = 2\pi_N - \pi_{CH}$ otherwise. The rate π set by the central bank is the default outcome that prevails if political veto players do not override the central bank.

Since π_{CH} , the inflation policy that the two veto players can agree on if they override the central bank, is a

key constraint on central bank decision making, the same four cases that affect the calculation of π_{CH} also influence the policy choice of the central bank. Private actors therefore set expected price increases, establishing expected inflation, using Eq. (8), for $b_A < b_N$, following the same logic as for Eq. (5).

$$\pi_{CB}^e = q_1(\pi_A) + q_2(2\pi_A - \pi_{CB}^e) + q_3(2\pi_A - 2\pi_N + \pi_{CB}^e) + q_4(\pi_A). \quad (8)$$

In the earlier section, the inflation rate contracted by the private sector was labeled π_{SQ} , to denote that it constituted the status quo outcome. Since this is no longer the case in the presence of a central bank, Eq. (8) labels the private sector's inflation rate π_{CB}^e , to denote that it is the expected inflation calculated by private actors in the presence of a central bank.


The key difference in Eq. (8) is that the inflation policy that prevails under each of the four cases is simply the override-proof policy chosen by the central bank after having observed the shock. For example, consider a supply shock such that Case I is realized, $\pi_{CB}^e < \pi_A < \pi_N$. If the central bank were overridden, the agenda setter would propose and the other veto player would accept the agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome, or $\pi_{CH} = \pi_A$. Knowing this, the central banker can do no better than to propose the agenda setter's preferred inflation outcome, $\pi = 2\pi_A - \pi_{CH} = \pi_A$. In Case II, the inflation outcome in the event of an override of the central bank's proposal is the default outcome, or $\pi_{CH} = \pi_{CB}^e$, so that the central bank proposes $\pi = 2\pi_A - \pi_{CB}^e$, the inflation outcome that is no further from the agenda setter's preferred outcome than the default outcome.

If the non-agenda setter is less tolerant of inflation, $b_N < b_A$, the central bank then sets policy such that the non-agenda setter has no incentive to agree to reverse the central bank. The cases remain the same as before, but the override-proof policy is now the one that leaves the non-agenda setter just indifferent between the central bank's policy and the pursuit of an override. The derivation of expected inflation in this case is given in Appendix 3. The solutions for expected inflation in both cases (the agenda setter less and more tolerant of inflation) are derived in Appendix 3 and given by Eqs. (A.14) and (A.15).

As before, there is no simple closed-form expression for expected inflation with an independent central bank, but numerical simulations can be used to generate three relevant propositions. First, delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative central banker always lowers expected inflation when there are multiple veto players. Second, the central banker is able to pursue a lower inflation policy as polarization of the political actors increases. Third, just as the addition of a second veto player makes the most difference when the agenda setter is *more* tolerant of inflation, so too does the addition of an independent central bank.

The numerical simulations illustrated in Figure 3 yield each of these predictions. In each case, an independent central bank achieves lower inflation than two veto players alone, and the difference in inflation

⁹ This simplification, without loss of generality, simply eliminates the case where the central banker just chooses his/her own preferred inflation outcome.

FIGURE 3. The Effect of Central Bank Independence on Expected Inflation

Note: See Figure 1 for parameter values.

outcomes grows as polarization between the two veto players grows, but the biggest impact of an independent central bank occurs when the agenda setter is more inflation-tolerant. The latter claim can be verified by comparing the distances between the top and the bottom lines and between the two middle lines in Figure 3.

WHY ARE INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANKS CREATED?

Unlike the central banking literature, our model specifies the conditions under which politicians might override decisions made by a central bank. We give less attention to another issue: Why do politicians delegate to an agency that might be more inflation-averse than they are? However, the analysis above is consistent with substantial research, beginning with Rogoff 1985, that shows that even an inflation-tolerant political actor might prefer to delegate authority to a conservative central banker in the presence of unpredictable economic shocks.¹⁰

As a factual matter, moreover, many governments inherit central bank legislation approved by earlier governments, frequently earlier governments controlled by inflation-averse political parties that established a central bank fearing a future in which more inflation-tolerant parties might take office. For example, Boylan (1998) has shown that the current strong independence of the Chilean central bank was introduced during the Pinochet era. The United States Federal Reserve Act was passed in an extraordinary session of Congress in 1913, when the Democrats were in control of both houses and the presidency (Laughlin 1914; Leake 1917).¹¹ Berger and de Haan (1999) show how

the evolution of the Bundesbank independence was influenced by the institutional structures set up by the Allied powers following World War II and manifested in the Bundesbank Law of 1948. These examples provide a justification for the decision made in this paper to treat central bank independence as exogenous.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

The model underlines the importance of taking political institutions and preferences into account when examining the impact of administrative arrangements such as central bank independence. Three predictions that emerge from the foregoing analysis are tested below.

1. The presence of a legally independent central bank should have a more negative effect on inflation in the presence of multiple veto players.
2. The presence of a legally independent central bank has a more negative effect on inflation when different veto players have more divergent preferences over inflation.
3. Political interference, such as replacement of central bank governors, is less likely when multiple veto players are present and when veto players have divergent preferences over inflation.

Prediction 1 has been tested previously by Moser (1999), in a sample restricted to OECD countries, and by Keefer and Stasavage (2002), in a paper using only one proxy for checks and balances.¹² In this paper we extend this previous work by considering two different proxies for checks and balances. Tsebelis (2002) argues persuasively that the number of veto players affects policy only insofar as the veto players have divergent policy preferences. To be consistent with this condition, tests of Proposition 1 must therefore treat veto players with the same preferences as only a single veto player. The tests reported below do this. Prediction 2, regarding the effect of *increasing* polarization among veto players, has not been previously

¹⁰ Figures 1 and 2 track expected inflation, not the preferences of the veto players. One cannot infer from Figures 1 and 2, therefore, that the more inflation-tolerant agenda setter would always block the introduction of an independent central bank. On the contrary, the fact that expected inflation is higher when the more inflation-tolerant veto player controls the agenda provides a rationale for that agenda setter to support the introduction of a conservative central bank.

¹¹ Debate over the Federal Reserve Act was focused almost exclusively on banking regulation rather than on the inflation-fighting characteristics of an independent central bank, however.

¹² Lohmann (1998) conducts time-series tests using German data, which also support Prediction 1.

tested. Delegation improves policy credibility because it is more difficult for multiple veto players to agree to overturn an agency's decision than their own. In that case, however, we should see more evidence of overt political interference in central bank affairs when there are fewer veto players and their interests are more concordant. This is Prediction 3, which has also not been previously tested and provides supporting evidence for the primary thesis that central bank independence depends on checks and balances.¹³ The theoretical model also suggests other hypotheses, related to the interaction of the agenda setter, the degree of polarization, and the uncertainty about the status quo outcome. The absence of data on agenda setters across countries means that tests of these hypotheses must be reserved for future work.

Data

Following standard practice, in our tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 we use average levels of inflation as our dependent variable and, more specifically, the log of average inflation.¹⁴ We consider determinants of average inflation in a maximum of 66 countries (both OECD and developing) over three time periods from 1960 to 1989.¹⁵ As noted below, several of our tests are restricted to the two time periods 1972–79 and 1980–89 due to limitations in political data availability.

Our measure of legal central bank independence (CBI) was developed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), based on 16 characteristics of central bank statutes such as the term of office for the governor, provisions for his or her replacement, limits on central bank lending to government, and procedures for resolution of conflicts between central bank and government.¹⁶ The component of CBI that measures rules concerning the tenure of the central bank governor is also used separately for testing hypothesis 3, and we label it *CEO*.

These authors have also collected data on replacement of central bank governors. Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) argue that high turnover of central bank governors is indicative of low independence, and they show that the rate of turnover is positively and significantly correlated with inflation in a sample including both developed and developing countries.¹⁷ Cukierman and Webb (1995) collect data on the fre-

quency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government, a period where any political influence is most likely to be exercised. We use the latter measure, which we call *governor turnover*, in our test of hypothesis 3, because it appears to be the best available proxy for the extent of political interference with central bank governors.¹⁸

With respect to checks and balances in government, one would ideally like to have separate measures on the number of political actors who exercise veto power over monetary policy, their inflation preferences, and their respective agenda-setting power. These variables are not available in the cross-country setting that we seek to examine, so we instead employ two recently developed measures of checks and balances.¹⁹ They have the advantage of being based on objective criteria and of capturing the existence of coalition governments or divided control of two chambers in a bicameral system. Henisz (2000) has developed a formula for measuring checks and balances. Although it does not measure the extent of polarization among veto players with respect to economic policy, it carefully distinguishes veto players based on the number of formal constitutional veto points present in a political system (executive, houses of the legislature, federal subunits, judiciary), on whether these veto points are controlled by different parties, and on the cohesiveness of the majority that controls each veto point.²⁰ This variable would not be appropriate for the tests below if veto players occupying different veto points (and therefore elected, typically, by different constituencies) and from different parties had identical preferences with respect to economic policy. We do not regard this as likely, however, given that one of the principal reasons for two politicians not belonging to the same party is that they have different preferences over policy. The index, *political constraints*, is available for the last three decades of our sample (1960–89).

A second measure of checks and balances, developed by Keefer (2002), also has the advantage of being based on objective criteria and of capturing the existence of coalition governments or divided control of two chambers in a bicameral system. In addition, unlike *political constraints*, the *checks* variable is explicitly incremented when a party in the government has an economic policy orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the party of the executive. More generally, *checks* is based on a formula that first counts the number of veto players, based on whether the executive and legislative chamber(s) are controlled by different parties in presidential systems

¹³ This prediction does, however, involve “out of equilibrium” behavior—in our model central bank governors are never replaced, because they avoid choosing a rate of inflation that would be overridden by both political veto players. In practice this might happen if the outside opportunities of the central bank governor are adversely influenced by a weak central bank stance against inflation.

¹⁴ This is based on consumer price index data from the IMF, International Financial Statistics. An alternative dependent variable used by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) is $\pi/(1 + \pi)$.

¹⁵ Following the initial study by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), we divide the three periods as follows, 1960–71, 1972–79, 1980–89.

¹⁶ We use Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti's (1992) weighted index, which they call LVAW.

¹⁷ These data have recently been updated and corrected by Sturm and de Haan (2001).

¹⁸ In a few cases *governor turnover* could not be coded because a country did not experience a change of government during the period. This results in the exclusion of only four potential observations from our Table 3 regressions.

¹⁹ Our results are also robust to the use of *executive constraints*, a variable from the Polity IV database. Unlike the two measures that are reported here, this is a subjective measure of the extent to which there are “checks” on the executive.

²⁰ All of the results we report are robust to using a version of *political constraints* that excludes the judiciary as a veto player. Details on the construction of this index can be found in Henisz 1997.

and on the number of parties in the government coalition for parliamentary systems (as described in greater detail in Beck et al. 2001). The index is then modified to take account of the fact that certain electoral rules (closed list vs. open list) affect the cohesiveness of governing coalitions. The variable is constructed based on variables in a new database of political institutions assembled by Beck et al. (2001) and is available for the last two decades of our sample (1972–89). Since the effects of checks and balances hypothesized in the model are likely to be strongest at lower levels of checks than at higher levels, we use a log version of *checks*, *log checks*, in our regressions.²¹

The measures developed by Keefer (2002) and Henisz (2000) capture the number of veto players as well as can be done in a cross-country setting that includes both OECD and developing countries. Both of these indicators rise with the number of veto points (depending upon the number of legislative chambers) and fall when the veto points are occupied by the same political party (depending on whether majorities are multiparty coalitions).

There is no measure available that precisely assesses the policy distance between veto players. However, to test Prediction 2 we use a reasonable substitute, the *political polarization* variable from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The database reports the economic orientation of the four largest parties and the executive in each country, based on whether the data sources indicated parties as having an economic orientation that was left, center, or right. Pairwise comparisons of economic orientation are made; the difference in economic orientation between the pair of veto players exhibiting the largest difference in orientation is the *political polarization* measure. Given the way it is constructed, the *political polarization* measure is a reasonable proxy for the degree to which the preferences of veto players diverge. In addition, however, since it takes a value of zero for systems with only one veto player, it is simultaneously a proxy for the number of veto players in a country.

We use one additional control variable, *openness*, measured as imports of goods and services divided by GDP (*International Financial Statistics*). This follows Romer (1993), who argues that as imports increase as a share of total consumption, policymakers have less of an *ex post* incentive to inflate. We also follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) and include decade dummy variables to control for unobserved characteristics specific to each time period.

Testing Predictions 1 and 2: Checks and Balances, Polarization, and Central Bank Independence

In order to examine whether legal CBI has a stronger negative impact on inflation in countries with multiple

veto players, and in cases where veto players are more polarized, we use a model with interaction terms that allows the marginal effect of CBI on inflation to vary across political systems. The general form of Regressions 2 and 3 in Table 2 is shown in Eq. (9), where *pol. inst.* represents our alternative proxies for the number of veto players in government and the degree of polarization between veto players.

$$\log inflation_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 CBI_{it} + \beta_2 pol. inst._{it} + \beta_3 (pol. inst.)_{it} * (CBI)_{it} + \beta_4 openness_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (9)$$

The interaction term is predicted to have a negative coefficient. The net effect of CBI, given by $\beta_1 + \beta_3 * (pol. inst.)$, should be to reduce inflation only at high levels of checks and balances (or at high levels of polarization).

Regression 1 in Table 2 suggests that, although there is some theoretical ambiguity about the effects of multiple veto players on inflation, in practice the introduction of multiple political veto players may be to reduce inflation: The coefficient on *log checks* is negative and significant. As in previous research, legal CBI has no significant impact on inflation when it enters linearly in a sample including both OECD and developing countries, and openness is significantly and negatively correlated with inflation. The variable *political constraints* is similarly significant, economically and statistically, when substituted for *log checks* in the Regression 1 specification.

Regression 2 suggests that the effect of CBI on inflation is conditional on the presence of checks and balances in government. Consistent with Prediction 1, the interaction term $CBI * \log checks$ is negative, and an increase in CBI is estimated to have a negative effect on inflation only at high levels of checks and balances. Regression 3 produces very similar results. The interaction term $CBI * polcon$ is negative and statistically significant.

In Regression 4 we extend the inquiry to consider whether the effect of CBI is influenced by both the number of veto players and their degree of polarization. The variable *political polarization* captures exactly this effect, since it is zero when there is only one veto player, while in systems with more than one veto player *political polarization* can take on a positive value ranging from zero to two as veto player preferences over economic policy diverge.

The coefficient on the interaction term $CBI * political polarization$ in Regression 4 is negative and statistically significant, supporting Prediction 2. This result in Regression 4 is also robust to the linear inclusion of *log checks* to the regression. Figure 4 plots the estimated effect of an increase in CBI, together with its standard error, and different levels of *political polarization*. The model predicts that an increase in CBI will have a negative impact on inflation only at relatively high levels of polarization (*political polarization* > 0.6). This corresponds roughly to the mean value of *political polarization* for the group of countries in which *political polarization* is not equal to

²¹ Otherwise this variable would give as much weight to a change from one to two veto players as to a change from four to five; since our model speaks to the first case and is silent about the second, the log formulation is more appropriate.


TABLE 2. Checks and Balances, Polarization, and Central Bank Independence

Dependent Variable: log Inflation	Regression			
	1	2	3	4
Constant	-0.976 (0.325)	-2.17 (0.63)	-2.30 (0.35)	-1.93 (0.31)
<i>CBI</i>	0.106 (0.635)	3.48 (1.82)	2.68 (1.07)	1.24 (0.88)
<i>Openness</i>	-1.17 (0.28)	-1.22 (0.29)	-1.20 (0.32)	-1.37 (0.34)
<i>log checks</i>	-0.664 (0.208)	0.473 (0.533)		
<i>CBI * log checks</i>		-3.16 [*] (1.48)		
<i>Political constraints (polcon)</i>			1.13 (0.54)	
<i>CBI * polcon</i>			-5.10 (1.52)	
<i>Political polarization</i>				0.558 (0.345)
<i>CBI * political polarization</i>				-1.95
<i>R</i> ²	0.21	0.24	0.36	0.16
<i>N</i>	123	123	164	123

Note: OLS, with White's heteroskedastic consistent standard errors reported in parentheses. Period dummies not reported.

zero. This result is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, as it suggests that multiple veto players with divergent preferences must be present for CBI to have a significant impact.

The results in Regressions 2 and 3 bear on an unresolved puzzle in empirical work on CBI. A number of papers have found a statistically significant relationship between legal measures of CBI and inflation

FIGURE 4. Estimated Effect of an Increase in Central Bank Independence at Different Levels of Polarization

Note: Change in CBI is one standard deviation, = 0.13.

TABLE 3. Estimated Effect on log Inflation of a One-Standard Deviation Increase in Central Bank Independence

	log Checks	Political Constraints
One veto player	0.002 (0.077)	0.238 (0.110)
Two veto players	-0.116 (0.088)	-0.094 (0.058)
Three veto players	-0.208 (0.116)	-0.182 (0.066)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. In the case with one veto player $\log \text{ checks} = 1.09$ and $\text{political constraints} = 0.167$. With two veto players $\log \text{ checks} = 1.38$ and $\text{political constraints} = 0.67$. With three veto players $\log \text{ checks} = 1.61$ and $\text{political constraints} = 0.80$.

in advanced industrialized economies.²² However, this relationship has not been documented in samples that include both developed and developing countries (Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992). Our results suggest that legal independence can reduce inflation bias in both developed and developing countries, but that this depends on the level of checks and balances in a country's political system.

Table 3 reports the estimated effect of a one π standard deviation increase in CBI (0.13) at different levels of each of our proxies for checks and balances used in Regressions 2 and 3. It also reports the conditional standard errors of these effects, which depend on the variance of both the linear and the interactive CBI terms, as well as their covariance. To facilitate comparison, we have chosen values for each of the two variables that would reflect a political system with one, two, or three veto players. Table 3 provides additional evidence that in each case an independent central bank reduces inflation only where multiple veto players are present, as the theory predicts.

Cases of Conflict from the Bundesbank and the Fed

Qualitative evidence emerging from specific instances of confrontation between central bankers and political decision makers provides further support for the analysis here. For example, during the Gürzenich Affair of 1955–56, the German Bundesbank was able to insist on a course of action strongly opposed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer precisely because members of his cabinet, Ludwig Erhard and Fritz Schäffer, supported the central bank. As Berger and de Haan (1999) document, although they were not formal veto players, these two were highly influential within the Christian Democratic Party and, more to the point, represented different interests. Adenauer sought a looser money supply to satisfy the demands of major industrial interests who were important contributors to the party; the

two cabinet members were able to rely on broader public support for the autonomy of the Bundesbank. Two elements of this story are especially important. First, the two cabinet ministers were de facto veto players. Although public opposition to restricting the authority of the Bundesbank eventually emerged, internal cabinet opposition to Adenauer's actions seems to have been key to representing public opinion against the interests of industrialists. Only if they had de facto veto power could these two ministers have accomplished this. Second, although it is inaccurate to speak of the "agenda-setting" authority of Adenauer versus his cabinet ministers, there is little doubt that his bargaining power was greater than that of his two ministers, given his status in the party and as Chancellor. Despite this—but as the model predicts—the Bundesbank was able to get nearly everything it wanted in the conflict with the support of these two ministers.

Wooley (1984, 144–47) documents several instances of conflict among the U.S. Federal Reserve, Congress, and the President. In 1975, at the trough of a two-year-old recession, Federal Reserve policy was markedly more conservative than either the Republican President Ford or the Democratic Congress desired. At the outset of the 1975 Ninety-Fourth Congress, several committee chairmen were replaced and the more liberal Henry Reuss took over the House Banking Committee, assuming a position of agenda control. He immediately introduced legislation requiring the Fed to expand the money supply at a rate of 6% per year. Within days, however, he agreed to replace this proposal with a substantially weaker one, calling only for the Fed to increase the money supply in the first half of 1975 and to maintain long-run growth in the money supply consistent with long-run potential output growth. This bill was passed and signed by the President. Since the bill had no binding effect (Wooley [147] describes it as "toothless and compromised"), one is left to ask why stronger legislation did not succeed. The analysis here suggests that the move toward a less inflation-averse agenda setter had little effect on policy because other, more conservative veto players remained the same (e.g., the Republican president). These veto players were constrained by concerns about the inflation outcome that would have prevailed should they have overturned Fed policy. Knowing this, the Fed was able to pursue a more aggressive policy than the veto players preferred.

Testing Prediction 3: Checks and Balances, Polarization, and Political Influence on Central Banks

If our primary thesis is correct, then in addition to influencing observed policy outcomes, checks and balances and polarization should also have an impact on the degree to which a central bank is subject to political influence. We examine this issue by proxying for political influence with a variable collected by Cukierman and Webb (1995), which measures the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following elections. As argued above, while even this variable is likely to be an imperfect proxy for political

²² See, for example, Alesina and Summers 1993, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992, and Grilli, Masciandro, and Tabellini 1991.

TABLE 4. Political Influence on the Central Bank, Checks and Balances, and Polarization

Dependent Variable: Central Bank Governor Turnover	Regression					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	0.491 (0.088)	0.345 (0.074)	0.285 (0.081)	0.274 (0.116)	0.187 (0.084)	0.238 (0.089)
<i>CEO</i>	0.086 (0.138)	0.068 (0.127)	0.088 (0.142)	0.581 (0.271)	0.422 (0.180)	0.183 (0.168)
<i>log checks</i>	-0.222 (0.063)			0.00339 (0.1343)		
<i>CEO* log checks</i>				-0.518 (0.299)		
<i>Political constraints (polcon)</i>		-0.169 (0.081)			0.187 (0.166)	
<i>CEO* polcon</i>					-0.762 (0.323)	
<i>Political polarization</i>			-0.086 (0.044)			0.045 (0.132)
<i>CEO* polarization</i>						-0.269 (0.232)
R^2	0.10	0.05	0.02	0.12	0.07	0.03
N	112	152	112	112	152	112

Note: Period dummies not reported.

influence, it is a better proxy than measures that focus on the overall rate of turnover for central bank governors. We test two alternative versions of the hypothesis.

First, to the extent that the decision to replace a central bank governor must be agreed to by more than one veto player, then we should expect more infrequent turnover of central bank governors in countries with multiple veto players in government, in particular, in countries where there is evidence that there are multiple veto players with divergent preferences. This might be the case, for example, in a country with a coalition government where all coalition members might have a say in any decision to replace the central bank governor. Because our variable *governor turnover* is a direct measure of the frequency of policy change, this is a straightforward prediction.²³

We also test a second version of Prediction 3. Logically it should be the case that the replacement of governors will become more difficult when a central bank's statutes offer tenure guarantees *and* when there are multiple political veto players with different preferences over economic policy. The most relevant tenure guarantees would involve a long term of office and provisions making it difficult for the central bank governor to be replaced in the case of a conflict over policy. In countries where decisions over replacing the central bank governor would normally be made by a single veto player, then legal guarantees of tenure can have the effect of increasing the number of veto players whose accord is necessary to replace the central bank governor. So, for example, in the absence of tenure guarantees, the executive alone might be able to dismiss the

central bank governor, but once such guarantees are in place, both the executive and the legislature would need to agree to pass a law removing the tenure guarantees before the governor could be removed from office. In contrast, in countries where there is only one veto player, it may be as easy to alter legal restrictions on dismissal as it would be to remove a central bank governor in a country without such restrictions. Given that we lack accurate data on the number of veto players that would normally be able to block an attempt to remove the central bank governor, in what follows we test both variants of Prediction 3.

Equation (10) is the specification of a test of this hypothesis (recalling that *CEO* measures legal protection of the tenure of the central bank governor and *governor turnover* measures the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced following changes in government).²⁴

$$\begin{aligned} \text{governor turnover}_{it} = & \alpha_t + \beta_1 \text{CEO}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{pcl. inst.}_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 (\text{pol. inst.}_{it}) \\ & * (\text{CEO}_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

Table 4 reports the estimates from six versions of (10). We begin in Regressions 1–3 by asking only whether governor turnover following elections is less

²³ In contrast, in our Table 1 regressions the dependent variable, inflation, is not a direct measure of the frequency of policy change, and as a result, predictions about the effect of checks and balances on inflation depend on other intervening variables.

²⁴ *CEO* is itself composed of four subindexes that measure legal length of tenure for the central bank governor, restrictions on dismissal of central bank governors in cases of policy conflict, provisions regarding appointment of governors, and restrictions on governors holding other positions simultaneously. A large number of missing observations in the individual subindexes made it impossible to use them individually. However, given that the subindexes regarding length of tenure and restrictions on dismissal are the most closely suited to testing Prediction 3, we also repeated Regressions 1–6 from Table 3 using an index equal to the average of these two variables. The results were similar to those reported here, in particular, for Regressions 1–3.

frequent in countries with multiple veto players in government. These regressions therefore test the first variant of Prediction 3, that checks and balances in government should directly reduce the rate of governor turnover. The coefficients on both proxies for the number of veto players are negative and significant, as is the coefficient on *political polarization*. Political interference with central banks is less frequent in countries with multiple veto players having divergent preferences.

In Regressions 4–6 we consider the second variant of Prediction 3: Tenure guarantees should be more effective in reducing governor turnover in countries where there are multiple veto players in government and where veto players are polarized. That is, we expect the interaction term *pol. inst. * CEO* to be negative. In each of the three regressions the interaction term has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant for *log checks* and *political constraints*. An increase in tenure protections *CEO* reduces *governor turnover* only in the presence of multiple veto players (or polarized veto players in the case of *political polarization*). However, the conditional standard error of this effect is quite sizable in all regressions—even at very high levels of checks and balances, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the effect is zero. We therefore find strong evidence to support the conclusion that the presence of multiple polarized veto players reduces political influence on central banks and significant, but weaker evidence that multiple veto players increase the effectiveness of legal protections for central bank governors.

Robustness

A number of possible concerns could be raised about our core empirical results. These include the possibilities that they are driven by serial correlation, by the endogeneity of legal CBI to inflation or lagged inflation, by the effect of omitted variables, or by outliers. The evidence presented in this section indicates that these do not provide plausible alternative explanations of our empirical findings.

Results of Lagrange multiplier tests suggest that serial correlation of the error terms might have led to inconsistent estimates of standard errors in the tests in Table 1. However, the results in Table 1 are robust to controls for serial correlation (that is, the inclusion of log inflation, lagged one period). At the same time, it is possible that *CBI* is endogenous to inflation. Empirically, in our sample we find little evidence that central bank independence is endogenous to lagged inflation; nor is *CBI* endogenous to contemporary inflation.

A potential omitted variable in our regressions is income per capita. A country's level of income might simultaneously influence both inflation and the efficacy of an independent central bank. However, when entered into our Table 1 regressions, the log of real GDP per capita is never significant and leaves the estimates of the interaction terms nearly unchanged. Given that our checks and balances measures are highly correlated with levels of per capita GDP, we also consider whether the significance of our interaction terms *CBI * checks* simply reflects the previous finding that legal CBI has a more negative effect on inflation in wealthy countries.

To assess this possibility, we compare the explanatory power of the specifications in Table 1 with a specification that substitutes *logGDP* and *logGDP * CBI* for the respective *checks* variables and *checks * CBI* variables. Using *J* tests first proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), we rejected the GDP specification in favor of the original specifications in Table 1, Regressions 2–4. In Regression 5 we rejected the *political polarization* specification in favor of the GDP specification.²⁵

Our results are also robust to two other variables omitted in Table 1, and to the exclusion of influential outliers.²⁶ We find that an interaction term, *openness * CBI*, does not affect the results in Table 1.²⁷ It might also be argued that political instability explains our results: Countries that exhibit checks and balances are less stable, and it is their instability, rather than checks and balances, that generates our results. The evidence suggests that this is not the case, however.²⁸

CONCLUSION

Multiple veto players and delegation to independent agencies have attracted great attention as institutional mechanisms through which governments can enhance the credibility of their commitments. This paper advances our understanding of the role of veto players and delegation in several ways and tests these advances in the context of independent central banks in a broad set of countries.

We rigorously identify theoretically and empirically the conditions under which additional veto players can mitigate the problem of credible commitment. Our analysis goes beyond the problem of policy stability that is the focus of much of the current veto player literature. In addition, the analysis shows that the impact of veto players depends on the certainty with which players can anticipate future status quo or default outcomes. Multiple veto players have more limited effects in more volatile policy environments characterized by exogenous shocks.

With respect to the literature on delegation, the argument here highlights an additional effect of delegation not typically discussed. Delegation enhances credible commitment, and does so the more divergent are the

²⁵ These tests involve estimating the two alternative specifications and then reestimating each specification, adding as an independent variable the predicted value of log inflation from the alternative model. The *t* statistic on the fitted values can be interpreted as a test of the null that the alternative specification would not add explanatory power to the existing model.

²⁶ Outliers were identified using *dfbeta* statistics for the coefficients on our political variables, as well as calculation of Cook's distance for individual observations. No countries were repeated outliers across the different regressions in Tables 1 and 3.

²⁷ Following Romer 1993 and Franses 1999, we added the interaction term *CBI * openness* to the Table 1 specifications and found that it was never significant. More importantly, the *CBI * checks* interaction terms generally retain their significance.

²⁸ First, the correlation between three measures of political instability and the *checks* variable (all from the Database of Political Indicators) is slightly positive (7%) in two cases and negative (–17%) in a third case. Second, our regression results are robust to the inclusion of instability.

interests of the competing veto players and, especially, the closer are the interests of the non-agenda setter to those of the agency to which authority has been delegated.

The evidence for many of these points is direct, and unlike much of the empirical evidence in this area, it derives from diverse institutional settings in the developed and developing world. Central banks are associated with lower inflation (that is, greater credibility of government monetary policy) in the presence of checks and balances, and the turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. We find as well, and consistent with the theory, that the impact of checks and balances on inflation (credibility) is greater in more polarized societies.

These results suggest that policy reformers face frustration if, in the absence of appropriate political institutions, they grant policymaking authority to formally independent agencies. It is undeniable that these institutions, such as courts and central banks, can sometimes achieve a high level of prestige and respect such that citizens are willing to turn out governments that abridge their independence. However, at least in the case of central banks, the evidence suggests that prestige alone is insufficient to guarantee independence. Political institutions, instead, are crucial to the sustainability and effectiveness of decision making by independent agencies.

APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND THE CHECKS AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MEASURES

TABLE A1

Variable	No. Observ.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
<i>log inflation</i>	217	-2.53	1.12	-5.81	0.81
<i>CBI</i>	236	0.34	0.13	0.09	0.69
<i>CEO</i>	236	0.48	0.20	0.06	0.94
<i>Governor turnover</i>	194	0.26	0.33	0	1.5
<i>Executive constraints</i>	226	4.73	2.24	1	7
<i>log checks</i>	133	0.95	0.47	0	1.92
<i>Political constraints</i>	179	0.27	0.19	0	0.65
<i>Openness</i>	197	0.30	0.23	0.03	1.90
<i>Political polarization</i>	132	0.51	0.78	0	2
<i>logGDP</i>	171	1.18	1.02	-1.26	280

APPENDIX 2: DERIVATION OF EXPECTED INFLATION UNDER CHECKS AND BALANCES

Private actors solve for expected inflation using Eq. (5), rewritten here as

$$\begin{aligned}\pi^e = & q_1 \left[\frac{b_A(\pi^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_1 + y^*)}{1 + b_A} \right] \\ & + q_2 \pi^e + q_3 \left[\frac{2b_N(\pi^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_3 + y^*)}{1 + b_N} - \pi^e \right] \\ & + q_4 \left[\frac{b_A(\pi^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_4 + y^*)}{1 + b_A} \right],\end{aligned}$$

where the q_i 's are the probabilities of each of the four decision-making outcomes and sum to one, and the $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ are the expected values of the range of economic shocks over which these four possible outcomes can occur.

The probability q_1 , describes the likelihood that the shock will be such that $\pi^e < \pi_A < \pi_N$. That is,

$$q_1 = \text{pr} \left[\pi^e < \frac{b_A}{1 + b_A} (y^* - \varepsilon + \pi^e) \right],$$

or

$$q_1 = \text{pr} \left[\varepsilon < -\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* \right]. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Similarly, q_2 is the probability that $\pi_A < \pi^e < \pi_N$, or

$$q_2 = \text{pr} \left[-\frac{1}{b_N} \pi^e + y^* > \varepsilon > -\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* \right]. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

q_3 is $\text{pr} [\pi_N < \pi^e < 2\pi_N - \pi_A]$, or

$$\begin{aligned}q_3 = & \text{pr} \left[-\frac{1}{b_N} \pi^e + y^* < \varepsilon < \pi^e + y^* \right. \\ & \left. - \frac{(1 + b_A)(1 + b_N)}{(1 + b_A)2b_N - (1 + b_N)b_A} \pi^e \right], \quad (\text{A.3})\end{aligned}$$

and q_4 is $\text{pr} [\pi_N < 2\pi_N - \pi_A < \pi^e]$, or

$$q_4 = \text{pr} \left[\varepsilon > \pi^e + y^* - \frac{(1 + b_A)(1 + b_N)}{(1 + b_A)2b_N - (1 + b_N)b_A} \pi^e \right]. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Set $K = [(1 + b_A)(1 + b_N)] / [(1 + b_A)2b_N + (1 + b_N)b_A]$. In order to fix the value of inflation that they expect, the private actors solve for the q_i 's and ε_i 's in terms of the parameters and expected inflation. They then substitute the resulting terms into Eq. (5) and solve for expected inflation in terms of desired output and the preference parameters b_i . To carry out this exercise, assume that ε is distributed uniformly over the range $[-c, c]$. Given this uniform distribution, (A.1) can be rewritten

$$q_1 = \int_{-c}^{-\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^*} \frac{1}{2c} d\varepsilon = \frac{1}{2c} \left(-\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* + c \right). \quad (\text{A.1}^*)$$

The average value of the shock over this range, $\hat{\varepsilon}_1$, is therefore

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left(-\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* - c \right). \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Proceeding in a parallel fashion with the remaining probabilities,

$$q_2 = \frac{1}{2c} \pi^e \left(\frac{1}{b_A} - \frac{1}{b_N} \right), \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_2 = \frac{1}{2} \left[2y^* - \pi^e \left(\frac{1}{b_A} + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right], \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$q_3 = \frac{1}{2c} \pi^e \left(1 - K + \frac{1}{b_N} \right), \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_3 = \frac{1}{2} \left[2y^* + \pi^e \left(1 - K + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right], \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$q_4 = \frac{1}{2c} [\pi^e (K - 1) - y^* + c], \quad (\text{A.10})$$

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_4 = \frac{1}{2} [c + y^* + \pi^e (1 - K)]. \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Substituting these expressions into Eq. (5) and manipulating gives the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\pi^e)^2 & \left[\frac{b_A}{(1+b_A)} \left(-\frac{1}{b_A} - \frac{1}{2b_A^2} + K - 1 - \frac{(K-1)^2}{2} \right) \right. \\
 & + \frac{1}{b_A} - \frac{1}{b_N} + \left(1 - K + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \\
 & \times \left(\frac{2b_N}{(1+b_N)} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - K - \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right) - 1 \right) \\
 & \left. - \pi^e \left(\frac{2c}{1+b_A} \right) + \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} - 2y^*c \right] = 0. \quad (\text{A.12})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $b_A > b_N$, a similar analysis can be performed. In this case, though, the probabilities q attached to the inflation outcomes in Eq. (5) are reversed:

$$\begin{aligned}
 q_1 &= \text{pr} \left[\varepsilon > -\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* \right], \\
 q_2 &= \text{pr} \left[-\frac{1}{b_N} \pi^e + y^* < \varepsilon < -\frac{1}{b_A} \pi^e + y^* \right], \\
 q_3 &= \text{pr} \left[-\frac{1}{b_N} \pi^e + y^* > \varepsilon > (1-K)\pi^e + y^* \right],
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$q_4 = \text{pr}[\varepsilon < (1-K)\pi^e + y^*].$$

Substituting these, and the corresponding values for $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$, into Eq. (5) and solving yields the following expression for expected inflation when the executive is more inflation-tolerant than the legislature:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\pi^e)^2 & \left[\frac{b_A}{(1+b_A)} \left(\frac{1}{b_A} + \frac{1}{2b_A^2} + 1 - K + \frac{(1-K)^2}{2} \right) \right. \\
 & + \frac{1}{b_N} - \frac{1}{b_A} + \left(K - 1 - \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \\
 & \times \left(\frac{2b_N}{(1+b_N)} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - K - \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right) - 1 \right) \\
 & \left. - \pi^e \left(\frac{2c}{1+b_A} \right) + \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} - 2y^*c \right] = 0. \quad (\text{A.13})
 \end{aligned}$$

APPENDIX 3: DERIVATION OF EXPECTED INFLATION UNDER CHECKS AND BALANCES WITH AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK

Rewriting Eq. (8), for $b_A < b_N$, expected inflation is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_{CB}^e &= q_1 \left[\frac{b_A(\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_1 + y^*)}{1+b_A} \right] \\
 &+ q_2 \left[\frac{2b_A(\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_2 + y^*)}{1+b_A} - \pi_{CB}^e \right] \\
 &+ q_3 \left[2(\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_3 + y^*) \left(\frac{b_A}{1+b_A} - \frac{b_N}{1+b_N} \right) + \pi_{CB}^e \right] \\
 &+ q_4 \left[\frac{b_A(\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_4 + y^*)}{1+b_A} \right].
 \end{aligned}$$

If the veto players override the central bank's proposal after the shock is revealed and the private actors have set expected

inflation, the political actors make their determination of a new inflation policy exactly as if there were no central bank. The probabilities q_i and the expected shocks $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ are calculated over the same limits as in the corresponding case in Appendix 2 ($b_A < b_N$), with no central bank.

As in Appendix 2, substituting the expressions for the probabilities and expected shocks into Eq. (13) and manipulating, we obtain the following expression for expected inflation under CBI and checks and balances:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\pi_{CB}^e)^2 & \left[\frac{b_A}{(1+b_A)} \left(-\frac{1}{b_A} - \frac{1}{2b_A^2} + K - 1 + \frac{(K-1)^2}{2} \right) \right. \\
 & + \frac{2b_A}{1+b_A} \left(\frac{1}{b_A} - \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \left(1 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{b_A} + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right) - \frac{1}{b_A} \\
 & + \frac{1}{b_N} + \left(1 - K + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \left(\left(\frac{2b_A}{1+b_A} - \frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} \right) \right. \\
 & \times \left. \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - K - \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right) + 1 \right) \\
 & \left. + \pi_{CB}^e \left[-\frac{2c}{(1+b_A)} \right] + \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} (2cy^*) \right] = 0. \quad (\text{A.14})
 \end{aligned}$$

Since the central bank conditions its policy choice on the preferences of the most inflation-averse political decision maker, the case where $b_A > b_N$ changes the payoffs that generated (A.14). In particular, the central bank does not propose policies such that the agenda setter is just indifferent between the proposal and what would prevail if the central bank decision were overridden and the checks and balances outcome (π_{CH}) prevailed, $\pi = 2\pi_A - \pi_{CH}$. Instead, the central bank proposes $\pi = 2\pi_N - \pi_{CH}$, such that the non-agenda setter is just indifferent. Expected inflation is therefore the solution to

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_{CB}^e &= q_1 \left[\left(\frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} - \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} \right) (\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_1 + y^*) \right] \\
 &+ q_2 \left[\frac{2b_N(\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_2 + y^*)}{1+b_N} - \pi_{CB}^e \right] + q_3 \pi_{CB}^e \\
 &+ q_4 \left[\left(\frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} - \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} \right) (\pi_{CB}^e - \hat{\varepsilon}_4 + y^*) \right].
 \end{aligned}$$

The probabilities q_i and the expected shocks $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ are calculated over the same limits as in the corresponding case ($b_A > b_N$) in Appendix 2. Solving, we get the following solution:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\pi_{CB}^e)^2 & \left[\left(\frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} - \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} \right) \left(\frac{1}{b_A} + \frac{1}{2b_A^2} + 1 - K \right. \right. \\
 & \left. \left. - \frac{(1-K)^2}{2} \right) + \frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} \left(\frac{1}{b_N} - \frac{1}{b_A} \right) \right. \\
 & \times \left(1 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{b_A} + \frac{1}{b_N} \right) \right) - \frac{1}{b_N} + \frac{1}{b_A} + K - 1 + \frac{1}{b_N} \\
 & + 2c\pi_{CB}^e \left(-1 + \frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} - \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} \right) \\
 & \left. + 2cy^* \left(\frac{2b_N}{1+b_N} - \frac{b_A}{1+b_A} \right) \right] = 0. \quad (\text{A.15})
 \end{aligned}$$

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New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95

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The relevance of socioeconomic class and of class-related parties for policymaking is a recurring issue in the social sciences. The “new politics” perspective holds that in the present era of austerity, class-based parties once driving welfare state expansion have been superseded by powerful new interest groups of welfare-state clients capable of largely resisting retrenchment pressures emanating from postindustrial forces. We argue that retrenchment can fruitfully be analyzed as distributive conflict involving a remaking of the early postwar social contract based on the full employment welfare state, a conflict in which partisan politics and welfare-state institutions are likely to matter. Pointing to problems of conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable in previous research, we bring in new data on the extent of retrenchment in social citizenship rights and show that the long increase in social rights has been turned into a decline and that significant retrenchment has taken place in several countries. Our analyses demonstrate that partisan politics remains significant for retrenchment also when we take account of contextual indicators, such as constitutional veto points, economic factors, and globalization.

What is the relevance of socioeconomic class and of class-related parties for government policymaking in the Western democracies? For at least half a century this question has generated intensive debates in political science as well as in sociology. In retrospect we can discern a cyclical pattern in the relative significance accorded to class in debates within the social sciences, a pattern evident also in analyses of welfare state development, one major arena for policymaking. During the first decades after the Second World War, the role of class and class politics waned as social scientists pronounced the end of ideology and the “embourgeoisement” of the working class, and the logic of industrialism saw welfare states as functional necessities of industrial societies.¹ Such interpretations of social change did, however, meet empirical as well as theoretical resistance from scholars asserting the continued relevance of class.² In the area

of welfare-state research, proponents for what has become known as the power resources approach argued that it is fruitful to view welfare states as outcomes of, and arenas for, conflicts between class-related, socioeconomic interest groups and that in these distributive conflicts partisan politics is likely to matter.³ As noted by Paul Pierson (2000, 793), the power resources approach generated the “most prominent body of research on the welfare state in the 1980s.”

In the 1990s, however, the role of class and class-related parties again came to wane.⁴ Thus, for example, while Lipset (1960) once saw elections as “the expression of the democratic class struggle,” he now maintained that “class analysis has grown increasingly inadequate in recent decades as traditional hierarchies have declined and new social differences have emerged” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 397). And according to Inglehart (1997, 237), “The shift towards postmodern values has brought a shift in the political agenda throughout the advanced industrial society . . . a shift from political cleavages based on social class conflict towards cleavages based on cultural issues and quality of life concerns.” Some scholars have even pronounced “The Death of Class” (Pakulski and Waters 1996). The cyclical pattern in social scientists’ views on the role of class for government policymaking points to unresolved theoretical and empirical problems in the study of class politics.

In this paper we analyze the relevance of class politics in Western democracies, and do this through the lens of its role in welfare state regress during recent decades. This area of research has also seen a waning of the

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Author names are in alphabetical order and they share equal responsibility for the manuscript. Early versions of this paper were presented at annual meetings of the Nordic Political Science Association in Aalborg, 2002, and the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, 2001, the International Sociological Association RC 28 meeting in Mannheim, 2001, the International Sociological Association RC 19 meeting in Tilburg 2000, and the American Sociological Association in Washington, DC, 2000, as well as at various seminars. For constructive comments on different versions of the manuscript we thank Rainer Lepsius, Anders Lindbom, Ingalill Montanari, John Myles, Michael Shalev, Sheila Shaver, and Robin Stryker, as well as other participants in these meetings. We want to thank Olof Bäckman, Stefan Englund, Ingrid Esser, Helena Höög, and Annita Näsström for very valuable help and Dennis Quinn for providing us his data on international financial deregulation. Our thanks are also due to three anonymous referees for careful reading. This research has been supported by grants from the Bank of Sweden Tercentennial Foundation and the Swedish Council for Social Research.

¹ For example, Bell 1957 and Kerr et al. 1960.

² For example, Alford 1963 and Goldthorpe et al. 1971.

³ The power resources approach originates in debates on the role of relative deprivation for manifest conflict (Korpi 1974), provides an alternative to the different faces of power discussed in the community power debates (Korpi 1985), and has been applied in the context of welfare state development (Korpi 1978, 1983, 1989, 2001). For partly parallel and complementary work see, e.g., Esping-Andersen 1985; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Kangas 1991, 1994; Myles 1984; Palme 1990; and Stephens 1979.

⁴ For analyses and debates see Clark and Lipset 2001 and Evans 1999a.

class-political perspective, which is often criticized with arguments similar to those discussed above, however, with globalization added as a new factor restricting the space for redistributive politics. The decreasing role of class has also been seen to reflect that welfare states themselves have changed the context for politics as well as the bases for interest group formation. Thus in a series of pioneering and challenging works, Pierson (1994, 1996, 2000, 2001) has argued that while the power resources approach was fruitful in analyses of welfare-state expansion, it cannot explain retrenchment after the mid-1970s. This is because retrenchment is assumed to be a distinctive process, reflecting the “new politics of the welfare state,” which is likely to follow new rules and to involve new types of interest groups different from those operating during the long phase of welfare-state expansion. In the new politics perspective the forces driving retrenchment are conceived as emanating largely from the advance of postindustrial society, which generates permanent austerity. While permanent austerity is a universal force pressing for retrenchment, politics is still held to matter, however, with the earlier class-based actors—primarily political parties and trade unions—now being largely replaced by new interest groups of welfare-state clients.

Proponents for the new politics of the welfare state have advanced three major lines of arguments questioning the role of socioeconomic class and the power resources approach in the context of welfare state retrenchment. First, this approach views relations between employers and employees as a zero-sum conflict and has neglected the positive role of employers for welfare state development (Pierson 2000; cf. also Pontusson and Swenson 1996). Second, it is maintained that in the retrenchment phase political contexts and goals of policymakers have changed markedly. While in the expansion period politicians could carry through generally popular reforms, retrenchment policies are unpopular, and politicians have to cope with the “negativity bias” among voters, who have come largely to support existing welfare-state programs. Politics then becomes the art of “blame avoidance,” in which political leaders attempt to escape voters’ wrath when unpopular measures have to be taken. Third, by their very existence, welfare states have generated new and strong interest groups among recipients of various benefits, such as pensioners, the disabled, and health care consumers but also among welfare-state employees. The emergence of these new groups is assumed to “make the welfare state less dependent on the political parties, social movements, and labor organizations that expanded social programs in the first place,” something explaining why “there appears to belittle correlation between declines of left power resources and the magnitude of retrenchment” (Pierson 1996, 147, 174). As a result of these factors, retrenchment is likely to be a relatively limited phenomenon. In a comparative study, Pierson (1996, 150) thus came to the conclusion that “what is striking is how hard it is to find radical changes in advanced welfare states.”

We argue that the power resources approach to welfare-state development, focusing on the role of

socioeconomic class in distributive conflict, remains relevant also in the context of retrenchment. Because of a nontheoretical conceptualization of the dependent variable—the welfare state—and the use of social expenditures as its main operationalization, earlier analyses of retrenchment have reached premature conclusions on the extent of welfare-state regress and on the role of class-related politics in this context.

Our theoretical discussion is centered on the conceptualization of welfare states, the basis for our hypothesis of the continued relevance of class in Western democracies, the role of employers, and differences in policy contexts during periods of expansion and retrenchment, and on the role of welfare-state institutions for policy feedbacks in the context of retrenchment. In the empirical analysis we also include contextual factors such as constitutional structures, economic pressures on governments, and indicators on globalization, while we only briefly discuss issues related to processes of the specific economic and political integration in Europe. Our empirical analysis of retrenchment brings in a new type of dependent variables, that is, indicators quantifying key aspects of social citizenship rights. This increases our possibilities to describe the extent and causes of retrenchment and to move from case studies to comparative analysis of a larger number of countries. The analysis covers 18 countries with uninterrupted political democracy after the Second World War—Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

THE WELFARE STATE AND CLASS

An analysis of the nature, causes, and extent of welfare-state retrenchment must begin with a discussion of the dependent variable, the welfare state. In Europe, since the late nineteenth century *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in Imperial Germany, and up to the present, scholarly texts on social policy have defined their subject matter in broad terms as including, in addition to social insurance and social services, also labor markets, employment policies, and parts of industrial relations.⁵ In marked contrast, comparative studies on welfare-state development came to use the size of social expenditures to the GDP, “the welfare state effort” indicator, as their central dependent variable.⁶ While this indicator is relevant, as is widely recognized, it is connected with serious problems and nobody appears to have argued that it provides a full or the best definition of the welfare state. Instead it is the easy availability of quantitative data for many countries published by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that here has generated a widely accepted

⁵ Examples include Elmer 1958, Kuusi 1964, and Flora 1986.

⁶ The use of the “welfare-state effort” indicator (social expenditures/GDP) dates back to the pioneering work of Wilensky 1975.

but unfortunately untheorized convention. Yet in analyses of welfare-state development and its causes, it is necessary to have a theoretically guided delineation of the dependent variable. The power resources approach provides a framework for a conceptualization of the welfare state and is also relevant for analyses of the role of class for its development.

In the power resources approach attention is focused on the assets, or power resources, which actors bring into distributive conflicts and, if necessary, can bring to bear in asserting their interests.⁷ Within the context of institutions, the distribution of power resources among actors sets frames for the opportunities that actors have and the constraints that they face. In Western countries, labor markets constitute the major arena structuring distributive conflict. The resources actors control in employment relations and labor markets are of key relevance for their involvement in and for the outcomes of such conflict. To describe and to summarize patterns of resource distributions on labor markets, we can use the class concept, a classical concept, in efforts to understand and to explain patterns of outcomes in distributive conflict. The class concept is, however, a controversial one and is used in several ways.⁸ It is thus often conceived of in terms of membership groups with which individuals identify and the specific subcultures and norms of such groups. Within European sociology, however, the dominant approach is to define class in nominal terms as categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions, or situations, on labor markets and in employment relations (Goldthorpe 2000). These socioeconomic positions define similarities in their opportunities and constraints, similarities generating what can be called "the logic of the situation" characterizing socioeconomically delineated classes.⁹ Assuming bounded rationality, such a logic of the situation is likely to affect individuals' courses of action.¹⁰ It is, however, an empirical question to what extent and in which forms such similarities in opportunities and constraints result in collective action, group identification, and inequalities in outcomes. The theoretical background to our hypothesis of the continued relevance of socioeconomic class in policymaking hinges on two considerations. One concerns differences in the nature of the assets or power resources that actors control in labor markets and employment relations, differences likely to structure actors' potential rewards from collective action. The other deals with the asymmetric effects of political democracy on the logic of the situation in markets and in politics of different socioeconomic classes.

On labor markets and in employment relations major differences in the logic of situations, constituting lines

of potential cleavages, are found between employers and employees but also among employees. Employment relations are typically characterized by positive-sum conflict and involve two major types of power resources—economic assets and labor power or human capital. While economic resources, such as shareholding, can be accumulated to individual actors or small groups of actors, labor power or human capital is much more difficult to concentrate on the individual level. In employment relationships, individual employees relying only on their human capital are therefore typically subordinated to employers deriving their power from ownership of various forms of capital. Assuming boundedly rational actors, although collective action can improve the efficacy of economic resources as well as of labor power, in employment relationships the potential benefits of collective action are greater for employees than for employers. But employees do not constitute a homogeneous category. Positions on the labor market and in production units differentiate employees in terms of the specificity of their human assets as well as with respect to possibilities for employer monitoring of the work process (Goldthorpe 2000).¹¹ These aspects are of relevance for their individual bargaining power in relation to employers as well as among employees.

While familiar, we must here recall the asymmetric effects of political democracy on the logic of the situation of different socioeconomic categories. Democracy annulled the traditional correlation between the right to vote and socioeconomic class, while on markets the distribution of economic resources remained not only markedly unequal but also clearly correlated with class. These asymmetric effects on the socioeconomic patterning of constraints and opportunities create important differences among classes in the logic of situation in markets and politics. Actors relying primarily on economic resources can be expected to favor market distribution, while especially categories of citizens relatively disadvantaged in terms of economic resources and relying primarily on their labor power are likely to attempt to combine in the sphere of politics to modify outcomes of, and conditions for, distributive processes on markets.¹² To a substantial degree welfare states in the twentieth century can be seen as outcomes of such efforts. In settlements affecting welfare-state development, to a larger or smaller extent all major interest groups have participated, and their strategies of conflict are likely to have changed with changes in power relations and welfare states. Because of their

⁷ Power resources refer to capabilities of actors to reward or to punish other actors.

⁸ For recent debates see Goldthorpe 2002 and Grusky and Weeden 2002.

⁹ We owe the "logic of the situation" term to Goldthorpe 2002, who points to its origin in the works of Karl Popper.

¹⁰ Bounded rationality assumes that actors are satisfying rather than maximizing, have limited information and information processing capability, and may consider also nonmaterial values.

¹¹ Goldthorpe's (2001, chap. 10) class schema is based on two dimensions: degree of asset specificity and degree of employer difficulty in monitoring employee performance. Apart from mixed categories, this scheme generates two opposite poles. Occupations combining high asset specificity with great difficulties for employer monitoring generate a "service relationship" characterizing high-grade professionals, administrators, and managers, while occupations with low asset specificity and easy employer monitoring generate a "labor contract" characterizing manual workers.

¹² Here of course obstacles to collective action pointed out by Mancur Olson (1965) must be kept in mind. The role of these obstacles is likely to increase with the number of actors involved.

greater dependence on numbers and collective action, parties and interest organizations with their primary base in sections of the labor force with a disadvantage in terms of economic resources and low or medium levels of human capital are likely to become relatively highly involved as protagonists in welfare-state policies.

The power resources approach thus leads to a *conceptualization of welfare states in terms of policies to affect outcomes of, and conditions for, distributive processes in the sphere of markets so as to decrease inequality and/or poverty*. In this context legislated social insurance programs and social services, which change outcomes of market distribution, are of course important and form major parts of what T. H. Marshall (1950) once called social citizenship rights. When it comes to modification of conditions for market distribution, of key relevance are policies that affect citizens' participation in distributive processes on labor markets. In this context the level of unemployment becomes important in a double way. It is thus central for outcomes of distributive conflicts, such as levels of wages and inequality. As studies on the "wage curve" have shown, there tends to be a negative relationship between unemployment levels and wage levels; in labor markets with low unemployment, wages tend to be higher than in labor markets with high unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994). Furthermore, the level of unemployment itself can be seen as partly an outcome of distributive conflict and as a "worker disciplinary device" (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and is, moreover, likely to be affected by political decision making. Full employment empowers wage and salary earners and where unemployment is low, their position is likely to be stronger than where unemployment is high (Korpi 2002). For postwar Europe, William Beveridge (1944) set the goal for "full employment in a free society" as a level of unemployment below 3%. While the right to employment nowhere was legislated as a claim right, in most rich countries outside North America in the decades after the Second World War full employment in this sense became what could be called a social protoright in the sense that governments keyed their policies towards maintaining a very low level of unemployment. Especially in Western Europe, what can be described as an implicit social contract came to include well-developed social insurance programs and social services in combination with full employment, a triad widely seen as a unity forming "the Keynesian welfare state."

The nontheoretical convention of viewing welfare states in terms of social expenditures has left major sectors of social and economic policies outside the scholarly view. In the analysis of retrenchment, the level of unemployment is of major relevance as an indicator of retrenchment in itself.¹³ Within the context of this

article, we can only briefly discuss unemployment as retrenchment but instead focus on the particular relevance that increases in unemployment are likely to have for government budget balances, forming major proximate causes of austerity and, thus, constituting endogenous risk factors for retrenchment in social citizenship rights.

EMPLOYERS, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND AUSTERITY

As noted above, critics have argued that the power resources approach views the employment relationship as a zero-sum conflict and has not analyzed the positive role of employers in welfare-state development. The first part of this criticism is plainly wrong.¹⁴ The second part brings up complex issues. Backed up by the arguably strongest power resources within the Western democracies, business interests can obviously be expected to have influenced welfare state developments. Yet since their power is based primarily on control over economic resources rather than on votes, employers are likely to tend to oppose the encroachment of democratic politics on markets. In discussing the role of business interests in welfare-state development, it is, however, important to distinguish between the origins of policies and the subsequent development of policies (Pierson 2000; Skocpol and Amenta 1986) and to consider the tactical and strategic choices of employers in situations of changing distributions of power. Furthermore, it is fruitful to distinguish between different aspects of welfare policies and different institutional forms of welfare states, some of which have been more easily acceptable to business interests than others. Employer attitudes to the maintenance of welfare state measures therefore tend to be complex (Mares 2000; Swank and Martin 2001; Thelen 1999).

Employer influence on welfare-state development is reflected, for example, in the time order in which the major social insurance programs were introduced in the Western countries (Väisänen 1992). Here work accident insurance, freeing employers from costly court procedures and abolishing one problematic area for interfirm competition, was typically the first type of program to be introduced. In contrast, unemployment insurance, with its implications for reservation wages and wage setting, met strong resistance and was typically the last form of social insurance legislated. In the continued development of welfare states, employers have tended to prefer institutional solutions that leave a large scope for markets. It would thus appear that the first-best choice of business interests is a quite

¹³ This is often overlooked in earlier studies. Castles (2001) and Huber and Stephens (2001) belong to those few who have discussed the role of unemployment for welfare-state retrenchment. As we have argued earlier, it is, however, necessary to view the return of mass unemployment in itself as an essential part of retrenchment (Korpi and Palme 2000).

¹⁴ Thus, for example, in an early exposition of the power resources approach, the "Historical Compromise" between capital and labor in Sweden in the late 1930s is described as partially "an economic growth strategy of class conflict, intended to increase the total national product so that a 'zero-sum' type of conflict between labor and capital could be turned into a 'positive-sum' type of conflict: both parties could thereby profit from the increase in the total product even if their relative shares were not substantially changed" (Korpi 1978, 83).

limited welfare state. Yet we find differences among employers, for example, between small and large firms (Martin 1998), and under changing constellations of societal power, business interests have learned to live with their second-best or even lower-order choices, something generating "varieties of capitalism" (Hall and Soskice 2001). Also, welfare-state programs can thus be seen as an aspect of positive-sum conflicts between employers and employees. Yet such programs represent an aspect that employers have found less enticing than have employees. We therefore second the warning by Pierson (2000, 795) for the "suggestion that welfare states were in fact built by employers, for employers."

While employers have generally attempted to influence ongoing social policy reforms, the specific role of employers in welfare-state development is reflected in the fact that it is difficult to find evidence for major social policy reforms where business interests have been the main originators and protagonists. Here the United States would appear to provide a relevant test case. In the absence of major left parties of the type found in Europe and without strong and centralized trade unions, the United States is a country where the first-best choice of business interests with respect to welfare-state development can be expected to have had the greatest chances of being realized. After the end of the First World War, the United States saw the development of employer initiatives in the area of employee insurance and services, generating what sometimes has been described as "welfare capitalism." Yet as is well known, in the comparative literature on welfare states the United States is often described as a "laggard." The basic parts of its social insurance programs—social security, unemployment insurance, and family assistance—were introduced in the mid-1930s against the backdrop of the Great Depression and in one of the rare periods when the majority in both chambers of Congress as well as the presidency was held by Northern Democrats (Amenta, Bonastia, and Caren 2001; Hacker and Pierson 2002; Hicks 1999; Quadagno 1994; Skocpol 1992). In this context Skocpol and Amenta (1985, 272–73) argue that "by 1934–35 virtually all politically active business leaders and organizations strongly opposed national and state-level pensions and social insurance" and that "had any sort of business influence really been decisive in Congress, there would have been no Social Security Act."

The power resources approach indicates that because of their interest in profitability and control over the labor force, employers are likely to be especially concerned about full employment with its implications for bargaining power, wage levels, and the position of labor in political processes. In Western countries, full employment has a short history, which shows interesting variations among countries. Abruptly breaking the long history of high unemployment before the Second World War, in almost all of our 16 countries outside North America, full employment became a centerpiece of the postwar social contract; in 1955–73 their average unemployment was 2.1%. In the United States, however, the social contract had different contours and unemployment levels remained more than twice

as high, 4.9%.¹⁵ These differences in existing realities came to shape understandings of welfare states. While in Europe, full employment in the Beveridgian sense was widely seen as an essential part of the welfare state, in the United States full employment came to play a more marginal role. In the postwar period the U.S. unemployment level has shown largely trendless fluctuations. In sharp contrast, during the two decades after 1973, in our countries outside North America the average level of unemployment saw a fivefold increase. In the United States the increase was modest, only 1.6 percentage points, and in the 1990s, U.S. unemployment rates declined considerably more than in Europe. When judged in relation to the benchmark set by the realities that existed outside North America, the return of unemployment on a mass scale since the 1970s must be described as a basic regress of welfare states, a crushing of one of their central parts. The causal processes underlying these patterns of changes are very complex but it can be argued that both the arrival and the demise of full employment reflect significant elements of class conflict and partisan politics (Korpi 2002).¹⁶

The crucial aspect of this development for the empirical purpose of this article is that the return of mass unemployment came to have major consequences for government fiscal balances. In most European countries, for political reasons governments attempted to care for the swelling armies of the unemployed by relaxing conditions for access to benefits in invalidity, accident, and unemployment insurance, as well as through pre-retirement pensions.¹⁷ Thus government expenditures increased while the tax base shrunk; between these two opposite trends, budgetary pressures increased. As noted above, in the new politics perspective permanent austerity defined in terms of government budgetary pressures is viewed as a largely exogenous factor driving welfare-state retrenchment. Pierson (2001,

¹⁵ American "exceptionalism" in this respect is discussed, for example, by Weir (1987). Up to the early 1980s, Canadian levels of unemployment largely followed the U.S. pattern.

¹⁶ Very briefly sketched, the coming of full employment after the Second World War is likely to reflect the sea change in relations of power, when in that period, for the first time in the history of Western capitalism, in most of our countries outside North America left parties emerged either in government positions or as main contenders for government power, and average levels of unionization doubled in comparison with levels between the wars. While conservative and centrist parties retained their traditional first preference for low inflation, they saw the top priority for full employment stressed by the left as having superior electoral appeal and therefore very difficult to oppose. Against the background of increasing inflation, decreasing profit ratios and increasing labor militancy, conservative, and centrist policymakers searched for ways to make low inflation and wage costs to replace full employment as a top priority, but they were held back by the widespread conviction that governments that allowed high unemployment would be unseated by voters. When unemployment rose in connection with the oil shocks in the 1970s, governments could more easily be exonerated for allowing unemployment to increase. These shocks thus served primarily as catalysts in a transition, where the conscious pursuit of full employment was reverted to a pursuit of low inflation and persistent high unemployment became a reality (Korpi 2002).

¹⁷ Thus, for example, in many European countries the labor force participation rates of men in the 55 to 65-year category have been halved after the 1970s.

chap. 3) argues against the interpretation by many that permanent austerity is caused by globalization. Instead he points at four profound postindustrial transitions, which have come to strain government budget in the advanced industrial economies: the slowdown of productivity and GDP growth associated with a massive shift from manufacturing to service employment, the gradual expansion and maturation of governmental social commitments, the increasing share of elderly in the population, and the increasing proportion of women in the public-service sector.

While we largely agree with Pierson on the long-term relevance of these factors for government financial balances, it is necessary to recognize that government budget imbalances during the 1975–95 period analyzed here were clearly associated with the return of high levels of unemployment. During the period of rising unemployment, in most countries we thus find sizable negative correlations between rates of unemployment and general government financial balances.¹⁸ On the average, during this period levels of unemployment within countries can account for 42% of variation in fiscal balances within countries (average $r = -.65$). While factors such as demographic shifts and labor force reallocations are likely to have gradual and long-term effects, in most of our countries immediate budgetary pressures during this quarter-century have thus been clearly associated with the return of very high rates of unemployment. To a significant extent austerity is endogenous to the retrenchment process rather than primarily an exogenous cause.

NEGATIVITY BIAS, WELFARE-STATE INSTITUTIONS, AND DRIVING FORCES

In the new politics perspective, the phase of welfare-state expansion during the three decades following the end of the Second World War often appears as a relatively uncomplicated competition among politicians to provide voters with widely popular reforms, while in the retrenchment phase politicians mobilize negativity bias when they attempt to deprive voters of entrenched social rights. While we agree that expansion and cutbacks represent different contexts for political dynamics, negativity bias and blame avoidance were of relevance also in the expansion phase. This reflects the fact that reforms had to be paid for by tax increases. Instead of a head-on confrontation for or against social policy reform, in most Western countries the partisan political debate came instead to focus on the “trade-off” between levels of taxation and social reform. Here the formulation that “reformers needed only to over-

come diffuse concern about tax rates” (Pierson 1996, 144) fails to capture the intensity in the debates on tax levels. In this debate, negativity bias was clearly activated when voters were asked to give up money from their own pocketbooks in return for future, often less concrete benefits. Furthermore, rising levels of taxation greatly increased the role of the state, and “big government” was widely portrayed as a threat to freedom and democracy, as “the road to serfdom.”¹⁹ In this period blame avoidance tactics included, for example, a shift from direct taxes to less visible indirect ones.

Increases in total taxation were of a magnitude that few, if any, would have dared to predict. In the OECD countries, from 1960 to 1980 the average increase in total government revenues as a percentage of the GDP was about 75%; in countries such as Sweden and Denmark, tax levels doubled.²⁰ These increases were the results of repeated and often heated election campaigns, where voters faced the choice between more welfare reforms and fewer tax increases. If the expansion of the welfare state had primarily been a competition in carrying through popular reforms, we could expect relatively small intercountry differences unaffected by partisan politics, something contradicted by findings in studies on welfare-state expansion.

As noted above, a central argument in the new politics perspective is that, as a result of policy feedbacks, welfare states have generated major new interest groups of clients, largely defined in terms of benefit reciprocity, such as retirees, the disabled, and health-care consumers. It is, however, necessary to specify the bases as well as the forms of policy feedback. While benefit reciprocity via some forms of “operant conditioning” is one relevant base for such feedback, we must remember that the clearly largest and most important potential base consists of risk-averse citizens, who benefit from social insurance even if the need to claim benefits has not materialized. The power resources approach has long underlined the role of policy feedbacks from welfare states, as well as the different ways in which welfare states tend to structure such feedbacks (Kangas and Palme 1996; Korpi 1980a, 1980b, 2001; Palme 1990). In this perspective policy feedbacks do not come primarily from undifferentiated categories of recipients; instead they emanate from the risk-averse citizenry, structured into different constituencies by welfare-state institutions.

In attempts to explain differences among welfare states in terms of policy feedbacks, a typology of welfare states can be fruitful. The great merit and appeal of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential typology of “the three worlds of welfare capitalism” is that it captures some significant characteristics of welfare states, and, moreover, by placing political labels on the models, it hints at the political origins of the different policy configurations. This typology is hence useful for global descriptive purposes. Yet for the purpose of examining

¹⁸ The following correlations refer to the period 1970–90, but to the period 1970–95 in the countries of the European Free Trade Area (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), where massive increases in unemployment were delayed to the 1990s. We find strong negative correlations (-80 or higher) in seven countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, and The Netherlands) and medium levels ($-.50$ to $-.79$) in five countries (Austria, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States) but lower negative levels in five countries (Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom) and zero correlation in one (New Zealand).

¹⁹ In these decades and in most Western countries, books such as Hayek’s (1944) *The Road to Serfdom* were often evoked as arguments against increased taxes and welfare-state expansion.

²⁰ OECD 1998, Table 6.6.

various consequences of welfare states, the great advantage of this typology becomes problematic insofar as it mixes causes, mediating variables, and outcomes. Korpi and Palme (1998) addressed these problems by using welfare-state institutional structures as mediating variables forming the basis for a typology, which has the considerable advantage that it can be related to the extensive theorizing on institutions and, furthermore, lends itself to analytical uses and hypothesis testing about causes and outcomes as well as for more precise descriptions of country differences and their changes over time.

One basic hypothesis behind this institutional typology is that in a society where potential cleavages such as socioeconomic stratification, status, ethnicity, religion, economy sector, and region form a mosaic of cross-cutting lines among citizens and provide competing bases for the formation of citizens' identities and interests, welfare-state institutions can be used to emphasize some of these potential lines and bases and to suppress others. Thereby institutions can come to delineate citizens into categories varying in the degree of homogeneity in terms of resources as well as risks. Socioeconomic stratification differentiates citizens in terms of economic resources and human capital. This stratification is also related to the distribution of some of the relevant risks, such as poverty and unemployment, both of which have traditionally been markedly higher among manual workers than among salaried employees. Some other risks are, however, less clearly related to socioeconomic structures. Thus aging is a human fate and the risk for illness has to be reckoned with in all socioeconomic categories. It can be hypothesized that the role of welfare-state institutions for the formation of identities and socioeconomically based interest groups will be greatest with respect to aging and sickness, where risks are universally shared. In contrast, risks for unemployment, work accidents, and poverty have traditionally been socially skewed to such an extent that institutions limited to these specific areas are likely to be of less relevance for wide-based interest-group formation.²¹ Welfare-state feedbacks are thus not likely to be unidimensional or based on the number of benefit recipients.²² Instead policy feedbacks will differ by institutional structures of welfare states, generating differences in the extent to which citizens are likely to support welfare states and thus in their degree of path dependency.

The typology by Korpi and Palme includes five ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions reflecting the structure of old age pensions and sickness insur-

ance. These models are defined in terms of three separate aspects of institutional differences: criteria for benefit eligibility, principles for benefit levels, and forms of program governance. The *targeted model* typically gives minimum benefits after a test of need. The *voluntary state-supported model* organizes a number of voluntary funds, where eligibility depends on membership contributions but benefits often tend to be relatively low. The *state corporatist model* was originally introduced in Germany by Bismarck and involves compulsory membership for the economically active population in occupationally segmented insurance organizations with benefits clearly related to previous earnings but conditions and financing differing between insurance organizations. Unlike the other models, the state corporatist one involves joint governance by representatives for employers and employees.²³ The *basic security model*, with William Beveridge as its best-known spokesman, is universalistic and includes all insured within the same programs giving flat-rate benefits, typically on relatively low levels. The *encompassing model* combines Bismarck and Beveridge, earnings-relatedness with universalism. Within the same institutional structures, this model can give basic security to all citizens as well as clearly earnings-related benefits to all economically active ones.

The emergence and change of these institutional models have often been associated with intensive conflicts among socioeconomic interest groups and different political tendencies (Korpi 2001). Social insurance institutions must thus be seen as embedded in larger social settings and structures of power. Once in existence, however, institutions can be assumed to mediate and to amplify effects of the contexts in which they are embedded. Our hypothesis is that in the long run, basic security institutions are likely to generate a split of interests and identities between the middle classes and the workers. This is because basic security programs tend to have relatively low replacement rates, insufficient to maintain accustomed standards of living of better-off categories of citizens, who therefore are likely to develop various types of private solutions. While workers remain primarily dependent on the public programs, middle classes will have more or less well-developed private solutions and are therefore less likely to give support to public programs, which for them are of more marginal importance. Targeted programs will, in

²¹ Trade union-associated state-supported unemployment insurance programs found in four of our countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) are widely seen as increasing union membership (Rothstein 1989). Yet the risk for unemployment has traditionally been socioeconomically skewed to the disadvantage of manual workers to an extent making it unlikely that unemployment insurance programs can mobilize more broad-based support against cutbacks.

²² Thus, for example, in recent decades the most rapidly growing category of benefit recipients have been the unemployed. Yet historically it has proved very difficult to mobilize the unemployed for political action.

²³ What we here term the state corporatist model was an application of "classical" corporatist ideology, which was very influential in Europe during the century before the end of the Second World War (Bowen 1947; Durkheim [1902] 1964; Elbow 1953). This theory was developed as an attempt to solve what in nineteenth-century Europe was referred to as "The Worker Question." The classical corporatist strategy was intended to counteract socialist attempts to mobilize the dependent labor force on the basis of class by instead implementing institutions segmenting employees on the bases of occupation and by engineering cooperation between employees and employers in the administration of institutions, a strategy coming into flower in fascist Italy between the two world wars. Classical corporatism thus has roots very different from what later has been termed liberal or neo corporatism emerging in countries where labor movements have been strong enough to be drawn into tripartite political bargaining with employers' confederations and governments.

addition, also tend to create splits within the working class, separating the poor from the better-off workers.

In contrast, with their clearly earnings-related benefits state corporatist and encompassing programs decrease the need for separate middle-class solutions and tend to “crowd out” private forms of insurance, leaving the middle classes as well as workers largely dependent on public programs and therefore as potential sources of support for these programs. However, these two models bring in the middle classes into very different contexts. In the state corporatist model, the insured are included as several separate occupational categories in programs with conditions and benefits differing from those of others, each program governed by representatives for employers and employees in a public–private legal context. Thereby this model of social insurance institutions generates separate organized interest groups capable and willing to act in their specific interests. In the encompassing model, middle classes find themselves in a much more heterogeneous setting within universal programs that also include all other citizens; in such a context interests have to be mobilized from the outside, primarily via political parties. These two types of institutions may therefore play different roles and have differing consequences during expansion and during retrenchment.

Since they cover risks that are relatively equally shared by all socioeconomic categories, the institutional structures of pension and sickness programs are likely to be the most important ones for policy feedbacks in welfare-state development. These two programs have the same institutional structures in all but four of our 18 countries. In these four countries (The Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States) we take the structure of pension programs to define dominant institutions.²⁴ Work accident insurance and unemployment insurance cover risks that traditionally have been concentrated to manual workers, but as discussed above the sociopolitical roles of these programs are quite different. Here it must also be noted that in recent decades in most of our countries, work accident programs have become more or less closely coordinated with sickness insurance. Because of its relevance for workers’ reservation wages and employment relations, unemployment insurance therefore stands out as the most likely target for cutbacks; because of the socioeconomically skewed risks for unemployment, it is also a program likely to have a relatively narrow constituency to its defense.

Among driving forces, a key hypothesis in the new politics strand of thought to be tested here is that traditional partisan politics is largely irrelevant for welfare-

state retrenchment.²⁵ In this analysis we have to consider also other factors of relevance for cutbacks (see Methodological Appendix). Potentially important in this context are economic factors. As indicators of internally induced economic pressures, we here include the level of unemployment and general government fiscal balances. Several authors have pointed to the relevance of the number of constitutional veto points at which government efforts to change social policy legislation can be resisted (Bonoli 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Immergut 1992) and such an indicator is included here.²⁶ In addition to these endogenous causes, other factors, linked to the external relations of nation states, may put pressure on governments to impose various restrictions on domestic policies. To capture different aspects of globalization we have here included indicators of capital account deregulation and of current account deregulation (Quinn 1997). Other relevant indicators for external economic relations are capital account balances, current account balances, and export–import dependence measured as the size of exports and imports to the GDP. Reminiscent of evolutionary thinking, it has been argued that modern welfare states have a “growth to limits” problem (Flora 1986), a point of view suggesting the hypothesis that the largest retrenchment is likely to appear in countries with the most generous entitlements. In the testing of the above hypotheses, we must, however, remember that in macro comparative analyses based on relatively few countries and markedly correlated independent variables, it is difficult to specify the independent effects of separate variables.

THE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR PROGRAM

As noted above, while useful, the expenditure-based welfare-state effort indicator used in most studies of retrenchment is associated with serious problems, which are aggravated in the context of retrenchment. Thus, for example, rising unemployment levels have tended to raise social expenditures, thereby increasing the nominator, while lower GDP growth rates negatively affect the denominator in this indicator. The consequences of an economic crises may therefore appear as increases in welfare-state efforts.

We here introduce a new basis for the study of retrenchment by considering cuts in social citizenship rights in major social insurance programs, using preliminary data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), the archive of which now is under construction and has required a massive and prolonged work involvement (see Methodological Appendix).²⁷

²⁴ These four countries have basic security pension programs but sickness insurance is targeted in New Zealand, voluntary state supported in Switzerland, absent in the United States, and state corporatist in The Netherlands. In contrast to the state corporatist countries, during the postwar period The Netherlands did not introduce new programs with this model. The voluntary state-subsidized type of program no longer dominates in any of the pension systems in our countries. This means that we are left with four institutional categories among our countries.

²⁵ For a questioning of this hypothesis, see Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002 and Levy 2001.

²⁶ This indicator is from the Comparative Welfare States Data Set (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1998).

²⁷ The concept of social citizenship goes back to T. H. Marshall (1950). The data archive within *The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP)* is under construction at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University.

These indicators reflect the nature of the social citizenship rights that have been legislated via major social insurance programs in our 18 countries, entitlements that here have been quantified in terms of net replacement rates for model households. The following analyses are based on three social insurance programs giving benefits during short-term absences from work, that is, sickness cash insurance, work accident insurance, and unemployment insurance. In the study of retrenchment these three programs have the great advantage that they react fairly quickly to changes in rules, making it easier to register the extent of changes and to relate cutbacks to political decisions.²⁸ Furthermore, these three programs are of key interest for short-term government financial balances and are likely to come under scrutiny in times of budget deficits. In these programs we focus on cutbacks in net replacement rates. In comparison with earlier studies on retrenchment, we here have a much better empirical base, that is, one-dimensional dependent variables facilitating quantitative comparisons between countries and having a high degree of validity and reliability.

Needless to say, however, although the variables used here are central, they do not exhaust possible areas where retrenchment may appear. Thus, for example, in the above three programs we do not include changes in rules referring to waiting days, duration, conditions for benefits, and the like. Even more importantly, we cannot consider here areas such as social services, health-care services, family policy, and social assistance programs. While several program changes can be seen as a restructuring or recasting of welfare states, we argue that those observed here can be described as retrenchment.²⁹

CONTOURS OF RETRENCHMENT IN SOCIAL RIGHTS

To what extent has there been retrenchment in social citizenship rights in our countries in terms of replacement rates in sickness, work accident, and unemployment insurance? We have calculated net replacement rates (that is, after taxes and social security contributions) for earnings at the average wage level of production workers. Net levels have been assessed for two types of households—a single-person and a four-person family (including one earner, a dependent spouse, and two minor children)—and for two durations—a short period (the first week after waiting days) and a longer period (a year consisting of 26 weeks of benefits and 26 weeks of normal earnings). For each insurance program, we use the annual average of these four indicators (see Methodological Appendix for details). Decreases

in net replacement rates reflect at least three types of factors: (1) politically made decisions to cut benefit levels, (2) political “nondecisions,” that is, the failure to raise benefit levels and ceilings in the face of increasing wages, and (3) taxation of benefits that is “claw-back” via taxation. In this context it must, however, be remembered that net replacement levels are also affected by changes in the denominator, i.e., in earnings and the taxation of earnings.

To give a long-term perspective on recent changes in social citizenship rights, we begin by looking at the development of average net replacement rates in sickness, work accident, and unemployment insurance during the period 1930–95. Taken as an average of existing programs in our 18 countries, we find roughly similar patterns of change in the three programs, but at different levels. Partially as a reflection of their specific roles in the socioeconomic class structure, the lowest replacement rates are found in unemployment insurance, while work accident insurance clearly has the highest rates, with sickness cash benefits as the intermediate category (Figure 1, left). From starting levels in 1930 of about 35% for unemployment, 40% for sickness, and close to 60% for accident insurance, the long-term increase in benefit levels peaked in the 1975–85 period, at about 65% for unemployment, 70% for sickness, and 85% for accident insurance. Thereafter the increase turned into a decrease, and up to 1995, replacement levels fell by close to 10 percentage points for unemployment and about 5 percentage points for sickness and accident insurance.


The above averages do, however, hide large variations in developments of individual countries. This is illustrated by developments in the United Kingdom, which has had a long period of Conservative government wedded to market-liberal policies. In the 1930s, in Britain the average net replacement rate in sickness insurance was somewhat above 20%, while unemployment insurance replaced about 35% and work accident insurance about 45% (Figure, right). The postwar introduction of the Beveridgian welfare state with flat-rate benefits increased replacement levels in sickness and work accident insurance by about 10 percentage points.³⁰ As a result of the introduction of earnings-related supplements and increased supplements for dependents, in 1975 replacement levels had increased to somewhat above 60% in sickness and unemployment insurance and above 70% in work accident insurance. After the coming of the Thatcher government in 1979, benefit levels fell drastically up to 1985, then gradually to 1995. In 1995, work accident insurance, with a 20% replacement level, was down to less than half of its level in 1930; unemployment insurance, with 24%, to about two-thirds of the 1930 level; and sickness insurance, with 20%, was at about the same level as in 1930.

These figures thus show that in terms of indicators studied here, the British welfare state has been rolled back to a pre-Beveridge level, at or below that of the

²⁸ In the context of an analysis of retrenchment, these three programs thus differ favorably from old-age pensions systems, where changes in rules are often intended to affect benefits in a more or less distant future, and current benefit changes may reflect political decisions made decades ago. Retrenchment in pension programs will be analyzed in a different context.

²⁹ For discussions of terminology in the analysis of welfare-state change, see Ferrera and Rhodes (2000) and Pierson (2001).

³⁰ This increase primarily reflected the introduction of supplements for dependents, features already earlier found in unemployment insurance, which therefore remained relatively stable.

FIGURE 1. Net Replacement Rates in Sickness, Work Accident, and Unemployment Insurance 1930–95 as an Average for 18 Countries (Left) and in the United Kingdom (Right)

1930s. They indicate a radical change in an advanced welfare state, a change carried through by a Conservative party within a constitutional structure with few veto points and in the context of a markedly weakened Labour Party and a largely defeated trade union movement. The cuts in social insurance programs in combination with the return of mass unemployment during the Thatcher period indicate that while the conclusion of Pierson (1994, 161), "The British welfare state, if battered, remains intact," could be seen as correct with respect to the National Health Service, it was clearly premature when it comes to social insurance and unemployment. This conclusion reflected a pioneer stage in retrenchment analysis with problematic empirical data³¹ and a narrow conceptualization of welfare states.

As indicated above, the basic data used here concern net replacement rates for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 in each of the three short-term social insurance programs. For causal analyses, we summarize changes in benefit rates in our programs in each of our countries by three separate indicators reflecting different aspects of retrenchment: (1) cuts in each of the three programs in a country as the decline up to 1995 from the peak observation year during the 1975–90 period, (2) cuts as events in *each* of the three separate programs defined in terms of the decrease between two consecutive years of observation, and (3) cuts in *at least one* of the three programs during a five-year period. This third indicator is used in event history analysis. In Australia, Canada, and the United States, benefits in work accident programs are largely determined by states and provinces rather than at the national level. Such benefit

changes can therefore not be easily interpreted in terms of national-level political decision making, and in these three countries, work accident programs are therefore excluded from causal analyses. In the United States also benefit levels in unemployment insurance are set at the state level but decisions on the introduction of taxation have been taken at the federal level. Furthermore, the United States lacks a national sickness cash benefit program. In the United States we can thus include only changes in unemployment insurance benefits.

As a preliminary overview of retrenchment in net replacement rates from 1975 to 1995, Table 1 shows our first indicator, that is, declines from an initial peak year up to 1995 in each of the three programs by type of social insurance institutions.³² On average the largest cuts appear in countries dominated by basic security institutions. Here the United Kingdom is in the lead, followed by a second group consisting of Ireland, New Zealand, and Denmark.³³ Also, The Netherlands has sizable cuts in all three programs, while Canada has cuts of similar size in sickness and unemployment insurance. In the United States, Unemployment insurance saw a major cut as the result of a federal decision

³¹ In a parallel way, Alber (1996) criticized Pierson's failure to identify declining replacement levels in mean-tested programs in the United States.

³² Discarding increases in benefits, we thus look here at absolute rather than at relative decreases, and large cuts can therefore be more likely to appear in countries with initially higher replacement levels. The decline from peak year up to 1995 is of course a crude index, which does not reflect all changes since 1975. Yet it is helpful in giving a first overview, and the two other indicators reflect all changes during the period.

³³ Note that while in a global characterization in terms of the three worlds of welfare capitalism, Denmark is classified as belonging to the social democratic one, in our typology based on the institutional characteristics of the two main social insurance programs—in contrast to Finland, Norway, and Sweden—it clearly falls into the basic security one. In the context of retrenchment in social insurance, this appears to be a fruitful choice.

TABLE 1. Initial Net Replacement Rates in 1975 and Largest Percentage Declines in Rates Up to 1995 from Preceding Peaks in Sickness, Work Accident, and Unemployment Insurance in 18 Countries, by Type of Dominant Social Insurance Institutions

Type of Dominant Social Insurance Institution	Country	Social Insurance Program					
		Sickness		Work Accident		Unemployment	
		Level	Decline	Level	Decline	Level	Decline
Targeted	Australia	48.4	-10.1 ^a	—	—	48.4	-10.1 ^a
Basic security	Canada	62.9	-15.4 ^a	—	—	72.7	-13.1 ^a
	Denmark	74.7	-21.4 ^b	74.7	-21.4 ^b	81.9	-24.5 ^a
	Ireland	56.3	-33.5 ^c	64.0	-31.5 ^c	56.3	-34.9 ^c
	Netherlands	84.7	-14.7 ^b	84.7	-14.7 ^b	81.6	-13.2 ^b
	New Zealand	57.5	-34.7 ^c	94.3	-16.0 ^a	57.5	-25.0 ^a
	Switzerland	77.4	0.0	80.3	0.0	55.7	0.0
	United Kingdom	63.4	-43.1 ^a	71.6	-51.3 ^a	63.4	-39.9 ^a
	United States	—	—	—	—	59.8	-12.8 ^a
State corporatist	Austria	99.2	-4.6 ^c	100.0	-3.4 ^c	47.4	-10.1 ^c
	Belgium	91.9	-9.3 ^a	100.0	-3.7 ^a	76.0	-28.1 ^b
	France	55.7	-6.8 ^a	66.8	0.0	41.1	-7.2 ^c
	Germany	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	74.3	-6.4 ^a
	Italy	68.1	0.0	74.1	0.0	66.8	-23.8 ^b
	Japan	68.9	0.0	68.9	0.0	67.1	-1.0 ^c
Encompassing	Finland	86.1	-10.3 ^d	100.0	0.0	59.1	-5.0 ^d
	Norway	55.0	0.0	55.0	0.0	73.5	-10.0 ^a
	Sweden	90.3	-13.8 ^c	92.6	-21.8 ^c	77.1	-7.3 ^d

Note: Peak years: superscript a, 1975; b, 1980; c, 1985; d, 1990.

to make benefits taxable. Switzerland shows no cuts, partly because cuts introduced in unemployment insurance were made for by increases up to 1995. In targeted Australia replacement rates have substantially declined in the two programs included here, that is, sickness and unemployment insurance.

The state corporatist countries have a quite distinct pattern. Here Austria, France, Germany, and Italy show no or only a moderate decline in sickness and work accident insurance, while unemployment benefits have been cut. Belgium experienced a major decline in unemployment insurance but saw a sizable decline also in sickness insurance. Drops in replacement levels in unemployment insurance were large also in Italy but smaller in Austria, France, and Germany. In Japan all three programs have remained practically unchanged. Among countries with encompassing institutions, relatively large reductions have been made in Sweden and Finland, while Norway has lowered only unemployment benefits. Declines in Sweden are of about the same order as those in The Netherlands.

For an analysis of the effects of potential causal factors, we begin by using our second indicator specifying cuts as events within each of the three insurance programs. On the basis of information on average net benefit levels in each country and each program for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, we have delineated *events as cuts* between two adjacent observation years. Using available information each of these events has been assigned to a specific year and government. We are concerned here with cuts in benefit levels that can be seen as results of political decision making in the social policy area, but as noted above, our net benefit replacement rates also reflect changes in

wages, the taxation of wages, and measurement errors. Furthermore, small changes are difficult to relate to political decision making. We therefore focus on events defined as major cuts involving decreases in net benefit rates of at least 10 percentage points in a program, events that can be described as clear cases of retrenchment. When summed over all three programs for all 18 countries in this way, we define 37 major cuts (for a specification of cases see Methodological Appendix). These cuts have been distributed into categories defined in terms of independent variables referring to economic contexts, welfare-state institutions, constitutional veto points, globalization, initial benefit levels, and partisan cabinet composition, and the number of country-years under risk in each of these categories has been determined. Since observations here characterize countries, they are unlikely to be independent and potential causal factors can be expected to be relatively strongly intercorrelated. We have therefore chosen a simple analysis of data in terms of the number of cuts per 100 country-years under risk in each of these categories in all 18 countries. To specify the role of confessional parties as well as of the state corporatist and the encompassing models, all of which are concentrated to Europe, we also show results for a more homogeneous set of the 13 European countries.

In the characterization of economic contexts for government policymaking, we have used variables that, directly or indirectly, capture internal and external economic pressures on governments (see above). Since the risk for cuts can be assumed to reflect not only the economic situation during the year in which cuts are made but also the situation in the immediately preceding years, we look here at three-year weighted

lags³⁴ (Table 2, A). In the 18 countries as well as in Europe, with increasing levels of unemployment, we find a clear and monotonic increase in the risk for cuts.³⁵ General government fiscal balances have been negative during four-fifths of all country-years, although less so during periods of left government, something probably reflecting differences in levels of unemployment. While country-years with the relatively best financial position clearly show the lowest risks for cuts, these risks are highest at medium levels of imbalances.

Again we find indications that the dominant types of social insurance models differ with respect to the risk for cuts. Looking at the three most common types of institutions, the highest risk for cuts are associated with basic security institutions, followed by encompassing institutions, with state corporatist institutions having the lowest risks for cuts. As noted above, since 1975 benefit levels in Australia with the targeted model have decreased in sickness and unemployment insurance, but not in ways that these decreases are here defined as major events. The potential relevance of constitutional veto points is indicated by the fact that we find the clearly highest risks for cuts in countries with no veto points, however, those with the highest number of veto points have only somewhat lower risks than the medium-level countries.

With regard to globalization and external economic pressures, we find lower risks for cuts at low levels of capital account deregulation and current account deregulation but smaller differences between medium and high levels. The states of current account and capital account balances show no discernible trends and are therefore not included in the tables presented here. Where export–import dependency is low, risks for cuts are lowest, but there is no difference between medium and high levels of dependency.

To test a key hypothesis in the new politics strand of thought that retrenchment is largely unrelated to traditional political parties, we examine relationships between cabinet party composition and the risk for cuts, distinguishing three traditional political categories: left, confessional, and secular conservative–centrist parties (see Methodological Appendix). Since several countries have frequently had coalition governments, we have also examined the relevance of the party of the prime minister in governments participating in cuts. These results are similar to those for cabinet composition and are therefore not shown in the tables. The data indicate that the risk for major cuts has clearly been lowest with left cabinet representation and highest when secular center–right parties have been in government, with confessional parties somewhere in the middle.

Since we here define cuts in absolute terms, large cuts are statistically more likely to appear at high rather

than at low initial benefit levels. This circumstance introduces a potential complication in the testing of some of our hypotheses. As noted above, according to the “growth to limits” hypothesis we can expect the highest risks for cuts at high rather than at low initial levels. Furthermore, by definition state corporatist and encompassing institutions are likely to have higher initial levels than targeted and basic security institutions, and confessional and left governments may have higher initial levels than secular conservative–centrist ones.³⁶ To check for the potential influence of the absolute definition, initial benefit levels for 1975–90 have been trichotomized into low, medium, and high levels. Contrary to expectations, among all 18 countries the highest risk for cuts appears at low initial levels, while in Europe the high category has a slightly lower risk than the low and medium ones. The “growth to limits” hypothesis is thus not supported and this result indicates that, if anything, this test and those concerning the role of social insurance institutions and political parties are likely to be conservative ones.

Looking at the interplay between dominant institutions and cabinet composition, we find that in the 18 countries as well as in Europe, irrespective of institutional model, the lowest risks are found for left parties (Table 2, B). For all three party categories, state corporatist institutions tend to have the lowest risks. In all institutional contexts, left parties tend to have the lowest risks. Especially in Europe, secular center–right parties are associated with higher risks for cuts in the context of basic security institutions than with encompassing ones. In both Finland and Sweden, following the massive increase in unemployment and the resulting crises of public finances in the 1990s, cuts were made by cabinets of different colors, yet cuts exceeding the 10% limit applied here were made only by center–conservative coalition governments (Kautto 2000; Palme and Wennemo 1998). In Europe confessional parties show higher risks for cuts in the context of basic security institutions than within the state corporatist ones, but very high risks within encompassing institutions. The latter observation appears to reflect the fact that in the three Nordic countries with encompassing institutions, the small confessional parties have only been in government position as coalition partners to secular center–right parties.

In the interplay between government fiscal balances and cabinet composition, among all parties risks are low with good balances. For left parties in all 18 countries the risk for major cuts are somewhat higher where balances have been worst, whereas in Europe, no trend appears. Secular center–right parties have higher risks with the worst balances but the highest risks at the

³⁴ The weights are 1 for year t , 0.5 for year $t - 1$, and 0.25 for year $t - 2$ for unemployment, government financial balances, capital account deregulation, current account deregulation, capital account balance, current account balance, and export–import dependence. We also tested unweighted lags ($t - 1$) but found roughly similar results.

³⁵ We also examined changes in unemployment levels but they do not yield easily interpretable results.

³⁶ The average net replacement rates of the three programs for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 are 84.2% for encompassing, 78.1% for state corporatist, 57.3% for basic security, and 28.7% for the targeted model. In this period differences in average net benefit rates by cabinet composition are relatively small (left, 74.1%; confessional, 77.8%; and secular centrist–conservative, 65.8%), reflecting that government changes are more frequent than major shifts in benefit levels and the frequent presence of coalition governments in Europe.

TABLE 2. Number of Major Benefit Cuts per 100 Country-Years Under Risk in Three Social Insurance Programs 1975–95 in 18 Countries and in Europe by Financial Balances, Unemployment, Institutions, and Partisan Government Composition

A			
Independent Variable and Category		18 Countries	Europe
Level of unemployment ^a			
Low		0.3	0.4
Medium		4.1	3.7
High		6.9	7.8
Government financial balances ^a			
Best		1.0	0.9
Medium		6.8	7.1
Worst		4.7	5.6
Social insurance institution			
Targeted		0.0	—
Basic security		6.2	6.7
State corporatist		1.4	1.7
Encompassing		3.3	3.3
Constitutional veto points			
None		6.9	7.0
Medium		2.1	2.5
High		1.4	0.8
Capital account deregulation ^a			
Low		0.8	1.4
Medium		4.3	3.8
High		5.2	5.5
Current account deregulation ^a			
Low		2.7	3.2
Medium		4.1	4.7
High		4.4	4.1
Export/import as % of GDP ^a			
Low		1.4	1.8
Medium		4.6	4.7
High		4.7	4.4
Cabinet composition			
Left		1.6	1.2
Confessional		4.0	4.0
Secular center-right		5.2	7.0
Initial benefit levels			
Low		5.6	4.6
Medium		2.7	4.6
High		2.8	3.0
B			
Independent Variable and Category		Cabinet Composition	18 Countries Europe
Institution			
Targeted and basic security	Left	3.0	2.0
	Confessional	5.9	5.9
	Secular center-right	6.9	9.9
State corporatist	Left	0.7	0.7
	Confessional	1.9	1.9
	Secular center-right	1.7	3.0
Encompassing	Left	1.1	1.1
	Confessional	12.3	12.3
	Secular center-right	5.8	5.8
Government financial balances ^a			
Best	Left	0.9	0.9
	Confessional	0.6	0.6
	Secular center-right	1.2	1.0
Medium	Left	1.3	1.4
	Confessional	4.4	4.4
	Secular center-right	13.0	17.7
Worst	Left	3.0	1.3
	Confessional	5.1	5.1
	Secular center-right	5.5	9.7

TABLE 2—Continued

B			
Independent Variable and Category	Cabinet Composition	18 Countries	Europe
Unemployment level ^a			
Low	Left	0.2	0.2
	Confessional	0.8	0.8
	Secular center-right	0.3	0.6
Medium	Left	3.2	1.7
	Confessional	1.8	1.8
	Secular center-right	6.2	7.5
High	Left	1.9	2.6
	Confessional	7.4	7.4
	Secular center-right	9.3	10.9
Constitutional veto points			
None	Left	2.3	1.0
	Confessional	9.7	9.7
	Secular center-right	9.8	11.4
Medium	Left	1.4	1.4
	Confessional	2.4	2.4
	Secular center-right	2.7	4.0
High	Left	0.5	0.9
	Confessional	0.6	0.6
	Secular center-right	2.1	1.1
Initial benefit level			
Low	Left	2.5	1.1
	Confessional	6.5	6.5
	Secular center-right	7.2	10.2
Medium	Left	1.6	1.7
	Confessional	3.6	3.6
	Secular center-right	2.8	3.9
High	Left	0.9	0.9
	Confessional	2.6	2.6
	Secular center-right	5.3	6.4
C			
Capital account deregulation ^a			
Low	Left	1.2	1.3
	Confessional	0.0	0.0
	Secular center-right	0.6	1.8
Medium	Left	1.5	0.4
	Confessional	4.7	4.7
	Secular center-right	7.3	7.5
High	Left	2.3	2.3
	Confessional	3.6	3.6
	Secular center-right	7.4	8.8
Current account deregulation ^a			
Low	Left	0.5	0.5
	Confessional	5.0	5.0
	Secular center-right	2.8	4.7
Medium	Left	3.0	2.3
	Confessional	7.9	7.9
	Secular center-right	4.4	7.2
High	Left	0.0	0.0
	Confessional	1.2	1.2
	Secular center-right	7.4	8.7
Export/import as % of GDP ^a			
Low	Left	0.4	0.6
	Confessional	1.3	1.3
	Secular center-right	1.9	3.3
Medium	Left	1.1	1.1
	Confessional	1.8	1.8
	Secular center-right	7.9	8.7
High	Left	3.0	1.6
	Confessional	5.5	5.5
	Secular center-right	5.9	6.6

^a Weighted lag ($t = 1$; $t - 1 = 0.5$; $t - 2 = 0.25$).

medium level of imbalances.³⁷ Also, confessional parties have higher risks at medium and high levels of imbalances, and the differences between medium and high imbalances are small. When unemployment levels are low, no major differences appear with respect to government composition. Under high unemployment secular center-right parties are associated with the largest risks for cuts and left parties with the smallest risks, while confessional parties are in the middle. With medium levels of unemployment, differences between confessional and left parties are small, while secular center-right parties again have the highest risks. Looking at the interplay between constitutional veto points and cabinet composition, for confessional as well as secular-center right governments the clearly highest risks for cuts are found in the context of no constitutional veto points, while for left parties differences in risks for cuts have little relationship to the number of veto points. With respect to initial benefit levels we find that at all levels, left cabinet participation is associated with clearly lower risks for cuts than are confessional and, especially, secular center-right parties. At medium initial levels differences between confessional and secular center-right parties are small.

Turning to the interplay between cabinet composition and capital account deregulation, at low levels of deregulation we find low risks for all parties (Table 2, C). For left parties the risk remains low also with increasing deregulation. At medium and high levels of capital account deregulation risks are higher for confessional parties and, especially, for secular center-right parties. Increasing current account deregulation has small effects for left parties but increases risks for cuts for secular center-right parties, while confessional parties show the highest risks at medium levels of deregulation. With respect to export-import dependency, little association is found for left parties, while secular center-right parties have their highest risks at medium levels and confessional parties at high levels of dependency.

Event history analysis can be used for further explorations of relationships between the above independent variables and the risk for cuts. Again, we will limit the number of independent variables and use regression estimates primarily as indications of the direction of effects and the probability that they differ from zero. Quite frequently decisions on cuts have affected more than one of our three branches of insurance. As the dependent variable we therefore now use our third indicator of cuts, defining an event as cuts in at least one of the three programs in a country during a year. The number of major cuts so defined is 19 for all our countries and 15 for the European ones. We estimate intensity regressions for repeated events based on an exponential model with a constant hazard rate.³⁸

³⁷ This reflects the relatively large number of cuts carried out by the Conservative government in Britain but also the National government in New Zealand, cuts that thus may reflect a relatively strong ideological component.

³⁸ See Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995. Estimates for period-varying hazard rates show similar results.

For the 18 countries, unemployment shows positive effects well significant at conventional levels (Table 3, A). The state of government financial balances has the expected negative sign and is significant. The effects of dominant social insurance institutions (following the results in Table 2, trichotomized as state corporatist, encompassing, and other models) shows the expected negative signs, indicating that risks are lowest for the state corporatist model and second lowest for the encompassing one but reach significance only in Europe. Veto points have the expected negative sign but effects are not significant. Effects of globalization in terms of deregulation of capital accounts and current accounts are weak and go in different directions. Among all 18 countries export-import dependency has a significant positive effect, which, however, does not reach significance in Europe. Initial benefit level has an insignificant effect with an unexpected negative sign. Left cabinet representation has the expected negative sign and is significant among all countries as well as in Europe, while secular center-right cabinets have the expected positive signs, which also are significant in both categories of countries. Coefficients for confessional cabinet participation are close to zero, indicating that effects are somewhere between those of left and those of secular center-right cabinets.

Combining left party government and unemployment, coefficients for left cabinets remain negative and significant in both categories of countries and unemployment retains the expected positive sign but is not significant in Europe (Table 3, B). With both left cabinets and financial balances in the equations, they both retain the expected sign but only the left cabinet coefficient is significant. This also holds with left cabinet together with institutions. When left cabinet is combined with veto points, it again remains significant in both country categories, while veto points are significant only among all 18 countries. Combining left cabinet with the two indicators of globalization, left cabinet remains significant while effects of deregulation appear weak and have mixed signs. With export-import dependency left cabinet remains significant and negative, while the positive effect of dependency is significant only among all 18 countries. When combined with initial benefit levels, left cabinet retains significant negative effects while initial levels are of little relevance.

DISCUSSION

Through the lens of its role in welfare-state regress, the overarching issue addressed in this paper concerns the role of socioeconomic class and of class-related politics for "who gets what, when, and how" in Western democracies. Debates on the relevance of class are often muddled by differences in views on the class concept. Among many social scientists, class brings to mind manifest conflict between selfconscious collective actors, typically blue-collar workers, internally united by norms and values. In the absence of these manifestations, from such a perspective the death of class is a diagnosis close at hand. Instead we use the class concept

TABLE 3. Estimates from Intensity Regression of Effects on Introduction of Major Cuts in Net Replacement 1976–95 in 18 Countries and in 13 European Countries

Model	18 Countries			Europe		
	Relative Risk	<i>t</i>	log Likelihood	Relative Risk	<i>t</i>	log Likelihood
A						
Unemployment ^a	1.108	2.99**	–109.3	1.149	2.67**	–84.4
Constant	0.002	–11.0		0.000	–7.69	
Gov. fin. balance ^a	0.693	–1.93*	–111.6	0.623	2.31**	–84.8
Constant	0.020	–7.4		0.029	–6.5	
Institutional model	0.444	–1.71	–111.9	0.365	–1.95*	–85.8
Constant	0.010	–15.9		0.014	–12.0	
Veto points	0.581	–1.74	–111.8	0.642	–1.14	–86.1
Constant	0.011	–14.41		0.011	–13.0	
Cap. acc. dereg. ^a	0.959	–1.11	–112.8	0.970	–0.73	–87.4
Constant	0.007	–21.5		0.008	–18.5	
Curr. acc. dereg. ^a	1.060	0.44	–113.3	0.958	–0.31	–87.6
Constant	0.003	–3.42		0.013	–2.59	
Export/import share ^a	1.019	2.25*	–111.1	1.016	1.54	–86.6
Constant	0.002	–10.5		0.003	–7.98	
Initial benefit level	0.814	–0.74	–113.1	0.638	–1.47	–86.6
Constant	0.010	–7.96		0.021	–5.85	
Left cabinet	0.136	–2.33*	–109.6	0.045	–2.59**	–82.3
Constant	0.011	–16.9		0.017	–13.87	
Confessional cabinet	1.342	0.38	–113.3	0.988	–0.01	–87.6
Constant	0.007	–17.7		0.008	–13.9	
Sec. C-R cabinet	3.229	2.09*	–111.1	7.141	2.91**	–83.4
Constant	0.004	–13.2		0.003	–12.3	
B						
Left cabinet	0.172	–2.04*	–107.3	0.069	–2.18*	–80.7
Unemployment ^a	1.092	2.56**		1.074	1.82	
Constant	0.003	–9.55		0.006	–7.51	
Left cabinet	0.144	–2.19*	–108.2	0.046	–2.39*	–80.6
Gov. fin. balance ^a	0.732	–1.65		0.690	–1.78	
Constant	0.027	–6.7		0.044	–5.5	
Left cabinet	0.156	–2.17*	–108.6	0.052	–2.39*	–81.6
Institutional model	0.521	–1.42		0.534	–1.21	
Constant	0.015	–13.6		0.023	–10.1	
Left cabinet	0.114	–2.59*	–107.0	0.049	–2.64**	–81.2
Veto points	0.510	–2.19*		0.605	–1.40	
Constant	0.021	–11.33		0.023	–10.29	
Left cabinet	0.134	–2.28*	–109.3	0.043	–2.58**	–82.1
Cap. acc. dereg. ^a	0.966	–0.87		0.974	–0.61	
Constant	0.011	–16.9		0.016	–13.7	
Left cabinet	0.136	–2.32*	–109.6	0.042	–2.63*	–82.1
Curr. acc. dereg. ^a	1.005	0.04		0.915	–0.68	
Constant	0.011	–2.91		0.050	–1.89	
Left cabinet	0.112	–2.43*	–107.0	0.044	–2.58**	–81.4
Export/import share ^a	1.019	2.40*		1.014	1.38	
Constant	0.004	–9.93		0.007	–6.91	
Left cabinet	0.141	–2.26*	–109.6	0.051	–2.46*	–81.9
Initial benefit level	0.930	–0.25		0.758	–0.90	
Constant	0.013	–7.43		0.029	–5.31	

Note: For 18 countries, 360 country-years; number of cuts, 19. For Europe 260 country-years; number of cuts = 15. Significance levels:

p* < .05, *p* < .01 (all constants significant).

^a Weighted lag (*t* = 1; *t* – 1 = 0.5; *t* – 2 = 0.25).

here to designate individuals' positions in employment relations and labor markets and to differentiate categories of positions that are relatively similar in terms of resources and opportunities that they provide and the constraints they set for actors in conflicts of interest. In this perspective, it is an empirical question to what extent differences in "the logic of situation" of these multiple categories generate manifest conflict, specific

norms and values, and differences in life chances. Just as the absence of strong and vocal feminist movements in countries such as Saudi Arabia need not imply that in this country gender is irrelevant for structuring life chances of men and women, the relative peacefulness on the streets in capitals of Western democracies need not indicate that socioeconomic class, defined in the above terms, has lost its importance.

Research with the new politics perspective has opened up important areas for exploring classical social science hypotheses on the bases for partisan politics. We have pointed at problematic aspects of the new politics arguments related to the conceptualization of welfare states and the nature of empirical evidence and have brought in greatly improved data for an analysis of retrenchment in a larger number of countries. In the perspective outlined here the present retrenchment of the welfare state as well as its earlier expansion can be seen as outcomes of distributive conflict under changing relations of power among major interest groups. Here the level of unemployment plays a key role, both as an outcome of distributive conflict and as a "risk factor" for retrenchments in social insurance.

Our empirical data make possible an analysis of retrenchment based on the development of core aspects of social citizenship rights, that is, legislated benefits in three short-term social insurance programs, forming unidimensional dependent variables well suited for comparative and causal analyses. In attempts to disentangle the separate effects of institutions, parties, constitutional veto points, austerity, and globalization, we do, however, face the severe problems in macro-comparative causal analyses generated by often marked correlations among independent variables. Concentrating on major cuts in net replacement rates in the three programs, we find that the long gradual increase in average benefit levels characterizing developments up to the mid-1970s has not only stopped but turned into a reverse. This downward deviation from the upward trend cannot easily be interpreted as a kind of natural "growth to limits," since the largest cuts tend to come in countries with initially relatively low benefit levels; instead this reversal indicates a significant retrenchment. Yet in contrast to the universal demise of the full employment component of Western welfare states, this decrease cannot be described as a universal rollback of social insurance programs. There are, however, important differences in levels of cutbacks among countries, and in several of them cuts have been of a size that indicates major retrenchment. In the United Kingdom, the rollback has been profound, taking replacement levels back to or even below their levels in 1930. Also in Ireland, Denmark, and New Zealand we find major cutbacks and somewhat smaller ones in Belgium, The Netherlands, and Sweden. These findings stand in contrast to previous accounts of no or little retrenchment.

As argued above, the demise of full employment and cutbacks in social insurance rights have been closely related, and can be seen as two aspects of distributive conflicts in the reworking of postwar social contracts. In many countries, for political reasons the return of mass unemployment was met by efforts to maintain minimum living standards among the unemployed through easier access to benefits in unemployment, sickness, and invalidity insurance and by measures allowing for exit from the labor force via preretirement pensions. In countries such as Belgium, Denmark, and The Netherlands these emergency solutions eventually needed restructuring, but such restructuring need not

necessarily involve benefit cuts of the type we have used here as indicators of retrenchment.

Globalization and postindustrial developments have affected many of the parameters within which distributive conflicts take place. Yet, in a clear contrast to the new politics hypothesis of no or only a marginal role for partisan politics in the retrenchment phase, our analyses show that the probability for major cuts in these insurance programs have to a significant extent been associated with partisan government composition. The risk for major cuts has been significantly lower with left party representation in cabinets, while the opposite holds true for secular conservative-centrist governments. In the expansionary phase, confessional parties have often been seen as functional equivalents to left parties, at least with regard to social insurance programs. Here we find that they form an intermediate category, in Europe, having risks for cuts between those of the left and those of the secular center-right.

Among economic factors, general government fiscal balances and levels of unemployment appear to be of some relevance, but not to the extent that they overshadow the role of partisan politics. As discussed above, budgetary strains have been relatively closely correlated with increases in unemployment. In retrenchment processes, to a considerable extent, austerity thus appears to be an endogenous factor. The interpretation of differences with regard to export-import dependency is complicated since the lowest export-import dependency is found in our eight largest countries, that is, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As is well known, there tends to be a relatively strong correlation between the size of countries and their export-import dependency.

By focusing on benefit recipients, the new politics perspective has tended to overlook major policy feedbacks coming from the much larger categories of risk-averse citizens, for whom the main relevance of social insurance is that it decreases risks. Policy feedbacks from welfare states can be expected to reflect interactions between institutions and the socioeconomic distribution of risks and resources among citizens. What we have called dominant welfare-state institutions are likely to impress templates on potential lines of cleavages and bases for interest and identity formation among citizens, thereby affecting patterns of mobilization for collective action. This institutional perspective shifts our focus from "classless" benefit recipients to institutions of relevance for the structuring of citizens' definitions of their interests and identities along socioeconomic lines. While benefit reciprocity plays a role, and recipients of old age pensions form important electoral categories and, with the United States as the prime example, often are represented by organized pressure groups, recipients in other programs have been difficult to organize, something most clearly evident with respect to unemployment benefits and means-tested benefits.

Our approach points to the importance of the ways in which welfare-state institutions structure interests of risk-averse citizens, and our typology based on

institutions can help us to explain—rather than merely to label—structural differences among countries. The results presented here indicate that it is fruitful to continue to explore the effects of these institutional differences. The state corporatist welfare states have been labeled “frozen” (Palier 2000), with the exception of unemployment insurance a largely accurate labeling. Our focus on institutional structures indicates that to an important extent this resistance to change is likely to reflect the organization of economically active citizens into separate insurance institutions based on occupational categories with differing conditions and benefits and governed in a private–public context. These occupationally segmented programs thus bring together categories of citizens where relatively homogeneous interests are concentrated and, because of its specific forms of governance, can be readily mobilized to self-defense. During the first decade after the end of the Second World War, state corporatist institutions proved their resilience in largely resisting attempts by left parties to transform them in the direction of universalism (Korpi 2001). In the retrenchment period, in countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, government proposals for cuts have generated strikes and demonstrations, typically initiated by unions involved in the management of different autonomous bodies within the state corporatist systems. The actors here have not been recipients of cash benefits but instead preorganized bodies of insured risk-averse citizens, which have defended their particular social rights.

In contrast, the encompassing welfare state brings in the middle classes together with all other citizens under the same umbrella. While the institutional structure of the state corporatist welfare state creates something resembling well-organized regiments that can be mobilized with short notice, in the encompassing model insured citizens are more like a heterogeneous collection of civilians who need external agents, at first hand political parties, to be activated.³⁹ In the expansion phase of the welfare states, political parties served as external organizers; one of the outcomes was that, in comparison with other institutional models, including the state corporatist one, the encompassing countries tended to be characterized by, on the average, relatively high benefit levels and insurance coverage (Korpi and Palme 1998). During the retrenchment phase, however, the reliance on political parties in the encompassing model may have different consequences. In the state corporatist model, it is relatively easy for separate insurance constituencies to externalize pressures from government fiscal balances. In the encompassing model including all interest groups within the same institutions, such externalization is not possible, and these two institutional models are therefore likely to differ with respect to resistance to cutbacks.

In this context we must, however, recall the problems for causal interpretations generated by correlations among welfare-state institutions, parties, and constitutional veto points. To exemplify, in Europe the presence of the state corporatist model is strongly correlated with the strength of confessional parties. On the average, with the exception of unemployment insurance, the state corporatist model has had the lowest risks for major cuts. In the two countries with strong confessional parties but the basic security model, Ireland and The Netherlands, governments dominated by confessional parties have carried through major cuts. This pattern may point to the relevance of institutions over partisan politics. Yet in Belgium, one of the state corporatist countries, coalition governments led by confessional prime ministers made major cuts in unemployment insurance and sizable ones also in sickness benefits, partly bypassing the parliament and ruling by decree. This exception may reflect structural as well as political factors. In Belgium the dramatic rise in unemployment since the mid-1970s was coupled with greatly increasing regional and linguistic conflicts as well as with conflict among unions and employers' organizations. One of the outcomes of these tensions was long-lasting and extremely high government budget deficits as well as increased unit labor costs relative to its main trading partners.

The constitutional veto point variable appears relevant. Because of its correlations with welfare state institutions and government composition, however, the specific roles of these various factors need to be further explored. Thus, for example, among the six countries conventionally classified as having the fewest veto points, four, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, have made the largest benefit cuts but they also share the basic security model in their social insurance programs. The remaining two, Norway and Sweden, both have the encompassing model and have had less cuts than the first-named four countries. To complicate interpretations, all countries with the state corporatist model have constitutional veto points, yet among them Germany, with both federalism and bicameralism, is the only country with more than one veto point. The clearly highest number of veto points are found in Switzerland and the United States with the basic security model, where they would appear to have been of importance in the phase of expansion, and in Switzerland also for the absence of major cutbacks.

It should be noted that we do not argue that the different forms of new politics have been irrelevant. Yet it remains for those who make general claims about the retrenchment era to design comparable indicators of their critical variables and to use them for testing hypotheses beyond the cases studies that have hitherto served as their primary empirical bases. For social sciences at large, their hypothesis on the demise of class politics is a key issue. Our hypothesis of the continued relevance of class in democratic politics in Western countries is based on two considerations. One refers to differences in the nature of power resources controlled by actors differently positioned in labor markets, of particular importance being the extent to which their assets

³⁹ Thus, for example, when the first postwar center–right government in Sweden legislated cuts in sickness insurance programs in 1981, this legislation was challenged by the Social Democratic opposition and was a significant factor in the Social Democratic victory in the following election.

can be concentrated to a few actors or require broad-based collective action to increase efficacy. The other reflects the asymmetric effects of political democracy on the logic of situations of different socioeconomic classes, reshaping the logic of situations in politics but with only modest changes in the logics prevailing in markets. Welfare states can be seen as outcomes of efforts to use politics to effect outcomes of, and conditions for, market distribution. As our empirical data indicate, such class differences in the logic of situations, manifested in partisan politics, have remained relevant also during welfare-state regress.

A demise of class-related politics could come about through changes in class-party linkages or through changes in class structures and human values, while absolute standards of living appear less relevant. The link of parties to socioeconomic categories can not be taken for given. As has long been noted, variations in party strategies and policies can be of greater relevance for patterns of class voting than are changes in class structures (Korpi 1983, 107–9; Sartori 1969). As argued by Evans (1999b) it is difficult to find evidence for drastic declines in class voting in the Western countries. Yet to the extent that, for example, the globalization of capital markets comes to decrease the capacity of national governments to respond to national economic problems, this may weaken the rationality of voting. In Europe the increasing role of institutions such as the Economic and Monetary Union and the Maastricht stability pact may come to have similar effects.

For socioeconomic class to lose its potential role in structuring distributive conflicts and outcomes, the relevance of the world of work and of citizens' positions in employment relations would have to be undermined by a dilution of class differences in assets or overshadowed by nonmaterial life values. Comparative studies on long-term changes in social mobility, however, do not indicate increasing trends in social fluidity between different socioeconomic classes (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Furthermore, even with increasing material standards, relative positions are still likely to matter. In recent decades with drastically rising levels of unemployment and in many countries also increased income inequality, it would appear that the material bases of life are likely to remain central concerns for most citizens. Proponents for postmaterialism have claimed that a change in values is now taking place. But the world of work is relevant not only for material values; it also differentiates citizens in terms of factors such as prestige, status, and opportunities for self-actualization. Therefore distributive conflicts generated in labor markets and employment relations still appear to be basic for most citizens. Paraphrasing a great American author, Mark Twain, we conclude that—again—the rumors about the death of class are considerably exaggerated.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) is under construction at the Swedish Institute for Social

Research, Stockholm University. In the data collection we strive for high standards with respect to comparability over time and among countries. The data archives contain information on the nature of social citizenship rights in five major social insurance programs—old age pensions, sickness insurance, work accident insurance, unemployment insurance, and family benefits—in 18 countries for 14 observation years 1930–95. To give an idea of the work investment involved in this undertaking one can mention that an OECD report containing a one-page table presenting net benefits rates in one program (unemployment) at one time point required no less than 332 pages of text explaining sources and ways of calculation to show how they were derived (OECD, 1999). While all OECD countries are not included in our database, we have five programs and 14 time points. Yet multiplying by a factor of 70 does not convey the size of the task, since comparison of change over time adds major problems for finding comparable information from different years, and we collect data also for variables other than replacements. When completed, the SCIP database will include more than 200,000 data points based on information that literally have been spread all over the Western world and often difficult to locate, access, and codify. To make data collection of this type possible, the International Sociological Association has established the following ethical guidelines: "Databases should not be regarded as being in the public domain until the researchers who have assembled them have specified the sources of their data and the methods by which they were constructed. . . . Interim data sets should be available for inspection of their accuracy by other scholars" (*International Sociological Association Bulletin* No. 72, 1997).

Average Net Replacement Rates

In sickness, work accident, and unemployment insurance entitlements to cash benefits are given at the level of average production worker wages. Here we use an indicator giving net replacement rates for an average of four components, that is, for a single person and for a four-person family (with one economically active spouse and two minor children) during a short period (the first week after waiting days) and during a longer period (26 weeks with benefits). In some countries benefits have long been taxed, while in others taxation has come more recently. Where benefits have been untaxed, net replacement rates during the short period are taken as the ratio net benefit/net wage; where benefits are taxed, as the ratio gross benefit/gross wage (assuming that one weekly benefit does not significantly affect taxation). Since taxation is always levied for a one-year period, for the longer period we have taken account of taxation in terms of a year consisting of 26 weeks of benefits and 26 weeks of normal earnings. Here we use an index consisting of three components: (a) net income during a year consisting of 26 weeks of benefits and 26 weeks of normal earnings, (b) net income during a year consisting of 52 weeks of normal earnings, and (c) net income during a year consisting of only 26 weeks

of normal earnings. The index defines net replacement during the longer period as equal to $(a - c)/(b - c)$.

Definitions of Major Cuts

As an indication of the timing of the 37 cuts of at least 10 percentage points in different countries and the primary nature of these events, it can be mentioned that 16 of them reflect direct decreases of benefits, while 12 are results of tax claw-backs and nine reflect the freezing or reduction of benefit ceilings. Referring to unemployment insurance as U, sickness as S, and work accident as W, we find the following patterns. Straightforward cuts in benefit levels took place in Finland (S, 1992), Ireland (U, S, W, 1988), The Netherlands (U, 1985), New Zealand (U, S, 1991), Sweden (U, S, W, 1993), and the United Kingdom (U, S, W, 1980, and U, S, W, 1984). Tax claw-backs are relevant in Belgium (S, W, 1977, and U, 1985), Ireland (U, S, W, 1993), New Zealand (U, S, 1990), the United Kingdom (U, S, W, 1982), and the United States (U, 1980). Freezing or reduction of benefit ceilings is observed in Canada (U, 1980), Denmark (U, S, W, 1982), Finland (U, S, 1980), Italy (U, 1990, and U, 1995), and Switzerland (S, 1980). Accumulated cuts resulting from the freezing of ceilings for replacements have been assigned to the year of decision. In some countries, more than one form of cutting was made simultaneously.

Cabinet Composition

Years with coalition cabinets and years with changes of cabinets are weighted according to the proportion of seats held by the party in cabinet and the proportion of the year during which the cabinet existed. Left parties are defined as the traditional social democratic parties and the parties to their left. Confessional parties include the European Christian–Democratic parties and their fraternal protestant parties. Because of the traditionally strong role of the Catholic church in Ireland we have included its two major parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, in the confessional category. The results remain essentially similar when years are weighted by the number of cuts registered for each year.

Constitutional Veto Points, Economic Indicators, and Globalization

The variable on constitutional veto points is from Huber, Ragin, and Stephens's (1998) Comparative Welfare States Data Set (<http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm>). Data on capital account deregulation and current account deregulation as described by Quinn (1997) were supplied by the author. Data on current account and export/import as percentage of GDP were taken from OECD 1999, while the capital account indicator was excerpted from the IMF (various years) *Balance of Payments Yearbook*.

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Freedom and Normalization: Poststructuralism and the Liberalism of Michael Oakeshott

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This paper discusses "normalization" as a problem for the liberal order through a detailed examination of the liberal political theory of Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott links the poststructuralist normalizing problematic with the "existential" dilemma of human finitude. In liberalism, he argues, selves become disciplined and normalized when they respond to finitude with an overemphasis on instrumentality. They understand freedom as an instrumental good, a means to external ends. Oakeshott reformulates liberalism based on another response when selves appreciate experience as a self-sufficient or intrinsic good. They understand freedom as a first-order good valuable for itself and this lessens the normalizing pressure. I argue that F. A. Hayek's theory of liberalism confirms Oakeshott's warning about an overemphasis on instrumentality. I show the importance of Oakeshott's work in that he restates the distinction between the public and the private and demonstrates the limits of contemporary liberal theories insofar as they neglect the problem of normalization.

Central to the "poststructuralist" critique of liberalism is a criticism of the liberal concept of "freedom of choice."¹ In the liberal tradition, freedom of choice allows for the display or development of individuality. The traditional political questions for liberals concern the extent of state power. To what degree does the state limit choice when it commands or forbids actions? Should the state increase the number of choices available through the redistribution of resources? For poststructuralists, liberals neglect the power that occurs in the socialization of the subject or in the constitution of the subjectivity of the subject. Foucault (1979, 30) famously argues that the individual whom liberalism seeks to "free" to make choices evidences "already in himself the effects of a subjection much more profound than himself." This means that selves are limited in how they come to develop their preferences. The question is not merely whether selves can make choices, but also why they make the choices they make.

Poststructuralists employ the idea of "normalization" to describe how selves are constrained in their subjectivity. Individuals are trained to be "normal" in various "disciplines" like schools and hospitals and by psychiatry. Normalization works through the binary opposition of the normal and the abnormal. The normal becomes the ideal and the abnormal the unthinkable, a division that informs multiplicities of oppositions such as healthy/sick, straight/gay, sane/mad. Through normalization, liberal selves become "disciplined" selves. Normalization acts through the consciousness of the self. Normal and disciplined selves become their own judges and ceaselessly interrogate themselves as to whether they meet preferred norms. These selves repress their own delinquent thoughts and feelings and force other wayward selves into the normal patterns of behavior (Foucault 1979).

In this paper I examine, through a detailed discussion of the liberal political theory of Michael Oakeshott, one interpretation of how normalization originates in liberalism and what a liberal theory might look like when it confronts normalization.² My linkage of poststructuralism with Oakeshott's liberalism has relevance to a number of broader political debates. First, the idea of normalization is typically identified with a radical perspective that critiques such basic institutions and practices of Western society as gender norms (Butler 1990) and market-determined property relations. Oakeshott is a "conservative" liberal, a critic of distributive justice and supporter of the Tory party. His work demonstrates that normalization can be identified as a problem for liberal society from within the discourse of liberalism, not from a perspective external to it. Second, Oakeshott enriches liberal theorizing because, unlike many other Anglo-American liberals, he takes seriously issues of "continental existentialism" (Worthington 1995, 19). Oakeshott connects normalization with the lived experience of finitude or the transience of ends and the frustrations of temporally bound agents.³ Third, Oakeshott's work has been seen as an important "reformulation" of liberalism (Franco 1990, 411). I argue that this reformulation departs from the conventional terms of the debate over liberalism and sheds light on the limits of the major schools of liberal theory.

Oakeshott argues that normalization results from the human tendency to react to finitude with an overemphasis on instrumentality or outcome. An instrumental orientation can take the form of the desire for the community to provide either material benefits or the "warmth" of solidarity. Here Oakeshott replicates the conventional liberal concern that the "community" threatens individuality. However, he also

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¹ For an overview of the poststructuralist critique of liberalism see Rose 1999.

² The identification of Oakeshott as a liberal is controversial since he has been seen as a conservative critic of liberalism; see Cranston 1967 and Sandel 1984. Recent critical work has clearly placed him in the liberal tradition; see Coats 1985, Franco 1990, and Rayner 1985.

³ Other writers have touched on this existential theme in Oakeshott's work but have not grasped the full importance of his ideas on finitude; see Fuller 1993, Mapel 1990, and Sullivan 1990.

argues that an idea of liberal freedom focused on outcome can lead to an inward discipline whereby selves conform to limiting social norms. Normalization results from an "instrumental" account of freedom, that is, freedom valued primarily as a means to ends external to action.

Oakeshott believes that just as an overemphasis on outcome leads to a conformist pressure, an idea of freedom as a first order or self-sufficient good can decrease this pressure and protect the sense of individual "distinctness."⁴ His idea of freedom is similar to the poststructuralist idea that "each person's life should be its own telos" (Rose 1995, 283). In this positive argument, Oakeshott suggests an alternative to the public/private opposition that defines the debate between liberals and communitarians. Communitarians argue that a sense of a common good should augment a life of private choice (Santal 1982). Liberals stress the repressive possibility of a common good organized by the state or community. Oakeshott reformulates this debate because he argues that action is public when regulated by the "adverbial" considerations of morality that concern the manner, not the goals, of acting. Commentators have focused on this idea of morality as a central innovation of his reformulation of liberalism. But Oakeshott believes that it is in the public moment of activity that the self gains a sense of self-sufficiency. In this experience selves are less likely to lose their distinctness in the collective or individual pursuit of outcome. The public moment of activity, properly understood, is an ally of individuality, not a threat.

In my conclusion I show how Oakeshott challenges the central liberal positions in the contemporary debate. His work implies a critique of neutralist liberalism in which a "substantial" (in political terms) meaning of freedom is excluded (Larmore 1987). He also disagrees with Richard Flathman (1989, 121) who defines freedom as an "instrumental" value that allows all persons to "pursue and satisfy their individual interests and desires." (Flathman 1989, 116) Nor is his work compatible with theorists who identify a set of "virtues" that enrich the experience of liberal freedom (Galston 1991; Macedo 1996).

In developing my interpretation of Oakeshott, I discuss two contemporary theorists, William Connolly and F. A. Hayek, as foils. Among contemporary political theorists, Connolly has "most extensively developed" (Simons 1995, 118) the implications of poststructuralist thought. His writings provide a useful set of ideas through which Oakeshott's work can be better understood. Connolly argues that the experience of freedom can lead to "resentment," which is a spur to normalization. While Oakeshott doesn't believe anything can solve the fundamental problems of experience, he does examine ways in which resentment can be decreased or increased. His idea of self-sufficiency as a way to reduce resentment is given detail by a comparison

with Connolly's (1995, 209) notion of a "fullness" in experience.

Oakeshott and F. A. Hayek are often linked as central critics of the "interventionist state" and proponents of the rule of law understood as a set of general rules (Sullivan 2001, 56). They share a belief in a noninstrumental political order. However, unlike Oakeshott, Hayek fails to establish an idea of individuality as an end in itself, as he asserts that autonomy is valuable as a means to external ends. His work, so popular among mainstream conservative libertarians, illuminates what happens to liberalism as a consequence of such a failure, that is, when instrumental considerations dominate all other values.⁵ Hayek endorses a liberalism pervaded by resentment, internal discipline and conformity.

THE PROBLEM OF FINITUDE

Oakeshott's abiding concern was the fact of human finitude and how humans value their action given temporal limits. In his first book, *Experience and Its Mode*, Oakeshott (1985) describes practical or ends-oriented experience as an "abstraction" of the totality of experience. In this early stage of his thought, Oakeshott was deeply influenced by the idealist tradition of Hegel and F. H. Bradley in which experience can be understood as a whole or absolute through philosophy. Other ways of experiencing the world (modes of experience), practice, science, history, are completely legitimate in their own domains, but are "abstractions" of the totality. They are "incomplete" and deficient in comparison to what is "total and whole." Practical experience is incomplete because of the permanent gulf between "what is" and "what ought to be." The practical actor hopes to transform what is into what ought to be, but this hope is futile since success is always followed by failure. The successful transformation of what is into what ought to be is followed by the creation of the next idea of what ought to be.

It follows for Oakeshott that the characteristic theme of practice is "change" and "mortality." He writes: "Mortality, I take it, is the central fact of practical experience; death is the central fact of life . . . I mean . . . the devastating mortality of every element of practical existence, the mortality of pleasures and pains, desires, achievements, emotions and affections" (Oakeshott 1985, 273). The distinctive characteristic of practice is "permanent dissatisfaction" (304). For Oakeshott, resentment is always a possible reaction to practical experience. He notes that "some" view this "universal mortality . . . as a poison polluting life and making it insufferable." Practical experience is a "fog" in which what is given by one hand is taken away by another. He notes that the "apprehension of the futility of living . . . carries with it melancholy and may lead to suicide" (355). Oakeshott's idea of the ever-changing quality

⁴ Oakeshott rejects "distinctiveness," that is, specialness, and prefers the fact of being "distinct" from others.

⁵ Hayek has unquestionably been a major, if not the central, inspiration for conservative-libertarian thought. In an interview with Hayek's biographer on C-SPAN, a number of conservatives pay homage to *Road to Serfdom* (Booknotes Interview 2001).

of practice illuminates his historicism. He argues that "there is no value, no judgment of value, nor anything valuable which, taken by itself and on its own account, may properly be spoken of as absolute" (278).

In *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott (1975) analyzes action in terms of its radical incompleteness. Every practical action begins in a concrete situation that is "diagnosed" and found wanting. The actor seeks to redeem the deficiency by a future-orientated action. Any achieved situation will immediately be found deficient and liable to a new diagnosis. Human action is interminable and ceaseless. Every situation is lacking or deficient and calls for a remedial action. Action is a "transaction" with the future, a gamble whose payoff only calls for a new gamble. No permanent resolution is possible for the predicament of action. In *On Human Conduct* resentment is a possibility when humans reflect on what Oakeshott calls the "nothingness" that is attached to all action. The "rot of time" undermines all possible human accomplishment (85).

For Oakeshott, humans are historical identities: "We are what we become in conduct." Human identity is what it is and there is no atemporal standard by which to judge it. He writes, "There is no ultimate or perfect man hidden in the womb of time or prefigured in the characters who now walk the earth" (Oakeshott 1975, 41). The historicity of identity is another possible source of resentment, particularly for those who wish for a more stable foundation for the self: "Human beings are apt to be disconcerted unless they feel themselves to be upheld by something more substantial than the emanations of their own contingent imaginations" (80).

William Connolly's work provides a more explicit and thorough analysis of the problem of finitude that is an implicit part of Oakeshott's central problematic. For Connolly, finitude is both constitutive of individuality and a possible source of resentment. A human life is defined by its temporal limits. The self is constituted by choices and activities. Every action defines the self and "forecloses" other options. Choosing breeds resentment since the self yearns for the "road not taken." Given unlimited time, each actor could undertake all jobs and activities and never resent temporally defined identity. But such an unlimited existence contradicts the value of freedom. Connolly (1991, 17–18) writes, "Freedom involves choice in a setting where it is impossible to pursue every valued option concurrently or serially; it presupposes a contrast with unfreedom that could not be maintained in a world without the constraints of time."

Connolly, like Oakeshott, argues that while desire is always unfulfilled, individuality depends on this lack of fulfillment. Desire defines the uniqueness of the self and for desire to remain desire it must remain incomplete. Connolly agrees with René Girard's claim that resentment at the unfulfillment of desire derives from the fact that the self seeks "being" or complete fulfillment that it can never achieve. A "model" is complete and so ends the unhappiness of incompleteness. For Connolly (1995, 52–53) and Girard, models are perfectionistic (How else are they models?) and are antagonistic to other models.

INSTRUMENTALITY AND NORMALIZATION

Oakeshott identifies two types of conformist pressures that result from how the self reacts to finitude: a bourgeois ethic defined as the pursuit of individual external satisfaction and the need for community. In an early essay Oakeshott discusses the first tendency in the development of a "worldly" self. This self finds worth primarily in "work" and the "results" of getting "things done." The worldly self wants to make a contribution to the "stability of the present order." This contribution requires a concern for the future, an orientation to what is achieved. "This belief implies what may be described as an external standard of value . . . what is prized is success, meaning the achievement of some external result" (Oakeshott 1993, 31). Oakeshott employs what would come to be a famous existential description of existence. He writes that worldliness promises an "illusory immortality" that makes "humanity a Sisyphus and its life the pointless trundling of a useless stone. For, as like as not, if we set value upon external achievement alone, death or disease will rob us of our harvest, and we shall have lived in vain" (32).

In his critique of a future orientation, Oakeshott rejects the central temporal norm of bourgeois society, namely, the indefinite "progress" of society. Progress or the continuous improvement of external circumstances cannot be the source of life since it is a "practise of death," the death of what is most valuable, "ourselves" in the here and now.

Oakeshott links instrumental thinking and bourgeois, future-oriented virtues. These virtues are normalizing since they require a self-manipulation in order to achieve generalized expectations. Oakeshott (1993, 31) criticizes the middle-class values of career and "reputation" in which the vividness of present experience is subordinated to the future: "[F]or the sake of an hypothetical old man, who may bear his name thirty years hence, the young man hoards his energies and restrains his activities." A reputation is something recognized as valuable by the community and so activities are restrained in order to create an impression on others. Individuals mold or discipline themselves in order to fit a collective idea of how to live. Oakeshott condemns the virtue of "prudence" because it robs the present of meaning and teaches that we ought to live "ahead of ourselves" (33). The prudential person focuses on future considerations. This person is careful, likely to avoid the eccentric or oddball. Oakeshott warns against averageness when he complains that modern life is "saturated" with "the middle-class passion for safety, regularity, and possession" (33–34). These three notions, so central to bourgeois concerns, all speak to a normalizing force. Safety and regularity are averse to the unusual and the abnormal. Difference must be suppressed as unsafe.

In his essay on Hobbes, Oakeshott is more explicit about the normalizing force of bourgeois society. He argues that Hobbes's political theory embodies two conceptions of the personality, each of which seeks "peace," but for different reasons. One personality fits a political order for a "tame man" whose primary interest

is the avoidance of "shameful death." From this point of view, Oakeshott argues that Hobbes is correctly understood as a philosopher of "bourgeois society." This bourgeois society involves a uniform model of how to live. It is "a single approved condition of human circumstances for all conditions of men, and morality as the art in which this condition is achieved and maintained" (Oakeshott 1991, 343).

Oakeshott also identifies a normalizing impulse in the liberal "classical economists." In classical economics, according to Oakeshott, the person is a purely "private" agent intent on the achievement of "the satisfaction of wants." Although these agents make "choices for themselves," the focus on want-satisfaction tends toward a leveling of distinctness. All agents are defined by their common role as "would-be consumers." In the pursuit of singular end of want-satisfaction, agents become objects of manipulation and calculation to themselves. They seek "the 'happiness' of satisfying wants with the least expenditure of energy" (Oakeshott 1975, 294). The intrinsic meaning of action is subordinated to the goal of results. As I show in the next section, Oakeshott believes that in self-sufficient experience the expenditure of energy is a value in itself apart from any outcome including "happiness."

In the framework of classical economy the state is an "association of the mutual satisfaction of wants" because want-satisfaction requires the response of others on a continuous basis. Rules have the purpose of promoting want-satisfaction. This state is outcome-oriented, even though it is not a social democratic state that distributes benefits or a collectivist entity that organizes the everyday life of its members. This idea of the state comes from the belief of the classical economists that "all or nearly all" individuals have the same wants to be satisfied (Oakeshott 1975, 295). A society oriented toward the externality of want-satisfaction engenders a similarity of lifestyles.

Connolly explains how the conformity that Oakeshott finds in want-satisfaction is part of the problem of identity. Humans achieve an identity only within the social order. But while identity provides meaning, it also involves "cruelty." This cruelty arises from the insecurity of identity that is supposed to be meaningful because it is stable but is imposed on an unstable array of desires and emotions. Selves try to overcome their insecurity by the assertion that their identity is not simply a contingent and short-lived designation, but the "intrinsic" or timeless way humans "ought" to be. Identity requires the subordination or elimination of aspects of experience that contradict dominant forms of recognition. Desires and thoughts that undermine the certainty of identity are deemed immoral or deviant. The need for an unambiguous identity means that those who stand outside are the "other." Deviant identities are obliterated through the process of normalization in which they are socialized into the proper norms of the community. This normalization turns against the individual. Desires and thoughts that disrupt stable identity must be disciplined and transformed.

Connolly discusses two contemporary patterns of thought, mastery and attunement, which intensify nor-

malization and discipline. Mastery, which speaks to Oakeshott's "worldly self," is the desire to have control over circumstances. In mastery, the self treats the world as if it were "plastic" and conducive to human reshaping and use. For Connolly (1991, 28), this mastery can take an individualistic form in which "freedom . . . involves control over personal destiny" through the subjection of "nature to human purposes," or a collectivist form in which a group organizes a plan for external realization. Attunement, corresponding to Oakeshott's notion of how the self seeks meaning in the solace of the community, refers to the individual's wish to be "fitted" into a larger pattern of meaning, either in the community or in the natural world. Adherents of mastery and attunement hope to reduce resentment by showing the world to be amenable to human ambitions. Connolly argues that mastery and attunement are "perfectionist" so that "discipline must be applied to the selves called upon to achieve" the ideals (31).

The linkage that Connolly and Oakeshott find between instrumentality and normalization is confirmed in the thought of F. A. Hayek. The Hayekian self is very much a normal self, representative of what Connolly calls a "liberal individualism." In this individualism, the "conduct and interior" of the individual "are . . . appraised" against the model of the "normal and rational" (Connolly 1991, 74). While I argue that Hayek's liberal individualism has its source in the importance of instrumental considerations, there are elements in his work that suggest a belief in intrinsic value in the liberal order and perhaps even the sense that liberty has primary value as an end in itself. But in the last analysis, Hayek's interest in noninstrumentality is subordinated to his interest in instrumental considerations, with dire consequences for his theory of liberalism.

Hayek (1960, 29) makes an unambiguous assertion that freedom is a second-order good: "We want [freedom] because we have learned to expect from it the opportunity of realizing many of our aims." Only an outcome orientation can make sense of freedom. Hayek writes, "Our faith in freedom" depends "on the belief that it will, on balance, release more forces for the good than the bad" (31). The value of freedom is revealed in the future: "It is not the fruits of past success but the living in and for the future in which human intelligence proves itself" (41).

Whereas Oakeshott questions the implications of progress, Hayek's main defense of the liberal order is that it is a progressive society with continuous material and moral development. The apparent instrumentality of this argument is complicated by his ambiguous conception of progress. For Hayek, progress is not a simple adding-up of accomplishments. Hayek notes that progress means "achieving things we have been striving for," a process which may make us "sadder men." The benefit of progress lies in what is learned, not the tentative and questionable "satisfaction" of a new stage of development. Hayek writes, "Progress is movement for movement's sake, for it is in the process of learning, in the effects of having learned something new, that man enjoys the gift of his intelligence" (41).

The ambiguity here is whether learning flows from acting or from the result of successful acts. In the former case, acting as learning might be considered an intrinsic good, a possibility given weight in his use of the word "gift," the noninstrumental concept *par excellence*. If, on the other hand, learning is the result of successful action, then Hayek understands progress (and freedom) as instrumental values. This second interpretation is more consistent with the broader scope of Hayek's thought. Freedom leads to progress and progress refers to a standard outside the action itself. Humans must "prove" their intelligence in activity. Learning is a matter of possible success or failure.

The same ambiguity can be seen in Hayek's view of the moral rules that are the requirements of an order of liberty. For Hayek, moral rules are essential for the attainment of ends. He notes that moral rules may appear noninstrumental because the individual rarely understands that following rules increases ends-attainment. Ultimately though, moral rules are "instrumental" in that "they assist mainly in the achievement of other human values" (Hayek 1960, 67).

The costs of Hayek's instrumental valuation of freedom are steep. The resentment and internal discipline that Connolly identifies in liberalism are pervasive in Hayek's political theory. Resentment at freedom is an obvious possibility insofar as we want to be free in order to accomplish ends. Failure at ends-achievement might give rise to resentment at the unfilled promise of freedom. To save autonomy from resentment, Hayek redirects responsibility from freedom to the individual. For Hayek (1960, 71) "liberty and responsibility are inseparable." Individuals are responsible for their misuse of autonomy. Failure indicates not the limits of freedom, but the failure of each person.

Although he warns that responsibility must be limited to what humans can be reasonably held accountable for, in the hands of Hayek, responsibility becomes rather despotic. Responsibility means not just accountability for particular foreseeable outcomes. The social "position" of the individual is a "result" of what the person does. Hayek admits that innumerable factors enter into the person's status. In each life there is an irreducible element of chance, yet he insists that individuals are responsible for their place in life. Hayek repeats a famous deceit of capitalism: Individuals are taught that they are responsible for their places in society even though individuals are not truly responsible for what happens to them due to accidents and heterogeneous factors. For Hayek, agents need to believe that they are responsible because that belief is a source of motivation for individual success and the maximization of the well-being of society.

A constant "discipline" is the self-imposed burden of an instrumental defense of autonomy. Hayek (1960, 72) argues that there is a growing denial of responsibility, and comments: "It is doubtless because the opportunity to build one's own life also means an unceasing task, a discipline that man must impose upon himself if he is to achieve his aims, that many people are afraid of liberty." Responsibility is a self-imposed discipline. Freedom

and responsibility are "inseparable." Freedom is tied to discipline as a form of life.

Hayek recognizes that a market system generates both discipline and resentment. A market system demands the discipline wherein the self becomes "useful" to others. "It is of the essence of a free society that a man's value and remuneration depend not on capacity in the abstract but on success in turning it into concrete service" (Hayek 1960, 41). In a market economy many abilities go unrewarded and cannot be developed. Hayek notes that similar abilities will be unequally rewarded. He speaks at length about the "bitterness" and "resentment" that will flourish when talents are wasted, an unavoidable outcome in a market system. The difficulty of finding a position causes a "pressure which is often resented" (82).

For Hayek, the progress that characterizes liberalism leads to conformity. Liberty creates the possibility of progress and in a free society "some manners of living are more successful than others." Hayek (1960, 85) argues that "much of the case" for freedom "would vanish" if it did not distinguish the successful from the failed. A normalizing imperative flows from this instrumentality, as Hayek argues, "the ends of the successful group will tend to become the ends of all members of the society" (36).

Recent scholarship on Foucault's politics suggests that the source of the normalizing tendency of Hayek's liberalism is rooted in the work of the classical liberals (figures Hayek cites as major influences on his work). This line of research also confirms Oakeshott's arguments about the implications of classical economics. Graham Burchell, in an essay on Foucault's politics, argues that for Adam Smith and others the idea of autonomy was subordinated to the development of social wealth. Burchell argues that the idea of "laissez-faire" or the economy as a self-regulating system, originates in the thought of Physiocrats as a restatement of an older conception that the purpose of the state is the maximization of the productivity and material well-being of the population. Laissez-faire is not a doctrine of negative freedom as an end in itself, but of a means by which the state maximizes the wealth of society. Early advocates of laissez-faire define the value of action as what maximizes the statistics of the population by the private pursuit of interests through the "invisible hand." Like Oakeshott's belief that the classical economists subordinate autonomy to want-satisfaction, this Foucaultian analysis holds that the intrinsic worth of the individual is not central to the liberal order. Liberal freedom becomes a "technical requirement of governing the natural processes of social life and, in particular, those of self-interested exchanges" (Burchell 1991, 139). Liberty is a means leading to growth and so "liberalism requires a proper use of liberty" (139). The free self is the useful self, and the useful self is constructed as the "normal man," a construction done not so much by the state as by "expertise licensed by the state, but formally independent of it: medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology, pedagogy and so on" (142).

In *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott warns about the dangers of these sub-political institutions. He arrives

at his argument in a discussion about the way in which humans escape the burden of freedom in the substantial good of the community. Oakeshott (1975, 275) examines the history of the modern European state through the evolution of two personalities: One sought the intrinsic worth of freedom and one—an individual-*manque*—was incapable of the enjoyment of experience for itself and needed the “warmth of the communal relationships.” Paralleling these two personalities are two conceptions of the state, a *societas*, a union grounded in formal laws that bound people by the manner of acting, and a *universitas*, bound by instrumental rules that organize individuals according to shared purposes.

These conflicting personalities and concepts of the state emerged in the modern world. In medieval times, there was no recognition of a distinct personality. There was no consciousness of a person who takes individualized action and suffers a personalized fate, only the “anonymity” of kinship relationships (Oakeshott 1975, 365). With the collapse of the closed communities of the middle ages, these relationships dissolved and personal identity replaced the facelessness of the group. For Oakeshott, the discovery of the individual is coincident with the discovery (both “unsought” and “inescapable”) of freedom.

The individual-*manque* and the state as *universitas* develop in tandem. Individual-*manques* fit this idea of the state because they yearn to conform to the norms of the community. This person has the “incapacity to sustain an individual life” and so suffers a “revulsion from distinctness” (Oakeshott 1975, 276). Oakeshott’s examples of the individual-*manque* include the “English Calvinist” in Geneva who felt attunement in the cohesion of a substantive community (275). The individual-*manque* experiences a sense of shame and “guilt” due to the “inability to hold his own belief and conduct” (277). Guilt gives birth to “a small seed of resentment” (277). Oakeshott claims that unscrupulous “leaders” use this resentment as a political tool to increase their own power. They gain followers by promising an end to guilt and loneliness, a salvation gained through the state as *universitas* that annihilates all distinctness. The individual-*manque* becomes an “anti-individual,” a figure that is “intolerant not only of superiority but of difference, disposed to allow in all others only a replica of himself.” The need grows for a state that allows for “no distinction of persons.” Oakeshott calls this state a “therapeutic corporation” (278).

The therapeutic corporation is the state as *universitas* that “treats” its subjects and “cures” them of their ills. Oakeshott’s elaboration of the therapeutic conception is very suggestive of poststructuralist concerns. In one version of the state as a corporation, the members of the community are considered diseased or disordered. Oakeshott argues that contemporary therapeutic workers—“sociologists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, group therapists”—are instruments of the rule of therapy. Citizens become “associates joined in being diseased and recognizing themselves not as cives but as the ‘subjects’ of *therapeutae* (as well as for the therapists themselves), everything is what it is in terms of

curative virtue: work (except, of course, ‘social work’) is occupational ‘therapy’, education is curative, leisure is remedial treatment.” The function of the state is to guarantee a universal “sanity”; that is, a uniform so-called normality” (Oakeshott 1975, 310).

The parallel with Foucault’s themes is striking. Foucault speaks of the proliferation of “judges” of “the normal and abnormal” who “judge, assess, diagnose.” He writes, “The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social worker-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based” (Foucault 1979, 304).

SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The idea of self-sufficiency originates in “Religion and the World,” where Oakeshott (1993) describes a “religious self” that enjoys experience for itself without regard to what is achieved. The religious person does not escape from life through the “hope” of a better life and overcomes concern for a future self and calculations about external achievement. The religious life is informed by a noninstrumental attitude toward things and individuals. “Life to . . . [the religious person] is not a game of skill, people and events are not counters valued for something to be gained, or achieved, beyond them” (Oakeshott 1993, 37). Oakeshott argues that experience gains meaning when the central value is “present insight” (33). In present insight, experience is valued for what is nearest, namely, “ourselves.” The religious self achieves “freedom from all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation on the future” (37). For this reason, the religious person “lacks nothing” and “so far as is possible he lives as an immortal” (38–37). In Connolly’s (1991, 75) terms, this Oakeshottian self reflects a “liberal individuality” that encourages “a range of conduct that is distinctive, stretches the boundaries of identity.” Oakeshottian selves honor their own uniqueness and the “distinctness” of others because they do not subordinate experience to generalized norms of behavior. Their life is their own “telos” not a means to other forms of life.

Connolly argues that this individuality might be encouraged in a Foucaultian ethic that is tied to a “non-thetic reverence for experience” (1991, 81). Such a reverence can lessen modern resentment. Reverence lies in a notion of “fullness,” that is, the acceptance of experience for what it is. The dilemma for Connolly is that fullness suggests the teleocratic or end-governed model of acting and teleocracy engenders normalization. Teleocracy demands that human acting and the meaning of experience be defined by a governing “end” to which the self is made subject. Connolly (1995, 209) has to find a “protean fullness enabled by the absence of any fundamental purpose or principle in being.” He refers to Nietzsche’s belief that the “abyss” and “abundance” are the same. The absence of meaning does not lead to the despair of nihilism but the joy of an overflowing of experience. Connolly (1995, 39) notes that the Chinese proverb “holding onto emptiness is

like grasping fullness” relates to the poststructuralist account that “difference” is “that which exceeds determinate being without being determinate itself.” The absence of fixed meaning must be satisfying in itself. A sense of fulfillment might allow the self to move “beyond the lack-fulfillment experience of desire toward an experience that affirms an abundance of ‘life’ or ‘difference’ flowing through and over identity, an abundance that enables the very movement of desire.” For Connolly, such a mode of experience, an “art of the self,” might “draw resentment from desire” (55).

Oakeshott believes that self-sufficiency is one way to decrease the frustrations of the “limit-fulfillment” structure of desire. His most comprehensive discussion of the idea is his essay on aesthetics in *Rationalism in Politics*. Oakeshott (1991, 510) argues that, in contrast to the incompleteness of practical action, aesthetic experience involves the “contemplation” of “images” that are “permanent and unique.” The permanence of the images of contemplation lies in their intrinsic value. The images have worth not as means to an end, but things valued for themselves. Images in aesthetic contemplation are entirely liberated from the constraints of “pragmatic requirement.” Aesthetic experience is characterized by “self-sufficiency enjoyed by each engagement in the activity and by the absence of any premeditated end” (514).

Oakeshott’s language suggests the superiority of self-sufficient experience in a number of ways. In practical experience, activity has no value in itself; the achievement of the end is everything. The energy exerted in the act is wasted if followed by failure and so in practice we always find a “need to be satisfied, a thirst to be quenched, and satiety is always followed by want; there may be weariness, but there is no rest” (Oakeshott 1991, 513). Aesthetic contemplation stands in sharp contrast to the “restlessness” of practice. “At whatever point contemplation is broken off it is never incomplete. Consequently, the ‘delight’ which I have coupled with contemplation is not to be thought of as a reward which follows up the activity, as wages follow work, as knowledge follows upon scientific research, as release follows death” (514). Aesthetic experience is a value for itself: “images in contemplation are merely present” (510). Aesthetic activity cannot repair the broken fabric of practical life. It is a “momentary release, a brief enchantment” (540–41).

Oakeshott links aesthetic experience and ethical life when he asks how the transition is made from aesthetics to practical experience. He argues that there are certain practical activities that suffer less from the defects of ends-orientation. Friendship and love, for example, do not involve the pursuit of external change. He writes, “The relationship of friends is dramatic, not utilitarian. . . . Loving is not ‘doing good’; it is not a duty; it is emancipated from having to approve or to disapprove” (Oakeshott 1991, 537). Similarly, Oakeshott writes that moral considerations are a moment of practice where there is “a release from the deadliness of doing and a possibility of perfection. . . . For here is a private and self-sufficient activity . . . independent of what went before and of what may come after.” In the moral life

“success” is not tied to “usefulness.” It is a category of experience egalitarian in spirit since it is open to anyone without regard to the ability to calculate “consequences . . . (as Kant says) by reason of some special disfavor of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of a step-motherly Nature” (538).

There is a subtle shift in Oakeshott’s understanding of ethical life. While in the above passage the ethical is “private” and independent of “place or condition,” in *On Human Conduct* he argues that morality is the public moment of action. This is an important change, for it indicates how for Oakeshott self-sufficient experience is connected to a public world.

In *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott argues that self-sufficiency was central to the European individuality he prizes. This individuality is characterized by a specific response to the predicament of freedom. It has a

disposition to transform this unsought ‘freedom’ of conduct from a postulate into an experience and to make it yield a satisfaction of its own, independent of the chancy and intermittent satisfaction of chosen actions . . . the disposition to recognize imagining, deliberating, wanting, choosing, and acting not as costs incurred in seeking enjoyments but as themselves enjoyments, the exercise of a gratifying self-determination or personal autonomy. (Oakeshott 1975, 236)

The language of “deliberating, wanting, choosing, and acting” clearly flows from the analysis of self-sufficiency in “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind” (see Coats 2000 for more on this point). In this disposition, selves find their meaning in the experience of the activities and subordinate the result of acting to the doing of acting. They are “perfected” and “lack nothing” to the greatest degree possible. The impulse to reshape and manipulate the self loses force. Oakeshott (1975, 241) argues that Pico della Mirandola described this personality in the image of “not Adam, not Prometheus, but Proteus—a character distinguished on account of limitless powers of self-transformation without self-destruction.” Proteus is a central image of the human being for poststructuralists like Connolly. This self constantly changes without either foundation or a future idea of perfection. For Oakeshott, Proteus fits the idea of the human being that is not Adam, an original sinless creature, perhaps recoverable through revolution or salvation; or Prometheus, rebel against God and seeker of power, but a creature with the “power” to exist despite an unending contingency.

In *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott connects self-sufficiency with the moral moment of action. Oakeshott’s discussion of morality is linked to his broader analysis of practical or ends-oriented activity. He argues that action has four elements or postulates: an action in relation to an end, a practice, “self-disclosure,” and “self-enactment.” A human action aims at the realization of an external end and is governed by a practice that regulates the manner in which that end is pursued. These practices are adverbial, generalized conditions of action. One type of practice is “instrumental,” that is, oriented to the pursuit of an end.

The rules of firefighters are purposeful, aimed at putting out fires. More important to Oakeshott are "moral practices," modes of relationships that have nothing to do with ends. He writes, "A morality is the *ars artium* of conduct; the practice of all practices; the practice of agency without further specifications" (Oakeshott 1975, 60). A moral practice is like a language that supplies the grammar and vocabulary of speaking, but does not demand particular speech-acts. A moral practice has no "extrinsic purpose" (62).

In addition to a moral practice and a substantive end, an actor engages in an act in relation to "self-disclosure" and "self-enactment." The former is action among others, the act in the external world; the latter is the self-understanding of the actor.

Every human practical action can be placed in a matrix that relates to these four elements. A self discloses itself in relation to a substantive end and subscription to a practice. A self also enacts itself in relation to an end and a practice. For example, when selling a car, the seller is disclosed in the attempt to make the best deal. The seller is also disclosed through subscription to the practices of selling honestly, although such considerations do not help conclude a successful deal. Further, the seller is enacted in pursuit of this end, in this case, the goal of getting a profit. Finally, the seller is enacted through the reason for subscription to the practice of selling honestly, the fear, for instance, of punishment, or the desire for an inner sense of being honest.

Oakeshott analyzes each of these elements in temporal terms. Self-disclosure in terms of external achievement is the least significant aspect of human action. Oakeshott (1975, 73) writes that it is "immersed in contingency, it is interminable, and it is liable to frustration, disappointment and defeat. . . . And even if what survives bears some relation to the meaning of the act, it may disappoint and it will certainly reveal itself as but another situation to be diagnosed and responded to. Here even the excellences of things are their undoing." While self-disclosure in pursuit of an end is "immersed in contingency," this transience is mitigated through moral practices. The moral life provides "some slight relief" from contingency since it provides "general conditions for choosing less incidental than the choices themselves." The rules of morality are "indifferent" to outcome and provide a "formality" through which "contingency is somewhat abated" (74).

The transitoriness of action is also diminished in self-enactment, that is, in the agent's intention and motive. Intention is oriented to the substantive end outcome of the act, while the motive of the action is the reason for subscription to moral laws. In both cases, the actor is "emancipated from liability to the frustration of adverse circumstances." Oakeshott (1975, 74) writes that in the interior experience of self-enactment, "doing is delivered, at least in part, from the deadliness of doing, a deliverance gracefully enjoyed in the quiet of a religious faith."

The highest, most durable moment of action is the "motive" for the act or the category of virtue, that is, self-enactment in relation to moral practices. When speaking the language of virtue, the self is "as uncon-

cerned as may be with the brittle pursuit and enjoyment of satisfactions and therefore as indifferent as may be to its frustration." This noninstrumentality constitutes how virtue is not "altruistic" but is self-affirming in that it allows for a "release from the bondage of contingent circumstances" (Oakeshott 1975, 75–76).

Oakeshott argues that the advantage of virtuous behavior lies in its "indifference" to consequences. Integrity is present-oriented. Oakeshott takes pains to note that virtue is not self-denial but the affirmation of personal character without regard to what happens in the world. Virtue may "improve" the world, but the inner value of virtuous conduct does not depend on any such improvement. Oakeshott makes clear that the content of a moral practice, such as honor, is not strictly private (as was suggested in *Rationalism in Politics*) but is constituted by the "genuine compunctions" of a moral practice. In other words, virtue is publicly defined through moral practices. Of course, the enactment of moral rules takes place in contingent circumstances at the occasion of purposeful action. What counts as integrity in the moment is at the disposal of the agent, but the agent reflects on this problem based on generally shared considerations.

THE STATE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The idea of self-sufficiency is central to Oakeshott's idea of noninstrumental law or "*lex*." For Oakeshott, only this proper law protects the integrity of the individual's choice. The self who appreciates self-sufficiency is likely to gravitate to this idea of the state and flourish in it. This is not to say that the purpose of the state is to create a type of personality or "combat" resentment. The whole meaning of Oakeshott's reconstruction of the liberal state is that it is purposeless. The personality Oakeshott prizes is likely to emerge in this conception of the liberal state, in the same way that "peace" (and perhaps peacefulness) is a by-product of the liberal state but not a "purpose."

In the third essay in *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott describes the "civil condition," a political association constituted by noninstrumental moral practices. This conception of the state is an example of the general distinction between two different types of associations constituted by either instrumental or moral practices. An association bound by instrumental practices is an "enterprise association," the rules of which are oriented to the achievement of ends, as the rules of a firehouse are oriented to the efficient putting out of fires. A civil association, on the other hand, is constituted by moral practices and has no end whatsoever. Oakeshott calls a state understood as a civil association the "civil condition." The civil condition is constituted by formal laws. These laws create the set conditions for acting without directing specific individuals to particular goals.

On one level, the formality of the laws of the civil condition protects diversity in the pursuit of ends, a central feature of liberalism. On a deeper level, the formality of the law reflects Oakeshott's vision of the human good or well-being that comes from

having a noninstrumental view of experience. To be sure, Oakeshott does not disparage the value of enterprise associations. The world needs firehouses. He does place a superior value on noninstrumental experience.

For Oakeshott, the civil condition is the only understanding of the state that protects "agency." Oakeshott argues that a postulate of agency is the ability to choose ends. The choice of an end is the "outcome of an intelligent engagement." Agency remains free when there is no break in the link between an act and intelligence. An enterprise association is organized according to instrumental practices that tell the members what to do and it exists in order to achieve a goal. Enterprise associations are perfectly compatible with agency when entry into them is freely accepted. An enterprise association may direct individuals toward an end that they agree to pursue, as when a business corporation directs its members to gain a profit. Oakeshott argues that if the state becomes an enterprise association, it must limit agency because the modern state is "comprehensive." By comprehensive Oakeshott means that a person does not choose to enter a state and can only leave by entering another. The modern state contradicts the free entry and departure that constitutes the agent's "freedom" in enterprise associations.

In subscribing to *lex*, on the other hand, citizens do not assent to a substantive goal. The members of a civil association understand that moral rules are the condition of agency whether they approve of any particular rule or not. Since noninstrumental law has no goal, it is authoritative without the need to gain the "approval" of citizens. Law understood as codified moral practice means that human agency is rule governed but not controlled. Oakeshott argues that in the civil condition the capacity to choose ends is in no way limited. Even criminal law does not impede the choice of ends; because such law is adverbial it articulates how an action is undertaken, not what is chosen. "A criminal law, which may be thought to come nearest to forbidding actions, does not forbid killing or lighting a fire, it forbids killing "murderously" or lighting a fire "arsonically" (Oakeshott 1975, 58fn).

Oakeshott argues that moral practice and the law as codified morality embody the public consciousness of generalized conditions of right action. Insofar as action is constrained by considerations of the moral life, the actor is concerned with others. Insofar as action aims at an end, the actor's consciousness is private. Oakeshott rejects the typical liberal division of public and private into two spheres, domains of interaction between which the actor moves to and fro. Public and private are aspects of all practical action. "'Private' and 'public' refer to relationships, not to persons, to performances, or to places. And they meet in every substantive engagement: the private 'interest' in its success and the public concern that it shall not be pursued without taking into considerations (specified in *lex*) which are indifferent to success or failure" (Oakeshott 1975, 146).

This reformulation of the traditional distinction between public and private is central to critics who praise the originality of Oakeshott's liberalism as well as critics who reject the entire framework. The former group

argues that Oakeshott's liberalism is an improvement on the "atomistic" conception of the self in social contract and deontological liberalism in which the community is a mere means to the realization of the human good chosen by each individual. Some critical readers of Oakeshott doubt that he can sustain the difference between the adverbial and the substantial. These writers argue that, for example, to forbid a murderous killing is to criminalize a substantial act, not to regulate the manner of an action.⁶

In his insistence on the noninstrumentality of the law, Oakeshott goes so far as to reject the category of state "policy," and even of an "executive" branch, except in emergencies such as war. A state has no interest in any end and no need for an executive branch to direct a policy. Oakeshott (1975, 153) brushes aside the idea of distributive justice: "And there is, of course, no place in civil association for so-called 'distributive' justice; that is, the distribution of desirable substantive goods. Such a 'distribution' of substantive benefits or advantages requires a rule of distribution and a distributor in possession of what is to be distributed; but a *lex* cannot be a rule of distribution of this sort, and civil rulers have nothing to distribute."

At the end of *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott summarizes his argument about the two dispositions, a consistent theme in his work beginning with "Religion and the World." He notes that these dispositions are "powerful and contrary" and that neither one is "strong enough to defeat or put to flight the other." One disposition prefers being "self-employed." This self emphasizes "self-determination" understood as the enjoyment "of wants rather than slippery satisfactions and of adventures rather than uncertain outcomes." Traveling is preferred to the destination and "ambulatory conversation" is preferred to "deliberation about means for achieving ends" (Oakeshott, 1975, 324).

The contrary disposition prefers ends-achievement. Oakeshott emphasize the collective bent of this disposition, namely, those disposed in this manner see themselves in league "with others in a common enterprise and as a sharer in a common stock of resources and a common stock of talent with which to exploit it." This language leads some to focus on Oakeshott purely as a critic of economic planning and socialism. They neglect the fact that Oakeshott wants to deemphasize the pursuit of outcome in general. In this disposition "outcomes" are more important than "wants" or "satisfactions." The orientation to outcome as a collective matter, as we have seen, also involves the bourgeois state's concern with maximum satisfaction with the least effort.

OAKESHOTT AS EGALITARIAN AND ARISTOCRAT

Oakeshott's discussion of self-sufficiency contains an unresolved tension. On the one hand, the experience of self-sufficiency engenders an egalitarian and nonmanipulative sensibility that might reduce resentment. On

⁶ For an overview of these issues see Friedman 1992.

the other hand, there is an aristocratic tendency that might give rise to resentment. At least one commentator notes that while Oakeshott believed that "egalitarian politics" were "fallacious," he "was a spiritual democrat: he did not think anyone could gain exemption from the limits of mortal human existence; he was Augustinian, not Pelagian" (Fuller 1993, 72). What is the content of this spiritual democracy? Oakeshott believes that the self-sufficiency of morality is available to all, independent of "ignorance or inexpertness" in practical action. While the world of desire is an "unavoidable *bellum omnium contra omnes*" in which one self is a thing for the pleasure of another, in the moral moment of activity humans are "equal members of a community" (Oakeshott 1991, 500). This mutuality is grounded in the ethos that "other selves are acknowledged to be ends and not merely means to our own ends" (502).

An aspect of Oakeshott's spiritual democracy is wariness about market activities despite his support for markets over government, and in clear contradiction to Hayek's unqualified support of the market. Oakeshott contrasts the mutuality and presentness of certain non-market activities with instrumentality and the future orientation of market life. The former are "activities where what is sought is present enjoyment and not a profit." The experience of profit-oriented roles, such as "buyer and seller, principal and agent," contradict the noninstrumentality of the present. He writes that economic relationships of "supply and demand . . . allow no room for the intrusion of the loyalties and attachments which spring from familiarity" (Oakeshott 1991, 416). Oakeshott criticizes the purely instrumental logic of market relations not on the grounds of selfishness but because market life intensifies transience, is future-oriented and calculating.

Despite these egalitarian elements, there remains a strong aristocratic tendency in Oakeshott's work. In the essay on Hobbes mentioned above, Oakeshott (1991, 344) argues that Hobbes is better understood as a theorist of the "morality of individuality" that he terms "aristocratic." Hobbes was primarily concerned with the "rarely found" few motivated by "pride" more than "fear." For this Hobbesian personality, pride "appears as self-knowledge and self-respect, the delusion of power over others is replaced by the reality of self-control, and the glory of the invulnerability from which courage generates magnanimity and magnanimity, peace" (341). Peace, the end of the Hobbesian polity, becomes an end-in-itself, not the means to self-preservation. The aristocratic figure is a "creature more properly concerned with honour than with survival and prosperity" (344). This suggests that for Oakeshott the liberal order is valuable primarily because it allows the rare individual to appreciate the value of self-sufficiency.

This aristocratic tendency informs Oakeshott's critique of the poor and of distributive justice. He believes that the redistribution of resources is beyond the scope of the state: "Rulers have nothing to distribute." Material deprivation only slightly limits the possibility of enjoying action for its own sake. His main concern

with the poor is that they threaten the liberal order. Oakeshott (1975, 304f) writes, "The poor were recognized to be a threat to civil association because their erroneous belief that they had nothing to lose but their poverty made them the willing instruments of an ambitious man bent upon subversion." A redistribution of wealth might have a negative effect on the individual insofar as a person's "capacity for agency" may be "emasculated by eleemosynary benefits" (304fn).

There is a note of ambiguity on this point. After condemning the wholesale transformation of the state into an enterprise association to appease the grievances of the poor, he does appear to allow for the validity of Hegel's argument that "great disparities of wealth were an 'impediment' (though not a bar) to the enjoyment of civil association, and this hindrance could and should be reduced by imposing civil conditions upon industrial enterprise . . . and where necessary the exercise of a judicious 'lordship' for the relief of the destitute" (Oakeshott 1975, 305fn). Clearly though, Oakeshott's poor are treated as inferiors by the elite capable of making a life for themselves.

In summary, Oakeshott encourages a nonmanipulative ethic. This ethic takes concrete form in his Kantian interpretation of morality, which is the self-sufficient moment of practical activity. This mutuality reduces resentment at finitude because it reduces calculation. Oakeshott, however, is unconcerned with the resentment found in a social order of unequal resources and where only a few can achieve the preferred form of life. Oakeshott's theory provides few resources for the development of the personality he prizes.

CONCLUSION: OAKESHOTT AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

In this paper I have traced in Oakeshott's work the problem of "finitude" and two responses to this problem. An overemphasis on instrumentality leads to normalization, while a sense of intrinsic worth promotes a sense of distinctness. Oakeshott ties self-sufficiency into the structure of action in morality and shows how morality, properly understood, is codified into law. If the civil condition is an idea of liberalism, then we can see how the liberal order enhances Oakeshott's scale of value. In the civil condition, selves will tend to experience their lives as their own "telos."

How does Oakeshott reformulate the terms of the debate over liberalism? As others have noted, Oakeshott goes beyond the usual discussion about too much or too little "community" involvement in the life of individual. The question for Oakeshott is the type of community life. Oakeshott distinguishes between the law understood as adverbial considerations and laws understood as substantial commands about ends the individual must pursue or avoid. While critics of Oakeshott have argued that formal considerations are ultimately substantial, they have failed to see that the very formality of morality makes it important as the fabric of noninstrumentality. Formality creates a sense of life, a "scale of value" that mitigates instrumentality,

reduces resentment, and so cuts off the source of normalization.

Oakeshott is not a "neutralist" liberal since he upholds a definition of the meaning of freedom. For neutralist liberals, such substantial ideas of freedom as "self-realization" threaten the pluralism of ends that is the heart of the liberal order. These ideas embody a comprehensive "good" that selves feel obligated to pursue, or are compelled to achieve through state action (Larmore 1987, 46–47). Oakeshott's work implies a criticism of any social theory that does not address the problem of meaning that finitude creates. Oakeshott clearly disagrees with Richard Flathman's idea of liberal freedom as something valued as a means to the satisfaction of desire. For Oakeshott, such a view does not distinguish between the noninstrumental development and pursuit of desires and ends, on the one hand, and the achievement of desires and ends, on the other. Further, in Flathman's (1992, 210) liberalism the community plays no role in the constitution of the good: "Public life at its best cannot itself create or sustain individuality, too often diminishes or even destroys it."

Although the concept of virtue is important for Oakeshott, he differs from recent liberal writings on the subject. He would agree with these liberals that the community plays a role in the constitution of agency (Macedo 1998, 56–57). He disagrees with how some liberals define virtue. In contemporary debates, the liberal virtues of tolerance, mutual respect, responsibility, provide a sense of community and restraint without excessive limitations on personal freedom. Oakeshott believes that these liberals fail to account for the normalizing dangers of shared values such as virtue. These virtues are mostly instrumental since they enable individuals to excel in their functions and allow for the flourishing of liberal society. Even when virtue-liberals identify an "end" or intrinsic good, this good refers to a life of externality, of "getting things done." William Galston (1995, 50) identifies the excellence of liberal virtues as having a "common core—a vision of individuals who in some manner take responsibility for their own lives." Virtue here lacks the Oakeshottian sense of a true end in itself. These virtues may lead to a normalizing outcome since a virtuous life means that selves must "make" themselves into something. Selves become objects to themselves. Selves manipulate their own inner experience as if it were other "things."⁷

On this point there is a link between Oakeshott and writers who oppose liberalism from a radical perspective. One critic finds in Oakeshott an "indictment of contemporary western life so sweeping and unrelentingly bleak that it threatens at times to end in the kind of extreme left-wing alienation found in Frankfurt School Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse" (O'Sullivan 2001, 41). The reference to the Frankfurt School is interesting if put in the context of Wendy Brown's (1995, 63) reminder that there is an "unexamined Frankfurt School strain in Foucault," that the "Foucaultian sub-

ject originally desirous of freedom comes to will its own domination or . . . becomes a good disciplinary subject." Oakeshott shares with these left perspectives a concern with the pathologies of a liberalism grounded in a self-objectifying instrumentality.

Despite these suggestions of antiliberalism, Oakeshott should be identified with the liberal tradition because of his conception of the rule of law, his defense of the market economy, and his critique of collectivism in all its forms. His theorizing is fiercely opposed to the idea of the substantial good of communitarian thought as well as the developmentalist idea of freedom found in Marx. Oakeshott's work is best seen as an internal critique of the liberal order that warns of a trajectory liberalism can take. Just as Oakeshott identifies two competing dispositions in the personality perhaps there are competing dispositions in the liberal order, with Oakeshott and Hayek at either pole. Oakeshott's alternative to Hayek is all the more necessary in the current moment given the influence of Hayekian liberalism on global neoliberal political discourse.

I have suggested at least one limit to Oakeshott's thought in that his stresses on the aristocratic and his indifference to poverty are at war with his own "spiritual democracy." Still, his work needs to be seen as a profound contribution to the contemporary debate over liberalism. Oakeshott's concern with European existentialism means that he rejects any ahistorical foundation for politics. His idea of morality as adverbial considerations of action is an alternative to the received liberal orthodoxy on the public/private distinction. When explored through the framework of poststructuralism, Oakeshott demonstrates that liberalism's fundamental promise to protect personal freedom and a diversity of life choices is undermined when freedom is valued for something other than itself. Although liberalism should not be reduced to the idea of individual achievement or "success," it is important to emphasize how the ideal of outcome may contain deeply illiberal possibilities.

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⁷ See Dana Villa's (1996) critique of Aristotelian virtue on the same grounds.

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Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and Majority Rule

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This essay examines the tension between agenda-setting and majority rule in the writings of one of the earliest and most original theorists of participatory democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Exploring Rousseau's views on lawmaking and the complexities associated with legislative initiation, specifically, this essay challenges the notion that representatives or legislative experts in a democracy inevitably reduce popular participation to acclamation. Contrary to authors who believe that Rousseau surreptitiously devolves political power to an elected elite who predecide a legislative agenda for a passive majority to vote upon later, I argue that the philosopher delegates authority to initiate the laws to representatives without undermining either the sovereignty or the robustness of citizen self-rule. This argument reveals, in part, why contemporary participatory democracy is not inherently "immobile" owing to the self-reinforcing benefits of democratic participation within a well-balanced constitution.

A central tenet of "strong democracy" and other contemporary theories of participatory democracy is the belief that the "more that individuals participate" in self-governance "the better able they become to do so" (Barber 1984, 167–73; Pateman 1970, 43; Wolfe 1985, 371). More valuable than expert guidance by an elected elite is the political education received from democratic participation under conditions of political equality. Knowledge of how to govern is "communal and consensual," and through the holding of televised debates, town hall meetings, referendums, plebiscites, open ballot initiatives, and other practical expressions of citizen self-rule, the people "deepen" the quality of democracy by expressing their will directly. Though the people may lack certain forms of specialized knowledge and technical skill, over time this void will be filled because "the pragmatic and self-regulating character of democratic politics" makes "political knowledge autonomous" (Barber 1984, 167).

Challenging this view, critics of participatory democracy routinely emphasize government's need for specialized competency and legislative expertise (Sartori 1987, 432; Schumpeter 1943, 261–62). They argue that it is impractical, if not utopian, to believe that a majority can or should legislate the laws without critical intervention by experts. Requisite for overcoming the logistical difficulties of size and numbers, agenda-setting by a professional body or class of legislators makes possible enlightened lawmaking. As Thomas Hobbes (1841, X:x, 136–37) wrote back in 1642, "Very few in a great Assembly of men understand" by "what goods the Country is nourished, and defended" or are able "to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a Common-weal."

Both of these contrary viewpoints allude to a dilemma unique to representative government in which those persons who are the most able to advance and benefit the aspirations of the people by way of their specialized knowledge are simultaneously those who

are also the most capable and likely to undermine majority rule. This dilemma exists even in a participatory democracy because, as John Stuart Mill ([1861] 1975, 223) noted, the political value of participation mitigates but does not entirely diminish government's need for law-making professionals. Identifying the basis of this dilemma, Robert Michels (1915, 83–84) wrote a half-century later, "This special competence, this expert knowledge, which the leader acquires in matters inaccessible, or almost inaccessible, to the mass . . . conflicts with the essential principles of democracy." Similarly, Hanna F. Pitkin (1967, 135–36) explains in her classic study, "Whenever we seek professional help or services, we are asking to be represented" for "the presumption of a specialized knowledge or skill in the representative suggests that he need not take orders from his constituents." This suggestion that representatives "need not take orders from his constituents" is not illegitimate because it is "the presumption of a specialized knowledge or skill" in representatives that, in part, is the source of their authority (Manin 1997, 139). This said, democracy's dilemma remains in that experts elected to serve beneath the people may surreptitiously serve over them by applying this specialized knowledge in a manner designed to keep those who selected them in ignorance of their actual situation. As has often been the case in history, experts have even utilized their knowledge in a manner that violates the rights and freedoms that give democracy meaning. Considering this danger, it is meaningful to ask whether agenda-setting by experts and majority rule must *necessarily* conflict in the way that these theorists describe. Is it true that whenever democrats authorize experts to agenda-set the laws, they are indeed "asking to be represented?"

One answer to this question was voiced many years ago by the earliest and, perhaps, most radical proponent of participatory democracy ever, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his political writings, Rousseau argues that majority rule is indeed possible even in the presence of agenda-setting experts. By "majority rule," I mean, specifically, rule by the people in the broadest sense of the term as *active*, *influential*, and *practically meaningful* participation in lawmaking even when experts set the agenda. By this term I also mean, temporally, lawmaking after the foundational *législateur* of Rousseau's (1997b) *Du contrat social* (henceforth

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The author wishes to thank Mads Qvortrup, Benjamin Wong, and APSR's Reviewers.

CS) voluntarily cedes its authority to the citizenry and to those persons among them who will assume its functions. This expansion of self-rule, dealt with parsimoniously in the vast literature on Rousseau, begins when citizens are mature enough morally and politically to be able to comprehend and institutionalize the *volonté générale* free of paternalistic interference by the *législateur*. Lasting for a number of years, presumably, before the inevitable decline of the republic owing to the debasement of public morals, this era of (at least formally) unmediated self-governance is a time when the laws appear to be most democratic.

It is also the moment when, according to Daniel Cullen (1993, 152–53), Richard Fralin (1978, 54), and Steven Johnson (1999, 87, 118),¹ among other authors, the representative features in Rousseau's complex system come most into play as the authority to initiate the laws devolves from the *législateur* to a select body of elected aristocrats whose job it is to predecide all legislation to be put before the people's vote (CS, III:v, 94/408).² According to these commentators, this crucial agenda-setting role undermines majority rule by elevating elected representatives into a locus of legislative authority in Rousseau's mature state. Johnson (1999, 87) writes, for example, that with the ratification of the laws "will masquerades as a property of the sovereign realm [as] government assumes responsibility for its actual formation and maintenance." In Rousseau's state "the subject-citizen" is a "contrivance of power" and an "artifice to be constructed more than an essence to be realized" (87). Less harshly, Daniel Cullen (1993, 152–53) explains that in Rousseau's polity the initiation of law by representatives reduces the people to "passivity" and "a punctuation of the political process."

This view is similar to that of Roger Masters and the late Judith N. Shklar, who, years earlier, argued that government exerts far more influence in Rousseau's

state than is apparent from the philosopher's denunciations of representation. Each concurred with Giovanni Sartori's (later [1987, 314]) description of representatives as serving to mobilize an otherwise "immobile democracy." Owing to logistics, the generality of its vote, the infrequency of its meetings, and Rousseau's restriction upon "'legislation' to the general or fundamental laws that are the 'conditions of the civil association'" (Masters 1968, 339), Shklar ([1969] 1987, 181) concludes that "the sovereign does very little." Master's (1968, 402) writes that, in the past, the philosopher's "explicit preference for elective aristocracy has not been sufficiently considered . . . [as it is] merely another name for parliamentary or representative government." Johnson (1999, 82, 118) agrees that "if Rousseau's texts are read carefully, I would suggest, the prominence of law and politics recede somewhat and the importance of government surges" and he asks "Are such subjects really capable of sovereign responsibility? Of changing entrenched laws, whether the best or the worst?"

This seemingly narrow question about the locus of political authority in Rousseau's state is relevant to more contemporary theories of participatory democracy by reinforcing the Schumpeterian view that democracy is rule by elites. Rousseau's sovereign is "constructed" in the sense that Schumpeter (1943, 262, 263) believes that politicians "fashion and . . . create the will of the people" into a "manufactured will." His constructed sovereign is seen as incapable of either "self-imposed law" or of self-reinforcing government. If Rousseau is viewed as "theorist *par excellence* of participation" (Pateman 1970, 22), whose republican ideas are "the most radical, if not the most radical, ever developed," this is a particularly forceful and pointed criticism (Held 1996, 56). In a different vein, this criticism of Rousseau highlights a problem of legislative agenda-setting in general, that "citizens of Western democracies can vote for those who will govern them but rarely for the policies by which they are governed; more rarely are they provided the opportunity to create their own agendas through permanent public discourse" (Barber 1984, 267). Rousseau appears unable to reconcile democracy's dual needs of expert agenda-setting and majority rule in even a minimalist system in which "permanent public discourse" is not an issue.

Below, I address each of these questions by arguing that neither does Rousseau intend nor does his constitutional plan allow for representation in any strong sense. Rejecting Shklar's view that "the sovereign does very little," I argue that democracy in his mature state is more robust than appears owing to a number of institutional and other substantive checks designed to prevent sovereignty being reduced to a mere "punctuation of the political process." Conversely, I argue that the alternative overly democratic or populist reading of lawmaking in Rousseau's state (Ellenburg 1976, 159–60; Miller 1984, 64, 120) is also wanting to the extent that this interpretation fails to explain why Rousseau does not permit the people *both* to initiate and to ratify the laws. If men are as ripe for self-rule as Rousseau implies, then why is a separation of powers among lawmakers

¹ Johnson and Cullen echo Richard Fralin's once-controversial view that elected aristocrats are the decisive legislative figures in Rousseau's state. In *Rousseau and Representation* (1978), Fralin argues that Rousseau consolidates legislative power in the hands of an elected elite in much the same way that Geneva's *Petit conseil* predecided all legislation put before the ratifying *Conseil générale*. Fralin writes that "the model of the CS was . . . recognizably the same basic model as that of the *Dédicace*" [to the second *Discours*—where Rousseau extols the sagacity of Geneva's *Petit conseil* and warns of the dangers of majoritarian self-rule]. Within Geneva "The allegedly subordinate councils were superior in fact; not only was there not an identity of interests among citizens, but the city was in effect divided into separate bodies, each contending for power" (Fralin 1978, 54).

² Rousseau writes in CS that "sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the *volonté générale*, and the will does not admit of being represented: Either it is the same or it is different; there is no middle ground. The deputies of the people therefore are not and cannot be its representatives, they are merely its agents [*commissaires*]; they cannot conclude anything definitively" (CS, III:xv, 114/429–30). In the only other section of the treatise where he discusses legislative initiation in the mature state, Rousseau states that "on the right of voicing opinions, proposing, dividing, discussing . . . the government takes great care to allow only to its own members" (IV:i, 122/439). All of the page numbers and citations from Rousseau's writings refer to (1) the English translations located in the references at the end of this essay and (2) the standard five-volume Gallimard edition of the *Œuvres Complètes* (1959, 1964, 1964, 1969, 1995).

even necessary? My view is that both sets of authors fail to answer this question adequately.

DEBUNKING THE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN ROUSSEAU'S MATURE STATE

In *CS*, Rousseau (1997b) describes the *législateur* as a transitional figure who edifies the *moeurs* of the people by way of the laws. Crafting legislation to inculcate Roman-style civic virtue and corporate unity, the *législateur* voluntarily retires, according to Rousseau, when the citizen body is morally and politically mature enough to legislate the laws by themselves. Though every ratified law is an expression of the *volonté générale* and Rousseau is unambiguous that laws are legitimate for this reason alone, he prescribes this transition believing that citizens will be cognizant of the *volonté générale* enough to be trusted with both ends of democratic lawmaking. Assuming total control over the laws, citizens are empowered to appoint a body from among themselves to initiate the laws that the community, as a whole, will ratify in person.

For some commentators this latter act of naming a second body to initiate the laws is of marginal importance, while for others it is evidence of Rousseau's distrust of majority rule. With respect to the former, in the widest sense "popular sovereignty is tenable because the citizens have been 'educated,' 'formed' [and] 'guided' " (Crocker 1973, 182). Having "borne the true yoke of laws" (*CS*, II:x, 77/390), citizens in his later state are no longer similar to the ancient Hebrews, "a swarm of wretched fugitives" and a "wandering and servile" horde in need of guidance (Rousseau, *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* [henceforth *CGP*], II, 180–81/956–57). This interpretation emphasizes how citizens practically "self-impose" legislation in the strong and intuitively satisfying sense of ratifying and initiating the laws that express their will. This notion is consonant with Rousseau's description of this body as agents or "*commissaires*" of the laws, rather than as "*representants*," to identify this body's bearing as an agent of the sovereign (*CS*, III:xv, 114/429–30).³

With respect to the second reading, the view is that Rousseau proposes the appointment of an elite body of aristocrats from among the citizenry because he has larger ambitions in mind. The true locus of political power in the republic, this body is responsible for the day-to-day functions of the government as well as for initiating and ratifying all of the civil and criminal laws. Together with ordinary legislation, the constitutional laws (*loix fondamentales*) are also initiated by representatives but voted upon by the community at large. Voting by the community at large is infrequent because

the people are narrowly restricted to constitutional law-making alone or, as Shklar (1969, 181) describes, "not called upon to make or remake laws but to reassert the people's willingness to abide by the contract and to live in justice."

In a unique feature of Rousseau's system, this initiation of constitutional legislation by a body other than the community at large does not divide its sovereignty. According to the philosopher, expert agenda-setting in his ideal state does not constitute representation, alienation, or a division of the *volonté générale* in any way. This corporate will, made explicit only at the very moment of the ratifying vote, is entirely vested in the majority and its integrity is preserved by the absence of *commissaires* during the final vote. In *CS* it is this consistency that makes possible (and plausible) the strong argument for representation by Rousseau. Formally, at least, an elected elite can do most of the legislating in his state and the philosopher can still claim with consistency that "*la Souveraineté ne peut être représentée*" (*CS*, III:xv, 114/429).

As congruous as the strong argument for representation is with Rousseau's unique definition of sovereignty (which I do not deny), it is also problematic on a number of levels that this congruousness veils. Of these difficulties, the most conspicuous, arguably, is the obvious irreconcilability of the strong argument for representation with the philosopher's frequent and vociferous protests against representation. One can argue that Rousseau expresses these protests repeatedly and forcefully enough to, at the very least, earn himself the benefit of the doubt that his intent really is to prevent representatives' from encroaching upon the legislative power of the majority. This can be witnessed in *CS* as he asserts that "sovereignty . . . consists essentially in the general will, and the will does not admit of being represented: either it is the same or it is different; there is no middle ground" (III:xv, 115/429–30). This "middle ground" appears to be not a purely theoretical space arising from the philosopher's idiosyncratic view of sovereignty, but something more concrete resulting from his knowledge of how political power is actually exercised and his fears about how it is expanded. This is also evident in his warning in *CS* not to let the polity grow large enough that "the Chiefs, scattered in order to govern it, can make decisions on behalf of the Sovereign" (III:v, 93–94/407). Although the Chiefs may be endowed with "probity, enlightenment and experience" it is the people who are "the voice of God," according to Rousseau. He laments elsewhere that "this sacred voice is always weak in human affairs beside the clamor of power; the complaint of oppressed innocence is breathed out in groans which tyranny treats with scorn" (Rousseau, *Lettres de la montagne*, VIII, 862).

Considering fear over the clamor of power, Rousseau's near-total silence on the specifics of legislative initiation in his mature state appears telling. It is surprising that, for an author who was rarely lost for words on anything politically germane, Rousseau offers just two brief cryptic comments on the positive features of legislative representation in his mature

³ In her classic study, Hanna F. Pitkin distinguishes *representants* from *commissaires* according to the latter's subordination to the majority. Pitkin (1967, 134) writes that "... 'commissioner' (unlike 'deputy') suggest[s] that the representative is sent to the central government with explicit instructions, or to do a particular thing And it is suggested that those sending him are a unified and official body There is no doubt that . . . commissioners . . . are subordinates of those who send them."

state—and both within the context of *rejecting* the sovereignty of representatives. The first is that the “deputies of the people therefore are not and cannot be its representatives, they are merely its agents [*commissaires*]; they cannot conclude anything definitively” (CS, III:xv, 114/429–30). The second is that “on the right of voicing opinions, proposing, dividing, discussing . . . the government takes great care to allow only to its own members” (IV:i, 122/439). One can speculate that each of these short passages was not further elaborated upon by Rousseau so as to diminish the significance of the agenda-setting functions of the government (or Prince). At least, this appears to have been the effect as the philosopher’s parsimoniousness on this subject has produced confusion over the years among even his most able readers. In each of their respective early 20th-century translations of the philosopher’s political writings, for example, both Earnest Barker and C. E. Vaughan glossed over these lines entirely to describe Rousseau’s idealized polity as free of any type of legislative representation. Barker (1947, xxxviii) writes that “Rousseau himself is aware of the necessity for distillation; but he will not trust representatives to do this necessary work . . .,” neglecting to mention that this power is entrusted to representatives at a later date. Similarly, Vaughan (1915, 186) writes that “with one exception” (legislative representation), the theory of CS is also “the doctrine . . . of the *Lettres de la montagne*.” This “exception” is, in actuality, a point of agreement between the two works that the Genevan obfuscates by omission.

If it is indeed true that Rousseau is deliberately silent on the role of representatives in this mature state, it would still be surprising considering the effusive praise that he lavishes upon Geneva’s *Petit conseil* in his *Dédicace* to the *Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes* (DI) a few years earlier (Rousseau 1997a, DI, 119/116). Whether this silence “suggests that there are many possible arrangements regarding the right to propose and to debate laws compatible with his principles” (Gildin, 1983, 159) is unclear, but what is clear is that Rousseau’s aside in CS, that “this important matter would require a separate treatise, and I cannot say everything in this one” (IV:i, 122/439), rings slightly hollow when situated beside his expansive comments on other matters of major political import—such as the negative aspects of representation. And it is for this reason that the philosopher’s fawning over Geneva’s *Petit conseil* in the *Dédicace* to the second *Discours* should not, at the very least, be understood as endorsing all that he lauds in this earlier work. In the *Dédicace*, he writes, for example, that “I should have wished that not everyone have the power to propose new Laws according to his fancy; that this right belong to the Magistrates alone” (DI, 116–17/114). Speaking of Geneva, he asks,

Does anyone of you know anywhere in the universe of a more upright, more enlightened, or more respectable Body than your Magistrature? Do not all of its members offer you an example of moderation, of simplicity or morals, of

respect for the laws, and of the most sincere reconciliation? Then grant without reservations to these wise Chiefs the salutary trust which reason owes to virtue . . . (119/116).

Though often quoted, the *Dédicace* to the second *Discours* is an especially poor example of Rousseau’s views on the merits of representative government. This can be seen, in part, from the motives for why Rousseau wrote the *Dédicace* in the first place. Specifically, like Machiavelli’s own Dedicatory Letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici in *Il Principe*, his flattery in the *Dédicace* appears to be influenced by political considerations distinct from the republican sentiments expressed in the writing itself. These considerations are not personal, as Helena Rosenblatt argues in *Rousseau and Geneva* (1997), but political and an expression of the philosopher’s desire to secure official permission from Geneva’s *Petit conseil* for the publication of the second *Discours*. Because any “formal permission granted by the Genevan government would . . . have implied their approval of the principles espoused in the Dedication, and even in the Discourse itself” (Rosenblatt 1997, 84–85). According to Rosenblatt (84–85), after returning to his place of birth, Rousseau eventually came to abandon all hope of receiving this official sanction believing “that the authorities would not approve of the political ideals the Dedication upheld.” Too disillusioned even to request formal approval, in the end Rousseau actually did receive official endorsement by the Genevan authorities in June 1755—an act that would have been inconceivable if his true beliefs about the *Petit conseil* had been voiced in the *Dédicace*.

Rosenblatt (1997, 159) writes that the *Dédicace* should be read as a “sophisticated political manifesto” by which “through ostensible flattery Rousseau delivered an ingenious criticism of the values of Geneva’s governing body.” In her view, “Anyone acquainted with Genevan society and politics would have recognized not just a hint of sarcasm in Rousseau’s flattery. Some of his characterizations of Genevans border on the farcical. For example, Rousseau . . . described the magistrates as being the very example of virtue and wisdom because of their moderation, their ‘simplicity of manners,’ their ‘respect for the laws’ and their desire to promote the ‘most sincere reconciliation’” (160). The subversiveness of Rousseau’s flattery of the *Petit conseil* would not have been lost on Genevan readers, according to Rosenblatt, even if, in the end, it bypassed the Genevan authorities. It is highly doubtful that the *Petit conseil*’s endorsement would have come at all if the more overtly democratic descriptions of the sovereignty of the *Conseil general* were not couched in flattery for the lesser body.

Whether this interpretation is an accurate assessment of the motives behind Rousseau’s writing of the *Dédicace* is open to debate, but what is certain is that the philosopher’s exaltation of Geneva’s *Petit conseil* in the *Dédicace* is soft ground upon which to stake a claim that representatives are the locus for political

authority in CS. How soft this ground really is can be seen in the paucity of contemporary commentators' arguments for why Rousseau believes it necessary to reduce sovereign members to a "contrivance of power." According to Richard Fralin (1978, 5, 8) the philosopher was "ambivalent about the value of direct citizen participation in the political process" and believed that the government ought to exert "a preponderant role in legislation" to "prevent the people from abusing their sovereignty." According to Johnson (1999, 87), government "assumes responsibility" for the sovereign's "actual formation and maintenance" to fashion suitable subjects who will allow for "for the republic to thrive, for the law to be truly respected." In light of these readings, it is meaningful to ask, though, whether such extreme measures truly are necessary to achieve these general aims. A powerful counterargument can be made for example, that virtually all of the supposed benefits resulting from elected aristocrats superior attributes exist elsewhere in Rousseau's polity: in particular, that whatever their natural or cultivated gifts, legislative *commissaires* are neither the primary nor even the secondary means of engendering good laws in his state. Rather than relying upon an enlightened elite to instill probity, virtue, and equity into the laws, what is more important to Rousseau are the institutionalized procedures that accompany voting that strengthen citizenship and, by extension, strengthen the laws. This can be seen after the *législateur* departs when, according to Rousseau, it is the "admirable agreement between interest and justice that confers upon common deliberations a character of equity" (CS, II:iv:7, 62/374), rather than the influence of a wise elite. When each votes for him- or herself by voting for all, reason rather than opinion guides individuals' private interests into conformity with the common good. This arrangement renders justice procedurally while substituting "justice for instinct" (I:xiii:1,2, 53/364) in citizens' conduct even after the *législateur* departs. Anticipating Tocqueville's praise of juries, Rousseau considers self-governance to be a politically educative mechanism for fostering corporate unity and civic virtue. The social contract's principle of equity compels each to consider all when considering his or her own interests in a manner that engenders civic responsibility and the virtues that promote obedience to law. This is very unlike what happens during the republic's founding, when citizens are easily confused and misguided about their own interests and a *législateur* is necessary. Later on, having "borne the true yoke of laws" (II:x, 77/390), this role is altered as the confluence of reason and self-interest make the "clear" and "luminous" *volonté générale* apparent. Any psychological "conditioning," so to speak, is unnecessary because the procedures that accompany self-governance serve to *self-condition* citizens to pass good laws. This self-conditioning is not permanent, of course, but it is less perilous than surreptitiously delegating political power to executives serving as an elected proxy for the *législateur*. In Rousseau's mature state representatives do initiate the laws but the *volonté générale* is evident enough and the citizenry virtuous enough to

diminish the importance of their interference (discussed in the following section).

In a different vein, it should not be forgotten that, rather than instituting a latter-day *législateur*, Rousseau advocates his most infamous mechanism from the ancient world for upholding the laws, a Roman-style dictator. A temporary solution for preserving the republic and its constitution during a moment of crisis, he believes that this institution would appear often in the early years of the state and that it would suspend the "sacred power of the laws" (CS, IV:vi, 138–39/456). One can speculate that any need for a dictator in the early years of the republic would be frequent precisely *because* the people are permitted the discretion to make meaningful political decisions that might sometimes be in error. This would not be the case if the chief danger to liberty arose out of a problem in human psychology that could be addressed by a *législateur*. Conditions may be such that a more subtle expedient may sometimes prove to be more effective, but Rousseau's choice of a dictator is an indication of both the type and the degree of the difficulty to be solved.

With respect to the role of representatives in the constitution of C.S., a case can be made that Rousseau's belief that *commissaires* of the laws cannot and should not serve as latter-day *législateurs* illustrates a critical difference between his unique form of representation and those in which citizens allow themselves (or ask) "to be represented" (Pitkin 1967, 135). Unlike the constitutional democracies in existence in Western Europe and the United States or elsewhere, for example, there is no legislative separation or balance of powers anywhere in Rousseau's sovereignty in the sense that either of these terms (separation and balancing) mean within the parlance of modern constitutionalism. Any sharing of the sovereign power is a logical impossibility because the *volonté générale* cannot be limited or divided without destroying its generality. As famous as this idea is, it is sometimes lost in confusion over the meaning of Rousseau's divide between those who initiate the laws and those who ratify them and his avid belief that there must be a legislative–executive separation of powers. Rousseau believes in separating or balancing the powers *within* the executive and lauds the *gouvernement mixte* of the English constitution in the *Lettres de la montagne*, but nowhere in his writings does he propose a constitutional separation or balance of powers in the traditional sense of dividing or sharing sovereignty in order to *restrain* it. Only acts of government can be restrained, never sovereignty (Cobban 1934, 82). In his mature state, Rousseau empowers an elected elite to shape constitutional lawmaking but stops short of authorizing this body to serve as a final check. Instead, a single and undivided majority is the final arbiter over every law put before it, and those laws not put before it, such as acts of government, can be overturned by a simple majority vote.

Within a purely legislative context, this hybrid cameralist arrangement is different from both the ancient mixed constitution and Madison, Hamilton, and Jay's ([1788] 1977, 48:2,3) modern understanding of separation of powers in which the "powers belonging to

one of the departments ought not . . . possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers." With regard to the former, Rousseau does not construe representatives who propose the laws to be "balancing" the majority who ratify them in the same way, for example, that Aristotle believes that oligarchs ought to balance democrats extreme view of justice and vice versa through a rotation of political offices (*Politics*, III:9) or collegial-style power-sharing arrangement. As Rousseau's description of the Roman republic's constitution in *CS* illustrates, such divisions can exist within the government but not within the sovereign. Rousseau does describe the Roman senators as temporarily holding "in check a proud and restless people" (*CS*, IV:iv, 132/449) and praises "a wisely tempered Tribunate" for being "the firmest bulwark of a good constitution" (IV:v, 137/454), but neither of these bodies in any way "balances" the majority by intermittently *substituting* their own will for that of the Comitia's or *restraining* the will of the majority by way of a final check. Rather, the will of one faction is *entirely* and *permanently* subject to the will of its opposite at the point of ratification. The will of the majority overrides and trumps the wills of everybody else—including that of the wise elite responsible for initiating the laws. For Aristotle, this would be tantamount to compelling oligarchs to govern according to a democratic principle of justice that gives equal weight to the many in the final outcome of legislation.

This absence of a final legislative check does not mean that the majority cannot, on occasion, be *temporarily* impeded by magistrates who deliberately fail to convoke the assembly (*CS*, III:xiii, 111/426; IV:iv, 132/449) or employ various (perhaps surreptitious) methods to prevent the *volonté générale* from forming but, rather, that any imposition can eventually be overturned. Assuming that Rousseau does indeed take republican Rome to be "the model of all free peoples," as he claims, it is possible to speculate that the philosopher's trepidation over the risks to liberty posed by the zealotry of "a proud and restless people" would be assuaged by the existence of well-chosen magisterial body capable of temporarily impeding the immediate expression of the majority will. Though such Madisonian-type tempering of the *volonté générale* is contrary to the spirit of Rousseauian political liberty as "obedience to self-imposed law," the presence of such checks is consistent with many of the other republican features of *CS*'s ideal polity.

In a different vein, Rousseau's legislative system can be shown to differ from most modern types of representative government that permit legislation to be initiated and decided by officials chosen for their distinctiveness from the people. The "mature judgment," "enlightened conscience," and other qualitative differences that Edmund Burke praises before the electors of Bristol in 1774, for example, are the same attributes that Rousseau venerates among the elected elite who would initiate the laws in his own state, but unlike the former, the philosopher believes that these and other differences from the people are what disqualify representatives from legislating "decisively." Laws proposed

by *commissaires* are illegitimate and the expression of an alien will *unless* and *until* each is met with the express approval of the majority. At this moment, any differences between those who initiate the laws and those who ratify them can be said to collapse and elites to "represent" not by their differences but by their *similarities*. At no time are elites permitted a final say over the laws and their distinctiveness from the people is material only if, in the end, the people openly embrace (and level) this distinctiveness by voting the propositions of this elite into law. This notion is contrary to legislative arrangements in Britain and the United States, where, at least prior to the advent of universal suffrage, laws and even certain elective offices could be decided by elites "decisively" or with minimal interference by a qualified constituency of electors.

Built into Rousseau's legislative design are incentives and disincentives that protect against this similitude between those who initiate the laws and those who ratify them from being manipulated. Chief among these is the disincentive for elites to try to "manufacture" consent for their legislative initiatives. This disincentive is coercive because, according to Rousseau, any proposal that is rejected by the majority is said to not reflect *la volonté générale* and, by implication, the body that proposed it is seen as unaware of the *volonté générale* (*CS*, VI:ii, 124/441). As great as the desire would be for an elected elite to try to foist their won special interests on to the majority or to try to manufacture consent by grandiosely reviving the *législateur's* efforts at psychological and social engineering, the enormous costs associated with failure as well as the enormous difficulty of literally having to persuade an entire voting public to support such measures would be equally weighty. Those who fail at such efforts must accept the political consequences that come with legislating without knowing the *volonté générale* and these costs may be exacting and brutal, according to Rousseau. One indication of his thinking in this regard is his remark in *CS* that "Cromwell would have been condemned to hard labor by the people of Berne, and Duc de Beaufort to reformatory by the Genevans" (IV:i, 121/438). Those *commissaires* who err repeatedly will, at best, be discharged and, at worst, suffer a terrible fate on the order of what Rousseau thought Cromwell deserved.

This risk may not be especially great, of course, if the philosopher's intent really is to forge an "immobile democracy" (Sartori 1987, 314; Shklar 1969, 181). The belief that owing to the sovereign's size, the generality of its vote, the infrequency of its meetings, and the limited nature of the its mandate to "form and authorize the fundamental laws," an "immobile democracy" results is, perhaps, the *most* convincing argument for strong representation by Rousseau. As I mention earlier, a number of passages in *CS* give substance to this reading by implying that sovereign responsibility is restricted to constitutional lawmaking (*loix fondamentales*) exclusively. All civil and criminal law appears to be the sole prerogative of the government even though this can only be inferred from Rousseau's statement that "political laws, which

constitute the form of Government, are the only class relevant to my subject" (CS, II:xii, 81/394). In CS, he also writes that "it is not enough for the people assembled to have once settled the constitution of the State by giving sanction to a body of laws" (III:xiii, 111/426), suggesting that "*settling* the constitution" is the sovereign's main responsibility. Likewise, he asserts that the first vote within every assembly is to ask whether or not to preserve the constitution as it is by retaining "the present form of government" (III:xviii, 120/436).

This limited view of the sovereign's legislative role can be brought into question by an even greater number of statements that the philosopher makes in CS and *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* that appear to contradict these passages and, significantly, assign a far wider range of legislative power. He writes, for example, that "any law which the People has not ratified in person is null; it is not a law" and if the "sovereign wants to govern, or the magistrate to give laws . . . [the result is that] disorder replaces rule" (CS, III:xv, 114/430, III:I, 83/397). This passage might be read as referring to the constitutional laws exclusively, but this view appears to be somewhat skewed in light of his other comment that "the Government receives from the Sovereign the *orders* which it gives the people . . ." (III:i, 83/396; my italics). Elsewhere, Rousseau also remarks that laws passed by the sovereign, on occasion, can "punish" [*punissent*] subjects. Seeming to imply that the people exert jurisdiction over criminal law, he writes that each "citizen consents to all the laws . . . even to those that punish him when he dares violate any one of them" (IV:ii, 124/440). Such an outcome is inconsistent with even a highly liberal interpretation of constitutional lawmaking that, by definition, would still be limited to articulating the terms for those acts of ordinary legislation that do punish citizens.

Similarly, the models and ancient examples that Rousseau cites from Rome, Sparta, and Athens illustrate a heightened level of popular participation in politics that is far beyond what would be necessary or possible if the people were restricted to constitutional lawmaking alone. It is his view that in a well-ordered polity the people would be politically concerned enough with "public business" to want to "fl[y] to the assemblies" (CS, III:xv, 113/429). Asking readers to "let us consider what can be done in light of what has been done," Rousseau recounts that the Greeks were "constantly assembled in the public square" and it was rare that "a few weeks went by" when Rome's 400,000 citizens were "not assembled" (III:xv, 115/430, III:xii, 110/425). Though the Romans, on occasion, "usurped the most important functions of government," it was only because "the Laws and the election of the chiefs were not the *only* matters submitted to the judgment of the Comitia" (IV:iv, 132/449–50; my italics). Rousseau appears to imply that had the Roman Comitia stuck to the jurisdiction of "the Laws and the election of the chiefs" exclusively, there would have been no usurpation.

In line with these observations about Rome, Rousseau's own constitution for Poland proposes instructions for a wide array of functions within the Diet

that would ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of the government if the sovereign were restricted to constitutional lawmaking. He proposes, for example, that "the Deputies' instructions should be drawn up with great care, with respect to the topics announced on the agenda, as well as to the other current needs of the State and the Province" (CGP, VII, 201/979). Transferring agenda-setting power away from the Diet and to the people, Rousseau is explicit that it is not simply those laws pertaining to the structure and reform of Poland's constitution that the people are to adjudicate over but, rather, also the various "topics announced on the agenda" of the Diet's mandate. Though this list is to be drawn up by a commission presided over by the Marshal of the Dietine and "the rest made up of members chosen by majority vote," deputies are compelled to "render a strict account of their conduct in the Diet to their constituents" (VII, 201–2/979–80). Rousseau is emphatic that each deputy do "nothing contrary to the express will of his constituents," for

the Deputy must, with every word he speaks in the Diet, with every action he takes, anticipate himself under the scrutiny of his constituents, and sense the influence their judgment will have on his projects for advancement as well as on the esteem of his fellow citizens . . . for after all the Nation sends Deputies to the Diet not in order to have them state their private sentiment but to declare the wills of the Nation. (VII, 202/980).

Even if it is indeed true that Rousseau restricts the sovereign's responsibilities to constitutional lawmaking alone in CS (a viewpoint that I hope to have shown to be strained by now), it is evident that by 1770–71 his position had broadened considerably to include popular interference in civil and criminal lawmaking in Poland. It may be, of course, that Rousseau simply modifies the constitutional framework of CS's idealized polity to correspond to the geographic, demographic, and political reality of late eighteenth-century Poland. But if this were the case, it would represent a strikingly acute rejection of a supposedly systematically articulated view that citizens ought to decide nothing but the structure and reform of their constitution. If anything, Poland's size and social heterogeneity would be an argument in *favor* of transferring power upward, rather than downward, in an effort to prevent unruly Poles from punishing or rewarding deputies according to how well each did or did not adhere to their constituents' will.

Whichever is the accurate (or *most* accurate) understanding of the sovereign's proper legislative domain, the view of Shklar and other authors that constitutional lawmaking results in an "immobile democracy" can be faulted for other reasons too. In all of his political writings, for example, Rousseau asserts that it is passivity, more than anything else, that is the death knell to the body politic (CS, III:xv *passim*) and he proposes that citizens remain actively engaged in lawmaking to avoid exactly the kind of dangers that befell Great Britain's representative system (III:xv, 114/430). Elaborating upon this phenomenon, in a persuasive essay, Stephen G. Affeldt (1999) describes Rousseauian

lawmaking as an expression of “continuous willing” or “continuous contracting” by the sovereign that precludes any kind of a “settled” or established body of laws. The sovereign’s role, among other things, is to “force men to be free” by compelling them continuously to will together a *volonté générale* so that “genuine society among them” can exist (Affeldt 1999, 306). The Genevan’s command that the “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body” (CS, I:vii, 53/364) is, according to Affeldt, meant to be taken literally and requires individual sovereign members to constrain others “to turn against the private will and toward participation in the continuous constitution of a general will” (Affeldt, 1999, 314). More than any kind of coercive strictures, forcing of men to be free entails day-to-day “philosophical instruction, critique, and self-presentation” by sovereign members to attract others to “the currently unrealized state of ourselves” (318, 323).

From Rousseau’s constitution for Poland and his proposals for CS, it is possible to speculate about what the legislative functions of the sovereign *would actually be* beyond will formation. Though the philosopher is parsimonious in his discussion of the minutiae of sovereign rule in CS, his suggestions for reforming the Diet in *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* make possible some speculation in this direction. As Rousseau describes, the sole function of the sovereign assembly is lawmaking, and any activity that is not lawmaking, specifically, is beyond its jurisdiction. This said, the single criterion that he uses to define a law—that it be general in its object and general in its source (CS, II:vi: 66/378, 67/379)—confers upon the assembly broad authority to pass legislation that affects all of the people directly.

According to Rousseau, the assembly can “specify the qualifications that entitle membership” to “classes of citizens” (CS, 67/379) so it could, presumably, pass a graduated tax code, for example, that specifies the earnings “qualifications” that “entitle membership” to different economic classes of citizens. Similarly, it could decide the general criteria to be used to draw up a slate of candidates before an election or determine the criteria that would decide how funds would be allocated in the state’s annual budget even if it could not draft the figures for the budget itself. Presumably, the legislative assembly could also draw up a criminal code that, in exacting detail, specifies the “qualifications that entitle membership” by criminals to prison terms or greater or lesser penalties for different classes of crimes. Requiring “a bare majority” for “simple administrative matters” or “other business of routine and immediate interest,” “a three-quarters majority” for more significant legislation, and “two-thirds in matters of state” (CGP, IX, 218/997), the assembly’s level of activity would be a variable of the importance of the issues before it and the level of activity by government that the assembly might need to counter (CS, III:xiii, 111/426; CGP, VII, 197/975). With respect to the latter, if the government is strong, the assembly could meet frequently for terms of no more than 6 weeks, which, according to Rousseau, would be “sufficient for the ordinary needs of the State”

(CGP, VII, 203/981). Presumably, the terms for constitutional or other types of extraordinary legislation could last much longer. The assembly could also decide in a very general fashion, perhaps, “the topics announced on the agenda” in the same manner that Rousseau prescribes Poles be permitted to instruct and decide the agenda of the Diet (VII, 201/979).

Whether or not this somewhat speculative view of the sovereign is overstated, what is accurate is that the majority in Rousseau’s state is neither overtly nor surreptitiously reduced to inertia by having its role diminished to an exclusively acclamatory body for the government. More meaningful than what the sovereign actually *does* is the influence that it *wields* by way of the institutional checks that the philosopher sees as obligatory. At no moment in the lawmaking process do representatives substitute their will for that of the sovereign’s or restrain its will for any elongated period of time. Unlike Sparta’s “static constitution by *autonomasia*” that Sartori (1987, 331n) describes Rousseau taking as his model, the lawmaking process and overall political program of CS are designed to ward off passivity, inertia, and *autonomasia* in any form. And none of the proposals above, although undeniably cumbersome for even a small citizen body, is by itself incredible enough to dismiss outright. One can argue that sometimes it really is the case that citizens will want to “fly to the assemblies” to “maintain the social treaty” (CS, III:xv, 113/429). As the frequent mass political rallies that have taken place in various Eastern and Western European cities over the past two decades over such issues as democratization, arms control, globalization, immigration, crime reduction, and other issues of public concern, this is what actually occurred. The continuous appeal of such issues to garner mass support illustrates, at least theoretically, the possibility of citizens remaining intimately engaged with and by public issues over long periods of time.

Considering everything said above, it is significant that Rousseau does choose, in the end, to subdivide legislative power between representatives and the majority in a nontraditional way in CS. He does advocate a unique arrangement of separation of powers that gives voice to the few among the many most adroit at framing the *volonté générale*. The flip side of the argument above asks “What is the legislative role of representatives in Rousseau’s mature state?”

ROUSSEAU’S OTHER CRITICISM OF DEMOCRACY: A SINGLE BODY THAT INITIATES AND RATIFIES THE LAWS

Rousseau’s rejection of democracy for its mixing of legislative and executive functions is well known. What is less well known is why he forbids mixing within the assembly and bars the majority from both framing and ratifying the laws. Surprisingly, some commentators say little or nothing about this legislative divide. Stephen Ellenberg (1976, 159–60) writes, for example,

Popular sovereignty, the only “authority” Rousseau permitted, means direct legislative action by all citizens . . .

Liberty is permanent and unmediated participation in legislation. Liberty is literal self-government. Each day among self-governing citizens is a celebration of the social bond of their fellowship, a renewal of the common life which establishes and preserves their equality Rousseau's hostility to the very idea of representative government is a final, direct insistence of his anarchistic imperative

Like Ellenburg, James Miller considers Rousseau to be a direct democrat. In *Rousseau, Dreamer of Democracy*, Miller (1984, 120) writes that for the philosopher "the primacy of an indivisible and inalienable sovereign meant, in practice, that every legitimate republic must, at base, be simple: a pure democracy." This was true even in Rousseau's mature state:

According to Greek tradition, the truly great legislator leaves the scene once his work is done . . . [leaving the] sovereign people, thus suitably illuminated, [to] continue to act together through legislation To insist, as Rousseau does, that sovereignty ought to be "inalienable" and "indivisible" is not, then, to abridge the freedom of the individuals, it is rather to protect it, by impugning the adequacy of "representative government" as a surrogate for direct self-rule. (Miller 1984, 64).

These interpretations underestimate the legislative role that representatives play in Rousseau's just state. Each ignore the philosopher's rejection of democracy and—critically—his most antidemocratic stipulation that lawmaking be divided. As brief as Rousseau is on this point, he is consistent that a body *other* than the sovereign must initiate the laws. The reasons for this divide are opaque in *CS*, and an unclouded understanding of representatives' legislative role in his ideal state reveals both (1) why it is necessary to transfer agenda-setting authority away from the foundational *législateur* to the community at large and (2) why and *how* the community at large can, in turn, transfer this same agenda-setting power to a lesser body of *commissaires* of the laws without itself being reduced to a "punctuation of the political process."

As I discussed earlier, the reasoning behind Rousseau's retiring of the foundational *législateur* in *CS* is not entirely self-evident. Considering that every ratified law is an expression of the *volonté générale* and that this corporate will remains legitimate before and after the *législateur* departs, the rationale for transferring agenda-setting authority to the people might appear curious. Why not simply choose another *législateur*? The first section of this essay attempted to answer this question by demonstrating, in part, that it is Rousseau's intent that the role of *commissaires* of the laws be unlike that of the foundational *législateur* who, like Moses, was confronted with a "wandering and servile" horde or, like Lycurgus, encountered a "people degraded by slavery" (*CGP*, II, 180–81/956–57). The question that Rousseau sets out in Book II:vi of *CS*, "How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out a system of legislation?" is *not* the problem to be solved by *commissaires* in his later state. By the time the *législateur* departs to his "distant glory in the progress of times" (*CS*, II:vii, 68/381), it is no longer the case

that the people have "not yet borne the true yoke of laws" (II:x, 77/390). Rather, a cohesive legislative system has long been in force and what is necessary now is for *commissaires* merely to "follow the model which the other propose[d]" and "operate" the "machine" in order to save the sovereign from inadvertently undermining the body of laws erected by the *législateur* (II:vii, 69/381). Rousseau's metaphor of a "workman who assembles and operates" a machine but does not build it reveals a salient distinction between his two definitions of *commissaire* and *representant* that elsewhere in *CS* is less apparent. Unlike "the complex process of remaking the individual, the Lawgiver's principal task" (Crocker 1973, 181), *commissaires* of the laws are solely responsible for maintaining the legislative machine (to stick with Rousseau's metaphor) that guides and upholds the sovereign will. Ideally, this prelegislated will is already "at the highest pitch of perfection it can reach" (*CS*, II:vii, 69/381) and is self-reinforcing owing to the procedural incentives within Rousseau's lawmaking process. For this reason, *commissaires* need not *remake* individuals or "feel themselves capable of changing human nature" but, rather, serve the sovereign in a more minor capacity: what Rousseau describes elsewhere in *CS* as "extend[ing] and strengthen[ing]" (*Emile*, I, 39/248) men's natural dispositions to give their passions "order and regularity" (*Emile*, IV, 219/500) by way of initiatives conducive to "wise applications" (IV:vii, 141/459) of the laws, such as censorship. Toward this end, this agenda-setting elite is composed not of extraordinary figures from without—such as the foundational *législateur*—but of fellow citizens from within who display "probity, enlightenment and experience" (III:v, 94/408), among other virtues, that are potentially within reach of all community members.

Critically, this expert body's criteria for selection differs radically from both the ancient democratic and the modern republican criteria used to judge legislators' qualifications in the past. Seeking to avoid any kind of pure identification between the people and the *commissaires* of the laws, Rousseau rejects any Athenian-style reliance upon lot, sortition, or any other random method of selection designed to produce "descriptive representation." A perfect "correspondence . . . resemblance and reflection" between electors and elected, with the latter "standing for" (Pitkin 1967, 61) the people, is not his goal. Similarly, unlike the franchise restrictions in use in Whig England or in the United States before 1846, Rousseau rejects any constraints upon the franchise that might facilitate the election of elites whose notable qualitative differences of wealth, status, privilege, rank, etc., would distinguish them from the general character of the people. Instead, he proposes something closer to the original natural aristocracy that he dismisses as appropriate only to simple peoples (*CS*, III:v, 92/406; Gildin 1984, 107–8, 110).

In *CS*, he argues that the best system is one where the whole of the people elect only those endowed with qualities natural to all. Rousseau lauds Rome, where "no law was sanctioned, no magistrate elected except

in the Comitia" (CS, IV:iv, 132/449; see Gildin 1984, 110) and believes that those elected should be chosen for their "probity, enlightenment and experience" (CS, III:v, 94/408). The wealthy have more time to participate in politics but "merit offers more important reasons for preference than do riches" (III:v, 94/408). Calling it "Aristocracy properly so called," Rousseau's *commissaires* of the laws are aristocratic only in the sense that they are endowed with a larger *degree* of natural qualities common to all. Requiring that the government as a whole be chosen from among the people, the use of elections capitalizes upon the natural differences among men but—critically—not any differences resulting from wealth, privilege, title, status, or any other social basis. This emphasis upon the differences in degree of citizens' natural attributes is a source of commonality between the government and the sovereign that is designed to guarantee that those delegates responsible for initiating the laws do not do so according to an alien will. Citizens' natural differences do not pose a threat to liberty because "our natural passions... are the instruments of our freedom; they tend to preserve us. All those which subject us and destroy us come from elsewhere" (Rousseau 1979, 212).

As Alexander Kaufman (1997, 39) explains in his reconstruction of Rousseau's understanding of the relationship between reason and passion in the ideal state, man's "original dispositions" are the root source of wisdom and enlightenment, and for Rousseau, judging well is a matter of "extend[ing] and strengthen[ing]" (Emile, I, 39/248) these natural dispositions and "put[ing] order and regularity into the passions." (Emile, IV, 219/500). It is this emphasis upon *commissaires'* role of extending and strengthening men's natural dispositions that reveals how it is possible for Rousseau to entrust a body other than the majority to initiate the laws while consistently maintaining that sovereignty resides in the majority. Though this body is different from the people, it is chosen *by* them and from *among* them for attributes *common* to all. These attributes exist simply in unequal measure. This view of *commissaires* in Rousseau's mature state is also dissimilar to his description of the foundational *législateur* as a being who "saw all of men's passions and experienced none of them, who had no relation to our nature and yet knew it thoroughly" (CS, II:vii, 68/381). The elite who inherit the office—but not the function—of this extraordinary being do "experience" passion and are of "our nature" and, because of this, can be said to *represent* the *volonté générale*, but only as long as the majority retains an inviolable final check to guard itself against these natural attributes ever becoming vulnerabilities that imperil liberty.

CONCLUSION: ROUSSEAU AND THE TENSION BETWEEN AGENDA-SETTING AND MAJORITY RULE

This essay has sought to illuminate an underexamined aspect of Rousseau's political theory: the complexities

associated with legislative initiation in his mature state. In explaining these complexities, I have attempted to show how one of the earliest and most original theorists of participatory democracy strove to reconcile the tension between democracy's dual needs of agenda-setting expertise and majority rule. This essay demonstrated that, unlike twentieth-century theorists such as Benjamin R. Barber, Rousseau believes that legislative experts can serve a vital function within a strong democracy if appropriately checked. These constraints include, among other things, persuasive disincentives to prevent any "manufacturing" of popular consent by a legislative elite. Ideally, in a participatory democracy expert agenda-setters would enhance and facilitate citizen participation rather than foster passivity or, worse yet, "immobility" among the majority. Toward this end, *commissaires* or, more conventionally, representatives do play a role in Rousseau's bifurcated legislative system but one that is functionally dissimilar to that of the foundational *législateur*. More important than outside guidance by experts are the politically educative and self-reinforcing benefits of democratic participation. For this and other reasons, few recent interpretations are more at odds with the word and the spirit of CS than those that elevate representatives into the locus of power in Rousseau's ideal state.

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Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?

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Malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures, it is widely argued, confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions. Ample empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures. The theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak. It is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se. Using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed-rule, infinite-horizon model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures. Two sets of results are derived. First, when bills originate in the House and the Senate considers the bill under a closed rule, the equilibrium expected payoffs of all House members are, surprisingly, equal. Second, we show that small-state biases can emerge when (1) there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber, (2) the Senate initiates bills, which produces maldistributed proposal probabilities, and (3) the distributive goods are "lumpy."

Bicameralism is common in the legislatures of the world's democracies. It is also common for one chamber to represent population and the other to represent geographical areas, such as provinces, cantons, states, or counties. This arrangement often emerges as a compromise, perhaps unavoidable, in the formation of the nation or union to balance the representation of people and of regions. Federal systems such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States often have such an arrangement, and the European Union employs a mix of representation of population and representation of states.

The result is malapportionment, with highly unequal representation of the population in at least one chamber of the legislature.¹ Malapportionment, in turn, has been found to have substantial and direct effects on

public policy. An extensive empirical literature has documented a strong, positive association between a geographic area's per-capita seats in the legislature and the share of public expenditures it receives.² Such results have stirred a growing chorus of criticism of malapportionment in bicameral legislatures; most notably, Dahl (2002) identifies the representation of states in the Senate as a fundamental flaw in the U.S. constitution.

Less certain is why. Most often, it is argued that the *voting power* of overrepresented areas leads directly to their disproportionate influence over public policy. Lee (2000, 59) puts it as follows:³

The great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result, even though all senators' votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal "price." Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less

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We thank seminar participants at New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association for helpful comments. James Snyder and Michael Ting gratefully acknowledge the financial support of National Science Foundation Grant SES-0079035. Stephen Ansolabehere gratefully acknowledges the support of the Carnegie Corporation under the Carnegie Scholars program. This paper was written while Michael Ting was at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and he thanks the Department of Political Science there for their support.

¹ Lijphart (1982) documents the severity of malapportionment in six bicameral legislatures: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. Samuels and Snyder (2001) document this for a wide set of countries for the current period. They find that when severe malapportionment exists it is typically in the upper chamber. The worst cases are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, the

Dominican Republic, the United States, Switzerland, Russian Federation, Venezuela, Chile, Australia, Spain, Germany, Mexico, South Africa, and Poland. In all these countries, the index of malapportionment in the upper house is .20 or higher. In all cases the index of malapportionment in the lower house is less than half as large as that for the upper house, and in most cases it is less than one-fourth as large. David and Eisenberg (1961) document the situation in the U.S. states for the 50 years prior to the *Baker v. Carr* decision.

² See Atlas et al. 1995, Lee 1998, 2000, and Lee and Oppenheimer 1999 for studies of federal spending in the U.S. states; see Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002 for a study of U.S. state spending prior to 1960; see Gibson, Calvo, and Falleti 1999 for a study of Argentina and Brazil; see Rodden 2001 for a study of the European Union; and see Horiuchi and Saito 2001 for a study of Japan.

³ Dahl (2002, p. 49) makes a similar argument: "With a population in 2000 of nearly 34 million, California had two senators. But so did Nevada, with only 2 million residents. Because the votes of U.S. senators are counted equally, in 2000 the vote of a Nevada resident for the U.S. Senate was, in effect, worth about seventeen times the vote of a California resident. A Californian who moved to Alaska might lose some points on climate, but she would stand to gain a vote worth about fifty-four times as much as her vote in California." See also Rodden 2001 for a similar analysis of the European Union.

expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states.

The intuition behind these arguments comes from theoretical results derived for the unicameral legislatures. In a single legislative body, politicians with greater voting weight will receive higher shares of the division of the public dollar (Shapley and Shubik 1954; Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere 2002). This logic, however, may not extend to the bicameral setting. The unicameral logic would apply readily to the entire chamber if coalition formation in one chamber were independent of coalition formation in the other chamber. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) observe, the legislators' preferences in the two chambers are not independent: Senators are more likely to support a bill if their House members are part of a coalition, because members of the lower house represent areas within the geography represented by a upper house.

What is the logic of bargaining over the division of public expenditures in bicameral legislatures? Most previous analyses employ a "power index" from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley–Shubik index or the Banzhaf index.⁴ As is well known, cooperative game theory models of voting power do not explicitly consider proposal power. Thus they cannot incorporate potential differences in proposal power of areas stemming from unequal representation. These measures also do not readily accommodate correlated preferences across chambers. Almost all of the previous work on coalition formation in bicameral legislatures assumes that the preferences of the legislators in the two chambers are independent.⁵ This assumption is made in order to apply the voting power indices to the bicameral problem, but it is almost surely wrong.

To isolate the effects of voting power, proposal power, and other institutional features, we analyze divide-the-dollar politics in a bicameral legislature using the noncooperative legislative bargaining model developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In this framework, a legislator is randomly chosen to make a proposal about how to divide a dollar among all legislators, then voting on the proposal occurs. Each legislator's expected share of public spending equals what he or she receives when making a proposal times the probability of being proposer, plus what the legislator must be paid to join a coalition times the probability of being included in a coalition.⁶

Within this framework we can ascertain the expected division of public expenditures under a range of institutional arrangements or rules. Our basic model begins by

considering the simplest case: Proposals originate in the House, may not be amended by the Senate, and must be approved by majority rule in each chamber. Legislators care about the welfare of their median voter. In this situation, the opportunity to make proposals is allocated evenly across the population because House districts are assumed to have equal populations and because every House member has the same probability of being chosen as a proposer. The voting power of the areas differs because of unequal representation of population in the Senate. As a practical matter, this case emerges in many real-world legislatures. In the large majority of bicameral legislatures, the lower house initiates money bills. This is true, for example, of the U.S. House of Representatives. Tsebelis and Money (1997) document that many bicameral systems also limit upper-house amendment powers. In some, such as Australia and The Netherlands, the upper house cannot amend.

Surprisingly, the basic model predicts an *equal* (expected) division of the public expenditure. The immediate implication that the argument that unequal voting power predicts maldistribution of public spending is incorrect. In a bicameral legislature, unequal voting power *per se* is not sufficient to explain maldistribution of government spending.

To produce maldistribution of public expenditures in the noncooperative bicameral bargaining game, other institutional rules or policy arenas are required. We consider three such factors here: (1) supermajority rules, (2) Senate proposal power, and (3) the nature of public expenditure programs. All are quite common in legislative politics. The cloture rules of the U.S. Senate are perhaps the best-known supermajority rules. The European Union provides an important example where the upper chamber (the Council of Ministers) proposes money legislation and the lower chamber (the European Parliament) votes whether to reject these bills (Tsebelis and Money, 1997, Table 2.2B). In this case, proposal power, as well as voting power, is maldistributed. Finally, many kinds of public expenditures cannot be targeted at specific districts, thereby restricting the divide-the-dollar policy space of our basic model.

Our formalization also advances noncooperative models of legislative bargaining and coalition formation. Over the last 15 years, an extensive literature, much of it in this *Review*, has used the Baron–Ferejohn model to explore the effects of government institutions on distributive outcomes.⁷ All of this research examines a legislature with a single chamber, significantly limiting the application of theoretical research.⁸ Strictly speaking, none of these models apply, for example, to the U.S. Congress or to 49 of the American states. We

⁴ See, e.g., Brams 1989, Deegan and Packel 1978, Dubey and Shapley 1979, and Shapley and Shubik 1954. Diermeier and Myerson 1999 is one of the few papers using a noncooperative approach. There is also a small literature examining whether bicameralism produces unbeatable points in a multidimensional issue space, which can be viewed as a hybrid—e.g., Hammond and Miller 1987 and Tsebelis and Money 1997.

⁵ This is true for all of the papers employing power indices cited in footnote 4.

⁶ The Baron–Ferejohn model is based on Rubinstein 1982. It is the most widely used model of legislative bargaining in distributive politics.

⁷ See, e.g., Diermeier and Feddersen 1998, LeBlanc, Snyder, and Tripathi 2000, McCarty 2000, and Winter 1996.

⁸ The only other paper we have found that explicitly models the linkage between the two chambers in a bicameral legislature is Kalandrakis n.d. He assumes that the utility functions of the Senators and House members in a state are not just linked but are the same. This is a very restrictive assumption. For a senator to agree to vote for a proposal requires that *all* House members in the senator's state would also vote for that proposal.

present a framework within which to analyze bicameral legislative bargaining and hope it provides the basis for further analysis.

BASIC MODEL

We analyze a variant of the closed-rule, divide-the-dollar game studied by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In the bicameral setting, we must make further assumptions about the structure of the politics in order to characterize how agreements are reached across chambers. We begin with one specific formulation of the problem and consider variations on this setup under Extensions, below.

Assumptions

Here we lay out some of the assumptions about the structure of the bicameral setting. Readers already familiar with this type of model in the literature may wish to skip to the formal presentation below.

- A1. The lower chamber (House) represents districts with equal population and the upper chamber (Senate) represents states, which may contain different numbers of districts. There is one House member per district, and one Senator per state.
- A2. Public expenditures are divisible to the district level. Legislators are responsive to their median voters.
- A3. Both chambers vote by majority rule. The lower chamber moves first, and the other chamber votes on that proposal without amendment, i.e., under a closed rule.

Assumption A1 describes the link between House members and Senators: The geographic areas of representation are nested, as in the U.S. Congress. One may imagine violations of this assumption, as occurs in some state legislatures where assembly district boundaries cut across senate district boundaries. Those lead to greater independence of coalition formation across the legislative chambers. But most bicameral legislatures nest districts, either completely or to a high degree.

Assumption A2 helps to characterize the decision rule for House members and Senators. As we will show, it implies that in order for a legislator to support a proposal the proposal must give some money to at least half of that legislator's voters. Thus, House members must receive some money to support a proposal, and Senators must receive money in more than half of their districts. We can vary this assumption, as suggested under Extensions. However, the simple majority rule approximates the behavior of legislators in practice.⁹

Assumption A3 defines voting and proposal power. Importantly, we assume for the basic model that vot-

ing power is unequal but proposal power is equal. The closed rule is surely a special case, but it means that we do not have to model the resolution of differences between the chambers. Modeling that additional decision process adds a layer of complication that is not needed to gain important insights. We relax both the equal proposal power and the majority rule assumptions under Extensions.

Formal Description

There are two legislative chambers, a *House* and a *Senate*. Seats in the House are apportioned on a per-capita basis, while seats in the Senate are apportioned geographically. For convenience we refer to geographical units as *states*. Each state has a *type*, identified by population, and there are at least two types of states. A type- t state gets one seat in the Senate and t seats in the House, where $t \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Let $m_t \geq 0$ be the number of type- t states, and $n_t = m_t t$ be the number of House seats from type- t states. Let T denote the size of the largest state. The total number of seats in the House is then $n = \sum_{t=1}^T n_t = \sum_{t=1}^T m_t t$ and the total number of seats in the Senate is $m = \sum_{t=1}^T m_t$. We assume that n and m are both odd. We call the House legislators *representatives*, and we call the Senate legislators *senators*. We equate each representative with his district, and each senator with his state.

Legislators in both chambers wish to maximize the expected utility of their constituency's median voter. We assume that voters in each district have identical, quasi-linear preferences. Further, spending is *indivisible* at the level of the House district—that is, it consists of local government expenditure programs consumed by all voters in the district. Thus, representatives simply wish to maximize the funds flowing to their district. Because they may represent multiple districts, senators care about not only the quantity of goods flowing to their state, but also the distribution thereof. A type- t senator attempts to maximize the benefit of the d_t -th highest per-district benefit that a bill promises in a type- t state, where $d_t = (t + 1)/2$ (t odd) or $(t/2) + 1$ (t even). The idea is that we are studying distributive spending, and any spending that goes into a district is valued by both the House member from that district and the senator from the state containing the district.

All proposals originate in the House. In period 1, Nature randomly draws one representative to be the proposer, who proposes a division of the dollar across representatives (House districts). Formally, a proposal is an n -dimensional vector from the set $X = \{\mathbf{x} \mid x_i \in [0, 1], \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \leq 1\}$. All legislators in both chambers then simultaneously vote for or against the proposal. If the proposal receives a majority in both chambers, then the dollar is divided and the game ends. If the proposal is rejected, then a new representative is randomly drawn to be the proposer. The game has an infinite horizon and no discounting.

To identify coalitions, we adopt the following notation. Let \mathbf{N} be the set of all representatives (districts), and for each $t = 1, \dots, T$, let \mathbf{N}_t be the set of all representatives (districts) from type- t states. If \mathbf{C} is

⁹ We examined all roll call votes in the U.S. House and Senate from 1989 to 2000 involving final passage on appropriations and authorizations. When a majority of a state's House delegation supports a money proposal, that state's senators vote for the bill 90% of the time. When a majority of a state's House delegations votes against a bill, the senators vote for the bill 64% of the time.

any coalition of representatives, let $N_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the set of representatives in \mathbf{C} from type- t states. Let $n_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the total number of representatives in $N_t(\mathbf{C})$, and let $n(\mathbf{C}) = \sum_{t=1}^T n_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the total number of representatives in \mathbf{C} . For each state j , let $N^j(\mathbf{C})$ be the set of representatives in \mathbf{C} that are drawn from j , and let $n^j(\mathbf{C})$ be the number of representatives in $N^j(\mathbf{C})$. Analogously, let $M_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the set of type- t states such that \mathbf{C} contains at least $(t+1)/2$ representatives from each of these states, and let $m_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the number of states in $M_t(\mathbf{C})$. Thus, $M_t(\mathbf{C})$ can be thought of as the set of senators from type- t states that are “in” \mathbf{C} , and $m_t(\mathbf{C})$ can be thought of as the number of senators from type- t states that are “in” \mathbf{C} . Let $\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C}) = \cup_{t=1}^T M_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the set of senators “in” \mathbf{C} , and let $m(\mathbf{C}) = \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C})$ be the total number of senators “in” \mathbf{C} . We call a coalition \mathbf{C} *winning* if and only if $n(\mathbf{C}) \geq (n+1)/2$ and $m(\mathbf{C}) \geq (m+1)/2$. Denote by $\mathcal{W} = \{\mathbf{C} \mid n(\mathbf{C}) \geq (n+1)/2 \text{ and } m(\mathbf{C}) \geq (m+1)/2\}$ the set of winning coalitions.

The game can be treated as a sequence of identical subgames, where each subgame begins with nature’s move to draw a proposer. We look for symmetric, stationary, subgame perfect equilibria (SSSPEs). Our definition of symmetry is that strategies treat all representatives of the same type symmetrically, although different types may be treated differently.¹⁰ Stationarity means that each legislator uses history-independent strategies at all proposal-making stages and voting strategies that depend only on the current proposal. This implies that we may suppress notation for time and game histories.

For all types $t = 1, \dots, T$, SSSPE strategies are then as follows. A proposal strategy for a type- t representative is $w_t \in \Delta(X)$ where $\Delta(X)$ is the set of probability distributions over X . Voting strategies for type- t representatives and senators are $y_t: X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $z_t: X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, respectively, mapping allocations into votes, where a one represents approval.

SSSPEs have the following properties, which simplify the analysis. By symmetry, for each type t , the continuation value of all type- t representatives at the beginning of each subgame will be equal. By stationarity, these values will also be the same for each subgame. Let v_t and v_t^s be the continuation values of type- t representatives and senators at the beginning of each subgame, respectively. At an SSSPE, the proposer must offer at least v_t to a type- t representative in order to obtain that representative’s support for his proposal (that is, $y_t(\mathbf{X}) = 1$ for legislator i of type t iff $x_i \geq v_t$). Likewise, the proposal must offer at least v_t^s to a type- t senator in order to gain her vote. Note that a type- t senator’s allocation is effectively an “order statistic” indicating the d_t -th highest per-district benefit that a bill promises to the state. Since a proposal will pass if and only if it receives majority support in both chambers, it must

offer at least v_t to $(n+1)/2$ representatives and v_t^s to $(m+1)/2$ senators.

MAIN RESULTS

Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 describe a situation in which voting power is unequal but proposal power is equal. In equilibrium, the expected share of public expenditures is *the same* in all districts—the expected division of expenditures is *not* skewed toward the areas that are overrepresented in the Senate. The intuition behind this result is as follows. To build a winning coalition, a proposer collects a majority of districts. Because the proposer keeps the surplus from any bargain, the proposer wishes to build the lowest cost minimal winning coalition. Under simple majority rule it is possible to do this without having to distribute any money solely in order to obtain votes in the Senate. As a result, the “marginal value” of any senator to the coalition is zero. Small states therefore do not have disproportionate bargaining power even though they have disproportionately more votes.

To show this claim, we proceed in two steps. Our first result identifies a fundamental relationship between chambers.

Proposition 1. Suppose that \mathbf{C} is a coalition such that $m(\mathbf{C}) = (m+1)/2$, $n^j(\mathbf{C}) = (t+1)/2$ (where t is state j ’s type) for all $j \in \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$, and $n^j(\mathbf{C}) = 0$ for all $j \notin \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$. If $\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$ contains all states with $t > 1$, then $n(\mathbf{C}) = (n+1)/2$. If $\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$ does not contain all states with $t > 1$, then $n(\mathbf{C}) < (n+1)/2$.

Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix. ■

That is, if a coalition \mathbf{C} has just enough representatives drawn from just enough states to win the Senate, then \mathbf{C} either is a minimal winning coalition in the House or loses in the House. A bare victory in the Senate typically leaves the proposer short of winning the House. Intuitively, this implies that no minimum winning majority in the Senate is less desirable in the sense of requiring more than a minimum winning majority in the House. Thus, from a simple counting perspective, attracting a sufficient number of votes from the malapportioned chamber is not a binding constraint. Any small-state advantage in an SSSPE must therefore arise from variations in v_t or v_t^s across types.

To keep the analysis simple, we search for an equilibrium satisfying $v_t \geq v_t^s$ for all t . This relationship is obviously true for type $t = 1$, as $v_1 = v_1^s$. In the equilibrium that we identify, the inequality becomes strict for $t > 2$. We will show that this restriction produces a unique distribution of expected payoffs in the class of SSSPEs. We suspect that all SSSPEs satisfy this condition but leave the question for future work.

This restriction links the chambers in the following, deterministic way: The senator from a state will support a bill if more than half of the state’s representatives support it. So, to obtain the support of a state’s senator, it is sufficient for proposers to pay a majority of its representatives their reservation values. The following

¹⁰ This definition of symmetry is somewhat nonstandard. Along with stationarity, the assumption will constrain equilibrium payoffs within types to be equal, but it does not artificially constrain equilibrium payoffs across types. Without the assumption, a much wider range of payoff distributions can be sustainable.

result shows that in equilibrium, it is also *necessary*; that is, if $v_t^s < v_t$, no representative ever receives v_t^s .

Lemma. If $v_t \geq v_t^s \forall t$ then there is no optimal coalition in which $x_k \in (0, v_t)$ for any representative k of type t .

Our problem is therefore reduced to one of characterizing winning House coalitions that are drawn from the states in such a way as to include more than half of the representatives in more than half of the states. For each coalition $C \subseteq N$, let $v(C) = \sum_{t \in T} v_t n_t(C)$ be the total “cost” of C . Clearly, $v(N) = 1$. For each type- t representative, let $\underline{v}_t = \min_{\{C | C \cap N_t \neq \emptyset, C \in \mathcal{W}\}} v(C)$ be the minimum-value winning coalition for a type- t proposer (including herself). Then the minimum that a type- t proposer must pay her coalition partners is $\underline{v}_t - v_t$. Let C_t be the set of coalitions that solve the problem: $\min_{\{C | C \cap N_t \neq \emptyset, C \in \mathcal{W}\}} v(C)$. Thus, C_t is the set of “cheapest” coalitions for a type- t representative. At an SSSPE, each type- t proposer chooses some $C \in C_t$, offers v_t to all type- r representatives in C other than herself, offers 0 to all representatives outside C , and keeps $1 - v(C) + v_t = 1 - \underline{v}_t + v_t$ for herself.

For each type- t representative, let q_t be the average probability that the representative is chosen as a coalition partner, given that someone other than the representative is the proposer. Then the continuation value for a type- t representative satisfies

$$v_t = \frac{1}{n}(1 - \underline{v}_t + v_t) + \frac{n-1}{n}q_t v_t.$$

Or

$$v_t = \frac{1 - \underline{v}_t}{(n-1)(1 - q_t)}. \quad (1)$$

Proposition 1 and the lemma provide sufficient leverage for us to identify the following, “unique” SSSPE in the bicameral bargaining game.¹¹

Proposition 2. An SSSPE exists. Any SSSPE satisfies $v_t = 1/n$ for all t .

Thus, the House districts in large states will *not* have lower expected payoffs than the House districts in small states. Since the House districts are apportioned on a per-capita basis, voters in large states are worse off than voters in small states if and only if the expected payoffs to the large-state House districts are smaller than the expected payoffs to the small-state House districts. Thus, the proposition says that in large states are *not* worse off than voters in small states.

EXTENSIONS: POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SMALL-STATE BIAS

Proposition 2 above shows that when both chambers require simple majorities to pass bills and the Senate cannot propose or amend bills, overrepresentation in the Senate does not lead to a bias in expected allocations

in purely distributive policy areas. That is, differences in voting power *per se* in one chamber do not automatically translate into differences in expected payoffs. Something else is required to explain distributive biases in favor of small states. In this section we consider three factors that can produce small-state biases: supermajoritarian requirements in the Senate, proposal power in the Senate, and “lumpy” distributive goods.

Supermajoritarian Rules

Supermajority rules, such as the cloture requirement in the U.S. Senate, can create small-state biases. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the marginal value of a senator is effectively zero: It is possible to build minimal winning coalitions in the House that guarantee a minimal winning coalition in the Senate. With supermajority rules in the upper chamber, the proposer may be forced to buy some small-state senators in order to clear the supermajority hurdle. The marginal value of small-state senators, then, becomes nonzero, and small states are able to extract additional payments for their legislative votes. The extreme case is when unanimity is required in the Senate. When all senators must be in the coalition, money is divided equally among the states, but on a per-capita basis this results in an unequal distribution of expenditures to people across states. Supermajority hurdles in the lower chamber, by assumption apportioned on the basis of population, lessen the small-state bias.

To simplify the analysis, we focus on a special case with two types of states, one type with a single district and the other with $k \geq 3$ districts. The total number of states is $n = m_k + m_1$, and the total number of districts is $n = km_k + m_1$.

Let $Q_S \geq (m+1)/2$ be the number of votes required to pass a bill in the Senate, and let $Q_H \geq (n+1)/2$ be the number required in the House. For simplicity, we assume that $Q_H < m_1 + (km_k + 1)/2$.¹² Also, let $r_k = \lfloor (km_k + 1)/(k+1) \rfloor$, where $\lfloor a \rfloor$ is the greatest integer less than or equal to a . Then r_k is the maximum number of type- k senators a proposal can attract if the proposal attracts the votes of exactly $(km_k + 1)/2$ type- k representatives.

Proposition 3. There is a bias in favor of small states—i.e., $v_k < v_1$ —if and only if $Q_S > r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$.

Several comparative statics reveal the effects of supermajority hurdles on biases.

First, if Q_S is a simple majority of the Senate, then the necessary and sufficient condition for small state bias will not be met. If Q_H is a simple majority in the House, then a sufficiently high Q_S produces small-state bias. At the extreme with unanimity rule in the Senate and simple majority rule in the House, the necessary and sufficient condition certainly holds.

¹¹ Note that because of the restriction $v_t > v_t^s$, we cannot invoke the results of Banks and Duggan (2000) in establishing uniqueness.

¹² This assumption is made strictly for convenience, to avoid the proliferation of subcases. Note that this approximates what many consider to be true of the U.S. Congress, in which only the Senate is clearly supermajoritarian because of the filibuster (e.g., Krehbiel 1998).

Second, raising Q_H makes the necessary and sufficient condition more difficult to obtain. At the extreme where there is unanimity rule in both the House and the Senate, the necessary and sufficient condition cannot hold.

Third, raising r_k also makes the necessary and sufficient condition for small-state bias more difficult to obtain. The term r_k is increasing in m and k . The intuition is that as m or k rises, the number of type- k states that are bought grows when buying exactly just over one-half of the type- k House members. In the limit, all type- k states are won. This makes small-state senators less vital to the coalition.

An example strengthens the intuition behind the result. Suppose that there are four type-1 states and one type-3 state, with $Q_S = 4$ (of 5) and $Q_H = 4$ (of 7). Then $v_1 = 2/11$ and $v_3 = 1/11$. The strategies supporting this are as follows: Type-3 proposers always choose a coalition with one type-3 district and three type-1 districts, while type-1 proposers mix. They choose three type-1 partners with probability $1/4$, and two type-1's and two type-3's with probability $3/4$. In both cases, $v_1 = 6/11$. Note that sometimes a "surplus" coalition is bought in the House.

Senate Proposal Power

In the situation studied in Proposition 2, only members of the well-apportioned chamber, the House, have proposal power. Small-state bias can exist when proposals originate in the malapportioned chamber. In this case, all senators are assumed to have equal proposal probabilities, and thus *proposal* power is maldistributed. When any senator is chosen he or she builds a coalition of other senators and House members and keeps the surplus to distribute among a majority of his or her own voters. Proposers will spend the same amount for a coalition as before. However, because a small state has a higher likelihood of making a proposal than if the legislation were initiated in the House, small states have higher expected returns.

Aside from Senate proposal power, we maintain all of the assumptions of the basic model. Additionally, as noted in the introduction, the analysis of Senate proposals also forces us to take a stand on how proposal power is distributed in the Senate. We will make the simplest assumption—that each senator has equal probability ($1/m$) of being recognized to make a proposal. Also, we will assume that the House cannot make proposals or amendments but simply passes or rejects proposals that pass the Senate. As a result, the likelihood that a small-state senator is proposer is higher than that state's share of the population (House seats). The large disparity in proposal probabilities leads to a difference in expected payoffs in which small-state districts receive more than large-state districts.

Proposition 4. If proposals originate in the Senate and $n \geq t(2m + 1) + 3$, then $v_t > 1/n$.

The condition of the proposition is obviously most easily satisfied for small states, thereby implying that

such states are the "first" to receive disproportionately large payoffs. This occurs because proposal power becomes more important as n increases (holding m constant), and because districts in small states capture more of the benefit of their senator being proposer. Even if small states are never included in a coalition, their proposal power alone can give their districts payoffs in excess of $1/n$, thus making the proportional equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 impossible.

The condition of the proposition also conveys an intuitive logic about the distribution of state sizes. Since $n \geq tm$, where t is the size of the smallest state, the condition is essentially that less than half of the districts are in the smallest states. When the condition does not hold, the distribution of districts across states is relatively even. In this environment, Senate proposal power does not imply heavily disproportionate "recognition probabilities" for districts in small states, and so more proportional equilibrium payoffs are possible.

While the conditions of Proposition 4 are sufficient for maldistribution, they are not necessary. Consider a legislature with two type-1 states and one type-3 state; thus, $m = 3$, $n = 5$, and $t(2m + 1) + 3 = 10$. It is then easily demonstrated that at any SSSPE, the expected payoffs are approximately $v_1 = 270$ and $v_3 = 153$. So the expected payoff in the small-state districts is much higher than that in the large-state districts.

Lumpy Distributive Goods

Many publicly funded distributive goods are not divisible down to the district level. Others produce benefits that spill over into other districts. Examples are interstate highways, river navigation projects, large-scale irrigation and hydroelectric power projects, and intracity highway, mass-transit, or airport projects in large cities that contain several districts.¹³

If the distributive goods divided by the legislature are "lumpy," then there will typically be a bias in favor of small states. An extreme case is where the distributive goods are not divisible within states. A model studied by Kalandrakis (n.d.) covers this case. In his model, legislators in the upper and lower chamber from any given state have identical utility functions. Thus, if one House district receives an amount x per capita, then the entire state containing that district must also receive x per capita.

A simple example provides the intuition about why this situation leads to a small-state bias. Suppose that the distributive goods are completely divisible across states, but they are not divisible within a state.

Example. Suppose that there are four type-1 states and one type-3 state, so $m = 5$ and $n = 7$. Then at any

¹³ Lumpiness or spillovers may be important in practice. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Woon (1998) study the public support for initiatives that sought to apportion that state's senate on the basis of area (county) rather than population. The patterns of voting suggest that the 10 counties around the San Francisco Bay area benefited from county-based representation in the Senate even though several of them would have lost seats. In contrast, Los Angeles County represented a similar geographic area and had no spillovers.

SSSPE, the expected payoffs are $v_1 = 1/6$ and $v_3 = 1/9$. So, the expected payoff in the small-state districts (type-1) is much higher than that in the large-state districts (type-3).

Because of the assumed indivisibility, there are just two sorts of minimal winning coalitions: those consisting of all four type-1 districts and those consisting of two type-1 districts and all three type-3 districts. Note also that the indivisibility implies that $v_3 = v_3^s$.

When the type-3 senator is proposer, she always offers v_1 to two of the type-1 districts and the remainder is shared evenly by her own districts. The optimal proposals for the type-1 senators depend on the relative values of v_1 and v_3 . If $3v_1 < v_1 + 3v_3$, then each type-1 proposer always offers v_1 to the other three type-1 districts and keeps the rest for her own state (district). If $3v_1 > v_1 + 3v_3$, then each type-1 proposer always offers v_1 to one of the other type-1 districts and v_3 to each of the type-3 districts and keeps the rest for her own state. If $3v_1 = v_1 + 3v_3$, then type-1 proposers are indifferent between offering v_1 to the other three type-1 districts and offering v_1 to one of the other type-1 districts and v_3 to each of the type-3 districts. We show that the latter condition must hold in equilibrium.

Suppose that $3v_1 < v_1 + 3v_3$, that is, $2v_1 < 3v_3$. Then $v_1 = \frac{1}{5}[1 - 3v_1] + \frac{3}{5}v_1 + \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{2})v_1$ (the first term covers the case where the given type-1 senator is proposer, the second term covers the case where one of the other type-1 senators is proposer, and the third term covers the case where the type-3 senator is proposer), and $v_3 = \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{3})[1 - 2v_1] + \frac{4}{5}(0)$ (the first term covers the case where the type-3 senator is proposer, and the second term covers the case where a type-1 senator is proposer). Solving these two equations yields $v_1 = \frac{2}{9}$ and $v_3 = \frac{1}{27}$. But then $2v_1 = \frac{4}{9} > \frac{1}{9} = 3v_3$, contradicting the assumption that $2v_1 < 3v_3$.

Next, suppose that $3v_1 > v_1 + 3v_3$, that is, $2v_1 > 3v_3$. Then $v_1 = \frac{1}{5}[1 - v_1 - 3v_3] + \frac{3}{5}(\frac{1}{3})v_1 + \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{2})v_1$, and $v_3 = \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{3})[1 - 2v_1] + \frac{4}{5}v_3$. Solving these two equations yields $v_1 = 0$ and $v_3 = \frac{1}{3}$. But then $2v_1 = 0 < 1 = 3v_3$, contradicting the assumption that $2v_1 > 3v_3$.

Thus, at any SSSPE we must have $3v_1 = v_1 + 3v_3$, that is, $2v_1 = 3v_3$. Let p be the probability that a type-1 proposer offers v_1 to the other three type-1 districts, and let $1 - p$ be the probability that a type-1 proposer offers v_1 to one of the other type-1 districts and v_3 to each of the type-3 districts. Then $v_1 = \frac{1}{5}[1 - 3v_1] + \frac{3}{5}[p + (1 - p)(\frac{1}{3})]v_1 + \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{2})v_1$; and $v_3 = \frac{1}{5}(\frac{1}{3})[1 - 2v_1] + \frac{4}{5}(1 - p)v_3$. Also, since none of the dollar is ever wasted, $4v_1 + 3v_3 = 1$. Solving these three equations yields $v_1 = 1/6$, $v_3 = 1/9$, and $p = 1/4$. (Note that $2v_1 = 3v_3$, as required.) Since $v_1 > v_3$, there is a bias in favor of small-state districts.

Lumpy public expenditure programs violate a key feature of Proposition 1. When goods are divisible, it is possible to build a minimal winning coalition in the lower house that guarantees a coalition in the upper house, so the marginal cost of a senator to a coalition is zero. That is no longer the case with lumpy goods. The lumpy expenditure assumption makes the

marginal cost of the large-state senator higher than the marginal cost of a small-state senator. To buy a senator from a state with, say, three House members, a proposer must pay the price of all three House members. If all members cost the same, then for the same cost, a proposer could buy three House members from small states and get three senators from the small states. The cost of large states, then, must be higher than the cost of small states. Recognizing this, small states can command higher (per capita) prices for their membership in a coalition.

The "lumpy goods" and supermajority results offer insight about relaxing the assumption that senators are responsive to their median voters (A2). So far we have assumed that a simple majority of districts (a threshold of 50%) is needed to gain a senator's support for a bill. The lumpy goods argument suggests that thresholds above 50% imply small-state biases. The highest threshold occurs when a senator will join a coalition only if a proposal distributes funds to all districts, that is, a completely indivisible good. A threshold below 50% will weaken the pressures toward small-state biases. Thinking about Proposition 2, if a senator votes for a proposal that gives money to less than half of a state's House delegation, then it becomes even easier to build minimal winning coalitions in the House that guarantee a majority in the Senate.

DISCUSSION

Geographic linkages across chambers in bicameral legislatures complicate distributive politics. Unlike unicameral politics, unequal representation in a bicameral legislature does not lead inexorably to unequal distributions of public expenditures. The need to win in both chambers tempers the importance of raw voting power in each chamber separately. When only voting power is unequal and when the lower-house districts are nested within the geography represented by the upper house, then it is possible to form minimum winning coalitions entirely within the House without having to "pay extra" to get the Senate. Other inequities in political power must exist in a bicameral legislature—such as proposal power or supermajority requirements—in order to generate maldistribution of government expenditures.

Several interesting empirical predictions follow from our analysis. We consider three briefly.

First, the effects of malapportionment in bicameral legislatures on the distribution of public funds should depend on the extent to which each of the two chambers deviates from equal representation. The U.S. state legislatures prior to 1964 provide empirical support for this general pattern. Many state legislatures paralleled the federal system of representation, with counties being the analog of the states, but many were also malapportioned in both chambers. Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) show that malapportionment of the state legislatures strongly affected the distribution of public spending. We analyzed the data they considered with an eye to the specific claim here. We regressed the share of state transfers received by counties on the counties'

representation in the legislature (called the RRI Index) and other factors, all variables in logarithms. We tested for a differential effect of the RRI Index in states where both chambers were badly apportioned and found that there is a statistically significant interaction.¹⁴

Second, the U.S. Congress is an interesting test case not of the effects of malapportionment *per se*, as is sometimes argued, but of the effects of supermajority rules and unequal proposal power in the face of malapportionment. Consistent with the results in the previous section, Atlas et al. (1995) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) document that inequitable divisions of federal expenditures are a persistent and striking feature of American public finance.

Third, our results have implications for preferences over the choice of constitutions and legislative rules in federal systems. The filibuster in the U.S. Senate provides one important example. The U.S. Senate determines its own rules about the number of votes required to end debate. The number of votes required for cloture has varied over time, from two-thirds of the entire Senate to two-thirds of those present to three-fifths. Proposition 3 suggests that senators from smaller states would favor more stringent requirements for cloture. In fact, this seems to be the case. Senator Harry Reid (D, NV) put it as follows:

Checks and balances has nothing to do with protecting a small state. Vetoes have nothing to do with it, unless you have the ear of the Chief Executive of this country. The filibuster is uniquely situated to protect a small state in population like Nevada. (Binder and Smith, 1997, 98)

Dozens of roll call votes have been taken on this issue over the years. Binder and Smith (1997) study these votes and find that, even after controlling for party, ideology, region, and other factors, there is a tendency for senators from smaller states to favor more stringent requirements for cloture.¹⁵

These empirical patterns support the basic idea forwarded here—that malapportionment in bicameral legislatures depends not only on the constitution of the representative body but on the rules of the chambers. To make our basic point, we have focused on distribu-

tive politics under some restrictive assumptions, and a more extensive analysis will yield further insights.

One important class of extensions would examine situations where bills may be amended. Bills may be considered under an open rule, or one chamber may be allowed to make a counterproposal. The latter situation is considerably more complicated than our basic model, as it requires further assumptions about how the chambers resolve differences between them. Our intuition is that any (randomized) amendment power will tend to reduce the rents from being proposer and spread benefits more equally across districts. However, the logic of different proposal powers across chambers might still result in maldistribution. Drawing on our analysis above, Senate amendment powers might work like a supermajority requirement and, therefore, increase small-state bias. Likewise, House amendment powers would decrease small-state bias. One empirical implication would then be that small states prefer open rules in the Senate, while large states prefer open rules in the House.

A related model might also explore the role of conference committees, which are involved in most major U.S. legislation. Our results are suggestive of the likely outcomes under a conference committee procedure similar to that used in the United States. Within such committees, proposals must “pass” both the House and the Senate delegations on the committee separately. The resulting proposal must then pass each chamber. Modeling this situation would require nontrivial assumptions about the distribution of proposal power. However, conference committees on large money bills often have a preponderance of House members, so our basic assumption that proposal probabilities are proportional to population may be a reasonable approximation.¹⁶

A second type of extension would change the policy space. One alternative is to incorporate taxation schemes and project size into legislators’ strategies. This would allow us to examine policy characteristics beyond the distribution of expenditures. Another alternative is to add an ideological dimension to the simple division of the public dollar. Politicians may use public expenditures to “buy” votes in the ideological domain. Standard results suggest that moderates on the ideological dimension may command higher prices. That intuition might be altered in a bicameral setting.

A final generalization is to allow legislatures to determine the rules under which divide-the-dollar politics will occur. Diermeier and Myerson (1999) argue that the two chambers in a bicameral legislature will erect countervailing hurdles, thereby equalizing the institutional power of the chambers. In their model, legislators compete for interest group contributions, and roadblocks increase a chamber’s expected contributions. In our setting, hurdles have different effects across chambers and state sizes. Small-state senators and large-state

¹⁴ The badly apportioned states were the states with the lowest percentage of the population required to elect a majority in both chambers. The coefficient on RRI (in logarithms) is .15 (SE = .013) and the coefficient on the interaction term is .06 (SE = .016), meaning that the slope on representation in the malapportioned states is substantially larger (i.e., .21 = .15 + .06). Other factors in the model are state fixed effects, county population, income, poverty, percentage black, percentage old, percentage school aged, percentage unemployed, and percentage Democratic.

¹⁵ Actually, Binder and Smith argue that their evidence shows *weak* support for the hypothesis that small states favor the filibuster. In particular, they find a statistically significant positive effect of the “small-state” dummy in only two of the 12 roll calls they examined. A closer look, however, shows that the effect is quite strong. First, in 10 of 12 cases the effect is in the right direction—small-state senators supporting a more stringent cloture rule. Second, they examine only a subset of all the roll calls on cloture reform. We pooled all of the relevant data for the post-World War II period—69 roll calls in all—and find a large and highly significant “small-state senator” effect. (The details of this analysis are available upon request.)

¹⁶ For example, the 1984 budget reconciliation bill conference committee was composed of 90 representatives and 32 senators, and the 1987 omnibus trade bill conference committee had 155 representatives and 44 senators.

representatives prefer supermajority requirements in their respective chambers, but large-state senators and small-state representatives do not. Thus, our model would not predict a continual escalation of legislative hurdles.

APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1. Expanding, $n(\mathbf{C}) = \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C})$ $(t+1)/2 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C})t + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C}) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C})t + (m+1)/4$. Now $(n+1)/2 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t t + \frac{1}{2}$, so $n(\mathbf{C}) \leq (n+1)/2$ if and only if $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t(\mathbf{C})t + (m+1)/4 \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T m_t t + \frac{1}{2}$, or $(m-1)/2 \leq \sum_{t=1}^T [m_t - m_t(\mathbf{C})]t$. Now $\sum_{t=1}^T [m_t - m_t(\mathbf{C})] = m - (m+1)/2 = (m-1)/2$, and $t \geq 1$ for all t , so the desired inequality holds. Moreover, the inequality is strict unless $m_t(\mathbf{C}) = m_t$ for all t with $t > 1$. Note that for each t , the term $m_t - m_t(\mathbf{C})$ is the number of type- t states that are *not* in $\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$. So, the inequality is strict unless $\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{C})$ contains *all* states with $t > 1$. ■

Proof of Lemma. Suppose otherwise. This clearly implies the existence of a type t' such that representatives receive $v_{t'}^s < v_{t'}$ with positive probability. Let $\mathbf{W} \in \mathcal{W}$ represent an optimal winning coalition in which a type- t' representative, k' , receives $x_{k'} = v_{t'}^s$. This implies three facts. First, \mathbf{W} contains no "surplus" legislators of type t' (i.e., all type t' states have either 0 or $d_{t'}$ representatives receiving $x_k > 0$). Second, $m(\mathbf{W}) = (M+1)/2$, for otherwise $\mathbf{W} \setminus \{k'\} \in \mathcal{W}$. Third, $m(\mathbf{W}) = (M+1)/2$ and Proposition 1 imply the existence of a type $t'' \neq t'$ that contains surplus legislators receiving $v_{t'}$. In order for \mathbf{W} to be optimal, all surplus legislators must be of the least expensive type, and so $t'' \in \{t \mid v_t = \min\{v_t\}\}$.

The existence of a type- t'' surplus legislator implies that $v_{t''} + v_{t'}^s < v_{t'}$. Thus the proposer would replace as many type- t' legislators with type t'' (or identically inexpensive) legislators as possible. There are two cases. First, some type- t' legislators receive $v_{t'}$ and all type- t'' legislators receive $v_{t''}$ (i.e., $q_{t''} = 1$). This generates an obvious contradiction of (1). Second, no type- t' legislators receive $v_{t'}$ (i.e., $q_{t'} = 0$). Let ρ_t^s and ρ_t represent the equilibrium probabilities that a type- t senator receives v_t^s and v_t , respectively. Then $v_t^s = \rho_t^s v_t^s + \rho_t v_t$, and $q_{t'} = 0$ implies that $\rho_{t'} = 0$, so $\rho_{t'}^s = 1$. Thus, every type- t' state has $d_{t'}$ representatives receiving $v_{t'}^s$ and $t' - d_{t'}$ representatives receiving 0. An identical argument applies for all types in \mathbf{W} containing a representative who receives $v_t^s < v_t$.

Denote by \mathbf{A} the set of all Representatives receiving $v_t^s < v_t$. Then $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{A} \cup \mathbf{B}$, where $n(\mathbf{A}) = 0$, $n(\mathbf{B}) \geq (N+1)/2$, $m(\mathbf{A}) > 0$, and $m(\mathbf{B}) < (M+1)/2$. Note that the number of surplus representatives must satisfy $\hat{s} < d_{t''}$, for otherwise a type- t'' senator could be bought and a senator from \mathbf{A} dropped. So, other than these \hat{s} representatives, all representatives in \mathbf{B} must be among the $d_{t''}$ necessary to buy their state's senator. But since $m(\mathbf{B}) < (M+1)/2$, by Proposition 1 $n(\mathbf{B}) < (N+1)/2$: contradiction. Thus no coalition containing a payment of $v_t^s < v_t$ can be optimal. ■

Proof of Proposition 2

Existence. To show existence, note that in such an equilibrium, Proposition 1 implies that exactly $(n-1)/2$ legislators receive v_t . Thus, \underline{v}_t is constant across t , and expression (1) implies that q_t is also constant across t . Thus $q_t = 1/2$ for all types. It is sufficient to identify a proposal strategy for any proposer i such that, *ex ante*, $\Pr\{x_k = v_i \mid k \neq i\} = \Pr\{x_k = 0 \mid k \neq i\} = 1/2$, subject to the constraint that at least $(m+1)/2$ states receive at least v_i in more than half of their districts. Let i

belong to state j of type \bar{t} , and let S^j denote the set of states not including j . Consider any partition $\{S_1, S_2\}$ of S^j with the following properties: (i) S_1 consists of one state from each type $t \neq \bar{t}$ such that m_t is odd and one from type \bar{t} if $m_{\bar{t}} - 1$ is odd; (ii) $S_2 = S^j \setminus S_1$ (that is, a largest subset of S^j such that the number of states of each type is even). Note that $|S_1|$ and $|S_2|$ must both be even and that S_1 or S_2 may be empty. We assign $x_k = v_i$ across districts as follows (all other districts receive $x_k = 0$).

1. In S_2 : For each type $t \neq \bar{t}$, choose $m_t/2$ states if t is even, and $(m_t - 1)/2$ states if t is odd, at random with equal probability. For type \bar{t} , choose $m_{\bar{t}}/2 - 1$ states if \bar{t} is even, and $(m_{\bar{t}} - 1)/2$ states if \bar{t} is odd, at random with equal probability. Assign $x_k = v_i$ to all representatives in these states.
- 2a. If \bar{t} is odd, in S_1 : The number of districts in S_1 is even. Thus, there exists a partition $\{S_1^l\}_{l=1, \dots, |S_1|/2}$ of S_1 such that for each l , S_1^l contains a pair of states, both with either odd or even numbers of districts. Choose any such partition. For each S_1^l , label the member states j'' and j''' , of types t'' and t''' , respectively, where $t'' \leq t'''$. With probability $1/2$, assign $x_k = v_i$ randomly to $(t'' + t''')/2$ representatives in state j'' with equal probability. With probability $1/2$, assign $x_k = v_i$ to all representatives in state j'' and randomly to $(t''' - t'')/2$ representatives in state j''' with equal probability. In state j : Assign $x_k = v_i$ randomly to $(\bar{t} - 1)/2$ representatives with equal probability.
- 2b. If \bar{t} is even, in S_1 and state j : The number of districts in S_1 is odd. Thus, there exists a state \hat{j} of type \hat{t} , where \hat{t} is odd. Suppose that $\bar{t} - 1 \leq \hat{t}$. Then with probability $1/2$, assign $x_k = v_i$ randomly to $(\hat{t} + \bar{t} - 1)/2$ representatives in state \hat{j} , with equal probability. With probability $1/2$, assign $x_k = v_i$ to all representatives except \hat{i} in state \hat{j} and randomly to $(\hat{t} - \bar{t} + 1)/2$ representatives in state \hat{j} , with equal probability. A symmetrical result assignment is used for $\bar{t} - 1 > \hat{t}$. For the set of states in $S_1 \setminus \{\hat{j}\}$, follow the procedure in step 2a for S_1 , replacing S_1 with $S_1 \setminus \{\hat{j}\}$.

Given this proposal strategy, and letting $v_t = 1/n$ for all t , it is easily verified that $q_t = 1/2$ and (1) holds for all types. Further, exactly $(m+1)/2$ states receive at least v_i in more than half of their districts. Finally, since $v_t^s \leq v_t$ trivially and only one district can receive strictly more than v_t , $v_t^s \leq v_t$ for all types, as required.

Uniqueness of Expected Payoffs. To prove that $v_t = 1/n$ for all t , suppose, on the contrary, that there is an SSSPE with some type t such that $v_t \neq 1/n$. Without loss of generality, let $v_c = \min_t \{v_t\}$ and $v_e = \max_t \{v_t\}$. Clearly, $v_c < 1/n < v_e$. We show that this leads to a contradiction.

Consider the set of representatives from states with $v_t = v_e$, and let \mathbf{A} denote the representatives from the largest type in this set. Note two facts that follow from equation (1). First, if $q_t = 0$, then $v_t = (1 - \underline{v}_t)/n < 1/n$. Second, if $q_t = 1$, then $v_t = (1 - \underline{v}_t) > 1/n$. There are two cases.

Case 1: $m_1 < (m-1)/2$. There are two subcases: (i) $m(\mathbf{A}) \leq (m-1)/2$ and (ii) $m(\mathbf{A}) \geq (m+1)/2$. In (i), a cheapest coalition always includes $(m+1)/2$ states in $\mathbf{N} \setminus \mathbf{A}$ and none from \mathbf{A} . If $n(\mathbf{A}) < (n+1)/2$, then $q_t = 0$ and $v_e < 1/n$ for all representatives in \mathbf{A} : contradiction. If $n(\mathbf{A}) \geq (n+1)/2$, then $q_t = 1$ and $v_t > 1/n > v_c$ for all representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus \mathbf{A}$: contradiction. So (ii) must hold. In this subcase a cheapest coalition always includes a minimum winning majority in all states with representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus \mathbf{A}$, plus $(m+1)/2 -$

$m(\mathbf{N} \setminus A)$ states from \mathbf{A} . Since cheapest coalitions include one or more representatives of each type, there exists a cheapest coalition for each proposer that includes herself; thus, $v_t = \underline{v}$ for all t . Substituting into equation (1),

$$v_t = \frac{1 - \underline{v}}{(n-1)(1-q_t)}.$$

Obviously, v_t is strictly increasing in q_t . The fact that a cheapest coalition always includes a minimum winning majority in all states with representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus A$ means that $q_t > 1/2$ for all representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus A$. Since cheapest minimum winning coalitions include exactly $(n+1)/2$ representatives, they never include more than half of representatives in \mathbf{A} ; thus, $q_t < 1/2$ for all representatives in \mathbf{A} . This implies that v_t is larger for representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus A$ than for those in \mathbf{A} : contradiction.

Case 2: $m_1 \geq (m-1)/2$. There are two subcases: (i) \mathbf{A} consists of type 1 representatives, and (ii) \mathbf{A} does not. In (i), if $m_1 = (m-1)/2$, then a winning coalition can be drawn from types $t \neq 1$. This implies that $q_1 = 0$ and $v_1 < 1/n$: contradiction. If $m_1 > (m-1)/2$, then subcase (ii) of Case 1 applies. In (ii), if $m(\mathbf{A}) \leq (m-1)/2$, then $q_t = 0$ and $v_e < 1/n$ for representatives in \mathbf{A} : contradiction. Otherwise, $m(\mathbf{A}) = (m+1)/2$ so $q_1 = 1$ and $v_t > 1/n > v_e$ for all representatives in $\mathbf{N} \setminus A$: contradiction. ■

Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that $Q_S > r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$ and $v_k \geq v_1$. We show that this leads to a contradiction. If $v_k > v_1$, then $v_k > 1/n > v_1$. In this case, if $m_1 \geq Q_H$ and $m_1 \geq Q_S$, then $q_k = 0$, and so $v_k < 1/n$: contradiction. Otherwise, $q_1 = 1$ and thus $v_1 > 1/n$: contradiction.

Thus $v_k = v = 1/n$. In this case, since there are only two types, there exists a least-cost coalition that includes both type-1 and type- k representatives, which implies that $\underline{v}_k = \underline{v}_1 = \underline{v}$. Since $(n+1)/2 \leq Q_H < n$, this implies that $1/2 < q_k = q_1 < 1$. So, there exist optimal winning coalitions that do not contain all type-1 representatives. Any such coalition must have exactly Q_H representatives and, therefore, costs $\underline{v} = Q_H/n$. Thus, all optimal winning coalitions must have exactly Q_H representatives (and cost $\underline{v} = Q_H/n$). Consider a coalition with Q_H representatives, at least $(km_k + 1)/2$ of which are of type k . This coalition can win no more than $r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$ senators, where $r_k = \lfloor (km_k + 1)/(k+1) \rfloor$. (This is achieved by distributing $\lfloor km_k + 1 \rfloor/2$ payouts of v_k to $\lfloor k+1 \rfloor/2$ districts in as many type- k states as possible. The remaining $Q_H - \lfloor km_k + 1 \rfloor/2$ districts are allocated to type-1 states.) Note that the assumption $Q_H < m_1 + (km_k + 1)/2$ (made in the text) ensures that there are enough type-1 districts to make this distribution feasible. Thus, since $Q_S > r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$ by assumption, it is impossible to construct a coalition that contains exactly Q_H representatives, has at least $(km_k + 1)/2$ members in type- k districts, and wins the Senate. So, $q_k < 1/2 < q_1$: contradiction. Thus, if $Q_S > r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$, then $v_k < v_1$.

Finally, when $Q_S \leq r_k + Q_H - (km_k + 1)/2$, an argument analogous to Proposition 2 shows that $v_1 = v_k = 1/N$ (i.e., no small-state bias exists). ■

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose otherwise (i.e., $v_t \leq 1/n$). By the lemma, no representative receives an allocation in $(0, v_t)$. This implies that under an optimal allocation for any senator,

$$\frac{1}{n} \geq \frac{1}{m} \frac{d_t}{t} \frac{1}{d_t} \left[1 - \left(\frac{n+1}{2} - dt \right) \frac{1}{n} \right] + \frac{m-1}{m} q_t \frac{1}{n},$$

where q_t represents the average probability of being included in a coalition, conditional on not being the proposer.

Collecting terms, this implies that

$$m \geq \frac{1}{t} \left[n - \left(\frac{n+1}{2} - d_t \right) \right] + (m-1)q_t,$$

and thus,

$$q_t \leq \frac{tm - (n-1)/2 + d_t}{t(m-1)}.$$

This implies that $q_t < 0$, generating a contradiction, if $tm < (n-1)/2 - d_t$, or $n > 2(tm + d_t) + 1$. Since $2d_t + 1 \leq t + 3$, the condition is satisfied if $n > t(2m+1) + 3$. If $m_1 \geq 1$, $v_1 > 1/n$ if $n > 2m + 3$.

Note that by substituting equalities for the inequalities, the expressions above also imply that an equilibrium in which $v_t = 1/n$ for all t is impossible if $q_t > 1$. This occurs if $t > (n-1)/2 - d_t$, or $n < 2(t + d_t) + 1$, which is satisfied if $n < 3t + 2$ for some t . ■

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Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85

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Using the racial integration of national labor unions as a case study, I find that courts played an important and meaningfully autonomous role in integrating unions while elected officials largely failed to act. Courts, unlike elected officials, offered civil rights groups relatively easy access to the legal agenda. In response to thousands of cases in federal courts, judges rewrote key civil rights statutes, oversaw the implementation of their rulings, and used attorneys' fees and damage awards to impose significant financial costs on resistant unions. Court power was the product of multiple and historically contingent forces that involved the interaction of elected officials, civil rights activists, and the legal community. Elected officials delegated to the courts the power to enforce civil rights laws and tacitly endorsed procedural changes that augmented the courts' institutional powers and the legal community's professional influence. In response, judges and lawyers promoted and implemented a civil rights agenda far beyond the endorsement of elected officials. An historical-institutional approach helps explain how courts achieved and wielded independent power and the consequences of their action for civil rights, labor unions, and the American state.

Are courts capable of producing significant social change? Most scholars argue that, absent express executive and legislative backing, courts are ineffective reformers because they lack the institutional weapons to enforce their judgments (e.g., Dahl 1957; Rosenberg 1991). Judges have neither the power to compel behavior nor the staff and resources to confront multifaceted social problems (Horowitz 1977). Gerald Rosenberg's (1991, 338) recent work makes this claim most emphatically: "U.S. courts can *almost never* be effective producers of significant social reform. . . . Problems that are unsolvable in the political context can rarely be solved by courts." While this account has garnered its share of critics (e.g., Casper 1976; Feeley and Rubin 1999; McCann 1994; Reed 2001), most scholars "concede the central insight . . . that federal courts alone rarely 'cause' significant social change" (McCann 1999, 67). For this and other reasons, prominent legal theorists conclude that courts should accept a far more limited role in national politics (Sunstein 1999; Tushnet 1999; Waldron 1999), and even those who promote courts as policymakers tend to see their influence as less direct or "bottom-up" (Klarman 1994; McCann 1994; Silverstein 1996).

Using the racial integration of national labor unions in the latter half of the twentieth century as a case study, I find that courts succeeded in integrating resistant unions in a manner largely independent of both the interests and the actions of elected officials. From 1935 to 1985 the number of African Americans in la-

bor unions increased from roughly 50,000, many of whom were in segregated local unions, to more than 3 million. Legal activism with the aid of "top-down" institutional weapons was crucial to this process. Most notably, courts compelled unions to integrate their workforces by imposing significant financial costs through lawyer fees and damage awards in a series of civil rights lawsuits. It may be a truism that courts do not have the power of the purse or sword—that they do not have enforcement powers in the classic sense of agencies and armies—but the case study shows that courts effectively enforced their will by making it too financially costly for unions not to comply.

To argue that courts produced significant social change nonetheless begs a second question—How did judges obtain and wield this power when the Constitution does not seem to provide for it? Scholars and politicians alike have deemed courts "the least dangerous branch" not only because the Constitution does not empower judges to enforce decisions but because judicial independence, as John Ferejohn (1999, 382) points out, "is dependent on the 'willingness' of the popular branches of government to refrain from using their ample constitutional powers to infringe on judicial authority." Elected officials can refuse to enforce court judgments or overturn these judgments with new laws. They retain the power to "ordain and establish" federal courts "inferior" to the Supreme Court, to define the jurisdiction of these courts, to set their budgets, and to impeach judges. During the historical period explored here, there was yet a second obstacle to judicial influence. This case study begins precisely at a time when judges seemingly buckled in response to one of the strongest attacks against their authority by Franklin Roosevelt's court packing scheme. How, then, did courts produce social change independently of electoral officials so soon after their power had seemingly hit a low point?

In recent years, public law scholars have emphasized the importance of historical and institutional context for understanding moments of court power (e.g.,

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Thanks for very helpful comments go to Amy Bridges, Kerstin Carlson, Malcolm Feeley, Beth Garrett, Howard Gillman, Mark Graber, Jeff Haydu, David Karol, Ken Kersch, David Mayhew, Jim Morone, Shehzad Nadeem, Ruth O'Brien, Corey Robin, Pam Singh, John Skrentny, Mark Tushnet, Rick Valelly, Keith Whittington, Janelle Wong, the *APSR* reviewers, and Lee Sigelman. The University of California's Institute for Labor and Employment provided generous financial assistance.

Gillman 1999; Klarman 1996; Smith 1988; Whittington 1999). The integration of unions occurred at a specific historical juncture as a multitude of actors, from elected officials to civil rights activists to lawyers and judges, were pursuing often independent goals that coalesced in a manner enabling court-centered activism. First, elected officials faced great obstacles from Southern Democrats and labor unions in their efforts to pass civil rights policy. Blocked from acting through their own houses, the manner that elected officials could promote civil rights policy was of a specific type—not in their express approval of the civil rights policies themselves but in their often tacit support of the institutional methods by which courts carried out policies. Elected officials provided judges the power to determine civil rights law and establish remedies and encouraged private litigation by passing numerous statutes that made court strategies more affordable for civil rights groups. In arguing that courts were chief activists in promoting civil rights during this period, at least in part because legislators frequently invited and even “commanded” them to intervene, my account is consistent with judicial scholars who emphasize the links between elected official behavior and court power (Gillman 2002; Graber 1993, 1998; Lovell 2003; Melnick 1994).

But courts were not acting simply because elected officials wanted them to. A second factor was at work: Independently, this was a period when the legal community was actively expanding its own profession (Abel 1989; Halliday 1987), and it found elected officials unwitting allies. Elected officials provided uncontroversial “particularistic” policies to lawyers and judges, just as they provide to a myriad of well-organized interest groups (Mayhew 1974), with little recognition of how these policies would be used to promote civil rights goals. Most notably, elected officials delegated to judges and lawyers the power to greatly expand legal institutions, making litigation a more appealing political strategy for civil rights groups. The reform of federal civil procedure rules during this time, for instance, expanded the opportunities for civil rights groups to gain standing and access to a judge, expanded the entry points at which civil rights groups promoted creative legal interpretations through reforms to venue and jurisdiction, made it easier for civil rights plaintiffs to “discover” damaging evidence from discriminators, gave judges the power to create “special masters” who oversaw and implemented court orders, and provided judges far greater influence in determining the remedies, particularly financial, to use against resistant discriminators. Judges and lawyers used these reforms to promote and enforce a social agenda that often ranged far beyond the intent of legislators, express or otherwise.

Third, the decisions of civil rights activists interacted with the opportunities for success provided by other institutions. Civil rights groups used a litigation strategy predicated on their determination that the elected branches were unresponsive and this decision in turn perpetuated its further use. Lawyers not only became central players in the civil rights policy debates, but they consistently and successfully advocated legal so-

lutions instead of political solutions from a deadlocked Congress. While the importance of activist interaction with lawyers and judges in promoting legal change has been well documented (see Epp 1998; McCann 1994; Novkov 2001), I wish to emphasize how the choice by civil rights activists to pursue goals through litigation enabled the further absence of political resolutions. In the following pages, I consider the interaction of these three factors with court power in two historical periods: from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the two decades that followed the Civil Rights Act. In the conclusion, I explore some broader implications about the role of courts and civil rights for the development of the twentieth-century American state.

ELECTED OFFICIALS AND LABOR UNION CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY FROM ROOSEVELT TO KENNEDY

The development of federal strategies to confront union racism took place in the context of a Democratic Party heavily reliant on southern votes to win elections and southern congressional members to pass legislation. In particular, southern Democrats wielded disproportionate power in Congress through a variety of internal mechanisms such as committee chairs in the House and the filibuster in the Senate. Southern influence divided the New Deal majority, preventing Democrats from passing civil rights legislation and necessitating that they include provisions in many of their key economic policies that discriminated against large numbers of minority workers (Katznelson et al. 1993; Lieberman 1998). Southern interests, with the support of many national unions, had similar influence on labor legislation including the passage of the NLRA, an act that Karl Klare (1978, 265) has called “the most radical piece of legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress.” Most notably, Section 9 of the NLRA empowered unions to have closed shops and be the exclusive collective bargaining agents based on a determination by the majority of workers in a company. The NAACP complained that unions were using the Act “to organize a union for all the white workers, and to either agree with the employers to push Negroes out of the industry or, having effected an agreement with the employer, to proceed to make a union lily-white” (Wolters 1970, 179). The National Urban League argued that the Act failed to protect blacks from being excluded from employment by closed shop unions, that it permitted competitive unions in the same industry on the basis of race, and that it excluded blacks who were hired as strike-breakers from employee protection even in situations where their only opportunity to gain work was during a strike period (Wagner Archives 1935a). These groups fought to have a civil rights amendment attached to the NLRA—a “duty of fair representation” that would prevent discriminatory unions from representing only white workers.¹ But with

¹ The National Urban League asked for three amendments, one regarding strike breakers, one providing that “no employee otherwise

little African American representation in Congress or in the labor movement—the NAACP estimated the numbers of black union members at roughly 50,000 at this time, half of whom were in the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (Wolters 1970, 172)—it was soundly defeated (Wagner Archives 1934a). Their efforts to include agricultural workers in the Act, who at the time represented a significant proportion of black workers, also failed. As the Act's namesake, Robert Wagner, acknowledged at the time, agricultural workers were "excluded because I thought it would be better to pass the bill for the benefit of industrial workers than not to pass it at all, and that inclusion of agricultural workers would lessen the likelihood of passage" (Wagner Archives 1935b).

The NLRA enabled unions to maintain discriminatory workplace standards for decades and high-profile legislative reforms of the Act in the 1940s and 1950s failed to offer further protection for racial minorities. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) treated union discrimination in a manner that reflected congressional intent. The Board consistently certified all-white unions and was unwilling to declare that the creation of separate unions for white workers was a violation of fair representation (*Atlanta Oak Flooring Co.*, 62 NLRB 973 [1945]; broadly, see Hill 1986). By 1944, 31 national unions were known to discriminate against blacks, most notably the Railroad Workers, Electrical Workers, Plumbers and Steamfitters, Sheet Metal Workers, and Boilermakers (McCray 1944, 203). Overall numbers of black workers in trade unions had grown to roughly 400,000, but the percentage of blacks constituted only 3.4% of the AFL membership in 1945, a small growth from their 2.8% in 1926–28 (McCray 1944, 202; Marshall 1967, 29). Most black membership in unions was centered in northern industrial states, with large numbers in the United Mine Workers, Steelworkers, and Autoworkers. Moreover, many unions with large numbers of blacks restricted them to separate auxiliary unions that had limited rights and bargaining strength.

The Executive Branch was more active in other ways in confronting union civil rights matters. Presidents during this time passed a number of Executive Orders, most notably Roosevelt's Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) that responded to A. Philip Randolph's threatened Washington protest. The orders gave a variety of commissions the authority to conduct investigations into union discrimination and to promote voluntary compliance. None of the executive commissions, however, had any type of enforcement power beyond publicity. The FEPC's (1943b) greatest achievement with regard to unions, for instance, was to hold hearings and put public pressure on the Boilermakers Union to grant equal status to black auxiliary unions. Although it lacked enforcement powers, the Committee, with the help

of the National War Labor Board and some creative statutory interpretations by some federal and state judges, forced the Boilermakers to change their national constitution and accept black workers into their ranks in segregated but "equal" unions.² But further efforts to strengthen the FEPC continually met fierce resistance from both unions and southern Democrats in Congress (Arnesen 2001; Marshall 1967, 121–22). In the early 1960s, President John Kennedy's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity similarly failed to get beyond initial investigations and requests for voluntary compliance (Department of Labor [DOL] 1963a; 1963e; 1964). The investigations, on the one hand, revealed that extensive union discrimination existed; nine different construction trade unions, for instance (electricians, elevator constructors, glasers, lathers, sheet metal workers, sprinkler fitters, stone masons, structural iron workers, and rodmen), had exclusively white workforces (DOL 1963c). They recognized the "need for very strong action"; they also recognized that it required "action which we will have no means to take" (DOL 1963c; 1963d; 1963f).

Absent federal involvement, national unions, particularly in the construction and craft industries, were slow in making their own reforms. Some unions were active in promoting diversity, most notably numerous CIO unions during the 1940s and also some AFL unions (e.g., Goldfield 1997; Honey 1993; Kelley 1990; Nelson 2001). Coalitions of union and civil rights protestors pushed for changes in national AFL policies in the 1930s and were integral in the Boilermaker reforms mentioned above (FEPC 1944a; NAACP 1935). But similar to elected officials, national unions moved slowly to promote changes and felt similarly constrained by internal opposition. Most often, their efforts paralleled those of the executive committees; they attempted to investigate how bad the situation was, came to mixed conclusions, and failed to do more than place occasional symbolic pressure on resistant locals (Meany Archives 1957b; Nelson 2001; Reuther Archives 1962a).³ And while unions were widely diverse in their policies and treatment of blacks and other minority workers, white union workers often reacted with violence in order to prevent minority integration and promotions (FEPC 1943a; Nelson 2001, DOL 1963b).

² In Oregon shipyards, for instance, African Americans represented 19% of the workforce in 1944, after having numbered only 32 workers out of 18,707 in November of 1943 (FEPC 1943c, 1944b).

³ A 1962 memo from Jacob Clayman of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department to Walter Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers, in which he criticized the absence of a union civil rights policy, aptly reflects where national unions were on the eve of the Civil Rights Act: "I understand that the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department does not have a concise or even a reasonably clear civil rights inventory relating to our various AFL-CIO unions. For example, no one has the answer to . . . which local unions have a separate line of job progression; which local unions have segregated meetings; which local unions have denied membership because of race; which local unions have separate personal facilities, etc.?" (Reuther Archives 1962b).

eligible is denied membership or restricted or interfered with because of race, color, or creed," and one asking that denial of union membership because of one's race should be an unfair labor practice." The NAACP asked for similar provisions. (Wagner Archives 1934c).

COURTS AS A PROFESSIONAL BRANCH, COURTS AS A CIVIL RIGHTS PROMOTER 1935-64

Although efforts by elected officials to promote union integration largely failed during this period, two simultaneous events pulled judges and lawyers to the center of the policy process. First was the shift in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence during the New Deal. After failing to prevent Roosevelt's efforts to regulate the national economy, the Court slowly turned toward protecting the rights of individuals and "discrete and insular minorities" who found themselves unrepresented by the political process (*U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 fn 4 [1938]).⁴ It was in this political context that the NAACP and other "rights" organizations chose to emphasize litigation over legislative strategies (Epp 1998; Handler 1978; Tushnet 1987). The Supreme Court, with the prodding of the NAACP and the Department of Justice, went on to decide a series of cases that favored the expansion of rights to disadvantaged groups, most notably *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954. It was also in this context that elected officials who desired civil rights reforms began to look to the courts as an avenue to achieve their goals. Kevin McMahon (2000) argues the Roosevelt Administration made a number of moves—through both court appointments and a more aggressive Department of Justice—to accomplish through courts what the President believed was unattainable through legislation and executive action. Presidents Truman through Johnson made similar moves, either through liberal judicial appointments or by using the Justice Department to file *amicus* briefs to promote civil rights goals before federal courts (Clayton 1992, 127-37; Dudziak 2000).

The Supreme Court was less active in the realm of union discrimination, never passing a case of *Brown's* stature or legal scope but supportive of civil rights nonetheless. Often this was done with direct recognition that legislators had failed to act on the matter and with the assertion that it was the Court's duty to rectify the situation. In *Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Supreme Court's most notable statement on union civil rights during these years, the majority held that unions have a statutory duty of "fair representation," by which they cannot discriminate on the basis of race when representing employee interests. In response to a railroad union that supported a collective bargaining agreement which eliminated most African American jobs, the Court rewrote the Railway Labor Act: "We think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act . . . did not intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect the minority" (199, 200). This assertion was reiterated on numerous occasions both by the Supreme Court (see *Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard*, 343 U.S. 768 [1952]; *Ford*

Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 [1953]; *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41 [1957]) and by lower courts that overturned the efforts of white union members to sign contracts that denied rights to black employees.

The impact of these early decisions was mixed. On the one hand, the data and case studies examining the success of courts in the area of union discrimination during this time are uniform in finding significant compliance by the targeted unions, as well as in finding dramatic examples of what occurs in a much more extensive fashion in the 1970s—courts rewarding plaintiffs with large damage awards and union lawyers recommending compliance over further expense and litigation (see Arneson 2001, 209-15; FEPC 1943c, 1944; Herring 1964). On the other hand, the scope of the legal matters the courts were dealing with in most of these cases was narrow; they dealt primarily with unions that discriminated against current union members, not against workers who were denied access to unions altogether. More importantly, it was not until the 1960s that civil rights groups and lawyers began to prioritize union discrimination on their agenda (Meany Archives 1958).⁵ The NAACP, for example, was concerned more with school segregation and voting rights and without their advocacy, few union cases were brought to federal courts. Between 1935 and 1964, federal courts ruled on only nine discrimination lawsuits involving the AFL-CIO.⁶ Among the building trades, there was only one case decided in federal court, involving the above-mentioned Boilermakers. Nearly three-quarters of the union discrimination cases in federal courts during this time involved railroad unions. Only when civil rights groups target unions, coupled with other legal reforms, are unions besieged with federal lawsuits.

The Rise of a Professional Bar and Court

Court expansion into civil rights matters was not solely the result of elected officials and civil rights activists promoting policy agendas on a different turf. Independent of civil rights, lawyers and judges were involved in efforts to reform and professionalize the bar and national legal system. In this regard, perhaps the most important event in the courts' eventual capacity to conduct civil rights policy successfully was not the heralded 1938 footnote in *Carolene Products* but the reforms to the federal rules of civil procedure that passed through Congress in the same year, four years after the historic passage of the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules Enabling

⁴ The reasons for the Court's change, whether ideological, situational, or institutional, is much debated (see Cover 1982; Pacelle 1991, 52-55; Skrentny 1996, 171-75).

⁵ Similarly, while the relationship between civil rights litigators and labor unions was generally mixed during this time, it was not until the late 1950s when the NAACP makes union litigation a priority that the two sides became polarized. Contrast, for example, a memo from NAACP's Herbert Hill in 1949 in which he wrote to Roy Wilkins that the NAACP should emphasize more extensive relationships and fundraising from unions (NAACP, 1949) with a series of memos he wrote a decade later when he accused the AFL-CIO of systematic discrimination practices and called on the NAACP to make litigation against the unions one of its primary objectives (NAACP, 1960; Nelson 2001, 232-42).

⁶ This includes cases involving the AFL and CIO prior to 1956. The number of cases is compiled from Lexis. A similar check of state courts also found very few cases.

Act, passed by Congress with the strong backing of the American Bar Association (ABA), provided judges substantial influence over the content of the federal rules of civil procedure (Bone 1999; Burbank 1982). The Act provided that a set of judicial committees led by the Judicial Conference, and made up of judges, lawyers, and elite law professors, would devise the procedure for all federal courts to follow in the litigation process, from initial pleading to trial decisions and appeals. The 1938 Rules represented the first effort by these judicial committees, and their impact—although almost entirely ignored by political scientists (though see Kersch 2002)—is widely seen in the legal world as revolutionary. Perhaps most notably, the procedural rule changes made it easier for potential plaintiffs, even those of modest means and limited expertise, to have their day in court. Assuming, for instance, that a potential litigant meets rules of standing and follows the relatively simple pleading requirements as defined by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they will get a courtroom hearing with lawyers present to make arguments and will subsequently have opportunities for appeal if they are inadequately served.⁷ Document exchange, deposition, and interrogatories became available to federal civil litigants as a matter of course, enabling plaintiffs greater ease in finding out damaging evidence against defendants. Litigants could avail themselves of all these remedies under a relatively broad definition of the scope of “discovery” that permits a plaintiff to look at any information relevant to the “subject matter” of the dispute. Even “fishing expeditions” were allowed in order to determine legal disputes with the maximum factual information. In 1946, the Judicial Conference again reformed discovery rules by making it easier for challenging parties to search for evidence, even if it is “not admissible at trial,” as long as it is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26b[1]).⁸ These changes struck the balance in favor of those who petitioned for redress of grievances and shifted the burden onto those accused to come into court and make a case. Class action and

joinder rules made it economically feasible to go to court despite the prospect of only small financial gain for the individual, while the use of special masters and magistrates enhanced the ability of district judges to decide large complex cases of national importance.

The writers of the federal rule changes had a diverse set of interests and agendas. Historians emphasize that the reforms were in part the culmination of Progressive ideals aimed at making it easier for everyday citizens to gain access to the courtroom as well as a significant step toward professionalizing the judicial branch and legal community, both longstanding goals of the ABA and high-profile judges and law professors (Burbank 1982). The ABA wanted legal procedure to be less technical so that people could understand and participate in court proceedings. It also hoped that uniform rules would “diminish the expense and delay of litigation” and complete trials more quickly (Resnick 1986, 503). Creating a national system of civil procedures made it cheaper for lawyers to litigate, made it easier for them to pursue multistate practices, and made it easier for them to find work in the midst of an economic depression (Auerbach 1976, 206–9). The 1938 Rules, Judith Resnick (1986, 522) argues, created a whole new set of jobs for lawyers: “With the new procedural opportunities came a new set of lawyers, ‘litigators,’ who did their work (motions, deposition and interrogatory practice) during the pretrial process and who were distinguished from ‘trial lawyers,’ who actually conducted trials.”

The Rules were also part of an effort by lawyers and judges to insulate courts from the political process. Stephen Subrin (1987, 956) argues that many judges, most notably Chief Justice Howard Taft, believed as early as the 1900s that “making courts and their procedure more efficient would reduce the outcry for some popular control over the judiciary.” Taft and others “saw the courts as the protector of property and republican values, a last moat shielding the country from the wild progressives, the unions, and the masses” and began promoting the ABA’s Enabling Act proposal to better insulate courts from political attacks (Subrin 1987, 955). Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to diminish the Supreme Court’s influence two decades later only further fueled ABA efforts at insulating the courts from politics. The ABA lobbied for rule changes and the passage of the Administrative Office Act of 1939 and other legislation to regain judicial authority and autonomy back from the elected branches. Chief Justice Fred Vinson called the 1939 Act “something of a Declaration of Independence for the courts” (quoted in Fish 1970, 603) as it provided for the transfer of legal administrative functions from the Department of Justice to the Judicial Conference, giving judges far more control over legal standards and determinations, as well as their budgets and administration without the scrutiny of the executive branch.

There is little evidence that these rule changes were in any way related to a civil rights agenda, and they were arguably unattached to any substantive ideological agenda. Expanding opportunities for litigants to participate in court, Richard Bone (1999, 897) argues, was reflective of the ABA’s belief in the adversarial

⁷ The Supreme Court, in *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), emphasized that these new rules were intended to assist plaintiffs: “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim . . . all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits continues to steadfastly maintain the ease of pleading rules.” The Court has continued to reiterate this point: all that is needed in civil rights discrimination claims, for example, is “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief” (*Swierkiewicz v. Sorema*, 534 U.S. 506 [2002]; *Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit*, 507 U.S. 163 [1985]).

⁸ The Supreme Court affirmed these changes the next year: “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation” (*Hickman v. Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 507 [1947]).

legal *process* and the organization's commitments to expanding employment opportunities and professional power, not a desire to allow any specific groups greater representation.⁹ There was no mention of civil rights during congressional discussion of the 1938 Rules. Texas House member and Judicial Committee chair, Hatton Sumners, provided one of the very few public comments on the rule changes and they seemed to typify what opinion existed in Congress: He supported the rule changes because they would "materially reduce the uncertainty, delay, expense, and the likelihood which cases may be decided on technical points of procedure which had no just determination" of justice (Congressional Record, 1938, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, Appendix 2920). Labor unions offered one of the very few examples of a skeptical voice, fearing the new rules would allow judges to issue injunctions against strikes (House Judiciary Committee Hearings on Rules of Civil Procedure 1938, 13–14). The 1938 Rules changes were never voted on by Congress; as per the Rules Enabling Act, the Rules became law in six months when Congress failed to act against them.

In the following sections, I discuss some of the consequences of these rule changes. Civil rights groups may not have been involved in their creation, but they found that the rules provided greater opportunity for a fair hearing in the court room than in congressional chambers. Judges zealously guarded their new authority (e.g., *Sibbach v. Wilson*, 312 U.S. 1 [1941]),¹⁰ and civil rights groups placed greater resources into litigation. Perhaps most importantly, although these rule changes were nominally supported by congressional action and inaction, the legal community had carved out a significant degree of professional and institutional autonomy from elected officials to carry out a major social agenda.¹¹

1964–1972—ELECTED OFFICIALS ACT: TITLE VII AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246

In 1964, elected officials responded to unprecedented worldwide pressure brought on them by the civil rights movement and the Cold War by passing the Civil Rights Act (Dudziak 2000; Klinkner with Smith 1999;

Skrentny 1998; 2002). In taking this action, elected officials set a significant precedent in antidiscrimination law (Burstein 1985; Edelman 1990; Lieberman 2002). As such, we might well expect that efforts to integrate unions would coincide with Rosenberg's (1991, 97–100) noteworthy findings about school integration. He found that prior to 1964, court activism failed to integrate schools; dramatic changes occurred only after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act and various financial inducements. But there are significant differences in the case of union integration. First, the Civil Rights Act included specific provisions promoted by the AFL-CIO that enabled unions to resist civil rights policy. Second, Congress did not pass a tax incentive package to motivate unions to integrate. Third, unlike Rosenberg's findings, EEOC data show that significant integration of resistant unions did not begin shortly after 1964, but in the mid-1970s as courts effectively rewrote Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to get rid of the carefully crafted loopholes, and as litigation created severe financial costs for discriminatory unions.

In order to end a southern filibuster against the initial bill, Congress passed a series of amendments to Title VII's provisions regarding discrimination in private employment (Graham 1990; Rodriguez and Weingast 2002). These provisions, first proposed by Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, most notably took away the enforcement powers of the newly created EEOC as they denied the agency "cease-and-desist" and litigation powers. In this regard, the EEOC's power in 1964 was little different than the FEPC's two decades prior: When the agency's efforts at conciliation failed, its only option was to inform its clients of their right to sue in court (and in certain situations refer cases to the Department of Justice), leaving the enforcement of Title VII to private individuals through lawsuits.¹² Title VII contained further loopholes that limited its effectiveness. It prohibited the use of racial quotas to enforce integration¹³ and mandated that an individual who accuses an employer (or union) of discrimination demonstrate that the accused acted with specific intent

⁹ Malcolm Feeley (2002) makes similar arguments about the "nonpolitical" reforms of the American Law Institute, another organization backed strongly by the ABA, during this time period.

¹⁰ In fact, some believed that judges were going too far. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for instance, dissented in *Sibbach*, criticizing the Court's decision as taking its power over rules too far: "So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts. . . . *Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and can not be treated as such. Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality*" (17–18; italics added).

¹¹ Suggestive of the importance of procedural change independent from ideological change in impacting court agendas is the increase in public law cases heard by the Fifth Circuit, arguably the nation's most conservative, from 12% between 1915 and 1930 to 31% between 1935 and 1955 and 35% between 1960 and 1975 (Baum et al. 1982, 301).

¹² Judith Stein (1998, 85) argues that the choice by Congress to give the Department of Justice and not the EEOC the power to sue after finding a "pattern or practice of resistance" was a specific effort to weaken Title VII's reach with labor. Senate Minority Leader "Dirksen assumed, accurately, that the Justice Department selected its cases conservatively. Consumed with voting and school desegregation cases and about to assume responsibility for enforcing of the new legislation, the civil rights division also lacked lawyers versed in labor matters. This meant, in effect, that individuals, not the government, would enforce the law."

¹³ Senator Joseph Clark, the bill's manager in the Senate, said, "It is clear that the bill would not affect the present operation of any part of the National Labor Relations Act or rights under existing labor laws. The suggestion that racial balance or quota systems would be impacted by this proposed legislation is entirely inaccurate" (Congressional Record 1964, 7207). Union leaders seemed to believe similarly that this was the purpose of the legislation. Walter P. Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers Union, wrote to Senator Lister Hill, "Your principal concern appears to be that the pending law will require a mathematical apportionment of jobs. . . . [W]e do not believe it to be the import of the pending Federal measure" (General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives 1965, 233).

to discriminate. It exempted small businesses and provided employers with a quite broadly defined “bona fide occupational qualification” defense to claims of discrimination while also expressly allowing employers to use professionally developed ability tests.¹⁴ Labor unions, meanwhile, were successful in prohibiting any requirement that employers or unions make changes to existing seniority systems so long as such systems did not presently discriminate (Congressional Record 1964, 7206–17).¹⁵ Even if a seniority system harmed black workers, Title VII could not address it unless there was a finding of specific *intent* to harm (EEOC 1964, 3006). This led unions to ignore EEOC requests at reconciliation and rely on seniority systems to maintain either all-white work forces or workforces segregated by job description (EEOC 1967b). By 1967, the seniority loophole in Title VII became a central concern among EEOC officials focused on union discrimination (EEOC 1967c). By 1969, civil rights groups were actively targeting discriminatory building trades with pickets, protests, and lawsuits (Gould 1977; Stetson 1969; Sugrue 2003).

The executive branch made further efforts to promote union civil rights. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 mandating that all federal contractors take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities, advertise their commitment to nondiscrimination, and file detailed reports describing their own employment practices. Contractors had to meet hiring goals for each construction trade or at least show that they had made “good faith” efforts; penalties for failing to comply included disqualification from future federal contracts. Since construction unions operated their own hiring halls, their discriminatory behavior—even when acting independently

from the contractor—could effectively exclude minority workers from jobs. But unions successfully fought enforcement as the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) in the Department of Labor was understaffed, was underfunded, and promoted vague plans that failed to create new jobs (Skrentny 1996, 134–38). Unions played a prominent role in the enforcement of the act and they pushed the Department of Labor (which enforced union apprenticeship programs) to “ignore most complaints filed against unions under the Equal Opportunity Act and [take] no action when its investigations revealed violations” (Quadagno 1994, 73).

President Nixon’s “Philadelphia Plan,” an affirmative action program that created specific goals and timetables for federally funded construction trades in the Philadelphia Metropolitan area, perhaps had the most potential of the government enforcement efforts. The Plan, which began in June of 1969, attempted to move black workers into six construction trades that all had abysmal minority hiring records.¹⁶ It provided a designated time period of four years for contractors to reach their goals for minority employment in all crafts. The goal was to have the percentage of qualified black workers in each covered craft equal to the percentage of black residents in the five-county area. The OFCC could cancel or suspend contracts or portions of contract and disbar unions from further federal contracts. Enforcement, however, had a slow start—by the end of 1969, a summary of the results from the OFCC declared that unions were doing “in effect, nothing!” (DOL 1969b). It did not get much better. In response to anger from contractors and unions, the Nixon Administration supported “hometown plans” negotiated by local contractors, local union representatives, and community organizations that were ineffective, as they were not binding and limited in coverage (Payton 1984; Waldinger and Bailey 1991). Labor Department officials complained in 1971 that “it has become apparent that the implementation of Executive Order 11246 is and in the foreseeable future will continue to be, materially impeded by the failure of the unions involved to grant membership and provide employment referrals to minorities” and urged “appropriate legal action” (Meany Archives 1971a). A 1974 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) found the OFCC to have “taken virtually no enforcement action” and been largely ineffectual, calling the hometown plans “a failure.”¹⁷ OFCC statistics of the plans in five major cities found that 13 of the 16 targeted craft unions had fewer minority workers in 1973 than they had in 1971, while two of the others had an increase of only five workers (USCCR 1976, 188).

¹⁴ Senator Clark interpreted the BFOQ broadly: “Examples of such legitimate discrimination would be the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that religion” (Congressional Record 1964, 7213, 7217).

¹⁵ During floor discussion, Senator Dirksen stated that “seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a ‘last hired, first fired’ agreement a Negro happens to be the ‘last hired,’ he can still be ‘first fired. . .’ the bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change existing seniority lists” (EEOC 1964, 3013). Senator Kenneth Keating, in response to charges that Title VII would interfere with seniority rights of union members, said, “Title VII does not grant this authority to the Federal Government. . . . A particularly vicious implication . . . leads white workers to believe that they will be fired in order to make jobs for Negroes. An employer or labor organization must first be found to have practiced discrimination before a court can issue an order to prohibit further acts of discrimination in the first instance” (EEOC 1964, 3246). A summary statement by the Department of Justice stated, “Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even where, owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes.” This was then reiterated by Senator Clark on the floor (Congressional Record 1964, 7207). The AFL-CIO clearly believed the law would not interfere with seniority rights, commenting on the Senate debate that Title VII “will take nothing away from the American worker which he has already acquired” (Meany Archives 1964).

¹⁶ The ironworkers had 12 African Americans out of 850 workers; the steamfitters, 13 out of 2308 workers; the sheet metal workers, 17 out of 1688; the electricians, 40 out of 2274; the elevator construction workers, 3 out of 562; and the plumbers and pipefitters, 12 out of 2335 (DOL 1969a).

¹⁷ “Altogether, 335 of the 478 participating trades fell short of their promised objectives. OFCC audits found that a total of 3,102 minorities had been placed in construction work in the 39 cities” (USCCR 1974, 375–76, 385).

Although most construction unions refused to cooperate, the OFCC rarely applied sanctions and did so only symbolically (USCCR 1976, 168–69). After rising public and congressional opposition to these plans, as well as Nixon's efforts to make alliances with southern whites and conservative union members, government spending on civil rights declined and enforcement of Title VII policy waxed and waned over these years, leading to public criticism and resignations from key government enforcers and leading civil rights groups to turn aggressively to federal courts (Skrentny 1996, 215–16; Walton 1988, 78–85).

COURT ENFORCEMENT: REWRITING STATUTES AND IMPOSING FINANCIAL COSTS

Although elected officials largely failed in their ability to address union discrimination through legislation and regulatory agencies, they provided civil rights groups with a number of opportunities to press claims through the federal courts. First, as mentioned above, since the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not provide the EEOC with cease and desist powers and since the agency was understaffed and underfunded, it left federal courts with enforcement power. Some accounts of the EEOC have argued that despite its lack of enforcement power, the agency used hearings, creative rule making, participation as *amicus curiae* on lawsuits, and (after 1972 reforms that allowed the agency to sue in federal court) participation as a litigant to make itself influential (Lieberman 2002; Skrentny 1996). Alfred Blumrosen (1971, 43–44), an advisor with the agency in the 1960s, argued that its lack of enforcement power ironically went hand-in-hand with its political success as the increasing *threat* of litigation gave the agency more authority: Although the EEOC “has no power . . . its success rate in conciliations is substantial and meaningful. . . . The answer is that because it lacks power, conciliation can consist of ‘helping’ the respondent company or union avoid an uncertain but certainly unpleasant prospect of litigation conducted by private persons whom the government does not control” (also see Hill 1977, 28). But while the agency did participate in some notable high-profile cases such as the litigation against ATT and the steel industry, private lawyers were doing the overwhelming share of the work. Between 1972 and 1989, the EEOC brought less than four percent of the employment discrimination cases to federal courts (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, 1000). During this same period, private class action suits rose sharply, peaking in 1975 at more than 1,100 federal cases on Title VII charges (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, 1019). Indeed, one of the advantages of the class action suit, besides expediency, was that “class actions allowed class members who had filed no charges with the EEOC to circumvent this requirement” (Belton 1978, 932).

Even when the EEOC participated in the lawsuits, it was often unclear whose agenda was being followed. Civil rights lawyers quickly seized on the overwhelmed

agency that received nearly 9,000 complaints in its first year. Lawyers were not simply helping the agency become more efficient, they were attempting to speed through procedural hurdles so that they could pursue their own agenda in federal courts. Judith Stein (1998, 102) writes that the NAACP's legal director Jack Greenberg told the EEOC “that his lawyers could do [their] investigatory work. Greenberg was less concerned with improving agency fact-finding and conciliation than with getting cases to court. He required only a pro forma run through the process . . . then he could sue.” At the same time, these lawyers were pursuing an agenda with Congress that often opposed legislative efforts to strengthen EEOC power. While almost yearly efforts to reform the EEOC by giving it cease and desist powers both failed and were opposed by key legal organizations, lawyers were consistently able to get Congress to strengthen the courts' role in promoting civil rights reforms. For example, the 1964 Act provided attorneys' fees to victorious litigants, making it easier for poorer clients to sue and making it more worthwhile for lawyers to take Title VII cases. The 1972 reforms provided the EEOC with the power to represent discriminated employees in court but did not provide the cease and desist powers advocated by civil rights groups and labor unions, the latter who were supporting a stronger EEOC in exchange for an end to Title VII's private right to sue (Hill 1977, 34–38; Meany Archives 1971b).¹⁸ Not only were cease and desist powers opposed by the Nixon administration as well as southern and conservative members of Congress (Graham 1990, 433–43)—they preferred court enforcement of civil rights claims, in part because they felt that southern federal courts would provide stricter definitions of the law than the EEOC (Bureau of National Affairs 1973, 354–68)—but also they were opposed by civil rights lawyers, who were emphatic about maintaining the private law suit and opposed cease and desist powers as an alternative (Meany Archives 1968).¹⁹ Legal organizations and bar associations widely lobbied Congress to protect the private right to sue, as well as to defeat a bill that would have limited class action suits in discrimination cases, and the support of civil rights lawyers made it easier for opponents of the EEOC to legitimate to civil rights supporters.

¹⁸ The AFL-CIO's support of agency power was also contingent on its proposal to move the OFCC into the EEOC (Graham 1990, 431–33).

¹⁹ Henry Schwarzschild, executive director of the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, for instance, wrote at the time that the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights should not accept any proposal that would “deprive private parties of [the rights] to seek redress in the Federal Courts for employment discrimination under Title VII. . . . [G]iving the EEOC more enforcement power [is not] a substitute.” Schwarzschild called the AFL-CIO's opposition to private litigation of Title VII “a scandal and another sign that the labor movement's role in our present history is profoundly harmful.” Clarence Mitchell, the Director of the NAACP's Washington Bureau, responded to Schwarzschild's letter: “It is so insulting to those of us who have been working for legislative progress with the invaluable help of organized labor that I do not consider it worthy of a substantive answer” (Meany Archives 1968).

Meanwhile, judges and lawyers continued to successfully promote (with tacit approval but little discussion from Congress) changes to federal procedure rules expanding opportunities for civil rights litigants as well as the capacity for court enforcement. Two rule changes were particularly notable, as was the changing use by the courts of a third rule. First, revisions to discovery rules in 1970 took away the need for civil rights plaintiffs to have "good cause" in order to obtain employment documents and authorized financial sanctions against defendants who resisted. Second, Rule 23 was officially amended in 1966 (with almost no congressional attention), which made it far easier for lawyers to represent a large class of individuals in a single case. As mentioned above, the rule change helped lead to an explosion in class action litigation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, rising from only a few dozen in 1965 to more than a thousand a decade later (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, 1019). The class action provided the prototypical example of where giving private lawyers a financial incentive enabled them to perform a public good—only through representing a large class of litigants can the lawsuit become financially worthwhile for the individual lawyer. The changes to Rule 23 also provided one of the very few examples where civil rights issues appeared to play at least some role in the thinking of the Judiciary Council. The Council's advisory notes explaining the reform specified a notable civil rights case of the early 1960s to illustrate the usefulness of class actions (Bell 1976, 506). Regardless of intent, the rule was used dramatically by the NAACP and other civil rights groups to make claims against employers and unions. During this time, its use was consistently interpreted expansively by courts, even when in it appeared to be in direct conflict with specific provisions of Title VII.²⁰

Third, courts began to interpret Rule 53, which provided for special masters, in a far more expansive manner leading these court-appointed administrators to play a variety of critical roles, particularly as enforcers of consent agreements between unions and civil rights groups. During this period, consent agreements became one of the primary ways that unions avoided long-term litigation. By entering into an agreement, usually in the face of severe threats of litigation and brokered by some combination of courts and government administrative agencies, unions found themselves presented with specific timetables, racial quotas, and provisions for penalties and found that their hiring decisions would be directly supervised and authorized by the special master. The special master enabled courts to respond quickly to union resistance to these agreements by making quick assessments of compliance efforts and invoking often sizeable financial fines against resistant unions. By relying on and directly supervising special masters, as Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin (1998) found with regard to prison reform, judges were given

the capacity to replace the EEOC and DOL as the agency overseeing enforcement. In so doing, they interpreted and enforced the law in a manner that often went far beyond legislative intent, particularly with the use of racial quotas and affirmative action.

Congress was not simply a passive participant in the expansion of legal opportunities. To enable judges to better handle their increased responsibilities, elected officials authorized a significant increase in federal judgeships, increasing the size of the court of appeals bench by 43% during the 1960s and another 35% during the 1970s (Harrington and Ward 1995, 210). In addition, they passed the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, which gave federal judges the power to appoint these government officials whenever it was deemed appropriate to help them with caseload. Designed to relieve the litigation burden of judges, the Act greatly increased the power and scope of the judiciary by allowing them to delegate a substantial portion of their work and responsibilities (Silberman 1989). Congress also continued to provide particularized benefits—with much prodding by lawyers and judges and little resistance—that significantly broadened the standards of who could claim "standing" to litigate (Orren 1976) and how lawyers could be paid for their litigation efforts through attorney fee provisions (Melnick 1994, 27–28). This was perhaps most dramatic in 1976, when Congress extended attorney fee awards to other civil rights statutes under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976. Drafters of the 1976 Act recognized what they were doing: "The effective enforcement of federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the U.S. government have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality" (House of Representatives, No 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Session 1976, 1). Senator Hugh Scott stated during floor debates at the time that "Congress should encourage citizens to go to court in private suits to vindicate its policies and protect their rights. To do so, Congress must insure that they have the means to go to court and to be effective once they get there" (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act 1976, 19). The Act also had the benefit, as one opponent in the Senate described it, as going "down in history as . . . [a] bonanza to the legal profession. . . . I am wondering if the person advocating this legislation is interested in civil rights or if he is interested in attorney's fees" (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act 1976, 24).

Judicial Use of Statutory Interpretation

As elected officials provided amorphous and broad institutional powers to courts, judges were actively creating and enforcing claims that far exceeded the initial legislative intent of Congress and kept constant pressure on unions to integrate in ways unforeseen by legislative actors. Most importantly, courts significantly rewrote the law on Title VII, getting rid of the carefully

²⁰ Title VII excludes the authority of a nongovernmental group to sue on behalf of a protected worker. Federal courts navigated around this by expanding class action opportunities as long as groups like the NAACP could find one plaintiff. See *Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir., 1968).

placed loopholes that unions and other civil rights opponents demanded in order to pass the Act and turning it from one that emphasized color-blindness to one that emphasized affirmative action (Skrentny 1996). Courts have always used their power of statutory interpretation to create new rights, laws, and political opportunities in situations where elected officials have either refused to legislate or have purposely created legislation that is hollow and unenforceable (e.g., Eskridge 1994; Melnick 1994; Shapiro 1964). This is in part why the changes to federal rules that made it easier for civil rights proponents to get into courts were so important. Once in court, effective civil rights lawyers could convince judges to follow their interpretations of key civil rights statutes. And federal judges were particularly dramatic with regards to their interpretations of Title VII. For instance, just a few years after the Act's passage, a federal district court held in *Quarles v. Philip Morris*, 279 F.Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. VA, 1968), that plant seniority is discriminatory where it adversely impacts black workers. The court argued that although the legislative history reflected congressional desire to protect "bona fide" seniority systems, "obviously, one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be a lack of discrimination" (1968, 517). While the legislative history did not intend for affirmative action programs that would require blacks to be preferred over more senior whites, the court argued that it was "also apparent that Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act" (1968, 516). The 3rd Circuit, in *Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor*, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d. Cir., 1971), defended affirmative action with a similarly expansive reading: "To read §703(a) in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs we would have to attribute to Congress the intention to freeze the status quo and to foreclose remedial action under authority designed to overcome existing evils. We discern no such intention either from the language of the statute or its legislative history."


The Supreme Court was also active in reinterpreting the law. In *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court went strongly against legislative history, striking down employer and union tests that had a disparate impact on the hiring of minority workers (many unions, for example, instituted new standards for employment such as diplomas and written exams) and expanded Title VII by including historical experience as a way of determining racial discrimination. A few years after *Griggs*, the Court gave further bite to antidiscrimination efforts against unions by holding that Title VII was independent from the NLRA and that employees claiming discrimination could pursue a grievance through both laws at the same time, effectively expanding plaintiff opportunities (*Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36 [1974]). In *Franks v. Bowman Transportation*, 424 U.S. 747 (1975), the Court responded to a class action law suit by holding that discriminated union members could receive seniority credit based on the time of their initial application. The Court held that a union was liable in situations even when it shared blame with the employer (*Bowen*

v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 [1983]) and expanded legal standing to potential plaintiffs who had not formally applied for jobs, thus allowing litigants to challenge seniority positions (*International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S.*, 431 U.S. 324 [1977]). In *United Steelworkers of America v. Weber*, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court may have taken its most extensive liberties interpreting Title VII. The case involved an affirmative action plan at Kaiser Aluminum where the company and the steelworkers union agreed to a training program for unskilled production workers that would set aside 50% of the spaces for African Americans. At the time, blacks constituted less than 2% of the workforce at the company, despite representing nearly 40% of the area workforce (1979, 198–99). Weber, a white production worker, complained that he was not chosen for a position despite having greater seniority than the African Americans chosen. In the majority decision, Justice Brennan held that Title VII allowed for affirmative action in training programs that could effectively trump existing seniority systems. In so holding, Brennan took ample liberty with the legislative statute, emphasizing the "spirit" of Title VII by relying on liberal Senate speeches during the Title VII debates and ignoring many of the concessions the legislation made to labor, Republicans, and southern Democrats.²¹

Mammoth Court Case Loads and Financial Coercion

Federal court receptiveness to civil rights litigation and its re-writing of Title VII law helped fuel a mammoth case load of litigation by individual plaintiffs and civil rights lawyers representing class actions. In 1970, there were 350 federal court cases involving Title VII litigation; by 1975, this number had reached roughly 1,500; and by 1983, the number had reached 9,000 cases (Donohue and Siegelman, 985–86). Figure 1 charts the number of Title VII cases specifically involving labor union discrimination that resulted in decisions by federal judges. Note that in focusing on federal court *decisions*, these numbers represent only a small portion of the overall cases filed, as this larger number includes cases dismissed during litigation or settled out of court. To give a sense of the number of cases being filed, AFL-CIO records indicate that unions were investigated in 658 cases by the EEOC as of June 30, 1967 (Meany Archives 1967), and nearly double these charges were brought to the agency in 1971; more than 1,600 charges

²¹ Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the legislative history of the Act clearly showed that seniority rights trumped affirmative action programs. Rehnquist quoted the Senate managers of Title VII, who claimed during the legislative battles that "Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. . . . [I]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged—or indeed permitted—to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier" (1979, 240; emphasis in original).

FIGURE 1. Union Discrimination Cases Decided by Federal Courts, 1960–85

were filed in 1973 (Meany Archives 1971c; USCCR 1974, 510), and in 1978 the EEOC had 2,617 union discrimination cases still open (Meany Archives 1978). The increase in the number of decided cases against unions during these years is also dramatic. The number of cases doubles between 1970 and 1971, does so again in 1973 and once again in 1975, and rises another 20% in 1977 and again in 1980. Between 1964 and 1985, the AFL-CIO was involved in 296 reported federal court decisions involving union discrimination; the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) was involved in 44 and the Teamsters in 51 discrimination cases alone.

The number of cases created huge litigation costs for unions. These costs rose further when unions resisted, as judges and special masters frequently ordered them to pay significant fees in damages—whether through orders to provide backpay or through financial sanctions for not following quota-based consent decrees. Racial minorities and women won significant financial awards against discriminatory unions, and even when damages were not awarded, unions recognized the potential of losses and often settled with potential litigants by entering into long-term consent agreements that set targeted goals to be overseen by special masters. These consent agreements, often involving the union paying out millions of dollars in the initial settlement, led to dramatic changes in union behavior and, as evidenced below, real changes in the number of racial minorities in union ranks (Marshall et al. 1978; Minchin 2001; Schwarzschild 1984; Stein 1998). Certainly judges believed that they could achieve change through financial pressure. The Eighth Circuit, for instance, wrote in an order for damages and back pay to enforce a chemical workers union to follow integration orders: “Backpay awards act as a deterrent . . . they provide the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate the last vestiges of racism” (*U.S. v. NC Industries and Chemical Workers Basic Union*, 479 F.2d 354 [8th Cir., 1972]). Three years later, the Supreme Court ruled that back pay awards could not be denied in discrimination cases: “It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that ‘provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employ-

ers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices” (*Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody*, 422 US 405 [1975]).

The use of damages to enforce court decisions against unions occurred consistently during the 1970s, to the extent that many unions were severely weakened by the costs to their treasuries. AFL-CIO budgets show that its litigation costs doubled between 1966 and 1973, and doubled again between 1973 and 1979, before further quadrupling between 1979 and 1983 (Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, 1966–85; Labor Organization Reports, 1966–85).²² Similar costs occurred with other national unions; the IBEW’s legal fees quadrupled between 1965 and 1975 and then doubled again by 1980; the Papermakers and Paperworkers Union tripled between 1975 and 1980; and the Sheet Metal Workers union rose six times over the course of the 1970s (Labor Organization Reports, 1966–85).

Union leaders responded to the increasing costs of litigation—as financial institutions with often tight budgets, they had little choice but to follow court orders or face severe economic costs. By the late 1960s, as mentioned above, the AFL-CIO was lobbying Congress to shield it from Title VII lawsuits and was willing to increase the power of the EEOC as a compromise. In the 1970s, a period “where the unions were getting sued out of their socks,” the AFL-CIO civil rights division repeatedly told its local members that “it was better to conciliate than litigate,” because of the number of cases, the unfavorable response to unions from court decisions, and the economic “hardship” that both locals and the national were enduring (Meany Archives 1971c, 1972; quote from McCann 1995, 190). Court activity, the division argued, had led to large backpay and attorney costs, and it repeatedly told locals that were considering fighting court battles that “the local would have to pay the bill” (Meany Archives 1972). Facing “massive amounts of back pay,” the steelworkers signed a nation-wide consent decree to avoid the “unworkable and inconsistent rules written by judges” that “threatened bankruptcy of many local unions and severe crippling of the International” (Steelworkers Civil Rights Decree 1974, 1). A report of the International Executive Board of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers in 1972 showed a picture of the union’s attorney with his head in his hands next to a report that detailed how “[e]qual employment opportunity problems have continued to multiply. . . . The most disturbing feature of the recent batch of Title VII cases against the International Union is that all of them demand substantial back pay. . . . [M]oney judgments against the Union could be paralyzing” (Minchin 2001, 69). A leading attorney for the same union reported that the cost of Title VII litigation threatened “the future solvency and possible continued

²² This increase was not isolated to labor lawyers. Robert Kagan (1995, 106) found that “national expenditures on lawyers exploded” during this time, “growing sixfold [in constant dollars] between 1960 and 1987 and more than doubling the share of gross national product [GNP] devoted to legal services.”

existence of the union," leading the president of the union to write to his members: "We are forced by the developments in the field of civil rights to make substantial and radical changes in our seniority, progression lines, promotion, and lay-off practices. . . . We must face the fact that unless we do what the law requires we will be bled to death financially" (69-70).

Some unions were ultimately "bled to death." Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers in New York was sued almost yearly during the 1970s and 80s. The constant litigation including involvement by the Supreme Court (*Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC*, 478 U.S. 421 [1986]), use of a special master, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines when the union failed to meet court-ordered quotas of 29% racial minorities, led the union to reach 10% minority membership in 1982 (it had 0% in 1970). By the end of the decade, while the union reached 20% minority membership, it had gone bankrupt from a demand to pay more than \$12 million in wages when it had assets of only \$2.5 million and was back in court attempting to force another union to take on its debts. At least some courts, meanwhile, appeared to be sensitive to this financial crisis. While many simply saw their role in using financial damages as a means of costing "the union enough money to provide an incentive to meet [its] goals," (*EEOC v. Local 638*, 921 F.Supp. 1126 [1996, S.D. NY]), others feared union bankruptcy from Title VII litigation and made efforts to avoid it. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in a fair representation breach by the IBEW that punitive damage awards not only would deplete union treasuries, but also would impair "the effectiveness of unions as collective bargaining agents. Inflicting this risk on employees, whose welfare depends on the strength of their union, is simply too great a price for whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have" (*IBEW v. Foust*, 442 US 42, 49-51 [1979]).

While litigation was hurting unions financially, it was having an impact on their racial demographics. The local examples are numerous. The Teamsters Union responded to a class-action suit in 1972 by integrating previously segregated unions in Boston, Buffalo, and Washington, DC (*U.S. v. Time*, 1992 US District Lexis 11509 [1972]). By 1975, the minority membership of these locals had increased from roughly 0% to 13%. In Seattle, law suits were filed against four construction unions—the ironworkers, who had one black member out of 920 workers; the sheet metal workers, who had one black member out of 900; the electricians, who had 1 out of 1,715 workers; and the plumbers and pipefitters, with one black worker out of 1,900 (USCCR 1976, 213). A federal district court ordered the unions to participate in an affirmative action and apprenticeship program, supervised by a labor advisory committee. After unions were halting in their response and after further civil rights groups' protests, the federal judge became more aggressive; he issued a series of specific supplemental orders, rewrote the unions' collective bargaining agreements, and appointed a special master to be involved on a daily basis in overseeing implementation efforts. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found the impact of these cases "sub-

TABLE 1. Percentage Minority Membership in Unions, 1968-83^a

Union	1968	1972	1978	1983
Asbestos workers	0.1	2.9	7.2	10.1
Boilermakers	7.6	9.6	17.6	15.9
Bricklayers	12.5	12.7	14.5	15.3
Carpenters	4.9	9.7	12.9	12.6
Electrical workers	5.1	6.6	10.1	10.5
Elevator constructors	2.5	5.1	6.3	7.8
Hotel and restaurant	23.4	31.5 ^b	44.7	51.5
Ironworkers	5.3	6.5	11.6	12.1
Plumbers/pipefitters	2.1	3.6	8.0	8.0
Painters	12.0	13.9	17.7	19.3
Plasterers	25.4	31.4	36.2	37.1
Operating engineers	4.3	5.1	12.0	11.8
Sheetmetal workers	2.6	6.4	8.2	11.0
Stage and motion picture	4.3	8.9 ^b	9.7	11.3
Teamsters	16.0	N/A	26.3	26.5

Source: Office of Research, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "EEO-3 Reports."

^a"Minority" includes blacks and "Spanish Surnamed" only; Asian Americans and Native Americans are inconsistently listed in the EEOC data reports and thus are left out to provide consistency.

^b1972 data unavailable; 1974 data used.

stantial," although only the electricians union met the goals required by the court order—the other unions met roughly 50-70% of their goals within three years of the order (USCCR 1976, 218-19). A study of Seattle building trade unions found the four unions supervised by court order to integrate at a far faster rate than those unions not covered by the order (Marshall et al. 1978, 51). By 1980, census data reflect even further change in at least three industries (data on ironworkers are unavailable), as electricians reached 9% minority workers in Seattle, plumbers and pipefitters reached 9.3%, and sheet metal workers reached 8.2% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1981). Lawsuits directed against Washington, DC unions achieved a similar impact. All seven craft unions targeted by class-action law suits showed significant improvement between the early 1970s and 1980; census data (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1981) reflect dramatic increases among sheet metal workers (from 8.5% to 21.8% minority), electricians from (11.9% to 25.8%), and machinists (16.9% to 29.8%). A settled lawsuit against the bricklayers union in Washington, DC, had a similarly significant impact by integrating a white-only union that had provided work preference to its workers over an all-black local that comprised nearly 40% of industry workers (Payton 1984).

Table 1 provides a sense of the national progress in unions, according to available reports from the EEOC. The reports are the most comprehensive data available on union membership during this time and the numbers correspond with available "Employment and Earning" statistics from the Bureau of Labor (1983).²³ While they exclude some large unions, they nonetheless

²³ Unfortunately, the Bureau of Labor's statistics are sporadic and broken down only by occupation, not by union membership. In 1983, Bureau of Labor statistics placed the percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the construction trades at 13.2% (compared to the EEO-3 number of 12.6%), the number of electricians at 11.8% (compared

provide strong evidence that both building and non-building trades significantly increased the percentages of nonwhite workers in their ranks between 1968 and 1983, particularly between 1972 and 1978.²⁴ After a slow start—the EEOC reported that the percentage of black workers in construction unions went down between 1968 and 1969 (EEOC 1970)—the changes were dramatic. Boilermakers, electrical workers, and iron workers doubled; carpenters, elevator constructors, stage and motion picture workers, and operating engineers roughly tripled; plumbers and pipefitters quadrupled; sheet metal workers increased almost five times; and asbestos workers increased from 0.1% in 1968 to 10.1% in 1983.

CONCLUSION

The history of union integration demonstrates the significance of judicial power on a matter of national importance. Judges interpreted statutes in ways that denied unions the benefit of well-crafted loopholes. Judges and lawyers helped devise and then aggressively implemented new courtroom procedures that made it easier for civil rights plaintiffs to access the courtroom and achieve success once they were there. Civil rights lawyers besieged unions with lawsuits and judges compelled compliance with the use of special masters and by ordering unions to pay significant financial fees for back pay, attorneys' fees, and damage fees. Far from a "hollow hope" (as Rosenberg [1991] labels them), courts acted independently and forcefully.

Arguments about institutional independence are inherently fraught with difficulties in a political system filled with clearly interdependent actors and this case study makes clear that courts did not act in a vacuum—not only were elected officials, both national and local, influential, but both leaders and activists of civil rights groups and labor unions were critical to the final outcome. I argue simply that judicial independence is a meaningful concept within the context of institutionally shared powers and historical circumstances. In so arguing, I hope to offer not only a more nuanced understanding of court power, but a similar understanding of the power of elected officials as well. The enormous institutional power that elected officials have to make social policy cannot be separated from the incentives that lead them not to do so. The Constitution may provide elected officials with institutional weapons that it denies to courts, but with these weapons come significant institutional constraints on the ability of elected officials to be active policy makers, particularly on matters of civil rights (Frymer 1999). No political branch,

then, is either "hollow" or perfect, as each provides activists different opportunities and constraints that vary with historical and political context.

I conclude with three broader consequences and implications. First, the institutional power of courts described in this article is *both* historically situated and, in important ways, constant over time. Courts gained power when elected officials were unable to respond on their own and looked to defer and displace political conflict onto the courts. In this regard, my work agrees with Mark Graber's (1993, 36) argument that courts are historically most powerful when "the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public dispute." In addition, courts gained influence at a time when lawyers and judges were greatly expanding their own professional opportunities. Congress aided, but only tacitly, this expansion of the legal community. The specific historic nature of these reforms meant that they could later be taken away. By the mid-1970s, Congress started to pay closer attention to the politics of legal rule making. In 1973, Congress rejected rule changes for the first time and has since remained far more active in this process (Bone 1999). Congress has also scaled back professional opportunities for lawyers, restricting class action and attorney fee opportunities. The Supreme Court has also changed and now reviews legal and procedural matters differently. Many of the Court's key decisions that put pressure on unions, from *Griggs* to *Weber*, have since been either overturned, severely narrowed, or reinforced only by statute. At the same time, as American political development scholars have argued with regard to other institutions, certain historical developments that increase an institution's power are not so easily displaced even in times when electoral officials favor such changes (e.g., North 1990; Skowronek 1993). Moreover, there are features of U.S. legal systems and courts, such as their reliance on common law and the multitude of judges and forums that are provided to civil rights litigants, which enable courts always to provide a certain degree of malleability and dynamism that can give rise to political activism even in moments of historical retrenchment (McCann 1994).

Second, the historical-institutional analysis of court power provided here offers insights to broader questions about the unique development of the American state during the twentieth century and, particularly, the importance that both race and law played in this development. American political development scholars have frequently argued that race has been a central limit to the expansion and success of the New Deal welfare state (e.g., Katznelson et al. 1993; Lieberman 1998; Quadagno 1994). Into the vacuum of New Deal civil rights enforcement stepped courts and lawyers, making themselves a major component of the state building enterprise. An account of courts as pivotal actors in the New Deal and post-New Deal state is at odds with political development scholars who link the New Deal's importance to state building with the *defeat* of court activism (e.g., Forbath 1991; Orren 1991). The mid-1930s may have been a moment when elected officials took control of national labor policy away from the courts, but the fragmented nature of the New Deal

to 10.5% for EEO-3), the number of plumbers and pipefitters at 7.9% (compared to 8.0%), and the number of sheet metal workers at 9.0% (compared to 11.0%).

²⁴ This is not to contend that these numbers are the only measure of racial progress. Statistical improvements do not account for discrimination against minority workers on the job, nor do they mean that there is not discrimination in the types of jobs that workers on the basis of their race tend to get (see Crain and Matheny 1999; Edelman 1990; Mahoney 2000).

coalition and its failure to incorporate black Americans into labor policy meant that courts would remain the primary vehicle for civil rights reforms. This in turn would help undermine the New Deal state, as the split between labor and civil rights groups has had dramatic implications for national politics (Frymer and Skrentny 1998; Goldfield 1997; Klare 1981; Sugrue 1996). By the early 1980s, the percentage of minorities in unions had increased dramatically, but because the overall union population was declining precipitously during these years, the actual number of minorities in many integrated unions actually declined (Stein 1998). Had race not been left out of the initial building of labor regulatory agencies—had the NLRB or DOL, for example, been an available alternative for handling civil rights matters—the government might have been able to respond in a manner that did not further weaken labor and the New Deal coalition in the process. Considering union importance for the passage of civil rights laws, the fact that unions represent far more minority workers than any other interest group, and the very concrete benefit of union membership for minority workers' salaries,²⁵ union decline during this time is far from inconsequential.

This leads to a final point. As much as the history of labor union integration reflects court power, it also supports arguments from law and society scholars as to the problematic role of courts in the policy realm—that they are often inefficient and unnecessarily combative (Kagan 1995), that they provide opportunities to those who are well-organized compared to disadvantaged litigants (Gallanter 1974), and that their decisions place a particular emphasis on individualism and “rights” that ignore political and economic deliberation and more complicated social realities (Glendon 1991; Scheingold 1974). In fact, the claim that courts ignored a more complicated economic reality regarding union discrimination, resulting in further (and unintended) consequences for the labor movement, has become a popular refrain among labor scholars (e.g., Lichtenstein 2002; Stein 1998). It also became an occasional concern of the Supreme Court, most notably in a series of decisions authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall (e.g., *Foust: Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization*, 420 U.S. 50 [1975]). The single-mindedness with which many judges and lawyers focused on integrating unions led them to ignore less adversarial ways in which the process might have been resolved. As a result, when racial minorities were provided access to unions, they often found them gravely weakened by financial problems and social discord, leaving unions less power to negotiate collective bargaining agreements. One of the ironies of this story, *pace* those who claim that courts are a “hollow hope,” is that courts were arguably *too* powerful in promoting civil rights in labor unions.

Court influence, then, was the product of a much larger political-institutional conflict—an historically specific conflict that particularly involved the national Democratic Party, the evolving regulatory state, and entrenched anti-civil rights interests both in the South and in the national labor movement. It is out of this broad historical and institutional context, and out of the fact that the development of the American regulatory state failed to incorporate racial minorities until very late in its process, that courts came to have tremendous significance. The successful activism of judges and lawyers took place as the federal government was trying to resolve new social policy matters within a web of fragmented and uneven patterns of state building. It was also quite arguably the only possible alternative for civil rights groups, even if its impact was problematic and led to many unintended outcomes. The end result, then, was not ideal for anyone involved and key actors continue to this day to respond to its consequences.

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
²⁵ According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002), in 2001 African American and “Hispanic” union members (aged 16 and over), respectively, made on average \$140 and \$180 more per week than non-union members.

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


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


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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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


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
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
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

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


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


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


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




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Table of Contents

American Political Science: The Discipline's State and the State of the Discipline

Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner

Section 1: The State in an Era of Globalization

Margaret Levi

Miles Kahler

Atul Kohli

Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa Martin

James Alt

James Morrow

Stephen Walt

Section 2: Democracy, Justice, and Their Institutions

Ian Shapiro

Jeremy Waldron

Romand Coles

Gerald Gamm and John Huber

Barbara Geddes

Kathleen Thelen

Section 3: Citizenship, Identity, and Political Participation

Seyla Benhabib

Kay Schlozman

Nancy Burns

Michael Dawson and Cathy Cohen

Morris Fiorina

Amy Gutmann

Randall Calvert

Thomas Risse

Section 4: Studying Politics

David Laitin

Barry Weingast

Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol

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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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